

119TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. 5382

To require a report on the artificial intelligence power of the People’s Republic of China.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

AUGUST 7, 2026

Mr. HUSTED (for himself and Mr. WARNER) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To require a report on the artificial intelligence power of
the People’s Republic of China.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “China AI Power Re-
5 port Act”.

6 **SEC. 2. REPORT ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE POWER OF**
7 **THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
9 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter
10 for 3 years, the Secretaries, in consultation with the cov-

1 ered agency heads, shall submit to the appropriate com-
2 mittees of Congress a report on the advanced artificial in-
3 telligence capabilities of the PRC, including the efforts by
4 the PRC relating to supply chains for advanced artificial
5 intelligence systems.

6 (b) COMPONENTS.—Each report required under sub-
7 section (a) shall also include the following:

8 (1) An assessment of integrated circuits de-
9 signed or optimized for advanced artificial intel-
10 ligence training or inference by artificial intelligence
11 chip designers in the PRC, including Huawei Tech-
12 nologies Co., Ltd. and Cambricon Technologies (or
13 successor entities), that includes—

14 (A) with respect to such integrated cir-
15 cuits, the—

- 16 (i) total processing power;
17 (ii) integer and floating point oper-
18 ations per second at relevant precision lev-
19 els;
20 (iii) memory capacity and bandwidth;
21 (iv) interconnect bandwidth;
22 (v) power efficiency;
23 (vi) transistor count and die size;
24 (vii) process node used per design;
25 (viii) energy efficiency;

1 (ix) manufacturing cost and yield as-
2 sumptions;

3 (x) ability of the integrated circuit to
4 effectively run artificial intelligence models
5 trained on a different chip designer's inte-
6 grated circuit, including measurements
7 such as model inference in tokens per sec-
8 ond and cost per token with and without a
9 software application layer that improves
10 model translation ability;

11 (xi) the capability of the most ad-
12 vanced server configuration produced using
13 the chip designer's integrated circuits in-
14 cluding such technical specifications like
15 floating point operations per second, mem-
16 ory capacity and bandwidth, energy effi-
17 ciency, and ability to function at scale; and

18 (xii) any future specification that be-
19 comes relevant to the development of fu-
20 ture artificial intelligence capability; and

21 (B) with respect to such chip designers—

22 (i) the total number and types of inte-
23 grated circuits produced in the year pre-
24 ceding submission of such report and the

1 projected production number for the year
2 proceeding submission of such report;

3 (ii) the foundries used in the produc-
4 tion of the integrated circuits;

5 (iii) the software ecosystem, including
6 any parallel computing platforms, pro-
7 gramming models, or development frame-
8 works that enable accelerated computing
9 for artificial intelligence training or infer-
10 ence;

11 (iv) the method and extent to which
12 such integrated circuits are used in other
13 countries, including in the United States;
14 and

15 (v) the manufacturer's ability to
16 produce a software application layer re-
17 quired to achieve an improved token per
18 seconds and cost per token rate.

19 (2) An assessment of semiconductor fabrication
20 facilities in the PRC that produce logic integrated
21 circuits for use in advanced artificial intelligence
22 training or inference, including such facilities owned
23 or operated by the Semiconductor Manufacturing
24 International Corporation, that includes, with re-
25 spect to such facilities, the—

1 (A) total monthly production capacity per
2 advanced process node with non-planar transis-
3 tors or 16/14 nm and below and the percentage
4 of that monthly production capacity dedicated
5 to production of logic integrated circuits for use
6 in advanced artificial training or inference;

7 (B) yield for producing such logic inte-
8 grated circuits for use in advanced artificial in-
9 telligence training or inference at each facility
10 with an assessment of that yield in industry rel-
11 evant terms, such as compared to PRC firms,
12 compared to non-PRC firms, or how many are
13 in current industry-leading datacenters;

14 (C) most advanced process node under pro-
15 duction;

16 (D) types and volume of semiconductor
17 manufacturing equipment used, the country of
18 origin for such equipment, and the export con-
19 trol regulatory regime under which such equip-
20 ment was procured;

21 (E) collaborations, licit or illicit, between
22 PRC firms or their subsidiaries and non-PRC
23 firms and the advancements those collabora-
24 tions produce for the PRC firm;

1 (F) progress PRC firms are making at
2 indigenizing export controlled technologies;

