[Analytical Perspectives]
[Crosscutting Programs]
[7. Credit and Insurance]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov]


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                         7. CREDIT AND INSURANCE

  Federal credit programs offer direct loans and loan guarantees for a 
wide range of activities, primarily housing, education, business and 
community development, and exports. At the end of 2003, there were $249 
billion in Federal direct loans outstanding and $1,184 billion in loan 
guarantees. Through its insurance programs, the Federal Government 
insures bank, thrift, and credit union deposits, guarantees private 
defined-benefit pensions, and insures against other risks such as 
natural disasters, all up to certain limits.
  The Federal Government also enhances credit availability for targeted 
sectors indirectly through Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs)--
privately owned companies and cooperatives that operate under Federal 
charters. GSEs increase liquidity by guaranteeing and securitizing 
loans, as well as by providing direct loans. In return for serving 
social purposes, GSEs enjoy many privileges, which differ across GSEs. 
In general, GSEs can borrow from Treasury in amounts ranging up to $4 
billion at Treasury's discretion, GSEs' corporate earnings are exempt 
from state and local income taxation, GSE securities are exempt from SEC 
registration, and banks and thrifts are allowed to hold GSE securities 
in unlimited amounts and use them to collateralize public deposits. 
These privileges leave many people with the impression that their 
securities are risk-free. GSEs, however, are not part of the Federal 
Government, and their securities are not federally guaranteed. By law, 
GSE securities carry a disclaimer of any U.S. obligation.
  This chapter discusses the roles and risks of these diverse programs 
and entities in the context of evolving financial markets and assesses 
their effectiveness and efficiency.
     The first section analyzes the roles of Federal credit and 
          insurance programs. Federal programs play useful roles when 
          market imperfections prevent the private market from 
          efficiently providing credit and insurance. Financial 
          evolution has partly corrected many imperfections and 
          generally weakened the justification for Federal intervention. 
          The roles of Federal programs, however, may still be critical 
          in some areas.
     The second section examines how credit and insurance 
          programs fared with the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) 
          and discusses special features of credit programs that may 
          need to be considered in interpreting and refining this tool.
     The third section reviews Federal credit programs and GSEs 
          in four sectors: housing, education, business and community 
          development, and exports. This section discusses program 
          objectives, recent developments, performance, and future plans 
          for each program.
     The final section describes Federal deposit insurance, 
          pension guarantees, disaster insurance, and insurance against 
          terrorism and other security-related risks in a context 
          similar to that for credit programs.

            I. FEDERAL PROGRAMS IN CHANGING FINANCIAL MARKETS

The Federal Role

  The roles of Federal credit and insurance programs can be broadly 
classified into two categories: helping disadvantaged groups and 
correcting market imperfections. Subsidized Federal credit programs 
redistribute resources from the general taxpayer to disadvantaged 
regions or segments of the population. Since disadvantaged groups can be 
assisted through other means, such as direct subsidies, the value of a 
credit or insurance program critically depends on the extent to which it 
corrects market imperfections.
  In most cases, private lending and insurance businesses efficiently 
meet societal demands by allocating resources to the most productive 
uses, and Federal intervention is unnecessary or can even be 
distortionary. However, Federal intervention may improve the market 
outcome in some situations.
  Insufficient Information. Financial intermediaries promote economic 
growth by allocating credit to the most productive uses. This critical 
function, however, may not be performed effectively when there is little 
objective information about borrowers. Some groups of borrowers, such as 
start-up businesses, start-up farmers, and students, have limited 
incomes and credit histories. Many creditworthy borrowers belonging to 
these groups may fail to obtain credit or be forced to pay excessively 
high interest. Government intervention, such as loan guarantees, can 
reduce this inefficiency by enabling these borrowers to obtain credit 
more easily and cheaply and also by providing opportunities for lenders 
to learn more about those borrowers.
  Externalities. Decisions at the individual level are not socially 
optimal when individuals do not capture the full benefit (positive 
externalities) or bear the full cost (negative externalities) of their 
activities. Examples of positive and negative externalities are 
education and pollution. The general public benefits from the high 
productivity and good citizenship of a well-educated person and suffers 
from pollution. Without Government intervention, people will engage less 
than socially opti

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mal in activities that generate positive externalities and more in 
activities that generate negative externalities. Federal programs can 
address externalities by influencing individuals' incentives.
  Limited Ability to Secure Resources. The ability of private entities 
to absorb losses is more limited than that of the Federal Government, 
which has general taxing authority. For some events potentially 
involving a very large loss concentrated in a short time period, 
therefore, Government insurance commanding more resources can be more 
credible and effective. Such events include massive bank failures and 
some natural and man-made disasters that can threaten the solvency of 
private insurers. Resource constraints can also limit the lending 
ability of private entities. Small lenders operating in a local market, 
in particular, may have limited access to capital and occasionally be 
forced to pass up good lending opportunities.
  Imperfect competition. Competition is imperfect in some markets 
because of barriers to entry, economies of scale, and foreign government 
intervention. For example, legal barriers to entry or geographic 
isolation can cause imperfect competition in some rural areas. If the 
lack of competition forces some rural residents to pay excessively high 
interest on loans, Government credit programs aiming to increase the 
availability of credit and lower the borrowing cost for those rural 
residents may improve economic efficiency.

Effects of Changing Financial Markets

  Financial markets have undergone fundamental changes that greatly 
enhanced competition and economic efficiency. The main forces behind 
these changes are financial services deregulation and technological 
advances. Deregulation, represented by the Riegle-Neal Interstate 
Banking and Branching Act of 1997 and the Financial Services 
Modernization Act of 1999, has increased competition and prompted 
consolidation by removing geographic and industry barriers. By 
increasing the availability of information and lowering transaction 
costs, technological advances have significantly contributed to 
enhancing liquidity, refining risk management tools, and spurring 
globalization. These developments have significant implications for 
Federal credit and insurance programs.
  Financial evolution has generally increased the private market's 
capacity to serve the populations traditionally targeted by Federal 
programs, and hence has weakened the role of Federal credit and 
insurance programs. The private market now has more information and 
better technology to process it, has better means to secure resources, 
and is more competitive. To improve the effectiveness of credit and 
insurance programs, therefore, the Federal Government may focus on more 
specific objectives that have been less affected by financial evolution 
and on narrower target populations that still have difficulty in 
obtaining credit from private lenders. Problems related to 
externalities, for example, are likely to persist because the price 
mechanisms that drive the private market will continue to ignore the 
value of the externality. In addition, the benefits of deregulation and 
technological advances may have been uneven across populations. The 
Federal Government also needs to pay more attention to new challenges 
introduced by financial evolution and other economic developments.
  Information about borrowers is more widely available and easier to 
process, thanks to technological advances. Lenders now have easy access 
to large databases, powerful computers, and sophisticated analytical 
models. Thus, many lenders use credit scoring models that evaluate 
creditworthiness based on various borrower characteristics derived from 
extensive credit bureau data. As a result, creditworthy borrowers are 
less likely to be turned down, while borrowers that are not creditworthy 
are less likely to be approved for credit. The Federal role of improving 
credit allocation, therefore, is generally not as strong as it once was. 
The benefit from financial evolution, however, can be uneven across 
groups and over time. Credit scoring, for example, is still difficult to 
apply to some borrowers with unique characteristics that are difficult 
to standardize. In times of economic downturn or financial instability, 
lenders can be overly cautious, turning away some creditworthy 
borrowers.
  Financial evolution has also alleviated resource constraints faced by 
private entities. Financial derivatives, such as options, swaps, and 
futures, have improved the market's ability to manage and share various 
types of risk such as price risk, interest rate risk, credit risk, and 
even catastrophe-related risk. An insurer can distribute the risk of a 
natural or man-made catastrophe among a large number of investors 
through catastrophe-related derivatives, although the extent of risk 
sharing in this way is still limited because of the small size of the 
market for those products. Securitization (pooling a certain type of 
asset and selling shares of the asset pool to investors) facilitates 
fund raising and risk management. By securitizing loans, even a lender 
with limited access to capital can make a large amount of loans, while 
limiting its exposure to credit and interest risk.
  Imperfect competition is much less likely in general. Financial 
deregulation removed legal barriers to competition. More commercial 
firms borrow directly in capital markets, bypassing financial 
intermediaries; the use of commercial paper (short-term financing 
instruments issued by corporations) has been particularly notable. 
Nonbank financial institutions, such as finance companies and venture 
capital firms, have increased their presence, providing more financing 
alternatives to small, start-up firms that formerly relied heavily on 
banks. Internet-based financial services have lowered the cost of 
financial transactions and reduced the importance of physical location. 
Due to globalization, foreign financial institutions actively compete in 
the U.S. market. All of these developments have increased competition.
  Nevertheless, concerns remain. The removal of geographic barriers 
spurred consolidation among banks.

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Consolidation can negatively affect the markets that were traditionally 
served by small banks. Large financial institutions with global 
operations may want to focus more on large customers and business lines 
that utilize economies of scale and scope more fully, leaving out small 
borrowers in remote rural areas and inner city areas. Another concern is 
that nontraditional financing sources, such as commercial paper and 
venture capital, can become unavailable when they are needed most. For 
example, commercial-paper issuance by nonfinancial companies and venture 
capital investments plunged during the last recession. The decreased 
volume of these instruments may have mostly reflected changed market 
conditions, such as decreased investment demand. A part of the reason, 
however, may have been the investors' overreaction to unfavorable market 
conditions, which could cause financing difficulties for creditworthy 
firms. Federal credit programs can play useful roles on these occasions.
  Overall, the financial market is evolving to be more efficient and 
safer. Financial evolution and other economic developments, however, are 
often accompanied by new risks. Federal agencies need to be vigilant to 
identify and, when appropriate, to manage new risks. Consolidation, for 
example, has increased bank size. Thus, the failure of even a single 
large bank can seriously drain the federal deposit insurance fund. As a 
result of deregulation, banks engage in more activities. While 
diversification across business lines may generally improve the safety 
of banks, new businesses introduce new risks. For example, one concern 
raised recently is that the motive to obtain underwriting business from 
borrowing firms may have affected lending decisions, undermining loan 
quality at some large banking organizations. Globalization also has both 
an upside and a downside. A financial institution with a worldwide 
operation may overcome difficulties in the U.S. market more easily, but 
it is more heavily exposed to economic turmoil in other countries, 
especially those that are less-developed or politically unstable. The 
large size of some GSEs is also a potential problem. Financial trouble 
of a large GSE could cause repercussions in financial markets, affecting 
federally insured entities and economic activity. Three years of stock 
market declines following the 2000 peak and the slow economic recovery 
have increased the risk and uncertainty for the pension benefit guaranty 
program by impairing the financial health of many pension funds and 
firms offering pension benefits. New and amended insurance programs for 
security-related risks also make the Federal Government's liability more 
uncertain. Security-related events such as terrorism and war are highly 
uncertain in terms of both the frequency of occurrence and the magnitude 
of potential loss.

            II. PERFORMANCE OF CREDIT AND INSURANCE PROGRAMS

  The Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) produces an assessment of 
the performance of federal programs, which is designed to be consistent 
across programs. This section analyzes the PART score for credit and 
insurance programs as a group to identify the strengths and weaknesses 
of credit and insurance programs. Also discussed are special features of 
credit programs that may need to be considered in interpreting and 
refining the common assessment of performance.

PART Scores

  The PART classifies performance into four categories (program purpose 
and design, strategic planning, program management, and program results) 
and assigns a numerical score (0 to 100 percent) to each category. For 
the final evaluation, the PART weights the four categories, placing a 
particularly heavy weight on program results.
  There are 14 credit programs and 2 insurance programs among 399 
programs that have been rated by the PART (excluding programs that were 
assessed for the 2004 Budget but are being reassessed as components of a 
different program in 2005 to avoid double-counting). Overall, the PART 
scores for credit and insurance programs are fairly similar to those for 
other programs (see Table ``Summary of PART Scores''). When 
appropriately weighted, higher scores for credit and insurance programs 
in some categories are roughly offset by lower scores in other 
categories. A detailed analysis suggests that the dispersion of scores 
across programs is also similar for the two groups of programs.

                                             SUMMARY OF PART SCORES
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  Purpose
            Programs                and     Strategic   Program    Program                  Rating
                                   Design    Planning     Mgmt     Results
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
ED Student Loan Guarantees.....         60         75         33         53  Adequate
ED Direct Studen Loans.........         60         75         33         53  Adequate
ED Perkins Loans...............         20         50         33          0  Ineffective
SBA Section 504................         60         50        100         60  Adequate
SBA Disaster Assistance........        100        100         78         73  Moderately Effective
SBA SBIC Venture Capital.......         60         88         67         60  Adequate
FSA Loan Guarantees............        100         63        100         67  Moderately Effective
RHS Community Facilities.......         80         50        100         33  Results Not Demonstrated
RUS Rural Electric Utility.....         80         17         90         25  Results Not Demonstrated
RUS Telecommunications.........         60         50        100         33  Results Not Demonstrated
RBS Business and Industry......         80         75        100         33  Adequate
Ex-Im Bank L-T Guarantees......        100         86        100         67  Moderately Effective
OPIC Insurance.................        100         75        100         42  Adequate
OPIC Finance...................        100         75        100         42  Adequate
Crop Insurance.................         80         67         86         58  Results Not Demonstrated
National Flood Insurance.......         90         86        100         67  Moderately Effective
 
Credit and Insurance Programs
Average........................         77         68         83         48  ...................................
Standard Deviation.............         22         20         26         19  ...................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
Other Programs (all programs
 excluding credit and insurance
 programs)
Average........................         85         70         79         47  ...................................
Standard Deviation.............         19         24         19         26  ...................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

  Across categories, there are some similarities, as well as 
differences, between credit and insurance programs and other types of 
programs. For most programs, the scores are relatively high for program 
purpose and design and for program management, while the scores are low 
for program results. This general pattern holds for credit and insurance 
programs. Relative to other programs, however, credit and insurance 
programs scored low in program purpose and design and high in program 
management.
  The PART indicates that most credit and insurance programs have clear 
purposes. Some credit and insurance programs, however, fail to score 
high in program design. Some are duplicative of other federal programs 
or private sources, and some have outdated designs due to failure to 
adapt to changed economic and financial environments. For example, 
Federal involvement in venture capital financing is difficult to 
justify, given that the venture capital market has matured.
  Regarding strategic planning, many credit and insurance programs 
reveal the need to improve on setting targets and time frames for their 
long-term measures, evaluating program effectiveness and improvements on 
a regular basis, and tying budgets to accomplishment of performance 
goals.
  Program management is a relatively strong area for credit and 
insurance programs. They are particularly

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strong in basic financial and accounting practices, such as spending 
funds for intended purposes. The financial complexity of credit and 
insurance programs may have forced program managers to develop better 
financial management tools. Nevertheless, some credit and insurance 
programs show weaknesses in more sophisticated financial management, 
such as cost control. Another weakness for some credit and insurance 
programs is in collecting and effectively utilizing performance 
information.
  Program results, the most important category of performance, are a 
weak area for credit and insurance programs, as well as for other 
programs assessed by the PART. While most credit and insurance programs 
had some success in achieving short-term performance and efficiency 
goals, most of them have had trouble making progress toward long-term 
goals. A more troubling indication from detailed analyses is that many 
credit and insurance programs have a low PART score for program 
effectiveness and achieving results. Based on this finding, the managers 
of credit and insurance programs need to place much more emphasis on 
results-driven management.

Common Features

  Credit programs share many features that distinguish them from other 
programs. For example, the cost is uncertain because of various risks, 
such as default risk, prepayment risk, and interest rate risk. Given 
these risks, risk management is an important aspect of credit programs. 
Most credit programs are also intended to address imperfections in 
financial markets. These common features are discussed in the context of 
the four areas of the PART. Although this section focuses on credit 
programs, much of the discussion also applies to insurance programs. For 
example, the cost is uncertain for insurance programs, too, because 
insured events occur unexpectedly. Financial market imperfections are 
also the main justification for insurance programs.
  In analyzing the PART scores of credit programs, it is important to 
understand the common features of credit programs. Understanding common 
features facilitates the comparison of efficiency across credit programs 
and helps lead to improvements in performance. For example, if the PART 
score related to a common feature, such as risk management, is 
particularly low for a credit program, managers of the program may 
significantly improve performance by emulating the practice of other 
credit programs. A uniformly low PART score for all credit programs, on 
the other hand, may indicate that credit programs are facing a unique 
difficulty. In that case, program managers may need to make collective 
efforts to identify the difficulty and to address the problem. 
Individual efforts would be less efficient.

