[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4656 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
119th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 4656
To provide for secure and accountable use of artificial intelligence by
the Department of Defense, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
June 2, 2026
Mrs. Gillibrand introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on Armed Services
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To provide for secure and accountable use of artificial intelligence by
the Department of Defense, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Secure and Accountable Military AI
Act of 2026''.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Artificial intelligence.--The term ``artificial
intelligence'' has the meaning given that term in section 5002
of the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act of 2020
(15 U.S.C. 9401).
(2) Autonomous weapon system.--The term ``autonomous weapon
system'' means a weapon system that, once activated, can select
and engage targets without further intervention by an operator,
including operator-supervised autonomous weapon systems that,
after activation, can select and engage targets without further
operator input.
(3) Covered contract.--The term ``covered contract'' means
a contract, task order, delivery order, or other agreement for
the development, training, fine-tuning, evaluation, hosting,
integration, or provision of an artificial intelligence model
or artificial intelligence system for use by the Department.
(4) Covered contractor.--The term ``covered contractor''
means an entity that develops or provides a frontier artificial
intelligence model to the Department under a covered contract.
(5) Covered incident.--The term ``covered incident'' means
any of the following:
(A) Theft, unauthorized access, unauthorized
acquisition, or exfiltration of model weights for an
artificial intelligence model, including--
(i) instances in which a model autonomously
attempts to exfiltrate such model weights or
acquire unauthorized access to systems
containing such model weights; and
(ii) credible evidence indicating attempts
or material vulnerabilities, relating to any
such theft, access, acquisition, or
exfiltration.
(B) Attempts by a foreign adversary or individual
acting on behalf of a foreign adversary to obtain
unauthorized access to, acquire, influence, or
exfiltrate sensitive information, systems, or
intellectual property related to an artificial
intelligence model or artificial intelligence system,
including through insider threats, compromised
personnel, covert affiliations, or other deceptive
means.
(C) A compromise of the software, hardware, cloud,
data, or other supply chain used to develop, train,
fine-tune, evaluate, secure, or deploy an artificial
intelligence model or artificial intelligence system,
where such compromise could reasonably affect the
confidentiality, integrity, availability, reliability,
or security of the model or system provided to the
Department.
(D) Poisoning, corruption, manipulation, or
unauthorized alteration of training data, fine-tuning
data, retrieval corpora, model checkpoints, system
prompts, safety filters, monitoring systems, evaluation
pipelines, or model-update mechanisms.
(E) The discovery of a material vulnerability,
exploit, backdoor, or failure of access controls that
could permit unauthorized modification, extraction,
degradation, or misuse of an artificial intelligence
model or artificial intelligence system.
(F) Any materially concerning model behavior,
including materially increased capability for cyber
offense, exploitation, exploitation or evasion of
safeguards, deceptive behavior, capabilities related to
chemical or biological weapons, automated research and
development in national security domains, automated
research and development toward increasingly powerful
artificial systems, unauthorized autonomous action, or
other behavior that poses a significant risk to
national security or the operations, personnel, or
systems of the Department, when such behavior was not
previously disclosed to the Department.
(G) Any incident for which the Secretary determines
that timely notice is necessary to protect national
security or operations of the Department.
(6) Department.--The term ``Department'' means the
Department of Defense.
(7) Frontier artificial intelligence model.--The term
``frontier artificial intelligence model'' means a general-
purpose model, foundation model, or other large-scale model
designated by the Secretary, in consultation with the Chief
Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer and the Secretary
of Commerce, as appropriate, as presenting significant national
security relevance due to scale, capability, operational use,
or potential for misuse.
(8) High-consequence artificial intelligence application.--
The term ``high-consequence artificial intelligence
application'' means any use by the Department of artificial
intelligence that the Secretary designates under section 3 as
presenting heightened national security, operational, safety,
legal, or civil liberties risk, including any use relating to
nuclear command, control, and communications, intelligence
support to lethal targeting, cyber operations, autonomous
weapon systems, military decision support in time-sensitive
operations, homeland-facing surveillance or monitoring, or
mission-critical logistics and sustainment.
(9) Individual.--The term ``individual'' means a natural
person.
(10) Local defense.--The term ``local defense'' means
defense within a specifically defined geographic defensive area
(commonly referred to as ``point defense'') or of a high-value
physical asset (commonly referred to as ``platform defense'')
and for a specifically defined period of operation approved for
the system concerned.
