[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4615 Placed on Calendar Senate (PCS)]
<DOC>
Calendar No. 420
119th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 4615
To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the
Intelligence Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
May 20, 2026
Mr. Cotton, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, reported the
following original bill; which was read twice and placed on the
calendar
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the
Intelligence Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 104. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--MATTERS RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
Sec. 301. Appointment of Deputy Director of National Intelligence and
Assistant Directors of National
Intelligence.
Sec. 302. Repeal of National Intelligence Management Council.
Sec. 303. Repeal of various positions, units, centers, councils, and
offices.
Sec. 304. Transfer of National Intelligence University.
Sec. 305. Limitation on domestic activities at the National
Counterterrorism Center.
Sec. 306. Timely provision of security direction to intelligence
community whistleblowers.
Sec. 307. Notification of certain declassifications.
Sec. 308. No police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal
security functions for Director of National
Intelligence.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 401. Extension of Central Intelligence Agency authority regarding
unmanned aircraft systems.
Sec. 402. Higher Education Act of 1965 special rule.
Sec. 403. Modification relating to security personnel at certain
installations.
TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY
Sec. 501. Authority of National Security Agency to correlate, evaluate,
and disseminate certain intelligence.
Sec. 502. Prohibition on availability of funds for relocation of Office
of Intelligence and Analysis to certain
facilities.
Sec. 503. Funds for foreign intelligence activities conducted with and
by the National Reconnaissance Office.
Sec. 504. Modification of annual report on Federal Bureau of
Investigation case data.
Sec. 505. Establishment of Office of Counterintelligence.
Sec. 506. Modification of responsibilities of Office of Intelligence
and Analysis.
Sec. 507. Role of National Security Agency in collection and analysis
of signals intelligence.
TITLE VI--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Sec. 601. Amendments to presidential appointments for intelligence
community positions.
Sec. 602. Procedures regarding dissemination of nonpublicly available
information concerning United States
persons.
Sec. 603. Analytic standards for all-source intelligence products.
Sec. 604. Limitation on use of Intelligence Community Management
Account funds for certain entities.
Sec. 605. Ben Sasse Intelligence Community Technology Fellowship
Program.
Sec. 606. Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office at the
Department of Commerce.
Sec. 607. Countering hostile foreign cyber actors as a national
intelligence priority.
Sec. 608. Notification of criminal referrals regarding current or
former intelligence community employees.
Sec. 609. Modification of definitions in National Security Act of 1947
and scope of intelligence sharing
responsibilities of Director of National
Intelligence.
Sec. 610. Prohibition on intelligence community use of adversary
unmanned ground vehicles.
Sec. 611. China-Taiwan Strategic Warning Task Force.
Sec. 612. Limitations relating to Chinese products and services.
Sec. 613. Limitation on intelligence community support for offensive
cyber operations conducted by
nongovernmental entities.
Sec. 614. Biological intelligence activities of the intelligence
community.
Sec. 615. Prohibition on participation in prediction markets.
Sec. 616. Repeal of certain report and briefing requirements.
Sec. 617. Intelligence community personnel travel, allowances, and
related expenses regulations.
Sec. 618. Prohibition on sending and receiving objects using entities
owned or controlled by persons or
governments of certain countries.
Sec. 619. Enhancing intelligence cooperation in the Indo-Pacific
region.
Sec. 620. Intelligence activities related to Ukraine.
Sec. 621. Requirements relating to intelligence sharing with countries
of significant concern to the United
States.
Sec. 622. United States-Israel intelligence sharing enhancement.
TITLE VII--ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS RELATING TO THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY
Sec. 701. Artificial intelligence exploitation guard and intelligence
sharing.
Sec. 702. Director of National Intelligence review of intelligence
community use of artificial intelligence to
support targeting.
Sec. 703. Improvements for artificial intelligence policies, standards,
and guidance for intelligence community.
Sec. 704. Additional functions and requirements of Artificial
Intelligence Security Center.
Sec. 705. Reports on novel uses of artificial intelligence technology.
Sec. 706. Clear labeling of artificial intelligence outputs for
targeting workflows.
Sec. 707. Research on use of artificial intelligence relating to
inadvertent escalation.
Sec. 708. Research on interaction of adversarial artificial
intelligence systems with intelligence
community systems.
Sec. 709. Proliferation assessments regarding the export of artificial
intelligence-related technologies.
Sec. 710. Review of artificial intelligence security vulnerabilities
under Vulnerabilities Equities Process.
Sec. 711. Prohibition on certain artificial intelligence models on
intelligence community systems.
TITLE VIII--OTHER MATTERS
Sec. 801. Modification to notification requirements for authorized and
ordered departures.
Sec. 802. Identification of reallocable frequencies.
Sec. 803. Protection of classified information relating to budget
functions.
Sec. 804. Review by Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States of transactions in real estate near
intelligence community facilities.
Sec. 805. Intelligence support to the U.S. International Development
Finance Corporation.
Sec. 806. Establishing processes and procedures for protecting Federal
Reserve information.
Sec. 807. Amendments to prohibit payments to obtain national security
information or approvals.
Sec. 808. Offenses involving espionage.
Sec. 809. Parental bereavement leave.
Sec. 810. Definition of foreign instrumentality for purposes of
economic espionage prohibition.
Sec. 811. Protection of trade secrets.
Sec. 812. Technical amendments.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' has the meaning given
such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3003).
(2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given such term in such section.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2027
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the Federal Government.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts.--The amounts authorized to be
appropriated under section 101 for the conduct of the intelligence
activities of the Federal Government are those specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this Act.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--
(1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made
available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives,
and to the President.
(2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph
(3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of
the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule,
within the executive branch of the Federal Government.
(3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly
disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any
portion of such Schedule except--
(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act
of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3306(a));
(B) to the extent necessary to implement the
budget; or
(C) as otherwise required by law.
SEC. 103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the
Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2027 the sum of
$568,000,000.
(b) Classified Authorization of Appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community
Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for
fiscal year 2027 such additional amounts as are specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).
SEC. 104. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY
LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement,
and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in
such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund $514,000,000 for fiscal year
2027.
TITLE III--MATTERS RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
SEC. 301. APPOINTMENT OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND
ASSISTANT DIRECTORS OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Redesignation of Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence as Deputy Director of National Intelligence.--
(1) In general.--Subsection (a) of section 103A of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3026) is amended--
(A) in the subsection heading, by striking
``Principal''; and
(B) by striking ``Principal'' each place it
appears.
(2) Conforming amendments.--Subsection (c) of such section
is amended--
(A) in the subsection heading, by striking
``Principal''; and
(B) in paragraph (2)(B), by striking ``Principal''.
(3) Additional conforming amendment.--
(A) National security act of 1947.--Such Act is
further amended--
(i) in section 103(c)(2) (50 U.S.C.
3025(c)(2)), by striking ``Principal'';
(ii) in section 103I(b)(1) (50 U.S.C.
3034(b)(1)), by striking ``Principal'';
(iii) in section 106(a)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C.
3041(a)(2)(A)), by striking ``Principal''; and
(iv) in section 116(b) (50 U.S.C. 3053(b)),
by striking ``Principal''.
(B) Damon paul nelson and matthew young pollard
intelligence authorization act for fiscal years 2018,
2019, and 2020.--Section 6310 of the Damon Paul Nelson
and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C.
3351b) is amended by striking ``Principal'' each place
it appears.
(C) National defense authorization act for fiscal
year 2022.--Section 1683(b)(3) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C.
3373(b)(3)) is amended by striking ``Principal'' both
places it appears.
(b) Elimination of Deputy Directors of National Intelligence and
Establishment of Assistant Directors of National Intelligence.--
(1) In general.--Section 103A(b) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3026(b)) is amended--
(A) in the subsection heading, by striking
``Deputy'' and inserting ``Assistant'';
(B) in paragraph (1), by striking ``may'' and all
that follows through the period at the end and
inserting the following: ``is an Assistant Director of
National Intelligence for Mission Integration and an
Assistant Director of National Intelligence for Policy
and Capabilities, who shall be appointed by the
Director of National Intelligence.''; and
(C) in paragraph (2), by striking ``Deputy'' and
inserting ``Assistant''.
(2) Conforming amendments.--The National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended--
(A) in section 102A(l)(4)(F) (50 U.S.C.
3024(l)(4)(F)), as redesignated by section
402(g)(1)(B), by striking ``a Deputy'' and inserting
``an Assistant''; and
(B) in section 103(c) (50 U.S.C. 3025(c)), by
striking paragraph (3).
(c) References to Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence in Law.--Any reference in law to the Principal Deputy
Director of National Intelligence shall be treated as a reference to
the Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
(d) Clerical Amendments.--
(1) Section heading.--Section 103A of such Act (50 U.S.C.
3026) is further amended, in the section heading, by striking
``deputy directors of national intelligence'' and inserting
``deputy director of national intelligence and assistant
directors of national intelligence''.
(2) Table of contents.--The table of contents for such Act,
in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is amended by
striking the item relating to section 103A and inserting the
following:
``Sec. 103A. Deputy Director of National Intelligence and Assistant
Directors of National Intelligence.''.
SEC. 302. REPEAL OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT COUNCIL.
(a) In General.--Section 103M of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3034d) is repealed.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act is
amended by striking the item relating to section 103M.
SEC. 303. REPEAL OF VARIOUS POSITIONS, UNITS, CENTERS, COUNCILS, AND
OFFICES.
(a) Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer.--
(1) Repeal.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by striking section 103K
(50 U.S.C. 3034b).
(2) Conforming amendment.--Section 103G of such Act (50
U.S.C. 3032) is amended by striking subsection (d).
(3) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents for such Act
in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act is amended by
striking the item relating to section 103K.
(b) Intelligence Community Innovation Unit.--
(1) Termination.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall take such actions as may be necessary to terminate and
wind down the operations of the Intelligence Community
Innovation Unit before the date specified in paragraph (3).
(2) Repeal.--
(A) In general.--Title I of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is further amended
by striking section 103L (50 U.S.C. 3034c).
(B) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents for
such Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such
Act, is further amended by striking the item relating
to section 103L.
(3) Effective date.--The amendments made by this subsection
shall take effect on the date that is 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act.
(c) Technical Amendment Regarding Expired Climate Security Advisory
Council.--
(1) Repeal.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is further amended by striking section
120 (50 U.S.C. 3060).
(2) Conforming amendment.--Section 331 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117-
81; 10 U.S.C. 113 note) is amended by striking paragraph (2)
and inserting the following:
``(2) The term `climate security' means the effects of
climate change on the following:
``(A) The national security of the United States,
including national security infrastructure.
``(B) Subnational, national, and regional political
stability.
``(C) The security of allies and partners of the
United States.
``(D) Ongoing or potential political violence,
including unrest, rioting, guerrilla warfare,
insurgency, terrorism, rebellion, revolution, civil
war, and interstate war.''.
(3) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents for such
Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is further
amended by striking the item relating to section 120.
(d) Framework for Cross-Disciplinary Education and Training.--
(1) Repeal.--Subtitle A of title X of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) is amended by striking
section 1002 (50 U.S.C. 3192).
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents for such
Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is further
amended by striking the item relating to section 1002.
(e) Foreign Languages Program.--
(1) Termination.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall take such actions as may be necessary to terminate and
wind down the operations of the Foreign Languages Program
before the date specified in paragraph (5).
(2) Repeals.--Subtitle B of such title (50 U.S.C. 3201 et
seq.) is amended by striking sections 1011 (50 U.S.C. 3201,
relating to program on advancement of foreign languages
critical to the intelligence community), 1012 (50 U.S.C. 3202,
relating to education partnerships), and 1013 (50 U.S.C. 3203,
relating to voluntary services).
(3) Conforming amendments.--Such subtitle is further
amended by striking sections 1014 (50 U.S.C. 3204, relating to
regulations) and 1015 (50 U.S.C. 3205, relating to
definitions).
(4) Clerical amendments.--The table of contents for such
Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is further
amended by striking the items relating to subtitle B of title
X.
(5) Effective date.--The amendments made by this subsection
shall take effect on the date that is 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act.
(f) Joint Intelligence Community Council.--
(1) Termination.--The Joint Intelligence Community Council
is terminated.
(2) Conforming amendment.--Title I of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by striking
section 101A (50 U.S.C. 3022).
(3) Repeal of requirement to consult with joint
intelligence community council for national intelligence
program budget.--Section 102A(c)(1)(B) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(c)(1)(B)) is amended by striking
``, as appropriate, after obtaining the advice of the Joint
Intelligence Community Council,''.
(4) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents for such Act
in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act is amended by
striking the item relating to section 101A.
SEC. 304. TRANSFER OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE UNIVERSITY.
(a) Transfer.--The Director of National Intelligence shall transfer
the functions of the National Intelligence University to the National
Defense University described in section 2165 of title 10, United States
Code.
(b) Repeal.--Title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) is amended by striking subtitle D (50 U.S.C. 3227
et seq.).
(c) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Title 10.--Section 2151(b) of title 10, United States
Code, is amended by striking paragraph (3).
(2) Title 17.--Section 105(d)(2) of title 17, United States
Code, is amended--
(A) by striking subparagraph (M); and
(B) by redesignating subparagraph (N) as
subparagraph (M).
(3) Damon paul nelson and matthew young pollard
intelligence authorization act for fiscal years 2018, 2019, and
2020.--The Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and
2020 (division E of Public Law 116-92) is amended by striking
section 5324 (50 U.S.C. 3334a).
(d) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3002 et seq.) is amended, in the matter
preceding section 2 of such Act, by striking the items relating to
subtitle D of title X.
SEC. 305. LIMITATION ON DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES AT THE NATIONAL
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER.
(a) Domestic Counterterrorism Intelligence.--Subsection (e) of
section 119 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3056) is
amended to read as follows:
``(e) Limitation on Domestic Activities.--The Center may,
consistent with applicable law, the direction of the President, and the
guidelines referred to in section 102A(b), receive and retain
intelligence pertaining to domestic terrorism (as defined in section
2331 of title 18, United States Code) to enable the Center to collect,
retain, and disseminate intelligence pertaining only to international
terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of title 18, United States
Code).''.
SEC. 306. TIMELY PROVISION OF SECURITY DIRECTION TO INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY WHISTLEBLOWERS.
(a) Intelligence Community Employees.--Section
103H(k)(5)(D)(ii)(II) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3033(k)(5)(D)(ii)(II)) is amended by inserting ``, unless the Director
does not provide such direction not later than 7 calendar days after
the date on which the employee furnishes the statement required by
subclause (I)'' after ``practices''.
(b) Central Intelligence Agency Employees.--Section
17(d)(5)(D)(ii)(II) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)(D)(ii)(II)) is amended by inserting ``, unless the
Director does not provide such direction not later than 7 calendar days
after the date on which the employee furnishes the statement required
by subclause (I)'' after ``practices''.
SEC. 307. NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN DECLASSIFICATIONS.
(a) In General.--Title VIII of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3161 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 806. NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN DECLASSIFICATIONS.
``(a) Notification to Congress by Director of National
Intelligence.--
``(1) In general.--Immediately upon declassifying,
downgrading, or directing the declassification or downgrading
of information or intelligence relating to intelligence
sources, methods, or activities pursuant to section 3.1(c) of
Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to
classified national security information), or any successor
order, the Director of National Intelligence, or the Principal
Deputy Director of National Intelligence, as delegated by the
Director of National Intelligence, shall notify the
congressional intelligence committees and the Archivist of the
United States in writing of such declassification, downgrading,
or direction.
``(2) Contents.--Each notification required by paragraph
(1) shall include a copy of the information that has been, or
has been directed to be, declassified or downgraded.
``(b) Notification to Congress by Agency Head.--
``(1) In general.--Immediately upon the declassification of
information pursuant to section 3.1(d) of Executive Order
13526, or any successor order, the head, or senior official, of
a relevant element of the intelligence community shall notify
the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of
Representatives, and the Archivist of the United States in
writing of such declassification.
``(2) Contents.--Each notification required by paragraph
(1) shall include a copy of the information that has been
declassified.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended by inserting
after the item relating to section 805 the following:
``Sec. 806. Notification of certain declassifications.''.
SEC. 308. NO POLICE, SUBPOENA, OR LAW ENFORCEMENT POWERS OR INTERNAL
SECURITY FUNCTIONS FOR DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024)
is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(z) No Police, Subpoena, or Law Enforcement Powers or Internal
Security Functions.--The Director of National Intelligence shall have
no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security
functions.''.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 401. EXTENSION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AUTHORITY REGARDING
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS.
Section 15A(m) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 3515a(m)) is amended by striking ``December 31, 2027'' and
inserting ``the date set forth in section 210G(j)(1) of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124n(j)(1))''.
SEC. 402. HIGHER EDUCATION ACT OF 1965 SPECIAL RULE.
Section 135 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1015d)
is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (c) and (d) as subsections
(d) and (e), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following:
``(c) Special Rule.--With respect to a member of a qualifying
Federal service who is an officer or employee of an element of the
intelligence community, the term `permanent duty station', as used in
this section, shall exclude a permanent duty station that is within 50
miles of the headquarters facility of such element.''.
SEC. 403. MODIFICATION RELATING TO SECURITY PERSONNEL AT CERTAIN
INSTALLATIONS.
Section 15(a)(1)(D) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949
(50 U.S.C. 3515(a)(1)(D)) is amended by inserting ``or the National
Reconnaissance Office'' after ``Office of the Director of National
Intelligence''.
TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY
SEC. 501. AUTHORITY OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY TO CORRELATE, EVALUATE,
AND DISSEMINATE CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE.
The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.)
is amended by adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 23. AUTHORITY TO CORRELATE, EVALUATE, AND DISSEMINATE CERTAIN
INTELLIGENCE.
