[Analytical Perspectives]
[Economic and Accounting Analyses]
[1. Economic Assumptions]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



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                    ECONOMIC AND ACCOUNTING ANALYSES

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                        1.  ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS

                               Introduction

  The economy begins this year in excellent condition. Budget surpluses 
have replaced soaring deficits; fiscal policy is now augmenting national 
saving, investment and growth, rather than restraining them. Monetary 
policy has successfully pursued the goals of supporting economic growth 
while at the same time wringing out inflation.
  These sound policies have contributed to another year of outstanding 
economic achievement. Data for the first three quarters of 1998 and 
partial data for the fourth indicate that real Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) rose about 4 percent over the four quarters of 1998, almost one 
percentage point faster than the average pace set during the prior five 
years. The Nation's payrolls increased by 2.9 million jobs during 1998, 
bringing the total number of new jobs created since this Administration 
took office to 17.7 million--93 percent of which were in the private 
sector. Healthy job growth pulled the unemployment rate down further 
last year. By December, the rate was 4.3 percent, the lowest level in 
nearly three decades and 3.0 percentage points lower than in January 
1993. The unemployment rate averaged 4.5 percent last year, the lowest 
it has been since 1969.
  Despite robust growth and low unemployment, inflation remained low. 
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose just 1.6 percent last year, aided by 
a sharp fall in energy prices. Even excluding the volatile food and 
energy components, the CPI rose only 2.4 percent. The GDP chain-weighted 
price index, the broadest measure of prices paid by consumers, business, 
and government, rose by around 1 percent. Not since the early 1960s has 
inflation been this low. The combination of a low unemployment rate and 
a low inflation rate pulled the ``Misery Index''--the sum of the two 
rates--to its lowest level since the 1960s.
  Both households and businesses have prospered in this environment of 
strong growth and low inflation. For the second year in a row, hourly 
earnings after adjustment for inflation increased faster than at any 
time in the past two decades, while the share of profits in GDP reached 
10 percent during the last three years, the highest it has been since 
1968.
  Effective policy actions and the fundamental health of the American 
economy have enabled it to weather an extraordinary buffeting from 
economic turmoil abroad. Imports, adjusted for inflation, rose last 
year, while exports shrank; but robust growth of domestic demand by 
consumers and businesses more than offset this source of restraint. The 
sound fiscal policies of this Administration, which produced the first 
Federal budget surplus since 1969, lowered interest rates and reduced 
the government's demands in credit markets, thereby providing needed 
resources for private-sector spending. During the summer and fall, 
financial crises in foreign lands sent tremors through stock and bond 
markets. Beginning in September, the Federal Reserve responded by 
cutting the Federal funds rate in three successive steps, actions that 
restored confidence to financial markets. As 1999 began, financial and 
nonfinancial market indicators were signaling that the economic outlook 
remains healthy.
  The economy has outperformed the consensus forecast during the past 
six years, and the Administration believes that it can continue to do so 
if sound fiscal policies are maintained. However, for purposes of budget 
planning, it is prudent to rely on mainstream projections. The 
Administration assumes that the economy will continue to expand, while 
unemployment, inflation and interest rates will remain low. Real growth 
in the next few years is expected to moderate to 2.0 percent per year, 
followed by somewhat faster, but sustainable, growth thereafter 
averaging 2.4 percent per year.
  Even with more moderate growth than recently, the economy will 
generate millions of new jobs. The unemployment rate, which by 
mainstream estimates is below the level consistent with stable 
inflation, is projected to edge up slightly until mid-2001. Thereafter, 
it is projected to average a relatively low 5.3 percent, the middle of 
the range that the Administration estimates is consistent with stable 
inflation. Inflation is expected to rise slightly as the restraining 
influence of temporary factors wanes, but then to average just above 2 
percent per year. Short-term interest rates are expected to remain in 
the neighborhood of levels reached at the end of 1998. Long-term rates 
are projected to move up by about 0.6 percentage point, the same amount 
as the rise in inflation, leaving inflation-adjusted long-term rates not 
much different than in December.
  Most private sector forecasts have a similarly favorable view of the 
outlook. The most recent Blue Chip consensus, an average of 50 private 
forecasts, calls for real growth of 2.1 percent this year, and 2.4 
percent, on average, through 2004. Unemployment and inflation 
projections are also close to the Administration's economic assumptions, 
while interest rates are projected to be slightly higher in the outyears 
of the budget horizon. The similarity with private-sector projections 
indicates that the Administration's assumptions provide a reasonable, 
prudent basis for projecting the budget.
  In December, this business cycle expansion (which began in April 1991) 
set the record for the longest period of continuous growth during 
peacetime--surpassing the expansion of the 1980s. Last month marked the 
94th consecutive month of growth. If the expansion continues through 
February 2000, it will exceed the

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longevity record of 106 months set during the Vietnam War expansion of 
the 1960s. The Administration expects, as do most private sector 
forecasters, that this expansion will surpass that record.
  This chapter begins with a review of recent developments, and then 
discusses two statistical issues: the growing statistical discrepancy 
(the difference between the aggregate measures of output and income); 
and recent methodological improvements in the calculation of the 
Consumer Price Index. The chapter then presents the Administration's 
economic projections, followed by a comparison with the Congressional 
Budget Office's projections. The following sections present the impact 
of changes in economic assumptions since last year on the projected 
budget surplus, and the cyclical and structural components of the 
surplus. The chapter concludes with estimates of the sensitivity of the 
budget to changes in economic assumptions.

                       Fiscal and Monetary Policy

  Fiscal Policy: When this Administration took office in January 1993, 
it vowed to restore sound fiscal discipline. That goal has been amply 
achieved. In contrast to 1992, when the deficit reached a postwar record 
of $290 billion, representing 4.7 percent of GDP, the budget last year 
recorded a surplus of $69 billion, or 0.8 percent of GDP. The last time 
the budget was in surplus was in 1969; the last time the surplus was a 
larger share of GDP was in 1956. This year, the surplus is projected to 
rise to $79 billion, or 0.9 percent of GDP. The dramatic shift in the 
Nation's fiscal position in the last six years from huge deficits to 
surpluses is unprecedented since the demobilization just after World War 
II.
  The historic improvement in the Nation's fiscal position during this 
Administration is due to two landmark pieces of legislation, the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA) and the Balanced Budget Act of 
1997 (BBA). OBRA, based on proposals made by the Administration soon 
after it came into office and signed into law in August of that year, 
set budget deficits on a downward path. The deficit reductions following 
OBRA have far exceeded predictions made at the time of its passage. OBRA 
was projected to reduce pre-Act deficits by $505 billion over the five 
years 1994-98. The total deficit reduction has been more than twice 
this--$1.2 trillion. In other words, OBRA and subsequent developments 
have enabled the Treasury to issue $1.2 trillion less debt than would 
have been required under previous estimates.
  While OBRA fundamentally altered the course of fiscal policy towards 
lower deficits, it was not projected to eliminate the deficit. Without 
further action, deficits were expected to begin to climb once again. To 
prevent this and bring the budget into permanent surplus, the 
Administration negotiated the Balanced Budget Act with the Congress in 
the summer of 1997. The BBA was not expected to produce surpluses until 
2002, but like OBRA, the results of pursuing a policy of fiscal 
discipline far exceeded expectations. The budget moved into surplus in 
1998, four years ahead of schedule. OBRA and the BBA together are 
estimated to have improved the budget balance compared with the pre-OBRA 
baseline by a cumulative total of $4.4 trillion over 1993-2002.
  Like the budget, the economy in recent years has far outperformed 
expectations. This is more than a coincidence. Lower deficits contribute 
to a healthy, sustainable expansion by reducing interest rates and 
boosting interest-sensitive spending in the economy. Rapid growth of 
business capital spending expands industrial capacity and boosts 
productivity growth. The additional capacity, in turn, prevents 
shortages and bottlenecks that might otherwise threaten to ignite 
inflation.
  Lower interest rates also raise equity prices, which increases 
household wealth, optimism, and spending. The added impetus to consumer 
spending creates new jobs and business opportunities. While the benefits 
of fiscal discipline have been widely recognized, the surprise in recent 
years has been the magnitude of the positive impact on the economy. 
Growth of production, jobs, income, and capital gains have all exceeded 
expectations. Consequently, Federal revenues in the past three years 
have been larger than projected--the so-called ``revenue surprise.'' 
Deficits have been smaller than expected and surpluses have occurred 
sooner. The outstanding economic performance during this Administration 
is proof positive of the lasting benefits of prudent fiscal policies.

