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S. 1883

To require the executive branch to develop a whole-of-government strategy to disrupt growing cooperation among the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which are the foremost adversaries of the United States, and mitigate the risks posed to the United States.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 22, 2025

Mr. COONS (for himself, Mr. McCORMICK, Ms. KLOBUCHAR, Mr. CORNYN, Mr. SULLIVAN, Mr. BENNET, Mr. MULLIN, and Ms. SLOTKIN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

JUNE 18, 2025

Reported by Mr. RISCH, with an amendment

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in *italic*]

A BILL

To require the executive branch to develop a whole-of-government strategy to disrupt growing cooperation among the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which are the foremost adversaries of the United States, and mitigate the risks posed to the United States.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
 2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Defending Inter-
 5 national Security by Restricting Unacceptable Partner-
 6 ships and Tactics Act” or “DISRUPT Act”.

7 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

8 Congress makes the following findings:

9 (1) The People’s Republic of China, the Rus-
 10 sian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and
 11 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are each
 12 considered—

13 (A) a foreign adversary (as defined in sec-
 14 tion 825(d) of the National Defense Authoriza-
 15 tion Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law
 16 118–31, 137 Stat. 322, 46 U.S.C. 50309
 17 note));

18 (B) a country of risk (as defined in section
 19 6432(a) of the Servicemember Quality of Life
 20 Improvement and National Defense Authoriza-
 21 tion Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law
 22 118–159, 138 Stat. 2488, 42 U.S.C. 7144b
 23 note)) for purposes of assessing counterintel-
 24 ligence risks posed by certain visitors to Na-
 25 tional Laboratories;

1 (C) a foreign country of concern (as de-
2 fined in section 10612(a) of the Research and
3 Development, Competition, and Innovation Act
4 (Public Law 117–167; 136 Stat. 1635; 42
5 U.S.C. 19221 note));

6 (D) a covered foreign country (as defined
7 in section 164 of the Servicemember Quality of
8 Life Improvement and National Defense Au-
9 thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public
10 Law 118–159; 138 Stat. 1818; 10 U.S.C. 4651
11 note prec.)) for purposes of a prohibition on op-
12 eration, procurement, and contracting relating
13 to foreign-made light detection and ranging
14 technology; and

15 (E) a covered foreign country (as defined
16 in section 1622 of the National Defense Au-
17 thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public
18 Law 117–81; 135 Stat. 2086; 10 U.S.C. 421
19 note prec.)) for purposes of a strategy and plan
20 to implement certain defense intelligence re-
21 forms.

22 (2) According to the 2025 Intelligence Commu-
23 nity Annual Threat Assessment, the United States
24 faces an increasingly contested and dangerous global

1 landscape as the four adversaries named in para-
2 graph (1) deepen cooperation in a manner that—

3 (A) reinforces threats posed by each such
4 adversary individually; and

5 (B) poses new challenges to the strength
6 and power of the United States globally.

7 (3) Much of the cooperation referred to in para-
8 graph (3) is occurring bilaterally, as the People's
9 Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Is-
10 lamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People's
11 Republic of Korea strengthen diplomatic, economic,
12 and military ties in accordance with bilateral agree-
13 ments, which include—

14 (A) the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation
15 and Mutual Assistance between China and the
16 Democratic People's Republic of Korea, signed
17 at Beijing July 11, 1961;

18 (B) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive
19 Strategic Partnership between the Islamic Re-
20 public of Iran and the People's Republic of
21 China, issued on March 27, 2021;

22 (C) the Joint Statement of the Russian
23 Federation and the People's Republic of China
24 on International Relations Entering a New Era

1 and Global Sustainable Development, issued on
2 February 4, 2022;

3 (D) the Treaty on Comprehensive Stra-
4 tegic Partnership between the Russian Federa-
5 tion and the Democratic People's Republic of
6 Korea, signed at Pyongyang June 18, 2024;

7 (E) the Iranian-Russian Treaty on Com-
8 prehensive Strategic Partnership, signed at
9 Moscow January 17, 2025; and

10 (F) traditional relations of friendship and
11 cooperation between the Islamic Republic of
12 Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of
13 Korea.