``The Director of the National Security Agency may--
``(1) correlate and evaluate intelligence related to
national security; and
``(2) disseminate such intelligence to legislative and
executive branch customers as the Director considers
appropriate.''.
SEC. 502. PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR RELOCATION OF OFFICE
OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS TO CERTAIN FACILITIES.
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or
otherwise made available for fiscal year 2027 for the National
Intelligence Program (as defined in section 3 of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)), may be obligated or expended to move or
relocate the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of
Homeland Security to any facility other than a facility owned by the
Department of Homeland Security.
SEC. 503. FUNDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED WITH AND
BY THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.
(a) In General.--Subchapter I of chapter 21 of title 10, United
States Code, is amended by inserting after section 421 the following:
``Sec. 421a. Funds for foreign intelligence activities conducted with
and by the National Reconnaissance Office
``(a) Use of Appropriated Funds.--The Director of the National
Reconnaissance Office may use appropriated funds available to the
National Reconnaissance Office for intelligence and communications
purposes to pay for the expenses of arrangements with foreign countries
for intelligence activities conducted with and by the National
Reconnaissance Office.
``(b) Use of Funds Other Than Appropriated Funds.--The Director of
the National Reconnaissance Office may use funds other than
appropriated funds to pay for the expenses of arrangements with foreign
countries for intelligence activities conducted with and by the
National Reconnaissance Office without regard for the provisions of law
relating to the expenditure of United States Government funds, except
that--
``(1) no such funds may be expended, in whole or in part,
by or for the benefit of the Department of Defense for a
purpose for which Congress had previously denied funds;
``(2) proceeds from the sale of items or services may be
used only to purchase replacement items similar to the items
that are sold; and
``(3) the authority provided by this subsection may not be
used to acquire items or services for the principal benefit of
the United States.
``(c) Reports.--
``(1) Use of appropriated funds.--Any funds expended under
the authority of subsection (a) shall be reported, pursuant to
the provisions of title V of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.), to--
``(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on
Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate; and
``(B) the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, and the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
``(2) Use of funds other than appropriated funds.--Funds
expended under the authority of subsection (b) shall be
reported to the committees described in paragraph (1) pursuant
to procedures jointly agreed upon by such committees and the
Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of
such subchapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to
section 421 the following:
``421a. Funds for foreign intelligence activities conducted with and by
the National Reconnaissance Office.''.
SEC. 504. MODIFICATION OF ANNUAL REPORT ON FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION CASE DATA.
Section 512A(b)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3111a(b)(6)) is amended by striking ``country affiliation'' and
inserting ``terrorist organization''.
SEC. 505. ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.
Section 311 of title 31, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a semicolon;
(B) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph
(4); and
(C) by inserting after paragraph (2), the following
new paragraph (3):
``(3) identify and mitigate counterintelligence threats to
the Department of the Treasury; and''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(c) Office of Counterintelligence.--There is established, within
the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Office of
Counterintelligence, which shall be responsible for implementing the
policies and procedures across the bureaus of the Department of the
Treasury required to carry out the counterintelligence responsibilities
described in subsection (a).''.
SEC. 506. MODIFICATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES OF OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE
AND ANALYSIS.
Section 201 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121) is
amended--
(1) in subsection (d)--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``in support''
and all that follows through ``of the homeland.'' and
inserting ``pertaining to foreign threats to the
homeland, as determined by the Secretary.'';
(B) in paragraph (2)--
(i) by striking ``terrorist attacks
within'' and inserting ``foreign threats to'';
and
(ii) by striking ``attacks'' each place it
appears and inserting ``threats'';
(C) in paragraph (3)(A), by striking ``terrorist
and other'' and inserting ``foreign'';
(D) in paragraph (6), by striking ``terrorist
attacks against'' and inserting ``foreign threats to'';
(E) by striking paragraphs (7), (17), and (23), and
redesignating paragraphs (8), (9), (10), (11), (12),
(13), (14), (15), (16), (18), (19), (20), (21), and
(22) as paragraphs (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12),
(13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), (19), and (20),
respectively;
(F) in paragraph (7), as so redesignated, by
striking ``threats of terrorism'' and inserting
``foreign threats'';
(G) in paragraph (9), as so redesignated, by
striking ``threats of terrorism in'' and inserting
``foreign threats to''; and
(H) in paragraph (12), as so redesignated, by
striking ``, other agencies'' and all that follows
through ``by the Department,''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsections:
``(h) Collection of Intelligence and Information.--In carrying out
the duties and responsibilities of the Secretary pursuant to this
section, the personnel of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis shall
liaise and share intelligence and other information between federal
agencies (including the components of the Department), State, local, or
tribal governments, and the private sector.
``(i) Prohibition.--
``(1) United states person defined.--In this subsection,
the term `United States person' means--
``(A) a United States citizen;
``(B) an alien known by the Office of Intelligence
and Analysis to be a permanent resident alien;
``(C) an unincorporated association substantially
composed of United States citizens or permanent
resident aliens; or
``(D) a corporation incorporated in the United
States, except for a corporation directed and
controlled by 1 or more foreign governments.
``(2) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis may not engage in
the collection of information or intelligence targeting any
United States person, or any clandestine collection.
``(j) Intelligence Defined.--In this section, the term
`intelligence' has the meaning given the terms foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence, as defined paragraphs (2) and (3) of the National
Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3003(2),(3)).''.
SEC. 507. ROLE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY IN COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
OF SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE.
The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.)
is amended by adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 23. SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE.
``The Director of the National Security Agency shall--
``(1) provide overall direction for and coordination of the
collection and analysis of signals intelligence by elements of
the intelligence community authorized to undertake such
collection and analysis; and
``(2) in coordination with other departments, agencies, and
elements of the United States Government that are authorized to
undertake such collection, ensure that--
``(A) the most effective use is made of resources;
and
``(B) appropriate account is taken of the risks to
the United States and those involved in such
collection.''.
TITLE VI--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
SEC. 601. AMENDMENTS TO PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS FOR INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY POSITIONS.
(a) Appointment of Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency.--Section 104B(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3037(a)) is amended by inserting ``, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate'' after ``President''.
(b) Appointment of Deputy Director of the National Security
Agency.--Section 2 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50
U.S.C. 3602) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(c) There is a Deputy Director of the National Security Agency,
who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate.''.
(c) Appointment of Director of the Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence.--
(1) In general.--Section 215(c) of the Department of Energy
Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7144b(c)) is amended to read as
follows:
``(c) Director.--
``(1) Appointment.--The head of the Office shall be the
Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,
who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate. The Director of the Office shall
report directly to the Secretary.
``(2) Term.--
``(A) In general.--The Director shall serve for a
term of 6 years.
``(B) Reappointment.--The Director shall be
eligible for reappointment for 1 or more terms.
``(3) Qualifications.--The Director shall--
``(A) be an employee in the Senior Executive
Service, the Senior Intelligence Service, the Senior
National Intelligence Service, or any other Service
that the Secretary, in coordination with the Director
of National Intelligence, considers appropriate; and
``(B) have substantial expertise in matters
relating to the intelligence community, including
foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.''.
(2) Effective date.--The amendment made by this section
shall take effect on January 21, 2029.
(d) Appointment of Director of the National Counterterrorism
Center.--Section 119(b)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3056(b)(1)) is amended by striking ``President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate'' and inserting ``Director of National
Intelligence''.
(e) Appointment of Director the National Counterintelligence and
Security Center.--Section 902(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2003 (50 U.S.C. 3382(a)) is amended by striking
``President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate'' and
inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''.
(f) Appointment of General Counsel of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence.--Section 103C(a) of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3028(a)) is amended by striking ``by the President, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate'' and inserting ``by the
Director of National Intelligence''.
(g) Appointment of General Counsel of the Central Intelligence
Agency.--Section 20(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949
(50 U.S.C. 3520(a)) is amended by striking ``by the President, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate'' and inserting ``by the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''.
SEC. 602. PROCEDURES REGARDING DISSEMINATION OF NONPUBLICLY AVAILABLE
INFORMATION CONCERNING UNITED STATES PERSONS.
(a) Procedures.--
(1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end
the following new section:
``SEC. 519. PROCEDURES REGARDING DISSEMINATION OF NONPUBLICLY AVAILABLE
INFORMATION CONCERNING UNITED STATES PERSONS.
``(a) Procedures.--The head of each element of the intelligence
community, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence,
shall develop and maintain procedures for that element to respond to
unmasking requests.
``(b) Requirements.--The procedures required by subsection (a)
shall ensure, at a minimum, the following:
``(1) Each unmasking request submitted to a disseminating
element shall include, in writing--
``(A) information that identifies the disseminated
intelligence report containing the United States person
identifying information requested;
``(B) the date the unmasking request was submitted
to the disseminating element;
``(C) the name, title, and organization of the
individual who submitted the unmasking request in an
official capacity;
``(D) the name, title, and organization of each
individual who will receive the United States person
identifying information sought by the unmasking
request; and
``(E) a fact-based justification describing why
such United States person identifying information is
required by each individual who will receive the
information to carry out the duties of the individual.
``(2) An unmasking request may only be approved by the head
of the disseminating element or by officers or employees of
such element to whom the head has specifically delegated such
authority. When the disseminating element is not the
originating element of the United States person identifying
information, the head of the disseminating element shall obtain
the concurrence of the head or designee of the originating
element before approving the unmasking request.
``(3) The head of the disseminating element shall retain
records on all unmasking requests, including the disposition of
such requests, for not less than 10 years.
``(4) The records described in paragraph (3) shall include,
with respect to each approved unmasking request--
``(A) the name and title of the individual of the
disseminating element who approved the request; and
``(B) the fact-based justification for the request.
``(5) The procedures shall include an exception that--
``(A) allows for the immediate disclosure of United
States person identifying information in the event of
exigent circumstances or when a delay would likely
result in the significant loss of intelligence; and
``(B) requires that promptly after such disclosure,
the recipient of the United States person identifying
information make a written unmasking request with
respect to such information.
``(6) If an unmasking request is made during a period
beginning on the date of a general election for President and
ending on the date on which such President is inaugurated--
``(A) the documentation required by paragraph (1)
shall include whether--
``(i) the requesting entity knows or
reasonably believes that any United States
person identifying information sought is of an
individual who is a member of the transition
team as identified by an apparent successful
candidate for the office of President or Vice
President; or
``(ii) based on the intelligence report to
which the unmasking request pertains, the
disseminating element or the originating
element knows or reasonably believes that any
United States person identifying information
sought is of an individual who is a member of
the transition team as identified by an
apparent successful candidate for the office of
President or Vice President;
``(B) the approval made pursuant to paragraph (2)
of an unmasking request that contains United States
person identifying information described in
subparagraph (A) shall be subject to the concurrence of
the general counsel of the disseminating element (or,
in the absence of the general counsel, the principal
deputy general counsel, or, as applicable, the senior
Departmental legal officer supporting the disseminating
element) that the dissemination of such United States
person identifying information is in accordance with
the procedures required by subsection (a); and
``(C) consistent with due regard for the protection
from unauthorized disclosure of classified information
relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods
or other exceptionally sensitive matters, the head of
the disseminating element shall notify the chairmen and
ranking minority members of the congressional
intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority
leader of the House of Representatives, and the
majority leader and minority leader of the Senate of an
approval described in subparagraph (B) not later than
14 days after the date of such approval.
``(7) If an unmasking request concerns a nominee for or the
holder of a Federal office, a member of a transition team as
identified by an eligible candidate for the office of the
President, a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,
or an individual nominated by the President to be a Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States, and such unmasking
request is approved, the head of the disseminating element
shall submit the documentation for the request to the
congressional intelligence committees not later than 14 days
after the date of such approval.
``(c) Annual Reports.--Not later than March 1 of each year, the
head of each element of the intelligence community shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report documenting, with
respect to the year covered by the report--
``(1) the total number of unmasking requests received by
that element;
``(2) of such total number, the number of requests
approved;
``(3) of such total number, the number of requests denied;
and
``(4) for each number calculated under paragraphs (1)
through (3), the number disaggregated by requesting entity.
``(d) Certain Procedures Regarding Congressional Identity
Information.--With respect to the dissemination of congressional
identity information, the head of each element of the intelligence
community shall carry out this section in accordance with annex A of
Intelligence Community Directive 112, or successor annex or directive.
``(e) Effect on Minimization Procedures.--The requirements of this
section are in addition to--
``(1) any minimization procedures established under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801
et seq.);
``(2) any procedures governing the collection, retention,
or dissemination of information concerning United States
persons established under Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001
note; relating to United States intelligence activities) or
successor order; and
``(3) any other provision of statute or Executive order the
Director of National Intelligence considers relevant.
``(f) Definitions .--In this section:
``(1) Apparent successful candidate.--The term `apparent
successful candidate' means any apparent successful candidate
for the office of President or Vice President as determined
pursuant to the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 (3 U.S.C.
102 note).
``(2) Candidate; federal office.--The terms `candidate' and
`Federal office' have the meanings given those terms in section
301 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C.
30101).
``(3) Congressional identity information.--The term
`congressional identity information' means information that
identifies, by name or by individually identifying titles or
characteristics--
``(A) any current Member of the Senate or the House
of Representatives;
``(B) any current staff officer for any Senator or
Representative, whether paid or unpaid; or
``(C) any current staff officer of any committee of
the Senate or the House of Representatives, whether
paid or unpaid.
``(4) Disseminating element.--The term `disseminating
element' means an element of the intelligence community that
disseminated an intelligence report subject to an unmasking
request.
``(5) Eligible candidate.--The term `eligible candidate'
has the meaning given that term in section 3(h)(4) of the
Presidential Transition Act of 1963 (3 U.S.C. 102 note).
``(6) Originating element.--The term `originating element'
means an element of the intelligence community that originated
information in a disseminated intelligence report subject to an
unmasking request.
``(7) Requesting entity.--The term `requesting entity'
means an entity of--
``(A) the United State Government; or
``(B) a State, local, Tribal, or territorial
government.
``(8) United states person.--The term `United States
person' means a United States person as defined in section 101
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.
1801) or section 3.5 of Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001
note; relating to United States intelligence activities).
``(9) United states person identifying information.--
``(A) In general.--The term `United States person
identifying information' (commonly referred to as
`United States Person Information')--
``(i) means information that is reasonably
likely to identify one or more specific United
States persons; and
``(ii) includes a single item of
information and information that, when combined
with other information, is reasonably likely to
identify one or more specific United States
persons.
``(B) Determination.--The determination of whether
information is reasonably likely to identify one or
more specific United States persons may require
assessment by a trained intelligence professional on a
case-by-case basis.
``(10) Unmasking request.--The term `unmasking request'
means a request to gain access to nonpublic United States
person identifying information concerning a known unconsenting
United States person that was omitted from a disseminated
intelligence report by the originating element.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents preceding
section 2 of such Act is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 518 the following new item:
``Sec. 519. Procedures regarding dissemination of nonpublicly available
information concerning United States
persons.''.
(b) Development of Procedures.--The head of each element of the
intelligence community shall develop the procedures required by section
519(a) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection
(a)(1), by not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act.
(c) Public Release.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall make
publicly available the procedures for each element of the intelligence
community required by section 519(a) of the National Security Act of
1947, as added by subsection (a)(1).
SEC. 603. ANALYTIC STANDARDS FOR ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS.
(a) In General.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001
et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 1115. ANALYTIC STANDARDS FOR ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS.
``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) All-source intelligence product.--The term `all-
source intelligence product'--
``(A) means any intelligence product published by
an element of the intelligence community using multiple
types of intelligence for purposes of providing an
analytic assessment or situational update; and
``(B) does not include a product containing purely
law enforcement information.
``(2) Assumption.--The term `assumption' means a
supposition used to frame or support an argument.
``(3) Judgment.--The term `judgment' means a conclusion
based on underlying intelligence information, analysis, and
assumptions.
``(b) Establishment.--
``(1) In general.--The production of any all-source
intelligence product shall adhere to--
``(A) the analytic standards described in
subsection (c); and
``(B) any guidance or policy issued under paragraph
(2).
``(2) Guidance and policy.--The Director of National
Intelligence or any other head of an element of the
intelligence community may issue guidance or policy that
expands upon the standards described in subsection (c) as such
head considers appropriate, except that any such guidance or
policy shall not contradict or otherwise circumvent such
standards.
``(c) Analytic Standards.--The standards described in this
subsection are the following:
``(1) Objectivity.--In producing any all-source
intelligence product, an analyst--
``(A) shall--
``(i) perform the analyst's functions with
objectivity and with awareness of their own
assumptions and reasoning;
``(ii) employ reasoning techniques and
practical mechanisms that reveal and mitigate
bias;
``(iii) be alert to influence by existing
analytic positions or judgments; and
``(iv) consider alternative perspectives
and contrary information; and
``(B) shall not be unduly constrained by previous
judgments when new developments indicate a modification
is necessary.
``(2) Independent of political consideration.--Any all-
source intelligence product shall not be--
``(A) distorted by, or shaped for, advocacy of a
particular audience, agenda, or policy viewpoint; or
``(B) influenced by the force of preference for a
particular policy.
``(3) Timely.--Any all-source intelligence product shall be
disseminated in time for the product to be actionable by
customers.
``(4) Based on all relevant information available.--Any
all-source intelligence product shall be informed by all
relevant information available.
``(5) Analytic tradecraft standards.--Any all-source
intelligence product shall adhere to the following analytic
tradecraft standards:
``(A) Sourcing.--Any all-source intelligence
product shall--
``(i) identify and properly describe the
quality and credibility of underlying sources,
data, and methodologies upon which judgments
are based; and
``(ii) use source descriptors in accordance
with sourcing guidance prescribed by the
Director of National Intelligence.
