119 SRES 716 IS: Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding critical elements of the United States policy towards the People's Republic of China. U.S. Senate 2026-04-30 text/xml EN Pursuant to Title 17 Section 105 of the United States Code, this file is not subject to copyright protection and is in the public domain.

III119th CONGRESS2d SessionS. RES. 716IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATESApril 30, 2026Mr. Coons (for himself, Mr. Ricketts, Mrs. Shaheen, Mr. Cruz, Mr. Kaine, Mr. Moreno, Mrs. Murray, Mr. Curtis, Mr. Kim, Mr. McCormick, Ms. Duckworth, Mr. Banks, Mr. Tillis, Mr. Young, Mr. Wicker, and Ms. Slotkin) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign RelationsRESOLUTIONExpressing the sense of the Senate regarding critical elements of the United States policy towards the People's Republic of China.

Whereas the People’s Republic of China is the foremost rival and strategic competitor of the United States that has the intent and capacity to undermine the security, economic prosperity, and strategic interests of the United States and the allies and partners of the United States;Whereas the People’s Republic of China has rapidly modernized and expanded its military in a manner that—(1)poses direct threats to the security and economic prosperity of the United States, including by expanding its arsenal of nuclear, maritime, conventional long-range strike, cyber, space, and intelligence capabilities;(2)aims to project power and deter the United States presence in the Indo-Pacific region;(3)facilitates intensified coercive military and illegal, coercive, aggressive, and deceptive activities (also known as gray zone activities) that—(A)threaten the security and sovereignty of countries in the Indo-Pacific region; and(B)compromise freedom of navigation in vital lanes of commerce, such as the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait;(4)aims to give the People's Republic of China the capability to carry out its threat to alter the status quo in the Taiwan Strait by coercion or force, including by delaying or denying third-party involvement in a Taiwan Strait contingency; and(5)supports United States adversaries, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the Russian Federation, including through the sharing of military technology and materiel;Whereas the People’s Republic of China employs a wide range of state-directed economic and industrial policies designed to—(1)disadvantage United States workers, firms, and long-term economic competitiveness;(2)secure dominance in strategic industries; and(3)distort global markets, including by—(A)exploiting its position across global supply chains, such as critical minerals, advanced manufacturing inputs, and other strategic goods;(B)forcing technology transfers;(C)engaging in intellectual property theft;(D)creating market distortions;(E)imposing expansive export controls; and(F)establishing barriers to market access;Whereas the People’s Republic of China is working—(1)to surpass the United States in the development of critical emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing, which will define twenty-first century economic and military power; and(2)to use such technologies—(A)to expand the reach and range of their offensive military capabilities; and(B)to conduct widespread cyber operations, including operations targeting the United States and its partners;Whereas the People’s Republic of China continues to be the primary source of precursor chemicals used by transnational criminal organizations to synthesize illicit substances (including illicit fentanyl and nitazenes) that harm communities in the United States;Whereas the People’s Republic of China leverages international institutions and regional organizations, including standards-setting bodies and technical governance frameworks, in ways that—(1)give an unfair advantage to Chinese firms;(2)embed technologies and rules preferred by the People's Republic of China in global markets to the disadvantage of companies in the United States and allied countries seeking to compete in strategic sectors; and(3)obstruct Taiwan's participation in global forums; andWhereas the People’s Republic of China is an authoritarian state that—(1)restricts and suppresses human rights, religious and ethnic minority groups, civil society, and free speech and media; and(2)engages in a sophisticated global campaign of transnational repression: Now, therefore, be it

That it is the sense of the Senate that the United States should—(1)address the security, economic, technological, diplomatic, and strategic threats posed by the People's Republic of China as the foremost priorities of United States foreign policy;(2)sustain and strengthen deterrence against the People's Republic of China and enhance the capacity of the United States—(A)to defend its interests;(B)to support freedom of navigation; and(C)to maintain peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, including in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea;(3)protect United States economic interests against the predatory economic and trade practices of the People's Republic of China, including by—(A)strengthening export controls and closing loopholes;(B)restricting investments in strategic industries in the United States;(C)enforcing forced labor restrictions; and(D)imposing costs to offset state-subsidized entities and goods;(4)dominate the artificial intelligence and other foundational technologies sectors compared to the People's Republic of China and other peer and near-peer competitors;(5)reaffirm the ironclad United States commitment to, and support for, United States treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific region, which stand at the frontlines of the People's Republic of China’s aggression, increased defense spending to deter such aggression, and provide vital basing for United States forces, including—(A)Japan, consistent with the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan, signed at Washington, January 19, 1960;(B)South Korea, consistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea, signed at Washington, October 1, 1953; (C) Australia, consistent with the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America, signed at San Francisco, September, 1951, and through the partnership among Australia, the United Kingdom, and United States (commonly known as AUKUS); (D)the Philippines, consistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Philippines, signed at Washington, August 30, 1951; and(E)trilateral cooperation between United States allies in the Indo-Pacific region, including among—(i)the United States, Japan, and South Korea;(ii)the United States, Japan, and the Philippines; and(iii)the United States, Japan, and Australia;(6)preserve peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and maintain the longstanding United States policy on Taiwan, guided by the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), the Three Joint Communiqués between the United States and the People's Republic of China, and the Six Assurances between the United States and Taiwan;(7)strengthen support for United States partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including partners facing military, economic, and gray-zone coercion from the People’s Republic of China, including by—(A)broadening United States engagement with India, including through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue;(B)advancing United States partnerships with countries comprising the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; and(C)working with Pacific island countries to support their resilience and prosperity;(8)mitigate the leadership and influence of the People's Republic of China in multilateral organizations, technical bodies, and international standards-setting institutions to prevent the adoption of rules or standards that disadvantage the interests of the United States or of its partners; and(9)advance the democratic norms and values that promote human rights, openness, and the flourishing of civil society in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond, in accordance with United States laws, such as Public Law 117–78 (commonly referred to as the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act) and the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409; 22 U.S.C. 3301 note).