14 (4) The most concerning forms of such coopera-
15 tion with respect to the interests of the United
16 States occur bilaterally in the realm of defense co-
17 operation. Examples include the following:

18 (A) The transfer and sharing of weapons
19 and munitions. Since 2022, the Islamic Repub-
20 lic of Iran has supplied the Russian Federation
21 with drones and ballistic missiles, and the
22 Democratic People's Republic of Korea has pro-
23 vided artillery ammunition and ballistic mis-
24 siles. Likewise, the Russian Federation has
25 agreed to provide the Islamic Republic of Iran

1 with Su-35 fighter jets and air defense assist-
2 ance.

3 (B) The transfer and sharing of dual-use
4 technologies and capabilities. Dual-use goods
5 supplied by the People's Republic of China have
6 enabled the Russian Federation to continue de-
7 fense production in the face of wide-ranging
8 sanctions and export controls intended to pre-
9 vent the Russian Federation from accessing the
10 necessary components to fuel its defense indus-
11 try. In turn, reporting indicates that the Rus-
12 sian Federation has provided technical expertise
13 on satellite technology to the Democratic Peo-
14 ple's Republic of Korea and is working closely
15 with the People's Republic of China on air de-
16 fense and submarine technology.

17 (C) Joint military activities and exercises.
18 The military forces of the Democratic People's
19 Republic of Korea are actively participating in
20 the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine,
21 and joint military exercises between the Peo-
22 ple's Republic of China and the Russian Fed-
23 eration are expanding in scope, scale, and geo-
24 graphic reach, including in close proximity to
25 territory of the United States.

1 (D) Coordination on disinformation and
2 cyber operations, including coordinated mes-
3 saging aimed at denigrating and isolating the
4 United States internationally.

5 (5) Adversaries of the United States are also
6 cooperating in a manner that may circumvent
7 United States and multilateral economic tools. Ex-
8 amples include the following:

9 (A) The continued purchase by the Peo-
10 ple's Republic of China of oil from the Islamic
11 Republic of Iran despite sanctions imposed by
12 the Treasury of the United States on oil from
13 the Islamic Republic of Iran.

14 (B) The veto by the Russian Federation
15 of, and abstention by the People's Republic of
16 China in a vote on, a United Nations Security
17 Council resolution relating to monitoring United
18 Nations Security Council levied sanctions on the
19 Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

20 (6) Adversaries of the United States are cooper-
21 ating multilaterally in international institutions such
22 as the United Nations and through expanded multi-
23 lateral groupings, such as the Brazil-Russia-India-
24 China-South Africa group (commonly known as

1 “BRICS”), to isolate and erode the influence of the
 2 United States.

3 ~~(7) Such increased cooperation and alignment~~
 4 ~~among the People’s Republic of China, the Russian~~
 5 ~~Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the~~
 6 ~~Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, to an un-~~
 7 ~~precedented extent, poses a significant threat to~~
 8 ~~United States interests and national security.~~

9 ~~(8) Such increasing alignment—~~

10 ~~(A) allows each such adversary to mod-~~
 11 ~~ernize its military more quickly than previously~~
 12 ~~anticipated;~~

13 ~~(B) enables unforeseen breakthroughs in~~
 14 ~~capabilities through the sharing among such ad-~~
 15 ~~versaries of critical military technologies, which~~
 16 ~~could erode the technological edge of the United~~
 17 ~~States Armed Forces;~~

18 ~~(C) presents increasing challenges to strat-~~
 19 ~~egies of isolation or containment against such~~
 20 ~~individual adversaries, since the People’s Re-~~
 21 ~~public of China, the Russian Federation, the Is-~~
 22 ~~lamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic~~
 23 ~~People’s Republic of Korea now provide critical~~
 24 ~~lifelines to each other;~~

(D) threatens the effectiveness of United States economic tools; as such adversaries cooperate to evade United States sanctions and export controls and seek to establish alternative payment mechanisms that do not require transactions in United States dollars; and

(E) increases the chances of United States conflict or tensions with any one of such adversaries drawing in another; thereby posing a greater risk that the United States will have to contend with simultaneous threats from such adversaries in one or more theaters.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to disrupt or frustrate the most dangerous aspects of cooperation between and among the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including by using the threat of sanctions and export controls, bringing such cooperation to light, and sharing information with United States allies and partners who may—

(A) share the concerns and objectives of the United States; and

(B) have influence over such adversaries;

- 1 (2) to constrain such grouping from expanding
 2 its footprint or capabilities across the world; and
 3 (3) to prepare for the increasing likelihood that
 4 the United States could face simultaneous challenges
 5 or conflict with multiple such adversaries in multiple
 6 theaters, including by bolstering deterrence across
 7 all priority theaters.