  Program purpose and design. Program purposes widely vary across credit 
programs. They include increasing homeownership, increasing college 
graduates, promoting entrepreneurship, and promoting exports. The 
private market serves some of these distinctive purposes better now than 
it did in the past. Thus, it can be useful to compare the effects of 
changes in financial markets on the need for various credit programs.
  Credit programs share many critical elements of design. Using the 
common tool, credit, they try to correct

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imperfections in financial markets. Thus, credit programs mostly target 
those borrowers who would not be able to obtain credit in the private 
market without government assistance. In addition, the lending business 
involves many complexities, such as setting appropriate lending terms, 
screening borrowers, and monitoring borrowers. Given these complexities, 
it is important to utilize the private sector's expertise. Targeting the 
right borrowers and utilizing the private sector's expertise require 
careful program design, which needs to consider various factors, such as 
borrowers' incentives, private lenders' incentives, the state of 
financial markets, and general economic conditions. Excessively low 
lending rates, for example, might attract many borrowers who could 
obtain credit from private lenders. To be effective, partnership with 
the private sector should be designed such that the private partner's 
profit is closely tied to its performance in achieving the public 
purpose. Private lenders are generally better at screening borrowers, 
but their incentive to screen borrowers effectively evaporates if the 
Government provides a 100-percent loan guarantee. Credit programs with 
low PART scores related to these aspects of program design may draw 
useful lessons from the practices of other credit programs.
  Strategic planning. Credit programs operate in rapidly changing 
financial markets. Thus, an important aspect of strategic planning for 
credit programs is to adapt to changes in financial markets. To achieve 
the maximum efficiency, program managers need to watch closely and adapt 
their programs quickly to new developments. For example, private lenders 
are more willing to serve many customers to whom they did not want to 
lend in the past. Thus, some Federal credit programs may need to focus 
more narrowly on customers who are still underserved by private lenders. 
Quickly adopting new technologies is also important, because financial 
institutions are increasingly applying advanced technologies to risk 
management.
  Program management. Some elements of program management are more 
important for credit programs than for other programs. To address these 
areas of special interest, the PART adds two extra items for credit 
programs: risk management and estimation models. Credit programs face 
similar risks in the lending business. To minimize the risks, program 
managers must carefully manage the loan portfolio that is held either 
directly or by private lenders. Once a loan defaults, effective 
collection efforts can reduce the loss. Estimating the program cost is a 
critical feature of credit programs. The cashflow is uncertain for 
credit programs. Some loans default, while some others are prepaid. The 
program cost must be estimated based on the expected default, 
prepayment, and recovery rates. This estimation is critical for program 
evaluation. Without knowing the cost, one cannot tell if a program is 
effective.
  Some other management issues that apply to all government programs are 
particularly important for credit programs. Data collection is essential 
for effective risk management and cost estimation. Effective risk 
management requires accurate and timely information. Default and 
prepayment histories are key ingredients in cashflow estimation. In 
addition, accurate estimation requires detailed data on borrower and 
lender characteristics. Thus, managers of credit programs need to make 
extensive efforts to collect and process relevant information. To 
achieve efficiency and effectiveness, it is also important to have well 
organized procedures and to coordinate with other credit programs to 
carry out many complex functions, such as loan origination, loan 
servicing, lender monitoring, and collection of defaulted loans. 
Financial management is more challenging for credit programs because of 
the complex structure of cashflows.
  Program Results. The main difficulty in evaluating program performance 
is to measure the net outcome of the program (improvement in the 
intended outcome net of what would have occurred in the absence of the 
program). For example, although many Federal programs help college 
students, it is difficult to tell how many of those would not have 
obtained a college education without Federal assistance. For credit 
programs, this difficulty is compounded by the uncertainty of the 
program cost. In evaluating programs, the outcome must be weighed 
against the cost. For a program intended to increase the number of 
college graduates, the relevant statistic is the number of college 
graduates due to the program per dollar spent by the program, not just 
the total number of college graduates produced by the program. For 
credit programs, the validity of this evaluation critically depends on 
the accuracy of the cost estimation. An underestimation (overestimation) 
of the cost would make the program appear unduly effective 
(ineffective). Thus, results for credit programs need to be interpreted 
in conjunction with the accuracy of the cost estimate. In some cases, 
whether a program's performance has improved over the past may be more 
meaningful than whether it performs better than others.
  It is also important to evaluate credit programs in the context of 
changing financial markets. The financial sector is very dynamic, and 
the net outcome of a credit program may change quickly with the state of 
financial markets. The net outcome can decrease, as private entities 
become more willing to serve those customers whom they were reluctant to 
serve in the past, or it can increase if financial markets fail to 
function smoothly due to some temporary disturbances. A sub-par 
performance by a credit program could be related to financial market 
developments; the program might fail to adapt to rapid changes in 
financial markets, or its function might become obsolete due to 
financial evolution. The program should be restructured in the former 
case, and discontinued in the latter case.

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                       III. CREDIT IN FOUR SECTORS

Housing Credit Programs and GSEs

  The Federal Government makes direct loans, provides loan guarantees, 
and enhances liquidity in the housing market to promote homeownership 
among low- and moderate-income people and to help finance rental housing 
for low-income people. While direct loans are largely limited to low-
income borrowers, loan guarantees are offered to a much larger segment 
of the population, including moderate-income borrowers. Increased 
liquidity achieved through GSEs benefits virtually all borrowers in the 
housing market.

Federal Housing Administration

  In June 2002, the President issued America's Homeownership Challenge 
to increase first-time minority homeowners by 5.5 million through 2010. 
During the first 15 months since the goal was announced, over one 
million minority families have become homeowners, setting a pace to 
exceed this goal. HUD's Federal Housing Administration (FHA) accounted 
for over 250,000 of these first-time minority homebuyers through its 
insurance funds, mainly the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund. FHA mortgage 
insurance provides access to homeownership for people who lack the 
financial resources or credit history to qualify for a conventional home 
mortgage. In 2003, FHA insured $159 billion in mortgages for over 1.3 
million households. Most of these were people buying their first homes, 
many of whom were minorities. The dollar volume of FHA mortgages 
exceeded the 2002 volume by seven percent, driven by high housing demand 
and increased refinancings in response to lower interest rates.
  For fiscal year 2005, FHA is proposing two new mortgage programs that 
reduce the biggest barriers to homeownership--the down payment and 
impaired credit. The Zero Down mortgage allows first-time buyers with a 
strong credit record to finance 100 percent of the purchase price and 
closing costs. For borrowers with limited or weak credit histories, 
Payment Rewards initially charges a higher insurance premium, but 
reduces the borrower's premiums once they have established a history of 
regular payments, thereby demonstrating their creditworthiness.
  The Budget expands HUD's support for new homeowners by increasing 
funds for pre- and post-purchase housing counseling services through a 
network of counseling agencies. At the proposed funding level, almost 
800,000 potential and existing homeowners will receive counseling in 
2005.
  The President's Management Agenda sets out several critical tasks for 
FHA to complete to combat fraud and improve risk management. In 2005, as 
in 2004, HUD will conduct quarterly rounds of Credit Watch--a lender 
monitoring program that rates lenders and underwriters by the 
performance of their loans and allows FHA to sever relationships with 
those showing poor performance. HUD also will have in place an automated 
system to enforce its regulations prohibiting the predatory practice of 
property flipping and will refine the Appraiser Watch system established 
in 2003 in order to closely monitor appraiser performance and hold 
appraisers accountable for the quality of their work. These efforts will 
reduce the possibility of improperly originated FHA loans that victimize 
the borrower and expose FHA to excessive losses.

VA Housing Program

  The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) assists veterans, members of 
the Selected Reserve, and active duty personnel to purchase homes as 
recognition of their service to the Nation. The program substitutes the 
Federal guarantee for the borrower's down payment. In 2003, VA provided 
$66 billion in guarantees to assist 508,436 borrowers. Both the volume 
of guarantees and the number of borrowers increased substantially from 
2002 as lower interest rates increased loan originations and 
refinancings in the housing market.
  Since the main purpose of this program is to help veterans, lending 
terms are more favorable than loans without a VA guarantee. In 
particular, VA guarantees zero down payment loans. The subsidy rate 
decreased due to an improved default rate methodology that more 
appropriately recognizes the relationship between defaults and interest 
rates.
  In order to help veterans retain their homes and avoid the expense and 
damage to their credit resulting from foreclosure, VA plans aggressive 
intervention to reduce the likelihood of foreclosures when loans are 
referred to VA after missing three payments. VA was successful in 45 
percent of its 2003 interventions, and its goal is to achieve at least a 
47 percent success rate in 2005. VA is continuing its efforts to reduce 
administrative costs through restructuring and consolidations.
  In order to refocus VA's housing loan program towards its original 
intent of serving as a readjustment benefit from military to civilian 
life, the Administration will be transmitting legislation that would 
limit eligibility for veterans' housing loans to one-time use in lieu of 
the lifetime multi-use entitlement it has become. For those who are 
already veterans upon enactment of this bill, the proposal allows 
unlimited usage for the next five years, and then only once thereafter. 
The proposal would not limit use by active duty members.

Rural Housing Service

  The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) Rural Housing Service 
(RHS) offers direct and guaranteed loans and grants to help very low- to 
moderate-income rural residents buy and maintain adequate, affordable 
housing. The single family guaranteed loan program guarantees up to 90 
percent of a private loan for low to moderate-income rural residents. 
The program's emphasis is on reducing the number of rural residents 
living in substandard housing. In 2003, $3.1 billion of guarantees went 
to 31,100 households, of which 30 per

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cent went to very-low and low-income families (with income 80 percent or 
less than median area income).
  In 2002, RHS approved separate risk categories for guarantee 
refinancing (refis) and guarantees of new loans. As part of that change, 
RHS also reduced the guarantee fee to 0.5 percent for the refis. This 
change reflected the lower risk on refis as compared to an unseasoned 
borrower receiving a new loan. It is also consistent with the rate HUD 
and VA charge on their refis of similar loans. For 2005, RHS will 
increase the guarantee fee on new loans to 1.75 percent from 1.5 
percent. This will be coupled with language that would allow the 
guarantee fee to be financed as part of the loan. The ability to finance 
the guarantee fee is more in line with the housing industry, including 
HUD and VA, and will allow more lower income rural Americans to realize 
the dream of home ownership.
  In 2003, RHS continued to enhance a web-based system that will, with 
future planned improvements, provide the capacity to accept electronic 
loan originations from their participating lenders. RHS is also 
continuing development of an automated underwriting system (AUS) that 
will add significant benefits to loan processing efficiency, consistency 
and timeliness for RHS, the lenders, and customers. RHS continues to 
operate under the ``best practice'' for asset disposition for its 
guaranteed loan program. For single family guarantees, the lender is 
paid the loss claim, including costs incurred for up to three months 
after the default. After the loss claim is paid, RHS has no involvement 
in the property, and it becomes the sole responsibility of the lender 
for disposition. RHS is also developing the capacity to partner with 
lenders to seek recovery of loss claims from the former homeowner. They 
are also in the process of centralizing and automating the loss claim 
process to improve consistency and efficiency.
  RHS programs differ from other Federal housing loan guarantee 
programs. RHS programs are means-tested and more accessible to low-
income, rural residents. In addition, the RHS direct loan program offers 
deeper assistance to very-low-income homeowners by reducing the interest 
rate down to as low as 1 percent for such borrowers. The program helps 
the ``on the cusp'' borrower obtain a mortgage, and requires graduation 
to private credit as the borrower's income and equity in their home 
increases over time. The interest rate depends on the borrower's income. 
Each loan is reviewed annually to determine the interest rate that 
should be charged on the loan in that year based on the borrower's 
projected annual income. The program cost is balanced between interest 
subsidy and defaults. For 2005, RHS expects to provide $1.1 billion in 
loans with a subsidy cost of 11.58 percent.
  RHS also offers multifamily housing loans, which includes farm labor 
housing loans. Direct loans are offered to private developers to 
construct and rehabilitate multi-family rental housing for very-low to 
low-income residents, elderly households, or handicapped individuals. As 
an incentive to the developers to provide low income rental housing in 
rural areas, these loans are heavily subsidized; the interest rate is 
between 1 and 2 percent. RHS rental assistance grants supplement the 
loan to the developer in the form of project based rent subsidies for 
very low-income rural households (for continuation of this assistance 
plus new commitments, the cost will be $592 million in 2005). RHS will 
address management issues in its multifamily housing portfolio in 2005 
by restricting the $60 million loan level to repair and rehabilitation 
of its existing portfolio (17,400 projects, 446,000 units). Farm labor 
housing will have a program level of $59 million and will provide for 
new construction as well as repair/rehabilitation. RHS also offers 
guaranteed multifamily housing loans with a loan level of $100 million a 
year.

Housing GSEs

  Three organizations were chartered by Congress to increase the flow of 
credit for housing. These government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) are 
privately owned companies; the shares of two of them are listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange. They receive special benefits as a result of 
their Government sponsorship, including exemption from State and local 
taxes. Their missions are to increase the liquidity and improve the 
distribution of mortgage financing, particularly for low- and moderate-
income borrowers. Two of the GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, primarily 
accomplish this mission by guaranteeing mortgages for sale as securities 
to investors. The third GSE, the Federal Home Loan Bank System, provides 
loans at preferred rates to member financial institutions. The three 
GSEs have grown significantly since they were chartered decades ago and 
are now three of the largest financial companies in the world. 

                                      GROWTH OF THE GSEs IN THE LAST DECADE
                                               Dollars in millions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                           Balance Sheet Assets                    Balance Sheet
                                         ------------------------                   Liabilities
                                                                    Change   ------------------------   Change
                                             1992        2002                    1992        2002
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fannie Mae..............................   $ 172,055   $ 887,515        416%   $ 163,602   $ 871,227        433%
Federal Home Loan Bank System...........   $ 161,834   $ 763,631        372%   $ 151,210   $ 727,307        381%
Freddie Mac.............................    $ 62,739   $ 752,249       1099%    $ 59,281   $ 718,610       1112%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total...................................    $396,628  $2,403,395        506%    $374,093  $2,317,144        519%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Freddie Mac data not audited. Freddie Mac liabilities exclude minority interest in consolidated
  subsidiaries.

  The GSEs are increasingly in the asset management business, growing 
significant portfolios of mortgages

[[Page 82]]

and mortgage-backed securities. The GSEs are highly leveraged, holding 
much less capital in relation to their assets than similarly sized 
financial institutions. A consequence of that highly leveraged condition 
is that a misjudgment or unexpected economic event could quickly deplete 
this capital, potentially making it difficult for a GSE to meet its debt 
obligations. Given the very large size of each enterprise, even a small 
mistake by a GSE could have consequences throughout the economy. More 
than six out of ten institutions in the banking industry hold as assets 
GSE debt in excess of 50 percent of their equity capital. As shown in 
the accompanying table (Growth of the GSEs in the Last Decade), the 
outstanding liabilities of the GSEs have grown by more than five hundred 
percent since 1992, to $2.3 trillion at the end of December 2002. For 
comparison, the privately held debt of the Federal Government at that 
time was $3.0 trillion.\1\ In 2003, the Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), which oversees the safety and soundness of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, studied the risks posed by these GSEs to the 
financial system. Its study indicated that should a GSE experience large 
unexpected losses, the market for its and other GSEs' debt might become 
illiquid. Institutions holding this debt would see a rapid depletion in 
the value of their assets and a loss of liquidity, spreading the 
problems of the GSEs into financial sectors beyond the housing market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Privately held debt differs from debt held by the public (the 
measure generally used in the budget) by not including the Federal debt 
held by the Federal Reserve Banks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Freddie Mac. In 2003, serious accounting problems surfaced at Freddie 
Mac, leading its Board of Directors in June to remove the company's top 
management, including its Chairman and CEO, its President and COO, and 
its Chief Financial Officer. This triggered multiple lawsuits on behalf 
of investors, and investigations by OFHEO, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and the Department of Justice, some still underway. The 
company restated its earnings, both up and down, over the period 2000-
2002. OFHEO reported that Freddie Mac misstated its financial results 
and assessed Freddie Mac a monetary penalty of $125 million. The 
magnitude of the accounting restatement was large. The net impact is a 
cumulative increase of $5 billion in reported earnings over 2000-2002, 
which will result in a decrease in reported earnings in future years. 
Most of these amounts are linked to changes in the valuation of 
derivative financial instruments under relatively new accounting 
standards. The $5 billion increase in earnings represented over twenty 
percent of Freddie Mac's total capital available to cover losses and 
illustrates why an error by a GSE, intentional or not, may pose risks to 
investors. To date, Freddie Mac has made progress towards, but has not 
achieved, accurate and timely financial reporting and controls. Freddie 
Mac expects to provide an annual report for 2002 in the first quarter of 
2004. Freddie Mac expects to publish 2003 results by June 2004.
  Fannie Mae. Fannie Mae reported an accounting error in November 2003, 
requiring it to file a correction with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. The correction of Fannie Mae's reported balance sheet showed 
a change of over $1 billion in shareholders' equity. The company 
reported that the error was unintentional, the result of a computational 
mistake made when implementing a new accounting standard. OFHEO has 
begun an investigation of the accounting practices at Fannie Mae.
  Federal Home Loan Bank System. The Federal Home Loan Bank System, a 
cooperative of twelve regional banks that issue debt for which all are 
jointly and severally liable, suffered a significant decline in profits 
in 2003, primarily stemming from investment losses and a failure to 
hedge interest rate risk adequately at several Federal Home Loan Banks. 
As a result, one ratings organization downgraded its outlook for some 
individual banks of the 12-bank System.
  The Administration stated in September and October 2003 that the 
Government's supervisory system for the three housing GSEs has neither 
the tools nor the stature to deal effectively with the current size, 
complexity, and importance of these companies. Department of the 
Treasury Secretary John Snow and then Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) Secretary Mel Martinez proposed a set of reforms on 
behalf of the Administration to give housing finance a regulatory 
framework as strong as those in place for other financial sectors. The 
reforms follow the principles accepted throughout the world as 
requirements for first-class regulation, based on a three-pronged 
regulatory approach: strong market discipline, effective supervision, 
and adequate capital requirements.
  Market discipline. Chief among the factors that guide a company in its 
decision-making is the discipline imposed by the market. Market 
participants can signal to a company that it is making risky choices, 
for example, by charging the company more to borrow, or paying less for 
its stock. This discipline places constraints on companies. As Federal 
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has noted, however, market discipline is 
not as strong for the GSEs as it is for other private companies. Some 
mistakenly perceive that GSE securities are backed by the Government--
despite the fact that the Government explicity does not guarantee their 
securities. In both domestic and international markets, therefore, 
investors pay a premium for GSE debt by accepting a relatively low rate 
of return. As a result, the enterprises are able to finance their 
activities at a lower cost than others. The Congressional Budget Office 
estimated that in 2002 the value of the resulting subsidy exceeded $15 
billion per year.
  Market discipline also is hindered because GSE investors do not enjoy 
the same level of disclosure, or oversight of disclosures, as investors 
in fully private companies. The GSEs have a statutory exemption from the 
registration and disclosure requirements of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). Recognizing this disadvantage to GSE investors, the 
Administration in 2002 called upon the three housing GSEs to register 
voluntarily their equity securities under the 1934 Secu