(11) Materiel target.--The term ``materiel target'' --
(A) means a weapon, munition, military vehicle,
military vessel, military aircraft, unmanned system, or
other military object; and
(B) does not include an individual.
(12) Pattern-of-life analysis.--The term ``pattern-of-life
analysis'' means the use of data over time to infer or map the
habits, movements, associations, or routines of an individual
or a group of individuals.
(13) Persistent person-centric analytic product.--The term
``persistent person-centric analytic product'' means a dossier,
watchlist, score, profile, targeting package, or other record
organized primarily around an identified or identifiable
individual.
(14) Operational deployment.--The term ``operational
deployment'' means use of an artificial intelligence system in
support of, or as part of, an operational military mission,
contingency, or real-world military activity other than
testing, training, evaluation, or experimentation conducted in
a controlled environment.
(15) Operator-supervised autonomous weapon system.--The
term ``operator-supervised autonomous weapon system'' means an
autonomous weapon system that is designed to provide operators
with the ability to intervene and terminate engagements,
including in the event of a weapon system failure, before
unacceptable levels of damage occur.
(16) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of Defense.
(17) Semi-autonomous weapon system.--
(A) In general.--The term ``semi-autonomous weapon
system'' means a weapon system that, once activated, is
intended to only engage single targets or specific
target groups that have been selected by an operator.
(B) Inclusions.--The term ``semi-autonomous weapon
system'' includes weapon systems that employ autonomy
for engagement-related functions, including--
(i) acquiring, tracking, and identifying
potential targets;
(ii) cuing potential targets to operators;
(iii) prioritizing selected targets;
(iv) timing of when to fire;
(v) providing terminal guidance to home in
on selected targets, provided that operator
control is retained over the decision to select
single targets and specific target groups for
engagement; and
(vi) ``fire and forget'' or lock-on-after-
launch homing munitions that rely on tactics
techniques and procedures to maximize the
probability that the only targets within the
seeker's acquisition basket when the seeker
activates are those individual targets or
specific target groups that have been selected
by an operator.
(18) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' has the meaning given that term in section 101 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801).
SEC. 3. HIGH-CONSEQUENCE MILITARY ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT.
(a) Designation of High-Consequence Applications.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall establish and
maintain a process to designate categories of artificial
intelligence applications of the Department as high-
consequence.
(2) Designations.--The following categories shall be
designated as high-consequence artificial intelligence
applications pursuant to paragraph (1):
(A) Artificial intelligence used for the selection
of targets for, or execution of the launch or
detonation of, a nuclear weapon.
(B) Artificial intelligence used in support of
lethal targeting decisions, including intelligence
fusion or target recommendation for lethal operations.
(C) Artificial intelligence used in support of
cyber operations that are intended or reasonably likely
to create effects outside Department-owned or
Department-controlled information systems.
(D) Autonomous weapon systems and operator-
supervised autonomous weapon systems.
(E) Artificial intelligence used for domestic
person-based analysis described in section 6(a)(2).
(F) Any other category designated by the Secretary
as presenting a material risk of death, serious bodily
harm, unlawful use of force, strategic surprise, major
mission failure, or substantial violation of law or
policy if the system malfunctions, is misused, or is
employed outside approved constraints.
(b) Approval Required Before Operational Deployment.--The Secretary
shall require that a high-consequence artificial intelligence
application may not be approved for operational deployment unless a
senior Department official designated by the Secretary, who may not be
below the level of the Under Secretary of Defense or the Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, determines in writing that the
application satisfies the requirements of subsection (c).
(c) Minimum Requirements.--Before approving a high-consequence
artificial intelligence application for operational deployment, the
approving official shall ensure that the Department has completed, as
appropriate to the application, the following:
(1) Realistic developmental and operational testing and
evaluation sufficient to assess performance, capability,
reliability, effectiveness, suitability, and resilience under
expected operational conditions, including adversarial
conditions where feasible.
(2) Legal and policy review.
(3) Documentation of intended missions, intended
operational environments, intended target or decision sets,
known limitations, failure modes, and assumptions.
(4) Clear procedures for trained operators to activate,
deactivate, override, or terminate system functions, and the
circumstances requiring such actions.