  Monetary Policy: Monetary policy shares the credit for the economy's 
excellent performance. During this expansion, the Federal Reserve 
appropriately tightened policy when inflation threatened to pick up, but 
eased when the expansion risked stalling out. In 1994 and early 1995, 
interest rates were raised when rapid growth threatened to cause 
inflationary pressures. During 1995 and early 1996, however, the Federal 
Reserve reduced interest rates because the expansion appeared to be 
slowing unduly at a time when higher inflation no longer threatened. 
From January 1996 until this past fall, monetary policy remained 
essentially unchanged; the sole adjustment was a one-quarter percentage 
point increase in the federal funds rate target in March 1997 to 5\1/2\ 
percent.
  Last year, the spread of financial turmoil from foreign markets to our 
own threatened to undermine the hard-won health of the U.S. economy. The 
Russian government's default on its debt in August led to a near-panic 
in credit markets and a sell-off of equities here and abroad. Almost 
instantly there was a drastic revaluation of potential risks--not just 
for foreign loans, but for domestic credit as well. At the height of the 
flight to quality in early October, the spreads between yields on 
Treasury and private sector bonds widened dramatically. Market 
participants shunned all but the most liquid of credit instruments. The 
drying up of normal credit channels intensified with the near-failure of 
a large, highly leveraged U.S. hedge fund that had borrowed heavily from 
major banks.

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  In response to these challenges, the Federal Reserve quickly shifted 
policy once more. It cut the Federal funds rate by one-quarter 
percentage point in September, followed by a cut of similar magnitude in 
both the funds rate and the discount rate in October and again in 
November. The drop in the funds rate target from 5\1/2\ to 4\3/4\ 
percent in just seven weeks, accompanied by a one-half percentage point 
cut in the discount rate to 4\1/2\ percent, was the swiftest easing 
since 1991, when the economy was just emerging from recession.
  Market sentiment responded quickly to these actions. U.S. stock 
markets, which endured a short but sharp decline in late summer and 
early fall, rallied during the winter, reaching record levels in 
January, 1999. The S&P 500 was up 27 percent during 1998, a remarkable 
achievement after having more than doubled during the prior three years. 
Other market indexes staged impressive gains as well. During the last 
four years, the S&P and the narrower Dow-Jones Industrial Average have 
risen by 2\1/2\ times. This is the best four-year performance in the 
postwar period.
  By December, the Federal Reserve's actions had restored normal 
relationships in most credit markets. Rates on short-term Treasury bills 
and commercial paper were about 70 basis points lower than in December 
1997. The yield on 30-year Treasury bonds was about 90 basis points 
lower than a year earlier while yields on high-grade AAA-rated corporate 
bonds were 55 basis points lower. New bond and equity issuance, which 
had plummeted in the panic-ridden market atmosphere of October, 
recovered--even for less credit-worthy companies.
  Some signs of heightened risk aversion remained, however. Interest 
rate spreads between highly rated instruments and more risky ones were 
still unusually large, although not as large as in October. The yield 
spread between below-investment grade corporate bonds and equivalent 
maturity Treasury bonds, for example, finished the year three percentage 
points higher than at the end of 1997.
  Although there were still strains in some markets, credit, so 
essential to a healthy economy, was generally widely available--and at 
favorable interest rates by historical standards. Consequently, at its 
December meeting, the Federal Reserve decided that no further easing was 
needed. The actions taken during the prior three months had accomplished 
its goal of restoring confidence.

                           Recent Developments

  Real Growth: The economy expanded at a 3.7 percent annual rate over 
the first three quarters of 1998, and is estimated to have grown at a 
somewhat faster pace during the fourth quarter. This is the third year 
in a row of robust growth of around 4 percent annually. In each of these 
years, most forecasters had expected growth to slow to about 2\1/4\ 
percent per year, around the pace that the economy is generally believed 
capable of sustaining on a long-run basis.
  The fastest growing sector last year was again business spending on 
new equipment: up at a 16 percent annual rate during the first three 
quarters of the year, it is estimated to have risen at a double-digit 
rate in the fourth quarter as well. The biggest gains continued to be 
for information processing and related equipment, but businesses 
invested heavily in other forms of equipment as well. Investment in new 
structures, in contrast, edged down during 1998.
  This exceptionally strong growth of spending for new equipment boosted 
productivity and expanded industrial capacity to meet current and future 
demands. Overall industrial capacity rose by more than 5 percent in each 
of the past four years; the last time capacity grew this rapidly was in 
the late 1960s. The extra capacity has helped keep inflation low by 
easing the bottlenecks that might otherwise have developed. In the 
fourth quarter of 1998, the manufacturing operating rate was below its 
long-term average, even though labor markets were much tighter than 
usual.
  Growth last year was also supported by robust household spending. Low 
unemployment, low interest rates, rising real incomes, extraordinary 
capital gains, and record levels of consumer optimism have provided 
households with the resources and willingness to spend heavily, 
especially on discretionary, postponable purchases. Overall consumer 
spending after adjustment for inflation rose at a 5.4 percent annual 
rate during the first three quarters of the year, and continued at a 
brisk pace in the fourth quarter. Growth of consumer spending last year 
was the fastest in 15 years.
  The surge in consumer spending last year outstripped even the robust 
growth of disposable personal income. As a result, the saving rate edged 
down during the year, and entered negative territory in the fourth 
quarter. Not since the 1930s has the household saving rate been 
negative. Then, however, it was sign of extreme stress: incomes were 
shrinking faster than spending. Now, it is the result of economic 
success: soaring stock market wealth has enabled households to feel 
confident boosting spending knowing they have made unexpectedly large 
capital gains.
  The same factors spurring consumption pushed new and existing home 
sales during 1998 to their highest level since record-keeping began. The 
homeownership rate reached a record 66.8 percent in the third quarter. 
Buoyant sales and low inventories of unsold homes provided a strong 
incentive for builders to start new construction. Housing starts rose 
last year to the highest level since 1987. Residential investment, after 
adjustment for inflation, increased at a 13.5 percent annual rate during 
the first three quarters of the year, and is estimated to have risen at 
a double-digit pace in the fourth quarter. The growth of residential 
investment last year was the strongest since 1992, when homebuilding was 
just emerging from recession.
  Government purchases, on balance, made very little contribution to GDP 
growth last year. Federal government spending in GDP after adjustment 
for inflation edged down at a 1.2 percent annual rate during the

