119 S2684 RS: United States-Taiwan Partnership in the Americas Act
U.S. Senate
2025-10-30
text/xml
EN
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II
Calendar No. 242
119th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 2684
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
September 2, 2025
Mr. Merkley (for himself, Mr. Curtis, Mr. Kaine, Mr. Ricketts, and Mr. Bennet) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
October 30, 2025
Reported by Mr. Risch, with an amendment
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic
A BILL
To support countries in Latin America and the Caribbean that maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, to counter efforts by the People's Republic of China to coerce or pressure governments into breaking such ties, to deepen coordination with Taiwan on diplomatic, development, and economic engagement in the Western Hemisphere, and for other purposes.
1.

Short title
This Act may be cited as the “United States-Taiwan Partnership in the Americas Act”.
2.

Findings
Congress finds the following:
(1)
Taiwan is a democratic partner of the United States, and countries that maintain ties with Taiwan often share our Nation's commitment to transparency, good governance, and human rights.
(2)
The People’s Republic of China has pressured Taiwan’s remaining 7 diplomatic allies in Latin America and the Caribbean to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan by leveraging opaque development deals and backroom pressure.
(3)
The United States has an interest in ensuring countries in Latin America and the Caribbean can make sovereign foreign policy decisions free from coercion or financial manipulation by the People's Republic of China.
3.

Statement of policy
It is the policy of the United States—
(1)
to support countries in Latin America and the Caribbean that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan;
(2)
to counter efforts by the People's Republic of China to coerce or pressure governments in the region into breaking diplomatic ties with Taiwan; and
(3)
to deepen coordination with Taiwan on its development and economic engagement in the Western Hemisphere.
4.

Monitoring the economic influence of the People's Republic of China
(a)

Infrastructure influence risk mechanism
The Secretary of State shall establish a mechanism to track and respond to infrastructure and development projects by the People's Republic of China in countries that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
(b)

Functions
The mechanism required under subsection (a) shall—
(1)
identify projects referred to in such subsection that carry strategic risks or involve non-transparent financing;
(2)
coordinate appropriate United States diplomatic or technical responses to such projects; and
(3)
share relevant information with Congress and with United States allies.
5.

Reporting requirements
(a)

Semiannual status report
The Secretary of State shall submit semiannual status reports to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives regarding governments in Latin America that have taken steps to discontinue diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
(b)

Diplomatic engagement plan
If the Secretary of State determines that a government in a country referred to in subsection (a) is taking steps to terminate diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the Secretary, not later than 30 days after such determination, shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that includes a detailed plan to support the maintenance of official diplomatic relations between such government and Taiwan.
(c)

Annual report
(1)

In general
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that includes—
(A)
an assessment of the goals, investments, and interests of the People’s Republic of China in Latin America and the Caribbean that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan;
(B)
an overview of the pressure tactics and influence campaigns carried out by the People’ s Republic of China in countries in Latin America and the Caribbean that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan; and
(C)
the actions taken by the Department of State during the most recent 12-month period to implement this Act by—
(i)
supporting Taiwan’s diplomatic partners in Latin America and the Caribbean; and
(ii)
countering the efforts of the People’s Republic of China to isolate Taiwan from its Latin American and Caribbean allies.
(2)

Form
Each report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
6.

Taiwan–Americas strategic coordination
The Secretary of State should take steps to expand United States coordination with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean with respect to Taiwan by—
(1)
coordinating joint programming and technical cooperation with United States allies;
(2)
aligning public diplomacy efforts; and
(3)
encouraging collaboration between United States embassies and Taiwan's representative offices in Latin America and the Caribbean.
1.

Short title
This Act may be cited as the “United States - Taiwan Partnership in the Americas Act”.
2.

Findings
Congress finds the following:
(1)
Taiwan is a democratic partner of the United States, and countries that maintain ties with Taiwan often share our Nation's commitment to transparency, good governance, and human rights.
(2)
The People’s Republic of China has pressured Taiwan’s remaining 7 diplomatic allies in Latin America and the Caribbean to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan by leveraging opaque development deals and backroom pressure.
(3)
The United States has an interest in ensuring countries in Latin America and the Caribbean can make sovereign foreign policy decisions free from coercion or financial manipulation by the People's Republic of China.
3.

Statement of policy
It is the policy of the United States—
(1)
to support countries in Latin America and the Caribbean that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan;
(2)
to counter efforts by the People's Republic of China to coerce or pressure governments in the region into breaking diplomatic ties with Taiwan; and
(3)
to deepen coordination with Taiwan on its development and economic engagement in the Western Hemisphere.
4.