8 **SEC. 4. TASK FORCES AND REPORTS.**

9 (a) **TASK FORCES ON ADVERSARY ALIGNMENT.**—

10 (1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 60 days after
 11 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
 12 of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
 13 the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Direc-
 14 tor of National Intelligence, and the Director of the
 15 Central Intelligence Agency shall each—

16 (A) establish a task force on adversary
 17 alignment; and

18 (B) designate a point of contact on adver-
 19 sary alignment, who shall serve as the head of
 20 the task force for the applicable department, of-
 21 fice, or agency.

22 (2) **REQUIREMENTS.**—Each task force estab-
 23 lished pursuant to paragraph (1) shall—

24 (A) comprise—

1 (i) subject matter experts covering
2 each of—

3 (I) the People's Republic of
4 China;

5 (II) the Russian Federation;

6 (III) the Islamic Republic of
7 Iran; and

8 (IV) the Democratic People's Re-
9 public of Korea;

10 (ii) representatives covering all core
11 functions of the department, office, or
12 agency of the Secretary or Director estab-
13 lishing the task force; and

14 (iii) a mix of analysts, operators, and
15 senior management;

16 (B) ensure that the task force members
17 have the requisite security clearances and ac-
18 cess to critical compartmented information
19 streams necessary to assess and understand the
20 full scope of adversary cooperation, including
21 how events in one theater might trigger actions
22 in another; and

23 (C) not later than 180 days after the date
24 of the enactment of this Act, submit to the Sec-
25 retary or Director who established the task

force, and to the appropriate committees of Congress, a report—

(i) evaluating the impact of adversary alignment on the relevant operations carried out by the individual department, office, or agency of the task force; and

(ii) putting forth recommendations for such organizational changes as the task force considers necessary to ensure the department, office, or agency of the task force is well positioned to routinely evaluate and respond to the rapidly evolving nature of adversary cooperation and the attendant risks.

~~(3) QUARTERLY INTERAGENCY MEETING.~~—Not less frequently than quarterly, the heads of the task forces established under this section shall meet to discuss findings, problems, and next steps with respect to adversary alignment.

~~(b) REPORT ON NATURE, TRAJECTORY, AND RISKS OF BILATERAL COOPERATION BETWEEN, AND MULTILATERAL COOPERATION AMONG, ADVERSARIES OF THE UNITED STATES.~~—

~~(1) IN GENERAL.~~—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director

1 of National Intelligence, in coordination with the
2 head of any Federal agency the Director considers
3 appropriate, shall submit to the President, any Fed-
4 eral officer of Cabinet-level rank the Director con-
5 siders appropriate, and the appropriate committees
6 of Congress, a report on bilateral and multilateral
7 cooperation among adversaries of the United States
8 and the resulting risks of such cooperation.

9 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by para-
10 graph (1) shall include the following:

11 (A) A description of the current nature
12 and extent of bilateral or multilateral coopera-
13 tion among the People's Republic of China, the
14 Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of
15 Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic of
16 Korea across the diplomatic, information, mili-
17 tary, and economic spheres, and an assessment
18 of the advantages that accrue to each such ad-
19 versary from such cooperation.

20 (B) An assessment of the trajectory for co-
21 operation among the adversaries described in
22 subparagraph (A) during the 5-year period be-
23 ginning on the date on which the report is sub-
24 mitted.

1 (C) An outline of the risks to the United
2 States and allied diplomatic, military, intel-
3 ligence, and economic operations, and broader
4 security interests around the world, including
5 the following:

6 (i) The risk of technology transfer
7 dramatically increasing the military capa-
8 bilities of adversaries of the United States
9 and its impact on the relative balance of
10 United States and allied capabilities as
11 compared to that of the adversary.

