[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 5382 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
119th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 5382
To require a report on the artificial intelligence power of the
People's Republic of China.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
August 7, 2026
Mr. Husted (for himself and Mr. Warner) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To require a report on the artificial intelligence power of the
People's Republic of China.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``China AI Power Report Act''.
SEC. 2. REPORT ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE POWER OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 3 years, the
Secretaries, in consultation with the covered agency heads, shall
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the
advanced artificial intelligence capabilities of the PRC, including the
efforts by the PRC relating to supply chains for advanced artificial
intelligence systems.
(b) Components.--Each report required under subsection (a) shall
also include the following:
(1) An assessment of integrated circuits designed or
optimized for advanced artificial intelligence training or
inference by artificial intelligence chip designers in the PRC,
including Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. and Cambricon
Technologies (or successor entities), that includes--
(A) with respect to such integrated circuits, the--
(i) total processing power;
(ii) integer and floating point operations
per second at relevant precision levels;
(iii) memory capacity and bandwidth;
(iv) interconnect bandwidth;
(v) power efficiency;
(vi) transistor count and die size;
(vii) process node used per design;
(viii) energy efficiency;
(ix) manufacturing cost and yield
assumptions;
(x) ability of the integrated circuit to
effectively run artificial intelligence models
trained on a different chip designer's
integrated circuit, including measurements such
as model inference in tokens per second and
cost per token with and without a software
application layer that improves model
translation ability;
(xi) the capability of the most advanced
server configuration produced using the chip
designer's integrated circuits including such
technical specifications like floating point
operations per second, memory capacity and
bandwidth, energy efficiency, and ability to
function at scale; and
(xii) any future specification that becomes
relevant to the development of future
artificial intelligence capability; and
(B) with respect to such chip designers--
(i) the total number and types of
integrated circuits produced in the year
preceding submission of such report and the
projected production number for the year
proceeding submission of such report;
(ii) the foundries used in the production
of the integrated circuits;
(iii) the software ecosystem, including any
parallel computing platforms, programming
models, or development frameworks that enable
accelerated computing for artificial
intelligence training or inference;
(iv) the method and extent to which such
integrated circuits are used in other
countries, including in the United States; and
(v) the manufacturer's ability to produce a
software application layer required to achieve
an improved token per seconds and cost per
token rate.
(2) An assessment of semiconductor fabrication facilities
in the PRC that produce logic integrated circuits for use in
advanced artificial intelligence training or inference,
including such facilities owned or operated by the
Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, that
includes, with respect to such facilities, the--
(A) total monthly production capacity per advanced
process node with non-planar transistors or 16/14 nm
and below and the percentage of that monthly production
capacity dedicated to production of logic integrated
circuits for use in advanced artificial training or
inference;
(B) yield for producing such logic integrated
circuits for use in advanced artificial intelligence
training or inference at each facility with an
assessment of that yield in industry relevant terms,
such as compared to PRC firms, compared to non-PRC
firms, or how many are in current industry-leading
datacenters;
(C) most advanced process node under production;
(D) types and volume of semiconductor manufacturing
equipment used, the country of origin for such
equipment, and the export control regulatory regime
under which such equipment was procured;
(E) collaborations, licit or illicit, between PRC
firms or their subsidiaries and non-PRC firms and the
advancements those collaborations produce for the PRC
firm;
(F) progress PRC firms are making at indigenizing
export controlled technologies;
(G) market share PRC firms have in the PRC and
internationally; and
(H) year-over-year trends in leading semiconductor
fabrication facilities during at least the preceding 5-
year period;
(3) An assessment of semiconductor fabrication facilities
in the PRC that produce memory integrated circuits used for
advanced artificial intelligence training or inference,
including such facilities owned or operated by ChangXin Memory
Technologies or Yangtze Memory Technologies Corp., that
includes--
(A) with respect to such circuits, the--
(i) most advanced generation of high-
bandwidth memory, including the technical
specifications and stack height;
(ii) memory cell area and memory density of
other dynamic random access memory integrated
circuits; and
(iii) highest number of layers in three-
dimensional NOT-AND memory integrated circuits;
(B) with respect to such facilities, the--
(i) yield and total monthly production
capacity for memory integrated circuits,
including dynamic random access memory such as
high-bandwidth memory, and NOT-AND memory; and
(ii) types and volume of semiconductor
manufacturing equipment used, including the
country of origin of such equipment and the
export control regulatory regime such equipment
was procured under.