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first three quarters, about the same contraction as during 1997. By the 
third quarter of last year, Federal government spending in GDP was 12 
percent lower than when the Administration took office. State and local 
spending in GDP rose at a moderate 2.3 percent rate during the first 
three quarters of 1998, offsetting the restraint on growth from the 
Federal sector. In recent years, States and localities have increased 
their spending only modestly, despite the availability of unexpectedly 
large budget surpluses resulting from stronger-than-expected revenues.
  The foreign sector was the primary restraint on growth last year, as 
it was the year before. Exports of goods and services after adjustment 
for inflation shrank last year (the first time that has occurred since 
1985) as several economies abroad contracted--including Japan, the 
world's second largest economy. In addition, the 21 percent rise in the 
dollar from the end of 1996 to October 1998 stimulated imports into the 
United States. The widening of the net export deficit during the first 
three quarters of the year trimmed 1\3/4\ percentage point off of real 
GDP growth. The negative contribution from the trade sector was less 
pronounced during the second half of the year than the first, suggesting 
that the worst of the adverse trade impact may be over.

  Labor Markets: The performance of the labor market last year far 
exceeded most predictions. At the start of the year, most forecasters 
had expected growth to slow and the unemployment rate to rise slightly. 
Instead, the economy expanded at about the same rapid pace as during 
1997, driving the unemployment rate down to 4.3 percent by December. 
When this Administration took office, the unemployment rate was 7.3 
percent. All demographic groups, and especially minorities, have 
experienced a large decline in unemployment. Forty states had 
unemployment rates of 5.0 percent or less in November; only two had 
rates above 6.0 percent.
  The Nation's payrolls expanded by a sizeable 2.9 million jobs last 
year. Unlike previous years, employment gains were not widespread across 
industries. Mining and manufacturing, especially vulnerable to 
developments in international trade, lost jobs. This was more than 
offset numerically by job growth by the private service sector, 
construction, state and local government, and even the Federal 
Government (because of its temporary hiring in preparation for the 
decennial census). The abundance of employment opportunities pushed the 
labor force participation rate and employment/population ratio up the 
highest levels on record.

  Inflation: Despite rapid growth and the low unemployment rate, 
inflation remained low last year, and even declined by some measures. 
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the CPI excluding food and energy 
increased about the same rate in 1998 as in 1997. The core CPI excluding 
food and energy rose just 2.4 percent last year, nearly matching 1997's 
2.2 percent, which was the slowest rise since 1965. Because of falling 
energy prices, the total CPI rose even less, 1.6 percent, about the same 
as the 1.7 percent of 1997.
  Progress in reducing inflation is even more impressive measured by the 
broadest indicator, the GDP chain-weighted price index. It rose just 0.9 
percent at an annual rate during the first three quarters of 1998, 0.8 
percentage point less than during the four quarters of 1997. The last 
time aggregate inflation was this low was in 1961.
  The favorable inflation performance was the result of several factors: 
intense foreign competition, low unit labor costs, and perhaps 
structural changes in the link between unemployment and inflation. The 
rise in the dollar has reduced the costs of imported materials and 
intensified price competition from imports. Non-oil import prices fell 
3.1 percent last year, while imported oil prices tumbled 40 percent. 
Export prices of goods (a component of the GDP price index) fell 3.5 
percent, as American exporters trimmed prices to remain competitive 
abroad.
  Despite low unemployment, the increase in hourly earnings and the 
broader measures of compensation were not much different during 1998 
than the prior year. Moreover, robust investment in new equipment 
contributed to unusually strong productivity growth for this stage of an 
expansion, helping to restrain inflation by offsetting the gains in 
labor compensation. Unit labor costs rose at only a 1.8 percent annual 
rate during the first three quarters of 1998, down from 2.0 percent 
during 1997.
  The absence of inflationary pressures has implications for the 
estimate of the level of unemployment that is consistent with stable 
inflation. This threshold has been called the NAIRU, or 
``nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment.'' Economists have been 
lowering their estimates of NAIRU in recent years in keeping with the 
accumulating experience that lower unemployment has not led to higher 
inflation, even after taking into account the influence of temporary 
factors. The economic projections for this Budget assume that NAIRU is 
in a range centered on 5.3 percent. That is 0.1 percentage point less 
than estimated in the 1999 Budget assumptions and 0.4 percentage point 
less than in the 1997 Budget. Most private forecasters have also reduced 
their estimates of NAIRU in recent years.
  By the end of 1998, the unemployment rate was about one percentage 
point below the current mainstream estimate of NAIRU. The Administration 
forecast for real growth over the next three years implies that 
unemployment will return to 5.3 percent by the middle of 2001.

                            Statistical Issues

  The U.S. statistical agencies endeavor to measure accurately the 
economy's performance, but the U.S. economy is a moving target; 
statistical agencies must constantly improve their measurement tools 
just to keep up with rapid structural changes. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that concerns have been raised about possible

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mismeasurement in recent years, especially of real GDP growth and of 
inflation.

  Real Growth: In a perfect statistical world, the value of output would 
equal the value of income generated in its production: GDP would match 
Gross Domestic Income (GDI). However, because the series are estimated 
from different source data, each with its own gaps and inconsistencies, 
the two measures are hardly ever identical. What is particularly unusual 
now is the wide and growing difference between product and income 
measures.
  This ``statistical discrepancy'' (defined as aggregate output minus 
aggregate income) was -$102 billion in the third quarter of 1998, a 
record -1.2 percent of nominal GDP. By comparison, in the first quarter 
of 1995, the statistical discrepancy was nearly zero, and two years 
earlier, in the first quarter of 1993, it was a positive $71 billion, or 
1.1 percent of GDP. A swing of this magnitude means that during the past 
five and a half years, the annual average real growth rate measured from 
the familiar GDP output side has been about 0.4 percentage point less 
than the growth rate measured from the income side. During the first 
three quarters of last year, the divergence between the two measures of 
real growth remained near this magnitude.
  It is possible that the incorporation of more complete source data in 
the annual and benchmark revisions to the national accounts will 
eventually reduce the size of the statistical discrepancy. That is what 
happened last July, but even after that revision, the discrepancy in the 
third and fourth quarters of 1997 was still a sizeable -0.8 percent of 
GDP.
  The absence of a clear picture of the economy's actual growth 
performance is a cause for some concern. Any estimate of potential 
growth depends on an estimate of trend productivity growth, which itself 
depends on recent data on actual growth. When there is a growing 
divergence between product and income measures, there is a comparable 
divergence in estimates of the productivity trend. For example, from the 
last cyclical real GDP peak in the second quarter of 1990 to the third 
quarter of 1998, labor productivity growth has increased at a 1.3 
percent annual rate according to the official productivity statistics 
which measure output growth from the product side. Productivity growth 
measured from the income side, however, is at a 1.5 percent rate.
  While faster growth of trend productivity and potential GDP of 0.2 
percentage point per year may seem trivial, cumulated over the 10-year 
budget horizon--or more significantly over the 75 years of the long-run 
projections made in Chapter 2 of this Analytical Perspectives volume--
the additional output made possible by higher productivity growth can 
imply tens or even hundreds of billions of dollars of additional income 
in the economy.
  It is unclear whether the product or the income side provides the more 
accurate measure of growth. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
recognizes the shortcomings of both measures but believes that GDP is a 
more reliable measure than GDI (see the Survey of Current Business, 
August 1997, page 19). Other experts believe that some figure between 
the two measures may be more accurate.
  There is circumstantial evidence to suggest that growth may be faster 
than shown by the traditional GDP output measure. The recent combination 
of low inflation and high profits suggests that productivity growth may 
be stronger than reported from the output side. Moreover, the unexpected 
strength of Treasury receipts in the last three years suggests that the 
output measure, and even the income measure, may be too low. While some 
of the higher receipts are from capital gains generated by the booming 
stock market, which are not included in the national income accounts 
(because they arise from asset price revaluations rather than from 
current production), capital gains do not fully account for the surge.
  The Administration's budget assumptions project trend productivity 
growth of 1.3 percent per year, the average measured pace since GDP 
reached its last peak in the second quarter of 1990. It is possible that 
trend productivity growth may be somewhat faster, not only because of 
the faster growth of gross domestic income than gross domestic product 
in recent years, but also because the next benchmark GDP revision to the 
national accounts may incorporate improvements to the measurement of 
consumer prices that would lower GDP inflation slightly during the first 
half of the 1990s and raise real GDP growth by a comparable amount.
  In last July's annual revision covering the years 1995-1998, the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis took a step in this direction by switching 
to a geometric mean formula for the calculation of the consumer price 
measures used to deflate personal consumption expenditures. This lowered 
overall GDP inflation by almost 0.2 percentage points per year, and 
thereby boosted measured nonfarm output and productivity growth by 0.2 
percentage points annually. The next benchmark GDP revisions, which will 
be published in October 1999, will incorporate this methodological 
change going back at least to 1990. All other things equal, this would 
be expected to raise slightly productivity growth measured from the last 
cyclical peak. However, because the benchmark revisions will include 
many other methodological and source data improvements, it is not 
possible to know how much and in what direction the currently measured 
productivity trend will be altered. Therefore, the budget projections 
are based on the prudent course of assuming a continuation of the 
productivity trend as measured by the statistics now available.
  The uncertainty surrounding actual growth and its trend makes it more 
difficult to determine appropriate monetary policy. From a budgetary 
perspective, estimates of receipts and expenditures are more uncertain 
because they are dependent on the forecast for growth. As shown in Table 
1-6, ``Sensitivity of the Budget to Economic Assumptions,'' even small 
errors in projecting real GDP growth can have a significant effect on 
the budget balance cumulated over several years.