``(B) Uncertainty.--Any all-source intelligence
product shall--
``(i) indicate and explain the basis for
the uncertainties associated with major
analytic judgments, specifically the likelihood
of occurrence of an event or development, and
the analyst's confidence in the basis for the
judgment;
``(ii) note causes of uncertainty,
including assumptions and gaps, and explain how
uncertainties affect analysis; and
``(iii) for expressions of likelihood or
probability, use one of the sets of terms
defined in Intelligence Community Directive
203.
``(C) Distinguishing.--Any all-source intelligence
product shall--
``(i) clearly distinguish statements that
convey underlying intelligence information used
in analysis from statements that convey
assumptions or judgments;
``(ii) state an assumption explicitly when
the assumption serves as the linchpin of an
argument or when the assumption bridges key
information gaps;
``(iii) explain the implications for
judgments if assumptions prove to be incorrect;
and
``(iv) as appropriate, identify indicators
that, if detected, would alter judgments.
``(D) Incorporate analysis of alternatives.--Any
all-source intelligence product shall--
``(i) identify and assess plausible
alternative hypotheses;
``(ii) in discussing alternatives, address
factors such as associated assumptions,
likelihood, or implications related to United
States interests; and
``(iii) identify indicators that, if
detected, would affect the likelihood of
identified alternatives.
``(E) Relevance.--Any all-source intelligence
product shall provide information and insight on United
States national security issues.
``(F) Argumentation.--Any all-source intelligence
product shall--
``(i) present a clear main analytic message
up front;
``(ii) in the case of a product containing
multiple judgments, have a main analytic
message that is drawn collectively from those
judgments; and
``(iii) be effectively supported by
relevant intelligence information and coherent
reasoning.
``(G) Analytic line.--Any all-source intelligence
product shall--
``(i) state how its major judgments on a
topic are consistent with or represent a change
from major judgments in previously published
analysis, or that it represent initial coverage
of a topic; and
``(ii) fully consider and bring to the
attention of customers significant differences
in analytic judgment, such as between two
analytic elements of the intelligence
community.
``(H) Accuracy.--Any all-source intelligence
product shall--
``(i) apply expertise and logic to make the
most accurate judgments and assessments
possible, based on the information available
and known information gaps; and
``(ii) express judgments as clearly and
precisely as possible, reducing ambiguity by
addressing the likelihood, timing, and nature
of the outcome or development.
``(I) Visuals.--Any all-source intelligence product
shall incorporate effective visual information as
appropriate. Any content of any all-source intelligence
product depicted visually shall adhere to the analytic
standards described in this subsection.
``(d) Required Information.--
``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), any
all-source intelligence product shall include a section
dedicated to explaining the tradecraft related to the analytic
tradecraft standards described in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C),
(D), and (G) of subsection (c)(5).
``(2) Exceptions.--The requirement of paragraph (1) shall
not apply to--
``(A) any all source-intelligence product less than
300 words; or
``(B) any all-source intelligence product produced
for the President's Daily Brief.
``(e) Tracking Adherence to Analytic Standards.--The Director of
National Intelligence and each other head of an element of the
intelligence community shall--
``(1) develop metrics for evaluating the performance of
their respective element in adhering to the analytic standards
described in subsection (c); and
``(2) use such metrics to evaluate individual performance,
develop analytic workforce training, and inform Congress on
matters related to analytic performance.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 1115. Analytic standards for all-source intelligence
products.''.
SEC. 604. LIMITATION ON USE OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT
ACCOUNT FUNDS FOR CERTAIN ENTITIES.
(a) In General.--Title III of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3071 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 314. LIMITATION ON USE OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT
ACCOUNT FUNDS FOR CERTAIN ENTITIES.
``Amounts appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account may not be obligated or expended to provide financial or in-
kind support for the purposes of analytic collaboration, including for
any study, research, or assessment, to--
``(1) an entity that is described in section 501(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from taxation
under section 501(a) of such Code, or otherwise describes
itself as a think tank in any public document, that has
received or expects to receive any financial or in-kind support
from a foreign government, except for a foreign government that
is a member of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance; or
``(2) an entity that is organized for research or for
engaging in advocacy in areas such as public policy or
political strategy that has received or expects to receive any
financial or in-kind support from a government, or an entity
affiliated with the military or intelligence services, of--
``(A) the People's Republic of China;
``(B) the Russian Federation;
``(C) the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
``(D) the Islamic Republic of Iran;
``(E) the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; or
``(F) the Republic of Cuba.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 103B(e) of such Act (50 U.S.C.
3027(e)) is amended by inserting ``and subject to section 314'' after
``control of the Director of National Intelligence''.
(c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for such Act, in the
matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is amended by inserting after
the item relating to section 313 the following:
``Sec. 314. Limitation on use of Intelligence Community Management
Account funds for certain entities.''.
SEC. 605. BEN SASSE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TECHNOLOGY FELLOWSHIP
PROGRAM.
(a) In General.--Title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 1002 the
following:
``SEC. 1003. BEN SASSE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TECHNOLOGY FELLOWSHIP
PROGRAM.
``(a) In General.--There is established a program (in this section
referred to as the `Program') under which selected employees of the
intelligence community may train at certain nongovernmental entities as
technology fellows.
``(b) Designation.--The program shall be known as the `Ben Sasse
Intelligence Community Technology Fellowship Program'.
``(c) Agreements.--
``(1) Nongovernmental entities.--Each head of an element of
the intelligence community described in paragraph (3) shall
seek to enter into agreements with nongovernmental entities
with experience in cutting-edge technology under which such
entities may host technology fellows under the Program.
``(2) Selected employees.--For each employee of an element
of the intelligence community selected for participation in the
Program in accordance with subsection (e), the head of the
element of the intelligence community that selected the
employee shall provide for a written agreement among that
element of the intelligence community, the nongovernmental
entity concerned, and the employee. The agreement shall--
``(A) require that the employee of the element of
the intelligence community, upon completion of the
fellowship, serve in that element, or elsewhere in the
intelligence community if approved by the head of the
element that selected the employee, for a period equal
to twice the length of the fellowship;
``(B) provide that if the employee of the element
of the intelligence community fails to carry out the
agreement, the employee shall be liable to the United
States for payment of all expenses of the fellowship,
unless that failure was for good and sufficient reason,
as determined by the head of the element that selected
the employee; and
``(C) contain language ensuring that the employee
of the element of the intelligence community does not
improperly use information that the employee knows
relates to an acquisition or procurement of the element
of the intelligence community for the benefit or
advantage of the nongovernmental entity.
``(3) Elements described.--The elements of the intelligence
community described in this paragraph are the following:
``(A) The Central Intelligence Agency.
``(B) The National Security Agency.
``(C) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
``(D) The National Reconnaissance Office.
``(E) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
``(d) Board.--
``(1) In general.--There is established a board for the
Program (in this section referred to as the `Board').
``(2) Membership.--The Board shall be composed of the
directors of science and technology, or equivalents, of the
elements of the intelligence community described in subsection
(c)(3).
``(3) Co-chairs.--The members of the Board shall serve as
co-chairs of the Board.
``(4) Selection criteria.--The Board shall establish
selection criteria for the participation of employees in the
Program.
``(e) Selection.--Each year, each head of an element of the
intelligence community described in subsection (c)(3) shall select two
employees of such element to participate in the Program.
``(f) Term.--An employee selected for participation in the Program
may serve for one year as a technology fellow at a nongovermental
entity that has entered into an agreement under subsection (c)(1) with
the head of the element of the intelligence community concerned.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act is
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1002 the
following:
``Sec. 1003. Ben Sasse Intelligence Community Technology Fellowship
Program.''.
SEC. 606. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OFFICE AT THE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Department.--The term ``Department'' means the
Department of Commerce.
(2) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of Commerce.
(b) Establishment of Intelligence Community Counterintelligence
Office.--
(1) Agreement with secretary of commerce.--The Director of
National Intelligence, acting through the Director of the
National Counterintelligence and Security Center, shall seek to
enter into an agreement with the Secretary under which the
Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary shall
establish within the Department, within the Office of
Secretary, an office, which shall be known as the
``Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office'', in
accordance with this section.
(2) Location.--The Intelligence Community
Counterintelligence Office established pursuant to this section
shall be physically located within the headquarters of the
Department and within reasonable proximity to the offices of
the leadership of the Department.
(3) Security.--The Director of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center shall be responsible
for the protection of classified information and for the
establishment and enforcement of all security-related controls
within the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office.
(c) Personnel.--
(1) Director.--
(A) Appointment.--There shall be at the head of the
Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office a
Director who is appointed by the Director of National
Intelligence. The Director of the Intelligence
Community Counterintelligence Office shall--
(i) be supervised and subject to
performance evaluations by the Director of the
National Counterintelligence and Security
Center, in consultation with the Secretary;
(ii) be an employee of the intelligence
community with significant counterintelligence
experience; and
(iii) serve for a period of 3 years.
(B) Responsibilities.--The Director of the
Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office shall
carry out the following responsibilities:
(i) Serving as the head of the Intelligence
Community Counterintelligence Office, with
supervisory responsibility for the Intelligence
Community Counterintelligence Office and any
other personnel assigned to the Intelligence
Community Counterintelligence Office.
(ii) Advising the Secretary on
counterintelligence and intelligence
information.
(iii) Ensuring that counterintelligence
threat information and, as appropriate,
finished intelligence on topics related to the
functions of the Department, are provided to
appropriate personnel of the department or
agency without delay.
(iv) Ensuring critical intelligence
relevant to the Secretary is requested and
disseminated in a timely manner.
(v) Establishing, as appropriate,
mechanisms for collaboration through which
Department subject matter experts, including
those without security clearances, can share
information and expertise with the intelligence
community.
(vi) Correlating and evaluating
counterintelligence threats identified within
intelligence community reporting, in
coordination with the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center, and
providing appropriate dissemination of such
intelligence to officials of the Department
with a need-to-know.
(vii) Advising the Secretary on methods to
improve the counterintelligence posture of the
Department.
(viii) Where appropriate, supporting the
Department's leadership in engaging with the
National Security Council.
(ix) In coordination with the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center,
establishing counterintelligence partnerships
to improve the counterintelligence defense of
the Department.
(2) Deputy director.--There shall be within the
Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office a Deputy
Director who is appointed by the Secretary, in coordination
with the Director of National Intelligence. The Deputy Director
shall--
(A) be supervised and subject to performance
evaluations by the Secretary, in consultation with the
Director of the National Counterintelligence and
Security Center;
(B) be a current or former employee of the
Department with significant experience within the
Department; and
(C) serve at the pleasure of the Secretary.
(3) Other employees.--
(A) Joint duty assignment.--There shall be within
the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office
such other employees as the Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary,
determines appropriate. Employment at the Intelligence
Community Counterintelligence Office is an intelligence
community joint duty assignment. A permanent change of
station to the Intelligence Community
Counterintelligence Office shall be for a period of not
less than 2 years.
(B) Supervision.--The Director of the Intelligence
Community Counterintelligence Office shall be
responsible for the supervision and management of
employees assigned to the Intelligence Community
Counterintelligence Office, including employees
assigned by program elements of the intelligence
community and other Federal departments and agencies,
as appropriate.
(C) Joint duty or assigned personnel
reimbursement.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall reimburse a program element of the intelligence
community or a Federal department or agency for any
permanent change of station employee assigned to the
Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office from
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence.
(D) Operation under authority of director of
national intelligence.--Employees assigned to the
Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office under
this paragraph shall operate under the authorities of
the Director of National Intelligence for the duration
of their assignment or period of employment within the
Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office,
except for temporary duty assignment employees.
(E) Incentive pay.--
(i) In general.--An employee who accepts
employment at the Intelligence Community
Counterintelligence Office during the 120-day
period after the date of the establishment of
the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence
Office shall receive an incentive payment,
which shall be payable by the Director of
National Intelligence, in an amount equal to 10
percent of the base annual pay of the employee.
Such an employee who completes 2 years of
service in the Intelligence Community
Counterintelligence Office may receive an
incentive payment in an amount equal to 10
percent of the base annual pay of the employee
if the Director of the Intelligence Community
Counterintelligence Office determines the
performance of the employee is exceptional.
(ii) Eligibility.--An employee is only
eligible for an incentive payment under clause
(i) if the employee enters into an agreement
with the Director of National Intelligence to
serve in the Intelligence Community
Counterintelligence Office for a period of at
least 2 years.
(d) Funding.--To the extent and in such amounts as specifically
provided in advance in appropriations Acts for the purposes detailed in
this subsection, the Director of National Intelligence may expend such
sums as are authorized within the National Intelligence Program of the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence for--
(1) the renovation, furnishing, and equipping of a Federal
building, as necessary, to meet the security and operational
requirements of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence
Office;
(2) the provision of connectivity to the Intelligence
Community Counterintelligence Office to enable briefings,
secure audio and video communications, and collaboration
between employees of the Department and the intelligence
community at the unclassified, secret, and top secret levels;
(3) the provision of other information technology systems
and devices, such as computers, printers, and phones, for use
by employees of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence
Office;
(4) the assignment of employees of the intelligence
community to support the operation of the Intelligence
Community Counterintelligence Office; and
(5) the provision of other personal services necessary for
the operation of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence
Office.
(e) Deadline for Establishment of the Intelligence Community
Counterintelligence Office.--
(1) Establishment.--Not later than January 1, 2028, the
Director of National Intelligence shall seek to establish, in
accordance with this section, the Intelligence Community
Counterintelligence Office within the Department.
(2) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on the
plan to establish the Intelligence Community
Counterintelligence Office required under paragraph (1). Such
report shall include the costs and schedule associated with
establishing the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence
Office.
SEC. 607. COUNTERING HOSTILE FOREIGN CYBER ACTORS AS A NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE PRIORITY.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) In 2025, foreign malicious cybercriminal organizations,
such as foreign scam centers that engage in sophisticated
investment fraud, cyber-enabled extortion activity, and
impersonation-based fraud, stole at least $7,566,000,000 from
Americans according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
Internet Crime Complaint Center, which has emphasized that
these estimates are conservative and only includes losses
reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(2) According to the Consumer Federation of America,
Americans are losing an estimated $119,000,000,000 each year to
online scams.
(3) Investigative reporting, Federal indictments, and
sanctions designations issued by the Department of the Treasury
have revealed the extent to which foreign malicious
cybercriminal organizations collaborate with foreign
governments, illicit finance actors, and foreign militia groups
whose activities present a threat to the economic and national
security of the United States.
(4) Foreign malicious cybercriminal organizations rely
extensively on communications and financial services of United
States companies, enabling the organizations' targeting of
vulnerable Americans.
(5) Financial insecurity generated by foreign malicious
cybercriminal organizations presents a counterintelligence
threat to the United States intelligence community.
(b) Sense of Congress.--
(1) In general.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(A) foreign malicious cybercriminal organizations,
and foreign affiliates associated with those
organizations, constitute hostile foreign cyber actors
and are valid targets for intelligence operations under
existing intelligence authorities; and
(B) the Director of National Intelligence should
treat collection, analysis, and disruption toward
hostile foreign cyber actors as a national intelligence
priority as part of the National Intelligence
Priorities Framework.
(2) Hostile foreign cyber actors.--The hostile foreign
cyber actors described in paragraph (1) include, at a minimum,
the following:
(A) Prince Group.
(B) Huione Group.
(C) L.Y.P. Group.
(D) Jin Bei Group.
(E) Funnull Technology Inc.
(F) TransAsia International holding Group Thailand
Company Limited.
(G) The Democratic Karen Benevolent Army.
(H) HH Bank Cambodia PLC.
(c) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to Congress a report on
hostile foreign cyber actors, such as foreign scam centers.
(2) Contents.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) An identification of the individuals and
entities operating as hostile foreign cyber actors,
including foreign scam centers, that pose the most
significant threat.
(B) An identification of the locations from which
the individuals and entities identified under
subparagraph (A) operate.
(C) A description of the infrastructure, tactics,
and techniques hostile foreign cyber actors, including
foreign scam centers, commonly use, including reliance
on any products or services subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States.
(D) A description of any relationships between the
individuals and entities that operate as hostile
foreign cyber actors, including foreign scam centers,
and their governments or countries of origin that could
impede the ability to counter threats from such
centers.
(E) An identification of communications and
financial services providers subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States that provide enabling
services to individuals and entities identified under
subparagraph (A).
(F) A description of any relationships that the
individuals and entities identified under subparagraph
(A) have with transnational organized crime groups.
(3) Form; public availability.--The report required by
paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
include a classified annex. The unclassified form of the report
shall be made available to the public.
SEC. 608. NOTIFICATION OF CRIMINAL REFERRALS REGARDING CURRENT OR
FORMER INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EMPLOYEES.
(a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50
U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 519. NOTIFICATION OF CRIMINAL REFERRALS REGARDING CURRENT OR
FORMER INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EMPLOYEES.
``If an element of the intelligence community makes a criminal
referral to the Department of Justice regarding a current or former
employee of any element of the intelligence community, the general
counsel of the element of the intelligence community that made the
referral shall notify the congressional intelligence committees of the
referral on the date such referral is made and provide to the
congressional intelligence committees a summary of the referral.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended by inserting
after the item relating to section 518 the following:
``Sec. 519. Notification of criminal referrals regarding current or
former intelligence community employees.''.
SEC. 609. MODIFICATION OF DEFINITIONS IN NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
AND SCOPE OF INTELLIGENCE SHARING RESPONSIBILITIES OF
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Definitions.--Section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3003) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``includes'' and
inserting ``means''; and
(2) in paragraph (5)--
(A) in the matter before subparagraph (A), by
striking ``refer to all'' and inserting ``means'';
(B) by amended subparagraph (B) to read as follows:
``(B) involves foreign threats to the United
States, its people, property, or interests.''.
