[Analytical Perspectives]
[Economic and Accounting Analyses]
[1. Economic Assumptions]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


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                    ECONOMIC AND ACCOUNTING ANALYSES

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                        1.  ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS

                              Introduction

   Economic growth decelerated suddenly and sharply last year; by the 
end of the year, the record-long expansion was on the verge of stalling. 
The economy hardly expanded in the fourth quarter, and signs of weakness 
in the first months of this year were widespread. The stock market has 
plummeted, consumer and business confidence has dropped sharply, 
industrial production and capacity utilization rates have declined, and 
job growth has slackened. The unemployment rate, although low by 
historical standards, has begun to climb.
   Despite the sudden weakness, most forecasters, including the 
Administration, anticipate that an economic recovery will begin later 
this year. Forward-looking indicators have begun to strengthen recently, 
pointing to faster growth in the coming months. Monetary policy has 
shifted to stimulating demand. The Federal Reserve reduced the Federal 
funds rate twice in January, and it made another cut in March.
  Fiscal policy is poised to support a recovery. The Administration 
proposes to reduce individual income taxes, which will provide near-term 
fiscal stimulus and long-term economic incentives to encourage work and 
saving. Beyond the next year or two, the long-term outlook has never 
been brighter. There is accumulating evidence that the underlying 
productivity trend has improved markedly. This is welcome news for 
American workers and business. Enhanced productivity growth enables real 
wages to grow faster, profits to expand, and the stock market to rise. 
In the long run, productivity growth is the key to maintaining a strong 
economy and rising living standards.
  This chapter begins with a review of recent developments and then 
presents the Administration's economic assumptions, followed by a 
comparison with projections of the Congressional Budget Office and the 
consensus of private sector forecasters. The following section 
decomposes the surplus into its cyclical and structural components. The 
chapter concludes with estimates of the sensitivity of the budget to 
changes in economic assumptions.

                           Recent Developments

  Financial Markets: Beginning in 1999 and lasting through May 2000, the 
Federal Reserve tightened monetary policy to reduce the risk of higher 
inflation in a rapidly expanding economy. However, the ensuing 
deceleration of demand, the falloff in profits, and financial strains 
were unexpectedly sharp. As a result, the threat of higher inflation 
diminished while the risk that the expansion might end soon rose. In 
response to this shift in the balance of risks, the Federal Reserve 
eased monetary policy by cutting the Federal funds by a total of one 
percentage point in January and by another one-half percentage point in 
March to 5.0 percent. Judging by the futures market, investors expect 
additional cuts in the funds rate of one-half percentage point by the 
summer.
   The credit markets responded promptly to the monetary easing. In the 
Treasury market, the yield on 3-month bills fell by 1.5 percentage 
points from the end of 2000 to late March, bringing the rate down to 4.3 
percent. The decline in the yield on the 10-year Treasury note was less 
pronounced, from 5.1 percent to 4.8 percent. Together these changes 
restored an upward sloping yield curve, which in the past has often 
signaled faster economic growth ahead. In response to the shift in 
monetary policy, bond yields fell this year while new issuance rose 
significantly. The renewed access to capital enables firms to cope with 
the financial pressures from weaker sales and profits.
   The easing of monetary policy and lower interest rates, however, did 
not succeed in arresting the fall in the stock market. As of late March, 
the S&P 500 and the broad-based Wilshire 5000 were down almost 15 
percent since the end of last year, bringing the total decline from 
their peaks in March 2000 to over 25 percent. The technology-laden 
NASDAQ was hit even harder--off about 20 percent through late March, and 
about 60 percent from its year-earlier peak.
  Economic Activity: Economic growth decelerated significantly last 
year, sliding from a robust 5.2 percent annual rate of increase during 
the first half of the year to only a 1.1 percent advance in the fourth 
quarter. The decline in the growth rate reflected the effects of falling 
stock prices and rising interest rates. The deceleration was most 
pronounced in the sectors that are especially responsive to changes in 
financial market conditions: residential investment, business capital 
spending, and consumer durable goods purchases.
     Residential investment contracted in the third and fourth 
          quarters, the first back-to-back declines in four years. 
          Homebuilding was adversely affected by the rise in mortgage 
          rates during 1999 and the first half of 2000. By May, the rate 
          on 30-year mortgages reached 8.5 percent, the highest level in 
          over five years. Since then, however, the mortgage rate has 
          fallen to 7.0 percent, the lowest rate in three years, and 
          there were signs of a pickup in the housing markets as the new 
          year began.
     After adjusting for inflation, investment in new plant and 
          equipment contracted slightly in the fourth quarter, a marked 
          drop-off from the double-digit gains that prevailed since 
          1995. Even demand for high-technology hardware and software, 
          which had soared in recent years, slackened in

