[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4708 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
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119th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 4708
To improve the security of the Arctic, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
June 8, 2026
Mr. Lee introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To improve the security of the Arctic, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Arctic Security and Diplomacy Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The Arctic is a critical domain for the security and
sovereignty of the United States and faces elevated risks
related to the threats of territorial expansion and violation,
influence operations, sabotage of critical undersea
infrastructure, and espionage by foreign adversaries,
particularly the People's Republic of China and the Russian
Federation.
(2) The Russian Federation holds a significant portion of
the Arctic, accounting for approximately 53 percent of the
Arctic Ocean coastline, and has significantly expanded its
military basing infrastructure and capabilities in the region.
(3) In 2018, the People's Republic of China declared that
it is a ``Near-Arctic State'' with significant interests in the
Arctic and is attempting to become a ``polar great power''
through economic expansion, scientific investments, and dual-
use civilian and military infrastructure.
(4) The Russian Federation is cooperating with the People's
Republic of China to establish a ``Polar Silk Road'' in the
Arctic, and the two countries are working together to
strengthen cooperation in polar shipbuilding and ship
technology.
(5) The People's Republic of China has made multiple
attempts to gain strategic footholds in the Arctic, has
research stations in Norway's Svalbard archipelago and in
Iceland, and consistently attempts to co-opt and manipulate
civilian science and research activities, university
partnerships, and multilateral science and research initiatives
throughout the Arctic.
(6) The People's Republic of China has observer status on
the Arctic Council, has significantly increased diplomatic
engagement with Nordic countries, and uses investments in
cooperative marine scientific research as a form of soft power
in the Arctic.
(7) The People's Republic of China engages in extensive
marine surveying, much of which has dual-use risk for military
applications, including seabed mapping, NATO asset monitoring,
and other espionage-related activity.
(8) In 2022, the Danish Security and Intelligence Service
reported several attempts at espionage by the People's Republic
of China against Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands.
(9) In 2024, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service
warned of espionage activity by the People's Republic of China
and the Russian Federation, and the Canadian military
discovered and removed buoys in the Arctic owned by the
People's Republic of China.
(10) In 2025, the head of the National Police Commission in
Iceland warned that the China-Iceland Arctic Science
Observatory poses dual-use risks and may be used for espionage.
(11) The 2026 Annual Threat Assessment by the intelligence
community describes the Russian Federation as ``our primary
challenge in the Arctic . . . Moscow is seeking to expand and
deepen its presence in the Arctic through increased maritime
trade, natural resource extraction, and military activity,''
while warning that the People's Republic of China ``seeks to
expand its Arctic presence using scientific research,
investments, and commercial ventures along the Northern Sea
Route.''
(12) The 2025 NATO Maritime Strategy highlighted the
Russian Federation's military build-up in the Arctic and use of
hybrid threats like sabotage against critical undersea
infrastructure, while warning that the People's Republic of
China ``is pursuing a military build-up, including rapidly
expanding its naval capabilities, increasing its use of dual-
use military-scientific vessels and surging its presence in the
High North and the Arctic, while remaining opaque about its
intentions.''
(13) According to the Department of Homeland Security, an
unprecedented number of military and research vessels of the
People's Republic of China are operating in or near United
States Arctic waters.
(14) It is in the interests of Arctic countries to
cooperatively limit the ability of the People's Republic of
China to conduct further espionage in the Arctic.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' has the meaning given the
term ``Executive agency'' in section 105 of title 5, United
States Code.
(2) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee
on Homeland Security, and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
(3) Arctic.--The term ``Arctic'' has the meaning given that
term in section 112 of the Arctic Research and Policy Act of
1984 (15 U.S.C. 4111).
(4) Covered activities.--The term ``covered activities''
means marine surveys that may pose dual-use risks for civilian
and military applications, including--
(A) exploration of natural resources;
(B) seabed mapping, hydrographic surveys, and
oceanographic surveys;
(C) data collection related to subsea assets and
infrastructure;
(D) operation of unmanned maritime systems; and
(E) any other activity designated by the Secretary
of State as posing a risk to national security.
(5) Covered vessel.--The term ``covered vessel'' means a
foreign vessel that--
(A) is a vessel of a foreign adversary; or
(B) the Secretary of State reasonably believes to
be associated with a foreign adversary in a manner that
threatens the security of the United States.
(6) Exclusive economic zone.--The term ``exclusive economic
zone'' means, with respect to the United States, including the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the United States Virgin
Islands, and any other territory or possession over which the
United States exercises sovereignty, the zone seaward of and
adjacent to the territorial sea, including the contiguous zone,
and extending 200 nautical miles from the territorial sea
baseline (except where otherwise limited by treaty or other
agreement recognized by the United States) in which the United
States has sovereign rights and jurisdiction.