(C) collaborations, licit or illicit, between PRC
firms or their subsidiaries and non-PRC firms and the
advancements those collaborations produce for the PRC
firm;
(D) progress PRC firms are making at indigenizing
export controlled technologies;
(E) market share PRC firms have in the PRC and
internationally; and
(F) year-over-year trends in the PRC's advanced
memory integrated circuit production for a minimum of
the 5 previous years.
(4) An assessment of semiconductor manufacturing equipment
companies in the PRC, including NAURA Technology Group,
KINGSEMI, Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment Inc., Shanghai
Micro Electronics Equipment, and Shenzhen SiCarrier
Technologies Co., Ltd, that includes--
(A) a categorical breakdown of annual unit
production volume and technical specifications,
including minimum feature size, throughput, and defect
rate, of all major equipment classes installed or under
development for wafer production in foundries in the
PRC, including--
(i) lithography tools, including
photolithography, nanoimprint, and electron
beam lithography tools;
(ii) etch equipment, including wet etching
and dry etching;
(iii) deposition equipment, including
chemical vapor deposition, physical vapor
deposition, and atomic layer deposition;
(iv) cleaning systems;
(v) chemical mechanical planarization
tools;
(vi) ion implantation and diffusion
systems;
(vii) wafer inspection, metrology, and
process control tools;
(viii) back-end packaging equipment,
including wafer dicing equipment and wire
bonders;
(ix) capabilities and advancements in
advanced packaging technologies;
(x) thermal processing equipment;
(xi) bonding equipment, including thermo
compression bonders and hybrid bonders;
(xii) environmental control systems;
(xiii) laser systems; and
(xiv) reticle and photomask writing and
inspection tools;
(B) the country of origin and supplier company for
each piece of semiconductor manufacturing equipment
used in foundries in the PRC for advanced-node logic or
high-bandwidth memory production by such companies;
(C) the foreign-sourced subcomponents integrated
into the semiconductor manufacturing equipment produced
by such companies, including precision motion stages,
lasers, electrostatic chucks, optical systems, radio
frequency generators, or extreme-purity gas handling
systems;
(D) collaborations, licit or illicit, between PRC
firms or their subsidiaries and non-PRC firms and the
advancements those collaborations produce for the PRC
firm;
(E) progress PRC firms are making at indigenizing
export controlled technologies;
(F) market share PRC firms have in the PRC and
internationally; and
(G) year-over-year trends in leading semiconductor
manufacturing equipment companies in the PRC for a
minimum of the 5 previous years.
(5) An assessment of electronic design automation (EDA)
software used in the design of integrated circuits for advanced
artificial intelligence applications in the PRC, including
software developed or provided by leading PRC EDA companies
such as Empyrean Technology Co., Ltd. and Primarius
Technologies Co., Ltd., that includes--
(A) with respect to such software tools, the--
(i) range of design stages supported,
including front-end design such as architecture
and register-transfer level design, logic
synthesis, verification, physical design,
place-and-route, timing closure, and final
signoff;
(ii) compatibility with advanced process
nodes, including sub-7 nanometer technologies,
gate-all-around devices, and three-dimensional
integration;
(iii) capabilities for designing artificial
intelligence-specific components of such
integrated circuits, including tensor
processing cores, systolic array processing
units, matrix multiplier units, and high-
bandwidth memory interfaces;
(iv) ability to model and optimize for
power, performance, and thermal constraints in
artificial intelligence workloads;
(v) scale and performance of the software
in handling large designs, such as chips
exceeding 50-100 billion transistors; and
(vi) integration with cloud compute
resources or distributed workflows for large-
scale artificial intelligence chip development;
(B) with respect to such companies, the--
(i) total market share within the PRC and
internationally, including the share of
advanced-node integrated circuits designed or
optimized for advanced artificial intelligence
training or inference designs supported by each
company; and
(ii) types, volume, and origin of critical
technology components used in software
development, including intellectual property
cores, third-party libraries, verification
suites, and artificial intelligence-assisted
optimization algorithms;
(C) progress PRC firms are making at indigenizing
export-controlled or foreign-origin technologies used
in EDA, including high-performance computing
integration, advanced verification engines, and
proprietary intellectual property cores;
(D) year-over-year trends for the PRC's EDA
industry over a minimum of the previous 5 years,
including technology adoption, market share, and
software capability evolution; and
(E) identification of technical gaps relative to
leading global EDA providers, particularly in relation
to artificial intelligence-focused design, advanced
nodes, and large-scale verification.