Monitoring the economic influence of the People's Republic of China
(a)

Infrastructure influence risk mechanism
The Secretary of State shall establish a mechanism to track and respond to infrastructure and development projects by the People's Republic of China in countries that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
(b)

Functions
The mechanism required under subsection (a) shall—
(1)
identify projects referred to in such subsection that carry strategic risks or involve non-transparent financing;
(2)
coordinate appropriate United States diplomatic or technical responses to such projects; and
(3)
share relevant information with Congress and with United States allies.
5.

Reporting requirements
(a)

Semiannual status report
The Secretary of State shall submit semiannual status reports to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives regarding governments in Latin America that have taken steps to discontinue diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
(b)

Diplomatic engagement plan
If the Secretary of State determines that a government in a country referred to in subsection (a) is taking steps to terminate diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the Secretary, not later than 30 days after such determination, shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that includes a detailed plan to support the maintenance of official diplomatic relations between such government and Taiwan.
(c)

Annual report
(1)

In general
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that includes—
(A)
an assessment of the goals, investments, and interests of the People’s Republic of China in Latin America and the Caribbean that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan;
(B)
an overview of the pressure tactics and influence campaigns carried out by the People’ s Republic of China in countries in Latin America and the Caribbean that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan; and
(C)
the actions taken by the Department of State during the most recent 12-month period to implement this Act by—
(i)
supporting Taiwan’s diplomatic partners in Latin America and the Caribbean; and
(ii)
countering the efforts of the People’s Republic of China to isolate Taiwan from its Latin American and Caribbean allies.
(2)

Form
Each report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
6.

Taiwan–Americas strategic coordination
The Secretary of State should take steps to expand United States coordination with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean with respect to Taiwan by—
(1)
coordinating joint programming and technical cooperation with United States allies;
(2)
aligning public diplomacy efforts; and
(3)
encouraging collaboration between United States embassies and Taiwan's representative offices in Latin America and the Caribbean.
7.

Briefing on efforts to support Taiwan’s response to malign influence operations
(a)

In general
Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall brief the appropriate congressional committees by—
(1)
describing existing United States efforts supporting the Taiwan government’s efforts in countering the malign influence operations of the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party; and
(2)
providing recommendations, developed in coordination with the heads of relevant Federal agencies and international partners, for identifying, and providing targeted assistance to address, remaining vulnerabilities in the Taiwan government’s efforts to counter such malign influence operations.
(b)

Briefing elements
The briefing required under subsection (a)(1) shall include the response of the United States to the People’s Republic of China malign influence campaigns and cyber-intrusions targeting Taiwan, including—
(1)
United States assistance in building the capacity of Taiwanese officials, media entities, and private-sector entities to document and expose propaganda and malign foreign influence supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, or affiliated entities;
(2)
United States assistance to the Taiwan government’s efforts to develop a whole-of-government strategy to respond to malign influence operations, including election interference;
(3)
exchanges and other technical assistance through which the United States has collaborated with Taiwan to strengthen Taiwan’s legal system’s ability to respond to malign influence operations; and
(4)
the extent to which like-minded governments have collaborated with the Taiwan government on ways to address malign influence operations supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party.
(c)

Definitions
In this section:
(1)

Appropriate congressional committees
The term appropriate congressional committees means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(2)

Malign influence operations
The term malign influence operations means the coordinated and often concealed application of media manipulation, economic coercion, cyber-intrusions, targeted investments, and academic censorship that is intended—
(A)
(i)
to corrupt businesses and political and nongovernmental institutions;
(ii)
to interfere in democratic elections; and
(iii)
to encourage self-censorship of views at odds with those of the Government of the People's Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party;
(B)
to foster attitudes, behavior, decisions, or outcomes in Taiwan and elsewhere that support the interests of the Government of the People's Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party; or
(C)
to undermine the administrative activities or daily operations of the Taiwan government.
8.

Briefing on deterrence in the Taiwan Strait
Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall brief the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives by providing—
(1)
an assessment of the military posture of Taiwan and the United States as it specifically pertains to the deterrence of military conflict and conflict readiness in the Taiwan Strait; and
(2)
an analysis of whether current Taiwan and United States policies sufficiently deter the People's Republic of China's efforts to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, taking into account the changing military balance in the Taiwan Strait.
October 30, 2025
Reported with an amendment