[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4708 Reported in Senate (RS)]
<DOC>
Calendar No. 516
119th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 4708
To improve the security of the Arctic, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
June 8, 2026
Mr. Lee (for himself and Mrs. Shaheen) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
July 27, 2026
Reported by Mr. Risch, with an amendment
[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed
in italic]
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To improve the security of the Arctic, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
<DELETED>SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.</DELETED>
<DELETED> This Act may be cited as the ``Arctic Security and
Diplomacy Act''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 2. FINDINGS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> Congress finds the following:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) The Arctic is a critical domain for the
security and sovereignty of the United States and faces
elevated risks related to the threats of territorial expansion
and violation, influence operations, sabotage of critical
undersea infrastructure, and espionage by foreign adversaries,
particularly the People's Republic of China and the Russian
Federation.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) The Russian Federation holds a significant
portion of the Arctic, accounting for approximately 53 percent
of the Arctic Ocean coastline, and has significantly expanded
its military basing infrastructure and capabilities in the
region.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) In 2018, the People's Republic of China
declared that it is a ``Near-Arctic State'' with significant
interests in the Arctic and is attempting to become a ``polar
great power'' through economic expansion, scientific
investments, and dual-use civilian and military
infrastructure.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) The Russian Federation is cooperating with the
People's Republic of China to establish a ``Polar Silk Road''
in the Arctic, and the two countries are working together to
strengthen cooperation in polar shipbuilding and ship
technology.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) The People's Republic of China has made
multiple attempts to gain strategic footholds in the Arctic,
has research stations in Norway's Svalbard archipelago and in
Iceland, and consistently attempts to co-opt and manipulate
civilian science and research activities, university
partnerships, and multilateral science and research initiatives
throughout the Arctic.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) The People's Republic of China has observer
status on the Arctic Council, has significantly increased
diplomatic engagement with Nordic countries, and uses
investments in cooperative marine scientific research as a form
of soft power in the Arctic.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (7) The People's Republic of China engages in
extensive marine surveying, much of which has dual-use risk for
military applications, including seabed mapping, NATO asset
monitoring, and other espionage-related activity.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (8) In 2022, the Danish Security and Intelligence
Service reported several attempts at espionage by the People's
Republic of China against Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe
Islands.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (9) In 2024, the Canadian Security Intelligence
Service warned of espionage activity by the People's Republic
of China and the Russian Federation, and the Canadian military
discovered and removed buoys in the Arctic owned by the
People's Republic of China.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (10) In 2025, the head of the National Police
Commission in Iceland warned that the China-Iceland Arctic
Science Observatory poses dual-use risks and may be used for
espionage.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (11) The 2026 Annual Threat Assessment by the
intelligence community describes the Russian Federation as
``our primary challenge in the Arctic . . . Moscow is seeking
to expand and deepen its presence in the Arctic through
increased maritime trade, natural resource extraction, and
military activity,'' while warning that the People's Republic
of China ``seeks to expand its Arctic presence using scientific
research, investments, and commercial ventures along the
Northern Sea Route.''</DELETED>
<DELETED> (12) The 2025 NATO Maritime Strategy highlighted
the Russian Federation's military build-up in the Arctic and
use of hybrid threats like sabotage against critical undersea
infrastructure, while warning that the People's Republic of
China ``is pursuing a military build-up, including rapidly
expanding its naval capabilities, increasing its use of dual-
use military-scientific vessels and surging its presence in the
High North and the Arctic, while remaining opaque about its
intentions.''</DELETED>
<DELETED> (13) According to the Department of Homeland
Security, an unprecedented number of military and research
vessels of the People's Republic of China are operating in or
near United States Arctic waters.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (14) It is in the interests of Arctic countries to
cooperatively limit the ability of the People's Republic of
China to conduct further espionage in the Arctic.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> In this Act:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' has the meaning
given the term ``Executive agency'' in section 105 of title 5,
United States Code.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations,
the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
Committee on Homeland Security, and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) Arctic.--The term ``Arctic'' has the meaning
given that term in section 112 of the Arctic Research and
Policy Act of 1984 (15 U.S.C. 4111).</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) Covered activities.--The term ``covered
activities'' means marine surveys that may pose dual-use risks
for civilian and military applications, including--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) exploration of natural
resources;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) seabed mapping, hydrographic surveys,
and oceanographic surveys;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) data collection related to subsea
assets and infrastructure;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) operation of unmanned maritime
systems; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (E) any other activity designated by the
Secretary of State as posing a risk to national
security.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) Covered vessel.--The term ``covered vessel''
means a foreign vessel that--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) is a vessel of a foreign adversary;