[[Page 83]]

rities Exchange Act, triggering mandatory SEC disclosures. To date, only 
Fannie Mae has complied, registering with the SEC in March 2003. Freddie 
Mac does not anticipate being in compliance until 2005, and the Federal 
Home Loan Bank System has not committed to comply voluntarily. The 
Federal Housing Finance Board has proposed a rule that would require 
each Federal Home Loan Bank to register voluntarily with the SEC under 
the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. Mandatory SEC disclosures would 
improve market discipline, and additional disclosures might further 
enhance investor awareness of and discipline over the GSEs' risk-taking.
  Market discipline also requires that a company be controlled by those 
who represent the best interests of its owners. An independent Board of 
Directors, therefore, is essential. A board unduly influenced by the 
company's management may have reason not to provide investors timely and 
adequate information. In 2002, the President established a 10-point plan 
for corporate governance practices that emphasized the importance of 
corporate board independence. In addition, the Administration proposed 
in 2003 to eliminate the Presidential appointees to the Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac Boards.
  Supervision. An effective financial regulator must possess authorities 
and capabilities commensurate with its responsibilities. The 
Administration has determined that the safety and soundness regulators 
of the housing GSEs lack sufficient powers and stature to meet their 
responsibilities, and therefore that both OFHEO, regulator of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, and the Federal Housing Finance Board, regulator of the 
Federal Home Loan Bank System, should be replaced with a new, 
strengthened regulator.
  The Administration has proposed a new regulator, empowered with 
expanded enforcement authorities, independent litigation authority, 
receivership authority, and control over its funding levels independent 
of Congressional appropriations. It regards such authorities as 
essential to a world-class regulator.
  A new regulator must have full authority together with accountability 
for the prudential supervision of the enterprises, which includes the 
authority to approve new activities of the enterprises. Under current 
law, the responsibility for new program approval of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac has been split between OFHEO, an independent agency within 
HUD, and HUD itself. Neither, therefore, is fully accountable for this 
key element of effective supervision of these two large and complex 
entities. The Administration's proposal would remedy this by 
establishing a single new regulator with consolidated responsibility for 
the prudential operation of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal 
Home Loan Banks, as well as authority to review their on-going business 
activities and reject new ones proposed by the GSEs, if they would be 
inconsistent with the charter or prudential operations of the GSEs, or 
incompatible with the public interest. HUD would continue to be 
consulted on new activities.
  A new regulator must have the stature to avoid regulatory capture, 
i.e., undue influence by the entities it regulates. This is difficult 
for a regulator of a small number of very large entities. The 
Administration proposes placing the new regulator within the Department 
of the Treasury to provide the necessary stature and other supervisory 
benefits, provided the Department is given adequate oversight authority. 
The Administration, however, does not support an outcome that would 
create the illusion of greater oversight by the Treasury without the 
authority to make it a reality.
  Capital requirements. Because neither investors nor regulators can 
predict all of the impacts of possible errors by a company or unexpected 
economic changes, requirements that ensure that the GSEs hold capital 
adequate to cushion such shocks are essential. Capital requirements must 
be set with an eye to both known risks and unknown or unquantifiable 
risks. Losses from these latter risks can well exceed losses from 
measured risks, as shown by the rapid depletion of capital in 1998 for 
the highly leveraged hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management. For this 
reason, it is essential that the new regulator of the housing GSEs have 
ongoing authority to adjust both risk-based and minimum capital 
requirements. The accompanying table (Capital Held by the GSEs and 10 of 
the Largest U.S. Financial Institutions) contrasts the capital held by 
the GSEs with that held by similarly sized financial institutions. On 
average, the GSEs hold less than one-half the capital of these other 
companies.

      CAPITAL HELD BY THE GSEs AND 10 OF THE LARGEST U.S. FINANCIAL
                              INSTITUTIONS
                (Dollars in millions; December 31, 2002)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Capital
                                 Balance                       Ratio:
  Companies ranked by assets      Sheet     Stockholders'   Equity    to
                                  Assets        Equity         Assets
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Citigroup Inc................   $1,097,190       $86,718           7.9%
Fannie Mae...................     $887,515       $16,288           1.8%
Federal Home Loan Bank System     $763,631       $36,324           4.8%
JP Morgan Chase & Co.........     $758,800       $42,306           5.6%
Freddie Mac..................     $752,249       $31,330           4.2%
Bank of America Corp.........     $660,458       $50,319           7.6%
Wells Fargo & Co.............     $349,259       $30,358           8.7%
Wachovia Corp................     $341,839       $32,078           9.4%
Bank One Corp................     $277,383       $22,440           8.1%
Washington Mutual Inc........     $268,298       $20,134           7.5%
FleetBoston Financial Corp...     $190,453       $16,833           8.8%
US Bancorp...................     $180,027       $18,101          10.1%
American Express Company.....     $157,253       $13,861           8.8%
 
Average all companies........  ...........  .............          7.2%
Average GSEs.................  ...........  .............          3.6%
Average excluding GSEs.......  ...........  .............          8.2%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: In addition to GSEs, this table includes the ten largest publicly
  traded U.S. companies in the finance industry, in terms of balance
  sheet assets, excluding insurance companies and security brokers and
  dealers. Capital defined as stockholders' equity. Financial regulators
  may use an alternative definition of capital.
Data sources: Securities and Exchange Commission public filings, Federal
  Home Loan Bank System Office of Finance, and Freddie Mac. Freddie Mac
  data not audited.

  Risks, and how they are measured, evolve over time. The Administration 
proposes to give the new GSE regulator full flexibility to establish 
risk-based capital standards. The current risk-based capital standards 
for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are rigidly defined by a 10-year old 
statute. The risk-based capital standards for the Federal Home Loan Bank 
System, while more flexible, have not been fully implemented.
  Affordable housing mission. As noted above, many investors perceive an 
implicit guarantee of GSE securities by the Government, and convey a 
large subsidy to the GSEs by paying a premium for their securities. 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchase two-thirds of all single-family 
mortgages originated (non-governmental, non-jumbo). With this large 
subsidy, and with their substantial market share, the GSEs conceivably 
could have a considerable impact on lowering mortgage costs. Yet the 
Congressional Budget Office estimated in 2001 that Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac lower mortgage rates by no more than 25 basis points, or 
one-quarter of one percentage point. A 2003 working paper by a member of 
the Federal Reserve Board staff estimates that the two GSEs lower 
mortgage rates by an even smaller amount. At the higher estimate of 25 
basis points, a homeowner saves about $25 on the monthly payment for a 
median-priced $160,000 thirty-year mortgage. One reason the effect is 
not larger is that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do not pass through the 
entire subsidy to mortgage borrowers. According to CBO, 37 percent is 
retained by the companies, their executives,

[[Page 84]]

shareholders, or other stakeholders. Current market and regulatory 
mechanisms are not sufficient to force the GSEs to pass on greater 
savings to borrowers.
  To encourage the GSEs to use their Government sponsorship to benefit 
those less likely to have access to mortgage credit and households with 
moderate or low incomes, the governing statutes require them to address 
affordable housing needs. For Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, HUD is 
required to set and enforce annual housing goals. These require that a 
certain percentage of the two companies' mortgage purchases be mortgages 
for low- and moderate-income borrowers or from geographic areas that 
have been underserved by the market. For the Federal Home Loan Bank 
System, the Federal Housing Finance Board enforces a requirement to 
dedicate 10 percent of the System's profits to affordable housing and to 
provide subsidized loans to members' community investment programs. 
Given the different methods used to convey affordable housing subsidies, 
comparing the relative efforts of the Federal Home Loan Bank System with 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is not simple. Comprehensive research in this 
area has not been undertaken. Such a comparative analysis would be 
useful to policy makers and GSE regulators.
  The Administration has identified weaknesses in the system for setting 
and enforcing the affordable housing goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac. These weaknesses could result in their failure to perform the 
targeted housing mission for which they were created. For example, HUD 
needs new administrative authority to enforce the goals. Current law 
does not permit the Secretary to impose timely and appropriate penalties 
for a GSE's failure to meet a goal. This authority is necessary to 
ensure that the goals are strict requirements that the GSEs must meet.
  The Administration also has proposed that these two GSEs be required 
to meet a national home purchase goal, a tool specifically to promote 
affordable homeownership, particularly for first-time homebuyers. This 
goal would ensure that the GSEs' activities support home purchases, even 
in years when refinance activity is high. Although Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac provide liquidity in the refinance market, the share of 
funding they provide for home purchases declines during years when many 
mortgages are refinanced.
  HUD has conducted analyses showing that private lenders operating 
without the benefits and subsidies enjoyed by the GSEs contribute more 
to affordable housing than do Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. For example, 
during 1999-2002, home loans for low- and moderate-income families 
accounted for 44.3 percent of all home purchase mortgages originated by 
lenders in the conventional conforming market. Yet these loans accounted 
for only 42.5 percent of Fannie Mae's purchases and 42.3 percent of 
Freddie Mac's purchases. The GSEs particularly lag the market in funding 
first-time homebuyers. First-time homebuyers accounted for 26.5 percent 
of each GSE's purchases of mortgages used to buy homes, compared with 
37.6 percent of home purchase mortgages originated in the conventional 
conforming market.
  The GSEs' risk management affects not only their owners and investors, 
but the entire financial system. Despite their Government sponsorship 
and mission, the GSEs do not lead the market in creating homeownership 
opportunities for less advantaged Americans. The

[[Page 85]]

Administration's proposed reforms to the supervisory system for the GSEs 
address these problems by promoting a strong and resilient financial 
system, while increasing opportunities for affordable housing and 
homeownership.

                   Education Credit Programs and GSEs

  The Federal Government guarantees loans through intermediary agencies 
and makes direct loans to students to encourage post-secondary 
education. The Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae), a GSE, 
makes secondary market purchases of guaranteed student loans from banks 
and other eligible lenders.

Student Loans

  The Department of Education helps finance student loans through two 
major programs: the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) program and the 
William D. Ford Federal Direct Student Loan (Direct Loan) program. 
Eligible institutions of higher education may participate in one or both 
programs. Loans are available to students regardless of income. However, 
borrowers with low family incomes are eligible for loans with additional 
interest subsidies. For low-income borrowers, the Federal Government 
subsidizes loan interest costs while borrowers are in school, during a 
six-month grace period after graduation, and during certain deferment 
periods.
  In 2005, nearly 9 million borrowers will receive over 14.5 million 
loans totaling over $85 billion. Of this amount, nearly $57 billion is 
for new loans, and the remainder reflects the consolidation of existing 
loans. Loan levels have risen dramatically over the past 10 years as a 
result of rising educational costs and an increase in eligible 
borrowers.
  The FFEL program provides loans through an administrative structure 
involving over 3,500 lenders, 36 State and private guaranty agencies, 
roughly 50 participants in the secondary market, and approximately 6,000 
participating schools. Under FFEL, banks and other eligible lenders loan 
private capital to students and parents, guaranty agencies insure the 
loans, and the Federal Government reinsures the loans against borrower 
default. In 2005, FFEL lenders will disburse over 11 million loans 
totaling almost $65 billion in principal, roughly a third of which 
involve consolidations of existing loans. Lenders bear two percent of 
the default risk, and the Federal Government is responsible for the 
remainder. The Department also makes administrative payments to guaranty 
agencies and, at certain times, pays interest subsidies on behalf of 
borrowers to lenders.
  The William D. Ford Direct Student Loan program was authorized by the 
Student Loan Reform Act of 1993. Under the Direct Loan program, the 
Federal Government provides loan capital directly to more than 1,100 
schools, which then disburse loan funds to students. In 2005, the Direct 
Loan program will generate more than 3.5 million loans with a total 
value of nearly $21 billion, including over $6 billion in consolidations 
of existing loans. The program offers a variety of flexible repayment 
plans including income-contingent repayment, under which annual 
repayment amounts vary based on the income of the borrower and payments 
can be made over 25 years with any residual balances forgiven.
  The Congress is currently considering legislative reforms to both FFEL 
and DL as part of this year's Higher Education Act reauthorization. 
These reforms come at a critical time with college costs continuing to 
rise at increasing rates and the widening gap between the number of high 
income and low income students that attend college. The President's 
Budget proposes several legislative changes to the student loan programs 
to help make college more affordable for millions of students while 
making both student loan programs more cost efficient. To help students 
meet rising tuition costs, the Budget proposes to increase loan limits 
for first year students, retain variable interest rates beyond 2006 so 
students can continue to take advantage of historically low interest 
rates, expand borrower repayment options, and increase loan forgiveness 
for highly qualified teachers who teach math, science, or special 
education for five years in high-need schools. To fund these changes, 
the Administration proposes to reduce program costs through modest 
changes to lender subsidies and Guaranty Agency fees. For example, the 
Budget proposes to eliminate an expensive loophole that provides lenders 
with a federally financed 9.5% guaranteed return on loans that are tied 
to out-dated tax exempt bonds.
  The Administration's proposed changes are consistent with the PART 
findings for the student loan programs, which found that program 
benefits were not well targeted to student borrowers while they are 
attending school. The PART also found that both programs could meet 
their goals in a more cost effective manner if financial benefits for 
program participants were more closely tied to market realities. The 
PART generated specific proposals for addressing these areas, many of 
which are included in the HEA reforms package in the President's Budget.

Sallie Mae

  The Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae) was chartered by 
Congress in 1972 as a for-profit, shareholder-owned, Government-
sponsored enterprise (GSE). Sallie Mae was reorganized in 1997 pursuant 
to the authority granted by the Student Loan Marketing Association 
Reorganization Act of 1996. Under the Reorginization Act, the GSE became 
a wholly owned subsidiary of SLM Corporation and must wind down and be 
liquidated by September 30, 2008. In January 2002, the GSE's board of 
directors announced that it expects to complete dissolution of the GSE 
by Sep

[[Page 86]]

tember 30, 2006. The Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act of 1999 allows the SLM Corporation to affiliate with 
a financial institution upon the approval of the Secretary of the 
Treasury. Any affiliation will require SLM Corporation to dissolve the 
GSE within two years of the affiliation date (unless such period is 
extended by the Department of the Treasury).
  Sallie Mae makes funds available for student loans by providing 
liquidity to lenders participating in the FFEL program. Sallie Mae 
purchases guaranteed student loans from eligible lenders and makes 
warehousing advances (secured loans to lenders). Generally, under the 
privatization legislation, the GSE cannot engage in any new business 
activities or acquire any additional program assets other than 
purchasing student loans. The GSE can continue to make warehousing 
advances under contractual commitments existing on August 7, 1997. SLM 
Corporation and its affiliates, including the GSE, currently hold 
approximately 38 percent of all outstanding guaranteed student loans.

         Business and Rural Development Credit Programs and GSEs

  The Federal Government guarantees small business loans to promote 
entrepreneurship. The Government also offers direct loans and loan 
guarantees to farmers who may have difficulty obtaining credit elsewhere 
and to rural communities that need to develop and maintain 
infrastructure. Two GSEs, the Farm Credit System and the Federal 
Agricultural Mortgage Corporation, increase liquidity in the 
agricultural lending market.

Small Business Administration

  The Small Business Administration (SBA), created in 1953, helps 
entrepreneurs start, sustain, and grow small businesses. As a ``gap 
lender'' SBA works to supplement market lending and provide access to 
credit where private lenders are reluctant to do so without a Government 
guarantee. Additionally, SBA assists home- and business-owners cover the 
uninsured costs of recovery from disasters.
  The 2005 Budget requests $326 million, including administrative funds, 
for SBA to leverage nearly $25 billion in financing for small businesses 
and disaster victims. The 7(a) General Business Loan program will 
support $12.5 billion in guaranteed loans--a more than 25 percent 
increase over 2004--while the 504 Certified Development Company program 
will support $4.5 billion in guaranteed loans. SBA will supplement the 
capital of Small Business Investment Companies (SBICs), which provide 
equity capital and long-term loans to small businesses, with up to $7 
billion in participating securities and guaranteed debentures.
  To continue to serve the needs of small businesses, SBA will focus 
program management in three areas:
  1) Targeting economic assistance to the neediest small businesses
  SBA seeks to target assistance more effectively to credit-worthy 
borrowers who would not be well-served by the commercial markets in the 
absence of a Government guarantee to cover defaults. SBA is actively 
encouraging financial institutions to increase lending to start-up 
firms, low-income entrepreneurs, and borrowers in search of financing 
below $150,000. Preliminary evidence shows that SBA's outreach for the 
7(a) program has been successful. Average loan size has decreased from 
$258,000 in 2000 to $167,000 in 2003, while the number of small 
businesses served has grown from 43,748 to 67,306 during the same time 
period. In addition, SBA issued new regulations for the Section 504 
program that foster additional competition among intermediaries, thereby 
allowing borrowers greater access to loans.
  2) Improving program and risk management
  Improving management by measuring and mitigating risks in SBA's $45 
billion business loan portfolio is one of the agency's greatest 
challenges. As the agency delegates more responsibility to the private 
sector to administer SBA guaranteed loans, oversight functions become 
increasingly important. SBA established the Office of Lender Oversight, 
which is responsible for evaluating individual SBA lenders. This office 
has made progress in employing a variety of analytical techniques to 
ensure sound financial management by SBA and to hold lending partners 
accountable for performance. These analytical techniques include 
financial performance analysis, industry concentration analysis, 
portfolio performance analysis, selected credit reviews, and credit 
scoring to compare lenders' performance. The oversight program is also 
developing on-site safety and soundness examinations and off-site 
monitoring of Small Business Lending Companies (SBLCs) and compliance 
reviews of SBA lenders. In addition, the office will develop incentives 
for lenders to minimize defaults and to adopt sound performance 
measures.
  Improving risk management also means improving SBA's ability to more 
accurately estimate the cost of subsidizing small businesses. During 
2003, the SBA followed through on its commitment to improve its accuracy 
in estimating the cost of the Section 7(a) General Business Loan program 
by developing a loan-level econometric credit and reestimate model for 
the program. The improved model should help SBA avoid repeating its 
experience during the 1990's, when subsidy costs for the 7(a) program 
were overestimated by $1 billion. (These subsidy overestimates, however, 
were significantly offset by program administrative costs during the 
same period.) More recent analysis, using the new model, shows that 
during the last few years the 7(a) program has cost almost $230 million 
more than previously estimated. Building upon the 7(a) modeling 
improvements, a comparable model was developed for the 2005 subsidy 
estimates for the Section 504 loan program.