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          the final quarter, growing at about one-third the pace of the 
          first half of the year. Weakening capital spending reflected 
          lackluster demand, growing excess capacity, and a rising cost 
          of capital because of higher interest rates and falling equity 
          values.
     Real consumer spending on durable goods fell in the fourth 
          quarter, led by an unexpected drop in motor vehicle purchases, 
          which, in turn, contributed to a buildup of unwanted 
          inventories on dealers' lots and sizeable cutbacks in 
          production in the first quarter. The drop in durable goods 
          spending restrained the total growth of consumer spending in 
          the fourth quarter to a 2.8 percent annual rate, the smallest 
          advance in over three years. The slackening of consumer 
          spending was influenced by falling equity wealth--a reversal 
          from the prior five years when exceptional stock market gains 
          boosted wealth and fueled consumer spending. From its peak in 
          March 2000 to the end of the year, the decline in the stock 
          market cut $3 trillion off the $18 trillion in market 
          capitalization of U.S. equities.
  The foreign sector also restrained GDP growth in the fourth quarter, 
trimming about one-half percentage point off the growth rate. Imports of 
goods and services declined modestly at the end of the year, which 
bolstered growth slightly, but this was more than offset by a decline in 
exports, in part because of weakening demand in our trading partners.
  The economic news so far in 2001 has been mixed. On the downside, 
surveys of consumers' attitudes revealed a further loss of confidence, 
with especially heightened concerns about the future. The stock market, 
which is an indicator of investors' confidence, fell as well.
  On the upside, the Nation's total payrolls continued to expand in 
January and February, despite large job losses in manufacturing 
industries. The unemployment rate ticked up from 4.0 percent to 4.2 
percent in January and held there in February. This is still a very low 
rate, two percentage points below the average rate over the previous 
thirty years.
  Based on information for the first two months of the year, consumer 
spending after adjustment for inflation appears to have continued to 
expand in the first quarter at a moderate pace. Sales of motor vehicles, 
however, recovered sharply, which helped reduce the excess inventories 
that built up at the end of last year.
  In the housing market, starts, permits, existing home sales and 
refinancing all increased at the start of the year in response to the 
fall in mortgage rates during the second half of 2000. There were also 
signs that business investment was holding up. In January, nondefense 
capital goods orders and unfilled orders, excluding the volatile 
aircraft sector, rose sharply.
  Inflation: Price inflation accelerated last year, primarily because of 
a jump in crude oil prices, which rippled through to higher energy 
prices. The price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil doubled during 
1999 and rose by another third during the first 11 months of 2000. On a 
year-over-year basis, the total Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose 3.4 
percent in 2000, up from 2.2 percent in 1999. Since November, oil prices 
have fallen sharply, which can be expected to slow the growth of overall 
inflation this year. Excluding the volatile food and energy components, 
the acceleration in core CPI inflation last year was much less 
pronounced than the rise in the total. The core CPI rose just 2.4 
percent during 2000, which is not much more than the 2.1 percent rise in 
1999.
  The GDP chain-weighted price index, a broad gauge of inflation 
covering all the goods and services produced in the United States, rose 
just 2.1 percent in 2000 measured on a year-over-year basis. Although 
higher than the 1.5 percent advance in 1999, it is still a remarkably 
low rate of inflation. Looking at the prices paid by consumers, 
businesses, and governments, and excluding the food and energy 
components, inflation was only 1.8 percent in 2000, not much different 
than the 1.5 percent of 1999.

  Historically low unemployment last year contributed to strong growth 
of labor compensation, including benefits as well as cash wages. 
Nonetheless, core price inflation rose very little because of continued 
robust productivity growth, which provided an offset to the upward price 
pressures from rising labor costs.
  With the unemployment rate near 4 percent for the last two years and 
only a small step-up in the core rate of inflation, the economy appeared 
capable of maintaining stable inflation at a lower level of unemployment 
than previously envisaged. In light of this experience, the Budget 
assumes that NAIRU (the ``nonaccelerating inflation rate of 
unemployment'') is 4.6 percent in the long run. That is identical to the 
rate implied by the consensus of private sector forecasters. By 
contrast, two years ago the consensus implied a NAIRU just above 5 
percent.
  Productivity: Productivity growth during the past five years has 
averaged 2.9 percent per year, double the rate that prevailed from 1974 
through 1995. Increased capital investment and general improvements in 
business efficiency were responsible for the step up. The maintenance of 
this strong productivity growth, even as the expansion has aged and 
unemployment has declined to very low levels, provides evidence that the 
improvement is likely to be ongoing.

