

119TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. 5205

To promote democracy, defend human rights, and impose accountability on the Government of Turkey for systemic political repression, censorship, transnational repression, and violations of international law.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JULY 30, 2026

Mr. MARKEY introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To promote democracy, defend human rights, and impose accountability on the Government of Turkey for systemic political repression, censorship, transnational repression, and violations of international law.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the
5 “Turkey Human Rights Promotion Act of 2026”.

6 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for
7 this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Definitions.

- Sec. 4. Statement of policy.
- Sec. 5. Sense of Congress on press freedom.
- Sec. 6. Sense of Congress on internet freedom.
- Sec. 7. Sense of Congress on protecting lawyers and promoting fair trials.
- Sec. 8. Sense of Congress on accountability for human rights violations.
- Sec. 9. Limitations on certain security assistance.
- Sec. 10. Political prisoners assistance.
- Sec. 11. Annual report.
- Sec. 12. Support for civil society and independent media.

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 Congress finds the following:

3 (1) The United States values its longstanding
 4 alliance with the Republic of Turkey, its friendship
 5 with the Turkish people, and remains committed to
 6 supporting a healthy Turkish democracy.

7 (2) Articles I and II of the North Atlantic
 8 Treaty require Member States of the North Atlantic
 9 Treaty Organization (NATO) to conduct themselves
 10 in a manner that promotes peace abroad and
 11 strengthens democratic institutions at home, affirm-
 12 ing that the NATO alliance is founded on shared
 13 democratic principles.

14 (3) The Republic of Turkey joined NATO in
 15 1952, the first nation, along with Greece, to join the
 16 alliance after its founding.

17 (4) Since the attempted coup in July 2016, the
 18 Government of Turkey has intensified its crackdown
 19 on freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, and
 20 association. In its World 2026 assessment, Freedom
 21 House rated Turkey to be “Not Free”.

1 (5) In the years following the coup attempt, the
2 Government of Turkey has pursued a sweeping and
3 systematic campaign of domestic and transnational
4 repression targeting journalists, academics, students,
5 lawyers, opposition politicians, Kurds, Alevis, and in-
6 dividuals associated with the Hizmet (Gulen) Move-
7 ment.

8 (6) Since 2016, Turkish authorities have used
9 vague and overly broad anti-terrorism laws to inves-
10 tigate more than 3,000,000 individuals for alleged
11 terrorism-related offenses and to detain or arrest
12 large numbers of people for peaceful civic or reli-
13 gious activities, according to the Stockholm Center
14 for Freedom.

15 (7) The Government of Turkey has used the
16 failed 2016 coup as justification for a sweeping
17 crackdown. In the immediate aftermath, authorities
18 detained tens of thousands of people accused of aid-
19 ing the coup or supporting terrorism and dismissed
20 thousands of public employees. At least 4,156 judges
21 and prosecutors and more than 5,800 academics
22 were dismissed on terrorism-related grounds.

23 (8) The April 2017 constitutional referendum,
24 advanced by the ruling Justice and Development
25 Party (AKP) and held under a state of emergency,

1 shifted Turkey from a parliamentary to a presi-
2 dential system, concentrating sweeping powers in the
3 presidency. The Venice Commission warned that the
4 amendments “represent a dangerous step back-
5 wards” and risk the country’s degeneration into an
6 authoritarian presidential system. Although the state
7 of emergency formally ended in 2018, many emer-
8 gency-era measures remain in force, and restrictions
9 on fundamental freedoms persist.

10 (9) According to the United States Department
11 of State’s 2022 Human Rights Report, President
12 Erdogan’s 2018 anti-terror legislation continues to
13 restrict basic freedoms and undermine judicial inde-
14 pendence. Since 2016, Turkish authorities have dis-
15 missed or suspended more than 60,000 police and
16 military personnel, removed roughly 125,000 civil
17 servants, purged approximately one-third of the judi-
18 ciary, arrested or imprisoned more than 95,000 peo-
19 ple, and closed over 1,500 nongovernmental organi-
20 zations on terrorism-related grounds.