(b) Scope of Intelligence Sharing Responsibilities.--Section
102A(f)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3024(f)(1)) is amended, in the first
sentence, by inserting ``, and other Federal agencies as the Director
considers appropriate,'' after ``community''.
SEC. 610. PROHIBITION ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY USE OF ADVERSARY
UNMANNED GROUND VEHICLES.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Covered foreign country.--The term ``covered foreign
country'' means any of the following:
(A) The People's Republic of China.
(B) The Russian Federation.
(C) The Islamic Republic of Iran.
(D) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
(2) Covered foreign entity.--The term ``covered foreign
entity'' means an entity that is domiciled in a covered foreign
country, or subject to influence or control by the government
of a covered foreign country as determined by the Secretary of
Homeland Security or the Secretary of Defense, and any
subsidiary or affiliate of such an entity.
(3) Covered unmanned ground vehicle system.--The term
``covered unmanned ground vehicle system''--
(A) means a mechanical device that--
(i) is capable of locomotion, navigation,
or movement on the ground; and
(ii) operates at a distance from one or
more operators or supervisors based on commands
or in response to sensor data, or through any
combination thereof; and
(B) includes--
(i) remote surveillance vehicles,
autonomous patrol technologies, mobile
robotics, and humanoid robots; and
(ii) the vehicle, its payload, and any
external device used to control the vehicle.
(b) Prohibition on Procurement of Covered Unmanned Ground Vehicle
Systems From Covered Foreign Entities.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided under paragraph (2),
the head of an element of the intelligence community may not
procure any covered unmanned ground vehicle system that is
manufactured or assembled by a covered foreign entity.
(2) Exemption.--The heads of elements of the intelligence
community are exempt from the restriction under paragraph (1)
if the procurement is required in the national interest of the
United States and--
(A) is for the sole purposes of research,
evaluation, training, testing, or analysis for
electronic warfare, information warfare operations,
cybersecurity, or development of unmanned ground
vehicle system or counter-unmanned ground vehicle
system technology;
(B) is for the sole purposes of conducting
counterterrorism or counterintelligence activities,
protective missions, or Federal criminal or national
security investigations, including forensic
examinations, or for electronic warfare, information
warfare operations, cybersecurity, or development of an
unmanned ground vehicle system or counter-unmanned
ground vehicle technology; or
(C) is an unmanned ground vehicle system that, as
procured or as modified after procurement but before
operational use, can no longer transfer to, or download
data from, a covered foreign entity and otherwise poses
no national security cybersecurity risks as determined
by the exempting official.
(c) Prohibition on Operation of Covered Unmanned Ground Vehicle
Systems From Covered Foreign Entities.--
(1) Prohibition.--
(A) In general.--Beginning on the date that is one
year after the date of the enactment of this Act and
except as provided in paragraph (2), no element of the
intelligence community may operate a covered unmanned
ground vehicle system manufactured or assembled by a
covered foreign entity.
(B) Applicability to contracted services.--The
prohibition under subparagraph (A) applies to any
covered unmanned ground vehicle systems that are being
used by any element of the intelligence community
through the method of contracting for the services of
covered unmanned ground vehicle systems.
(2) Exemption.--The heads of the elements of the
intelligence community are exempt from the restriction under
paragraph (1) if the operation is required in the national
interest of the United States and--
(A) is for the sole purposes of research,
evaluation, training, testing, or analysis for
electronic warfare, information warfare operations,
cybersecurity, or development of unmanned ground
vehicle system or counter-unmanned ground vehicle
system technology;
(B) is for the sole purposes of conducting
counterterrorism or counterintelligence activities,
protective missions, or Federal criminal or national
security investigations, including forensic
examinations, or for electronic warfare, information
warfare operations, cybersecurity, or development of an
unmanned ground vehicle system or counter-unmanned
ground vehicle system technology; or
(C) is an unmanned ground vehicle system that, as
procured or as modified after procurement but before
operational use, can no longer transfer to, or download
data from, a covered foreign entity and otherwise poses
no national security cybersecurity risks as determined
by the exempting official.
(d) Prohibition on Use of Federal Funds for Procurement and
Operation Within the Intelligence Community of Covered Unmanned Ground
Vehicle Systems Manufactured by Certain Foreign Entities.--
(1) In general.--Beginning on the date that is one year
after the date of the enactment of this Act and except as
provided in paragraph (2), no Federal funds awarded to an
element of the intelligence community through a contract,
grant, or cooperative agreement, or otherwise made available
may be used--
(A) to procure a covered unmanned ground vehicle
system that is manufactured or assembled by a covered
foreign entity; or
(B) in connection with the operation of such a
robot or unmanned ground vehicle system.
(2) Exemption.--The heads of elements of the intelligence
community are exempt from the restriction under paragraph (1)
if the procurement or operation is required in the national
interest of the United States and--
(A) is for the sole purposes of research,
evaluation, training, testing, or analysis for
electronic warfare, information warfare operations,
cybersecurity, or development of unmanned ground
vehicle system or counter-unmanned ground vehicle
system technology;
(B) is for the sole purposes of conducting
counterterrorism or counterintelligence activities,
protective missions, or Federal criminal or national
security investigations, including forensic
examinations, or for electronic warfare, information
warfare operations, cybersecurity, or development of an
unmanned ground vehicle system or counter-unmanned
ground vehicle system technology; or
(C) is an unmanned ground vehicle system that, as
procured or as modified after procurement but before
operational use, can no longer transfer to, or download
data from, a covered foreign entity and otherwise poses
no national security cybersecurity risks as determined
by the exempting official.
SEC. 611. CHINA-TAIWAN STRATEGIC WARNING TASK FORCE.
(a) Establishment.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the
Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security shall establish
a task force to be known as the China-Taiwan Strategic Warning Task
Force (referred to in this section as the ``Task Force'') to lead the
efforts of the intelligence community with respect to providing
indications and warning of any military aggression by the People's
Republic of China against Taiwan.
(b) Objectives.--The objectives of the Task Force are the
following:
(1) The synchronization of all intelligence community
efforts related to China-Taiwan indications and warning,
including the generation of indicators and development of
collection requirements related to such indicators.
(2) The coordination of analysis related to China-Taiwan
indications and warning and the development of analytic
methodologies for use across the intelligence community in
conducting analysis related to China-Taiwan indications and
warning.
(3) The development and implementation of information
technology solutions to synchronize the access of the
intelligence community to information relating to indications
and warning.
(c) Membership.--The Task Force shall be composed of the following
members (or their designees):
(1) The Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and
Security.
(3) The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(5) The Director for Intelligence for the United States
Indo-Pacific Command.
(6) The Director of the National-Geospatial Intelligence
Agency.
(7) The Director of the National Security Agency.
(8) The Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for
Intelligence and Analysis.
(9) The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and
Research.
(10) Such other heads of the elements of the intelligence
community that the Director of National Intelligence and the
Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security
determine appropriate.
(d) Leadership; Organization; Meetings.--
(1) Co-chairs.--The Director of National Intelligence (or a
designee of the Director) and the Undersecretary of Defense for
Intelligence and Security (or a designee of the Undersecretary)
shall be co-chairs of the Task Force.
(2) Working groups.--The Task Force may create subordinate
working groups as determined by the co-chairs.
(3) Meeting frequency.--The Task Force shall meet regularly
but not less than quarterly.
(e) Staffing.--
(1) In general.--The Task Force may hire staff and create
joint duty assignments assigned to the Task Force. The Task
Force may not exceed 25 full-time equivalent staff in total.
(2) Agency liaison.--Each member listed in subsection (b)
shall appoint a senior intelligence officer from the agency
concerned to serve as a liaison to the Task Force. Such liaison
shall be responsible for coordinating the participation and
support of the agency concerned to the Task Force.
(f) Initial Reports.--. Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Task Force shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense
committees a report on the status of the Task Force, including--
(1) a summary of the efforts of the intelligence community
with respect to China-Taiwan indications and warning;
(2) a summary of efforts by the Task Force to develop a
common set of indicators and organize collection efforts by the
intelligence community against such indicators;
(3) a description of the resources provided by each Task
Force member towards efforts with respect to China-Taiwan
indications and warning, disaggregated by--
(A) dollars spent or planned to be spent during
fiscal year 2027 ; and
(B) total full-time equivalent personnel; and
(4) recommendations to improve the collection and analysis
of the intelligence community with respect to China-Taiwan
indications and warning.
(g) Sunset.--The provisions of this section shall terminate on the
date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 612. LIMITATIONS RELATING TO CHINESE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES.
(a) Prohibition on Use by Intelligence Community.--
(1) In general.--Paragraph (1) of subsection (e) of section
6604 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026
(50 U.S.C. 3334m note; division F of Public Law 119-60) is
amended to read as follows:
``(1) Covered application.--The term `covered application'
means--
``(A) the DeepSeek application or any successor
application or service; or
``(B) any product or service from any entity of the
People's Republic of China that is included on--
``(i) the Entity List maintained by the
Bureau of Industry and Security of the
Department of Commerce;
``(ii) the list (sometimes known as the
`Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex
Companies List') maintained by the Office of
Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the
Treasury under Executive Order 13959, as
amended by Executive Order 14032 (50 U.S.C.
1701 note; relating to addressing the threat
from securities investments that finance
certain companies of the People's Republic of
China), or any successor order; or
``(iii) the list of Chinese military
companies required under section 1260H of the
William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (10
U.S.C. 113 note; Public Law 116-283) and
maintained by the Department of Defense.''.
(2) Conforming amendment.--The heading for such section is
amended by striking ``deepseek'' and inserting ``products and
services from people's republic of china''.
(b) Limitation on Procurement by Intelligence Community.--Section
414 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (28
U.S.C. 532 note; division X of Public Law 117-103) is amended--
(1) in the section heading, by striking ``by federal bureau
of investigation'';
(2) in subsection (a)--
(A) in the matter before paragraph (1), by striking
``Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation'' and
inserting ``head of an element of the intelligence
community'';
(B) in paragraph (1), by striking ``Federal Bureau
of Investigation'' and inserting ``element''; and
(C) in paragraph (3), by striking ``Director (or a
designee of the Director)'' and inserting ``head'';
(3) in subsection (b), by striking ``the Director (or a
designee of the Director, as applicable) approves a
recommendation pursuant to subsection (a)(3), the Director
shall'' and inserting ``the head of an element of the
intelligence community approves a recommendation pursuant to
subsection (a)(3), the head shall'';
(4) in subsection (c), by amending paragraph (2) to read as
follows:
``(2) People's republic of china product or service.--The
term `People's Republic of China product or service' means--
``(A) an information or communication technology
product manufactured in China, Hong Kong, or Macau and
designed, developed, or maintained by a firm that is
domiciled in China, Hong Kong, or Macau; or
``(B) an information or communication technology
product or service provided or manufactured by--
``(i) an entity that is fully or partially
owned or controlled by, or otherwise connected
to, the government of China; or
``(ii) an entity included on the list
submitted by the Director of National
Intelligence under section 6706(c) of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2026 (division F of Public Law 119-60; 139
Stat. 1648).''.
SEC. 613. LIMITATION ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR OFFENSIVE
CYBER OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY NONGOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES.
(a) In General.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001
et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 1115. LIMITATION ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR OFFENSIVE
CYBER OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY NONGOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES.
``(a) In General.--An element of the intelligence community may not
provide intelligence or support for an offensive cyber operation
conducted by a nongovernmental entity, unless such an entity--
``(1) is conducting the offensive cyber operation on behalf
of such element and is operating under the authorities and
supervision of such element; or
``(2) is otherwise authorized by the President of the
United States to conduct the offensive cyber operation.
``(b) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Nongovernmental entity.--The term `nongovernmental
entity' means any entity that is not an entity of the United
States Government.
``(2) Offensive cyber operation.--The term `offensive cyber
operation' means any activity carried out in cyberspace, or any
associated preparatory action, that affects an information
system, network, or any other computer infrastructure that is
not owned or lawfully operated by the entity carrying out the
activity or action.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 1115. Limitation on intelligence community support for offensive
cyber operations conducted by
nongovernmental entities.''.
SEC. 614. BIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 124. BIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Biological data.--The term `biological data' means
multiomic information and other relevant information, including
associated descriptors, derived from the structure, function,
or process of a biological system, that is measured, collected,
or aggregated for analysis, including information from humans,
animals, plants, or microbes.
``(2) Biological intelligence.--The term `biological
intelligence' includes the information collected or
disseminated by the intelligence community concerning
biological threats through genomic surveillance, immunological
monitoring, environmental sampling, multiomic analysis, and
other scientific methodologies.
``(3) Biological threat.--The term `biological threat'
includes any naturally occurring infectious disease, engineered
pathogen, toxin, or other biological agent that poses a risk to
human, animal, or plant health or to the national security of
the United States.
``(b) Determination; Dissemination.--The Director of National
Intelligence, in such coordination with the Secretary of Defense as the
Director considers appropriate, shall, consistent with applicable
Federal law and Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to
United States intelligence activities)--
``(1) determine which United States agencies would benefit
from receiving anonymized biological data and biological
intelligence in support of detection, characterization, and
attribution of foreign biological threats; and
``(2) disseminate such anonymized biological data and
biological intelligence to agencies identified under paragraph
(1).
``(c) Standards; Databases.--Not later than 1 year after the date
of the enactment of this section, the Director of National
Intelligence, in such coordination with the Secretary of Defense as the
Director considers appropriate, shall--
``(1) ensure standards for the collection and data formats
of anonymized biological data and biological intelligence are,
to the extent possible, consistent with standards used by other
United States agencies, including by--
``(A) providing for standardized data
categorization and tagging of biological data;
``(B) considering standardized scientific and
laboratory equipment and data collection methodologies;
and
``(C) minimizing collection of any biological data
that is likely to contain biological or genomic
information specific to any United States person,
including any derived data that is specific to any
United States person; and
``(2) facilitate the establishment and maintenance of
streamlined and unified accesses to databases of biological
intelligence collected by the intelligence community or the
Department of Defense.
``(d) Priority.--In carrying out subsections (b) and (c), the
Director of National Intelligence shall prioritize supporting
capabilities, including the development of technical tools, that enable
the early detection, characterization, and attribution of naturally
occurring, novel, or engineered pathogens that could threaten the
United States.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act is
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 123 the
following:
``Sec. 124. Biological intelligence activities of the intelligence
community.''.
SEC. 615. PROHIBITION ON PARTICIPATION IN PREDICTION MARKETS.
(a) In General.--Title III of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3071 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 304 the
following:
``SEC. 304A. PROHIBITION ON PARTICIPATION IN PREDICTION MARKETS.
``(a) In General.--Except as may be necessary to conduct authorized
intelligence activities, a covered individual may not participate in a
prediction market on any topic relating to nonpublic information to
which the covered individual has access by virtue of being a covered
individual, during--
``(1) the period during which the covered individual is
employed or contracted by an element of the intelligence
community; or
``(2) the two-year period beginning on the date on which
the covered individual ceases to be employed or contracted by
such an element.
``(b) Policy.--Not later than 45 days after the date of the
enactment of this section, the Director of National Intelligence shall
issue a policy implementing the prohibition in subsection (a),
including--
``(1) establishing appropriate penalties for violating the
prohibition; and
``(2) providing notice to all covered individuals.
``(c) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Covered individual.--The term `covered individual'
means an employee or contractor, or a former employee or
contractor, of an element of the intelligence community who
holds a security clearance.
``(2) Prediction market.--The term `prediction market'
means a platform, company, or service that allows agreements,
contracts, transactions, or swaps between users over the
outcome of non-financial future events, such as sports,
military actions, and elections.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act is
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 304 the
following:
``Sec. 304A. Prohibition on participation in prediction markets.''.
SEC. 616. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORT AND BRIEFING REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Oversight of Foreign Influence in Academia.--Section 5713 of
the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C.
3369b) is repealed.
(b) Report on Efforts to Illicitly Acquire Satellites and Related
Items.--Section 1261 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2013 (22 U.S.C. 2778 note; Public Law 112-239) is amended
by striking subsection (e).
(c) Monitoring Mineral Investments Under Belt and Road Initiative
of the People's Republic of China.--Section 7003 of the Energy Act of
2020 (50 U.S.C. 3372) is amended by striking subsection (d).
(d) Briefing on Protocols for Certain Intelligence Community
Employees and Dependents.--Section 605(g) of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3334k(g)) is amended
by striking paragraph (3).
(e) Program on Use of Intelligence Resources in Efforts to Sanction
Foreign Opioid Traffickers.--Section 7231 of the Fentanyl Sanctions Act
(21 U.S.C. 2331) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (c); and
(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).
(f) Periodic Report on Positions in the Intelligence Community That
Can Be Conducted Without Access to Classified Information, Networks, or
Facilities.--Section 6610 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young
Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and
2020 (50 U.S.C. 3352e) is repealed.
(g) Review of Shared Information Technology Services for Personnel
Vetting.--Section 7701 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2024 (division G of Public Law 118-31; 137 Stat. 1100) is
repealed.
(h) Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task
Force.--Section 6306 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020
(50 U.S.C. 3370) is amended by striking subsection (e).
(i) Report on Best Practices to Protect Privacy, Civil Liberties,
and Civil Rights of Chinese Americans.--Section 620 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (50 U.S.C. 3240) is repealed.
(j) Enforcement of Cybersecurity Requirements for National Security
Systems; Report on Exemptions.--Section 6309(f) of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (44 U.S.C. 3557 note; division F
of Public Law 117-263) is amended by striking paragraph (3).
(k) Report on Collaboration Between Intelligence Community and
Department of Commerce to Counter Foreign Commercial Threats.--Section
6514(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50
U.S.C. 3370b(b)) is amended by striking paragraph (6).