                          Economic Projections

   The Administration's economic projections, summarized in Table 1-1, 
assume the adoption of the policies proposed in the Budget: tax relief 
for American workers and their families, the maximum feasible reduction 
in Federal debt, Federal spending restraint, and the preservation of the 
Social Security surplus for Social Security. Enactment of this 
comprehensive program will provide both a needed near-term stimulus to 
the economy and promote an economic climate that fosters long-term 
growth. The Federal Reserve is assumed to continue

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Table 1-1.  ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS \1\
                                                                          (Calendar years; dollar amounts in billions)
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                                                                                                                                      Projections
                                                                              Actual -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                               1999     2000     2001     2002     2003     2004     2005     2006     2007     2008     2009     2010     2011
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gross Domestic Product (GDP):
  Levels, dollar amounts in billions:
    Current dollars........................................................    9,299    9,974   10,434   11,004   11,596   12,217   12,866   13,550   14,269   15,023   15,817   16,649   17,524
    Real, chained (1996) dollars...........................................    8,876    9,325    9,551    9,867   10,184   10,509   10,840   11,180   11,532   11,894   12,264   12,642   13,031
    Chained price index (1996 = 100), annual average.......................    104.8    107.0    109.2    111.5    113.8    116.2    118.7    121.2    123.7    126.3    128.9    131.7    134.4
  Percent change, fourth quarter over fourth quarter:
    Current dollars........................................................      6.5      6.2      4.8      5.5      5.3      5.3      5.3      5.3      5.3      5.3      5.3      5.3      5.2
    Real, chained (1996) dollars...........................................      5.0      3.7      2.6      3.3      3.2      3.2      3.1      3.1      3.1      3.1      3.1      3.1      3.1
    Chained price index (1996 = 100).......................................      1.6      2.3      2.1      2.1      2.1      2.1      2.1      2.1      2.1      2.1      2.1      2.1      2.1
  Percent change, year over year:
    Current dollars........................................................      5.8      7.3      4.6      5.5      5.4      5.4      5.3      5.3      5.3      5.3      5.3      5.3      5.3
    Real, chained (1996) dollars...........................................      4.2      5.1      2.4      3.3      3.2      3.2      3.1      3.1      3.1      3.1      3.1      3.1      3.1
    Chained price index (1996 = 100).......................................      1.5      2.1      2.1      2.1      2.1      2.1      2.1      2.1      2.1      2.1      2.1      2.1      2.1

Incomes, billions of current dollars:
    Corporate profits before tax...........................................      823      935      951      983    1,030    1,080    1,137    1,173    1,222    1,256    1,291    1,332    1,402
    Wages and salaries.....................................................    4,470    4,766    5,016    5,312    5,620    5,930    6,256    6,590    6,927    7,272    7,641    8,035    8,448
    Other taxable income \2\...............................................    2,141    2,285    2,348    2,431    2,505    2,590    2,677    2,770    2,872    2,979    3,092    3,206    3,324

Consumer Price Index (all urban): \3\
    Level (1982-84 = 100), annual average..................................    166.7    172.3    176.9    181.4    186.1    190.8    195.6    200.4    205.5    210.6    215.9    221.3    226.8
    Percent change, fourth quarter over fourth quarter.....................      2.6      3.4      2.5      2.6      2.5      2.5      2.5      2.5      2.5      2.5      2.5      2.5      2.5
    Percent change, year over year.........................................      2.2      3.4      2.7      2.6      2.6      2.5      2.5      2.5      2.5      2.5      2.5      2.5      2.5

Unemployment rate, civilian, percent:
    Fourth quarter level...................................................      4.1      4.0      4.6      4.6      4.5      4.5      4.5      4.5      4.5      4.6      4.6      4.6      4.6
    Annual average.........................................................      4.2      4.0      4.4      4.6      4.5      4.5      4.5      4.5      4.5      4.6      4.6      4.6      4.6
Federal pay raises, January, percent:
    Military \4\...........................................................      3.6      4.8      3.7      4.6      3.9      3.9      3.9      3.9      3.9      3.9      3.9      3.9      3.9
    Civilian \5\...........................................................      3.6      4.8      3.7      3.6      3.9      3.9      3.9      3.9      3.9      3.9      3.9      3.9      3.9