(6) An assessment of the advanced artificial intelligence
models determined by the Secretaries to be the most relevant to
the national security of the United States that were developed
by artificial intelligence laboratories or companies based in
the PRC, especially those laboratories and companies affiliated
with the People's Liberation Army or any university in the PRC,
including the most advanced models, open-weight and closed-
weight models, based on model size, total compute used during
training, benchmark performance, and any other advanced
capabilities the Secretaries determine relevant, that includes,
with respect to each such model--
(A) the number of model parameters;
(B) the total training compute used, measured in
floating-point operations and their relevant precision
level;
(C) the model performance on benchmark tasks;
(D) an evaluation of the extent to which the model
exhibits advanced cyber offensive capabilities, an
advanced understanding of biological and virological
application domains, and the ability to substantially
automate or accelerate artificial intelligence
research, and a comparison of such models to the most
advanced artificial intelligence models from United
States developers;
(E) if the model is open-weight, an evaluation of
the files provided and the security implications of
following the developer's deployment instructions;
(F) a description of the algorithmic alignment
training used;
(G) the type and scale of compute infrastructure
used in training and inference, including the cluster
configurations, the number and type of integrated
circuits specifically designed or optimized for
advanced artificial intelligence training or inference,
how such integrated circuits were acquired and from
which companies, where those clusters are located, and
how they are being accessed;
(H) the manner and extent to which the model is
used throughout society in the PRC, including
throughout the following industries or sectors:
(i) the People's Liberation Army;
(ii) the surveillance and intelligence
collection functions of the CCP, including the
genocide of Uyghur Muslims and other religious
and ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region;
(iii) the Government of the PRC;
(iv) business and finance;
(v) education;
(vi) healthcare;
(vii) critical infrastructure sectors,
including the power grid and transportation;
and
(viii) any other sectors that the
Secretaries determines to be relevant, such as
high-risk industries where artificial
intelligence failure would have outsized safety
or mission consequences.
(I) whether and where such models are deployed for
public use, including API access or mobile app
deployment;
(J) the manner and extent to which such models are
diffused in other countries, including the United
States;
(K) the alignment of those models to CCP
propaganda;
(L) the potential of those models to inject or
create vulnerabilities for users or other ways they
could be used to further CCP national security
objectives;
(M) an assessment of global market share of PRC
models and the effect that global market share is
enabling the PRC to set artificial intelligence
hardware or software standards; and
(N) the total number of tokens inferenced globally
using the model, the types of hardware utilized for
such inference and the percent breakdown between
company of origin for such hardware, and the percentage
of global inferenced tokens attributable to the model.
(7) An assessment of artificial intelligence research in
the PRC, based on indicators such as academic publications,
patent filings, and research funding, including--
(A) the development of novel artificial
intelligence algorithms and techniques, including
advancements in reinforcement learning, natural
language processing, or computer vision, with a focus
on algorithms and techniques most relevant for
developing or deploying the most advanced artificial
intelligence systems;
(B) advancements in hardware designed to enhance
artificial intelligence capabilities, including custom
integrated circuits, quantum computing technologies, or
neuromorphic computing systems, with a focus on
hardware advancements most relevant for developing or
deploying the most advanced artificial intelligence
systems;
(C) the scale and focus of research efforts,
including the number of researchers, institutions, and
collaborations involved, and the funding levels and
sources, with a focus on those most relevant for
developing or deploying the most advanced frontier
artificial intelligence systems;
(D) an evaluation of the potential impact of such
research on future artificial intelligence capabilities
relevant to national security competitiveness; and
(E) a description of licit or illicit methods or
tactics such as unauthorized model distillation used by
PRC entities to steal non-PRC artificial intelligence
related intellectual property.