3 (G) market share PRC firms have in the
4 PRC and internationally; and

5 (H) year-over-year trends in leading semi-
6 conductor fabrication facilities during at least
7 the preceding 5-year period;

8 (3) An assessment of semiconductor fabrication
9 facilities in the PRC that produce memory inte-
10 grated circuits used for advanced artificial intel-
11 ligence training or inference, including such facilities
12 owned or operated by ChangXin Memory Tech-
13 nologies or Yangtze Memory Technologies Corp.,
14 that includes—

15 (A) with respect to such circuits, the—

16 (i) most advanced generation of high-
17 bandwidth memory, including the technical
18 specifications and stack height;

19 (ii) memory cell area and memory
20 density of other dynamic random access
21 memory integrated circuits; and

22 (iii) highest number of layers in three-
23 dimensional NOT-AND memory inte-
24 grated circuits;

25 (B) with respect to such facilities, the—

1 (i) yield and total monthly production
2 capacity for memory integrated circuits, in-
3 cluding dynamic random access memory
4 such as high-bandwidth memory, and
5 NOT-AND memory; and

6 (ii) types and volume of semicon-
7 ductor manufacturing equipment used, in-
8 cluding the country of origin of such equip-
9 ment and the export control regulatory re-
10 gime such equipment was procured under.

11 (C) collaborations, licit or illicit, between
12 PRC firms or their subsidiaries and non-PRC
13 firms and the advancements those collabora-
14 tions produce for the PRC firm;

15 (D) progress PRC firms are making at
16 indigenizing export controlled technologies;

17 (E) market share PRC firms have in the
18 PRC and internationally; and

19 (F) year-over-year trends in the PRC's ad-
20 vanced memory integrated circuit production
21 for a minimum of the 5 previous years.

22 (4) An assessment of semiconductor manufac-
23 turing equipment companies in the PRC, including
24 NAURA Technology Group, KINGSEMI, Advanced
25 Micro-Fabrication Equipment Inc., Shanghai Micro

1 Electronics Equipment, and Shenzhen SiCarrier
2 Technologies Co., Ltd, that includes—

3 (A) a categorical breakdown of annual unit
4 production volume and technical specifications,
5 including minimum feature size, throughput,
6 and defect rate, of all major equipment classes
7 installed or under development for wafer pro-
8 duction in foundries in the PRC, including—

9 (i) lithography tools, including photo-
10 lithography, nanoimprint, and electron
11 beam lithography tools;

12 (ii) etch equipment, including wet
13 etching and dry etching;

14 (iii) deposition equipment, including
15 chemical vapor deposition, physical vapor
16 deposition, and atomic layer deposition;

17 (iv) cleaning systems;

18 (v) chemical mechanical planarization
19 tools;

20 (vi) ion implantation and diffusion
21 systems;

22 (vii) wafer inspection, metrology, and
23 process control tools;

1 (viii) back-end packaging equipment,
2 including wafer dicing equipment and wire
3 bonders;

4 (ix) capabilities and advancements in
5 advanced packaging technologies;

6 (x) thermal processing equipment;

7 (xi) bonding equipment, including
8 thermo compression bonders and hybrid
9 bonders;

10 (xii) environmental control systems;

11 (xiii) laser systems; and

12 (xiv) reticle and photomask writing
13 and inspection tools;

14 (B) the country of origin and supplier
15 company for each piece of semiconductor manu-
16 facturing equipment used in foundries in the
17 PRC for advanced-node logic or high-bandwidth
18 memory production by such companies;

19 (C) the foreign-sourced subcomponents in-
20 tegrated into the semiconductor manufacturing
21 equipment produced by such companies, includ-
22 ing precision motion stages, lasers, electrostatic
23 chucks, optical systems, radio frequency genera-
24 tors, or extreme-purity gas handling systems;

1 (D) collaborations, licit or illicit, between
 2 PRC firms or their subsidiaries and non-PRC
 3 firms and the advancements those collabora-
 4 tions produce for the PRC firm;

5 (E) progress PRC firms are making at
 6 indigenizing export controlled technologies;

7 (F) market share PRC firms have in the
 8 PRC and internationally; and

9 (G) year-over-year trends in leading semi-
 10 conductor manufacturing equipment companies
 11 in the PRC for a minimum of the 5 previous
 12 years.