Interest rates, percent:
    91-day Treasury bills \6\..............................................      4.7      5.8      5.3      5.6      5.6      5.6      5.3      5.0      5.0      5.0      5.0      5.0      5.0
    10-year Treasury notes.................................................      5.6      6.0      5.4      5.6      5.7      5.7      5.7      5.7      5.7      5.7      5.7      5.7      5.7
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\1\ Based on information available as of January 20, 2001.
\2\ Rent, interest, dividend and proprietor's components of personal income.
\3\ Seasonally adjusted CPI for all urban consumers.
\4\ Percentages apply to basic pay only; adjustments for housing and subsistence allowances will be determined by the Secretary of Defense.
\5\ Overall average increase, including locality pay adjustments.
\6\ Average rate (bank discount basis) on new issues within period.

to pursue monetary policies that support economic activity while keeping 
inflation under control.
   The economic assumptions are conservative and are close to those of 
the Congressional Budget Office and mainstream private sector 
forecasters. The key assumption for the average real GDP growth over the 
next 10 years is even slightly below the private sector consensus. The 
economy may perform even better than assumed here. Nonetheless, for the 
purpose of planning fiscal policy, it is appropriate to base the Budget 
on prudent assumptions that do not over-estimate available resources.
  Real GDP, Potential GDP and Unemployment: Real GDP, which rose 5.0 
percent in 2000 on a calendar-year basis, is projected to increase 2.4 
percent this year. Economic activity is expected to gain momentum during 
the year as the easing of monetary policy stimulates interest-sensitive 
sectors. The restraint on production and GDP growth from the buildup of 
excess inventories evident early in the year is likely to diminish as 
inventories are brought in line with sales.
   Economic activity is expected to increase 3.3 percent during 2002. 
Faster economic growth over the next year and a half will add to the 
pace of job creation, household incomes, and corporate profits, which in 
turn will improve consumer confidence and equity markets. With actual 
GDP growth below the Nation's potential GDP growth during much of this 
year, the unemployment rate is projected to creep up to 4.6 percent by 
the fourth quarter. During 2002, the unemployment rate is projected to 
remain at that relatively low level.
   Beyond 2002, real GDP growth is projected to moderate gradually to a 
3.1 percent annual rate of increase beginning in 2005. Average GDP 
growth over the next ten years is expected to be close to potential 
growth, which would maintain the unemployment rate on a plateau of 
around 4.6 percent. Potential GDP growth depends largely on the growth 
of the labor force and the trend growth of labor productivity. The labor 
force is projected to increase 1.0 percent per year on average over the 
ten years 2002 to 2011.
   Nonfarm business sector productivity is projected to grow 3.0 percent 
in calendar year 2001, 2.6 percent in 2002-2003, slowing to a 2.2 
percent average annual increase from 2004 through 2011. Over the next 
ten years, productivity growth is assumed to average 2.3

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percent yearly, close to the very long-run average for the U.S. economy. 
This is well above the 1.4 percent average rate during 1974-1995, 
although it is a deceleration from the 2.9 percent average rate of the 
past five years. The assumption that productivity growth will taper off 
somewhat from its recent trend is a conservative one, appropriate for 
prudent budget planning.
  Inflation: The rate of inflation, measured by either the CPI or the 
GDP chain-weighted price index, is expected to slow this year as energy 
prices fall from the high levels at the end of last year. The CPI is 
projected to rise 2.7 percent in 2001 on a calendar year basis and slow 
to 2.5 percent yearly beginning in 2004. The GDP measure of inflation is 
forecast to increase 2.1 percent each year. The CPI tends to increase 
faster than the GDP chain-weighted price index in part because sharply 
falling computer prices, which are expected to continue, exert less of 
an impact on the CPI than on the GDP inflation measure.
  Interest Rates: The 91-day Treasury bill rate is projected to rise 
during 2001, leveling off at 5.6 percent during 2002-2004, then 
gradually decline to 5.0 percent in 2006 and thereafter. The yield on 
the 10-year Treasury note is assumed to rise to 5.7 percent in 2003 and 
remain at that level through 2011. The projected decline in the short-
term rate after 2004 would restore an upward sloping yield curve, which 
is normal during periods of expansion.
  Incomes: The share of total taxable income in nominal GDP is projected 
to decline gradually, mainly because capital consumption is expected to 
claim a larger proportion of GDP. The investment boom of recent years 
and the projected rising share of investment in GDP imply a rapid growth 
of depreciation, a component of business expenses. As the share of 
depreciation in GDP rises, the share of corporate profits is projected 
to decline. The share of wages and salaries in GDP is projected to be 
relatively stable over the projection horizon.