[[Page 87]]

  Improving risk management is especially important for the Small 
Business Investment Company (SBIC) venture capital program. Like the 
private venture capital market, performance in the SBIC program began to 
decline in 2000. The SBIC program is now expected to cost taxpayers 
approximately $2 billion due to defaults and other cash loses. In 
addition to the overall market decline, the poor performance in the SBIC 
program is due to the following structural flaws.
     The Federal Government's financial returns are not 
          proportional to its investment. SBA invests up to two-thirds 
          of total funds but, on average, receives only about ten 
          percent of SBICs' profits. Ninety percent of those profits 
          were generated by only 14 of 170 SBICs licensed in the 
          Participating Securities program since 1994.
     SBICs do not have adequate incentives to pay back funds 
          expeditiously to the Government. Under the current statute, 
          SBICs make ``profit'' payments to SBA but these are generally 
          insufficient to repay the original principal investment in a 
          timely manner which extends SBA's risk exposure.
     The prior subsidy model underestimated the cost of the 
          program. The technical assumptions (e.g., defaults, 
          recoveries, and profits) have turned out to be more optimistic 
          than actual program performance.
  The 2005 Budget takes steps to address the first of these issues by 
proposing to increase borrowers' fees and SBA's share of profits in the 
SBIC Participating Securties program. The Budget also proposes to 
accelerate repayments to the Government. In addition, the subsidy model 
for the Participating Securities program has been improved by 
incorporating more realistic technical assumptions, which are generally 
based upon historical experience. During 2004, SBA expects to reexamine 
the methodology used to calculate the cost to subsidize the SBIC 
Participating Securities program. With realized and projected losses of 
about $2 billion (reflected in an upward mandatory subsidy reestimate) 
on an outstanding portfolio of about $5 billion, these steps are 
critical if the program is to be fiscally sound and not rely on large 
taxpayer subsidies.
  SBA is improving oversight and accounting practices of its Secondary 
Market Guarantee (SMG) program for 7(a) guaranteed loans. To properly 
manage any risk associated with this fund which is authorized under 
section 5(g) of the Small Business Act, SBA is budgeting for the 
Government's liability in accordance with the Federal Credit Reform Act. 
In accordance with the commitment that SBA made last year, it refined 
its estimate of the Government's liability for the program, which is 
reflected in the $105 million upward mandatory reestimate cost in the 
2005 budget. Due to reforms that are being implemented in 2004, this 
program will not require discretionary subsidy appropriations to operate 
in 2005.
  In 1999, SBA initiated an asset sales program as a means of improving 
portfolio management and curtailing the growing level of assets--
primarily disaster loans--serviced by SBA. More than $5 billion in 
direct and repurchased (defaulted) guaranteed loans were sold to 
investors in seven separate sales through 2002. These assets were sold 
to private sector buyers without any recourse for future default claims 
or interest supplements from the Government. While the sales reduced 
loan management burdens on SBA, discrepancies eventually appeared 
between accounting and budgetary records; the agency's financial 
statements indicated losses on the program of $1.8 billion while the 
model used to value loans for purposes of sales showed gains of 
approximately $800 million. SBA and the General Accounting Office 
attempted to identify the source of the discrepancies in early 2002, but 
neither was able to explain the inconsistencies. As a result, SBA 
assembled a team of financial experts and undertook a detailed review of 
the financial records relating to the program between October 2002 and 
February 2003. The assessment revealed three sources of discrepancies. 
First, accounting entries overstated loan values and did not fully 
reconcile to subsidy estimates. Second, the agency's credit subsidy 
model, which assessed costs at an aggregate program level, did not 
always provide reliable loan cost estimates. Third, the model used to 
provide individual loan values for asset sales significantly 
underestimated the worth of those assets and did not reconcile to the 
subsidy model. Because of the findings, SBA halted its eighth sale 
scheduled for April 2003 and all subsequent sales. In addition, SBA has 
adjusted its accounting records and developed a single new loan-level 
credit model that can also determine the value of individual loans 
proposed for sale. Adjustments in the financial records have revealed 
that selling repurchased SBA guaranteed loans was profitable, while the 
sale of performing disaster loans resulted in budgetary costs to the 
Federal Government. On net, SBA's asset sales program has resulted in an 
$828 million loss.
  3) Operating more efficiently
  To operate more efficiently, SBA has automated loan origination 
activities in the Disaster Loan program with a paperless loan 
application. As a result, loan-processing costs, times, and errors will 
decrease, while Government responsiveness to the needs of disaster 
victims will increase. SBA is also transforming the way that staff 
perform loan management functions in both the 7(a) and 504 programs. In 
2003, SBA implemented a pilot program at three of its 68 district 
offices to consolidate and expedite Section 504 loan processing. Results 
have been very positive with the average loan processing time reduced 
from four weeks to only a few days. SBA is expanding the pilot 
nationally. Similarly, SBA is also shifting additional responsibilities 
to intermediaries by centralizing loan liquidation functions for the 
Section 504 program and requiring intermediaries to assume increased 
liquidation responsibilities.


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USDA Rural Infrastructure and Business Development Programs

  USDA provides grants, loans, and loan guarantees to communities for 
constructing facilities such as health-care clinics, day-care centers, 
and water and wastewater systems. Direct loans are available at lower 
interest rates for the poorest communities. These programs have very low 
default rates. The cost associated with them is due primarily to 
subsidized interest rates that are below the prevailing Treasury rates.
  The program level for the Water and Wastewater (W&W) treatment 
facility loan and grant program in the 2005 President's Budget is $1.4 
billion. These funds are available to communities of 10,000 or less 
residents. The program finances W&W facilities through direct or 
guaranteed loans and grants. Applicant communities must be unable to 
finance their needs through their own resources or with commercial 
credit. Priority is given based on their median household income, 
poverty levels, and size of service population as determined by USDA. 
The community typically receives a grant/loan combination. The grant is 
usually for 35-45% of the project cost (it can be up to 75%). Loans are 
for 40 years with interest rates based on a three-tiered structure 
(poverty, intermediate, and market) depending on community income. The 
community facility programs are targeted to rural communities with fewer 
than 20,000 residents and have a program level of $527 million in 2005. 
USDA also provides grants, direct loans, and loan guarantees to assist 
rural businesses, including cooperatives, to increase employment and 
diversify the rural economy. In 2005, USDA proposes to provide $600 
million in loan guarantees to rural businesses (these loans serve 
communities of 50,000 or less).
  These community programs are all part of the Rural Community 
Advancement Program (RCAP). Under RCAP, States have increased 
flexibility within the three funding streams for Water and Wastewater, 
Community Facilities, and Business and Industry (B&I). USDA also 
provides loans through the Intermediary Relending Program (IRP), which 
provides loan funds at a 1 percent interest rate to an intermediary such 
as a State or local government agency that, in turn, provides funds for 
economic and community development projects in rural areas. In 2005, 
USDA expects to retain or create over 66,000 jobs through its business 
programs, which will be achieved primarily through the B&I guarantee and 
the IRP loan programs.

Electric and Telecommunications Loans

  USDA's Rural Utilities Service (RUS) has programs that provide loans 
for rural electrification, telecommunications, distance learning, 
telemedicine, and broadband and grants for distance learning and 
telemedicine. The electric and telecommunications program makes new 
loans to maintain existing infrastructure and to modernize electric and 
telephone service in rural America. Historically, the Federal risk 
associated with the $40 billion loan portfolio in electric and telephone 
loans has been small, although several large defaults have occurred in 
the electric program.
  The Distance Learning and Telemedicine (DLT) provides loans and grants 
to improve distance learning and telemedicine services in rural areas 
and encourage students, teachers, medical professionals, and rural 
residents to use telecommunications, computer networks, and related 
advanced technologies. The USDA Broadband programs provide loans to 
provide broadband service to rural communities.
  The subsidy rates for several of the electric and telecommunication 
programs remain negative, though changes to the interest rate 
assumptions resulted in positive subsidy rates for the Electric Hardship 
and Municipal rate programs. Recent problems in the telecommunications 
industry have not had a significant impact on rural telecommunications 
cooperatives. The number of electric loans has been increasing due to 
large increases in loan level appropriated over the last several years. 
The average size for electric loans has also been increasing. The number 
and the size of telecommunications loans have remained steady. The 
subsidy rate for the DLT loan program increases in FY2005 from negative 
to positive due to a few defaults that were not included in the original 
assumptions. The Broadband subsidy rates increase slightly due to 
interest rate assumption changes.
  Providing funding and services to needy areas is of concern to USDA. 
Many rural cooperatives provide service to areas where there are high 
poverty rates. Based on PART findings, USDA will review its current 
method of issuing telecommunications loans, ```first in; first out,'' to 
determine if it allows for adequate support for areas with the highest 
priority needs. In addition, to ensure the electric and 
telecommunications programs' focus on rural areas, legislation will be 
proposed to require recertification of rural status for each electric 
and telecommunications borrower on the first loan request received in or 
after FY 2005 and on the first loan request received after each 
subsequent Census. Legislation will be sought to allow for the 
rescission of loans that are more than ten years old.
  RUS proposes to make $2.5 billion in direct and guaranteed electric 
loans in 2005, including provision for guaranteeing $100 million in 
electric loans made by private banks. The demand for loans to rural 
electric cooperatives has been increasing and is expected to increase 
further as borrowers replace many of the 40-year-old electric plants. 
With the $2.5 billion in loans, RUS borrowers are expected to upgrade 
225 rural electric systems, which will benefit over 3.4 million 
customers.
  USDA's RUS proposes to make $495 million in direct telecommunications 
loans in 2005. With the $495 million in loans, RUS borrowers are 
expected to fund over 50 telecommunication systems for advanced 
telecommunications services which will provide broadband and high-speed 
Internet access and benefit over 300 thousand rural customers.

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  With the $25 million in DLT grants RUS borrowers are expected to 
provide distance learning facilities to 300 schools, libraries, and 
rural education centers and also provide telemedicine equipment to 150 
rural health care providers, benefiting millions of residents in rural 
America. Loan funds are not provided due to the positive subsidy rate 
and the lack of interest in DLT loans. The budget proposes converting 
the mandatory broadband funding into discretionary funding and provides 
discretionary funding that supports $331 million in broadband loans.

Loans to Farm Operators

  Farm Service Agency (FSA) assists low-income family farmers in 
starting and maintaining viable farming operations. Emphasis is placed 
upon aiding beginning and socially disadvantaged farmers. FSA offers 
operating loans and ownership loans, both of which may be either direct 
or guaranteed loans. Operating loans provide credit to farmers and 
ranchers for annual production expenses and purchases of livestock, 
machinery, and equipment. Farm ownership loans assist producers in 
acquiring and developing their farming or ranching operations. As a 
condition of eligibility for direct loans, borrowers must be unable to 
obtain private credit at reasonable rates and terms. As FSA is the 
``lender of last resort,'' default rates on FSA direct loans are 
generally higher than those on private-sector loans. However, in recent 
years the loss rate has decreased with a rate of 5.1 percent in 2003, 
compared to 5.6 percent in 2002.
  FSA guaranteed farm loans are made to more creditworthy borrowers who 
have access to private credit markets. Because the private loan 
originators must retain 10 percent of the risk, they exercise care in 
examining the repayment ability of borrowers. As a result, losses on 
guaranteed farm loans remain low with default rates of .71 percent in 
2003 as compared to .70 percent in 2002.
  The 2002 Farm Bill changed some of the requirements for managing 
inventory property. Property acquired through foreclosure on direct 
loans must now be sold at auction within 165, rather than 105 days of 
acquisition. The new rule allows more time to advertise and encourage 
participation from beginning farmers.
  The subsidy rates for these programs have been fluctuating over the 
past several years. These fluctuations are mainly due to the interest 
component of the subsidy rate. The default rates for these programs tend 
to be below ten percent. As shown above, both the direct and guaranteed 
loans have experienced a decreasing default rate.
  In fiscal year 2003, FSA provided loans and loan guarantees to 
approximately 32,000 family farmers totaling $3.94 billion. The number 
of loans provided by these programs has fluctuated over the past several 
years. The average size for farm ownership loans has been increasing. 
The majority of assistance provided in the operating loan program is to 
existing FSA farm borrowers. In the farm ownership program, new 
customers receive the bulk of the benefits furnished.
  In the last few years, the demand for FSA direct and guaranteed loans 
has been high due to crop/livestock price decreases and some regional 
production problems. In 2005, USDA's FSA proposes to make $3.8 billion 
in direct and guaranteed loans through discretionary programs.
  A PART evaluation of the guaranteed loan portfolio was conducted in 
2003. The review found that the program is well-managed and serves a 
clear purpose in helping farmers who have difficulty in demonstrating 
creditworthiness obtain credit at reasonable rates from private lenders. 
However, while the program has a low loss rate, it is unable to 
adequately demonstrate whether it is achieving the objective of 
improving the economic viability of U.S. farmers and ranchers. Over the 
next year, FSA will be conducting an in-depth review of its direct and 
guaranteed loan portfolios to assess program performance, including the 
effectiveness of targeted assistance and the ability of borrowers to 
graduate to private credit.

The Farm Credit System and Farmer Mac

  The Farm Credit System (FCS or System) and the Federal Agricultural 
Mortgage Corporation (Farmer Mac) are Government-Sponsored Enterprises 
(GSEs) that enhance credit availability for the agricultural sector. The 
FCS provides production, equipment, and mortgage lending to farmers and 
ranchers, aquatic producers, their cooperatives, and related businesses, 
while Farmer Mac provides a secondary market for agricultural real 
estate and rural housing mortgages.
  The Nation's agricultural sector and, in turn, its lenders continue to 
exhibit stability in their income and balance sheets. This is due, in 
part, to government assistance payments being provided from 1998 through 
2003. Also, the low interest rate environment seen over the past two 
years has reduced interest expense for the capital-intensive 
agricultural sector and bolstered farmland values. Favorable growing 
conditions were widespread, and commodity prices generally rose in 2003, 
although weakness continued for some products. Farmland values increased 
moderately, up 5.0 percent in 2002, due to a combination of government 
payments, urban influences, and declining interest rates. Projections 
for 2003 see a smaller rise of 3.0 percent for farmland values
  Commercial banks maintained their predominant farm debt market share 
of 40 percent in 2002. The FCS trailed at a 29.8 percent share. The 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) direct farm loan programs 
market share was 3.7 percent, though it would more than double if 
adjusted for guaranteed loans issued through private institutional 
lenders. In 2003, USDA expects the market-share gap between commercial 
banks and the FCS to have narrowed marginally.


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The Farm Credit System

  During 2003, the financial condition of the System's banks and 
associations continued a 15-year trend of improving financial health and 
performance. Sound asset quality and strong income generation enabled 
FCS banks and associations to post record capital levels. As of 
September 30, 2003, capital increased 6.4 percent for the year and stood 
at $16.2 billion. These capital numbers exclude $2.0 billion of 
restricted capital held by the Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation 
(FCSIC). Loan volume has increased since 1989 to $91.3 billion in 
September 2003, which surpasses the high of $90.0 billion, set in 
December 2002. The rate of asset growth for the preceding three-year 
period (2000-2002) has been averaging 7.6 percent. However, the rate of 
capital accumulation has been greater resulting in total capital 
equaling 15.4 percent of total assets at yearend 2002 compared to 14.9 
percent at yearend 1999. Non-performing assets increased slightly to 1.4 
percent of the portfolio in September 2003 compared to 1.3 percent in 
December 2002. Competitive pressures and a falling interest rate 
environment have narrowed the FCS's net interest margin to 2.62 percent 
in September 2003 from 2.76 percent in 2002. The net interest margin is 
expected to remain stable in the near-term, given the expectations for a 
continued low interest rate environment into 2004. Consolidation 
continues to affect the structure of the FCS. In January 1995, there 
were nine banks and 232 associations; by September 2003, there were six 
banks and 99 associations.
  The FCSIC ensures the timely payment of interest and principal on FCS 
obligations. FCSIC's net assets, largely comprised of premiums paid by 
FCS institutions, supplement the System's capital and support the joint 
and several liability of all System banks for FCS obligations. On 
September 30, 2003, FCSIC's net assets totaling $1.7 billion were 
slightly below (1.98 percent) the statutory minimum of 2.0 percent of 
outstanding debt. In 2003, the premium rate was increased to bolster 
FCSIC's net assets to meet the expansion in the System's outstanding 
debt caused by strong growth in its asset base. The premium rate is 
slated to be reduced slightly in 2004.
  Improvement in the FCS's financial condition is also reflected in the 
examinations by the Farm Credit Administration (FCA), its Federal 
regulator. Each of the System institutions is rated under the FCA 
Financial Institution Rating System (FIRS) for capital, asset quality, 
management, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity. At the beginning of 
1995, 197 institutions carried the best FIRS ratings of 1 or 2, 36 were 
rated 3, one institution was rated 4, and no institutions received the 
lowest rating of 5. In September 2003, all 105 banks and associations 
had ratings of 1 or 2 and no institution was under an enforcement 
action.
  Over the past 12 months, the System's loans outstanding have grown by 
$3.4 billion, or 3.9 percent, while over the past five years they have 
grown $25.2 billion, or 38.1 percent. The volume of lending secured by 
farmland increased 52.6 percent, while farm-operating loans have 
increased 32.1 percent since 1998. Total members served increased about 
2 percent during the past year. Agricultural producers represented the 
largest borrower group, with $72.8 billion including loans to rural 
homeowners and leases, or just under 80 percent of the dollar amount of 
loans outstanding. As required by law, all borrowers are also 
stockholder owners of System banks and associations. The System has more 
than 453,000 stockholders; about 83 percent of these are farmers with 
voting stock. Over half of the System's total loan volume outstanding 
(53.6 percent) is in long-term real estate loans, over one-quarter (26.2 
percent) is in short- and intermediate-term loans to agricultural 
producers, and 17 percent is to cooperatives. International loans 
(export financing) represent 3.2 percent of the System's loan portfolio. 
Young, beginning, and small farmers and ranchers loans represented 12.7, 
18.0, and 30.1-percent, respectively, of the total dollar volume 
outstanding in 2002, which is slightly higher than in 2001. These 
percentages cannot be summed given significant overlap in these 
categories. Providing credit and related services to young, beginning, 
and small farmers and ranchers is a legislated mandate and a high 
priority for the System.
  The System, while continuing to record strong earnings and capital 
growth, remains exposed to numerous risks, including concentration risk, 
changes in government assistance payments, the volatility of exports and 
crop prices, and lower non-farm earnings of farm households associated 
with weakness in the economy's employment sector.