12 (ii) The risk posed to the United
13 States by efforts made by adversaries to
14 establish alternate payment systems, in
15 particular with respect to the dominance of
16 the United States dollar and the effective-
17 ness of United States sanctions and export
18 control tools.

19 (iii) The risk that an adversary of the
20 United States might assist or otherwise en-
21 able another adversary of the United
22 States in the event that one or more adver-
23 saries become party to a conflict with the
24 United States.

1 (iv) The risk that adversary coopera-
2 tion poses a growing threat to United
3 States intelligence collection efforts.

4 (D) An evaluation of the vulnerabilities
5 and tension points within such adversary bilat-
6 eral or multilateral relationships, and an assess-
7 ment of the likely effect of efforts by the United
8 States to separate adversaries.

9 (3) FORM.—The report submitted pursuant to
10 paragraph (1) shall be submitted in classified form.

11 (c) REPORT ON STRATEGIC APPROACH.—

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
13 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
14 retary of State and the Secretary of Defense, in con-
15 sultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the
16 Secretary of Commerce, the Director of National In-
17 telligence, and the Director of the Central Intel-
18 ligence Agency, shall submit to the appropriate com-
19 mittees of Congress a report outlining the strategic
20 approach of the United States to adversary align-
21 ment and the necessary steps to disrupt, frustrate,
22 constrain, and prepare for adversary cooperation
23 during the two-year period beginning on the date of
24 the enactment of this Act.

1 (2) ~~ELEMENTS.~~—The report required by para-
2 graph (1) shall include the following:

3 ~~(A) A detailed description of the methods~~
4 ~~and tools available to the United States to dis-~~
5 ~~rupt the most dangerous elements of adversary~~
6 ~~cooperation, including the growing connectivity~~
7 ~~between the defense industrial bases of each ad-~~
8 ~~versary.~~

9 ~~(B) A timeline for using diplomatic en-~~
10 ~~gagement and intelligence diplomacy—~~

11 ~~(i) to educate allies and partners~~
12 ~~about the increasing risk of adversary~~
13 ~~alignment; and~~

14 ~~(ii) to secure the support of allies and~~
15 ~~partners in combating adversary align-~~
16 ~~ment.~~

17 ~~(C) A plan for ensuring the integrity of~~
18 ~~United States methods of economic statecraft,~~
19 ~~including an assessment of the efficiency of the~~
20 ~~United States sanctions and export control en-~~
21 ~~forcement apparatus and any accompanying~~
22 ~~resourcing requirements.~~

23 ~~(D) A clear plan to bolster deterrence~~
24 ~~within the priority theaters of the Indo-Pacific~~
25 ~~region, Europe, and the Middle East by—~~

1 (i) increasing United States and allied
2 munitions stockpiles, particularly such
3 stockpiles that are most critical for sup-
4 porting frontline partners such as Israel,
5 Taiwan, and Ukraine in the event of ag-
6 gression by a United States adversary;

7 (ii) facilitating collaborative efforts
8 with allies for the co-production, co-main-
9 tenance, and co-sustainment of critical mu-
10 nitions and platforms required by the
11 United States and allies and partners of
12 the United States in the event of a future
13 conflict with the People's Republic of
14 China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic
15 Republic of Iran, or the Democratic Peo-
16 ple's Republic of Korea; and

17 (iii) more effectively using funding
18 through the United States Foreign Mili-
19 tary Financing program to support allied
20 and partner domestic defense production
21 that can contribute to deterrence in each
22 such priority theater.

23 (E) A plan for digitizing and updating
24 war-planning tools of the Department of De-
25 fense not later than 1 year after the date on

1 which the report is submitted to ensure that
 2 United States war planners are better equipped
 3 to update and modify war plans in the face of
 4 rapidly evolving information on adversary co-
 5 operation.

6 ~~(F)~~ An assessment of the capability gaps
 7 and vulnerabilities the United States would face
 8 in deterring an adversary in the event that the
 9 United States is engaged in a conflict with an-
 10 other adversary, and a plan to work with allies
 11 and partners to address such gaps and
 12 vulnerabilities.