            Comparison with CBO and Private-Sector Forecasts

  The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and many private-sector 
forecasters also make 10-year projections. The CBO projection is used by 
Congress in formulating budget policy. In the executive branch, this 
function is performed jointly by the Treasury, the Council of Economic 
Advisers, and the Office of Management and Budget. The private sector 
forecasts are often used by businesses for long-term planning. Table 1-2 
compares the Budget assumptions with projections by the CBO and the Blue 
Chip consensus, an average of about 50 private forecasts

   The Administration's projections always assume that the President's 
policy proposals in the Budget will be adopted in full. In contrast, CBO 
normally assumes that current law will continue to hold; thus, it makes

                                                     Table 1-2.  COMPARISON OF ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS
                                                                (Calendar years; percent)
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                                                                                             Projections
                                                      ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  Average,
                                                        2001    2002    2003    2004    2005    2006    2007    2008    2009    2010    2011    2002-11
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Real GDP (chain-weighted): \1\
  CBO January........................................     2.4     3.4     3.3     3.0     3.0     3.0     3.0     3.0     3.0     3.1     3.1        3.1
  Blue Chip Consensus March..........................     1.9     3.4     3.5     3.4     3.4     3.4     3.3     3.3     3.3     3.3     3.3        3.4
  2002 Budget........................................     2.4     3.3     3.2     3.2     3.1     3.1     3.1     3.1     3.1     3.1     3.1        3.2

Chain-weighted GDP Price Index: \1\
  CBO January........................................     2.3     2.1     2.0     1.9     1.9     1.9     1.9     1.9     1.9     1.9     1.9        1.9
  Blue Chip Consensus March..........................     2.1     2.0     2.1     2.1     2.1     2.2     2.2     2.2     2.2     2.2     2.2        2.2
  2002 Budget........................................     2.1     2.1     2.1     2.1     2.1     2.1     2.1     2.1     2.1     2.1     2.1        2.1

Consumer Price Index (all-urban): \1\
  CBO January........................................     2.8     2.8     2.7     2.5     2.5     2.5     2.5     2.5     2.5     2.5     2.5        2.6
  Blue Chip Consensus March..........................     2.8     2.4     2.6     2.6     2.5     2.6     2.6     2.6     2.6     2.6     2.6        2.6
  2002 Budget........................................     2.7     2.6     2.6     2.5     2.5     2.5     2.5     2.5     2.5     2.5     2.5        2.5

Unemployment rate: \2\
  CBO January........................................     4.4     4.5     4.5     4.7     4.8     4.9     5.0     5.1     5.2     5.2     5.2        4.9
  Blue Chip Consensus March..........................     4.5     4.6     4.6     4.6     4.6     4.6     4.6     4.6     4.6     4.6     4.6        4.6
  2002 Budget........................................     4.4     4.6     4.5     4.5     4.5     4.5     4.5     4.6     4.6     4.6     4.6        4.6

Interest rates: \2\
  91-day Treasury bills:
    CBO January......................................     4.8     4.9     5.0     4.9     4.9     4.9     4.9     4.9     4.9     4.9     4.9        4.9
    Blue Chip Consensus March........................     4.6     4.8     5.2     5.3     5.3     5.2     5.2     5.2     5.2     5.2     5.2        5.2
    2002 Budget......................................     5.3     5.6     5.6     5.6     5.3     5.0     5.0     5.0     5.0     5.0     5.0        5.2

  10-year Treasury notes:
    CBO January......................................     4.9     5.3     5.5     5.6     5.7     5.8     5.8     5.8     5.8     5.8     5.8        5.7
    Blue Chip Consensus March........................     5.1     5.4     5.7     5.7     5.7     5.7     5.7     5.7     5.7     5.7     5.7        5.7
    2002 Budget......................................     5.4     5.6     5.7     5.7     5.7     5.7     5.7     5.7     5.7     5.7     5.7        5.7
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Sources: Congressional Budget Office; Aspen Publishers, Inc., Blue Chip Economic Indicators
\1\ Year over year percent change.
\2\ Annual averages, percent.

[[Page 7]]

a ``pre-policy'' projection. The private sector forecasts are based on 
an appraisal of ``the most-likely policy outcome,'' which would vary 
considerably among forecasters. Despite these differences in policy 
assumptions, the three sets of projections are currently quite close for 
almost all the key economic assumptions.
   For real GDP growth, the Blue Chip consensus is slightly lower than 
the public-sector forecasts in 2001. The private forecasts, made in 
early-March, were influenced in part by the weaker recent data. For 
2002, all three sets of forecasts anticipate a rebound of growth. Over 
the ten years 2002-2011, the Blue Chip consensus averages 3.4 percent 
GDP growth, two-tenths of a percentage point faster than the 3.2 percent 
in the Administration's conservative assumptions.
   The Administration's inflation projection is very similar to that of 
the Blue Chip consensus. CBO's GDP inflation projection is slightly 
below the Administration's assumptions in most years. The 
Administration's unemployment rate is nearly identical to the Blue 
Chip's, while the CBO's rate is well above either of the other two 
forecasts.
   The Administration's projection of the yield on the 10-year Treasury 
note is identical in most years to that of the Blue Chip consensus, and 
is close to that of CBO. The Administration's short-term interest rate 
projection is somewhat higher than that of the Blue Chip consensus over 
the next few years. Beyond 2005, the three short-term interest 
projections are quite close.