21 (10) A 2020 Human Rights Watch report
22 found that the Government of Turkey continues to
23 arbitrarily detain and prosecute lawyers, in violation
24 of its obligations under the International Covenant
25 on Civil and Political Rights and the European Con-

1 vention on Human Rights. According to the Inter-
2 national Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute
3 and the Arrested Lawyers Initiative, more than
4 1,700 lawyers have been prosecuted, more than 700
5 were placed in pretrial detention, and at least 553
6 were collectively sentenced to more than 3,380 years
7 in prison.

8 (11) Turkey ranks 163 out of 180 countries in
9 the 2026 World Press Freedom Index. The Euro-
10 pean Court of Human Rights has repeatedly found
11 that Turkey unlawfully detains and prosecutes jour-
12 nalists. At least 314 journalists were tried in 2022
13 and 2023, and several journalists, including Hatice
14 Duman, Mustafa Gok, and Erdal Susem, remain im-
15 prisoned for life. In the second quarter of 2025, au-
16 thorities arrested 10 journalists and tried 103 jour-
17 nalists in 73 cases, resulting in 10 convictions.

18 (12) According to Prison Insider, an estimated
19 43,000 political prisoners remain incarcerated in
20 Turkey.

21 (13) Arbitrary arrests and unfair trials persist
22 as Turkey’s judiciary remains vulnerable to executive
23 interference, with inconsistent and contradictory rul-
24 ings from high courts. The case of civil society lead-
25 er Osman Kavala, arrested in 2017 on unfounded

1 charges, exemplifies this deterioration. Despite a
2 2019 binding ruling by the European Court of
3 Human Rights ordering his release, Turkish courts
4 have refused to comply. After briefly being acquit-
5 ted, Kavala was rearrested on espionage charges
6 and, in April 2022, sentenced to life imprisonment
7 without parole, prompting Council of Europe in-
8 fringement proceedings.

9 (14) The Government of Turkey continues to
10 detain Selahattin Demirtas, a leading Kurdish politi-
11 cian arrested in 2016. The European Court of
12 Human Rights has repeatedly ruled that his deten-
13 tion is unlawful and ordered his immediate release,
14 yet domestic courts have failed to enforce these
15 judgments. In May 2024, Demirtas was sentenced to
16 42 years in prison on politically motivated charges
17 related to the 2014 Kobani protests.

18 (15) The Government of Turkey continues to
19 detain political opposition leaders like Ekrem
20 Imamoglu, the Mayor of Istanbul and President
21 Erdogan's primary political opponent, on bogus cor-
22 ruption, bribery, and money laundering charges.
23 Since March 2025, President Erdogan's administra-
24 tion has escalated a crackdown on political opposi-
25 tion, resulting in the arrest of more than 500 people.

1 (16) The Government of Turkey continues to
2 censor online expression, prosecuting thousands for
3 social media activity, including for liking or sharing
4 posts. Authorities routinely block online content and
5 have restricted access to major platforms during pe-
6 riods of political unrest. In 2024, Turkey blocked
7 more than 311,000 web addresses, contributing to a
8 total of over 1,264,000 websites and domains
9 blocked since 2007.

10 (17) President Erdogan’s 2023 reelection ex-
11 tended more than two decades of AKP dominance
12 characterized by restrictions on assembly, associa-
13 tion, expression, and electoral interference, as docu-
14 mented by the Organization for Security and Co-op-
15 eration in Europe. Between 2021 and 2023, the
16 Constitutional Court considered a case seeking to
17 ban a major pro-Kurdish party, sharply limiting its
18 ability to campaign. Authorities continue to use
19 disinformation and anti-terrorism laws to target po-
20 litical opponents, and ahead of the 2023 elections,
21 courts compelled X (formerly Twitter) to remove nu-
22 merous accounts and hundreds of posts.

23 (18) In October 2022, the Government of Tur-
24 key amended its internet, press, and penal code laws
25 to create a vague new offense, “public dissemination

1 of misleading information”, and expanded state au-
2 thority over online speech. Social media companies
3 that do not comply with government demands face
4 severe fines and bandwidth throttling. These amend-
5 ments enable prison sentences of up to three years
6 and have resulted in arrests, including the detention
7 of 78 individuals in February 2023, for criticizing
8 the government’s earthquake response.