(5) Fallback procedures and mission-continuity measures in
the event of degradation, anomalous behavior, compromise, or
system failure.
(6) Logging, auditability, and record-retention mechanisms
sufficient to support oversight, investigation, and after-
action review.
(7) Post-deployment continuous monitoring mechanisms.
(8) Training, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and
procedures appropriate to the use of the application.
(d) Congressional Notification.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (3), not
later than 15 days before the initial operational deployment of
a category of high-consequence artificial intelligence
application, the Secretary shall notify the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and House of Representatives of such
deployment.
(2) Contents.--A notification required by paragraph (1)
shall include--
(A) a description of the application;
(B) the mission set, operational environment, and,
as appropriate, target or decision set for which the
application is intended;
(C) a summary of the testing and evaluation
conducted;
(D) a description of key safeguards, limitations,
and fallback procedures;
(E) an identification of the accountable human
decision-makers and operators; and
(F) any other matters the Secretary determines
appropriate.
(3) Exception.--The Secretary may provide a notification
required by paragraph (1) not later than 48 hours after the
initial operational deployment if the Secretary--
(A) determines that there are extraordinary
circumstances affecting the national security of the
United States; and
(B) provides, with the notification, a statement of
such circumstances necessitating delayed notice.
(e) Annual Briefing.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall
brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of
Representatives on the implementation of this section.
SEC. 4. HUMAN ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HIGH-CONSEQUENCE MILITARY ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Policy.--It shall be the policy of the Department that
artificial intelligence may support analysis, prioritization,
recommendations, automation, and other decision-support functions, but
may not substitute for accountable human judgment in decisions
involving the use of force, detention, domestic person-based analysis,
or other high-consequence artificial intelligence applications
designated pursuant to section 3.
(b) Accountable Human Decision-Maker.--For each high-consequence
artificial intelligence application approved for operational
deployment, the Secretary shall ensure that there is a clearly
identified accountable human decision-maker or accountable chain of
decision-makers with authority commensurate to the operational risk
presented by the application.
(c) Required Elements.--The accountable human decision-maker or
chain of decision-makers under subsection (b) shall have, as
appropriate to the application--
(1) documented commander intent and mission parameters;
(2) sufficient training on the capabilities, limitations,
and failure modes of the application;
(3) access to relevant information necessary to understand
the basis for significant system outputs or recommendations, to
the extent technically feasible;
(4) authority and practical ability to pause, override,
deactivate, or terminate use of the application when required
by law, policy, or operational circumstances; and
(5) procedures for elevating uncertainty, anomalous
outputs, or significant incidents for further human review.
SEC. 5. REPORTING OF SECURITY INCIDENTS AND CONCERNING MODEL BEHAVIORS
BY CERTAIN FRONTIER ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONTRACTORS.
(a) Requirement for Contract Clause.--The Secretary shall require--
(1) in any covered contract entered into on or after the
date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, a clause requiring a covered contractor to report to the
Secretary any covered incident relating to an artificial
intelligence model or artificial intelligence system developed,
trained, fine-tuned, hosted, or provided by the contractor; and
(2) in any covered contract entered into prior to the date
that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
such a clause to be added not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act.
(b) Implementation Guidance and Clarity.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall issue guidance
to covered contractors regarding the implementation of this
section in order to promote clear, predictable, and consistent
reporting expectations and support good-faith compliance.
(2) Elements.--The guidance required by paragraph (1) shall
include--
(A) illustrative examples of covered incidents,
factors relevant to determining whether an incident is
material or reportable;
(B) reporting procedures and timelines; and
(C) other information the Secretary determines
appropriate to promote consistent implementation and
reduce uncertainty for covered contractors.
(3) Updates to guidance.--The Secretary shall update such
guidance as appropriate to reflect changes in artificial
intelligence capabilities, deployment practices, threat
environments, and reporting needs of the Department.
(4) Consultation.--In issuing and updating such guidance,
the Secretary shall consult with the Chief Digital and
Artificial Intelligence Officer, the Director of the Artificial
Intelligence Security Center of the National Security Agency,
and the heads of any other Federal agencies or Departments the
Secretary deems appropriate.