Farmer Mac

  Farmer Mac was established in 1987 to facilitate a secondary market 
for farm real estate and rural housing loans. Since the Agricultural 
Credit Act of 1987, there have been several amendments to Farmer Mac's 
chartering statute. Perhaps the most significant amending legislation 
for Farmer Mac was the Farm Credit System Reform Act of 1996 that 
transformed Farmer Mac from a guarantor of securities backed by loan 
pools into a direct purchaser of mortgages, enabling it to form pools to 
securitize. The 1996 Act increased Farmer Mac's ability to provide 
liquidity to agricultural mortgage lenders. Since the passage of the 
1996 Act, Farmer Mac's program activities and business have increased 
significantly.

[[Page 91]]

  Farmer Mac continues to meet statutory minimum core capital and 
regulatory risk-based capital requirements. Farmer Mac's total program 
activity (loans purchased and guaranteed, and AgVantage bonds purchased, 
and real estate owned) as of September 30, 2003, totaled $5.6 billion. 
That volume represents growth of 8 percent over program activity at 
September 30, 2002. Of total program activity, $2.4 billion were on-
balance sheet loans and agricultural mortgage-backed securities and $3.2 
billion were off-balance sheet obligations. Total assets were $4.2 
billion at the close of the third quarter, with non-program investments 
accounting for $1.6 billion of those assets. Farmer Mac's net income for 
the first three quarters of 2003 was $20 million, an increase of $1.56 
million, or 8.8 percent over the same period in 2002.

                      International Credit Programs

  Seven Federal agencies, the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the 
Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Department of the 
Treasury, the Agency for International Development (USAID), the Export-
Import Bank, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), 
provide direct loans, loan guarantees, and insurance to a variety of 
foreign private and sovereign borrowers. These programs are intended to 
level the playing field for U.S. exporters, deliver robust support for 
U.S. manufactured goods, stabilize international financial markets, and 
promote sustainable development.

Leveling the Playing Field

  Federal export credit programs counter subsidies that foreign 
governments, largely in Europe and Japan, provide their exporters, 
usually through export credit agencies (ECAs). The U.S. Government has 
worked since the 1970's to constrain official credit support through a 
multilateral agreement in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). This agreement has significantly constrained direct 
interest rate subsidies and tied-aid grants. Further negotiations 
resulted in a multilateral agreement that standardized the fees for 
sovereign lending across all ECAs beginning in April 1999. Fees for non-
sovereign lending, however, continue to vary widely across ECAs and 
markets, thereby providing implicit subsidies.
  The Export-Import Bank attempts to strategically ``level the playing 
field'' and to fill gaps in the availability of private export credit. 
The Export-Import Bank provides export credits, in the form of direct 
loans or loan guarantees, to U.S. exporters who meet basic eligibility 
criteria and who request the Bank's assistance. USDA's ``GSM'' programs 
similarly help to level the playing field. Like programs of other 
agricultural exporting nations, GSM programs guarantee payment from 
countries and entities that want to import U.S. agricultural products 
but cannot easily obtain credit. The U.S. has been negotiating in the 
OECD the terms of agricultural export financing, the outcome of which 
could affect the GSM programs.

Stabilizing International Financial Markets

  In today's global economy, the health and prosperity of the American 
economy depend importantly on the stability of the global financial 
system and the economic health of our major trading partners. The United 
States can contribute to orderly exchange arrangements and a stable 
system of exchange rates by providing resources on a multilateral basis 
through the IMF (discussed in other sections of the Budget), and through 
financial support provided by the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF).
  The ESF may provide ``bridge loans'' to other countries in times of 
short-term liquidity problems and financial crises. In the past, 
``bridge loans'' from ESF provided dollars to a country over a short 
period before the disbursement of an IMF loan to the country. Also, a 
package of up to $20 billion of medium-term ESF financial support was 
made available to Mexico during its crisis in 1995. Such support was 
essential in helping to stabilize Mexican and global financial markets. 
Mexico paid back its borrowings under this package ahead of schedule in 
1997, and the United States earned almost $600 million more in interest 
than it would have if it dollars had not been lent. There was zero 
subsidy cost for the United States as defined under credit reform, as 
the medium-term credit carried interest rates reflecting an appropriate 
country risk premium.
  The United States also expressed a willingness to provide ESF support 
in response to the financial crises affecting some countries such as 
South Korea in 1997 and Brazil in 1998. It did not prove necessary to 
provide an ESF credit facility for Korea, but the United States agreed 
to guarantee through the ESF up to $5 billion of a $13.2 billion Bank 
for International Settlements credit facility for Brazil. In the event, 
the ESF guaranteed $3.3 billion in BIS credits to Brazil and earned 
$140.3 million in commissions. Such support helped to provide the 
international confidence needed by these countries to begin the 
stabilization process.

Using Credit to Promote Sustainable Development

  Credit is an important tool in U.S. bilateral assistance to promote 
sustainable development. USAID's Development Credit Authority (DCA) 
allows USAID to use a variety of credit tools to support its development 
activities abroad. This unit encompasses newer DCA activities, such as 
municipal bond guarantees for local governments in developing countries, 
as well as USAID's traditional microenterprise and urban environmental 
credit programs. DCA provides non-sovereign loans and loan guarantees in 
targeted cases where credit serves more effectively than traditional 
grant mechanisms to achieve sustainable development. DCA is intended to 
mobilize host country private capital to fi

[[Page 92]]

nance sustainable development in line with USAID's strategic objectives. 
Through the use of partial loan guarantees and risk sharing with the 
private sector, DCA stimulates private-sector lending for financially 
viable development projects, thereby leveraging host-country capital and 
strengthening sub-national capital markets in the developing world. 
While there is clear demand for DCA's facilities in some emerging 
economies, the utilization rate for these facilities is still very low.
  OPIC also supports a mix of development, employment, and export goals 
by promoting U.S. direct investment in developing countries. OPIC 
pursues these goals through political risk insurance, direct loans, and 
guarantee products, which provide finance, as well as associated skills 
and technology transfers. These programs are intended to create more 
efficient financial markets, eventually encouraging the private sector 
to supplant OPIC finance in developing countries. OPIC has also created 
a number of investment funds that provide equity to local companies with 
strong development potential.

Ongoing Coordination

  International credit programs are coordinated through two groups to 
ensure consistency in policy design and credit implementation. The Trade 
Promotion Coordinating Committee (TPCC) works within the Administration 
to develop a National Export Strategy to make the delivery of trade 
promotion support more effective and convenient for U.S. exporters.
  The Interagency Country Risk Assessment System (ICRAS) standardizes 
the way in which agencies budget for the cost associated with the risk 
of international lending. The cost of lending by the agencies is 
governed by proprietary U.S. government ratings, which correspond to a 
set of default estimates over a given maturity. The methodology 
establishes assumptions about default risks in international lending 
using averages of international sovereign bond market data. The strength 
of this method is its link to the market and an annual update that 
adjusts the default estimates to reflect the most recent risks observed 
in the market.
  For 2005, OMB updated the default estimates using the default estimate 
methodology introduced in FY 2003 and the most recent market data. The 
2003 default estimate methodology implemented a significant revision 
that uses more sophisticated financial analyses and comprehensive market 
data, and better isolates the expected cost of default implicit in 
interest rates charged by private investors to sovereign borrowers. All 
else being equal, this change expands the level of international lending 
an agency can support with a given appropriation. For example, the 
Export-Import Bank will be able to generally provide higher lending 
levels using lower appropriations in 2005.

Adapting to Changing Market Conditions

  Overall, officially supported finance and transfers account for a tiny 
fraction of international capital flows. Furthermore, the private sector 
is continuously adapting its size and role in emerging markets finance 
to changing market conditions. In response, the Administration is 
working to adapt international lending at Export-Import Bank and OPIC to 
dynamic private sector finance. The Export-Import Bank, for example, is 
developing a sharper focus on lending that would otherwise not occur 
without Federal assistance. Measures under development include reducing 
risks, collecting fees from program users, and improving the focus on 
exporters who truly cannot access private export finance.
  OPIC in the past has focused relatively narrowly on providing 
financing and insurance services to large U.S. companies investing 
abroad. As a result, OPIC did not devote significant resources to its 
mission of promoting development through mobilizing private capital. In 
2003, OPIC implemented new development performance measures and goals 
that reflect the mandate to revitalize its core development mission.
  These changes at the Export-Import Bank and at OPIC will place more 
emphasis on correcting market imperfections as the private sector's 
ability to bear emerging market risks becomes larger, more 
sophisticated, and more efficient.

Performance Assessment

  For FY 2005, the Administration used the Performance Assessment Rating 
Tool (PART) to rate OPIC's insurance and finance programs. The PART 
revealed the insurance program is generally well-managed and that it has 
instituted a meaningful policy to ensure it does not compete with 
private insurance companies. The PART found that the finance program 
could improve its credit function by ensuring the independence of the 
Credit Committee and the credit review process from the deal originating 
departments.

                         IV. INSURANCE PROGRAMS

                            Deposit Insurance

  Federal deposit insurance promotes stability in the U.S. financial 
system. Prior to the establishment of Federal deposit insurance, 
failures of some depository institutions often caused depositors to lose 
confidence in the banking system and rush to withdraw deposits. Such 
sudden withdrawals caused serious disruption to the economy. In 1933, in 
the midst of the Depression, the system of Federal deposit insurance was 
established to protect small depositors and prevent bank failures from 
causing widespread disruption in financial markets. The federal deposit 
insurance system came under serious strain in the late 1980s and early 
1990s when over 2,500 banks and thrifts failed. The Federal Government 
responded with a series of reforms designed

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to improve the safety and soundness of the banking system. These 
reforms, combined with more favorable economic conditions, helped to 
restore the health of depository institutions and the deposit insurance 
system.
  The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insures deposits in 
commercial banks and savings associations (thrifts) through separate 
insurance funds, the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) and the Savings 
Association Insurance Fund (SAIF). The National Credit Union 
Administration (NCUA) administers the insurance fund for most credit 
unions (certain credit unions are privately insured and not covered by 
the fund). FDIC and NCUA insure deposits up to $100,000 per account. 
FDIC insures over $3.4 trillion of deposits at almost 8,000 commercial 
banks and 1,500 savings institutions. NCUA insures about 9,500 credit 
unions with $474 billion in insured shares.

Current Industry and Insurance Fund Conditions

  Four BIF members with combined assets of $1.2 billion dollars failed 
during fiscal year 2003, while no SAIF members failed. In the last five 
years, assets associated with BIF failures have averaged $1.1 billion 
per year, while failures associated with SAIF averaged $465 million. 
During 2003, 8 federally insured credit unions with $25 million in 
assets failed (including assisted mergers). The FDIC currently 
classifies 116 institutions with $30 billion in assets as ``problem 
institutions,'' compared to 148 institutions with $42 billion in assets 
a year ago. By comparison, at the height of the banking crisis in 1989, 
failed assets rose to over $150 billion.
  In the third quarter ending September 30, 2003, banks and thrifts 
reported record-high earnings. In fiscal year 2003, the industry net 
income totaled $115 billion, an increase of 13 percent over fiscal year 
2002. The largest factor in the earnings increase is higher non-interest 
income, particularly growth in securitization income and gains on loan 
sales. Credit quality continues to improve and banks are reporting 
higher returns on assets. Despite the improving trends, prospects for 
higher interest rates cause concerns for the industry as increased 
interest rates usually reduce lending margins.
  In fiscal year 2003, the reserve ratio (ratio of insurance reserves to 
insured deposits) of BIF stayed above the 1.25-percent statutory target. 
As of September 30, 2003, BIF had estimated reserves of $33 billion, or 
1.31 percent of insured deposits. Factors that helped BIF stay above the 
statutory target in fiscal year 2003 include slower deposit growth, 
increases in unrealized gains on securities available for sale, and 
reductions to reserves previously set aside for future estimated losses. 
In 2003, FDIC developed a new model to estimate the amount of reserves 
needed for losses after it completed a study that found faults in its 
current methodology. FDIC continues to refine its new model as it looks 
to incorporate it in their reserve estimating process. The SAIF reserve 
ratio remained comfortably above the designated reserve ratio throughout 
the year. As of September 30, 2003, SAIF had reserves of $12 billion, or 
1.40 percent of insured deposits. Through June 30, 2004, the FDIC will 
continue to maintain deposit insurance premiums in a range from zero for 
the healthiest institutions to 27 cents per $100 of assessable deposits 
for the riskiest institutions. In May, the FDIC will set assessment 
rates for July through December of this year. Due to the strong 
financial condition of the industry and the insurance funds, less than 
10 percent of banks and thrifts paid insurance premiums in 2003.
  The National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF) ended fiscal 
year 2003 with assets of over $6 billion and an equity ratio of 1.28 
percent, below the NCUA-set target ratio of 1.30 percent. Each insured 
credit union is required to deposit and maintain an amount equal to 1 
percent of its member share accounts in the fund. Premiums were waived 
during 2003 because sufficient investment income was generated. As the 
Fund's equity ratio did not exceed 1.30 percent, NCUA did not provide a 
dividend to credit unions in fiscal year 2003.
  As a result of consolidation, fewer large banks control an 
increasingly substantial share of banking assets. Thus, the failure of 
even one of these large institutions could strain the insurance fund. 
Banks are increasingly using sophisticated financial instruments such as 
asset-backed securities and financial derivatives, which could have 
unforeseen effects on risk levels. Whether or not these new instruments 
add to risk, they do complicate the work of regulators who must gauge 
each institution's financial health and the potential for deposit 
insurance losses that a troubled institution may represent.

Federal Deposit Insurance Reform

  While the deposit insurance system is in good condition, the 
Administration supports reforms to make improvements in the operation 
and fairness of the deposit insurance system for banks and thrifts. In 
2003, the Treasury Department and federal banking regulatory agencies 
submitted to the U.S. Senate a draft bill that would accomplish this 
objective. Specifically, the proposal would merge the BIF and the SAIF, 
which offer an identical product. A single merged fund would be stronger 
and better diversified than either fund alone. A merged fund would 
prevent the possibility that institutions posing similar risks would pay 
significantly different premiums for the same product. Under the current 
system, the FDIC is required to maintain a ratio of insurance fund 
reserves to total insured deposits of 1.25 percent. If insurance fund 
reserves fall below the required ratio, the FDIC must charge either 
sufficient premiums to restore the reserve ratio to 1.25 percent within 
one year, or no less than 23 basis points if the reserve ratio remains 
below 1.25 percent for more than one year. The Administration's proposal 
would give the FDIC authority to adjust the ratio periodically within 
prescribed upper and lower bounds and greater discretion in determining 
how quickly it restores the ratio to target levels. This flexibility 
would help the

[[Page 94]]

banking industry to stabilize the premium costs over time and to avoid 
sharp premium increases when the economy might be under stress. Finally, 
the FDIC has been prohibited since 1996 from charging premiums to 
``well-capitalized'' and well-run institutions as long as insurance fund 
reserves equal or exceed 1.25 percent of insured deposits. Therefore, 
less than 10 percent of banks and thrifts pay insurance premiums, 
allowing a large number of financial institutions to rapidly increase 
their insured deposits without any contribution to the insurance fund. 
The Administration proposal would repeal this prohibition to ensure that 
institutions with rapidly increasing insured deposits or greater risks 
appropriately compensate the insurance fund.

                           Pension Guarantees

  The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) insures most defined-
benefit pension plans sponsored by private employers. PBGC pays the 
benefits guaranteed by law when a company with an underfunded pension 
plan becomes insolvent. PBGC's exposure to claims relates to the 
underfunding of pension plans, that is, to any amount by which vested 
future benefits exceed plan assets. In the near term, its loss exposure 
results from financially distressed firms with underfunded plans. In the 
longer term, additional loss exposure results from the possibility that 
currently healthy firms become distressed and currently well-funded 
plans become underfunded due to inadequate contributions or poor 
investment results.
  PBGC monitors troubled companies with underfunded plans and acts, in 
bankruptcies, to protect its beneficiaries and the future of the 
program. Such protections include, where necessary, initiating plan 
termination. Under its Early Warning Program, PBGC negotiates 
settlements with companies that improve pension security and reduce 
PBGC's future exposure to risk.
  PBGC's single-employer program ended 2002 at a deficit of $3.6 
billion, which deepened in 2003 to about $11.3 billion. The deficit has 
resulted from record losses on plan terminations in 2001 through 2003. 
In 2002 LTV, a steel company, terminated its plan with underfunding of 
nearly $2 billion, which then was PBGC's largest claim ever. But in 
December 2002, an even larger pension plan terminated. Bethlehem Steel's 
plan covered 95,000 workers and retirees and was underfunded by about 
$4.3 billion, of which PBGC is liable for about $3.6 billion. Other 
large underfunded terminations in 2003 included Columbia Hospital for 
Women, Consolidated Freightways, Geneva Steel, Hawaii Baking Company, 
National Steel, and US Airways' Pilots Plan. Since year's end, PBGC has 
terminated Kaiser Aluminum Salaried Plan, Pillowtex, and Weirton Steel.
  Moreover this ``snapshot'' measure of PBGC's deficit could hide 
significant risk of further losses. It includes the financial effects 
only of pension plans that have already terminated and of seriously 
underfunded large plans for which termination is considered 
``probable.'' Additional risk and exposure may remain for the future 
because of economic uncertainties and significant underfunding in 
single-employer pension plans, which exceeded an estimated $350 billion 
at year end, compared to $50 billion in December 2000. Some of the 
companies with the most underfunded plans are in financially troubled 
industries (like airlines or the old-line steel companies), or are 
already in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings.
  The smaller multiemployer program guarantees pension benefits of 
certain unionized plans offered by several employers in an industry. It 
ended 2003 with its first deficit in over 20 years, of about $261 
million. Underfunding in multiemployer plans approximated $100 billion 
at year end.
  PBGC is not in crisis--the agency has sufficient assets to meet its 
obligations for a number of years into the future--but it is clear that 
the financial integrity of the federal pension insurance system is at 
risk.
  Looking to the long term, in order to avoid benefit reductions, 
strengthen PBGC, and help stabilize the defined-benefit pension system, 
the 2005 Budget proposes legislative reforms to:
    Give employers two years of relief from current pension plan 
          contribution requirements--now tied to 30-year Treasury bond 
          interest rates--and base requirements on more appropriate 
          corporate bond rates.
    After the two-year transition period, base pension funding 
          requirements on a ``yield curve'' (commonly used in corporate 
          finance), which would better tie funding requirements to the 
          timing of the payout of retiree benefits.
    Make additional changes to restrict promises of added 
          benefits by severely underfunded plans and to provide better 
          information on pension finances to workers, retirees, and 
          stockholders.
  Additionally, the Administration is developing a plan for 
comprehensive reform of the pension funding rules to: strengthen funding 
for workers' defined-benefit pensions; simplify funding rules; offer 
sponsors new, flexible approaches to finance their plans without the 
present yearly volatility; and make additional reforms to ensure PBGC's 
continued ability to safeguard pension benefits.