(l) Timeliness Standard for Rendering Determinations of Trust for
Personnel Vetting; Reviews.--Section 7702(a) of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (50 U.S.C. 3352h(a)) is amended
by striking paragraph (2).
(m) Briefings on Status of Intelligence Community Innovation
Unit.--Subsections (c) and (d) of section 7502 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118-31; 137 Stat.
1082) are repealed.
(n) Annual Training Requirement and Report Regarding Analytic
Standards.--Section 6312 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3364 note; Public Law 117-263) is amended--
(1) by striking subsections (c) and (d); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as subsections
(c) and (d), respectively.
(o) Annual Reports Regarding Intelligence Community Public-private
Talent Exchanges.--Section 6506 of the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118-159; 138 Stat. 2497) is amended by
striking subsection (e).
(p) Software Licensing.--Section 109 of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3044) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (c); and
(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).
(q) Review and Update of Position Designation Guidance.--Section 7
of the SECRET Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-173; 132 Stat. 1294) is
amended--
(1) by striking subsection (c); and
(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).
(r) Report on Independent Study on Economic Impact of Military
Invasion of Taiwan by People's Republic of China.--Section 7407 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal year 2024 (Public Law 118-31;
137 Stat. 1075) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (c); and
(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).
SEC. 617. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL TRAVEL, ALLOWANCES, AND
RELATED EXPENSES REGULATIONS.
(a) Central Intelligence Agency.--Section 4 of the Central
Intelligence Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3505) is amended by adding at the
end the following new subsection:
``(c) Biennial Reviews and Reports.--Not later than September 30,
2027, and not less frequently than once every 2 years thereafter, the
Director shall--
``(1) review the regulations covered by this section; and
``(2) not later than 10 days after completing a review
under paragraph (1), submit to the congressional intelligence
committees the findings of the Director with respect to the
review, including identification of any changes to the
regulations or personnel coverage thereof that the Director
determines to be necessary for the performance of intelligence
functions.''.
(b) Office of Director of National Intelligence.--Section 102A of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024) is amended by adding
at the end the following new subsection:
``(z) Biennial Reviews and Reports Regarding Intelligence Community
Personnel Travel, Allowances, and Related Expenses Regulations.--Not
later than September 30, 2027, and not less frequently than once every
2 years thereafter, in order to reflect the requirements of the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence not taken into account in the
formulation of Government-wide travel procedures covered by this
section, the Director shall--
``(1) review such requirements; and
``(2) not later than 10 days after completing a review
under paragraph (1), submit to the congressional intelligence
committees the findings of the Director with respect to the
review, including any regulations that the Director determines
to be necessary for the performance of intelligence
functions.''.
SEC. 618. PROHIBITION ON SENDING AND RECEIVING OBJECTS USING ENTITIES
OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY PERSONS OR GOVERNMENTS OF CERTAIN
COUNTRIES.
(a) Definition of Covered Nation.--In this section, the term
``covered nation'' has the meaning given such term in section 4872(f)
of title 10, United States Code.
(b) In General.--
(1) List required.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, shall develop a list of products,
intellectual property, technology, and any other objects that
the Directors determine--
(A) affect the national security of the United
States; and
(B) if acquired by a covered nation, would pose a
threat to the national security of the United States.
(2) Form.--The list required by paragraph (1) may be in
classified form.
(c) Prohibition.--Except as provided in subsection (d), no element
of the intelligence community may send or receive any product,
intellectual property, technology, or other object as identified
pursuant to subsection (b) within the United States using an entity,
including any shipping company, that is owned or substantially
controlled by a person or a governmental entity domiciled in a covered
nation.
(d) Waiver.--The head of an element of the intelligence community--
(1) may waive the prohibition in subsection (c) for the
element on a case by case basis if the head determines that in
the particular case, sending or receiving any product,
intellectual property, technology, or other object by an entity
identified pursuant to subsection (b) is necessary for the
national security of the United States; and
(2) not later than 3 days after issuing such waiver, shall
notify the Director of National Intelligence of the waiver.
(e) Notification.--Not later than 30 days after the head of an
element of the intelligence community issues a waiver described in
subsection (d), such head shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a written notice of the waiver, which shall
include--
(1) a justification for the waiver, including the product,
intellectual property, technology, or other object subject to
the waiver; and
(2) a description of the national security threat
mitigation measures implemented for permitting the activity
that otherwise would be prohibited under subsection (c).
SEC. 619. ENHANCING INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
REGION.
(a) Definition of Intelligence Cooperation.--In this section, the
term ``intelligence cooperation'' means activities authorized under the
provisions of law administered by the heads of the elements of the
intelligence community, including the collection, analysis, production,
and dissemination of information, intelligence, and imagery.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to
consider intelligence cooperation with allies and partners of the
United States in the Indo-Pacific region a priority national security
investment that will help deter aggression, reinforce regional
stability, and reduce the risk of miscalculation, all of which will
advance the national security and economic prosperity of the United
States by helping to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific region.
(c) Requirements.--
(1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall, acting in close coordination with such heads of elements
of the intelligence community as the Director considers
relevant and the members of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing
alliance, undertake efforts to bolster and improve--
(A) the intelligence foundations of alliances
between the United States and Australia, Japan, New
Zealand, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and
Thailand; and
(B) intelligence cooperation between the United
States and other regional partners, such as India and
Vietnam.
(2) Priority areas for enhanced cooperation.--Efforts
undertaken pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include efforts--
(A) to address the speed and complexity of
potential strategic and operational contingencies in
the Indo-Pacific region, including any scenarios
involving adversarial efforts to limit the freedom of
navigation through critical maritime chokepoints
threaten supply chain security;
(B) relatedly, to ensure shared situational
awareness across the full spectrum of potential
contingencies, including military indications and
warnings;
(C) to enhance maritime, air, and space domain
awareness, with the goal of providing decision
advantage;
(D) to inform collective defense planning and
response by further integrating intelligence
cooperation into joint and combined operational
planning activities, exercises, and wargames focused on
regional contingencies, including the Rim of the
Pacific;
(E) to encourage intelligence cooperation with
Taiwan, consistent with United States law and policy;
and
(F) to promote multilateral intelligence sharing
and collaboration among allies and partners of the
United States, such as through the United States-Japan-
Republic of Korea trilateral mechanism and the United
States-Japan-Philippines trilateral mechanism.
SEC. 620. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES RELATED TO UKRAINE.
(a) Statement of Policy.--
(1) In general.--Section 3 of the Support for the
Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of
Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8902) is amended--
(A) in paragraph (16), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a semicolon;
(B) in paragraph (17), by striking the period at
the end and inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
``(18) to assist Ukraine in maintaining a credible defense
and deterrence capability, including through the provision of
intelligence support, as a means of advancing the national
security of the United States, regional stability, and the
protection of United States interests in Europe.''.
(2) Definition.--Section 2 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 8901) is
amended--
(A) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as
paragraphs (5) and (6), respectively; and
(B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
``(3) Credible defense and deterrence capability.--The term
`credible defense and deterrence capability' means the ability
to defend against and deter any credible conventional military
threat from the Russian Federation acting unilaterally or in
concert with partners, through the use of conventional military
means, possessed in sufficient quantity, including weapons
platforms and munitions, and command, control, communication,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.
``(4) Intelligence support.--The term `intelligence
support' means activities authorized under the provisions of
law governing the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community, including the collection, analysis, production, and
dissemination of information, intelligence, and imagery.''.
(b) Requirement Relating to Intelligence Support Absent an
Armistice or Comprehensive Political Settlement.--Until Ukraine and the
Russian Federation voluntarily and freely enter into an armistice or
comprehensive political settlement of the conflict, the Director of
National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency,
and the heads of any other relevant element of the intelligence
community, shall continue to ensure the provision of intelligence
support to the Government of Ukraine for purposes of advancing United
States policy goals in Ukraine.
(c) Pauses in Intelligence Support.--
(1) In general.--Intelligence support to Ukraine required
under this section shall not be suspended or limited unless the
Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency, identifies a specific and
identifiable national security concern.
(2) Notification.--Not later than 15 days after making the
decision to pause, terminate, restrict, or otherwise materially
downgrade intelligence support to Ukraine, the Director of
National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the
elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a notification that
includes--
(A) a detailed description of the reason for the
pause, termination, restriction, or material downgrade
of intelligence support;
(B) the expected duration of the pause,
termination, restriction, or material downgrade; and
(C) the anticipated impact of such decision on the
ability of Ukraine to conduct effective military
operations.
(3) Form.--A notification submitted under paragraph (2)
shall be in unclassified form, but may include an classified
annex.
(d) Requirement Relating to Intelligence Support in the Event of
Armistice or Comprehensive Political Settlement.--
(1) In general.--If Ukraine and the Russian Federation
voluntarily and freely enter into an armistice or a
comprehensive political settlement, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the other
relevant elements of the intelligence community, shall adjust
the intelligence support to Ukraine to support implementation
of the armistice or the comprehensive political settlement and,
consistent with the national security interests of the United
States, support building and sustaining the capacity of Ukraine
to detect, deter, and repel any future Russian attack against
the territory of Ukraine.
(2) Report on modifications to united states intelligence
support.--Not later than 30 days after an armistice or a
comprehensive political settlement is entered into force, the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in coordination
with the heads of the other relevant elements of the
intelligence community, including the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security
Agency, and the Director of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report that includes--
(A) a description of the details of the armistice
or the comprehensive political settlement of the
conflict in Ukraine, including a description of the
role of the intelligence community in monitoring the
adherence by the parties to specific elements of the
agreement;
(B) an assessment of the vulnerabilities that
Ukraine will face under the terms of the agreement and
potential measures that the intelligence community or
other parties could take to help mitigate such
vulnerabilities;
(C) a description of the modifications to ongoing
intelligence support the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency has authorized in light of the
changed situation on the ground in Ukraine in order to
help build and sustain the capacity of Ukraine to
detect, deter, and repel any future Russian attack
against the territory of Ukraine;
(D) an assessment of the implications of the
armistice or comprehensive political settlement for the
national security interests of the United States in
Europe, including the capacity of the United States and
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to deter future
aggression by the Russian Federation; and
(E) a description and assessment of any cooperative
arrangements that Ukraine has with other countries,
including member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, that the intelligence community assesses
would contribute to deterring a future attack or act of
aggression by the Russian Federation aimed at occupying
or seizing the territory of Ukraine.
(3) Form.--The report required by paragraph (2) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(4) Early warning.--The Director of National Intelligence,
in coordination with the heads of any other relevant elements
of the intelligence community, shall provide to Ukraine and
member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
intelligence and early warning to allow for an appropriate and
timely response with respect to any potential attack or act of
aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation.
(5) Notification.--
(A) In general.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall promptly notify each Member of the
congressional intelligence committees not later than 5
days after any intelligence element provides Ukraine
any intelligence pursuant to paragraph (4).
(B) Contents.--A notification submitted pursuant to
subparagraph (A) shall include--
(i) a description of the specific
threatened attack or act of aggression shared
with Ukraine;
(ii) the date on which the intelligence was
provided to Ukraine;
(iii) details of the channel through which
the intelligence was shared, including the
names and titles of the relevant intelligence
community officers and Ukrainian government
officials;
(iv) the response of the Government of
Ukraine upon receiving the intelligence;
(v) an assessment produced by the Defense
Intelligence Agency, in coordination with other
relevant elements of intelligence community, as
to what support Ukraine might require in order
to deter or repel the threatened attack or act
of aggression; and
(vi) a summary of subsequent actions that
the Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, and other heads of
relevant elements of the intelligence
community, directed be taken to support Ukraine
in defending against or otherwise responding to
the threatened attack or act of aggression.
(C) Form.--A notification submitted pursuant to
subparagraph (A) shall be in unclassified form, but may
include a classified annex.
(e) Requirement Relating to Intelligence Support in the Event of an
Armed Attack on Ukraine in Violation of an Armistice or Comprehensive
Political Settlement.--
(1) In general.--In the event of an armed attack by the
Russian Federation on Ukraine that violates an armistice or a
comprehensive political settlement, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the heads of other relevant elements of the
intelligence community, shall immediately resume the provision
of intelligence support to the Government of Ukraine at a level
the Directors deem necessary to support military operations of
the Government of Ukraine that are intended, or reasonably
expected, to help the Armed Forces of Ukraine defend or
liberate the territory of Ukraine and prevent such territory of
Ukraine from being occupied or attacked by the Russian
Federation.
(2) Notification.--
(A) In general.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall promptly notify the congressional
intelligence committees not later than 5 days after
resuming intelligence support pursuant to paragraph
(1).
(B) Contents.--A notification submitted pursuant to
subparagraph (A) shall include--
(i) a description of the specific attack or
act of aggression against Ukraine;
(ii) a description of any intelligence
support that Ukraine requested from the United
States;
(iii) an assessment of the support that
Ukraine might require in order to deter or
repel the attack or act of aggression;
(iv) a description of any intelligence
support that the Director has authorized to be
provided to Ukraine; and
(v) a description of the response of the
Government of Ukraine upon receiving the
intelligence support.
(C) Form.--A notification submitted pursuant to
subparagraph (A) shall be in unclassified form, but may
include a classified annex.
(3) Sunset.--
(A) In general.--The provision of intelligence
support for Ukraine under this subsection shall cease
on the date that is 120 days after the date on which
the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the
Russian Federation agree to reinstate the armistice or
comprehensive political settlement that was violated or
a new armistice or comprehensive political settlement
is entered into force.
(B) Recommencement.--Upon the cessation of the
provision of intelligence support under subparagraph
(A), the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
in coordination with the heads of any other relevant
elements of the intelligence community, shall resume
the provision of intelligence support to Ukraine
pursuant to subsection (d).
(f) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Armistice; comprehensive political settlement.--The
terms ``armistice'' and ``comprehensive political settlement''
mean a formal written agreement between the Government of
Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation that has
the effect of permanently ending the armed conflict between
both nations.
(2) Intelligence support.--The term ``intelligence
support'' means activities authorized under the provisions of
law governing the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community, including the collection, analysis, production, and
dissemination of information, intelligence, and imagery.
(3) Specific and identifiable national security concern.--
The term ``specific and identifiable national security
concern'' includes the following:
(A) Credible intelligence that an element of the
Government of Ukraine has been compromised by the
Russian Federation or another foreign adversary.
(B) Protection of sources and methods.
(C) A voluntary request from the Government of
Ukraine to pause intelligence support.
(D) Credible intelligence that an element of the
Government of Ukraine receiving United States
intelligence support engaged in a pattern of human
rights violations, atrocities, or violations of the law
of armed conflict.
(4) Territory of ukraine.--The term ``territory of
Ukraine'' means all territory internationally recognized to be
the sovereign territory of Ukraine on February 19, 2014,
including Crimea and the territory that the Russian Federation
claims to have annexed in Kherson and Zaporizhzia.
SEC. 621. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH COUNTRIES
OF SIGNIFICANT CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES.
Section 102A(j) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3024(j)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Under the direction'' and inserting the
following:
``(1) In general.--Under the direction''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) Notification required.--
``(A) In general.--Not later than 48 hours after a
decision to pause, terminate, or otherwise restrict or
materially downgrade intelligence support or
intelligence activities (as defined in section 501(f)),
including information, intelligence, and imagery
collection authorized under Executive Order 12333 (50
U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to United States
intelligence activities), to the government of a
country of significant concern to the United States,
the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to
the congressional intelligence committees a
notification of such decision.
``(B) Elements.--The notification required in
subsection (a) shall include--
``(i) a detailed description of the reason
for the pause, termination, restriction, or
material downgrade of intelligence support;
``(ii) a description of the change in
intelligence sharing;
``(iii) the categories of information
affected;
``(iv) the expected duration of the pause,
termination, restriction, or material
downgrade; and
``(v) the anticipated impact of such
decision on regional security and the national
security objectives of the United States.
``(C) Country of significant concern to the united
states defined.--In this subsection, the term `country
of significant concern to the United States' means--
``(i) Israel;
``(ii) Ukraine;
``(iii) Taiwan; and
``(iv) any other country designated as such
by the President.''.
SEC. 622. UNITED STATES-ISRAEL INTELLIGENCE SHARING ENHANCEMENT.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to maintain and strengthen the strategic security
partnership with Israel as a means of advancing the national
defense of the United States, regional stability, and the
protection of United States personnel and interests in the
Middle East;
(2) to enhance intelligence collaboration through robust
intelligence sharing and analytic partnership with Israel to
counter terrorism, proliferation networks, cyber threats, state
and nonstate aggressors, terror financing, sanctions evasion,
and other transnational security challenges that threaten both
Israel and the United States;
(3) to deter and counter destabilizing activities by the
Government of Iran and Iran-aligned state and nonstate actors
that threaten Israel, United States forces, and regional
partners;
(4) to ensure that security assistance and defense
cooperation are structured to help Israel maintain its
qualitative military edge, consistent with United States law
and broader regional security considerations;
(5) to encourage and support the expansion of regional
security architectures that include Israel and willing regional
partners, with a focus on integrated air and missile defense,
maritime security, early warning systems, and intelligence-
sharing frameworks; and
(6) to leverage security coordination with Israel to
enhance force protection, early warning, and crisis response
capabilities for United States military and diplomatic
personnel in the region.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) Israel remains a critical United States security
partner whose defense and intelligence capabilities provide a
strategic advantage that contributes to enhanced operational
effectiveness and technological superiority;
(2) timely and actionable intelligence sharing between the
United States and Israel has saved United States personnel and
property in the region and should remain a central pillar of
the bilateral security relationship;
(3) the evolving threat environment in the Middle East--
including missile proliferation, unmanned systems, cyber
operations, terror financing, and proxy warfare--requires
sustained and adaptive cooperation between the United States
and Israel;
(4) the United States-Israel security partnership has
historically benefitted from bipartisan support, which
strengthens the partnership's credibility, durability, and
deterrent value; and
(5) expanding normalization and practical security
cooperation between Israel and regional states can serve as a
force multiplier for collective deterrence and integrated
defense.