9 (19) Following the February 2023 earthquake,
10 authorities restricted access to X and other major
11 platforms for as long as 12 hours, hindering rescue
12 coordination and humanitarian response. Similar re-
13 strictions followed the 2022 Istanbul bombing, dem-
14 onstrating the government’s readiness to impose in-
15 formation controls during crises.

16 (20) The Radio and Television Supreme Coun-
17 cil continues to impose arbitrary fines and broadcast
18 suspensions on critical media outlets. Foreign out-
19 lets, including Deutsche Welle and Voice of America,
20 had their Turkish-language websites blocked after
21 refusing to comply with restrictive licensing and cen-
22 sorship requirements.

23 (21) The October 2022 amendments also
24 threaten the security of private messaging services.
25 Regulations issued by the Information and Commu-

1 nication Technologies Authority (BTK) require pro-
2 viders to allow government access to user commu-
3 nications, undermining cybersecurity safeguards and
4 expanding surveillance authorities.

5 (22) The Government of Turkey continues to
6 target LGBTQIA+ people and restrict peaceful
7 demonstrations. According to ILGA–Europe’s 2026
8 rainbow map, Turkey ranks 47th out of 50 Euro-
9 pean countries for LGBTQIA+ equality. Turkey
10 also has the highest recorded number of murders of
11 transgender people in Europe. Authorities enforce
12 nationwide bans on pride events and have used vio-
13 lent tactics and mass detentions to suppress such
14 events. A draft bill, which was introduced in October
15 2025, would criminalize “behavior contrary to bio-
16 logical sex,” raise the age for gender-affirming sur-
17 gery, and impose prison terms of up to 4 years for
18 same-sex marriage or civil-union ceremonies.

19 (23) In March 2021, Turkey withdrew from the
20 Istanbul Convention, a landmark human rights trea-
21 ty of the Council of Europe designed to prevent vio-
22 lence against women. Legal experts state that this
23 withdrawal violates both domestic and international
24 law and reflects broader efforts to roll back protec-

1 tions for women, LGBTQIA+ people, and funda-
2 mental freedoms.

3 (24) Since 2014, the Government of Turkey has
4 increasingly targeted critics beyond its borders, in-
5 cluding in the United States. Freedom House re-
6 ports that Turkish authorities have pursued oppo-
7 nents in more than 31 countries and secured the
8 rendition of at least 58 individuals without due proc-
9 ess.

10 (25) Following the 2016 coup attempt, the Gov-
11 ernment of Turkey escalated its campaign of
12 transnational repression, forcibly returning or ab-
13 ducting more than 100 individuals, primarily edu-
14 cators linked to Hizmet-affiliated schools. Turkish
15 authorities have pressured foreign governments to
16 transfer or close these schools and have repeatedly
17 abused INTERPOL Red Notices and diffusions to
18 pursue dissidents abroad.

19 (26) Turkish-Americans and lawful permanent
20 residents in the United States have reported threats,
21 intimidation, and harassment linked to politicized
22 Turkish government blacklists.

23 **SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.**

24 In this Act:

1 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
2 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
3 mittees” means—

4 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations
5 and the Committee on Appropriations of the
6 Senate; and

7 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
8 the Committee on Appropriations of the House
9 of Representatives.

10 (2) POLITICAL PRISONER.—The term “political
11 prisoner” means a person who has been deprived of
12 his or her personal liberty if—

13 (A) the detention has been imposed in vio-
14 lation of one of the fundamental guarantees set
15 out in the European Convention on Human
16 Rights, particularly—

17 (i) freedom of thought, conscience,
18 and religion;

19 (ii) freedom of expression and infor-
20 mation; and

21 (iii) freedom of assembly and associa-
22 tion;

23 (B) the detention has been imposed for
24 purely political reasons without connection to
25 any offense;

1 (C) for political motives, the length of the
 2 detention or its conditions are clearly out of
 3 proportion to the offense of which the person
 4 has been found guilty or is suspected;

5 (D) for political motives, he or she is de-
 6 tained in a discriminatory manner as compared
 7 to other persons; or

8 (E) the detention is the result of pro-
 9 ceedings which were clearly unfair and appear
 10 to be connected with political motives of the au-
 11 thorities.