[[Page 95]]

                           Disaster Insurance

Flood Insurance

  The Federal Government provides flood insurance through the National 
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), which is administered by the Emergency 
Preparedness and Response Directorate of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS). Flood insurance is available to homeowners and 
businesses in communities that have adopted and enforced appropriate 
flood plain management measures. Coverage is limited to buildings and 
their contents. By 2005, the program is projected to have approximately 
4.7 million policies from more than 19,000 communities with $699 billion 
of insurance in force.
  Prior to the creation of the program in 1968, many factors made it 
cost prohibitive for private insurance companies alone to make 
affordable flood insurance available. In response, the NFIP was 
established to make insurance coverage widely available. The NFIP 
requires building standards and other mitigation efforts to reduce 
losses, and operates a flood hazard mapping program to quantify the 
geographic risk of flooding. These efforts have made substantial 
progress.
  The number of policies in the program has grown significantly over 
time. The number of enrolled policies grew from 2.4 to 4.3 million 
between 1990 and 2002, and by about 34,000 policies in 2003. DHS is 
using three strategies to increase the number of flood insurance 
policies in force: lender compliance, program simplification, and 
expanded marketing. DHS is educating financial regulators about the 
mandatory flood insurance requirement for properties with mortgages from 
federally regulated lenders. The NFIP also has a multi-pronged strategy 
for reducing future flood damage. The NFIP offers mitigation insurance 
to allow flood victims to rebuild to code, thereby reducing future flood 
damage costs. Further, through the Community Rating System, DHS adjusts 
premium rates to encourage community and State mitigation activities 
beyond those required by the NFIP.
  Despite these efforts, the program faces financial challenges. The 
program's financing account, which is a cash fund, has sometimes had 
expenses greater than its revenue, preventing it from building 
sufficient long-term reserves. This is mostly because a large portion of 
the policyholders pay subsidized premiums. DHS charges subsidized 
premiums for properties built before a community adopted the NFIP 
building standards. Properties built subsequently are charged 
actuarially fair rates. The creators of the NFIP assumed that eventually 
the NFIP would become self-sustaining as older properties left the 
program. The share of subsidized properties in the program has fallen, 
but remains substantial; it was 70 percent in 1978 and is 28 percent 
today.
  Until the mid-1980s, Congress appropriated funds periodically to 
support subsidized premiums. However, the program has not received 
appropriations since 1986. During the 1990s, FEMA, which is now part of 
DHS, relied on Treasury borrowing to help finance its loss expenses (the 
NFIP may borrow up to $1.5 billion). As of October 31, 2002, the NFIP 
had repaid all of its outstanding debt.
  Although the program is generally well run, it receives some criticism 
about the low participation rate and the inclusion of subsidized 
properties, especially those that are repetitively flooded. The program 
has identified approximately 11,000 properties for mitigation action. To 
the extent they are available; funds will come from the Hazard 
Mitigation Grant Program, the Predisaster Mitigation Grant Program, and 
the Flood Mitigation Grant Program. There is also current legislation 
pending to address the problem of repetitive loss properties. An 
additional problem is the fairly low participation rate. Currently, less 
than half of the eligible properties in identified flood plains 
participate in this program. In comparison, the participation rate for 
private wind and hurricane insurance is nearly 90 percent in at-risk 
areas. Given that flood damage causes roughly $6 billion in property 
damage annually, DHS will have to evaluate its incentive structure to 
attract more participation in the program, while not encouraging misuse 
of the program.

Crop Insurance

  Subsidized Federal crop insurance administered by USDA's Risk 
Management Agency (RMA) plays an important role in assisting farmers to 
manage yield and revenue shortfalls due to bad weather or other natural 
disasters. RMA continues to evaluate and, as appropriate, provide new 
products so that the Government can further reduce the need for ad-hoc 
disaster assistance payments to the agriculture community in bad years.
  The USDA crop insurance program is a cooperative effort between the 
Federal Government and the private insurance industry. Private insurance 
companies sell and service crop insurance policies. These companies rely 
to varying degrees on reinsurance provided by the Federal Government and 
the commercial reinsurance market to manage their individual risk 
portfolio. The Federal Government also reimburses private companies for 
the administrative expenses associated with providing crop insurance and 
reinsures the private companies for excess insurance losses on all 
policies. The Federal Government also subsidizes premiums for farmers. 
In crop year 2003, 215 million acres were insured, with an estimated 
$3.4 billion in total premiums collected, including $2 billion in 
premium subsidy.
  During FY 2004 RMA will be renegotiating the Standard Reinsurance 
Agreement (SRA). The SRA contains the operational and financial risk 
sharing terms between the Federal government and the private companies. 
The Agriculture Risk Protection Act of 2000 (ARPA) allowed these terms 
to be renegotiated once during the 2001 and 2005 reinsurance years. RMA 
is taking this opportunity to strengthen the document now

[[Page 96]]

to address such issues as company oversight and quality control. In 
addition, significant attention will be given to evaluating all the 
financial incentives, risk sharing scenarios and administrative cost 
reimbursement percentages to ensure that the companies and the Federal 
government are bearing an appropriate amount of the costs associated 
with the crop insurance program. RMA is seeking to finalize the new SRA 
by June of 2004.
  There are various types of insurance programs. The most basic type of 
coverage is Catastrophic Crop Insurance (CAT), which compensates the 
farmer for losses up to 50 percent of the individual's average yield at 
55 percent of the expected market price. The CAT premium is entirely 
subsidized, and farmers pay only a small administrative fee. Commercial 
insurance companies deliver the product to the producer in all states. 
Additional coverage is available to producers who wish to insure crops 
above the basic coverage. Premium rates for additional coverage depend 
on the level of coverage selected and vary from crop to crop and county 
to county. The additional levels of insurance coverage are more 
attractive to farmers due to availability of optional units, other 
policy provisions not available with CAT coverage, and the ability to 
obtain a level of protection that permits them to use crop insurance as 
loan collateral and to achieve greater financial security. Private 
companies sell and service the catastrophic portion of the crop 
insurance program, and also provide higher levels of coverage, which are 
also federally subsidized. Approximately 80 percent of eligible acres 
participated in one or more crop insurance programs in 2003.
  There are also a wide range of yield and revenue-based insurance 
products are available through the crop insurance program. Revenue 
insurance programs protect against loss of revenue stemming from low 
prices, poor yields, or a combination of both. These programs extend 
traditional multi-peril crop insurance protection by adding price 
variability to production history. Indemnities are due when any 
combination of yield and price results in revenue that is less than the 
revenue guarantee. The price component common to these plans uses the 
commodity futures market for price discovery.
  USDA also continues to expand coverage. In September 2001, RMA 
published an interim rule that allows RMA to reimburse developers of 
private crop insurance products for their research and development costs 
and maintenance costs.
  Two pilot insurance programs for Iowa swine producers to protect them 
from lower hog prices began in 2002. The Livestock Gross Margin (LGM) 
and the Livestock Risk Protection (LRP). The LRP program was expanded in 
August 2003 to 10 additional states.
  In April 2003, RMA announced two pilot programs that will extend 
insurance protection to fed and feeder cattle. They are designed to 
insure against declining market prices. Both offer coverage prices based 
on expected cash prices. The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) 
will subsidize 13 percent of the producer's gross premium under both 
programs. LRP-Feeder Cattle is available in 10 states. LRP-Fed Cattle is 
available to producers in three states.
  For more information and additional crop insurance program details, 
please reference RMA's web site: (www.rma.usda.gov).

                Insurance against Security-Related Risks

  The Federal Government offers terrorism risk insurance and Airline War 
Risk Insurance on a temporary basis, and has created the smallpox injury 
compensation program. After the September 11 attacks, private insurers 
became reluctant to insure against security-related risks such as 
terrorism and war. Those events are so uncertain in terms of both the 
frequency of occurrence and the magnitude of potential loss that private 
insurers have difficulty estimating the expected loss. Furthermore, 
terrorism can produce a large loss that could wipe out private insurers' 
capital. These uncertainties make the private sector reluctant to 
provide security-related insurance. Thus, it is necessary for the 
Federal Government to insure against security-related risks, until the 
private sector learns enough to be comfortable about estimating those 
risks, to ensure the smooth functioning of the economy.

Terrorism Risk Insurance

  On November 26, 2002, President Bush signed into law the Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Act of 2002. The Act was designed to address disruptions 
in economic activity caused by the withdrawal of many insurance 
companies from the marketplace for terrorism risk insurance in the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Their 
withdrawal in the face of great uncertainty as to their risk exposure to 
future terrorist attacks led to a moratorium in construction projects, 
increased business costs for the insurance that was available, and 
substantial shifting of risk--from reinsurers to primary insurers, and 
from insurers to policyholders (e.g., investors, businesses, and 
property owners). Ultimately, these costs were borne by American workers 
and communities through decreased development and economic activity.
  The Act establishes a temporary Federal program that provides for a 
system of shared public and private compensation for insured commercial 
property and casualty losses arising from acts of terrorism. The program 
is administered by the Treasury Department and will sunset on December 
31, 2005.
  Under the Act, insurance companies included under the program must 
make available to their policyholders during the first two years of the 
program coverage for losses from acts of terrorism (as defined by the 
Act), and Treasury is required to determine whether to extend this 
requirement into the third and final year of the program. The Act also 
requires as a condition

[[Page 97]]

for Federal payment that insurance companies disclose to policyholders 
the premium charged for terrorism risk insurance and the Federal share 
of compensation under the program.
  In the event of a future terrorist attack on private businesses and 
others covered by this program, insurance companies will cover insured 
losses up to each company's deductible as specified in the Act. Insured 
losses above that amount in a given year would be shared between the 
insurance company and the Treasury, with Treasury covering 90 percent of 
the losses above the company's deductible. However, neither the Treasury 
nor any insurer would be liable for any amount exceeding the statutory 
annual cap of $100 billion in aggregate insured losses. The Act also 
provides authority for the Treasury to recoup Federal payments via 
surcharges on policyholders. In some circumstances this recoupment is 
mandatory, in other circumstances, as specified in the Act, its exercise 
is optional.
  Promptly after the Act was signed into law, Treasury issued a number 
of interim guidance notices to assist the insurance industry in 
complying with the requirements of the Act. The interim guidance notices 
were directly followed by the issuance of formal regulations to 
implement the Act. Treasury has also created a separate Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Program office to implement the Act, which includes setting up 
an infrastructure to handle potential claims under the Act.

Airline War Risk Insurance

  After the September 11, 2001 attacks, private insurers cancelled third 
party liability war risk coverage for airlines and dramatically 
increased the cost of other war risk insurance. In response, the 
Department of Transportation (DOT) provided a short-term reimbursement 
to airlines for the increased cost of aviation hull and passenger 
liability war risk insurance under the authority provided in P.L. 107-
42. Under Presidential Determination No. 01-29, the President delegated 
the authority to extend the duration of aviation insurance to the 
Secretary of Transportation. Due to the extended disruption in the 
marketplace, DOT also offered airlines third-party liability war risk 
insurance coverage at subsidized rates to replace coverage initially 
withdrawn by private insurers. DOT has continued to provide insurance 
coverage in 60-day increments since 2001.
  The Homeland Security Act of 2002 included airline war risk insurance 
legislation. This law extended the term of third party war risk coverage 
and expanded the scope of coverage to include war risk hull, passenger, 
crew, and property liability insurance. Under the law, the Secretary of 
Transportation was directed to extend insurance policies until August 
31, 2003. In addition, the law also limited the total premium for the 
three types of insurance to twice the premium rate charged for the third 
party liability insurance as of June 19, 2002. In 2003 the Department of 
Defense supplemental appropriation further extended the mandatory 
provision of insurance through August 31, 2004. Consequently, in 
December 2003 the President issued Presidential Determination 2004-13 
which authorizes the continued provision of insurance now in force 
through August 31, 2004 and the DOT expects to amend current policies to 
conform to that date. Recently, the basic authority of the insurance 
program was extended through December 31, 2008 by P.L. 108-176, Vision 
100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act.
  Currently 76 air carriers are insured by DOT. Coverage for individual 
carriers ranges from $80 million to $4 billion per carrier with the 
median insurance coverage at approximately $1.8 billion per occurrence. 
Premiums collected by the Government are deposited into the Aviation 
Insurance Revolving Fund. In FY 2003, the fund collected approximately 
$136 million in premiums for insurance provided by DOT. In FY 2004, it 
is anticipated that up to $125 million in premiums may be collected by 
DOT for the provision of insurance. At the end of FY 2003, the balance 
of the Aviation Insurance Revolving Fund used to pay claims was $218 
million. Any claims by the airlines that exceed the balance in the 
aviation insurance revolving fund would be paid by the Federal 
Government.

Smallpox Injury Compensation

  The Administration has taken steps to insure the immediate 
mobilization of emergency response personnel in the event of a smallpox 
attack. The Smallpox Injury Compensation Program, set up under the 
Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act of 2003, encourages 
vaccination of designated emergency personnel by providing benefits and/
or compensation to certain persons harmed as a direct result of 
receiving smallpox countermeasures, including the smallpox vaccine. Only 
persons receiving the smallpox vaccine under the Department of Health 
and Human Services Declaration Regarding the Administration of Smallpox 
Countermeasures are eligible for benefits. Also, the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 provided medical liability protection to doctors, drug 
manufacturers, and hospitals that administer smallpox vaccine and other 
countermeasures during an emergency declaration.

                                     

[[Page 98]]





[[Page 99]]



                    Table 7-1.  ESTIMATED FUTURE COST OF OUTSTANDING FEDERAL CREDIT PROGRAMS
                                            (in billions of dollars)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                      Estimated                     Estimated
                                                      Outstanding  Future Costs of  Outstanding  Future Costs of
                       Program                            2002           2002           2003           2003
                                                                   Outstanding \1\               Outstanding \1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Direct Loans \2\
  Federal Student Loan Programs.....................           99             14            102             10
  Farm Service Agency (excl.CCC), Rural Development,           45             11             44             11
   Rural Housing....................................
  Rural Utilities Service and Rural Telephone Bank..           32              2             32              3
  Housing and Urban Development.....................           12              2             13              3
  Agency for International Development..............            9              7              9              4
  Public Law 480....................................           11              2             11              7
  Export-Import Bank................................           12              4             11              4
  Commodity Credit Corporation......................            5              3              7              3
  Federal Communications Commission.................            5              *              5              1
  Disaster Assistance...............................            4              *              3              1
  Other Direct Loan Programs........................           14              *             12              *
                                                     -----------------------------------------------------------
    Total Direct Loans..............................          248             45            249             47
                                                     -----------------------------------------------------------
Guaranteed Loans: \2\
  FHA Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund................          467              3            407              2
  VA Mortgage.......................................          265              6            323              5
  Federal Family Education Loan Program.............          182             12            213             15
  FHA General/Special Risk Insurance Fund...........           96              5             89              4
  Small Business....................................           41              1             53              2
  Export-Import Bank................................           31              5             34              3
  International Assistance..........................           19              2             19              2
  Farm Service Agency and Rural Housing.............           23              *             24              1
  Commodity Credit Corporation......................            5              1              4              *
  Other Guaranteed Loan Programs....................           17              2             18              2
                                                     -----------------------------------------------------------
    Total Guaranteed Loans..........................        1,146             37          1,184             36
                                                     -----------------------------------------------------------
      Total Federal Credit..........................        1,394             82          1,433             83
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Less than $500 million.
\1\ Direct loan future costs are the financing account allowance for subsidy cost and the liquidating account
  allowance for estimated uncollectible principal and interest. Loan guarantee future costs are estimated
  liabilities for loan guarantees.
\2\ Excludes loans and guarantees by deposit insurance agencies and programs not included under credit reform,
  such as CCC commodity price supports. Defaulted guaranteed loans which become loans receivable are accounted
  for as direct loans.