(8) An assessment of the aggregate public funding and
capital flows supporting artificial intelligence development in
the PRC, including--
(A) the sum total of the PRC's national,
provincial, and municipal investment in artificial
intelligence;
(B) subsidies that are underwriting the costs of
artificial intelligence development in areas such as
compute, infrastructure, water, and energy;
(C) an assessment of foreign capital investments,
including the total amount invested and a breakdown by
entity, including the country of origin and the amount
invested; and
(D) an assessment of the PRC entities that have
received the funding, including the name of the entity
and the amount of funding received.
(9) The aggregate artificial intelligence computational
capacity in the PRC, including--
(A) a detailed analysis of computational capacity
of the 5 most capable PRC entities, including the
number and types of integrated circuits and server
systems used and their aggregate computational power;
(B) the countries and companies with respect to
which the PRC sourced its computational capacity; and
(C) the locations and specifications, including
energy and computational capacity, of datacenters used
for advanced artificial intelligence training and
inference.
(10) An assessment of leading humanoid robot manufacturers
in the PRC, including Unitree Robotics and Fourier, that
includes--
(A) with respect to such manufacturers, the--
(i) production capacity per year; and
(ii) unit cost and pricing trends for such
robots intended for commercial deployment; and
(B) with respect to the humanoid robots produced by
such manufactures--
(i) the number, type, and country and
company of origin of the semiconductor
components, including integrated circuits, used
to build, run, or train such robots;
(ii) the country and company of origin and
the technical specifications of critical
components used in such robots, including
actuators, sensors, and battery systems, and if
not PRC, the progress toward indigenization;
(iii) a description of the tasks such
robots can perform;
(iv) whether such robots are teleoperated,
operated through hard-coded instructions, or
function autonomously using artificial
intelligence models;
(v) whether inference is performed locally
or via remote cloud services;
(vi) the number of such robots deployed
across the PRC, including in the military,
manufacturing, logistics, health care,
security, and personal assistance sectors;
(vii) the extent to which, and ways in
which, such robots are diffused in other
countries, including in the United States; and
(viii) an assessment of the cybersecurity
and other vulnerabilities of PRC origin robotic
systems.
(11) An assessment of the most advanced or widely used
artificial intelligence-powered applications developed by PRC
entities or built on PRC artificial intelligence models,
including--
(A) the artificial intelligence models used to
power these applications, including the company and
country of origin for each model and whether the models
are open-weight or closed-weight;
(B) the means of deployment and the extent to which
such applications are used, including in the United
States;
(C) the purposes, capabilities, and promoted uses
of the applications;
(D) an analysis of how data collected or generated
by the applications is used, including for artificial
intelligence model training, surveillance, or other
national security-relevant purposes; and
(E) an evaluation of the potential risks posed by
these applications to United States national security,
foreign policy objectives, or data privacy.
(12) An assessment of the regulatory framework governing
artificial intelligence development, deployment, and usage in
the PRC, that includes--
(A) the explicit restrictions on artificial
intelligence models, including laws, regulations, and
government policies that directly limit or control the
development, deployment, or use of artificial
intelligence models in the PRC;
(B) an analysis of the implicit restrictions on
artificial intelligence models, including censorship,
data access limitations, or other indirect controls
that may constrain artificial intelligence model
capabilities;
(C) how such explicit and implicit restrictions
impact the development, deployment, and diffusion of
artificial intelligence models both within the PRC and
internationally, including the effects on innovation,
competitiveness, and national security;
(D) an analysis of efforts by the CCP to acquire
greater insight into advanced artificial intelligence
and reduce strategic surprise, such as efforts that
require advanced artificial intelligence developers to
disclose information about artificial intelligence
systems or provide models to government entities;
(E) an analysis of efforts in the PRC to assess or
mitigate national security or public safety threats
from advanced artificial intelligence systems,
including efforts to prevent loss of control from
autonomous artificial intelligence systems; and
(F) the goals for artificial intelligence
development explicitly and implicitly stated by the
CCP.