or</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) the Secretary of State reasonably
believes to be associated with a foreign adversary in a
manner that threatens the security of the United
States.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) Exclusive economic zone.--The term ``exclusive
economic zone'' means, with respect to the United States,
including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of
the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the United
States Virgin Islands, and any other territory or possession
over which the United States exercises sovereignty, the zone
seaward of and adjacent to the territorial sea, including the
contiguous zone, and extending 200 nautical miles from the
territorial sea baseline (except where otherwise limited by
treaty or other agreement recognized by the United States) in
which the United States has sovereign rights and
jurisdiction.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (7) Foreign adversary.--The term ``foreign
adversary'' means any foreign government or foreign
nongovernment person engaged in a long-term pattern or serious
instances of conduct significantly adverse to the national
security of the United States or the security and safety of
United States persons, including--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) the Islamic Republic of
Iran;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) the People's Republic of China;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) the Russian Federation.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (8) Foreign vessel.--The term ``foreign vessel''
means any vessel that is--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) owned, operated, or chartered by a
foreign government;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) owned or controlled by an entity
organized under the laws of, headquartered in, or
otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign
country; or</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) registered under the flag of a foreign
country.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (9) Intelligence community.--The term
``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that term in
section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3003).</DELETED>
<DELETED> (10) Marine scientific research.--The term
``marine scientific research'' means any activity that is--
</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) undertaken in the ocean to expand
knowledge of the marine environment and its processes,
including data collection activities; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) regulated by the United States under
the Presidential Proclamation on Revision to United
States Marine Scientific Research Policy of September
2020.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (11) Territorial sea.--The term ``territorial
sea'' means the waters extending to 12 nautical miles from the
baselines of the United States.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (12) United states waters.--The term ``United
States waters'' means--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) the territorial sea of the United
States;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) the exclusive economic zone of the
United States; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) the continental shelf of the United
States, as it pertains to marine scientific research
and other activities on the seabed or
subsoil.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.</DELETED>
<DELETED> It is the policy of the United States--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) to limit espionage and influence operations by
foreign adversaries in the Arctic and in United States
waters;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) to inform allied countries with a presence in
the Arctic about the espionage and influence operations of
foreign adversaries in the Arctic, including espionage through
covered activities;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) to condition support from the Federal
Government for marine surveys on cooperation with
counterespionage in the Arctic and in United States waters,
including limitations on information sharing of data obtained
through covered activities in the Arctic and in United States
waters; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) to leverage all appropriate diplomatic means
available to ensure the security of the Arctic and the
sovereignty of United States waters through the enforcement of
section 6, including through--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) demarches;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) public condemnations;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) diplomatic sanctions;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) coordination of multilateral
diplomatic pressure;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (E) motions to remove an offending country
from Arctic-related multilateral bodies and
cooperatives; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (F) any other diplomatic means authorized
by law.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 5. STRATEGY.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with
the heads of the elements of the intelligence community and the
Secretary of Homeland Security, shall produce a strategy to identify
and combat espionage and influence operations by foreign adversaries in
the Arctic.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Elements.--The strategy required by paragraph (1)
shall include--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) identifying and countering espionage
activities in the Arctic;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) diplomatic methods to enforce section 6;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) as appropriate, enlistment of and coordination
with allied countries that have a presence in the Arctic to
combat espionage by foreign adversaries.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 6. MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN UNITED STATES
WATERS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) In General.--No foreign scientist may conduct a
maritime scientific research project in United States waters without
prior consent from the United States Government provided in accordance
with this section and with appropriate international customs as
determined by the Secretary of State.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Requirements; Applications.--The Secretary of State,
in coordination with the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) require foreign vessels to obtain prior
consent to conduct maritime scientific research in United
States waters; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) implement a process for reviewing applications
for such consent.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (c) Information Sharing.--To facilitate the process for