[[Page 100]]


                                  Table 7-2.  REESTIMATES OF CREDIT SUBSIDIES ON LOANS DISBURSED BETWEEN 1992-2003 \1\
                                                 (Budget authority and outlays, in millions of dollars)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                       Program                           1994     1995     1996     1997     1998     1999     2000     2001     2002     2003     2004
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    DIRECT LOANS:
 
Agriculture:
  Agriculture credit insurance fund..................      -72       28        2      -31       23  .......      331     -656      921       10     -701
  Farm storage facility loans........................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       -1       -7       -8
  Apple loans........................................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       -2        1  .......
  Emergency boll weevil loan.........................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......        1        *
  Agricultural conservation..........................       -1  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......
  Distance learning and telemedicine.................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......        1       -1  .......
  Rural electrification and telecommunications loans.        *       61      -37       84  .......      -39  .......      -17      -42      101  .......
  Rural telephone bank...............................        1  .......  .......       10  .......       -9  .......       -1  .......       -3       -7
  Rural housing insurance fund.......................        2      152       46      -73  .......       71  .......       19      -29     -435  .......
  Rural economic development loans...................  .......  .......  .......        1  .......       -1        *  .......       -1       -1  .......
  Rural development loan program.....................  .......        1  .......  .......  .......       -6  .......  .......       -1       -3  .......
  Rural community advancement program \2\............  .......  .......  .......        8  .......        5  .......       37        3       -1  .......
  P.L. 480...........................................  .......  .......      -37       -1  .......  .......  .......      -23       65     -348       33
  P.L. 480 Title I food for progress credits.........  .......       84      -38  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......     -112      -44
 
Commerce:
  Fisheries finance..................................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......      -19       -1       -3        1
 
Defense:
  Military housing improvement fund..................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       -1
 
Education:
  Federal direct student loan program: \3\
    Volume reestimate................................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       22  .......       -6  .......       43  .......
    Other technical reestimate.......................  .......  .......        3      -83      172     -383   -2,158      560  .......    3,678    2,005
  College housing and academic facilities loans......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       -1  .......  .......  .......
 
Homeland Security:
  Disaster assistance................................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       47       36       -7       -6        *
 
Interior:
  Bureau of Reclamation loans........................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......        3        3       -9      -14  .......
  Bureau of Indian Affairs direct loans..............  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......        1        5       -1       -1        2        *
  Assistance to American Samoa.......................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......        *
 
Transportation:
  High priority corridor loans.......................  .......  .......  .......  .......       -3  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......
  Alameda corridor loan..............................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......      -58  .......  .......  .......      -50
  Transportation infrastructure finance and            .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       18  .......  .......       -4
   innovation........................................
  Railroad rehabilitation and improvement program....  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       -5
 
Treasury:
  Community development financial institutions fund..  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......        1  .......  .......        *       -2
 
Veterans Affairs:
  Veterans housing benefit program fund..............      -39       30       76      -72      465     -111      -52     -107     -697       17     -178
  Native American veteran housing....................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       -3        *
  Vocational rehabilitation loans....................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......        *        *
 
Environmental Protection Agency:
  Abatement, control and compliance..................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......        3       -1        *       -3
 
General Services Administration:
  Columbia hospital for women........................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       -6  .......  .......
 
International Assistance Programs:
  Foreign military financing.........................  .......  .......  .......       13        4        1      152     -166      119     -397      -64
  U.S. Agency for International Development:
    Micro and small enterprise development...........  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......        *  .......        *
  Overseas Private Investment Corporation:
    OPIC direct loans................................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       -4      -21
  Debt reduction.....................................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       36       -4  .......        *      -48
 
Small Business Administration:
  Business loans.....................................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......        1       -2        1  .......
  Disaster loans.....................................  .......  .......  .......  .......     -193      246     -398     -282      -14      266      624
 
Other Independent Agencies:
  Export-Import Bank direct loans....................      -28      -16       37  .......  .......  .......     -177      157      117     -640     -353
  Federal Communications Commission spectrum auction.  .......  .......  .......  .......    4,592      980   -1,501     -804       92      346      380
 

[[Page 101]]

 
                   LOAN GUARANTEES:
 
Agriculture:
  Agriculture credit insurance fund..................        5       14       12      -51       96  .......      -31      205       40      -36      -32
  Agriculture resource conservation demonstration      .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......        2  .......        1        *
   project...........................................
  Commodity Credit Corporation export guarantees.....        3      103     -426      343  .......  .......  .......   -1,410  .......      -13     -431
  Rural development insurance fund...................       49  .......  .......       -3  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......
  Rural housing insurance fund.......................        2       10        7      -10  .......      109  .......      152      -56       32  .......
  Rural community advancement program \2\............  .......  .......  .......      -10  .......       41  .......       63       17       91  .......
 
Commerce:
  Fisheries finance..................................  .......  .......  .......  .......       -2  .......  .......       -3       -1        3        *
  Emergency steel guaranteed loans...................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       50        *
  Emergency oil and gas guaranteed loans.............  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......        *        *        *        *
 
Defense:
  Military housing improvement fund..................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       -2
  Defense export loan guarantee......................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       -4
 
Education:
  Federal family education loan program: \3\
    Volume reestimate................................  .......  .......      535       99  .......      -13      -60      -42  .......      277  .......
    Other technical reestimate.......................       97      421       60  .......  .......     -140      667   -3,484  .......   -2,483   -3,278
 
Health and Human Services:
  Heath center loan guarantees.......................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......        3  .......        *        *        *
  Health education assistance loans..................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       -5      -37
 
Housing and Urban Development:
  Indian housing loan guarantee......................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       -6        *       -1        *
  Title VI Indian guarantees.........................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       -1        1
  Community development loan guarantees..............  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       19
  FHA-mutual mortgage insurance......................  .......  .......  .......     -340  .......    3,789  .......    2,413   -1,308    1,100    5,947
  FHA-general and special risk.......................     -175  .......     -110      -25      743       79  .......     -217     -403       77      351
 
Interior:
  Bureau of Indian Affairs guaranteed loans..........  .......  .......  .......       31  .......  .......  .......      -14       -1       -2       -1
 
Transportation:
  Maritime guaranteed loans (title XI)...............  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......      -71       30      -15      187       27      -16
  Minority business resource center..................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......        1  .......        *
 
Treasury:
  Air transportation stabilization program...........  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......      113     -199
 
Veterans Affairs:
  Veterans housing benefit fund program..............     -447      167      334     -706       38      492      229     -770     -163     -184   -1,547
 
International Assistance Programs:
  U.S. Agency for International Development:
    Development credit authority.....................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       -1  .......        *
    Micro and small enterprise development...........  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......        4
    Urban and environmental credit...................       -2       -1       -7  .......      -14  .......  .......  .......       -4      -15       48
    Assistance to the new independent states of the    .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......      -34  .......  .......
     former Soviet Union \4\.........................
    Loan guarantees to Israel........................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......      -76
  Overseas Private Investment Corporation:
    OPIC guaranteed loans............................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......        5       77       60
 
Small Business Administration:
  Business loans.....................................  .......  .......      257      -16     -279     -545     -235     -528     -226      304    1,750
 
Other Independent Agencies:
  Export-Import Bank guarantees......................      -11      -59       13  .......  .......  .......     -191   -1,520     -417   -2,042   -1,031
                                                      --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total............................................     -616      995      727     -832    5,642    4,518   -3,641   -6,427   -1,860     -142    3,083
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Less than $500,000.
\1\ Excludes interest on reestimates. Additional information on credit reform subsidy rates is contained in the Federal Credit Supplement.
\2\ Includes rural water and waste disposal, rural community facilities, and rural business and industry programs.
\3\ Volume reestimates in mandatory loan guarantee programs represent a change in volume of loans disbursed in the prior years. These estimates are the
  result of guarantee programs where data from loan issuers on actual disbursements of loans are not received until after the close of the fiscal year.
\4\ Closing reestimate executed in fiscal year 2002.


[[Page 102]]


                                   Table 7-3.  DIRECT LOAN SUBSIDY RATES, BUDGET AUTHORITY, AND LOAN LEVELS, 2003-2005
                                                                (in millions of dollars)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                      2003 Actual                    2004 Enacted                  2005 Proposed
                                                            --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     Agency and Program                                 Subsidy                        Subsidy                        Subsidy
                                                              Subsidy    budget     Loan     Subsidy    budget     Loan     Subsidy    budget     Loan
                                                             rate \1\  authority   levels   rate \1\  authority   levels   rate \1\  authority   levels
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agriculture:
  Agricultural credit insurance fund.......................     14.71        155     1,054     13.10        109       832      8.11         74       912
  Farm storage facility loans..............................      1.28          2       147      0.46  .........        82     -2.44         -2        82
  Rural community advancement program......................     10.00        104     1,040      1.96         30     1,532      7.85        102     1,300
  Rural electrification and telecommunications loans.......     -0.85        -38     4,454     -1.73        -76     4,404     -1.15        -35     3,035
  Rural telephone bank.....................................      1.38          2       168     -4.32         -7       174  ........  .........  ........
  Distance learning, telemedicine, and broadband program...      1.30          1        77      2.30         49     2,131      2.75          8       291
  Farm labor...............................................     49.02         30        61     42.73         18        42     47.06         20        42
  Rural housing insurance fund.............................     22.47        269     1,197     12.11        184     1,520     13.48        164     1,217
  Rural development loan fund..............................     48.26         19        40     43.27         17        40     46.38         16        34
  Rural economic development loans.........................     21.36          3        15     18.61          3        15     18.79          5        25
  Public law 480 title I...................................     62.84         51        81     78.90         30        38     86.42         26        30
 
Commerce:
  Fisheries finance........................................     -5.52         -8       145     -2.44         -4       164    -13.33         -4        30
 
Defense--Military:
  Family housing improvement fund..........................     21.71         28       129     69.23        153       221     34.22        181       529
 
Education:
  College housing and academic facilities loans............  ........  .........       269  ........  .........       269  ........  .........       170
  Federal direct student loan program......................     -1.50       -318    21,205     -1.19       -250    21,013     -2.93       -648    22,287
 
Homeland Security:
  Disaster assistance direct loan..........................     -4.10         -1        25     -2.02         -1        25     -2.60         -1        25
 
Housing and Urban Development:
  FHA-mutual mortgage insurance............................  ........  .........        50  ........  .........        50  ........  .........        50
  FHA-general and special risk.............................  ........  .........        50  ........  .........        50  ........  .........        50
 
State:
  Repatriation loans.......................................     80.00          1         1     70.75          1         1     69.73          1         1
 
Transportation:
  Federal-aid highways.....................................      7.10         10       140      5.96        127     2,400      5.94        131     2,400
 
Treasury:
  Community development financial institutions fund........     32.85          1         4     34.37          4        11     36.52          4        11
 
Veterans Affairs:
  Vocational rehabilitation and employment administration..      1.50  .........         3      1.33  .........         4      1.14  .........         4
  Housing..................................................     -1.54         -7       566     -0.44         -5     1,135     -4.49        -77     1,715
 
International Assistance Programs:
  Foreign military financing loan..........................  ........  .........     3,800     -0.05  .........       550  ........  .........  ........
  Debt restructuring.......................................  ........        211  ........  ........         59  ........  ........        105  ........
  Overseas Private Investment Corporation..................      4.97         20       394     16.78         24       143     17.12         19       111
 
Small Business Administration:
  Disaster loans...........................................     15.21        117       769     11.72         56       758     12.86         79       614
  Business loans...........................................     13.05          4        29      9.55          2        20     10.25  .........  ........
 
Export-Import Bank of the United States:
  Export-Import Bank loans.................................      1.72          1        58     34.00         17        50     34.00         17        50
                                                            --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total..................................................       N/A        657    35,971       N/A        540    37,674       N/A        185    35,015
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
N/A = Not applicable.
\1\  Additional information on credit subsidy rates is contained in the Federal Credit Supplement.


[[Page 103]]


                                 Table 7-4.  LOAN GUARANTEE SUBSIDY RATES, BUDGET AUTHORITY, AND LOAN LEVELS, 2003-2005
                                                                (in millions of dollars)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                      2003 Actual                    2004 Enacted                  2005 Proposed
                                                            --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     Agency and Program                                 Subsidy                        Subsidy                        Subsidy
                                                              Subsidy    budget     Loan     Subsidy    budget     Loan     Subsidy    budget     Loan
                                                             rate \1\  authority   levels   rate \1\  authority   levels   rate \1\  authority   levels
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agriculture:
  Agricultural credit insurance fund.......................      3.38         90     2,662      3.27         79     2,416      2.83         81     2,866
  Commodity Credit Corporation export loans................      4.10        170     4,146      6.96        289     4,155      6.82        309     4,528
  Rural community advancement program......................      3.28         35     1,067      2.99         25       837      3.28         29       885
  Rural electrification and telecommunications loans.......      0.08  .........  ........      0.06  .........        99      0.06  .........       100
  Distance learning, telemedicine, and broadband program...  ........  .........  ........      3.75          3        80      5.00          2        40
  Local television loan guarantee..........................  ........  .........  ........      8.46         44       520  ........  .........  ........
  Rural housing insurance fund.............................      1.22         39     3,186      1.64         46     2,808      1.31         37     2,825
  Rural business investment................................     20.00  .........  ........     20.00  .........  ........     20.00  .........  ........
 
Commerce:
  Emergency steel guaranteed loan..........................     27.69         69       250  ........  .........  ........  ........  .........  ........
 
Defense--Military:
  Procurement of ammunition, Army..........................      3.34          1        17      3.38          1        16  ........  .........  ........
  Family housing improvement fund..........................      3.70          7       189      1.54          4       259      9.65         14       145
 
Education:
  Federal family education loan............................      9.57      6,411    66,976      9.19      6,501    70,760      9.47      7,050    71,349
 
Health and Human Services:
  Health education assistance loans........................     15.76         16       100     16.48         25       150  ........  .........  ........
  Health resources and services............................      3.65          1         4      4.68          1        17      5.64          1        17
 
Housing and Urban Development:
  Indian housing loan guarantee fund.......................      2.43          5       197      2.73          5       197      2.58          1        29
  Native Hawaiian housing loan guarantee fund..............      2.43          1        40      2.73          1        40      2.58          1        37
  Native American housing block grant......................     11.07          2        17     10.56          2        18     10.32          2        18
  Community development loan guarantees....................      2.30          6       275      2.30          6       275  ........  .........  ........
  FHA-mutual mortgage insurance............................     -2.53     -3,584   165,000     -2.47     -3,545   185,000     -1.73     -2,627   185,000
  FHA-general and special risk.............................     -1.02       -254    25,000     -1.17       -293    25,000     -0.69       -242    35,000
 
Interior:
  Indian guaranteed loan...................................      6.91          5        72      6.13          5        84      6.76          5        86
 
Transportation:
  Minority business resource center program................      2.69  .........         9      2.53  .........        18      2.08          1        18
  Federal-aid highways.....................................  ........  .........  ........      4.77         10       200      4.68          9       200
  Maritime guaranteed loan (title XI)......................      6.09         21       345      6.10         25       410      6.76         25       370
 
Treasury:
  Air transportation stabilization \2\.....................     13.70        180     1,276     -8.93         -3        30  ........  .........  ........
 
Veterans Affairs:
  Veterans housing benefit program.........................      0.83        547    66,074      0.58        275    47,312     -0.21        -86    41,829
 
International Assistance Programs:
  Loan guarantees to Israel................................  ........  .........     1,600  ........  .........     3,460  ........  .........     3,650
  Development credit authority.............................      6.44         18       280      3.11         21       675      4.31         21       487
  Overseas Private Investment Corporation..................     -8.01        -57       712      1.81          5       276      0.49          3       615
 
Small Business Administration:
  Business loans...........................................      0.77        118    15,318      0.38         79    20,986  ........  .........    29,000
 
Export-Import Bank of the United States:
  Export-Import Bank loans.................................      3.06        320    10,449      3.03        349    11,507      3.94        474    11,976
 
Presidio Trust:
  Presidio Trust...........................................  ........  .........  ........      0.14  .........       200      0.05  .........  ........
                                                            --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total..................................................       N/A      4,167   365,261       N/A      3,960   377,805       N/A      5,110   391,070
                                                            --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 ADDENDUM: SECONDARY GUARANTEED LOAN COMMITMENT LIMITATIONS
 
GNMA:
  Guarantees of mortgage-backed securities loan guarantee..     -0.33       -398   252,870     -0.27       -405   200,000     -0.23       -368   200,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
N/A = Not applicable.
\1\  Additional information on credit subsidy rates is contained in the Federal Credit Supplement.
\2\ Numbers shown for 2004 include estimates for loan guarantees that have received either conditional or final approval. This presentation should not
  be construed as prejudging the outcome of the Air Transportation Stabilization Board's deliberations. The Board does not anticipate making any loan
  guarantees in 2005.


[[Page 104]]


                                             Table 7-5.  SUMMARY OF FEDERAL DIRECT LOANS AND LOAN GUARANTEES
                                                                (In billions of dollars)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                    Actual                                                Estimate
                                           -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                               1996       1997       1998       1999       2000       2001       2002       2003       2004       2005
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Direct Loans:
  Obligations.............................       23.4       33.6       28.8       38.4       37.1       39.1       43.7       45.4       46.4       44.5
  Disbursements...........................       23.6       32.2       28.7       37.7       35.5       37.1       39.6       39.7       39.0       41.5
  New subsidy budget authority \2\........          *          *       -0.8        1.6       -0.4        0.3          *        0.7        0.5        0.2
  Reestimated subsidy budget authority \1\  .........  .........        7.3        1.0       -4.4       -1.8        0.5        2.9        2.3  .........
  Total subsidy budget authority \3\......        1.8        2.4        6.5        2.6       -4.8       -1.5        0.5        3.5        2.8        0.2
 
Loan Guarantees:
  Commitments.............................      175.4      172.3      218.4      252.4      192.6      256.4      303.7      345.9      338.4      349.5
  Lender disbursements....................      143.9      144.7      199.5      224.7      180.8      212.9      271.4      331.3      318.1      333.5
  New subsidy budget authority \2\........          *          *        3.3          *        3.6        2.3        2.9        3.8        3.6        4.7
  Reestimated subsidy budget authority \1\  .........  .........       -0.7        4.3        0.3       -7.1       -2.4       -3.5        1.5  .........
  Total subsidy budget authority..........        4.0        3.6        2.6        4.3        3.9       -4.8        0.5        0.3        5.0        4.7
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Less than $50 million.
\1\ Includes interest on reestimate.
\2\ Prior to 1998 new and reestimated subsidy budget authority were not reported separately.
\3\ GNMA secondary guarantees of loans that are guaranteed by FHA, VA and RHS are excluded from the totals to avoid double-counting.


