[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4682 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
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119th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 4682
To establish requirements for human judgment in the use of force by
autonomous weapon systems used by the Department of Defense, and for
other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
June 4, 2026
Mr. Kelly introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on Armed Services
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To establish requirements for human judgment in the use of force by
autonomous weapon systems used by the Department of Defense, and for
other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Ultimate Human Responsibility in
Defense Systems Act of 2026''.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Autonomous weapon system.--The term ``autonomous weapon
system'' means a weapon system that, once activated, can select
and engage targets without further intervention by a human
operator.
(2) Congressional defense committees.--The term
``congressional defense committees'' has the meaning given that
term in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code.
(3) Ultimate human responsibility.--The term ``ultimate
human responsibility'', with respect to a weapon system, means
the ability of a human commander or operator to exercise
informed human agency--
(A) to understand the operational context of the
weapon system through training, capacity building, and
integration of design and testing features that
strengthen human understanding and effective oversight;
(B) to supervise, intervene in, or terminate the
use of force by the system, thereby guaranteeing human
responsibility when appropriate given system design;
and
(C) to ensure compliance with all applicable United
States law and international law, including applicable
treaties, weapon system safety rules, the law of armed
conflict, and rules of engagement.
(4) Use of force.--The term ``use of force'' means the
application of kinetic lethal or non-lethal military force
against a target.
SEC. 3. REQUIREMENT FOR HUMAN JUDGMENT IN AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS.
(a) Policy Requirement.--The Secretary of Defense shall--
(1) ensure that any autonomous weapon system or artificial
intelligence capability developed, acquired, or operated by the
Department of Defense--
(A) is designed and employed in a manner that
enables commanders and operators to exercise ultimate
human responsibility over the use of force; and
(B) is developed, fielded and employed using
ethical and legal principles that would delineate
unlawful uses of artificial intelligence; and
(2) develop technical and operational and organizational
guidelines around the use of artificial intelligence.
(b) Design Requirements.--To meet the requirements under subsection
(a), the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that any autonomous weapon
system or artificial intelligence capability described in such
subsection, to the maximum extent practicable--
(1) allows human operators to supervise the operation of
the weapon system during mission execution when appropriate
given system design;
(2) includes mechanisms that allow commanders or operators
to intervene in or terminate the use of force by the weapon
system during mission execution when appropriate given system
design;
(3) includes fail-safe mechanisms to enable manual control
when autonomous systems are degraded, jammed, spoofed, or under
adversarial attack when appropriate given system design;
(4) provides sufficient information regarding weapon system
status and decision logic to enable operators to understand,
oversee, and exercise functional control over system behavior;
(5) maintains records of relevant target selection data,
decision logic, and human operator actions sufficient to enable
post-engagement review of compliance with the requirements
under subsection (a); and
(6) operates consistent with applicable United States law
and international law, rules of engagement, the law of armed
conflict, applicable treaties, and Department of Defense
policy.
(c) Operational Oversight.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall establish
procedures to ensure that commanders and operators are
rigorously trained to appropriately supervise autonomous weapon
systems or artificial intelligence capabilities in operational
environments, including regular proficiency assessments in
manual target identification, threat assessment, and engagement
procedures, to ensure operators can effectively execute
missions using other capabilities when autonomous systems are
unavailable or unreliable.
(2) Reporting mechanism.--The procedures established under
paragraph (1) shall include a mechanism for operators of
autonomous weapon systems or artificial intelligence capability
to report, without fear of reprisal, concerns regarding weapon
system reliability or the adequacy of human-machine interfaces.
SEC. 4. REVIEW AND CERTIFICATION.
(a) Senior-Level Review.--
(1) In general.--Before fielding an autonomous weapon
system capable of independently selecting and engaging targets
without human supervision, the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation shall conduct a review to certify that the weapon
system complies with the requirements of this Act.
(2) Independent assessment.--Each review required under
paragraph (1) with respect to an autonomous weapon system shall
include an independent adversarial testing (``red-team'')
assessment that evaluates the vulnerability of the system to
adversarial manipulation under operationally realistic
conditions, including degraded and electronic warfare contested
environments (such as jamming and spoofing), communication
disruption, and adversarial manipulation.
(b) Certification Requirement.--No autonomous weapon system
described in subsection (a) may be fielded by the Department of Defense
unless the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation certifies that
the weapon system--
(1) allows for ultimate human responsibility with respect
to the use of force; and
(2) has been tested to verify secure, safe, and reliable
operations that meet the reliability standards of the
Department for weapon systems, including retesting following
any significant software update or change in operational
environment.