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  Inflation: Accurate measurement of inflation has become increasingly 
important in recent years, even as inflation has been brought under 
control. Eliminating biases of even a few tenths of a percentage point a 
year can be important relative to a goal of price stability when 
inflation is low, while it may have less significance when inflation is 
higher.
  A few years ago, questions were raised about the magnitude of bias in 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI). In December 1996, the Advisory 
Commission to Study the Consumer Price Index, appointed by the Senate 
Finance Committee, reported that the index overstated the actual cost of 
living by 1.1 percentage points per year; other experts believed that 
the magnitude of empirically demonstrated biases was less.
  The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) has made important methodological 
improvements beginning in 1995 that have significantly reduced any 
overstatement of inflation as measured by the CPI. Taken together, these 
changes are estimated to result in a 0.7 percentage point slower annual 
rise in the CPI by 1999 compared with the methodologies used in 1994. 
The changes instituted from 1995-1998 are estimated to have slowed the 
growth of the CPI by 0.5 percentage point per year. These improvements 
include correction of a problem in rotating new stores into the survey, 
a better measure of prices for hospital services and computers, and a 
more accurate estimate of the equivalent rent attributed to owner-
occupied housing. In addition, the BLS updated the expenditure weights 
used in the CPI from a 1982-84 basis to 1993-95 weights, introduced a 
more accurate geographic sample based on the 1990 decennial census, and 
redefined the groupings of items. (For a fuller description of these 
changes, see pages 7-8 in last year's Analytical Perspectives.) The 
changes introduced this year are expected to reduce CPI growth by 
another 0.2 percentage point per year.
  Two methodological improvements are being instituted this year. 
Beginning with the January CPI, items will be sampled on a product 
rather than a geographical basis. This switch will allow more frequent 
sampling of categories with rapidly changing product lines, such as 
consumer electronics.
  An even more important change is the replacement of the fixed-weighted 
Laspeyres formula that has been used in the CPI by a geometric mean 
formula for combining individual price quotations within certain 
components of the index. BLS is applying this improvement to categories 
where there are deemed to be substantial possibilities for substitution 
among items within the category--for example, different varieties of 
apples. In total, the categories using geometric means account for about 
60 percent of the overall weight of the CPI. A CPI calculated using 
geometric means more closely approximates a cost-of-living index. Unlike 
the fixed-weighted aggregation, the geometric mean formula allows for 
some shifts in consumer spending patterns in response to changes in 
relative prices within categories of goods and services.
  Because the CPI is used to deflate some nominal spending components of 
GDP, a slower rise in the CPI translates directly into a faster measured 
rise in real GDP and productivity growth. As noted in the discussion of 
real GDP in the prior section, the BEA recently applied the geometric 
mean formula to the prices used to deflate nominal personal consumption 
expenditures. As a result, measured productivity growth and real GDP 
growth in recent years were raised by almost 0.2 percentage point per 
year.
  The improved measurement of inflation, both in the CPI and the 
national income accounts, has important implications for the budget. 
Slower growth of the CPI means that outlays for programs with cost-of-
living adjustments tied to this index or its components--such as Social 
Security, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), retirement payments for 
railroad and Federal employees, and Food Stamps--will rise at a slower 
pace more in keeping with true inflation than they would have without 
these improvements. In addition, slower growth of the CPI will raise the 
growth of receipts: personal income tax brackets, the size of the 
personal exemptions, and eligibility thresholds for the Earned Income 
Tax Credit (EITC) will rise more slowly because they are also indexed to 
the CPI. Hence, the methodological improvements made in recent years act 
on both the outlays and receipts sides of the budget to increase the 
size of budget surpluses.

                          Economic Projections

  The economy's strong performance last year--and, indeed, over the last 
six years--and the maintenance of sound fiscal and monetary policies 
raise the possibility that actual economic developments may even be 
better than assumed--as has been the case in recent years. Nonetheless, 
it is prudent to base budget estimates on a conservative set of economic 
assumptions close to the consensus of private-sector forecasts.
  The economic assumptions summarized in Table 1-1 are predicated on the 
adoption of the policies proposed in this budget. The swing in the 
fiscal position from deficit to surplus is expected to contribute to 
continued favorable economic performance. Federal Government surpluses 
reduce interest rates, stimulate private sector investment in new plant 
and equipment, and help keep inflation under control. The Federal 
Reserve is assumed to continue to pursue successfully the twin goals of 
keeping inflation low while promoting growth.
  The economy is likely to continue to grow during the next few years, 
although at a more moderate pace than during 1998. While job 
opportunities are expected to remain plentiful, the unemployment rate is 
likely to rise gradually to a level consistent with stable inflation 
over the longer horizon. New job creation will boost incomes and 
consumer spending and keep confidence at a high level. Continued low 
inflation will enable monetary policy to support economic growth. 
Growth, in turn, will further improve the budget balance.