12 (3) PRISONER OF CONSCIENCE.—The term
 13 “prisoner of conscience” means any person who—

14 (A) is imprisoned or otherwise physically
 15 restricted solely for the peaceful exercise of the
 16 individual’s human rights; and

17 (B) has not used violence or advocated vio-
 18 lence or hatred.

19 **SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

20 It is the policy of the United States—

21 (1) to support democracy, peace, and human
 22 rights in Turkey, and to press the Government of
 23 Turkey to comply with its obligations under the
 24 North Atlantic Treaty;

1 (2) to oppose the abuse of counterterrorism
2 laws and authorities, including targeting journalists,
3 political opponents, dissidents, recognized and unrec-
4 ognized ethnic and religious minorities, and others
5 engaged in exercising their right to freedoms of ex-
6 pression, peaceful assembly, or association;

7 (3) to consider those detained or imprisoned
8 under counterterrorism authorities on politically mo-
9 tivated grounds to be prisoners of conscience or po-
10 litical prisoners, as appropriate, unless there is pro-
11 bative evidence of specific criminal misconduct pre-
12 sented in proceedings that comply with international
13 fair trial standards;

14 (4) to use all diplomatic tools to advocate that
15 all prisoners of conscience and political prisoners in
16 Turkey should be unconditionally released and
17 charges expunged;

18 (5) to press the Government of Turkey to re-
19 peal or amend—

20 (A) all anti-terrorism laws and regulations
21 that allow the government to unjustly target
22 journalists, political opponents, dissidents, and
23 minorities;

24 (B) all laws and regulations that violate
25 the right to freedoms of expression, peaceful as-

1 sembly, or association in a manner not per-
2 mitted by international legal standards, includ-
3 ing laws and regulations that seek to punish
4 those who insult political figures or denigrate
5 the Turkish nation or state institutions; and

6 (C) all laws and regulations that violate
7 the right to a fair trial;

8 (6) to oppose the export to Turkey by any
9 country of surveillance technologies, including soft-
10 ware, that could be used to monitor the activities of
11 journalists, political opponents, dissidents, or minor-
12 ity communities;

13 (7) to condemn the Government of Turkey's use
14 of transnational repression, including the abuse of
15 INTERPOL notices, renditions, and other
16 extraterritorial measures to target critics abroad;

17 (8) to protect United States persons and lawful
18 permanent residents from harassment, intimidation,
19 and other forms of foreign political retaliation by or
20 on behalf of the Government of Turkey; and

21 (9) to condition United States security coopera-
22 tion and assistance, as appropriate, on measurable
23 improvements in respect for human rights, rule of
24 law, and compliance with binding international
25 human rights judgments.

1 **SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PRESS FREEDOM.**

2 It is the sense of Congress that—

3 (1) the Government of Turkey must take steps
4 to significantly improve the dire climate for journal-
5 ists and those supporting the journalism profession,
6 including—

7 (A) ending the enforcement of draconian
8 laws and regulations that restrict freedom of
9 expression; and

10 (B) releasing unconditionally all journalists
11 and media workers who have been imprisoned
12 for fulfilling their professional responsibilities;

13 (2) the Department of State should provide as-
14 sistance and warnings of impending politically moti-
15 vated detention or harm to journalists and media
16 workers in danger in Turkey, regardless of citizen-
17 ship status, including journalists working for Kurd-
18 ish media organizations;

19 (3) United States Government officials should
20 prioritize demands to release unfairly detained jour-
21 nalists and media workers in their communications
22 with Turkish officials; and

23 (4) press freedom and the freedom of expres-
24 sion are fundamental human rights and should be
25 upheld and protected in Turkey and everywhere
26 where those rights are threatened.

1 **SEC. 6. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNET FREEDOM.**

2 It is the sense of Congress that—

3 (1) the Government of Turkey must cease its
4 ongoing crackdown on free expression on the inter-
5 net, including by repealing or amending laws allow-
6 ing the government to block a website or remove
7 content from the website if there is sufficient sus-
8 picion that the site is insulting political figures;

9 (2) the Department of State should support
10 and pressure the Government of Turkey—

11 (A) to halt its frequent requests that social
12 media companies block accounts and content of
13 journalists and media outlets; and

14 (B) to ensure that the Radio and Tele-
15 vision Supreme Council does not arbitrarily re-
16 strict online streaming services through a costly
17 and opaque licensing regime; and

18 (3) escalating controls regulating internet use
19 are an attempt by the Government of Turkey to si-
20 lence one of the last platforms for independent jour-
21 nalism in the country.

