<?xml version="1.0"?>
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="billres.xsl"?>
<!DOCTYPE bill PUBLIC "-//US Congress//DTDs/bill.dtd//EN" "bill.dtd">
<bill bill-stage="Introduced-in-Senate" dms-id="A1" public-private="public" slc-id="S1-DAV26H92-9YK-X7-FT5"><metadata xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">
<dublinCore>
<dc:title>119 S5160 IS: Countering Gray-zone Aggression by the People’s Republic of China Act</dc:title>
<dc:publisher>U.S. Senate</dc:publisher>
<dc:date>2026-07-29</dc:date>
<dc:format>text/xml</dc:format>
<dc:language>EN</dc:language>
<dc:rights>Pursuant to Title 17 Section 105 of the United States Code, this file is not subject to copyright protection and is in the public domain.</dc:rights>
</dublinCore>
</metadata>
<form>
<distribution-code display="yes">II</distribution-code><congress>119th CONGRESS</congress><session>2d Session</session><legis-num>S. 5160</legis-num><current-chamber>IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES</current-chamber><action><action-date date="20260729">July 29, 2026</action-date><action-desc><sponsor name-id="S386">Ms. Duckworth</sponsor> (for herself and <cosponsor name-id="S396">Mrs. Blackburn</cosponsor>) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the <committee-name committee-id="SSFR00">Committee on Foreign Relations</committee-name></action-desc></action><legis-type>A BILL</legis-type><official-title>To require the Secretary of State and relevant executive branch agencies to monitor and address gray-zone operations of the People’s Republic of China in the Indo-Pacific, to hold accountable gray-zone activities by national and international actors, and for other purposes.</official-title></form><legis-body><section id="S1" section-type="section-one"><enum>1.</enum><header>Short title</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">This Act may be cited as the <quote><short-title>Countering Gray-zone Aggression by the People’s Republic of China Act</short-title></quote>.</text></section><section id="ida240873399a340b58da7c862bdc77fbd"><enum>2.</enum><header>Sense of Congress</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that—</text><paragraph id="id0ce43604931d49e58df8f6bedebdc672"><enum>(1)</enum><text>gray-zone operations employed in the Indo-Pacific region with the purpose of expanding Chinese interest via coercion by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a growing threat to the United States, national security, regional partners in the Indo-Pacific and economic interests globally, with the Indo-Pacific region and Taiwan being a vital area of interest to the United States;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id29276676a54a49d58d917e67c7d9d957"><enum>(2)</enum><text>gray-zone tactics are employed by the PRC with the specific purpose of reunification with Taiwan through slow erosion of political cohesion, economic independence and societal confidence without kinetic escalation, among other objectives;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="iddfdbae48311246b59cf48147e93a35d7"><enum>(3)</enum><text>gray-zone tactics are becoming increasingly prevalent in the Taiwan Strait and the Indo-Pacific region with the increased incursions of Chinese vessels in national waters, airspace incursions, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and economic coercion, in which Taiwan and the Philippines are identified as main targets;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id9b0b3c439eb542a9985a8829ee59efea"><enum>(4)</enum><text>the PRC is continuously increasing the scope of targets and disputed territories in the Pacific, broadening the list of target territories beyond Taiwan and the Philippines;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id927bf34a57554da9b7cdbe9fbdb5b17c"><enum>(5)</enum><text>PRC-Russia gray-zone tactic coordination is becoming an increasing security risk for the United States in both the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific, with the involvement of Chinese vessels in cable breakages in Europe, and Russian vessels near Taiwan;</text></paragraph><paragraph commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="ida07d37a330004065a31f0468b6731100"><enum>(6)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the United States Indo-Pacific allies and partners find themselves at the forefront of aggression by the PRC, which they cannot effectively counter without substantive intelligence sharing, coordination, and publicization of PRC aggression, which can be further supplemented by United States coordination;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id6cd02db46bd744f1831f8573d586f239"><enum>(7)</enum><text>the United States Government should redouble efforts to hold the PRC accountable, including partnering with non-governmental groups who are documenting and exposing the PRC's coercive and destabilizing activities, for the purpose of deterrence; and</text></paragraph><paragraph commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id0d03bf80b2b8404f8ef6e3ab284bdc8a"><enum>(8)</enum><text>to effectively address PRC use of gray-zone tactics, the United States Government should work with partner governments, civil society experts, and private stakeholders to improve information sharing, strengthen preventative measures, raise public awareness, and increase coordination on regional law enforcement.</text></paragraph></section><section id="id8cad215de52b428e9e5b9adbc1aa6c7b"><enum>3.</enum><header>Definitions</header><subsection id="id1c058059c520407b914dfe39f398ada9"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text>In this Act:</text><paragraph id="ida3286a8efc104f2e918d03e8ed124891"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Appropriate congressional committees</header><text>The term <term>appropriate congressional committees</term> means—</text><subparagraph id="id567b77411727492aaa61e184f771ff9b"><enum>(A)</enum><text>the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id16cf5b7dbbd54f6e89acd1eb4c0c08e1"><enum>(B)</enum><text>the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;</text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id38fe6745864347deb555a6aa764cccc0"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Gray-zone tactics</header><text>The term <term>gray-zone tactics</term> means the use of activities, short of open warfare, to advance a state’s interests by maximizing advancement while avoiding kinetic military responses, including a mix of diplomatic, economic, informational and paramilitary tools.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idf9a2ae0acef44a89b83736af72c9e9f3"><enum>(3)</enum><header>Strategy</header><text>The term <term>Strategy</term> means the strategy to monitor and counter gray-zone tactics and hold the PRC accountable required under section 4.</text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id2611695c812e404ab1cbc6b72fc40977"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Rule of construction</header><text>The definitions under this section are exclusive to this Act and may not be construed to affect any other provision of United States law.</text></subsection></section><section id="id248595a789bc479cb7c3fdc0851b147b"><enum>4.