[[Page 9]]



                                                          Table 1-1.  ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS \1\
                                                      (Calendar years; dollar amounts in billions)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                    Projections
                                                                                   Actual --------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                    1997     1998     1999     2000     2001     2002     2003     2004
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gross Domestic Product (GDP):
  Levels, dollar amounts in billions:
    Current dollars.............................................................    8,111    8,497    8,833    9,199    9,582   10,004   10,456   10,930
    Real, chained (1992) dollars................................................    7,270    7,539    7,717    7,872    8,029    8,208    8,404    8,606
    Chained price index (1992 = 100), annual average............................    111.6    112.7    114.4    116.8    119.3    121.8    124.4    127.0
  Percent change, fourth quarter over fourth quarter:
    Current dollars.............................................................      5.6      4.5      4.0      4.2      4.1      4.5      4.5      4.5
    Real, chained (1992) dollars................................................      3.8      3.5      2.0      2.0      2.0      2.4      2.4      2.4
    Chained price index (1992 = 100)............................................      1.7      0.9      1.9      2.1      2.1      2.1      2.1      2.1
  Percent change, year over year:
    Current dollars.............................................................      5.9      4.8      4.0      4.1      4.2      4.4      4.5      4.5
    Real, chained (1992) dollars................................................      3.9      3.7      2.4      2.0      2.0      2.2      2.4      2.4
    Chained price index (1992 = 100)............................................      1.9      1.0      1.5      2.1      2.1      2.1      2.1      2.1
 
Incomes, billions of current dollars:
    Corporate profits before tax................................................      734      721      724      739      765      787      826      867
    Wages and salaries..........................................................    3,890    4,146    4,349    4,526    4,701    4,892    5,106    5,331
    Other taxable income \2\....................................................    1,717    1,763    1,815    1,863    1,921    1,980    2,051    2,126
 
Consumer Price Index (all urban): \3\
    Level (1982-84 = 100), annual average.......................................    160.6    163.1    166.7    170.6    174.5    178.5    182.6    186.8
    Percent change, fourth quarter over fourth quarter..........................      1.9      1.6      2.3      2.3      2.3      2.3      2.3      2.3
    Percent change, year over year..............................................      2.3      1.6      2.2      2.3      2.3      2.3      2.3      2.3
 
Unemployment rate, civilian, percent:
    Fourth quarter level........................................................      4.7      4.6      4.9      5.1      5.3      5.3      5.3      5.3
    Annual average..............................................................      5.0      4.6      4.8      5.0      5.3      5.3      5.3      5.3
Federal pay raises, January, percent:
    Military \4\................................................................      3.0      2.8      3.6      4.4      3.9      3.9      3.9      3.9
    Civilian \5\................................................................      3.0      2.8      3.6      4.4      3.9      3.9      3.9      3.9
 
Interest rates, percent:
    91-day Treasury bills \6\...................................................      5.1      4.8      4.2      4.3      4.3      4.4      4.4      4.4
    10-year Treasury notes......................................................      6.4      5.3      4.9      5.0      5.2      5.3      5.4      5.4
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Based on information available as of early December 1998.
\2\ Rent, interest, dividend and proprietors components of personal income.
\3\ Seasonally adjusted CPI for all urban consumers. Two versions of the CPI are now published. The index shown here is that currently used, as required
  by law, in calculating automatic adjustments to individual income tax brackets. Projections reflect scheduled changes in methodology.
\4\ Beginning with the 1999 increase, percentages apply to basic pay only; adjustments for housing and subsistence allowances will be determined by the
  Secretary of Defense.
\5\ Overall average increase, including locality pay adjustments.
\6\ Average rate (bank discount basis) on new issues within period.

  Real GDP, Potential GDP and Unemployment: Over the next three years, 
real GDP is expected to rise 2.0 percent per year. This shift to more 
moderate growth recognizes that by mainstream assumptions, growth has 
exceeded the pace that can be maintained on a sustained basis, and that 
this could eventually result in upward pressures on inflation. More 
moderate growth has been expected for this reason. Also, recessions in 
Asia and slow growth elsewhere are expected to restrain U.S. growth 
again this year, albeit not as much as during 1998. From 2001-2007, 
growth is expected to average a slightly faster 2.4 percent per year--
the Administration's estimate of the economy's potential growth rate. In 
2008, potential growth is projected to slow to 2.3 percent to reflect 
the foreseeable demographic trend toward slower growth of the workforce 
as the baby-boomers begin to retire.
  The net export component of GDP is expected to restrain real growth by 
about half as much as during 1998. Exports are expected to rise, rather 
than contract as they did in 1998, and import growth is likely to be 
somewhat slower than last year as our domestic demand slows. Beginning 
with 2000, the foreign sector is not expected to make a large 
contribution, positive or negative, to overall growth.
  As has been the case throughout this expansion, during the next six 
years business fixed investment is expected to be the fastest growing 
component of GDP. Although residential investment is also expected to 
benefit from low mortgage rates and strong demand for second homes for 
vacation or retirement, the high level of housing starts in recent years 
and underlying demographic trends may tend to reduce future growth 
somewhat. Consumer spending, especially on durable goods, is also likely 
to moderate from the rapid pace of 1998. The fundamental factors 
supporting consumer spending are likely to remain favorable, although 
not quite to the same extent as during 1998. The government component of 
GDP will grow slowly through 2004. A decline in Federal consumption and 
gross investment is projected to be offset by moderate growth in State 
and local spending.
  Potential GDP growth of 2.4 percent on average through 2007 can be 
decomposed into the trend growth

[[Page 10]]

of productivity, 1.3 percent per year, plus the growth of the labor 
force, estimated at 1.1 percent annually. The Administration's labor 
force projection assumes that the population of working age will grow 
1.0 percent per year and that the labor force participation rate will 
edge up 0.1 percent per year.
  Both the labor force and participation rate assumptions are lower than 
recent experience. The participation rate has risen 0.2 percent per year 
since 1993, as falling unemployment and rapidly expanding job 
opportunities have induced job-seeking. With the labor force 
participation rate and employment/population ratio already at post-World 
War II highs last year, it is prudent to project a slower rise in coming 
years. In addition, the female participation rate, which had risen 
sharply during much of the postwar period, grew much more slowly during 
the 1990s, and this is forecast to be reflected in future growth rates.
  The real GDP growth projection of 2.0 percent through 2001 is 
consistent with a gradual rise in the unemployment rate to 5.3 percent. 
Unemployment is then projected to average 5.3 percent from 2001 onward, 
when real GDP growth reverts on average to the Administration's estimate 
of the economy's potential growth rate.

  Inflation: With unemployment expected to be slightly below the NAIRU 
during the next three years, inflation is projected to creep up. The CPI 
is projected to increase 2.3 percent during this and the subsequent 
years of the forecast; the GDP chain-weighted price index is projected 
to increase 2.1 percent annually beginning in 2000. The 0.2 percentage 
point difference between the two inflation measures is narrower than the 
0.5 percentage point of 1998, in part because BLS will introduce the 
geometric means formula into the CPI this year, which will slow the 
growth in the index by about 0.2 percentage point annually. As discussed 
above, this change will not affect the GDP price index because BEA has 
already incorporated this improvement.
  Despite the relatively tight labor market in the next few years, the 
inflation rate is projected to remain low, partly because of two 
temporary factors. The rise in the dollar is expected to hold down 
import prices and intensify price competition from imported goods and 
services. In addition, wide profit margins provide a cushion that will 
enable firms to absorb cost increases without having to pass them on 
fully into higher prices. Moreover, the methodological improvements to 
the CPI introduced this year also will slow the rise in the CPI.