(c) Requirements Relating to Intelligence Sharing.--
(1) In general.--Title XI of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end
the following:
``SEC. 1115. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE SHARING.
``(a) Intelligence Sharing With Israel.--
``(1) In general.--The President, acting through the
Director of National Intelligence and, as necessary, the
Secretary of Defense, shall, subject to applicable law and the
protection of intelligence sources and methods, expand and
enhance intelligence sharing with the Government of Israel.
``(2) Scope of intelligence sharing.--Intelligence sharing
carried out under this subsection shall include the sharing of
information relating to cybersecurity threats, terrorism,
sanctions evasion, plans and intentions of state and nonstate
actors, adversarial technology proliferation, missile threats,
unmanned aerial systems, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles,
air and space domain awareness, and other aerial threats
relevant to the defense of Israel, United States forces and
interests in the region, and regional security partners.
``(3) Limitations on reduction of intelligence sharing.--
``(A) In general.--Intelligence sharing and related
security information exchanges with the Government of
Israel shall not be suspended, reduced, or otherwise
materially limited except on the basis of a specific
and identifiable national security concern determined
by the President, such as the protection of
intelligence sources and methods, counterintelligence
risk, or another significant security consideration.
``(B) Documentation requirement.--The President
shall document any determination to suspend, reduce, or
otherwise materially limit intelligence sharing or
related security information exchanges with the
Government of Israel, including a description of the
national security rationale supporting the change.
``(4) Congressional notification.--
``(A) In general.--Not later than 15 days after the
date of any decision to materially increase, suspend,
reduce, or otherwise alter intelligence sharing or
related security information exchanges with the
Government of Israel, the President shall notify the
congressional intelligence committees of such decision.
``(B) Elements.--Each notification required by
subparagraph (A) shall include the following:
``(i) A description of the change in
intelligence sharing or security information
exchange.
``(ii) The categories of information
affected.
``(iii) The national security objectives
served by the change.
``(iv) In the case of a suspension or
reduction, the specific national security
concern supporting the change.
``(v) An assessment of the anticipated
impact on regional security, United States
forces, and integrated air and missile defense
cooperation.
``(b) Intelligence Sharing and Analytic Cooperation With Abraham
Accords Countries.--
``(1) In general.--The President, acting through the
Director of National Intelligence and, as necessary, the
Secretary of Defense, shall, consistent with applicable law and
security agreements, expand and enhance intelligence sharing
and analytic cooperation with countries that have normalized
relations with Israel pursuant to the Abraham Accords (as
defined in section 64(k) of the State Department Basic
Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2735a(k)) in order to
strengthen regional security integration.
``(2) Priority areas.--In carrying out paragraph (1), the
President shall prioritize the sharing of appropriate
intelligence and information relating to--
``(A) counterterrorism threats and networks,
including state and nonstate aggressors, and terror
financing;
``(B) cybersecurity threats, vulnerabilities, and
defensive best practices;
``(C) air and missile defense early warning and
threat tracking;
``(D) geospatial, overhead, and other imaging
intelligence relevant to shared security concerns; and
``(E) maritime security threats, including threats
to freedom of navigation, commercial shipping,
sanctions evasion, and regional maritime stability.
``(3) Safeguards.--
``(A) Adoption of guidelines.--The Director of
National Intelligence, in coordination with the
Secretary of Defense, shall adopt guidelines for
intelligence sharing and analytic cooperation carried
out under this subsection that ensure appropriate
safeguards--
``(i) to protect intelligence sources and
methods; and
``(ii) to ensure that recipients maintain
adequate security protections consistent with
United States requirements.
``(B) Restrictions on access.--If the Director of
National Intelligence determines that a recipient of
intelligence sharing or analytic cooperation carried
out under this subsection has any intelligence,
defense, or technological information sharing
relationship with an adversarial nation, the Director
shall restrict all access of such recipient to such
intelligence sharing and analytic cooperation.
``(c) Report Required.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this section, and annually thereafter for 5
years, the President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on the status of United
States intelligence sharing with the Government Israel and, as
appropriate, regional partners.
``(2) Matters to be included.--Each report required by
paragraph (1) shall include, to the extent consistent with the
protection of intelligence sources and methods, the following:
``(A) A description of the categories of
intelligence and security information shared by the
United States Government with the Government of Israel.
``(B) An assessment of progress toward seamlessly
integrating Israel into regional air and missile
defense and early warning architectures with partner
countries, including those that have normalized
relations with Israel pursuant to the Abraham Accords.
``(C) A description of how such intelligence
sharing has contributed, if at all, to--
``(i) improved detection, tracking,
warning, interception, or deterrence of aerial
threats, including missiles and unmanned
systems, for Israel, United States forces, or
regional partners; and
``(ii) the overall stability and
coordination of security in the region.
``(D) An assessment of progress in improving
interoperability among technology networks of the
United States, Israel, and partner countries.
``(E) A description of efforts to secure technology
networks and data from cyber threats and unauthorized
access.
``(F) An identification of any legal, policy,
technical, counterintelligence, or security barriers
limiting deeper intelligence integration, including
risks to intelligence sources and methods.
``(G) A summary of any significant increases or
reductions in intelligence sharing during the reporting
period and the national security rationale for such
changes.
``(3) Form.--Each report required by paragraph (1) report
shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a
classified annex.
``(4) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In
this subsection, the term `appropriate congressional
committees' means--
``(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
and
``(B) to the extent Department of Defense
information is implicated, the congressional defense
committees (as defined in section 101(a) of title 10,
United States Code).''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents for such Act
is amended by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 1115. Requirements relating to intelligence sharing.''.
TITLE VII--ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS RELATING TO THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY
SEC. 701. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE EXPLOITATION GUARD AND INTELLIGENCE
SHARING.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Artificial intelligence model.--The term ``artificial
intelligence model'' means a capability or series of
capabilities combined that can, for a given set of objectives,
generate outputs such as predictions, recommendations, or
decisions without human intervention or input.
(2) Center.--The term ``Center'' means the Artificial
Intelligence Security Center of the National Security Agency.
(3) Classified information.--The term ``classified
information'' has the meaning given such term in section 805 of
the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3164).
(4) Cleared industry personnel.--The term ``cleared
industry personnel'' means employees or representatives of a
covered person who hold an appropriate security clearance and
have a demonstrated need to know.
(5) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' has the meaning given
such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (
50 U.S.C. 3003).
(6) Covered person.--The term ``covered person'' means a
non-Federal person who--
(A) is a United States citizen;
(B) develops, deploys, or operates artificial
intelligence models or critical enabling
infrastructure; and
(C) provides the services described in subparagraph
(B) to an element of the intelligence community or
Department of Defense.
(7) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of
the National Security Agency.
(8) Intelligence.--The term ``intelligence'' has the
meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security
Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3003).
(9) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the
National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3003).
(10) Security clearance.--The term ``security clearance''
means an authorization to access classified information.
(11) Threat information.--The term ``threat information''
means information on--
(A) efforts by foreign adversary countries to use
products or research of covered persons or other
entities or individuals to generate synthetic media for
foreign-directed influence campaigns, develop and
manage computer network exploitation campaigns, design
or develop weapons systems, or enhance surveillance
capabilities in ways that undermine the privacy or
threaten the security of citizens of the United States;
(B) threats posed by foreign adversary countries,
including indications of compromise to networks
associated with covered persons and other entities and
individuals, or other technical indicators, indicating
a compromise to the confidentiality, integrity, or
availability of an artificial intelligence system, or
to the supply chain of an artificial intelligence
system, including training or test data, frameworks or
software libraries, training or inference computing
environments, or other components necessary for the
training, management, or maintenance of an artificial
intelligence system;
(C) activity of foreign entities of concern to
clandestinely, fraudulently, or otherwise maliciously
access the systems of covered persons for purposes of
illicit technology transfer or otherwise gaining unfair
economic advantage, including through techniques to
extract a model's technical capabilities to replicate,
develop, or improve a foreign artificial intelligence
model without authorization by the covered person;
(D) activity of foreign entities of concern to
sabotage or otherwise clandestinely degrade artificial
intelligence systems or the supply chain of an
artificial intelligence system, including training or
test data, frameworks or software libraries, training
or inference computing environments, or other
components necessary for the training, management, or
maintenance of an artificial intelligence system; and
(E) observations, emerging concerns, or other
inputs from vendors or researchers regarding relevant
malicious or clandestine activity of foreign entities
of concern toward an artificial intelligence system,
its supply chain, or other necessary components.
(b) Establishment of Pilot Program on Sharing of Intelligence and
Threat Information With Covered Persons.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director shall, acting through
the Center, establish a pilot program to assess the feasibility
and advisability of facilitating the secure sharing with
covered persons of intelligence and threat information germane
to the exploitation of access to United States artificial
intelligence systems and enabling infrastructure to engage in
intelligence collection, intellectual property theft, and other
malicious activities.
(2) Participation.--The Director may not select covered
persons to participate in the pilot in a manner that provides a
competitive advantage or procurement preference to any covered
person, to the detriment of another covered person.
(3) Duration.--The Director shall carry out the pilot
program established pursuant to paragraph (1) during the 3-year
period beginning on the date of the establishment of the pilot
program.
(c) Participation Requirements.--
(1) Criteria.--The Director shall establish criteria
governing engagement with covered persons under the pilot
program required by subsection (b), which may include criteria
relating to the following:
(A) Relevance to national security.
(B) The ability to protect classified or sensitive
intelligence information.
(C) Cybersecurity and information security
maturity.
(D) Agreement to comply with intelligence handling,
use, and nondisclosure requirements.
(E) The availability of cleared personnel of
covered persons or willingness of covered persons to
increase the number of cleared personnel.
(2) Nature of participation.--Participation in the pilot
program shall not be construed as a certification, endorsement,
or regulatory approval by the United States Government of any
artificial intelligence system or commercial activity and the
Director may not exclude a covered person from participating on
the basis of political or ideological viewpoints of the covered
person or its employees.
(d) Intelligence Sharing Structure.--
(1) Authorized modes.--Under the pilot program required by
subsection (b), the Director may, acting through the Center,
authorize the sharing of intelligence and threat information as
described in paragraph (1) of such subsection through--
(A) bilateral exchanges between elements of the
intelligence community and a covered person;
(B) multilateral exchanges among covered persons,
as determined appropriate by the Director; or
(C) another designated intelligence-sharing
mechanism operated or overseen by the Director.
(2) Limitation.--Any mechanism established under this
section shall be limited to the dissemination of intelligence
and threat information and shall not establish standards,
requirements, or best practices governing artificial
intelligence development or deployment.
(e) Tailoring, Handling, and Protection of Intelligence.--
(1) Procedures required.--The Director shall, acting
through the Center, codify procedures to tailor, sanitize, or
downgrade the classification level of intelligence shared under
the pilot program required by subsection (b) to ensure
usability while protecting intelligence sources and methods.
(2) Examples of procedures.--The procedures developed under
paragraph (1) may include the following:
(A) The use of tear lines and segregable summaries.
(B) The preparation of classified annexes where
necessary.
(C) Criteria governing the classification level of
shared intelligence.
(D) The appropriate use of cleared industry
personnel.
(3) Handling requirements.--The Director shall, acting
through the Center, codify policies governing the handling,
storage, and dissemination of intelligence shared under the
pilot program required by subsection (b), including audit and
compliance mechanisms.
(f) Permissible Use and Nondisclosure.--
(1) Permissible use.--Intelligence shared under the pilot
program required by subsection (b) may be used solely for
detecting, preventing, or mitigating malicious foreign activity
exploiting access to United States artificial intelligence
systems and enabling infrastructure to engage in intelligence
collection, intellectual property theft, and other malicious
activities.
(2) Nondisclosure.--A covered person may not disclose to
any person who is not a covered person or an element of the
intelligence community any intelligence shared with the covered
person under the pilot program required by subsection (b),
except as expressly authorized by the Director acting through
the Center.
(g) Privacy and Civil Liberties.--In planning and coordinating the
pilot program required by subsection (b), the Director shall, acting
through the Center, consult with the Civil Liberties Protection Officer
of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(h) Evaluation and Reporting.--
(1) Evaluation.--The Director shall, acting through the
Center, continuously evaluate the effectiveness and risks of
the pilot program established under subsection (b).
(2) Report.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 90 days before the
date on which the pilot program required by paragraph
(1) of subsection (b) terminates pursuant to paragraph
(2) of such subsection, the Director shall, acting
through the Center, submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report assessing--
(i) the effectiveness of intelligence
sharing under the pilot program;
(ii) the adequacy of safeguards for
sources, methods, and privacy;
(iii) the scope of participation; and
(iv) whether the program should be
modified, extended, or terminated.
(B) Form.--The report submitted pursuant to
subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassified
form, but may include a classified annex.
(i) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed--
(1) to authorize the collection of intelligence on United
States persons not authorized by another provision of law;
(2) to require the disclosure of classified information to
unauthorized persons; or
(3) to establish commercial, competition, or technology
policy outside the purview of the intelligence community.
(j) Exemption From Disclosure; Protection.--Any information shared
by a covered person or other entity or individual with the United
States Government pursuant to this section--
(1) shall be exempt from disclosure and withheld, without
discretion, from the public, pursuant to section 552(b)(3)(B)
of title 5, United States Code, and any other provision of
United States law or law of any State, political subdivision or
agency thereof, or Tribe requiring disclosure of information or
records; and
(2) shall not be deemed a waiver of any applicable
privilege or protection, including trade secret protection.
SEC. 702. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO SUPPORT
TARGETING.
(a) Definitions.--In this subsection:
(1) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of
National Intelligence.
(2) Intelligence.--The term ``Intelligence'' has the
meaning given the term in section 3 of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
(b) Reviews Related to Intelligence Community Use of Artificial
Intelligence to Support Targeting.--
(1) Policy and procedure reviews.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall
review and assess the policies and procedures that
govern the use by the intelligence community of
artificial intelligence technologies in the production,
or review, of intelligence used by the United States to
inform targeting decisions with lethal effects.
(B) Elements.--In carrying out the review and
assessment required by subparagraph (A), the Director
shall--
(i) assess whether policies and procedures
of the intelligence community that were in
effect on the day before the date of the
enactment of this Act adequately address risks
posed by the use of artificial intelligence
technologies in the targeting analysis and
development and civilian harm mitigation
processes; and
(ii) ensure the review covers all policies
of the intelligence community that regard the
production or review of intelligence,
regardless of which element first produced the
intelligence.
(2) Workflow reviews.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall review
and assess all workflows of the intelligence community that
incorporate artificial intelligence used by the United States
to inform targeting decisions with lethal effects.
(c) Artificial Intelligence Errors Exploratory Analysis.--In
carrying out the reviews required by subsection (b), the Director shall
direct the National Intelligence Council to conduct a structured,
exploratory analysis that--
(1) assess ways in which frontier artificial intelligence
models could exhibit bias or cause errors that undermine
intelligence or other information provided by the intelligence
community that informs targeting accuracy;
(2) identify the specific point and cause of error; and
(3) provide proposed process mitigations to catch and
correct such mistakes.
(d) Consultation.--In carrying out the review and assessments
required by subsection (b), the Director shall consult with the heads
of the elements of the intelligence community whose intelligence is
commonly consulted to inform targeting decisions with lethal effects,
such as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Central
Intelligence Agency, to solicit input on potential negative
consequences resulting from artificial intelligence supported analysis,
and possible ways to mitigate such consequences.
(e) Policies and Directives.--The Director shall issue or adjust
such policies and directives to the intelligence community as the
Director considers appropriate to improve risk mitigation in light of
the review carried out under subsection (b).
(f) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the reviews
and assessments carried out under subsection (b) as well as a
summary of any new policies and directives issued pursuant to
subsection (e).
(2) Contents.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) A description of contributions of the
intelligence community to targeting workflows, such as
identification of points of interest, pattern of life
analysis, review of proposed targets, target selection,
and civilian impact reviews, as well as the
understanding of the intelligence community of the
delineation of roles and responsibilities with the
Armed Forces where applicable.
(B) Identification of any artificial intelligence
tools utilized and for what tasks or purposes they are
used.
(C) The level of autonomy afforded to the tools,
and whether human review of artificial intelligence
system outputs is required to be conducted prior to
dissemination of materials.
(D) The scope of individuals expected to have
access to the materials described in subparagraph (C).
(E) An explanation of whether and how the
capability limitations of artificial intelligence tools
available to personnel of the intelligence community
are communicated to users, including the cutoff date
for the tool's training data, databases to which it
does or does not have access rights, and the tasks the
model has been trained for or approved for use.
(3) Form.--The report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 703. IMPROVEMENTS FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE POLICIES, STANDARDS,
AND GUIDANCE FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--Section 6702 of the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3334m) is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)--
(A) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph
(4); and
(B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
``(3) Study for tracking data generated or modified by an
artificial intelligence system.--The Chief Artificial
Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, in
coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of
each element of the intelligence community, shall examine
whether the intelligence community should identify intelligence
information generated or materially modified by an artificial
intelligence system, including determining what methods are
necessary to preserve such information throughout the
intelligence lifecycle.'';
(2) in subsection (d), by adding at the end the following:
``(3) Process for review of artificial intelligence testing
methodologies and benchmarks.--Consistent with applicable
classification and access policies, the Chief Artificial
Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, in
coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of
each element of the intelligence community, shall--
``(A) establish a process to review artificial
intelligence testing methodologies and benchmarks
employed within each element; and
``(B) ensure such methodologies and benchmarks
remain commensurate with the capabilities and impacts
of systems being evaluated.''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(f) Process to Systematically Track and Evaluate Incidents.--Not
later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection,
the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence
Community, in coordination with the National Manager for National
Security Systems, shall establish a process to systematically track and
evaluate incidents associated with compromises to the confidentiality,
integrity, or availability of artificial intelligence systems within
each element of the intelligence community.
