[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4294 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

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119th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 4294

To require the Secretary of War to submit an annual report to Congress 
that assesses the capacity of the United States to fully implement the 
             Taiwan Relations Act, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 14, 2026

Mr. Curtis (for himself and Ms. Cortez Masto) introduced the following 
  bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign 
                               Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
To require the Secretary of War to submit an annual report to Congress 
that assesses the capacity of the United States to fully implement the 
             Taiwan Relations Act, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Taiwan Relations Reinforcement 
Act''.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate;
                    (C) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
                Representatives; and
                    (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives.
            (2) Gray zone tactics.--The term ``gray zone tactics'' 
        means coercive actions, including military, paramilitary, 
        cyber, space, economic, informational, and legal actions and 
        other activities conducted below the threshold of armed 
        conflict to alter the status quo without triggering a 
        conventional military response.
            (3) Taiwan contingency.--The term ``Taiwan Contingency'' 
        means any attempt--
                    (A) to overthrow or dismantle the governing 
                institutions in Taiwan;
                    (B) to occupy any territory controlled or 
                administered by Taiwan;
                    (C) to violate the territorial integrity of Taiwan; 
                or
                    (D) to take significant action against Taiwan, 
                including--
                            (i) conducting a naval blockade of Taiwan;
                            (ii) seizing any outlying island of Taiwan; 
                        or
                            (iii) perpetrating a significant physical 
                        or cyber attack on Taiwan that erodes the 
                        ability of the governing institutions in Taiwan 
                        to operate or provide essential services to the 
                        citizens of Taiwan.

SEC. 3. REPORT ON UNITED STATES CAPACITY TO COMPLY WITH THE TAIWAN 
              RELATIONS ACT.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 5 
years, the Secretary of War, in coordination with the Commander of the 
United States Indo-Pacific Command, shall submit a report to the 
appropriate congressional committees that assesses the capacity of the 
United States to fully implement sections 2 and 3 of the Taiwan 
Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 and 3302), including--
            (1) maintaining the capacity to resist any resort to force 
        or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security 
        or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan;
            (2) providing Taiwan with arms of a defensive character in 
        such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain 
        a sufficient self-defense capability; and
            (3) preserving peace, security, and stability in the 
        Western Pacific as matters of international concern.
    (b) Matters To Be Included.--
            (1) In general.--The report required under subsection (b) 
        shall include--
                    (A) a detailed assessment of whether the current 
                and projected military posture, force structure, 
                operational plans, and capabilities of the United 
                States are sufficient to credibly deter--
                            (i) a large-scale amphibious invasion of 
                        Taiwan;
                            (ii) a maritime or air blockade of Taiwan; 
                        and
                            (iii) major missile or air strike campaigns 
                        against Taiwan;
                    (B) an assessment of the United States capacity to 
                credibly deter and resist forms of coercion that would 
                jeopardize the security, or the social or economic 
                system of the people on Taiwan, including sustained 
                forms of coercion across air, maritime, cyber, space, 
                economic, and information domains;
                    (C) an assessment of the United States operational 
                readiness and sustainability, including--
                            (i) readiness, posture, basing access and 
                        overflight, mobility, logistics resilience, 
                        prepositioned stocks, and munitions sufficiency 
                        in the Indo-Pacific region;
                            (ii) projected munitions expenditure rates 
                        and replenishment timelines under high-
                        intensity conflict scenarios;
                            (iii) the ability of the defense industrial 
                        base to sustain operations in a protracted 
                        conflict of not less than 1 year; and
                            (iv) vulnerabilities to supply chain 
                        disruption, cyber attack, or anti-access/area 
                        denial strategies across domains;
                    (D) an assessment of the availability, reliability, 
                and sufficiency of allied and partner contributions to 
                deterrence and defense in a Taiwan contingency and to 
                resist gray zone coercion; and
                    (E) an assessment of the capacity of the United 
                States to comply with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public 
                Law 96-8) in a scenario in which the United States is 
                simultaneously responding to aggression initiated by 
                the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
                the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or a 
                terrorist organization.
            (2) Capability gaps and resource requirements.--For each 
        assessment described in paragraph (1), the report shall--
                    (A) identify current capability gaps, shortfalls, 
                and vulnerabilities;
                    (B) estimate capability gaps during the following 
                10 years based on current budget projections;
                    (C) specify budgetary, force posture, acquisition, 
                industrial base, and legislative changes required to 
                mitigate the gaps referred to in subparagraph (C); and
                    (D) include an estimated timeline and costs to 
                achieve a level of capability sufficient to credibly 
                deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression against 
                Taiwan.
    (c) Form.--The report required shall be submitted in classified 
form, but may include an unclassified executive summary.

SEC. 4. BRIEFING.

    Not later than 30 days after submission of each report pursuant to 
section 3, the Secretary of War shall provide a classified briefing to 
the appropriate congressional committees regarding the findings and 
recommendations contained in such report.

SEC. 5. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

    Nothing in this Act may be construed--
            (1) to authorize the use of military force; or
            (2) to alter or supersede any existing statutory 
        requirement under the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et 
        seq.).
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