(13) An assessment of the PRC's global artificial
intelligence standards diplomacy efforts, including--
(A) mapping the fora where PRC actors aimed to
shape global standards;
(B) outlining key policy objectives of the PRC;
(C) jurisdictions where PRC-promoted standards,
model laws, guidance, or procurement criteria have been
adopted or referenced;
(D) the effects on procurement and vendor
eligibility; and
(E) opportunities for the United States to shape
global artificial intelligence standards and counter
PRC efforts when they run contrary to United States
interest.
(14) An assessment of the degree to which PRC entities
remotely accessed artificial intelligence computational
resources, including through cloud services, international data
centers, or through circumvention or avoidance of United States
export controls.
(15) An assessment of the methods, pathways, quantities,
and companies and countries of origin of United States-
controlled integrated circuits specifically designed or
optimized for advanced artificial intelligence training or
inference, including graphics processing units or application-
specific integrated circuits, that have been diverted to the
PRC, the estimated total compute capacity enabled through these
chip diversions, and the percent of the PRC's total compute
capacity enabled through these chip diversions.
(16) An assessment of the effectiveness of United States
export controls in restricting access by the PRC to artificial
intelligence-relevant technologies, including an identification
of loopholes within United States export controls and
recommendations for legislative and administrative action to
strengthen export controls and enforcement that is consistent
with United States national security and foreign policy
objectives.
(c) Prioritization.--In conducting the assessments required under
subsection (b), the Secretaries shall prioritize the identification and
analysis of--
(1) semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing equipment,
and critical components of semiconductor manufacturing
equipment that are, or are likely to become, critical to the
supply chains for the training or inference of the most
advanced artificial intelligence systems; and
(2) items that enable or could enable advanced model
performance, are associated with systems that pose significant
national security or strategic implications to the United
States, or are likely to be foundational to the development of
future advanced artificial intelligence systems, including
those not yet deployed or publicly disclosed.
(d) Reference Class.--Where applicable, the Secretaries shall
provide context to all statistics regarding the PRC's artificial
intelligence power in the report by presenting the PRC's capabilities
and production numbers in comparison to relevant United States and
partner country production numbers and capabilities.
(e) Coordination With Expert Entities.--In carrying out this
section, the Secretaries may consult and coordinate with other Federal
departments and agencies, private industry or research organizations,
federally funded research and development centers, national
laboratories, academic institutions, relevant media outlets, or any
other entities with expertise in semiconductor technologies, artificial
intelligence, or national security that the Secretaries determine
relevant.
(f) Avoidance of Duplication.--In carrying out this section, the
Secretaries shall, to the maximum extent practicable, leverage existing
and ongoing assessments, analyses, intelligence products, collection
efforts, and reporting produced by covered agency heads and other
Federal departments and agencies, including elements of the
intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)), to avoid unnecessary
duplication of Federal efforts.
(g) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted
in unclassified form and may contain a classified annex.
(h) Mandatory Unclassified Elements.--In the unclassified portion
of the report required under subsection (a), the Secretaries shall
include, subject to the appropriate treatment of classified information
and protection of sources and methods--
(1) the number of integrated circuits specifically designed
or optimized for advanced artificial intelligence training or
inference produced by leading entities in the PRC in the year
preceding submission of such report;
(2) the projected production numbers of integrated circuits
from the PRC specifically designed or optimized for advanced
artificial intelligence training or inference, including
identification of foundries responsible for such production,
for the year proceeding submission of such report; and
(3) the extent to which and ways artificial intelligence-
relevant technologies in the PRC, including integrated
circuits, models, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and
humanoid robots are diffused in other countries, including the
United States.
(i) Briefing.--Not later than 90 days after submission of the
report required by subsection (a), the Secretaries shall provide to the
appropriate committees of Congress a classified and unclassified
briefing on the contents of the report.
(j) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee
on Energy and Commerce, and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
(2) CCP.--The term ``CCP'' means the Chinese Communist
Party.
(3) Covered agency heads.--The term ``covered agency
heads'' means the--
(A) Secretary of Defense;
(B) Secretary of Energy;
(C) Director of National Intelligence;
(D) Director for the White House Office of Science
and Technology Policy; and
(E) head of any other relevant Federal department
or agency the Secretary determines necessary.
(4) PRC.--The term ``PRC'' means the People's Republic of
China.
(5) Secretaries.--The term ``Secretaries'' means the
Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of State.
<all>