                     Structural vs. Cyclical Balance

   When the economy is operating above potential as it is currently 
estimated to be, receipts are higher than they would be if resources 
were less intensely employed, and outlays for unemployment-sensitive 
programs (such as unemployment compensation and food stamps) are lower. 
As a result, the surplus is larger than it would be if unemployment were 
at the sustainable long-run average. The portion of the surplus that can 
be traced to this factor is called the cyclical component. The balance, 
the portion that would remain with the unemployment rate at its long-run 
value, is called the structural surplus (or structural deficit).

   The structural balance gives a clearer picture of the stance of 
fiscal policy because this part of the surplus or deficit will persist 
even when the economy achieves permanently sustainable operating levels. 
For this reason, changes in the structural balance give a better picture 
of the impact of budget policy on the economy than does the unadjusted 
budget balance.
   During 1992-1996, when the actual unemployment rate was above the 5.2 
percent estimate of NAIRU, the cyclical component was negative: the 
unadjusted deficit was larger than the structural deficit. From 1997 to 
2000, the consensus of private sector forecasters gradually reduced 
NAIRU to 4.6 percent. Nonetheless, the actual unemployment rate was 
below NAIRU, resulting in a positive cyclical component. By 2000, the 
actual surplus of $236 billion was $72 billion larger than the 
structural surplus.
   In the early 1990s, large swings in net outlays for deposit insurance 
(the S&L bailouts) had substantial impacts on deficits, but had little 
concurrent impact on economic performance. It therefore became customary 
to remove deposit insurance outlays as well as the cyclical component of 
the surplus or deficit from the actual surplus or deficit to compute the 
adjusted structural balance. This is shown in Table 1-3.
   Two significant points are illustrated by this table. First, of the 
$527 billion swing in the actual budget balance between 1992 and 2000 
(from a $290 billion deficit to a $236 billion surplus), only 35 percent 
($182 billion) resulted from cyclical improvement in the economy. The 
rest of the reduction stemmed from policy actions and an unusually 
strong rise in individual income tax receipts as a percentage of GDP. 
Second, in 2002 and thereafter, the cyclical component of the surplus is 
small because the projected unemployment rate is close to the assumed 
NAIRU of 4.6 percent. Deposit insurance net outlays are also projected 
to be very small in the coming years. Therefore, the adjusted structural 
surplus and the unadjusted surplus are nearly identical during the 
forecast horizon.

            Sensitivity of the Budget to Economic Assumptions

   Both receipts and outlays are affected by changes in economic 
conditions. This sensitivity complicates budget planning because errors 
in economic assumptions lead to errors in the budget projections. It is 
therefore useful to examine the implications of alternative economic 
assumptions. Many of the budgetary effects of changes in economic 
assumptions are fairly predictable, and a set of rules of thumb 
embodying these relationships can aid in estimating how changes

                                                         Table 1-3.  ADJUSTED STRUCTURAL BALANCE
                                                                (In billions of dollars)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       1992     1993     1994     1995     1996    1997    1998    1999    2000    2001    2002    2003    2004    2005
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unadjusted deficit (-) or surplus..   -290.4   -255.1   -203.3   -164.0   -107.5   -22.0    69.2   124.6   236.4   280.7   231.2   242.0   262.1   269.0
  Cyclical component...............   -109.9   -104.0    -68.7    -29.5    -16.0     5.9    33.5    44.8    72.0    36.3     2.1     6.4     7.6     7.1
                                    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Structural deficit (-) or surplus..   -180.5   -151.1   -134.6   -134.5    -91.5   -27.9    35.7    79.8   164.4   244.4   229.1   235.6   254.5   261.9
  Deposit insurance outlays........     -2.3    -28.0     -7.6    -17.9     -8.4   -14.4    -4.4    -5.3    -3.1    -1.0    -0.7     0.1     0.6     1.1
                                    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adjusted structural deficit (-) or    -182.8   -179.1   -142.2   -152.3    -99.9   -42.3    31.3    74.5   161.3   243.4   228.4   235.7   255.1   263.0
 surplus...........................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTE: The NAIRU is assumed to be 5.2% through calendar year 1998, 4.9% in 1999, and 4.6% thereafter.