13 ~~(3) FORM.~~—The report required by paragraph

14 ~~(1)~~ shall be submitted in classified form.

15 ~~(d) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-~~
 16 ~~FINED.~~—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
 17 tees of Congress” means—

18 ~~(1)~~ the Committee on Armed Services, the Se-
 19 lect Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
 20 Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropria-
 21 tions, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
 22 Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Commerce,
 23 Science, and Transportation of the Senate; and

24 ~~(2)~~ the Committee on Armed Services, the Per-
 25 manent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Com-

1 ~~mittee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appro-~~
 2 ~~priations, the Committee on Financial Services, and~~
 3 ~~the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the~~
 4 ~~House of Representatives.~~

5 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

6 *This Act may be cited as the “Defending International*
 7 *Security by Restricting Unacceptable Partnerships and*
 8 *Tactics Act” or “DISRUPT Act”.*

9 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

10 *Congress makes the following findings:*

11 *(1) The People’s Republic of China, the Russian*
 12 *Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the*
 13 *Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are each con-*
 14 *sidered—*

15 *(A) a foreign adversary (as defined in sec-*
 16 *tion 825(d) of the National Defense Authoriza-*
 17 *tion Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118–*
 18 *31; 137 Stat. 322; 46 U.S.C. 50309 note));*

19 *(B) a country of risk (as defined in section*
 20 *6432(a) of the Servicemember Quality of Life*
 21 *Improvement and National Defense Authoriza-*
 22 *tion Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118–*
 23 *159; 138 Stat. 2488; 42 U.S.C. 7144b note)) for*
 24 *purposes of assessing counterintelligence risks*

1 *posed by certain visitors to National Labora-*
 2 *tories;*

3 *(C) a foreign country of concern (as defined*
 4 *in section 10612(a) of the Research and Develop-*
 5 *ment, Competition, and Innovation Act (Public*
 6 *Law 117–167; 136 Stat. 1635; 42 U.S.C. 19221*
 7 *note));*

8 *(D) a covered foreign country (as defined in*
 9 *section 164 of the Servicemember Quality of Life*
 10 *Improvement and National Defense Authoriza-*
 11 *tion Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law*
 12 *118159; 138 Stat. 1818; 10 U.S.C. 4651 note*
 13 *prec.)) for purposes of a prohibition on oper-*
 14 *ation, procurement, and contracting relating to*
 15 *foreign-made light detection and ranging tech-*
 16 *nology; and*

17 *(E) a covered foreign country (as defined in*
 18 *section 1622 of the National Defense Authoriza-*
 19 *tion Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law*
 20 *11781; 135 Stat. 2086; 10 U.S.C. 421 note*
 21 *prec.)) for purposes of a strategy and plan to*
 22 *implement certain defense intelligence reforms.*

23 *(2) According to the 2025 Intelligence Commu-*
 24 *nity Annual Threat Assessment, the United States*
 25 *faces an increasingly contested and dangerous global*

1 *landscape as the four adversaries named in para-*
 2 *graph (1) deepen cooperation in a manner that—*

3 *(A) reinforces threats posed by each such*
 4 *adversary individually; and*

5 *(B) poses new challenges to the strength and*
 6 *power of the United States globally.*

7 *(3) Much of the cooperation referred to in para-*
 8 *graph (2) is occurring bilaterally, as the People’s Re-*
 9 *public of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic*
 10 *Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People’s Repub-*
 11 *lic of Korea strengthen diplomatic, economic, and*
 12 *military ties in accordance with bilateral agreements,*
 13 *which include—*

14 *(A) the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation*
 15 *and Mutual Assistance between China and the*
 16 *Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, signed at*
 17 *Beijing July 11, 1961;*

18 *(B) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive*
 19 *Strategic Partnership between the Islamic Re-*
 20 *public of Iran and the People’s Republic of*
 21 *China, issued on March 27, 2021;*

22 *(C) the Joint Statement of the Russian Fed-*
 23 *eration and the People’s Republic of China on*
 24 *International Relations Entering a New Era*