</enum><header>Strategy to enhance and enact the monitoring of Chinese gray-zone activities within the Indo-Pacific</header><subsection id="id83804d609aa44d14a022390c321793a6"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text>Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, the Attorney General, the heads of intelligence community agencies, and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive strategy (in this section referred to as the <quote>Strategy</quote>) that—</text><paragraph id="ide713086fb31846dbb97a53e303e836da"><enum>(1)</enum><text>is designed to monitor and make public gray-zone tactics used by the PRC to the detriment of our allies and partners, as a means of exposing PRC methods and limiting their damage;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id2567156bd9fd4a1c8b4850023160c9f9"><enum>(2)</enum><text>consults with the intelligence community on best practices of increasing intelligence sharing;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id873b7673cedf436eb6077f21f93119aa"><enum>(3)</enum><text>is global in scope; and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id22839b7cce4d499fb52a599df67369c7"><enum>(4)</enum><text>may prioritize efforts focused on the PRC activities in the Indo-Pacific region and the Taiwan Strait.</text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="idbe063aa0fed147d4a8fad22d851752bb"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Contents</header><text>The Strategy shall—</text><paragraph id="id9db04ac34d324212b04fc5300053751d"><enum>(1)</enum><text>provide an assessment of gaps in capabilities or resourcing regarding our ability to monitor PRC gray zone activities in the Indo-Pacific;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id7c99c9dec381457dac00d027a2454832"><enum>(2)</enum><text>outline a list of territories or areas currently impacted by or imminently vulnerable to PRC gray-zone operations with an assessment the capabilities of United States allies and partners to respond, and describe the status of efforts to engage with these partners at governmental and local levels;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idda172b005a87462a81810798a9ec1e31"><enum>(3)</enum><text>identify all active, relevant United States foreign assistance programs and diplomatic efforts underway to mitigate and counter gray-zone tactics;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idac2bc9386b5c4b2f8620e48cefdaf323"><enum>(4)</enum><text>identify, if applicable, any additional capabilities or resources inherent to allies and partners, the private sector, or academia that would enhance the response to PRC gray-zone activities;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id2cd7e99fc26e493d9dd1beb4bbc61b3f"><enum>(5)</enum><text>outline additional resources or authorities needed to adequately counter PRC gray-zone activities and any obstacles to responding to gray-zone tactic incidents;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id33ec634a889944aabd5667d0237a899a"><enum>(6)</enum><text>outline an action plan for how the Federal Government will monitor, prevent, and deter PRC gray-zone activities, including in coordination with allies and partners, including strategic efforts to raise awareness and public exposure of PRC gray-zone activities; and</text></paragraph><paragraph commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id98fd0596640843eeae78298918525308"><enum>(7)</enum><text>establish objectives and performance indicators to achieve this strategy.</text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="ide70fa3ee626b482bbb77ee759a6792b1"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Limitation</header><text>Nothing in the Strategy may affect, apply to, or create obligations related to past, present, or future criminal or civil law enforcement or intelligence activities of the United States or the law enforcement activities of any State or subdivision of a State.</text></subsection><subsection id="id133b172944b54c53bb4152345b1703ff"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Classification</header><text>The Strategy shall be unclassified but may include a classified annex.</text></subsection></section><section id="id908fa84f5cb9454a84c4b5bd3053e592"><enum>5.</enum><header>Establishing a task force to implement the Strategy</header><subsection id="id8ca45a3b45514f0ca20f2000dcbdd7ad"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text>Not later than 90 days after submitting the Strategy pursuant to section 4(a), the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies, shall establish an interagency task force (referred to in this section as the <quote>Task Force</quote>)—</text><paragraph id="ide3e6d757b661415996fca2bb3871f2aa"><enum>(1)</enum><text>to coordinate the implementation of the Strategy;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id94a8f93f2fa648c0b3058cce1ddd3ca2"><enum>(2)</enum><text>to conduct and enhance regular monitoring and analysis of gray-zone operations internationally;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id68ead136b7b348e9b56c5950bc268754"><enum>(3)</enum><text>to track, formulate and strengthen tools for the purpose of countering and mitigating gray-zone operations internationally, including determining and reporting funding requirements;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id87e901ef4c3d4fe4bd36675367f580f2"><enum>(4)</enum><text>to track and evaluate progress toward the objectives, activities, and performance indicators of the Strategy described in section 4(b)(5); and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id695769719d2046299021ce528b093648"><enum>(5)</enum><text>to update the Strategy, in consultation with the appropriate congressional committees, as needed.</text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="ide8685e6cf13a4a05ba052b0029335870"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Annual reviews and reports</header><text>Not later than 1 year after the establishment of the Task Force, and not less frequently than annually thereafter, the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies, shall—</text><paragraph id="idb6c1714516ba4ee7be2fc180394b7be8"><enum>(1)</enum><text>conduct a status review of the Strategy and the overall state gray-zone operations by the PRC in the Indo-Pacific;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="ida2b31d3783d44db09363877fd0d0af19"><enum>(2)</enum><text>include a list of impacted allies and partners, as well as actors who may be enabling the PRC’s gray zone activity in the Indo-Pacific; and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="ida57a23abfb2f4c86ba8c2f1a29be23d5"><enum>(3)</enum><text>submit the results of such review in a public report to the appropriate congressional committees, which may contain a classified annex.</text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id4beaad478fe24348997d41842d817440"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Task force termination</header><text>The Task Force shall terminate on the date that is 7 years after the date on which it is established.</text></subsection></section></legis-body></bill> 