(c) Testing Standards.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 18 months after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation shall publish on a publicly available website
standards for the testing and evaluation of artificial
intelligence components in autonomous weapon systems, including
benchmarks for reliability, robustness, security, and human-
machine team performance.
(2) Form.--The standards required to be published under
paragraph (1) shall be published in unclassified form to the
maximum extent practicable.
SEC. 5. ANNUAL REPORTING TO CONGRESS.
Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this
Act, and semiannually thereafter until the date that is six years after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall
submit to the congressional defense committees a report that includes--
(1) a summary of autonomous weapon systems in development
or fielded by the Department of Defense;
(2) steps taken by the Secretary to ensure compliance with
the requirements of this Act; and
(3) such recommendations as the Secretary may have for
legislative or administrative action relating to human judgment
in autonomous weapon systems.
SEC. 6. AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEM INCIDENT REPOSITORY.
(a) Establishment.--The Secretary of Defense shall establish and
maintain a centralized repository for reporting, collecting, and
analyzing incidents involving autonomous weapon systems and artificial
intelligence capabilities used by the Department of Defense.
(b) Purpose.--The repository established under subsection (a) shall
be used--
(1) to document operational incidents, weapon system
failures, unintended weapon system behaviors, or near-miss
events involving autonomous weapon systems and artificial
incident capabilities;
(2) to enable the Department to identify systemic risks,
software errors, or operational vulnerabilities associated with
such weapon systems and capabilities; and
(3) to promote institutional learning and improvement in
the design, testing, and operational employment of autonomous
weapon systems and artificial intelligence capabilities.
(c) Reporting Requirements.--The Secretary shall establish
procedures requiring the reporting of incidents described in subsection
(b)(1), including--
(1) operational malfunctions affecting the use of force;
(2) unintended or anomalous weapon system behavior;
(3) instances in which autonomous weapon systems or
artificial intelligence capabilities selected or engaged
targets inconsistent with commander intent or rules of
engagement, regardless of whether engagement was ultimately
executed;
(4) human-machine interaction failures affecting command or
operator control; and
(5) other safety-related events determined appropriate by
the Secretary.
(d) Safety Reporting Model.--In establishing the repository under
subsection (a), the Secretary shall, to the extent practicable, model
reporting practices on aviation safety reporting systems used to
identify and mitigate systemic risks in complex operational
environments.
(e) Analysis and Dissemination.--The Secretary shall ensure that
information collected through the repository established under
subsection (a) is analyzed to identify trends and lessons learned, and
that appropriate findings are disseminated across the Department of
Defense to improve system design, training, and operational procedures.
(f) Protection of Sensitive Information.--Information contained in
the repository established under subsection (a) shall be handled in
accordance with applicable classification, operational security, and
national security requirements.
(g) Congressional Briefing.--Not less frequently than semiannually,
the Secretary shall provide to the congressional defense committees a
classified briefing on trends, systemic risks, and corrective actions
identified through the repository established under subsection (a).
SEC. 7. TRAINING PIPELINES.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of Defense shall develop formal
training pipelines for autonomous systems of the Department of Defense.
(b) Elements.--The formal training pipelines developed under
subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) Specialized training tracks for operators, commanders,
and system supervisors.
(2) Certification in human-machine teaming, not just system
operation.
(3) Mandatory training in denied and contested
environments, such as loss of global positioning system,
electronic warfare, and degraded communications.
(4) Integration of autonomous systems into Combat Training
Center rotations.
(5) Continuous retraining tied to software updates and
system changes.
SEC. 8. CIVILIAN HARM MITIGATION AND RESPONSE OFFICE.
(a) Establishment.--The Secretary of Defense shall establish within
the Office of the Secretary of Defense an office to be known as the
``Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Office'' (in this section
referred to as the ``Office'').
(b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Office is to develop, oversee, and
coordinate Department-wide policies, practices, and capabilities to
prevent, mitigate, and respond to civilian harm resulting from military
operations.
(c) Responsibilities.--The Office shall--
(1) develop and implement policies and guidance relating to
civilian harm mitigation and response;
(2) oversee the integration of civilian harm mitigation
practices into planning, targeting, and operational processes;
(3) coordinate assessments, investigations, and responses
to incidents involving civilian harm;
(4) support training and doctrine development across the
Department; and
(5) provide regular reports to Congress on civilian harm
mitigation efforts and outcomes.
(d) Leadership.--The Office shall be headed by a senior official
designated by the Secretary of Defense.
SEC. 9. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit the development
or use of autonomous weapon systems designed to intercept incoming
threats where human supervision remains part of the operational design.
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