[[Page 8]]

in the economic assumptions would alter outlays, receipts, and the 
surplus.
   Economic variables that affect the budget do not usually change 
independently of one another. Output and employment tend to move 
together in the short run: a high rate of real GDP growth is generally 
associated with a declining rate of unemployment, while moderate or 
negative growth is usually accompanied by rising unemployment. In the 
long run, however, changes in the average rate of growth of real GDP are 
mainly due to changes in the rates of growth of productivity and labor 
force, and are not necessarily associated with changes in the average 
rate of unemployment. Inflation and interest rates are also closely 
interrelated: a higher expected rate of inflation increases interest 
rates, while lower expected inflation reduces rates.
   Changes in real GDP growth or inflation have a much greater 
cumulative effect on the budget over time if they are sustained for 
several years than if they last for only one year.
   Highlights of the budget effects of the above rules of thumb are 
shown in Table 1-4.
   If real GDP growth is lower by one percentage point in calendar year 
2001 only and the unemployment rate rises by one-half percentage point 
more than in the budget assumptions, the fiscal year 2001 surplus is 
estimated to decrease by $11.7 billion; receipts in 2001 would be lower 
by $9.6 billion, and outlays would be higher by $2.1 billion, primarily 
for unemployment-sensitive programs. In fiscal year 2002, the estimated 
receipts shortfall would grow further to $20.9 billion, and outlays 
would increase by $7.3 billion relative to the base, even though the 
growth rate in calendar 2002 equaled the rate originally assumed. This 
is because the level of real (and nominal) GDP and taxable incomes would 
be permanently lower, and unemployment higher. The budget effects 
(including growing interest costs associated with smaller surpluses) 
would continue to grow slightly in each successive year.
   The budget effects are much larger if the real growth rate is assumed 
to be one percentage point less in each year (2001-2011) and the 
unemployment rate to rise one-half percentage point in each year. In 
this case, the levels of real and nominal GDP would be below the base 
case by a growing percentage. The budget balance would be worsened by 
$545.0 billion relative to the base case by 2011.
   The effects of slower productivity growth are shown in a third 
example, where real growth is one percentage point lower per year while 
the unemployment rate is unchanged. In this case, the estimated budget 
effects mount steadily over the years, but more slowly, resulting in a 
$431.9 billion worsening of the budget balance by 2011.
   Joint changes in interest rates and inflation have a smaller effect 
on the surplus than equal percentage point changes in real GDP growth. 
An example is the effect of a one percentage point higher rate of 
inflation and one percentage point higher interest rates during calendar 
year 2001 only. In subsequent years, the price level and nominal GDP 
would be one percent higher than in the base case, but interest rates 
are assumed to return to their base levels. Outlays for 2001 rise by 
$5.5 billion and receipts by $11.0 billion, for a increase of $5.5 
billion in the 2001 surplus. In 2002, outlays would be above the base by 
$11.4 billion, due in part to lagged cost-of-living adjustments; 
receipts would rise $22.4 billion above the base, however, resulting in 
an $11.0 billion improvement in the budget balance. In subsequent years, 
the amounts added to receipts would continue to be larger than the 
additions to outlays.
   If the rate of inflation and the level of interest rates are higher 
by one percentage point in all years, the price level and nominal GDP 
would rise by a cumulatively growing percentage above their base levels. 
In this case, the effects on receipts and outlays mount steadily in 
successive years, adding $57.7 billion to outlays in 2011 and $341.1 
billion to receipts, for a net increase in the 2011 surplus of $283.4 
billion. This rule-of-thumb now shows a more positive net budget outcome 
than was estimated a few years ago, when the interest outlays were 
larger because of higher levels of public debt.
   The table shows the interest rate and the inflation effects 
separately. These separate effects for interest rates and inflation 
rates do not sum to the effects for simultaneous changes in both. This 
occurs in part because, when the budget is in surplus and debt is being 
retired, the combined effects of two changes in assumptions affecting 
debt financing patterns and interest costs may differ from the sum of 
the separate effects.
   The outlay effects of a one percentage point increase in interest 
rates alone is now relatively small, and changes sign, that is, reduces 
outlays after 2006 when increased interest earnings on the Government's 
excess balances exceed increased interest payments on the outstanding 
debt held by the public. The receipts portion of this rule-of-thumb is 
due to the Federal Reserve's deposit of earnings on its securities 
portfolio.
   The last entry in the table shows rules of thumb for the added 
interest cost associated with changes in the budget surplus.
   The effects of changes in economic assumptions in the opposite 
direction are approximately symmetric to those shown in the table. The 
impact of a one percentage point lower rate of inflation or higher real 
growth would have about the same magnitude as the effects shown in the 
table, but with the opposite sign.