reviewing applications to conduct maritime scientific research under
this section, the head of each agency shall share information related
to such maritime scientific research with the Department of State
unless otherwise prohibited by law.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (d) Prohibition on Covered Vessels.--Except as provided in
subsection (e), the Secretary of State shall not approve any
application submitted under this section for any covered
vessel.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (e) National Interest Waiver.--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) In general.--The Secretary of State may waive
the prohibition in subsection (d) on an individual basis if the
Secretary determines that doing so is the national interest of
the United States.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Notice required.--Not later than 5 days after
any issuance of a waiver under paragraph (1), the Secretary of
State shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress
written notice describing the waiver.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (f) Congressional Notification.--Not later than 15 days
after the date of any violation of subsection (a), the Secretary of
State shall notify the appropriate committees of Congress of such
violation, including--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) the country affiliation of the foreign
scientist;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) the nature of the violation; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) subsequent action by the Federal Government to
address the violation.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 7. REPORT.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with
the heads of the elements of the intelligence community and the
Secretary of Homeland Security, shall submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a report on espionage and influence operations
by foreign adversaries in the Arctic and in United States
waters.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall
include the following:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) An assessment of the extent to which covered
activities support espionage and influence operations by
foreign adversaries in the Arctic and in United States
waters.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) A description of United States Government
support for covered activities in the Arctic that involve
foreign adversaries, including--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) funding;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) public-private partnerships;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) maritime security;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) technical assistance;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (E) information sharing; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (F) any other form of material or
technical support.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) A description of efforts by the Secretary of
State to enlist allied countries with a presence in the Arctic
to combat espionage in the Arctic by foreign
adversaries.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) Recommendations for combating such
espionage.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified
annex.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (d) Availability.--The report required by subsection (a)
shall be made available on request to any Member of Congress.</DELETED>
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Arctic Security and Diplomacy Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The United States is an Arctic nation by virtue of the
State of Alaska.
(2) The Arctic is a critical domain for the security and
sovereignty of the United States and faces elevated risks
related to the threats of territorial expansion and violation,
influence operations, sabotage of critical undersea
infrastructure, and espionage by foreign adversaries,
particularly the People's Republic of China and the Russian
Federation.
(3) The Russian Federation holds a significant portion of
the Arctic, accounting for approximately 53 percent of the
Arctic Ocean coastline, and has significantly expanded its
military basing infrastructure and capabilities in the region.
(4) In 2018, the People's Republic of China declared that
it is a ``Near-Arctic State'' with significant interests in the
Arctic and is attempting to become a ``polar great power''
through economic expansion, scientific investments, and dual-
use civilian and military infrastructure.
(5) The Russian Federation is cooperating with the People's
Republic of China to establish a ``Polar Silk Road'' in the
Arctic, and the two countries are working together to
strengthen cooperation in polar shipbuilding and ship
technology.
(6) The People's Republic of China has made multiple
attempts to gain strategic footholds in the Arctic, has
research stations in Norway's Svalbard archipelago and in
Iceland, and consistently attempts to co-opt and manipulate
civilian science and research activities, university
partnerships, and multilateral science and research initiatives
throughout the Arctic.
(7) The People's Republic of China has observer status on
the Arctic Council, has significantly increased diplomatic
engagement with Nordic countries, and uses investments in
cooperative marine scientific research as a form of soft power
in the Arctic.
(8) The People's Republic of China engages in extensive
marine surveying, much of which has dual-use risk for military
applications, including seabed mapping, NATO asset monitoring,
and other espionage-related activity.
(9) The Russian Federation and the People's Republic of
China have overlapping priority interests in the Arctic, though
each have their own distinct interests with associated
challenges.
(10) In 2022, the Danish Security and Intelligence Service
reported several attempts at espionage by the People's Republic
of China against Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands.
(11) In 2024, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service
warned of espionage activity by the People's Republic of China
and the Russian Federation, and the Canadian military
discovered and removed buoys in the Arctic owned by the
People's Republic of China.
(12) In 2025, the head of the National Police Commission in
Iceland warned that the China-Iceland Arctic Science
Observatory poses dual-use risks and may be used for espionage.
(13) The 2026 Annual Threat Assessment by the intelligence
community describes the Russian Federation as ``our primary
challenge in the Arctic . . . Moscow is seeking to expand and
deepen its presence in the Arctic through increased maritime
trade, natural resource extraction, and military activity,''
while warning that the People's Republic of China ``seeks to
expand its Arctic presence using scientific research,
investments, and commercial ventures along the Northern Sea
Route.''