[[Page 105]]


                 Table 7-6. DIRECT LOAN WRITE-OFFS AND GUARANTEED LOAN TERMINATIONS FOR DEFAULTS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    In millions of dollars       As a percentage of outstanding
                                               --------------------------------             loans \1\
              Agency and Program                                               ---------------------------------
                                                   2003       2004      2005       2003        2004       2005
                                                 actual     estimate  estimate   actual      estimate   estimate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             DIRECT LOAN WRITEOFFS
 
Agriculture:
  Agricultural credit insurance fund..........        158        151       140        1.95       1.99       1.98
  Farm storage facility loans program.........          1          1  ........        0.54       0.44
  Rural community advancement program.........          5   ........  ........        0.07  .........  .........
  Rural electrification and telecommunications  ..........       109        98  ..........       0.34       0.29
   loans......................................
  Rural telephone bank........................  ..........  ........         3  ..........  .........       0.44
  Rural development insurance fund............          1          1         1        0.03       0.04       0.04
  Rural housing insurance fund................        153        142       135        0.57       0.54       0.53
  Rural development loan fund.................          1          1         1        0.25       0.24       0.23
  P.L.480.....................................         34   ........  ........        0.32  .........  .........
  Debt reduction (P.L.480)....................  ..........        29        37  ..........       6.44       6.85
 
Commerce:
  Economic development revolving fund.........          1          1         1        3.84       4.54       5.55
 
Education:
  Student financial assistance................          3          4         4        0.92       1.24       1.26
 
Housing and Urban Development:
  Revolving fund (liquidating programs).......          1          1         1        8.33      16.66      25.00
  Guarantees of mortgage-backed securities....          3          4        21        2.91       3.47      16.53
 
Interior:
  Indian direct loan..........................          2          2         2        3.92       4.44       5.12
 
Labor:
  Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation........          5         11        39  ..........  .........  .........
 
State:
  Repatriation loans..........................  ..........         1  ........  ..........      33.33  .........
 
Transportation:
  Railroad rehabilitation and improvement.....  ..........         2         4  ..........       0.85       0.98
 
Treasury:
  Community development financial institutions  ..........  ........         1  ..........  .........       1.58
   fund.......................................
 
Veterans Affairs:
  Veterans housing benefit program............         15         13        11        0.87       0.75       0.59
 
International Assistance Programs:
  Military debt reduction.....................  ..........  ........        14  ..........  .........       5.83
  Debt reduction (AID)........................  ..........        19        13  ..........      10.61       7.64
  Overseas Private Investment Corporation.....  ..........         1         1  ..........       0.47       0.38
 
Small Business Administration:
  Disaster loans..............................         47         43        43        1.39       1.35       1.18
  Business loans..............................         11         10         9        3.23       3.54       4.05
 
Other Independent Agencies:
  Export-Import Bank..........................        570         48        45        5.17       0.47       0.48
  Debt reduction (ExIm Bank)..................         13         17        41        4.65       3.61       8.24
  Spectrum auction program....................         95   ........  ........        1.82  .........  .........
  Tennessee Valley Authority..................          1          1         1        2.08       1.81       1.63
                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------
    Total, direct loan writeoffs..............      1,119        612       667        0.50       0.27       0.28
                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------
 
   GUARANTEED LOAN TERMINATIONS FOR DEFAULT
 
Agriculture:
  Agricultural credit insurance fund..........         92         77        80        0.92       0.73       0.72
  Commodity Credit Corporation export loans...        102        172       184        2.38       3.81       3.27
  Rural community advancement program.........         72         60        55        1.66       1.36       1.27
  Rural electrification and telecommunications  ..........         6         6  ..........       0.57       0.37
   loans......................................
  Rural development insurance fund............         27   ........  ........       41.53  .........  .........
  Rural housing insurance fund................        170        117       121        1.25       0.85       0.87
 
Commerce:
  Emergency oil and gas guaranteed loan         ..........         1  ........  ..........     100.00  .........
   program....................................
  Emergency steel guaranteed loan program.....  ..........        32        12  ..........      15.53       5.74
 
Defense--Military:
  Family housing improvement fund.............  ..........         3         4  ..........       0.78       1.06
 

[[Page 106]]

 
Education:
  Federal family education loan...............      3,509      4,708     5,334        1.77       2.08       2.12
 
Health and Human Services:
  Health education assistance loans...........         56         58        58        2.42       2.43       2.44
 
Housing and Urban Development:
  Indian housing loan guarantee...............  ..........         1         1  ..........       1.56       1.38
  Title VI Indian Federal guarantees program..  ..........         1         1  ..........       1.36       1.25
  FHA--Mutual mortgage insurance..............      7,410      4,681     4,533        1.69       1.08       0.90
  FHA--General and special risk...............      1,740      1,903     1,773        1.87       2.13       1.90
 
Interior:
  Indian guaranteed loan......................          1          1         1        0.38       0.32       0.28
 
Transportation:
  Maritime guaranteed loan (Title XI).........  ..........        30        35  ..........       0.81       0.87
 
Treasury:
  Air transportation stabilization............  ..........       448        60  ..........      29.35       5.18
 
Veterans Affairs:
  Veterans housing benefit program............      1,345      2,917     3,016        0.45       0.85       0.79
 
International Assistance Programs:
  Foreign military financing..................  ..........         3        11  ..........       0.09       0.37
  Micro and small enterprise development......          3          1         1        7.69       1.81       1.33
  Urban and environmental credit program......         54         41        42        2.71       2.23       2.49
  Development credit authority................  ..........         1         1  ..........       1.11       0.56
  Overseas Private Investment Corporation.....         33         45        45        0.99       1.37       1.27
 
Small Business Administration:
  Business loans..............................      1,255      2,325     1,272        2.65       4.19       2.03
  Pollution control equipment.................  ..........         1         1  ..........      16.66      33.33
 
Other Independent Agencies:
  Export-Import Bank..........................        215        368       391        0.66       1.07       1.11
                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------
    Total, guaranteed loan terminations for        16,084     18,001    17,038        0.95       1.02       0.87
     default..................................
                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------
    Total, direct loan writeoffs and               17,203     18,613    17,705        0.90       0.94       0.81
     guaranteed loan terminations.............
                                               =================================================================
 
  ADDENDUM: WRITEOFFS OF DEFAULTED GUARANTEED
     LOANS THAT RESULT IN LOANS RECEIVABLE
 
Agriculture:
  Agricultural credit insurance fund..........          1          1         1       11.11      11.11      11.11
 
Commerce:
  Fisheries finance...........................         13   ........  ........       28.26  .........  .........
 
Education:
  Federal family education loan...............        213        196       198        1.16       1.08       1.05
 
Health and Human Services:
  Health education assistance loans...........         26         24        24        2.93       2.68       2.65
 
Housing and Urban Development:
  FHA--Mutual mortgage insurance..............          2   ........  ........        1.63  .........  .........
  FHA--General and special risk...............        309        362       354       10.61      11.06       9.43
 
Interior:
  Indian guaranteed loan......................         18          3  ........       51.42      13.63  .........
 
Treasury:
  Air transportation stabilization............  ..........  ........       383  ..........  .........     150.78
 
Veterans Affairs:
  Veterans housing benefit program............         87         83        95        7.63       6.87       6.97
 
International Assistance Programs:
  Urban and environmental credit program......         40   ........  ........        8.43  .........  .........
 
Small Business Administration:
  Business loans..............................        543        302       574       28.10       9.98      14.33
                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------
    Total, writeoffs of loans receivable......      1,252        971     1,629        3.93       2.83       4.46
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Average of loans outstanding for the year.


[[Page 107]]


                      Table 7-7.  APPROPRIATIONS ACTS LIMITATIONS ON CREDIT LOAN LEVELS \1\
                                            (In millions of dollars)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                               Estimate
                          Agency and Program                                2003     ---------------------------
                                                                          Actual          2004          2005
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        DIRECT LOAN OBLIGATIONS
 
Agriculture:
  Agricultural credit insurance fund..................................         1,006           844           937
  Distance learning, telemedicine, and broadband......................           300           898           291
  Rural electrification and telecommunications........................         4,454         4,404         3,035
  Rural telephone bank................................................           172           174  ............
  Rural water and waste disposal direct loans.........................           789         1,032         1,000
  Rural housing insurance fund........................................         1,260         1,563         1,259
  Rural community facility direct loans...............................           255           500           300
  Rural economic development..........................................            15            15            25
  Rural development loan fund.........................................            40            40            34
  P.L. 480 direct credit..............................................            44            38            30
 
Commerce:
  Fisheries finance...................................................            24            24            30
 
Education:
  Historically black college and university capital financing.........           269           269           170
 
Homeland Security:
  Disaster Assistance Direct Loan Financing Account...................            25            25            25
 
Housing and Urban Development:
  FHA-general and special risk........................................            50            50            50
  FHA-mutual mortgage insurance.......................................            50            50            50
 
Interior:
  Assistance to American Samoa........................................             1             1             1
 
State:
  Repatriation loans..................................................             1             1             1
 
Transportation:
  Transportation infrastructure finance and innovation program........         2,200         2,200         2,200
  Transportation infrastructure finance and innovation program line of           200           200           200
   credit.............................................................
 
Treasury:
  Community development financial institutions fund...................            11            11            11
 
Veterans Affairs:
  Native American and transitional housing............................  ............            50            30
  Vocational rehabilitation and education.............................             3             4             4
 
International Assistance Programs:
  Foreign military financing..........................................         3,800           550  ............
  Military debt reduction.............................................  ............            32  ............
 
Small Business Administration:
  Business loans......................................................            25            20  ............
                                                                       -----------------------------------------
    Total, limitations on direct loan obligations.....................        14,994        12,995         9,683
                                                                       -----------------------------------------
 
                      LOAN GUARANTEE COMMITMENTS
 
Agriculture:
  Agricultural credit insurance fund..................................         2,766         2,401         2,866
  Rural electrification and telecommunications guaranteed loans.......  ............           100           100
  Rural water and waste water disposal guaranteed loans...............            75            75            75
  Distance learning and telemedicine..................................  ............  ............            40
  Rural housing insurance fund........................................         3,186         2,809         2,825
  Rural community facility guaranteed loans...........................           210           210           210
  Rural business and industry guaranteed loans........................           845           552           600
 
Defense--Military:
  Arms initiative.....................................................            17            16  ............
 
Health and Human Services:
  Health education assistance loans...................................           160           150  ............
 
Housing and Urban Development:
  Indian housing loan guarantee fund..................................           197           197            29
  Title VI Indian Federal guarantees..................................            17            18            18
  Native Hawaiian housing loan guarantee fund.........................            40            40            37
  Community development loan guarantees...............................           273           273  ............

[[Page 108]]

 
  FHA-general and special risk........................................        25,000        25,000        35,000
  FHA-mutual mortgage insurance.......................................       165,000       185,000       185,000
 
Interior:
  Indian loan guarantee...............................................            72            84            86
 
Transportation:
  Minority business resource center...................................            18            18            18
  Transportation infrastructure finance and innovation program loan              200           200           200
   guarantee..........................................................
 
International Assistance Programs:
  Loan guarantees to Israel...........................................         3,000         3,000         3,000
  Development credit authority........................................  ............           700           700
 
Small Business Administration:
  Business guarantee..................................................        15,318        20,986        29,000
                                                                       -----------------------------------------
    Total, limitations on loan guarantee commitments..................       216,394       241,829       259,804
                                                                       =========================================
 
      ADDENDUM: SECONDARY GUARANTEED LOAN COMMITMENT LIMITATIONS
 
Housing and Urban Development:
  Guarantees of mortgage-backed securities............................       200,000       200,000       200,000
                                                                       -----------------------------------------
    Total, limitations on secondary guaranteed loan commitments.......       200,000       200,000       200,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Data represents loan level limitations enacted or proposed to be enacted in appropriation acts. For
  information on actual and estimated loan levels supportable by new subsidy budget authority requested, see
  Tables 7-3 and 7-4.


[[Page 109]]


  Table 7-8.  FACE VALUE OF GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISE LENDING \2\
                        (In billions of dollars)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      Outstanding
                                             ---------------------------
                                                  2002          2003
------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Government Sponsored Enterprises: \1\
Fannie Mae\1\...............................         1,689         2,086
Freddie Mac \2\.............................         1,255           N/A
Federal Home Loan Banks \3\.................           524           758
Sallie Mae \4\..............................  ............  ............
Farm Credit System..........................            83            86
  Total \2\.................................         3,551           N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
N/A = Not applicable.
 
\1\ Net of purchases of federally guaranteed loans.
\2\ 2003 financial data for Freddie Mac is not presented here because
  the company has not yet reported financial results for 2003. In
  addition, on November 21, 2003, Freddie Mac announced the results of
  its restatement of previously issued consolidated financial statements
  for the years 2000 and 2001 and the first three quarters of 2002 and
  the revision of fourth quarter and full-year consolidated financial
  statements for 2002 (collectively referred to as the ``restatement'').
  This restatement has changed the data provided last year in the 2004
  Budget. Restated data for 2002 has not yet been audited.
\3\ The lending by the Federal Home Loan Banks measures their advances
  to member thrift and other financial institutions. In addition, their
  investment in private financial instruments at the end of 2003 was
  $186 billion, including federally guaranteed securities, GSE
  securities, and money market instruments. The change between 2002 and
  2003 is not comparable because of discontinuity in the data series.
\4\ The face value and Federal costs of Federal Family Education Loans
  in the Student Loan Marketing Association's portfolio are included in
  the totals for that program under guaranteed loans in table 7-1.


[[Page 110]]


  Table 7-9  LENDING AND BORROWING BY GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES
                               (GSEs) 1,2
                        (In millions of dollars)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                       Enterprise                              2003
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Student Loan Marketing Association:
    Net change.........................................          -14,009
    Outstandings.......................................           27,923
 
Federal National Mortgage Association:
  Portfolio programs:
    Net change.........................................          162,939
    Outstandings.......................................          922,672
  Mortgage-backed securities:
    Net change.........................................          220,989
    Outstandings.......................................        1,210,263
 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation: \1\
  Portfolio programs:
    Net change.........................................              N/A
    Outstandings.......................................              N/A
  Mortgage-backed securities:
    Net change.........................................              N/A
    Outstandings.......................................              N/A
 
Farm Credit System:
  Agricultural credit bank:
    Net change.........................................            2,997
    Outstandings.......................................           23,463
  Farm credit banks:
    Net change.........................................              188
    Outstandings.......................................           58,353
  Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation:
    Net change.........................................  ...............
    Outstandings.......................................            6,000
 
Federal Home Loan Banks:
    Net change.........................................          232,687
    Outstandings.......................................          770,499
 
Less guaranteed loans purchased by:
  Student Loan Marketing Association:
    Net change.........................................          -14,009
    Outstandings.......................................           27,923
  Federal National Mortgage Association:
    Net change.........................................          -12,843
    Outstandings.......................................           47,300
  Other:
    Net change \3\.....................................              N/A
    Outstandings \1\...................................           13,897
 
                       BORROWING
 
Student Loan Marketing Association:
    Net change.........................................          -18,899
    Outstandings.......................................           26,821
 
Federal National Mortgage Association:
  Portfolio programs:
    Net change.........................................          175,479
    Outstandings.......................................          975,734
  Mortgage-backed securities:
    Net change.........................................          220,989
    Outstandings.......................................        1,210,263
 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation: \1\
  Portfolio programs:
    Net change.........................................              N/A
    Outstandings.......................................              N/A
  Mortgage-backed securities:
    Net change.........................................              N/A
    Outstandings.......................................              N/A
 
Farm Credit System:
  Agricultural credit bank:
    Net change.........................................            3,938
    Outstandings.......................................           26,451

[[Page 111]]

 
  Farm credit banks:
    Net change.........................................            4,255
    Outstandings.......................................           68,049
  Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation:
    Net change.........................................              764
    Outstandings.......................................            3,838
 
Federal Home Loan Banks:
    Net change.........................................           49,325
    Outstandings.......................................          716,886
 
                       DEDUCTIONS
 
Less borrowing from other GSEs:
    Net change \3\.....................................              N/A
    Outstandings \1\...................................           78,370
Less purchase of Federal debt securities:
    Net change \3\.....................................              N/A
    Outstandings \1\...................................            3,094
Less borrowing to purchase loans guaranteed by:
  Student Loan Marketing Association:
    Net change.........................................          -14,009
    Outstandings.......................................           27,923
  Federal National Mortgage Association:
    Net change.........................................          -12,843
    Outstandings.......................................           47,300
  Other:
    Net change \3\.....................................              N/A
    Outstandings \1\...................................           13,897
------------------------------------------------------------------------
N/A = Not applicable.
 
The estimates of borrowing and lending were developed by the GSEs based
  on certain assumptions that are subject to periodic review and
  revision and do not represent official GSE forecasts of future
  activity, nor are they reviewed by the President. The data for all
  years include programs of mortgage-backed securities. In cases where a
  GSE owns securities issued by the same GSE, including mortgage-backed
  securities, the borrowing and lending data for that GSE are adjusted
  to remove double-counting.
 
\1\ Financial data for Freddie Mac is not presented here because the
  company has not yet reported financial results for 2003. In addition,
  on November 21, 2003, Freddie Mac announced the results of its
  restatement of previously issued consolidated financial statements for
  the years 2000 and 2001 and the first three quarters of 2002 and the
  revision of fourth quarter and full-year consolidated financial
  statements for 2002 (collectively referred to as the ``restatement'').
  This restatement has changed the data provided last year in the 2004
  Budget. Restated data for 2002 has not yet been audited.
\2\ Totals and subtotals have not been calculated because a substantial
  portion of the total, Freddie Mac, is subject to the above-described
  restatement.
\3\ Not calculated due to discontinuity in the data series.