``(g) Policies for Agentic Artificial Intelligence Systems and
Processes.--
``(1) Definition of agentic artificial intelligence system
or process.--In this subsection, the term `agentic artificial
intelligence system or process'--
``(A) means an artificial intelligence system or
process that, given an objective or instruction--
``(i) determines the action or sequence of
actions to be taken to accomplish that
objective; and
``(ii) is capable of executing such actions
directly on information systems, data, or
external services; and
``(B) does not include a system or process that
solely generates informational or advisory output for a
human operator to act upon.
``(2) Review of the adequacy of existing identity,
credential, and access management systems for information
within the intelligence community.--
``(A) In general.--Consistent with authority under
section 102A(g) of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3024(g)), the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the National Manager
for National Security Systems, shall--
``(i) not later than 1 year after the date
of the enactment of this paragraph, complete a
review of the adequacy of existing identity,
credential, and access management systems for
information within the intelligence community
used by agentic artificial intelligence systems
and processes; and
``(ii) not permit access to any information
within the intelligence community by an
external department or agency for use in an
agentic artificial intelligence system or
process until the review required by clause (i)
is completed.
``(B) Evaluation of effectiveness of mechanisms for
agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes
to authenticate as non-human actors.--The review
required by subparagraph (A)(i) shall include an
evaluation of the effectiveness of mechanisms for
agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes
to authenticate as non-human actors, including the
appropriate delegation of clearance entitlements and
the traceability of any action taken by an agentic
artificial intelligence system or process to a cleared
individual on whose behalf the agentic artificial
intelligence system or process is acting.
``(3) Policy guidance.--Upon completion of the review
required by paragraph (2), the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the National
Security Agency, the Director of the National Reconnaissance
Office, and the Director of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, shall issue appropriate policy guidance
on--
``(A) the use of agentic artificial intelligence
systems and processes within the intelligence
community; and
``(B) the access of agentic artificial intelligence
systems and processes to information within the
intelligence community.
``(4) Specific issues relating to agentic artificial
intelligence systems and processes.--In carrying out paragraph
(3), the Director of National Intelligence, at a minimum and to
the extent such requirements are not already replicated in
existing processes or policies, consider--
``(A) establishing a taxonomy of autonomy and
security risks associated with agentic artificial
intelligence systems and processes that operate on, or
have the possibility of accessing, information within
the intelligence community; and
``(B) establishing technical controls, processes,
and other mitigation measures to address the risks
identified under subparagraph (A), including, at a
minimum--
``(i) requirements that any element of the
intelligence community or external department
or agency incorporating information from an
intelligence community element as part of an
agentic artificial intelligence system or
process provide the relevant element of the
intelligence community controlling such
information with documentation of--
``(I) the properties of the agentic
artificial intelligence system or
process, including the range of
additional systems or data sources it
may access (whether as a system or
process input or as an agent action),
the permissions and classification
entitlements associated with such
access, as well as any relevant model
or system documentation, such as model
and system cards;
``(II) anticipated mission use
cases for any access to information
within the intelligence community in
the context of an agentic artificial
intelligence system or process,
including whether any use case
constitutes a high-impact artificial
intelligence use as those terms are
defined under existing Federal
policies;
``(III) procedures to notify
relevant intelligence community
elements controlling such information
of any changes to the properties of the
agentic artificial intelligence system
or process, to permissions and
classification entitlements, or to
anticipated use cases of such system or
process, that might significantly limit
the utility, confidentiality,
integrity, or availability of such
information; and
``(IV) procedures for intelligence
community elements to promptly notify
external intelligence community
elements or departments or agencies of
any material changes to upstream
classified data or systems that might
significantly limit or impair the
utility, confidentiality, integrity, or
availability of any downstream agentic
artificial intelligence system or
process maintained by that external
intelligence community element or
department or agency;
``(ii) policies and procedures to log any
actions, as well as associated inputs, taken by
an agentic artificial intelligence system or
process to information within the intelligence
community, including mechanisms to reverse or
negate unauthorized actions or actions that
pose a risk to the user intent or
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of
such information;
``(iii) policies and procedures for
safeguards, continuous monitoring, and the
detection of security incidents or other
unexpected behavior of an agentic artificial
intelligence system or process, or failures of
associated safeguards, that may pose a threat
to the confidentiality, availability, or
integrity of information within the
intelligence community;
``(iv) policies and procedures for system-
level controls of agentic artificial
intelligence systems and processes, tailored to
address each system or process component; and
``(v) criteria for the selection of
interoperability standards for agentic
artificial intelligence systems and processes,
with preference, to the extent practicable, for
standards that are openly specified, governed
in a vendor-neutral manner, supported by
multiple model providers, extensible to future
requirements, and subject to ongoing
independent security review.''.
SEC. 704. ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE SECURITY CENTER.
Section 6504 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2025 (division F of Public Law 118-159) is amended--
(1) in subsection (c)--
(A) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph
(4); and
(B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following
new paragraph (3):
``(3) Making available a research test-bed to private
sector and academic researchers, on a subsidized basis, to
engage in artificial intelligence security research, including
through the secure provision of access in a secure environment
for pre-deployment testing of to proprietary third-party models
with the consent of the vendors of the models.'';
(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (f); and
(3) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
``(d) Test-bed Requirements.--
``(1) Access and terms of usage.--
``(A) Researcher access.--The Director shall
establish terms of usage governing researcher access to
the test-bed made available under subsection (c)(3),
with limitations on researcher publication only to the
extent necessary to protect classified information or
proprietary information concerning third-party models
provided through the consent of model vendors.
``(B) Availability to federal agencies.--The
Director shall ensure that the test-bed made available
under subsection (c)(3) is also made available to other
Federal agencies on a cost-recovery basis.
``(2) Use of certain infrastructure and other resources.--
In carrying out subsection (c)(3), the Director shall leverage,
to the greatest extent practicable, infrastructure and other
resources provided under section 5.2 of Executive Order 14110
(88 Fed. Reg. 75191; relating to safe, secure, and trustworthy
development and use of artificial intelligence).
``(3) Voluntary security guidance.--In order to incentivize
participation by vendors of leading commercial models and to
promote the national security of the United States, the
Director shall share relevant guidance, informed by pre-
deployment testing in the secure test-bed environment
identified in subsection (c), to inform voluntary vendor
actions to mitigate against potential security threats to such
models, or the ability of foreign actors to utilize such models
for computer network exploitation campaigns, the design or
development of weapons systems, or to further foreign
surveillance capabilities.''.
SEC. 705. REPORTS ON NOVEL USES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGY.
(a) Definition.--In this section, the term ``novel use of
artificial intelligence technology'' means--
(1) an artificial intelligence capability or series of
capabilities combined that has not previously been included in
an intelligence community element's inventory of artificial
intelligence use cases consistent with guidance issued pursuant
to section 6702(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3334m(b));
(2) a use of an artificial intelligence capability that
contravenes a restriction on the use of artificial intelligence
contained in such an inventory; or
(3) a use of an artificial intelligence capability that
constitutes a high-impact artificial intelligence use as that
term is defined under policies of the executive branch.
(b) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Director of
National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the other
elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a consolidated report detailing
any novel use of artificial intelligence technology that any element of
the intelligence community is considering employing within the one-year
period following submission of such report.
(c) Contents.--Each report submitted pursuant to subsection (b)
shall describe the proposed novel use of artificial intelligence
technology, including--
(1) hardware and software requirements;
(2) the proposed application of the technology;
(3) the risks and advantages assessed with respect to the
proposed novel use;
(4) any specific risk mitigation measures contemplated,
including measures specific to the proposed novel use;
(5) any test and evaluation activities conducted in
conjunction with the proposed novel use;
(6) any additional test and evaluation activity that is
still needed, and whether the intelligence community has
resources to conduct and fund such activity; and
(7) any estimated cost increases anticipated in connection
with the proposed novel use.
(d) Form.--Each report submitted pursuant to subsection (b) shall
be submitted in classified form.
(e) Sunset.--This section shall expire on October 1, 2032.
SEC. 706. CLEAR LABELING OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE OUTPUTS FOR
TARGETING WORKFLOWS.
Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Director of National Intelligence shall, in coordination with the
Chief Artificial Intelligence Officers of the elements of the
intelligence community, establish a policy that applies to elements of
the intelligence community, which generate intelligence that could
reasonably be judged useful to develop or inform targeting with lethal
effects, and that requires--
(1) labeling of outputs from any artificial intelligence
system used in the development of such intelligence are clearly
marked to indicate--
(A) that artificial intelligence was used;
(B) the artificial intelligence system or model
used;
(C) the manner in which, or task for which, the
artificial intelligence was used; and
(D) a point of contact such as the relevant Chief
Artificial Intelligence Officer, who can address
questions about data inputs, system access, or
artificial intelligence system performance; and
(2) the label or indicator that is used pursuant to
paragraph (1) is attached to the resulting data or work product
in a manner that remains prominent and visible to any person
who subsequently interacts with that data on a system of the
intelligence community, regardless of organizational
affiliation of the person or the role of the person in
developing the data.
SEC. 707. RESEARCH ON USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO
INADVERTENT ESCALATION.
(a) Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act and subject to the availability of
appropriations, the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research
Projects Activity, in coordination with the Chief Artificial
Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall commence a
research campaign to deepen the understanding of the intelligence
community with respect to specific ways in which the use of artificial
intelligence systems by the intelligence community could contribute to
inadvertent escalation with foreign nations or actors.
(b) Elements.--The research campaign required by subsection (a)
shall include--
(1) the identification of scenarios in which artificial
intelligence capabilities could contribute to inadvertent
escalation with foreign nations or actors, including--
(A) analytic judgments that fail to properly
consider or weigh alternative explanations;
(B) automation of imagery classification or signals
intelligence;
(C) distinguishing between civilians and authorized
targets;
(D) operational uses of artificial intelligence,
such as time-constrained uses that do not allow for
independent verification; and
(E) such other scenarios as identified by the
Director or participating subject matter experts;
(2) a simulation of select scenarios to discern where
miscommunication or miscalculations have a higher likelihood of
occurrence; and
(3)(A) an identification of potential mitigations for
vulnerabilities discovered; or
(B) if no mitigation could be identified, an identification
of vulnerabilities that require follow-up action by the
intelligence community.
(c) Briefings.--
(1) Congress.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, or 30 days after the date of
completion of the research campaign required by subsection (a),
whichever occurs first, the Director of the Intelligence
Advanced Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the
Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence
Community, shall brief the congressional intelligence
committees on the findings and recommendations of the research
campaign.
(2) Intelligence community.--The Director of the
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in
coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of
the Intelligence Community, shall brief the heads and Chief
Artificial Intelligence Officers of the elements of the
intelligence community on the findings and recommendations of
the research campaign required by subsection (a), as
appropriate.
SEC. 708. RESEARCH ON INTERACTION OF ADVERSARIAL ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS WITH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SYSTEMS.
(a) Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act and subject to the availability of
appropriations, the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research
Projects Activity, in coordination with the Chief Artificial
Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall commence a
research campaign to deepen the understanding of the intelligence
community with respect to novel dynamics and vulnerabilities that may
arise when an adversarial artificial intelligence system interacts
directly with systems of, or contracted by, the intelligence community
that include artificial intelligence components.
(b) Elements.--The research campaign required by subsection (a)
shall--
(1) pursue sandbox demonstrations with frontier artificial
intelligence models or leverage other tactics necessary to
uncover vulnerabilities to intelligence community systems,
infrastructure, or personnel that may result from--
(A) the accelerated development of artificial
intelligence capabilities by foreign nations;
(B) the increasing access that non-state and
criminal actors have to commercial artificial
intelligence tools that can identify vulnerabilities
and propose or orchestrate attacks; and
(C) the potential for artificial intelligence
systems to interact directly with each other during an
attack; and
(2) pursue findings, including--
(A) an identification of potential mitigations for
unique vulnerabilities discovered; or
(B) if no mitigation could be identified, an
identification of vulnerabilities that require follow-
up action by the intelligence community.
(c) Briefings.--
(1) Congress.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, or 30 days after the date of
completion of the research campaign required by subsection (a),
whichever occurs first, the Director of the Intelligence
Advanced Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the
Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence
Community, shall brief the congressional intelligence
committees on the findings and recommendations of the research
campaign.
(2) Intelligence community.--The Director of the
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in
coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of
the Intelligence Community, shall brief the heads and Chief
Artificial Intelligence Officers of the elements of the
intelligence community on the findings and recommendations of
the research campaign required by subsection (a), as
appropriate.
SEC. 709. PROLIFERATION ASSESSMENTS REGARDING THE EXPORT OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE-RELATED TECHNOLOGIES.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Artificial intelligence technology.--The term
``artificial intelligence technology'' means--
(A) any United States-origin model weights;
(B) semiconductor manufacturing equipment; and
(C) any other item classified under--
(i) Export Control Classification Number
3A090 or 4A090 of the Commerce Control List or
corresponding entries in the Export
Administration Regulations, as in effect on the
date of the enactment of this Act; or
(ii) any subsequent revisions to the
Commerce Control List as amended by the Bureau
of Industry and Security to impose more
restrictive parameters.
(2) Commerce control list.--The term ``Commerce Control
List'' means the Commerce Control List set forth in Supplement
No. 1 to part 774 of the Export Administration Regulations.
(3) United states artificial intelligence stack.--The term
``United States artificial intelligence stack'' means the
United States artificial intelligence integrated circuits,
cloud infrastructure, and models.
(4) Export control terms.--The terms ``export'', ``Export
Administration Regulations'', ``in-country transfer'',
``reexport'', and ``United States person'' have the meanings
given those terms in section 1742 of the Export Control Reform
Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801).
(b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United
States to restrict access to the most sophisticated artificial
intelligence integrated circuits and models that United States
adversaries may seek to use against the United States, while also
exporting the full United States artificial intelligence stack to
allies and partners who adhere to stringent national security
standards.
(c) Requirement.--Not fewer than 90 days before the Secretary of
Commerce grants a license for the export, reexport, or in-country
transfer of artificial intelligence technology, or before the United
States joins an agreement on artificial intelligence with a foreign
government, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the
National Intelligence Council, and in coordination with the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research, the Director of the National Security
Agency, and the heads of other appropriate elements of the intelligence
community, shall provide to the President and the congressional
intelligence committees a written assessment containing a comprehensive
analysis regarding the risks associated with such action.
(d) Substance.--Each report submitted under subsection (c) shall
include the assessment of the intelligence community of the
consequences of the action concerned for United States national
security, including assessment of--
(1) the recipient country's export control system with
respect to artificial intelligence technology, including
integrated circuits, integrated circuit design software, tools,
and manufacturing equipment;
(2) information on any past, present, or expected
interactions, including commercial ties and cooperation,
between commercial entities or government entities in the
recipient country and other countries of proliferation concern,
including the People's Republic of China and the Russian
Federation;
(3) actual or suspected transfers of artificial
intelligence technology to such countries, including the
People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation;
(4) the consequences that onward proliferation of United
States artificial intelligence technology from the recipient
would have for United States efforts to both deny adversaries
access to advanced artificial intelligence technology and
maintain a significant competitive advantage in frontier
artificial intelligence development, integrated design, and
integrated manufacturing, especially relative to the progress
of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation;
(5) the capacity of the intelligence community and United
States commercial entities to have near real-time awareness of
the any potential technology leakage or export violations by
the recipient country;
(6) potential measures that the intelligence community
assesses could reasonably be taken by the recipient country to
mitigate both the proliferation concerns identified by the
intelligence community and the consequences of any potential
onward proliferation as detailed in paragraph (4);
(7) in the case of the grant of a license, specific
measures that the intelligence community will take to evaluate
compliance with any associated restrictions or compliance
requirements;
(8) whether export of artificial intelligence technology
would reinforce United States artificial intelligence
dominance;
(9) the intended and likely end-uses, including military,
intelligence, and domestic surveillance applications, and
whether such uses are consistent with United States national
security interests; and
(10) current and planned agreements and arrangements
between the United States and the government of the recipient
country.
(e) Form.--Each report submitted under subsection (c) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 710. REVIEW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SECURITY VULNERABILITIES
UNDER VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES PROCESS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Artificial intelligence security vulnerability.--The
term ``artificial intelligence security vulnerability'' means a
weakness in an artificial intelligence system that could be
exploited by a third party to subvert, without authorization,
the privacy, integrity, or availability of an artificial
intelligence system, including through techniques such as--
(A) evasion attacks;
(B) poisoning attacks;
(C) privacy-based attacks;
(D) model theft or extraction attacks; and
(E) attacks designed to circumvent or degrade the
safety, alignment, or access control mechanisms of an
artificial intelligence system.
(2) Artificial intelligence system.--The term ``artificial
intelligence system'' means a capability or series of
capabilities combined that can, for a given set of objectives,
generate outputs such as predictions, recommendations, or
decisions without human intervention or input.
(3) Vulnerabilities equities policy and process document.--
The term ``Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process
document'' means the executive branch document entitled
``Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process for the United
States Government'' dated November 15, 2017.
(4) Vulnerabilities equities process.--The term
``Vulnerabilities Equities Process'' means the interagency
review of vulnerabilities carried out pursuant to the
Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document or any
successor document.