(14) The 2025 NATO Maritime Strategy highlighted the
Russian Federation's military build-up in the Arctic and use of
hybrid threats like sabotage against critical undersea
infrastructure, while warning that the People's Republic of
China ``is pursuing a military build-up, including rapidly
expanding its naval capabilities, increasing its use of dual-
use military-scientific vessels and surging its presence in the
High North and the Arctic, while remaining opaque about its
intentions.''
(15) According to the Department of Homeland Security, an
unprecedented number of military and research vessels of the
People's Republic of China are operating in or near United
States Arctic waters.
(16) On May 22, 2026, at the NATO Foreign Ministerial in
Sweden, the Arctic allies, consisting of Canada, the Kingdom of
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway, the Kingdom
of Sweden, and the United States, issued a joint statement
which stated that ``With Russia's increased military activity
and China's growing strategic interest, we seek to bolster
stability in the Arctic region'' and ``recognize the importance
of economic and resource development in the Arctic and have
tasked our experts to coordinate more closely on these issues .
. . to achieve our common goal of a safe, prosperous, and
peaceful Arctic'';
(17) It is in the interests of Arctic countries to
cooperatively limit the ability of the Russian Federation and
the People's Republic of China to conduct further espionage in
the Arctic.
(18) It is in the interest of the United States to
encourage marine scientific research, as President Ronald
Reagan noted in his Statement on United States Oceans Policy on
March 10, 1983.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' has the meaning given the
term ``Executive agency'' in section 105 of title 5, United
States Code.
(2) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee
on Homeland Security, and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
(3) Arctic.--The term ``Arctic'' has the meaning given that
term in section 112 of the Arctic Research and Policy Act of
1984 (15 U.S.C. 4111).
(4) Covered activities.--The term ``covered activities''
means marine surveys that may pose dual-use risks for civilian
and military applications, including--
(A) exploration of natural resources;
(B) seabed mapping, hydrographic surveys, and
oceanographic surveys;
(C) data collection related to subsea assets and
infrastructure;
(D) operation of unmanned maritime systems; and
(E) any other activity designated by the Secretary
of State as posing a risk to national security.
(5) Covered vessel.--The term ``covered vessel'' means a
foreign vessel that--
(A) is a vessel of a foreign adversary; or
(B) the Secretary of State reasonably believes to
be associated with a foreign adversary in a manner that
threatens the security of the United States.
(6) Exclusive economic zone.--The term ``exclusive economic
zone'' means, with respect to the United States, including the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the United States Virgin
Islands, and any other territory or possession over which the
United States exercises sovereignty, the zone seaward of and
adjacent to the territorial sea, including the contiguous zone,
and extending 200 nautical miles from the territorial sea
baseline (except where otherwise limited by treaty or other
agreement recognized by the United States) in which the United
States has sovereign rights and jurisdiction.
(7) Foreign adversary.--The term ``foreign adversary''
means any foreign government or foreign nongovernment person
engaged in a long-term pattern or serious instances of conduct
significantly adverse to the national security of the United
States or the security and safety of United States persons,
including--
(A) the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
(B) the Islamic Republic of Iran;
(C) the People's Republic of China; and
(D) the Russian Federation.
(8) Foreign vessel.--The term ``foreign vessel'' means any
vessel that is--
(A) owned, operated, or chartered by a foreign
government;
(B) owned or controlled by an entity organized
under the laws of, headquartered in, or otherwise
subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign country; or
(C) registered under the flag of a foreign country.
(9) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
(10) Marine scientific research.--The term ``marine
scientific research'' means any activity that is--
(A) undertaken in the ocean to expand knowledge of
the marine environment and its processes, including
data collection activities; and
(B) regulated by the United States under the
Presidential Proclamation on Revision to United States
Marine Scientific Research Policy of September 2020.
(11) Territorial sea.--The term ``territorial sea'' means
the waters extending to 12 nautical miles from the baselines of
the United States.
(12) United states waters.--The term ``United States
waters'' means--
(A) the territorial sea of the United States;
(B) the exclusive economic zone of the United
States; and
(C) the continental shelf of the United States, as
it pertains to marine scientific research and other
activities on the seabed or subsoil.
SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to limit espionage and influence operations by foreign
adversaries in the Arctic and in United States waters;
(2) to inform allied countries with a presence in the
Arctic about the espionage and influence operations of foreign
adversaries in the Arctic, including espionage through covered
activities;
(3) to condition support from the Federal Government for
marine surveys on cooperation with counterespionage in the
Arctic and in United States waters, including limitations on
information sharing of data obtained through covered activities
in the Arctic and in United States waters; and
(4) to leverage all appropriate diplomatic means available
to ensure the security of the Arctic and the sovereignty of
United States waters through the enforcement of section 6,
including through--
(A) demarches;
(B) public condemnations;
(C) diplomatic sanctions;
(D) coordination of multilateral diplomatic
pressure;
(E) any other diplomatic means authorized by law;
and
(F) maintaining robust participation of the United
States in the Arctic Council to limit Chinese and
Russian efforts to undermine the interests of the
United States in the Arctic.
SEC. 5. STRATEGY.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
heads of the elements of the intelligence community and the Secretary
of Homeland Security, shall produce a strategy to identify and combat
espionage and influence operations by foreign adversaries in the
Arctic.
(b) Elements.--The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall
include--
(1) identifying and countering espionage activities in the
Arctic;
(2) diplomatic methods to enforce section 6; and
(3) as appropriate, enlistment of and coordination with
allied countries that have a presence in the Arctic to combat
espionage by foreign adversaries.
SEC. 6. MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN UNITED STATES WATERS.
(a) In General.--No foreign vessel may conduct a marine scientific
research project in United States waters without prior consent from the
United States Government provided in accordance with this section and
with appropriate international customs as determined by the Secretary
of State.
(b) Requirements; Applications.--The Secretary of State, in
coordination with the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall--
(1) require foreign vessels to obtain prior consent to
conduct marine scientific research in United States waters; and
(2) implement a process for reviewing applications for such
consent.
(c) Information Sharing.--To facilitate the process for reviewing
applications to conduct marine scientific research under this section,
the head of each agency shall share information related to such marine
scientific research with the Department of State unless otherwise
prohibited by law.
(d) Prohibition on Covered Vessels.--Except as provided in
subsection (e), the Secretary of State shall not approve any
application submitted under this section for any covered vessel.
(e) National Interest Waiver.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State may waive the
prohibition in subsection (d) on an individual basis if the
Secretary determines that doing so is the national interest of
the United States.
(2) Notice required.--Not later than 5 days after any
issuance of a waiver under paragraph (1), the Secretary of
State shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress
written notice describing the waiver.
(f) Congressional Notification.--Not later than 15 days after the
date of any violation of subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall
notify the appropriate committees of Congress of such violation,
including--
(1) the country affiliation of the foreign vessel;
(2) the nature of the violation; and
(3) subsequent action by the Federal Government to address
the violation.
(g) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a report that details--
(1) how the requirements of this section compare to the
requirements of existing multilateral marine scientific
research consent regimes; and
(2) the staffing and resources necessary for the Department
of State to review applications under such consent regime in a
manner that is timely and continues to encourage marine
scientific research and scientific diplomacy.
SEC. 7. REPORT.
(a) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
heads of the elements of the intelligence community and the Secretary
of Homeland Security, shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a report on espionage and influence operations by foreign
adversaries in the Arctic and in United States waters.
(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include
the following:
(1) An assessment of the extent to which covered activities
support espionage and influence operations by foreign
adversaries in the Arctic and in United States waters.
(2) A description of United States Government support for
covered activities in the Arctic that involve foreign
adversaries, including--
(A) funding;
(B) public-private partnerships;
(C) maritime security;
(D) technical assistance;
(E) information sharing;
(F) scientific research; and
(G) any other form of material or technical
support.
(3) A description of efforts by the Secretary of State to
enlist allied countries with a presence in the Arctic to combat
espionage in the Arctic by foreign adversaries.
(4) Recommendations for combating such espionage.
(5) An assessment of the feasibility and potential utility
of establishing a formal Arctic security information-sharing
framework, under a new or existing framework or mechanism,
among allied Arctic countries, as appropriate, such as Canada,
the Kingdom of Denmark (including Greenland), the Kingdom of
Norway, Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden, and Iceland, including
mechanisms for the exchange of information and joint
identification of dual-use maritime scientific activity, and
the development of shared watchlists of high-risk vessels,
entities, and individuals.
(6) An analysis of how existing multilateral agreements
combat espionage and influence operations in the Arctic.
(c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted
in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.
(d) Availability.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be
made available on request to any Member of Congress.
Calendar No. 516
119th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 4708
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A BILL
To improve the security of the Arctic, and for other purposes.
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July 27, 2026
Reported with an amendment