13 (5) An assessment of electronic design automa-
 14 tion (EDA) software used in the design of integrated
 15 circuits for advanced artificial intelligence applica-
 16 tions in the PRC, including software developed or
 17 provided by leading PRC EDA companies such as
 18 Empyrean Technology Co., Ltd. and Primarius
 19 Technologies Co., Ltd., that includes—

20 (A) with respect to such software tools,
 21 the—

22 (i) range of design stages supported,
 23 including front-end design such as archi-
 24 tecture and register-transfer level design,
 25 logic synthesis, verification, physical de-

1 sign, place-and-route, timing closure, and
2 final signoff;

3 (ii) compatibility with advanced proc-
4 ess nodes, including sub-7 nanometer tech-
5 nologies, gate-all-around devices, and
6 three-dimensional integration;

7 (iii) capabilities for designing artificial
8 intelligence-specific components of such in-
9 tegrated circuits, including tensor proc-
10 essing cores, systolic array processing
11 units, matrix multiplier units, and high-
12 bandwidth memory interfaces;

13 (iv) ability to model and optimize for
14 power, performance, and thermal con-
15 straints in artificial intelligence workloads;

16 (v) scale and performance of the soft-
17 ware in handling large designs, such as
18 chips exceeding 50–100 billion transistors;
19 and

20 (vi) integration with cloud compute
21 resources or distributed workflows for
22 large-scale artificial intelligence chip devel-
23 opment;

24 (B) with respect to such companies, the—

1 (i) total market share within the PRC
2 and internationally, including the share of
3 advanced-node integrated circuits designed
4 or optimized for advanced artificial intel-
5 ligence training or inference designs sup-
6 ported by each company; and

7 (ii) types, volume, and origin of crit-
8 ical technology components used in soft-
9 ware development, including intellectual
10 property cores, third-party libraries,
11 verification suites, and artificial intel-
12 ligence-assisted optimization algorithms;

13 (C) progress PRC firms are making at
14 indigenizing export-controlled or foreign-origin
15 technologies used in EDA, including high-per-
16 formance computing integration, advanced
17 verification engines, and proprietary intellectual
18 property cores;

19 (D) year-over-year trends for the PRC's
20 EDA industry over a minimum of the previous
21 5 years, including technology adoption, market
22 share, and software capability evolution; and

23 (E) identification of technical gaps relative
24 to leading global EDA providers, particularly in

1 relation to artificial intelligence-focused design,
2 advanced nodes, and large-scale verification.

3 (6) An assessment of the advanced artificial in-
4 telligence models determined by the Secretaries to be
5 the most relevant to the national security of the
6 United States that were developed by artificial intel-
7 ligence laboratories or companies based in the PRC,
8 especially those laboratories and companies affiliated
9 with the People's Liberation Army or any university
10 in the PRC, including the most advanced models,
11 open-weight and closed-weight models, based on
12 model size, total compute used during training,
13 benchmark performance, and any other advanced ca-
14 pabilities the Secretaries determine relevant, that in-
15 cludes, with respect to each such model—

16 (A) the number of model parameters;

17 (B) the total training compute used, meas-
18 ured in floating-point operations and their rel-
19 evant precision level;

20 (C) the model performance on benchmark
21 tasks;

22 (D) an evaluation of the extent to which
23 the model exhibits advanced cyber offensive ca-
24 pabilities, an advanced understanding of biologi-
25 cal and virological application domains, and the

1 ability to substantially automate or accelerate
2 artificial intelligence research, and a comparison
3 of such models to the most advanced artificial
4 intelligence models from United States developers;
5

6 (E) if the model is open-weight, an evaluation
7 of the files provided and the security implications
8 of following the developer's deployment
9 instructions;

10 (F) a description of the algorithmic alignment
11 training used;

12 (G) the type and scale of compute infrastructure
13 used in training and inference, including
14 the cluster configurations, the number and
15 type of integrated circuits specifically designed
16 or optimized for advanced artificial intelligence
17 training or inference, how such integrated circuits
18 were acquired and from which companies,
19 where those clusters are located, and how they
20 are being accessed;

21 (H) the manner and extent to which the
22 model is used throughout society in the PRC,
23 including throughout the following industries or
24 sectors:

25 (i) the People's Liberation Army;

1 (ii) the surveillance and intelligence
2 collection functions of the CCP, including
3 the genocide of Uyghur Muslims and other
4 religious and ethnic minorities in the
5 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region;

6 (iii) the Government of the PRC;

7 (iv) business and finance;

8 (v) education;

9 (vi) healthcare;

10 (vii) critical infrastructure sectors, in-
11 cluding the power grid and transportation;
12 and

13 (viii) any other sectors that the Secre-
14 taries determines to be relevant, such as
15 high-risk industries where artificial intel-
16 ligence failure would have outsized safety
17 or mission consequences.