(c) Reporting Timeline for Covered Contractors.--
(1) In general.--A covered contractor shall submit to the
Under Secretary for Research and Engineering--
(A) an initial report regarding a covered incident
described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) of
section 2(5) not later than 72 hours after the
discovery of such covered incident; and
(B) an initial report regarding a covered incident
described in subparagraph (E) or (F) of section 2(5)
not later than 7 days after the contractor discovers a
behavior specified by the implementation guidance
issued pursuant to subsection (b) or that a reasonable
person would deem likely to be material.
(2) Supplemental updates.--A covered contractor shall
submit to the Secretary supplemental updates with respect to
any covered incident as material new information becomes
available.
(d) Contents of Contractor Report.--Each report submitted by a
covered contractor in accordance with this section shall include, to
the extent known at the time of submission--
(1) a description of the covered incident;
(2) the date or approximate period of occurrence and
discovery;
(3) the artificial intelligence model, artificial
intelligence system, or relevant training, fine-tuning,
evaluation, or deployment environment affected;
(4) the actual or suspected means of compromise,
exfiltration, manipulation, degradation, or misuse;
(5) whether model weights, training data, system prompts,
source code, evaluation data, safety systems, or software
dependencies were accessed, altered, degraded, poisoned,
exfiltrated, or otherwise compromised;
(6) an assessment of actual or potential impact on
missions, users, systems, operations, or decision-making of the
Department;
(7) any actions taken to contain, mitigate, remediate, or
investigate the covered incident;
(8) whether the covered incident has been reported to any
other Federal department or agency; and
(9) such other information as the Secretary determines
appropriate.
(e) Recipients Within the Department.--A report submitted to the
Secretary under this section shall be transmitted by the Secretary to--
(1) the contracting officer for the covered contract;
(2) the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office;
(3) the Chief Information Officer of the Department of
Defense;
(4) the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment;
(5) the Artificial Intelligence Security Center of the
National Security Agency;
(6) the Commander of the United States Cyber Command; and
(7) the heads of such other components of the Department
and other Federal departments or agencies as the Secretary
determines appropriate.
(f) Congressional Notification by Department.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 7 days after receipt of an
initial report under subsection (b) regarding a covered
incident, or the discovery of a covered incident by the
Department, the Secretary shall submit to the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives
notice of such covered incident.
(2) Contents.--A notice required by paragraph (1) shall
include, to the extent known at the time of submission--
(A) a summary description of the covered incident;
(B) the date or approximate period of occurrence
and discovery;
(C) the artificial intelligence model, artificial
intelligence system, or relevant training, fine-tuning,
evaluation, or deployment environment affected;
(D) the actual or suspected means of compromise,
exfiltration, manipulation, degradation, or misuse;
(E) an initial assessment of actual or potential
impact on missions, users, systems, or operations of
the Department; and
(F) any actions taken or planned to contain,
mitigate, remediate, or investigate the covered
incident.
(3) Additional updates.--The Secretary shall provide to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of
Representatives additional briefings or updates on a covered
incident as material information becomes available.
(g) Protection of Reported Information.--The Secretary shall
establish procedures for the handling of reports under this section,
including procedures to protect classified information, proprietary
information, trade secrets, security-sensitive information, and
information regarding vulnerabilities that, if disclosed publicly,
could reasonably be expected to harm national security.
(h) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed--
(1) to require the disclosure of information in a manner
inconsistent with the protection of classified information,
sensitive compartmented information, or other information
protected by law;
(2) to waive any applicable privilege or legal protection;
or
(3) to limit any other reporting obligation imposed by law,
regulation, or contract.
SEC. 6. LIMITATIONS ON CERTAIN USES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE BY THE
DEPARTMENT.
(a) In General.--The Department may not--
(1) use artificial intelligence for the selection of
targets for the use of a nuclear weapon or for the execution of
launching or detonating a nuclear weapon;
(2) except as provided in subparagraph (b), use artificial
intelligence to acquire, collect, ingest, retain, query,
correlate, analyze, or disseminate information concerning a
United States person located in the United States for the
purpose of--
(A) identifying or resolving the identity of such
person across datasets;
(B) tracking or conducting pattern-of-life analysis
of such person;
(C) conducting link analysis regarding the
associations, contacts, activities, or movements of
such person;
(D) assigning a risk score, threat score, or other
predictive assessment to such person;
(E) creating or maintaining a watchlist, dossier,
targeting package, or other persistent person-centric
analytic product regarding such person; or
(F) selecting such person for investigative,
operational, or law enforcement attention, unless such
activity is expressly authorized by Federal law and
supported by a lawful and documented predicate; or
(3) develop, procure, field, or employ an autonomous weapon
system, except as provided in subsection (d).