(7) Foreign adversary.--The term ``foreign adversary''
means any foreign government or foreign nongovernment person
engaged in a long-term pattern or serious instances of conduct
significantly adverse to the national security of the United
States or the security and safety of United States persons,
including--
(A) the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
(B) the Islamic Republic of Iran;
(C) the People's Republic of China; and
(D) the Russian Federation.
(8) Foreign vessel.--The term ``foreign vessel'' means any
vessel that is--
(A) owned, operated, or chartered by a foreign
government;
(B) owned or controlled by an entity organized
under the laws of, headquartered in, or otherwise
subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign country; or
(C) registered under the flag of a foreign country.
(9) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
(10) Marine scientific research.--The term ``marine
scientific research'' means any activity that is--
(A) undertaken in the ocean to expand knowledge of
the marine environment and its processes, including
data collection activities; and
(B) regulated by the United States under the
Presidential Proclamation on Revision to United States
Marine Scientific Research Policy of September 2020.
(11) Territorial sea.--The term ``territorial sea'' means
the waters extending to 12 nautical miles from the baselines of
the United States.
(12) United states waters.--The term ``United States
waters'' means--
(A) the territorial sea of the United States;
(B) the exclusive economic zone of the United
States; and
(C) the continental shelf of the United States, as
it pertains to marine scientific research and other
activities on the seabed or subsoil.
SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to limit espionage and influence operations by foreign
adversaries in the Arctic and in United States waters;
(2) to inform allied countries with a presence in the
Arctic about the espionage and influence operations of foreign
adversaries in the Arctic, including espionage through covered
activities;
(3) to condition support from the Federal Government for
marine surveys on cooperation with counterespionage in the
Arctic and in United States waters, including limitations on
information sharing of data obtained through covered activities
in the Arctic and in United States waters; and
(4) to leverage all appropriate diplomatic means available
to ensure the security of the Arctic and the sovereignty of
United States waters through the enforcement of section 6,
including through--
(A) demarches;
(B) public condemnations;
(C) diplomatic sanctions;
(D) coordination of multilateral diplomatic
pressure;
(E) motions to remove an offending country from
Arctic-related multilateral bodies and cooperatives;
and
(F) any other diplomatic means authorized by law.
SEC. 5. STRATEGY.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
heads of the elements of the intelligence community and the Secretary
of Homeland Security, shall produce a strategy to identify and combat
espionage and influence operations by foreign adversaries in the
Arctic.
(b) Elements.--The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall
include--
(1) identifying and countering espionage activities in the
Arctic;
(2) diplomatic methods to enforce section 6; and
(3) as appropriate, enlistment of and coordination with
allied countries that have a presence in the Arctic to combat
espionage by foreign adversaries.
SEC. 6. MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN UNITED STATES WATERS.
(a) In General.--No foreign scientist may conduct a maritime
scientific research project in United States waters without prior
consent from the United States Government provided in accordance with
this section and with appropriate international customs as determined
by the Secretary of State.
(b) Requirements; Applications.--The Secretary of State, in
coordination with the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall--
(1) require foreign vessels to obtain prior consent to
conduct maritime scientific research in United States waters;
and
(2) implement a process for reviewing applications for such
consent.
(c) Information Sharing.--To facilitate the process for reviewing
applications to conduct maritime scientific research under this
section, the head of each agency shall share information related to
such maritime scientific research with the Department of State unless
otherwise prohibited by law.
(d) Prohibition on Covered Vessels.--Except as provided in
subsection (e), the Secretary of State shall not approve any
application submitted under this section for any covered vessel.
(e) National Interest Waiver.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State may waive the
prohibition in subsection (d) on an individual basis if the
Secretary determines that doing so is the national interest of
the United States.
(2) Notice required.--Not later than 5 days after any
issuance of a waiver under paragraph (1), the Secretary of
State shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress
written notice describing the waiver.
(f) Congressional Notification.--Not later than 15 days after the
date of any violation of subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall
notify the appropriate committees of Congress of such violation,
including--
(1) the country affiliation of the foreign scientist;
(2) the nature of the violation; and
(3) subsequent action by the Federal Government to address
the violation.
SEC. 7. REPORT.
(a) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
heads of the elements of the intelligence community and the Secretary
of Homeland Security, shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a report on espionage and influence operations by foreign
adversaries in the Arctic and in United States waters.
(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include
the following:
(1) An assessment of the extent to which covered activities
support espionage and influence operations by foreign
adversaries in the Arctic and in United States waters.
(2) A description of United States Government support for
covered activities in the Arctic that involve foreign
adversaries, including--
(A) funding;
(B) public-private partnerships;
(C) maritime security;
(D) technical assistance;
(E) information sharing; and
(F) any other form of material or technical
support.
(3) A description of efforts by the Secretary of State to
enlist allied countries with a presence in the Arctic to combat
espionage in the Arctic by foreign adversaries.
(4) Recommendations for combating such espionage.
(c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted
in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.
(d) Availability.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be
made available on request to any Member of Congress.
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