18 (I) whether and where such models are de-
19 ployed for public use, including API access or
20 mobile app deployment;

21 (J) the manner and extent to which such
22 models are diffused in other countries, including
23 the United States;

24 (K) the alignment of those models to CCP
25 propaganda;

1 (L) the potential of those models to inject
 2 or create vulnerabilities for users or other ways
 3 they could be used to further CCP national se-
 4 curity objectives;

5 (M) an assessment of global market share
 6 of PRC models and the effect that global mar-
 7 ket share is enabling the PRC to set artificial
 8 intelligence hardware or software standards;
 9 and

10 (N) the total number of tokens inferenced
 11 globally using the model, the types of hardware
 12 utilized for such inference and the percent
 13 breakdown between company of origin for such
 14 hardware, and the percentage of global
 15 inferenced tokens attributable to the model.

16 (7) An assessment of artificial intelligence re-
 17 search in the PRC, based on indicators such as aca-
 18 demic publications, patent filings, and research
 19 funding, including—

20 (A) the development of novel artificial in-
 21 telligence algorithms and techniques, including
 22 advancements in reinforcement learning, nat-
 23 ural language processing, or computer vision,
 24 with a focus on algorithms and techniques most

1 relevant for developing or deploying the most
2 advanced artificial intelligence systems;

3 (B) advancements in hardware designed to
4 enhance artificial intelligence capabilities, in-
5 cluding custom integrated circuits, quantum
6 computing technologies, or neuromorphic com-
7 puting systems, with a focus on hardware ad-
8 vancements most relevant for developing or de-
9 ploying the most advanced artificial intelligence
10 systems;

11 (C) the scale and focus of research efforts,
12 including the number of researchers, institu-
13 tions, and collaborations involved, and the fund-
14 ing levels and sources, with a focus on those
15 most relevant for developing or deploying the
16 most advanced frontier artificial intelligence
17 systems;

18 (D) an evaluation of the potential impact
19 of such research on future artificial intelligence
20 capabilities relevant to national security com-
21 petitiveness; and

22 (E) a description of licit or illicit methods
23 or tactics such as unauthorized model distilla-
24 tion used by PRC entities to steal non-PRC ar-
25 tificial intelligence related intellectual property.

1 (8) An assessment of the aggregate public fund-
2 ing and capital flows supporting artificial intel-
3 ligence development in the PRC, including—

4 (A) the sum total of the PRC’s national,
5 provincial, and municipal investment in artifi-
6 cial intelligence;

7 (B) subsidies that are underwriting the
8 costs of artificial intelligence development in
9 areas such as compute, infrastructure, water,
10 and energy;

11 (C) an assessment of foreign capital invest-
12 ments, including the total amount invested and
13 a breakdown by entity, including the country of
14 origin and the amount invested; and

15 (D) an assessment of the PRC entities
16 that have received the funding, including the
17 name of the entity and the amount of funding
18 received.

19 (9) The aggregate artificial intelligence com-
20 putational capacity in the PRC, including—

21 (A) a detailed analysis of computational
22 capacity of the 5 most capable PRC entities, in-
23 cluding the number and types of integrated cir-
24 cuits and server systems used and their aggre-
25 gate computational power;

1 (B) the countries and companies with re-
 2 spect to which the PRC sourced its computa-
 3 tional capacity; and

4 (C) the locations and specifications, includ-
 5 ing energy and computational capacity, of
 6 datacenters used for advanced artificial intel-
 7 ligence training and inference.

8 (10) An assessment of leading humanoid robot
 9 manufacturers in the PRC, including Unitree Robot-
 10 ics and Fourier, that includes—

11 (A) with respect to such manufacturers,
 12 the—

13 (i) production capacity per year; and

14 (ii) unit cost and pricing trends for
 15 such robots intended for commercial de-
 16 ployment; and

17 (B) with respect to the humanoid robots
 18 produced by such manufactures—

19 (i) the number, type, and country and
 20 company of origin of the semiconductor
 21 components, including integrated circuits,
 22 used to build, run, or train such robots;

23 (ii) the country and company of origin
 24 and the technical specifications of critical
 25 components used in such robots, including

1 actuators, sensors, and battery systems,
2 and if not PRC, the progress toward
3 indigenization;