(b) Evaluation; Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Security Agency
shall--
(1) evaluate whether the existing Vulnerabilities Equities
Process sufficiently accommodates the submission and review of
artificial intelligence security vulnerabilities; and
(2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report describing the applicability of the Vulnerabilities
Equities Process to such vulnerabilities, including whether the
submission and review of such vulnerabilities under the
Vulnerabilities Equities Process would result in an unduly
large volume of notifications to affected vendors and, if so,
an assessment of mechanisms to manage the volume of such
notifications.
(c) Process.--In carrying out subsection (b), if the Director of
the National Security Agency determines that the existing
Vulnerabilities Equities Process does not sufficiently accommodate the
submission and review of artificial intelligence security
vulnerabilities identified by elements of the intelligence community,
and that such vulnerabilities present public interest considerations
meriting review under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process, the
Director shall establish a process for the submission and review of
such vulnerabilities under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process not
later than 30 days after the date of such determination.
(d) Briefing on Vulnerabilities Identified by Artificial
Intelligence Systems.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Security Agency
shall provide the congressional intelligence committees with a briefing
on--
(1) the volume of vulnerabilities of information systems
identified by artificial intelligence systems;
(2) the impact of any change in such volume on the
functioning of the Vulnerabilities Equities Process; and
(3) whether the increasingly rapid discovery and
exploitation of such vulnerabilities by external cyber actors
using artificial intelligence systems materially alters the
equity of disclosure.
(e) Consultation Required.--The Director of the National Security
Agency shall carry out subsections (b), (c), and (d) in consultation
with--
(1) the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency;
(2) the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
and
(3) other entities as the Director of the National Security
Agency considers appropriate.
SEC. 711. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE MODELS ON
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SYSTEMS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Artificial intelligence model.--The term ``artificial
intelligence model'' means a capability or series of
capabilities combined that can, for a given set of objectives,
generate outputs such as predictions, recommendations, or
decisions without human intervention or input.
(2) Child pornography.--The term ``child pornography'' has
the meaning given that term in section 2256 of title 18, United
States Code.
(3) Covered application.--The term ``covered application''
means any specific artificial intelligence model that has been
confirmed by a head of an element of the intelligence
community, or their designee, as--
(A) failing to comply with the National Institute
of Standard and Technology Artificial Intelligence Risk
Management Framework: Generative Artificial
Intelligence Profile with respect to ``obscene,
degrading, and/or abusive content'', or a successor
standard or framework, to the extent the framework
applies to synthetic child sexual abuse material or
non-consensual intimate images of adults;
(B) subject to a Federal court determination that
such artificial intelligence model has generated
content depicting child pornography; or
(C) subject to a Federal court determination that
such artificial intelligence model has generated non-
consensual intimate visual depictions of an
identifiable adult or a minor.
(4) Intimate visual depiction.--The term ``intimate visual
depiction'' has the meaning given that term in section 1309 of
the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022 (15
U.S.C. 6851).
(b) Prohibition.--
(1) In general.--The acquisition or use of any covered
application on national security systems operated by an element
of the intelligence community or by a contractor of such
element is prohibited unless the appropriate safeguards
described in subsection (c) can be implemented.
(2) Implementation.--
(A) Initial removal.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, any covered
application shall be required to be removed from
national security systems operated by an element of the
intelligence community or a contractor of such element.
(B) Subsequent removals.--Beginning after the 180-
day period described in subparagraph (A), any
artificial intelligence model that becomes a covered
application shall be required to be removed from
national security systems operated by an element of the
intelligence community or a contractor of such element
not later than 180 days after the date that the model
is confirmed by the head of an element of the
intelligence community, or their designee, to be a
covered application.
(c) Safeguards.--
(1) In general.--The head of an element of the intelligence
community may implement additional safeguards that prohibit the
generation of child pornography or non-consensual intimate
visual depictions of an identifiable adult or a minor.
(2) Certification required.--The head of an element of the
intelligence community shall certify to the Director of
National Intelligence that safeguards implemented under
paragraph (1) are sufficient to prevent misuse of covered
applications to generate child pornography or intimate visual
depictions of a minor.
(3) Congressional notification.--The head of an element of
the intelligence community that issues a certification pursuant
to paragraph (2) shall notify the congressional intelligence
committees of such certification not later than 7 days after
issuing such certification. Such a notification shall identify
the safeguards implemented pursuant to paragraph (1).
(d) National Security and Research Waiver.--
(1) In general.--The head of an element of the intelligence
community may issue a waiver for any artificial intelligence
model that would otherwise be subject to the prohibition under
subsection (b) if the head identifies a national security or
research justification for such artificial intelligence model
that benefits the intelligence community.
(2) Congressional notification.--Not later than 7 days
after issuing a waiver pursuant to paragraph (1), the head of
the element of the intelligence community that issues such
waiver shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a notification that includes--
(A) an identification of the national security or
research justification for such usage;
(B) an estimate of the approximate cost of such
usage; and
(C) a plan to implement a safeguard in such a way
as to allow for continued usage consistent with the
general prohibition described in subsections (b)(1) and
(c)(1).
(e) Cure.--If a covered application is identified for removal or is
disqualified from use or acquisition pursuant to this section, the head
of an element of the intelligence community may offer the provider of
the covered application an opportunity to cure performance to avoid
removal pursuant to subsection (b)(2).
TITLE VIII--OTHER MATTERS
SEC. 801. MODIFICATION TO NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR AUTHORIZED AND
ORDERED DEPARTURES.
Section 5173(e) of the Department of State Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2026 (22 U.S.C. 4865 note; division E of Public Law 119-60)
is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``, the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services,''
after ``Foreign Affairs''; and
(2) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``, the Select Committee
on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services,'' after
``Foreign Relations''.
SEC. 802. IDENTIFICATION OF REALLOCABLE FREQUENCIES.
Section 113 of the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration Organization Act (47 U.S.C. 923) is amended--
(1) in subsection (h)(7)(A)--
(A) in clause (i), by redesignating subclauses (I)
and (II) as items (aa) and (bb), respectively, and
adjusting the margins accordingly;
(B) by redesignating clauses (i) and (ii) as
subclauses (I) and (II), respectively, and adjusting
the margins accordingly;
(C) by striking ``If any of the information'' and
inserting the following:
``(i) In general.--If a portion of the
information''; and
(D) by adding at the end the following:
``(ii) Full classification.--
Notwithstanding paragraphs (5) and (6), if the
classification of information required to be
included in the transition plan of a Federal
entity prohibits even the public release of a
redacted transition plan, as determined by the
head of the Federal entity, the Federal entity
shall--
``(I) notify the NTIA that the
entire transition plan must be
classified and that even a redacted
version cannot be made public; and
``(II) classify the transition plan
in accordance with the levels of
materials contained in the transition
plan.''; and
(2) in subsection (l)--
(A) by striking ``For purposes of'' and inserting
the following:
``(1) In general.--For purposes of''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) Elements of the intelligence community.--
Notwithstanding paragraph (1) or any other provision of this
part, each element of the intelligence community (as defined in
section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3003)) shall be considered a Federal entity and shall be
eligible to receive payment from the Spectrum Relocation Fund
for any auction-related relocation or sharing costs incurred by
the element regardless of the existence of a Government station
license.''.
SEC. 803. PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RELATING TO BUDGET
FUNCTIONS.
(a) Requirement.--
(1) In general.--Chapter 11 of title 31, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``Sec. 1127. Protection of classified information relating to budget
functions
``(a) Protection of Classified Information.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, not later than September 30, 2028, each covered
official shall ensure that the department or agency of the official
uses secure systems that meet the requirements to protect classified
information, including with respect to the location at which the system
is located or accessed, to carry out any of the following activities of
the department or agency:
``(1) Formulating, developing, and submitting the budget of
the department or agency (including the budget justification
materials submitted to Congress) under the National
Intelligence Program.
``(2) Apportioning, allotting, issuing warrants for the
disbursement of, and obligating and expending funds under the
National Intelligence Program.
``(3) Carrying out Federal financial management service
functions or related activities of the intelligence community.
``(b) Waiver.--The Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the
Treasury, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, may
issue a waiver to a head of an element of the intelligence community
with respect to a requirement under subsection (a) if the Director of
National Intelligence certifies to the congressional intelligence
committees that--
``(1) one or more of the Federal financial management
service functions or related activities of the element under
the National Intelligence Program--
``(A) are appropriately carried out using a system
that does not meet the requirements to protect
classified information; and
``(B) such use does not represent a significant
counterintelligence risk; or
``(2) complying with a specified requirement under
subsection (a) would result in an increased counterintelligence
threat to a classified program or activity.
``(c) Display of Information in Public Reports.--Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, in making public a report or other
information relating to expenditures by an element of the intelligence
community, a covered official may modify or omit information relating
to such expenditures in a manner necessary to ensure the protection of
classified information.
``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Covered official.--The term `covered official' means
the following:
``(A) The Secretary of the Treasury.
``(B) The Director of the Office of Management and
Budget.
``(C) Each head of an element of the intelligence
community.
``(D) Any other head of a department or agency of
the Federal Government carrying out a function
specified in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection
(a).
``(2) Federal financial management service functions.--In
this section, the term `Federal financial management service
functions' means standard functions, as determined by the
Secretary of the Treasury, that departments and agencies of the
Federal Government perform relating to Federal financial
management, including budget execution, financial asset
information management, payable management, revenue management,
reimbursable management, receivable management, delinquent debt
management, cost management, general ledger management,
financial reconciliation, and financial and performance
reporting.
``(3) Intelligence community terms.--The terms
`congressional intelligence committees', `intelligence
community', and `National Intelligence Program' have the
meaning given those terms in section 3 of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of chapter 11 of title 31, United States Code, is
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1126
the following new item:
``1127. Protection of classified information relating to budget
functions.''.
(b) Funding Needed To Implement Specified Requirements.--
(1) Reimbursement.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, of the amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise
made available to the Director of National Intelligence under
the Intelligence Community Management Account that are
available until September 30, 2028, the Director may reimburse
a covered official for amounts that the official incurred to
implement section 1127(a) of title 31, United States Code, as
added by subsection (a).
(2) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence,
the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of the elements of
the intelligence community shall jointly submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a detailed cost estimate
associated with the implementation of the requirements under
section 1127(a) of title 31, United States Code, as added by
subsection (a).
(3) Covered official defined.--In this subsection, the term
``covered official'' has the meaning given that term in section
1127(d) of title 31, United States Code, as added by subsection
(a).
(c) Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006.--
Section 7 of the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of
2006 (Public Law 109-282; 31 U.S.C. 6101 note) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``or'' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; or''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) information that the Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget, determines would result in the
exposure of classified programs or activities, including such
information that could, when combined with other publicly
available information, reveal classified programs or
activities.''.
SEC. 804. REVIEW BY COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES OF TRANSACTIONS IN REAL ESTATE NEAR INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY FACILITIES.
(a) In General.--Section 721(a)(4) of the Defense Production Act of
1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565(a)(4)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (B)(ii)(II)(bb)(AA), by inserting ``,
facility owned or operated by an element of the intelligence
community,'' after ``military installation''; and
(2) in subparagraph (C)(ii), by inserting ``, facility
owned or operated by an element of the intelligence
community,'' after ``military installation''.
(b) Applicability.--The amendments made by subsection (a) apply
with respect to transactions proposed or pending on or after the date
of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 805. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
FINANCE CORPORATION.
The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the
heads of the other elements of the intelligence community, shall
provide intelligence and analytic support to the U.S. International
Development Finance Corporation to ensure all projects of the
Corporation are appropriately informed and strategically executed in
accordance with the purpose of the Corporation as described in section
1412(b) of the BUILD Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9612(b)).
SEC. 806. ESTABLISHING PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES FOR PROTECTING FEDERAL
RESERVE INFORMATION.
(a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and in consultation with the relevant heads of the elements of the
intelligence community, as determined by the Directors, shall--
(1) brief the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System on foreign threats to the Federal Reserve System; and
(2) work with the Chair of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System to create and implement standardized
security and classification measures for protecting information
collected, generated, and stored by the Federal Reserve System.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Chair of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System shall jointly submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a report detailing the
status of implementing the security measures described in subsection
(a).
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on
Financial Services of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 807. AMENDMENTS TO PROHIBIT PAYMENTS TO OBTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY
INFORMATION OR APPROVALS.
(a) Export Control Reform Act of 2018.--Section 1756(c) of the
Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4815(c)) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``, collected, or paid'' after
``charged''; and
(2) by inserting ``or for the award of such license or
other authorization'' after ``this part''.
(b) Protecting Americans From Foreign Adversary Controlled
Applications Act.--Section 2(c) of the Protecting Americans from
Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act (15 U.S.C. 9901 note;
Public Law 118-50) is amended--
(1) in the subsection heading, by inserting ``;
Prohibition'' after ``Exemptions''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) Prohibition.--No fee may be charged, collected, or
paid in connection with the execution of a qualified
divestiture.''.
(c) National Security Act of 1947.--Section 801 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3161) is amended by adding at the end
the following new subsection:
``(c) No fee may be charged, collected, or paid in connection
access to classified information.''.
SEC. 808. OFFENSES INVOLVING ESPIONAGE.
(a) In General.--Chapter 213 of title 18, United States Code, is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 3302. Espionage offenses
``Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an indictment may be
found or an information may be instituted at any time without
limitation for a violation of section 794 or a conspiracy to violate
such section.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for chapter 213 of
title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``3302. Espionage offenses.''.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 19 of the Internal Security Act
of 1950 (18 U.S.C. 792 note; 64 Stat. 1005) is amended by striking ``,
793, or 794'' and inserting ``or 793''.
SEC. 809. PARENTAL BEREAVEMENT LEAVE.
Section 6329d(b)(1) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by
inserting ``, including any instance of the natural or spontaneous loss
of an unborn child (as defined in section 1841(d) of title 18), such as
through miscarriage, stillbirth, or a loss that occurs due to a medical
intervention for a pregnancy emergency, such as the treatment of an
ectopic pregnancy'' after ``of the employee''.
SEC. 810. DEFINITION OF FOREIGN INSTRUMENTALITY FOR PURPOSES OF
ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE PROHIBITION.
Section 1839(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking ``that is substantially owned'' and
inserting the following: ``that is--
``(A) substantially owned''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following: ``or
``(B) domiciled in a covered nation, as defined in
section 4872 of title 10;''.
SEC. 811. PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS.
(a) Requiring Advantage to Foreign Entity or Injury to United
States Under Economic Espionage Statute.--Section 1831(a) of title 18,
United States Code, is amended, in the matter preceding paragraph (1),
by striking ``benefit any foreign government, foreign instrumentality,
or foreign agent'' and inserting ``provide any advantage to a foreign
government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent, or injure or
disadvantage in any way the United States, an instrumentality of the
United States, or an agent of the United States''.
(b) Extending Jurisdiction Over Economic Espionage and Trade Secret
Offenses.--Section 1837 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``or'' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and
inserting a semicolon; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(3) the victim is--
``(A) a natural person who is a citizen or
permanent resident alien of the United States; or
``(B) a person, including an organization,
headquartered or incorporated in the United States; or
``(4) an act committed in furtherance of the offense used
or took place through--
``(A) communications in interstate or foreign
commerce; or
``(B) financial infrastructure in the United
States.''.
(c) Criminalizing Unauthorized Transmission of Trade Secrets
Outside the United States.--Section 1832 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(c) Transmission of Trade Secrets Outside the United States.--
``(1) Offense.--It shall be unlawful for a person to,
without authorization, knowingly--
``(A) transmit a trade secret outside the United
States;
``(B) attempt to commit an offense described in
subparagraph (A); or
``(C) conspire with one or more other persons to
commit an offense described in subparagraph (A).
``(2) Penalties.--
``(A) In general.--Except as provided in
subparagraph (B), any person who violates paragraph (1)
shall be fined not more than $5,000,000, imprisoned not
more than 5 years, or both.
``(B) Organizations.--Any organization that commits
an offense described in paragraph (1) shall be fined
not less than 3 times the value of the stolen trade
secret to the victim, including expenses for research
and design and other costs of reproducing the trade
secret that the organization has thus avoided.''.
(d) Criminalizing Inciting Economic Espionage and Theft of Trade
Secrets.--Chapter 90 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in section 1831, by adding at the end the following:
``(c) Incitement or Solicitation of Economic Espionage.--
``(1) In general.--It shall be unlawful for a person to
solicit, command, induce, or otherwise endeavor to persuade
another person to engage in an offense described in subsection
(a).
``(2) Penalties.--Any person who violates paragraph (1)
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10
years, or both.''; and
(2) in section 1832, as amended by subsection (c), by
adding at the end the following:
``(d) Incitement or Solicitation of Theft of Trade Secrets.--
``(1) In general.--It shall be unlawful for a person to
solicit, command, induce, or otherwise endeavor to persuade
another person to engage in an offense described in subsection
(a) or (c).
``(2) Penalties.--Any person who violates paragraph (1)
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10
years, or both.''.
(e) Definition of Foreign Instrumentality for Purposes of Economic
Espionage Prohibition.--Section 1839(1) of title 18, United States
Code, is amended--
(1) by striking ``that is substantially owned'' and
inserting the following: ``that is--
``(A) substantially owned''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following: ``or
``(B) domiciled in a covered nation, as defined in
section 4872 of title 10;''.
SEC. 812. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.
(a) Definition of Armed Forces in National Security Act of 1947.--
Section 605(8) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3126(8))
is amended by inserting ``Space Force,'' after ``Marine Corps,''.
(b) National Intelligence University.--Section 6801(a)(4) of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60)
is amended in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) by striking
``3327'' and inserting ``3227''.
Calendar No. 420
119th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 4615
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the
Intelligence Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
May 20, 2026
Read twice and placed on the calendar