22 **SEC. 7. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PROTECTING LAWYERS**
23 **AND PROMOTING FAIR TRIALS.**

24 It is the sense of Congress that—

25 (1) the Government of Turkey must—

1 (A) halt its indiscriminate detention and
2 prosecution of lawyers, judges, prosecutors, and
3 court officials, and its targeting of lawyers' as-
4 sociations;

5 (B) repeal laws restricting the right of law-
6 yers to discharge their professional duties, the
7 rights of suspects to legal counsel, and the right
8 of lawyer-client privileged communication;

9 (C) ensure that lawyers can visit detainees
10 in police custody, and remind police and pros-
11 ecutors of the protected role of lawyers under
12 Article 14 of the International Covenant on
13 Civil and Political Rights, Articles 5 and 6 of
14 the European Convention on Human Rights,
15 and the United Nations Basic Principles on the
16 Role of Lawyers; and

17 (D) end the practice of prosecuting lawyers
18 based on whom they have represented as cli-
19 ents;

20 (2) the Department of State should pressure
21 the Government of Turkey—

22 (A) to abolish extended pretrial detention,
23 consistent with Turkey's Judicial Reform Strat-
24 egy;

1 (B) to reverse the April 2017 amendment
2 to Article 159 of the Constitution of Turkey,
3 which allows for political control over the nomi-
4 nation procedures to the Council of Judges and
5 Prosecutors; and

6 (C) to ensure the independence of judges
7 and of the judiciary system, with particular
8 focus on the Ministry of Justice; and

9 (3) the independence of any country's judicial
10 system suffers when lawyers—

11 (A) are subject to intimidation and harass-
12 ment in their work; and

13 (B) are identified with the causes of their
14 clients.

15 **SEC. 8. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ACCOUNTABILITY FOR**
16 **HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.**

17 It is the sense of Congress that if the Government
18 of Turkey does not promptly take effective steps to ad-
19 dress the human rights violations described in this Act—

20 (1) the President of the United States should
21 impose sanctions pursuant to the Global Magnitsky
22 Human Rights Accountability Act (subtitle F of title
23 XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note)
24 with respect to officials of the Government of Tur-

1 key determined to be responsible for or complicit in,
2 or to have directly or indirectly engaged in—

3 (A) the detention of prisoners of conscience
4 and political prisoners;

5 (B) the politically motivated detention of
6 journalists;

7 (C) restricting of freedom of free expres-
8 sion through social media; and

9 (D) other gross violations of internationally
10 recognized human rights;

11 (2) the President should confirm that United
12 States security assistance provided to the Govern-
13 ment of Turkey is fully consistent with the condi-
14 tions mandated in section 36 of the Arms Export
15 Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776) and the human rights
16 provisions contained in section 620M of the Foreign
17 Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d);

18 (3) the Secretary of the Treasury should in-
19 struct the United States executive director of each
20 international financial institution to oppose any loan,
21 grant, policy, or strategy determined to be directly
22 enabling the Government of Turkey to violate the
23 human rights of its citizens; and

24 (4) the Secretary of State should impose visa
25 restrictions under the announced “Khashoggi Ban”,

pursuant to section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(C)) on—

(A) individuals who, acting on behalf of the
government, are believed to have been directly
engaged in serious, extraterritorial counter-dis-
sident activities, including those who—

(i) suppress, harass, surveil, threaten,
or harm journalists, activists, or other per-
sons perceived to be dissidents for their
work; or

(ii) engage in such activities with re-
spect to the families or other close associ-
ates of such persons; and

(B) family members of individuals de-
scribed in subparagraph (A), as appropriate.