4 (iii) a description of the tasks such ro-
5 bots can perform;

6 (iv) whether such robots are teleoper-
7 ated, operated through hard-coded instruc-
8 tions, or function autonomously using arti-
9 ficial intelligence models;

10 (v) whether inference is performed lo-
11 cally or via remote cloud services;

12 (vi) the number of such robots de-
13 ployed across the PRC, including in the
14 military, manufacturing, logistics, health
15 care, security, and personal assistance sec-
16 tors;

17 (vii) the extent to which, and ways in
18 which, such robots are diffused in other
19 countries, including in the United States;
20 and

21 (viii) an assessment of the cybersecu-
22 rity and other vulnerabilities of PRC origin
23 robotic systems.

24 (11) An assessment of the most advanced or
25 widely used artificial intelligence-powered applica-

1 tions developed by PRC entities or built on PRC ar-
2 tificial intelligence models, including—

3 (A) the artificial intelligence models used
4 to power these applications, including the com-
5 pany and country of origin for each model and
6 whether the models are open-weight or closed-
7 weight;

8 (B) the means of deployment and the ex-
9 tent to which such applications are used, in-
10 cluding in the United States;

11 (C) the purposes, capabilities, and pro-
12 moted uses of the applications;

13 (D) an analysis of how data collected or
14 generated by the applications is used, including
15 for artificial intelligence model training, surveil-
16 lance, or other national security-relevant pur-
17 poses; and

18 (E) an evaluation of the potential risks
19 posed by these applications to United States
20 national security, foreign policy objectives, or
21 data privacy.

22 (12) An assessment of the regulatory frame-
23 work governing artificial intelligence development,
24 deployment, and usage in the PRC, that includes—

1 (A) the explicit restrictions on artificial in-
2 telligence models, including laws, regulations,
3 and government policies that directly limit or
4 control the development, deployment, or use of
5 artificial intelligence models in the PRC;

6 (B) an analysis of the implicit restrictions
7 on artificial intelligence models, including cen-
8 sorship, data access limitations, or other indi-
9 rect controls that may constrain artificial intel-
10 ligence model capabilities;

11 (C) how such explicit and implicit restric-
12 tions impact the development, deployment, and
13 diffusion of artificial intelligence models both
14 within the PRC and internationally, including
15 the effects on innovation, competitiveness, and
16 national security;

17 (D) an analysis of efforts by the CCP to
18 acquire greater insight into advanced artificial
19 intelligence and reduce strategic surprise, such
20 as efforts that require advanced artificial intel-
21 ligence developers to disclose information about
22 artificial intelligence systems or provide models
23 to government entities;

24 (E) an analysis of efforts in the PRC to
25 assess or mitigate national security or public

1 safety threats from advanced artificial intel-
2 ligence systems, including efforts to prevent loss
3 of control from autonomous artificial intel-
4 ligence systems; and

5 (F) the goals for artificial intelligence de-
6 velopment explicitly and implicitly stated by the
7 CCP.

8 (13) An assessment of the PRC's global artifi-
9 cial intelligence standards diplomacy efforts, includ-
10 ing—

11 (A) mapping the fora where PRC actors
12 aimed to shape global standards;

13 (B) outlining key policy objectives of the
14 PRC;

15 (C) jurisdictions where PRC-promoted
16 standards, model laws, guidance, or procure-
17 ment criteria have been adopted or referenced;

18 (D) the effects on procurement and vendor
19 eligibility; and

20 (E) opportunities for the United States to
21 shape global artificial intelligence standards and
22 counter PRC efforts when they run contrary to
23 United States interest.

24 (14) An assessment of the degree to which PRC
25 entities remotely accessed artificial intelligence com-

1 putational resources, including through cloud serv-
2 ices, international data centers, or through cir-
3 cumvention or avoidance of United States export
4 controls.

5 (15) An assessment of the methods, pathways,
6 quantities, and companies and countries of origin of
7 United States-controlled integrated circuits specifi-
8 cally designed or optimized for advanced artificial in-
9 telligence training or inference, including graphics
10 processing units or application-specific integrated
11 circuits, that have been diverted to the PRC, the es-
12 timated total compute capacity enabled through
13 these chip diversions, and the percent of the PRC's
14 total compute capacity enabled through these chip
15 diversions.