  Interest Rates: The assumptions, which were finalized in early 
December, project stable short-term rates and a slight rise in long-term 
interest rates. The rise at the long end of the maturity spectrum is 
about the same as the increase in the CPI. By 2002, the 91-day Treasury 
bill rate is expected to be 4.4 percent, close to December's average; 
the yield on the 10-year Treasury bond is projected to be 5.3 percent, 
compared with 4.7 percent in December.
  Incomes: The moderating of real growth during the projection horizon 
is expected to shift the distribution of national income slightly, 
augmenting somewhat the share going to compensation, while trimming the 
unusually high profits share in GDP. The personal interest income share 
is also projected to decline as interest rates remain historically low 
and as households hold less Federal government debt because of the 
projected budget surpluses. On balance, total taxable income is 
projected to decline gradually as a share of GDP.

                           Comparison with CBO

   The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) prepares the economic 
projections used by Congress in formulating budget policy. In the 
executive branch, this function is performed jointly by the Treasury, 
the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), and the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB). It is natural that the two sets of economic projections be 
compared with one another, but there are several important differences, 
along with the similarities, that should be kept in mind:
   The Administration's projections always assume that the President's 
policy proposals in the budget will be adopted in full. In contrast, CBO 
normally assumes that current law will continue to hold; thus, it makes 
a ``pre-policy'' projection. In recent years, and currently, CBO has 
made economic projections based on a fiscal policy similar to the 
budget's.
   Both CBO and the Administration assume that maintaining budget 
surpluses would have significant macroeconomic effects, especially for 
interest rates and the distribution of income.
   The two sets of projections are often prepared at different times. 
The Administration's projections must be prepared in early December, 
months ahead of the release of the budget. Some of the differences in 
the Administration's and CBO's near-term forecasts, therefore, may be 
due to the availability of more recent data to CBO. Timing differences 
are much less likely to play an important role in any differences in 
outyear projections, however.
   Table 1-2 presents a summary comparison of the two sets of 
projections. Briefly, the Administration and CBO projections are very 
similar for all the major variables affecting the budget outlook:

   Real GDP: The projections of real GDP growth are quite similar; both 
the Administration and CBO project that real GDP will grow at an average 
annual rate of 2.2 percent over the 1999-2004 period.
   Inflation: Both the Administration and CBO expect inflation to 
continue at a slow, steady rate over the next several years. For the 
chain-weighted GDP price index, both predict that inflation will be 2.1 
percent yearly; CBO expects the annual rate of change in the CPI to be 
about 0.3 percentage point higher than the Administration.
   Unemployment: CBO projects unemployment to rise from its current 
level to 5.7 percent. The Administra 

[[Page 11]]



                      Table 1-2.  COMPARISON OF ADMINISTRATION AND CBO ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS
                                            (Calendar years; percent)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                 Projections
                                                           -----------------------------------------------------
                                                              1999     2000     2001     2002     2003     2004
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Real GDP (chain-weighted): \1\
  CBO January.............................................      1.8      1.9      2.3      2.4      2.5      2.4
  2000 Budget.............................................      2.0      2.0      2.0      2.4      2.4      2.4
 
Chain-weighted GDP Price Index: \1\
  CBO January.............................................      2.1      2.0      2.2      2.1      2.1      2.1
  2000 Budget.............................................      1.9      2.1      2.1      2.1      2.1      2.1
 
Consumer Price Index (all-urban): \1\
  CBO January.............................................      2.7      2.6      2.6      2.6      2.6      2.6
  2000 Budget.............................................      2.3      2.3      2.3      2.3      2.3      2.3
 
Unemployment rate: \2\
  CBO January.............................................      4.6      5.1      5.4      5.6      5.7      5.7
  2000 Budget.............................................      4.8      5.0      5.3      5.3      5.3      5.3
 
Interest rates: \2\
  91-day Treasury bills:
    CBO January...........................................      4.5      4.5      4.5      4.5      4.5      4.5
    2000 Budget...........................................      4.2      4.3      4.3      4.4      4.4      4.4
 
  10-year Treasury notes:
    CBO January...........................................      5.1      5.3      5.4      5.4      5.4      5.4
    2000 Budget...........................................      4.9      5.0      5.2      5.3      5.4      5.4
 
Taxable income (share of GDP): \3\
  CBO January.............................................     77.8     77.1     76.9     76.6     76.5     76.3
  2000 Budget.............................................     78.0     77.5     77.1     76.6     76.4     76.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Percent change, fourth quarter over fourth quarter.
\2\ Annual averages, percent.
\3\ Taxable personal income plus corporate profits before tax.

tion projects that the unemployment rate will average a slightly lower 
5.3 percent.

   Interest rates: The Administration and CBO have very similar paths 
for long- and short-term interest rates.
   Income distribution: The Administration and CBO have similar 
projections for total taxable income shares of GDP. Both CBO and the 
Administration expect a shift of income from interest to corporate 
profits as a result of the sustained lower interest rates resulting from 
continued budget surpluses. Both project a similar secular decline in 
the total taxable income share.

              Impact of Changes in the Economic Assumptions

   The economic assumptions underlying this budget are similar to those 
of last year. Both budgets anticipated that achieving a fundamental 
shift in fiscal posture from large deficits to surpluses would result in 
a significant decline in interest rates, which would serve to extend the 
economic expansion at a moderate pace while helping to maintain low, 
steady rates of inflation and unemployment. The shift to budget 
surpluses and the ensuing lower interest rates were also expected to 
shift the composition of income from interest to profits. This would 
have favorable effect on receipts and the budget balance, because 
profits are on average taxed more heavily than interest income.
   The changes in the economic assumptions since last year's budget have 
been relatively modest, as Table 1-3 shows. The differences are 
primarily the result of economic performance in 1998 that has, once 
again, proven more favorable than was anticipated at the beginning of 
last year. Economic growth was stronger than expected in 1998, while 
inflation and unemployment were lower. Because of this favorable 
performance, the projected annual averages for the unemployment rate and 
GDP price index have again been reduced slightly this year. At the same 
time, interest rates are assumed in this budget to remain near their 
current low levels. Interest rates are already lower than the levels to 
which they were assumed to decline eventually in last year's forecast.

[[Page 12]]



                   Table 1-3.  COMPARISON OF ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS IN THE 1999 AND 2000 BUDGETS
                                  (Calendar years; dollar amounts in billions)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     1998     1999     2000     2001     2002     2003     2004
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nominal GDP:
  1999 Budget assumptions \1\....................    8,473    8,818    9,189    9,596   10,045   10,508   10,999
  2000 Budget assumptions........................    8,497    8,833    9,199    9,582   10,004   10,456   10,930
 
Real GDP (percent change): \2\
  1999 Budget assumptions........................      2.0      2.0      2.0      2.3      2.4      2.4      2.4
  2000 Budget assumptions........................      3.5      2.0      2.0      2.0      2.4      2.4      2.4
 
GDP price index (percent change): \2\
  1999 Budget assumptions........................      2.0      2.1      2.2      2.2      2.2      2.2      2.2
  2000 Budget assumptions........................      0.9      1.9      2.1      2.1      2.1      2.1      2.1
 
Consumer Price Index (percent change): \2\
  1999 Budget assumptions........................      2.2      2.2      2.3      2.3      2.3      2.3      2.3
  2000 Budget assumptions........................      1.6      2.3      2.3      2.3      2.3      2.3      2.3
 
Civilian unemployment rate (percent): \3\
  1999 Budget assumptions........................      4.9      5.1      5.3      5.4      5.4      5.4      5.4
  2000 Budget assumptions........................      4.6      4.8      5.0      5.3      5.3      5.3      5.3
 
91-day Treasury bill rate (percent): \3\
  1999 Budget assumptions........................      5.0      4.9      4.8      4.7      4.7      4.7      4.7
  2000 Budget assumptions........................      4.8      4.2      4.3      4.3      4.4      4.4      4.4
 
10-year Treasury note rate (percent): \3\
  1999 Budget assumptions........................      5.9      5.8      5.8      5.7      5.7      5.7      5.7
  2000 Budget assumptions........................      5.3      4.9      5.0      5.2      5.3      5.4      5.4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Adjusted for July 1998 NIPA revisions.
\2\ Fourth quarter-to-fourth quarter.
\3\ Calendar year average.