SEC. 9. LIMITATIONS ON CERTAIN SECURITY ASSISTANCE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—No funds authorized to be appro-
priated or otherwise made available for Foreign Military
Financing, Foreign Military Sales, or other security assist-
ance programs for the Government of Turkey may be obli-
gated or expended unless the Secretary of State certifies
to the appropriate congressional committees that the Gov-
ernment of Turkey—

(1) has taken demonstrable and sustained steps
to reduce the number of prisoners of conscience and

1 political prisoners, including by releasing individuals
2 detained solely for the peaceful exercise of their
3 human rights;

4 (2) has ceased the misuse of counterterrorism
5 and disinformation laws to criminalize peaceful ex-
6 pression, association, and political participation;

7 (3) is taking concrete steps to comply with
8 binding judgments of the European Court of Human
9 Rights, including in cases concerning Osman Kavala
10 and Selahattin Demirtas; and

11 (4) has ceased, or is no longer systematically
12 engaging in, acts of transnational repression tar-
13 geting individuals abroad for exercising their funda-
14 mental freedoms.

15 (b) WAIVER.—The Secretary of State may waive the
16 application of subsection (a) on a case-by-case basis if the
17 Secretary determines and reports to the appropriate con-
18 gressional committees that such waiver is in the vital na-
19 tional security interest of the United States, and includes
20 a justification for the waiver and a description of efforts
21 to promote the reforms described in subsection (a).

22 **SEC. 10. POLITICAL PRISONERS ASSISTANCE.**

23 The Secretary of State shall provide assistance to
24 civil society organizations in Turkey that work to secure
25 the release of prisoners of conscience and political pris-

1 oners in Turkey, and to current and former prisoners of
 2 conscience and political prisoners in Turkey, including—

3 (1) support for the documentation of human
 4 rights violations with respect to prisoners of con-
 5 science and politically motivated prisoners;

6 (2) support for advocacy in Turkey to raise
 7 awareness of issues relating to prisoners of con-
 8 science and political prisoners;

9 (3) support for efforts to repeal or amend laws
 10 or regulations that are used to imprison individuals
 11 as prisoners of conscience or political prisoners; and

12 (4) the delegation of specific United States mis-
 13 sion staff who will observe trials in politically moti-
 14 vated cases, including in Southeast Turkey.

15 **SEC. 11. ANNUAL REPORT.**

16 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
 17 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter
 18 for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State shall sub-
 19 mit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
 20 on the implementation of this Act.

21 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report re-
 22 quired under subsection (a) shall include—

23 (1) an assessment of the number, conditions,
 24 and legal status of prisoners of conscience and polit-
 25 ical prisoners in Turkey;

1 (2) a description of restrictions on freedom of
2 expression, association, assembly, and the press, in-
3 cluding online censorship and blocking of social
4 media platforms and websites;

5 (3) a description of incidents of transnational
6 repression, including renditions, attempted abduc-
7 tions, physical attacks, or misuse of INTERPOL no-
8 tices targeting individuals in other countries, includ-
9 ing the United States;

10 (4) an assessment of any use by the Govern-
11 ment of Turkey of United States-origin goods, serv-
12 ices, or technologies to facilitate surveillance, censor-
13 ship, or other serious human rights abuses;

14 (5) a description of efforts by the Government
15 of Turkey to restrict and repress political opposition
16 parties and leaders, including attempts to eliminate
17 meaningful political disagreement and debate;

18 (6) a description of efforts by the Government
19 of Turkey to amend the Constitution of the Republic
20 of Turkey to marginalize political opposition and
21 consolidate power around one political party or poli-
22 tician; and

23 (7) a description of the sanctions, visa restric-
24 tions, and other measures taken pursuant to this
25 Act and other applicable authorities.

1 **SEC. 12. SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY AND INDEPENDENT**
2 **MEDIA.**

3 The Secretary of State and the Administrator of the
4 United States Agency for International Development, as
5 appropriate, shall expand support for—

6 (1) independent journalists and media outlets in
7 Turkey, including those operating in exile;

8 (2) civil society organizations documenting
9 human rights violations or providing assistance to
10 victims of politically motivated persecution;

11 (3) digital rights advocates and organizations
12 working to enhance secure communications, privacy,
13 and cybersecurity for at-risk communities; and

14 (4) initiatives promoting human rights edu-
15 cation, legal literacy, and public awareness regarding
16 fundamental freedoms in Turkey.

○