16 (16) An assessment of the effectiveness of
17 United States export controls in restricting access by
18 the PRC to artificial intelligence-relevant tech-
19 nologies, including an identification of loopholes
20 within United States export controls and rec-
21 ommendations for legislative and administrative ac-
22 tion to strengthen export controls and enforcement
23 that is consistent with United States national secu-
24 rity and foreign policy objectives.

1 (c) PRIORITIZATION.—In conducting the assessments
2 required under subsection (b), the Secretaries shall
3 prioritize the identification and analysis of—

4 (1) semiconductors, semiconductor manufac-
5 turing equipment, and critical components of semi-
6 conductor manufacturing equipment that are, or are
7 likely to become, critical to the supply chains for the
8 training or inference of the most advanced artificial
9 intelligence systems; and

10 (2) items that enable or could enable advanced
11 model performance, are associated with systems that
12 pose significant national security or strategic impli-
13 cations to the United States, or are likely to be
14 foundational to the development of future advanced
15 artificial intelligence systems, including those not yet
16 deployed or publicly disclosed.

17 (d) REFERENCE CLASS.—Where applicable, the Sec-
18 retaries shall provide context to all statistics regarding the
19 PRC’s artificial intelligence power in the report by pre-
20 senting the PRC’s capabilities and production numbers in
21 comparison to relevant United States and partner country
22 production numbers and capabilities.

23 (e) COORDINATION WITH EXPERT ENTITIES.—In
24 carrying out this section, the Secretaries may consult and
25 coordinate with other Federal departments and agencies,

1 private industry or research organizations, federally fund-
2 ed research and development centers, national labora-
3 tories, academic institutions, relevant media outlets, or
4 any other entities with expertise in semiconductor tech-
5 nologies, artificial intelligence, or national security that
6 the Secretaries determine relevant.

7 (f) AVOIDANCE OF DUPLICATION.—In carrying out
8 this section, the Secretaries shall, to the maximum extent
9 practicable, leverage existing and ongoing assessments,
10 analyses, intelligence products, collection efforts, and re-
11 porting produced by covered agency heads and other Fed-
12 eral departments and agencies, including elements of the
13 intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of the Na-
14 tional Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)), to avoid
15 unnecessary duplication of Federal efforts.

16 (g) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a)
17 shall be submitted in unclassified form and may contain
18 a classified annex.

19 (h) MANDATORY UNCLASSIFIED ELEMENTS.—In the
20 unclassified portion of the report required under sub-
21 section (a), the Secretaries shall include, subject to the
22 appropriate treatment of classified information and pro-
23 tection of sources and methods—

24 (1) the number of integrated circuits specifi-
25 cally designed or optimized for advanced artificial in-

1 intelligence training or inference produced by leading
2 entities in the PRC in the year preceding submission
3 of such report;

4 (2) the projected production numbers of inte-
5 grated circuits from the PRC specifically designed or
6 optimized for advanced artificial intelligence training
7 or inference, including identification of foundries re-
8 sponsible for such production, for the year pro-
9 ceeding submission of such report; and

10 (3) the extent to which and ways artificial intel-
11 ligence-relevant technologies in the PRC, including
12 integrated circuits, models, semiconductor manufac-
13 turing equipment, and humanoid robots are diffused
14 in other countries, including the United States.

15 (i) BRIEFING.—Not later than 90 days after submis-
16 sion of the report required by subsection (a), the Secre-
17 taries shall provide to the appropriate committees of Con-
18 gress a classified and unclassified briefing on the contents
19 of the report.

20 (j) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

21 (1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CON-
22 GRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Con-
23 gress” means—

24 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations,
25 the Committee on Banking, Housing, and

1 Urban Affairs, the Committee on Commerce,
 2 Science, and Transportation, and the Select
 3 Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

4 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
 5 Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the
 6 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of
 7 the House of Representatives.

8 (2) CCP.—The term “CCP” means the Chinese
 9 Communist Party.

10 (3) COVERED AGENCY HEADS.—The term “cov-
 11 ered agency heads” means the—

12 (A) Secretary of Defense;

13 (B) Secretary of Energy;

14 (C) Director of National Intelligence;

15 (D) Director for the White House Office of
 16 Science and Technology Policy; and

17 (E) head of any other relevant Federal de-
 18 partment or agency the Secretary determines
 19 necessary.

20 (4) PRC.—The term “PRC” means the Peo-
 21 ple’s Republic of China.

22 (5) SECRETARIES.—The term “Secretaries”
 23 means the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary
 24 of State.