   The net effects of these modifications in the economic assumptions on 
the budget are shown in Table 1-4. The largest effects come from higher 
receipts during 1999-2004. In all years through 2004, there are lower 
outlays for interest due to the unexpectedly large fall in interest 
rates, and lower outlays for cost-of-living adjustments to Federal 
programs due to lower 1998 inflation. The change in economic assumptions 
since last year increases budget surpluses by $40 billion to $50 billion 
a year.

              Table 1-4.  EFFECTS ON THE BUDGET OF CHANGES IN ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS SINCE LAST YEAR
                                            (In billions of dollars)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              1999     2000     2001     2002     2003     2004
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Budget totals under 1999 Budget economic assumptions and
 2000 Budget policies:
  Receipts................................................  1,778.4  1,857.0  1,909.0  1,988.9  2,060.2  2,154.5
  Outlays.................................................  1,743.1  1,789.0  1,824.8  1,846.3  1,921.0  1,987.8
                                                           -----------------------------------------------------
      Surplus.............................................     35.4     68.1     84.1    142.6    139.2    166.8
 
Changes due to economic assumptions:
  Receipts................................................     27.9     25.9     24.4     18.1     14.8     11.0
  Outlays:
    Inflation.............................................     -4.9     -6.3     -6.6     -6.9     -7.3     -7.9
    Unemployment..........................................     -3.5     -2.4     -1.6     -0.7     -0.9     -1.0
    Interest rates........................................     -6.4    -11.0   --11.4    -10.0     -9.2     -8.3
    Interest on changes in borrowing......................     -1.2     -3.6     -6.1     -8.4    -10.6    -12.7
                                                           -----------------------------------------------------
      Total, outlay decreases (-).........................    -16.0    -23.3    -25.6    -26.0    -28.1    -29.9
                                                           -----------------------------------------------------
      Increase in surplus.................................     43.9     49.2     50.0     44.1     42.9     40.9
 
Budget totals under 2000 Budget economic assumptions and
 policies:
  Receipts................................................  1,806.3  1,883.0  1,933.3  2,007.1  2,075.0  2,165.5
  Outlays.................................................  1,727.1  1,765.7  1,799.2  1,820.3  1,893.0  1,957.9
                                                           -----------------------------------------------------
      Surplus.............................................     79.3    117.3    134.1    186.7    182.0    207.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 13]]

                     Structural vs. Cyclical Balance

   When the economy is operating above potential as it is currently 
estimated to be, receipts are higher than they would be if resources 
were less fully employed, and outlays for unemployment-sensitive 
programs (such as unemployment compensation and food stamps) are lower. 
As a result, the deficit is smaller or the surplus is larger than it 
would be if unemployment were at the NAIRU. The portion of the surplus 
or deficit that can be traced to this factor is called the cyclical 
surplus or deficit. The remainder, the portion that would remain with 
unemployment at the NAIRU (consistent with a 5.3 percent unemployment 
rate), is called the structural surplus or deficit.

                                                         Table 1-5.  ADJUSTED STRUCTURAL BALANCE
                                                                (In billions of dollars)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                               1992     1993     1994     1995     1996    1997    1998    1999    2000    2001    2002    2003    2004
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unadjusted deficit (-) or surplus..........   -290.4   -255.0   -203.1   -163.9   -107.4   -21.9    69.2    79.3   117.3   134.1   186.7   182.0   207.6
  Cyclical component.......................    -75.0    -66.2    -38.1    -16.5     -7.8    12.4    34.3    29.4    16.7     6.6     0.3  ......  ......
                                            ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Structural deficit (-) or surplus..........   -215.4   -188.9   -165.0   -147.4    -99.6   -34.3    35.0    49.9   100.6   127.5   186.5   182.0   207.6
  Deposit insurance outlays................     -2.3    -28.0     -7.6    -17.9     -8.4   -14.4    -4.4    -5.0    -2.3    -1.8    -1.3      -*     0.8
                                            ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adjusted structural deficit (-) or surplus.   -217.7   -216.9   -172.6   -165.3   -108.0   -48.7    30.6    44.8    98.3   125.7   185.1   182.0   208.5
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

   Changes in the structural balance give a better picture of the impact 
of budget policy on the economy than does the unadjusted budget balance. 
The level of the structural balance also gives a clearer picture of the 
stance of fiscal policy, because this part of the surplus or deficit 
will persist even when the economy achieves permanently sustainable 
operating levels.
   In the early 1990s, large swings in net outlays for deposit insurance 
(the S&L bailouts) had substantial impacts on deficits, but had little 
concurrent impact on economic performance. It therefore became customary 
to remove deposit insurance outlays as well as the cyclical component of 
the surplus or deficit from the actual surplus or deficit to compute the 
adjusted structural balance. This is shown in Table 1-5.
   For the period 1998 through mid-2001, the unemployment rate is 
slightly below the estimated NAIRU of 5.3 percent, resulting in cyclical 
surpluses. Thereafter, unemployment is projected to equal the NAIRU, so 
the cyclical component of the surplus vanishes. Deposit insurance net 
outlays are relatively small and do not change greatly from year to 
year. The adjusted structural surplus or deficits in this budget display 
much the same pattern of year-to-year changes as the actual deficits. 
Two significant points are illustrated by this table. First, of the $360 
billion swing in the actual budget balance between 1992 and 1998 (from a 
$290 billion deficit to a $69 billion surplus), 30 percent ($109 
billion) resulted from cyclical improvement in the economy. The rest of 
the reduction stemmed primarily from policy actions--mainly those in the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, which reversed a projected 
continued steep rise in the deficit and set the stage for the remarkable 
cyclical improvement that has occurred. Second, the structural surplus 
is expected to rise substantially over the projection horizon--in part 
due to the effects of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.