(b) Rule of Construction.--Subsection (a) shall not be construed to
prohibit the use of artificial intelligence--
(1) for cybersecurity, information assurance, threat
detection, vulnerability management, malware analysis, incident
response, or defensive cyberspace operations undertaken to
protect the Department of Defense Information Network,
information systems, weapons systems, military networks, or
defense critical infrastructure of the Department from
malicious cyber activity;
(2) for force protection or counterintelligence purposes to
identify, assess, or warn of a specific, credible, and
articulable threat to personnel, installations, facilities,
operations, activities, or covered assets of the Department; or
(3) with the informed consent of the person concerned.
(c) Additional Limitations on Domestic Uses.--The Department may
not use artificial intelligence--
(1) solely on the basis of activity protected by the First
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States or the
lawful exercise of any other right secured by the Constitution
of the United States or the laws of the United States; or
(2) to acquire, correlate, or analyze publicly available
information, commercially available information, or hacked,
leaked, or breached data that is posted online or made
available for sale for the primary purpose of circumventing
otherwise applicable constitutional, statutory, or regulatory
protections governing collection, retention, querying, or
dissemination of information by the Federal Government
concerning United States persons.
(d) Exceptions for Autonomous Weapon Systems.--Subsection (a)(3)
shall not apply to the following, provided that any such system
satisfies the conditions of subsection (e):
(1) Semi-autonomous weapon systems used to apply lethal or
non-lethal, kinetic or non-kinetic force, so long as such semi-
autonomous weapon systems do not include any mode of operation
in which the semi-autonomous weapon system is intended to
function as an autonomous weapon system.
(2) Operator-supervised autonomous weapon systems used to
select and engage materiel targets for local defense to
intercept attempted time-critical or saturation attacks for--
(A) static defense of installations with personnel,
including networked defense in which the autonomous
weapon system is not co-located with the installation;
or
(B) onboard or networked defense of platforms with
onboard personnel.
(3) Interception of surface-to-air missiles.
(4) Autonomous weapon systems used to apply non-lethal,
non-kinetic force against materiel targets in accordance with
Department of Defense Directive 3000.03E.
(e) Conditions on Excepted Systems.--A system described in
subsection (d) may be developed, procured, fielded, or employed only if
the Secretary certifies that such system--
(1) has undergone legal review for consistency with the law
of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and
applicable rules of engagement;
(2) has completed rigorous verification and validation and
realistic developmental and operational testing and evaluation
under conditions that reflect the intended operational
environment and reasonably anticipated adversary
countermeasures;
(3) is designed and fielded to permit commanders and
operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over
the use of force;
(4) includes human-machine interfaces and controls that--
(A) are readily understandable to trained
operators;
(B) provide transparent feedback on system status;
(C) provide clear procedures for activation and
deactivation of system functions; and
(D) for operator-supervised autonomous weapon
systems, permit operators to intervene and terminate
engagements before unacceptable levels of damage occur,
including in the event of weapon system failure;
(5) is approved for use only within defined temporal,
geographic, environmental, and operational constraints, and, if
unable to complete an engagement consistent with such
constraints, is designed to terminate the engagement or obtain
additional operator input before continuing; and
(6) uses technologies and data sources that are, to the
maximum extent practicable consistent with military necessity,
transparent to, auditable by, and explainable to relevant
personnel.
(f) Certification and Notification.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 30 days before fielding a
system pursuant to subsection (d), the Secretary shall submit
to the congressional defense committees a written certification
that the system falls within one of the exceptions under
subsection (d) and satisfies the conditions of subsection (e).
(2) Contents.--A certification under paragraph (1) shall
include--
(A) the exception under subsection (d) on which the
Department relies;
(B) a summary of the legal review conducted under
subsection (e)(1);
(C) the intended mission set, target class, and
operational concept for the system;
(D) the temporal, geographic, environmental, and
operational constraints approved for the system;
(E) a description of the operator supervision
concept, including procedures for intervention,
termination, activation, and deactivation;
(F) a summary of testing, verification, and
validation conducted for the system; and
(G) any substantial modification to the system's
algorithms, intended mission set, intended operational
environment, intended target set, or expected
adversarial countermeasures since any prior
certification submitted under this subsection.