[[Page 9]]

   These rules of thumb are computed while holding the income share 
composition of GDP constant. Because different income components are 
subject to different taxes and tax rates, estimates of total receipts 
can be affected significantly by changing income shares. However, the 
relationships between changes in income shares and changes in growth, 
inflation, and interest rates are too complex to be reduced to simple 
rules.

                                              Table 1-4.  SENSITIVITY OF THE BUDGET TO ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS
                                                                (In billions of dollars)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Budget effect                        2001     2002     2003     2004     2005     2006     2007     2008     2009     2010     2011
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Real Growth and Employment

Budgetary effects of 1 percent lower real GDP growth:
  For calendar year 2001 only: \1\
    Receipts.........................................     -9.6    -20.9    -24.8    -26.0    -27.3    -28.5    -29.8    -31.2    -32.7    -34.2    -35.9
    Outlays..........................................      2.1      7.3      8.6     10.8     13.0     15.1     17.5     20.2     23.0     26.2     29.7
                                                      --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Decrease in surplus (-)........................    -11.7    -28.3    -33.3    -36.8    -40.3    -43.6    -47.3    -51.4    -55.8    -60.4    -65.6

  Sustained during 2001-2011: \1\
    Receipts.........................................     -9.6    -30.8    -56.7    -84.8   -115.2   -147.9   -183.0   -220.8   -261.6   -305.0   -353.0
    Outlays..........................................      2.1      9.5     18.5     30.1     43.8     59.6     78.4    101.0    126.6    157.1    192.0
                                                      --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Decrease in surplus (-)........................    -11.7    -40.3    -75.2   -114.9   -159.1   -207.5   -261.4   -321.8   -388.2   -462.1   -545.0

  Sustained during 2001-2011, with no change in
   unemployment:
    Receipts.........................................     -9.6    -30.8    -56.7    -84.9   -115.3   -148.0   -183.1   -221.0   -261.9   -305.2   -353.3
    Outlays..........................................      0.2      1.1      3.3      7.1     12.2     18.2     25.9     35.8     47.6     61.9     78.6
                                                      --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Decrease in surplus (-)........................     -9.8    -31.8    -60.1    -92.0   -127.5   -166.1   -209.0   -256.8   -309.5   -367.2   -431.9

             Inflation and Interest Rates

Budgetary effects of 1 percentage point higher rate
 of:
  Inflation and interest rates during calendar year
   2001 only:
    Receipts.........................................     11.0     22.4     22.1     20.7     21.9     23.1     24.5     25.8     27.1     28.7     30.6
    Outlays..........................................      5.5     11.4      9.8      9.0      8.4      7.2      6.5      6.1      5.6      5.2      4.6
                                                      --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Increase in surplus (+)........................      5.5     11.0     12.3     11.7     13.4     15.9     18.0     19.7     21.5     23.5     26.0

  Inflation and interest rates, sustained during 2001-
   2011:
    Receipts.........................................     11.0     34.1     58.2     82.4    109.2    138.7    171.4    207.3    247.1    290.9    341.1
    Outlays..........................................      5.3     16.1     23.9     30.8     37.5     42.8     47.4     51.4     54.5     56.7     57.7
                                                      --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Increase in surplus (+)........................      5.7     17.9     34.3     51.7     71.7     95.9    124.0    155.9    192.7    234.1    283.4

  Interest rates only, sustained during 2001-2011:
    Receipts.........................................      1.4      3.8      4.8      5.3      5.7      6.1      6.5      7.0      7.4      7.8      8.2
    Outlays..........................................      4.1      9.8     11.6     11.3     10.2      8.3      5.7      2.1     -2.1     -7.1    -13.4
                                                      --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Decrease in surplus (-)........................     -2.7     -6.0     -6.8     -6.0     -4.6     -2.2      0.9      4.8      9.4     14.8     21.6

  Inflation only, sustained during 2001-2011:
    Receipts.........................................      9.6     30.3     53.4     77.2    103.5    132.6    164.8    200.3    239.7    283.1    332.9
    Outlays..........................................      1.2      6.6     12.8     20.6     29.2     37.4     46.0     55.2     64.5     74.3     84.7
                                                      --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Increase in surplus (+)........................      8.4     23.7     40.5     56.6     74.4     95.2    118.9    145.1    175.3    208.8    248.2

      Interest Cost of Higher Federal Borrowing

Outlay effect of $100 billion reduction in the 2001        2.8      5.9      6.3      6.7      6.9      7.0      7.2      7.6      8.0      8.4      8.9
 unified surplus.....................................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* $50 million or less.
\1\ The unemployment rate is assumed to be 0.5 percentage point higher per 1.0 percent shortfall in the level of real GDP.