            Sensitivity of the Budget to Economic Assumptions

   Both receipts and outlays are affected by changes in economic 
conditions. This sensitivity seriously complicates budget planning, 
because errors in economic assumptions lead to errors in the budget 
projections. It is therefore useful to examine the implications of 
alternative economic assumptions.
   Many of the budgetary effects of changes in economic assumptions are 
fairly predictable, and a set of rules of thumb embodying these 
relationships can aid in estimating how changes in the economic 
assumptions would alter outlays, receipts, and the surplus.
   Economic variables that affect the budget do not usually change 
independently of one another. Output and employment tend to move 
together in the short run: a high rate of real GDP growth is generally 
associated with a declining rate of unemployment, while moderate or 
negative growth is usually accompanied by rising unemployment. In the 
long run, however, changes in the average rate of growth of real GDP are 
mainly due to changes in the rates of growth of productivity and labor 
supply, and are not necessarily associated with changes in the average 
rate of unemployment. Inflation and interest rates are also closely 
interrelated: a higher expected rate of inflation increases interest 
rates, while lower expected inflation reduces rates.
   Changes in real GDP growth or inflation have a much greater 
cumulative effect on the budget over time if they are sustained for 
several years than if they last for only one year.
   Highlights of the budget effects of the above rules of thumb are 
shown in Table 1-6.
   If real GDP growth is lower by one percentage point in calendar year 
1999 only and the unemployment rate rises by one-half percentage point, 
the fiscal 1999 surplus would decrease by $9.8 billion; receipts in 1999 
would be lower by about $8.0 billion, and outlays would

[[Page 14]]

be higher by about $1.8 billion, primarily for unemployment-sensitive 
programs. In fiscal year 2000, the receipts shortfall would grow further 
to about $17.2 billion, and outlays would increase by about $6.1 billion 
relative to the base, even though the growth rate in calendar 2000 
equals the rate originally assumed. This is because the level of real 
(and nominal) GDP and taxable incomes would be permanently lower, and 
unemployment higher. The budget effects (including growing interest 
costs associated with higher deficits or smaller surpluses) would 
continue to grow slightly in later years.
   The budget effects are much larger if the real growth rate is assumed 
to be one percentage point less in each year (1999-2004) and the 
unemployment rate to rise one-half percentage point in each year. With 
these assumptions, the levels of real and nominal GDP would be below the 
base case by a growing percentage. The budget balance would be worsened 
by $163.3 billion relative to the base case by 2004.
   The effects of slower productivity growth are shown in a third 
example, where real growth is one percentage point lower per year while 
the unemployment rate is unchanged. In this case, the estimated budget 
effects mount steadily over the years, but more slowly, resulting in a 
$133.3 billion worsening of the budget balance by 2004.
   Joint changes in interest rates and inflation have a smaller effect 
on the deficit than equal percentage point changes in real GDP growth, 
because their effects on receipts and outlays are substantially 
offsetting. An example is the effect of a one percentage point higher 
rate of inflation and one percentage point higher interest rates during 
calendar year 1999 only. In subsequent years, the price level and 
nominal GDP would be one percent higher than in the base case, but 
interest rates are assumed to return to their base levels. Outlays for 
1999 rise by $5.6 billion and receipts by $9.2 billion, for a increase 
of $3.6 billion in the 1999 surplus. In 2000, outlays would be above the 
base by $12.9 billion, due in part to lagged cost-of-living adjustments; 
receipts would rise $18.4 billion above the base, however, resulting in 
a $5.6 billion improvement in the budget balance. In subsequent years, 
the amounts added to receipts would continue to be larger than the 
additions to outlays.
   If the rate of inflation and the level of interest rates are higher 
by one percentage point in all years, the price level and nominal GDP 
would rise by a cumulatively growing percentage above their base levels. 
In this case, the effects on receipts and outlays mount steadily in 
successive years, adding $54.0 billion to outlays and $109.0 billion to 
receipts in 2004, for a net increase in the surplus of $55.0 billion.
   The table shows the interest rate and the inflation effects 
separately. These separate effects for interest rates and inflation 
rates do not sum to the effects for simultaneous changes in both. This 
occurs because, when the budget is in surplus and some debt is being 
retired, the combined effects of two changes in assumptions affecting 
debt financing patterns and interest costs may differ from the sum of 
the separate effects, depending on assumptions about Treasury's 
selection of debt maturities to retire and the interest rates they bear. 
The last entry in the table shows rules of thumb for the added interest 
cost associated with changes in the budget surplus.
  The effects of changes in economic assumptions in the opposite 
direction are approximately symmetric to those shown in the table. The 
impact of a one percentage point lower rate of inflation or higher real 
growth would have about the same magnitude as the effects shown in the 
table, but with the opposite sign.
   These rules of thumb are computed while holding the income share 
composition of GDP constant. Because different income components are 
subject to different taxes and tax rates, estimates of total receipts 
can be affected significantly by changing income shares. However, the 
relationships between changes in income shares and changes in growth, 
inflation, and interest rates are too complex to be reduced to simple 
rules.

[[Page 15]]



                          Table 1-6.  SENSITIVITY OF THE BUDGET TO ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS
                                            (In billions of dollars)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Budget effect                       1999      2000      2001      2002      2003      2004
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Real Growth and Employment
 
Budgetary effects of 1 percent lower real GDP
 growth:
  For calendar year 1999 only: \1\
    Receipts........................................      -8.0     -17.2     -20.1     -20.9     -21.8     -22.7
    Outlays.........................................       1.8       6.1       6.6       8.0       9.7      11.5
                                                     -----------------------------------------------------------
      Decrease in surplus (-).......................      -9.8     -23.3     -26.7     -28.9     -31.5     -34.2
 
  Sustained during 1999-2004: \1\
    Receipts........................................      -8.0     -25.4     -46.1     -68.3     -92.0    -117.5
    Outlays.........................................       1.8       8.0      14.7      23.1      33.3      45.7
                                                     -----------------------------------------------------------
      Decrease in surplus (-).......................      -9.8     -33.4     -60.9     -91.4    -125.4    -163.3
 
  Sustained during 1999-2004, with no change in
   unemployment:
    Receipts........................................      -8.0     -25.4     -46.2     -68.4     -92.1    -117.6
    Outlays.........................................       0.2       1.0       2.8       5.7      10.0      15.7
                                                     -----------------------------------------------------------
      Decrease in surplus (-).......................      -8.2     -26.4     -49.0     -74.2    -102.1    -133.3
 
            Inflation and Interest Rates
 
Budgetary effects of 1 percentage point higher rate
 of:
  Inflation and interest rates during calendar year
   1999 only:
    Receipts........................................       9.2      18.4      17.8      16.4      17.2      18.1
    Outlays.........................................       5.6      12.9      10.3       9.2       9.0       8.3
                                                     -----------------------------------------------------------
      Increase in surplus (+).......................       3.6       5.6       7.5       7.2       8.2       9.7
 
  Inflation and interest rates, sustained during
   1999-2004:
    Receipts........................................       9.2      28.1      47.1      65.7      86.3     109.0
    Outlays.........................................       5.6      18.6      29.3      38.1      46.4      54.0
                                                     -----------------------------------------------------------
      Increase in surplus (+).......................       3.6       9.5      17.8      27.6      39.9      55.0
 
  Interest rates only, sustained during 1999-2004:
    Receipts........................................       1.3       3.3       4.1       4.4       4.8       5.1
    Outlays.........................................       5.2      14.1      18.5      20.3      21.6      22.2
                                                     -----------------------------------------------------------
      Decrease in surplus (-).......................      -3.9     -10.9     -14.4     -15.9     -16.9     -17.1
 
  Inflation only, sustained during 1999-2004:
    Receipts........................................       8.0      24.8      43.0      61.3      81.6     103.9
    Outlays.........................................       0.5       4.7      11.3      18.7      26.4      34.1
                                                     -----------------------------------------------------------
      Increase in surplus (+).......................       7.5      20.2      31.7      42.6      55.2      69.7
 
      Interest Cost of Higher Federal Borrowing
 
Outlay effect of a $50 billion reduction in the 1999
 surplus............................................       1.2       2.4       2.5       2.7       2.9       3.0
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* $50 million or less.
\1\ The unemployment rate is assumed to be 0.5 percentage point higher per 1.0 percent shortfall in the level of
  real GDP.