SEC. 7. IMPLEMENTATION.
(a) Regulations.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall revise the Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement and issue such regulations, guidance,
and instructions as are necessary to implement this Act.
(b) Initial Implementation Briefing.--Not later than 240 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall brief the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives
on the implementation plan for this Act, including--
(1) planned regulatory changes;
(2) directive and instruction updates; and
(3) any resource or organizational issues likely to affect
implementation.
SEC. 8. AUTHORIZATION FOR SPECIALIZED AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS.
(a) Petition for Authorization.--The Secretary may submit to the
House and Senate Armed Services Committees a formal request for
authorization to develop, procure, or field a specific autonomous
weapon system or category of systems that does not meet the exceptions
under section 6(d).
(b) Required Elements of Request.--Any request submitted under
subsection (a) shall include a classified annex containing the
following:
(1) Military necessity statement.--A detailed justification
of why the mission cannot be accomplished through semi-
autonomous weapon systems or existing human-in-the-loop
capabilities.
(2) Operational constraints.--The specific operational,
geographic, temporal, and target-class constraints under which
the system will operate.
(3) Law of armed conflict compliance certification.--A
written legal opinion from the General Counsel of the
Department certifying that the system's intended use complies
with the Law of Armed Conflict, specifically addressing how the
system will satisfy the principles of distinction and
proportionality.
(4) Risk mitigation plan.--A description of the technical
safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized autonomous action,
flash wars, or unintended escalation.
(5) Human judgment framework.--A description of the
appropriate levels of human judgment that will be exercised,
even if the system operates autonomously during the engagement
phase.
(c) Congressional Action.--
(1) Joint resolution of approval.--A system requested under
subsection (a) may only be fielded if Congress enacts a joint
resolution of approval specifically naming the system and the
authorized mission set.
(2) Expedited procedures.--For the purposes of this
section, the term ``joint resolution'' means only a joint
resolution that is introduced within the 30-day period
beginning on the date in which the Secretary submits a request
under subsection (a), and the matter after the resolving clause
is as follows: ``That Congress approves the operational
deployment of the autonomous weapon system described in the
request submitted by the Secretary of Defense on ____.'', with
the blank space being filled with the date the request was
submitted to Congress under subsection (a).
(3) Referral.--A joint resolution introduced in the Senate
shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services. A joint
resolution in the House of Representatives shall be referred to
the Committee on Armed Services.
(4) Discharge of committee.--If the committee to which is
referred a joint resolution has not reported such joint
resolution (or an identical resolution) at the end of the 20
calendar days after the introduction of such joint resolution,
such committee shall be deemed to be discharged from further
consideration of such resolution, and such joint resolution
shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the chamber
involved.
(5) Privileged motion in the senate.--
(A) Motion to proceed.--Notwithstanding Rule XXII
of the Standing Rules of the Senate, it is in order at
any time after the Committee on Armed Services has
reported or has been discharged from consideration of a
joint resolution to move to proceed on the
consideration of the joint resolution. The motion is
privileged and is not debatable. The motion to proceed
is not subject to a motion to postpone. A motion to
reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or
disagreed to shall not be in order.
(B) Limits on debate.--Debate on the joint
resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in
connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than
10 hours, which shall be divided equally between those
favoring and those opposing the join resolution. A
motion further to limit debate is in order and not
debatable.
(C) No amendments.--An amendment to the joint
resolution, or a motion to postpone, or a motion to
proceed to the consideration of other business, or a
motion to recommit the joint resolution is not in
order.
(6) Vote on final passage.--Immediately following the
conclusion of the debate on a joint resolution, and a single
quorum call at the conclusion of the debate if requested in
accordance with the rules of the appropriate chamber, the vote
on final passage of the joint resolution shall occur.
(d) Duration and Renewal.--Any authorization granted under this
section shall expire 3 years after the date of enactment of the joint
resolution of approval, but the Secretary may submit a renewed request
under subsection (a) for expedited consideration under subsection (c).
The Secretary must certify in such request that system has operated
within the approved parameters.
<all>