1 *and Global Sustainable Development, issued on*
 2 *February 4, 2022;*

3 *(D) the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic*
 4 *Partnership between the Russian Federation and*
 5 *the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,*
 6 *signed at Pyongyang June 18, 2024;*

7 *(E) the Iranian-Russian Treaty on Com-*
 8 *prehensive Strategic Partnership, signed at Mos-*
 9 *cow January 17, 2025; and*

10 *(F) traditional relations of friendship and*
 11 *cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran*
 12 *and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.*

13 *(4) The most concerning forms of such coopera-*
 14 *tion with respect to the interests of the United States*
 15 *occur bilaterally in the realm of defense cooperation.*
 16 *Examples include the following:*

17 *(A) The transfer and sharing of weapons*
 18 *and munitions. Since 2022, the Islamic Republic*
 19 *of Iran has supplied the Russian Federation*
 20 *with drones and ballistic missiles, and the Demo-*
 21 *cratic People's Republic of Korea has provided*
 22 *artillery ammunition and ballistic missiles.*
 23 *Likewise, the Russian Federation has agreed to*
 24 *provide the Islamic Republic of Iran with Su-*
 25 *35 fighter jets and air defense assistance.*

1 (B) *The transfer and sharing of dual-use*
2 *technologies and capabilities. Dual-use goods*
3 *supplied by the People's Republic of China have*
4 *enabled the Russian Federation to continue de-*
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10 *eration has provided technical expertise on sat-*
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15 (C) *Joint military activities and exercises.*
16 *The military forces of the Democratic People's*
17 *Republic of Korea are actively participating in*
18 *the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine,*
19 *and joint military exercises between the People's*
20 *Republic of China and the Russian Federation*
21 *are expanding in scope, scale, and geographic*
22 *reach, including in close proximity to territory*
23 *of the United States.*

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25 *cyber operations, including coordinated mes-*

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 2 *United States internationally.*

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 6 *clude the following:*

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 8 *Republic of China of oil from the Islamic Repub-*
 9 *lic of Iran despite sanctions imposed by the*
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 11 *lamic Republic of Iran.*

12 *(B) The veto by the Russian Federation of,*
 13 *and abstention by the People's Republic of China*
 14 *in a vote on, a United Nations Security Council*
 15 *resolution relating to monitoring United Nations*
 16 *Security Council-levied sanctions on the Demo-*
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 20 *as the United Nations and through expanded multi-*
 21 *lateral groupings, such as the Brazil-Russia-India-*
 22 *China-South Africa group (commonly known as*
 23 *"BRICS"), to isolate and erode the influence of the*
 24 *United States.*

1 (7) *Such increased cooperation and alignment*
 2 *among the People’s Republic of China, the Russian*
 3 *Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the*
 4 *Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, to an unprec-*
 5 *edented extent, poses a significant threat to United*
 6 *States interests and national security.*

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 9 *its military more quickly than previously antici-*
 10 *pated;*

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 12 *pabilities through the sharing among such adver-*
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controls and seek to establish alternative payment mechanisms that do not require transactions in United States dollars; and

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6 **SEC. 4. TASK FORCES AND REPORTS.**

7 (a) *TASK FORCES ON ADVERSARY ALIGNMENT.*—

8 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—*Not later than 60 days after*
 9 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of*
 10 *State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the*
 11 *Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of*
 12 *National Intelligence, and the Director of the Central*
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 18 *the task force for the applicable department, of-*
 19 *fice, or agency.*

20 (2) *REQUIREMENTS.*—*Each task force established*
 21 *pursuant to paragraph (1) shall—*

22 (A) *comprise—*

23 (i) *subject matter experts covering each*
 24 *of—*

25 (I) *the People’s Republic of China;*

- 1 (II) the Russian Federation;
2 (III) the Islamic Republic of Iran;
3 and
4 (IV) the Democratic People's Re-
5 public of Korea;
6 (ii) representatives covering all core
7 functions of the department, office, or agen-
8 cy of the Secretary or Director establishing
9 the task force; and
10 (iii) a mix of analysts, operators, and
11 senior management;
12 (B) ensure that the task force members have
13 the requisite security clearances and access to
14 critical compartmented information streams nec-
15 essary to assess and understand the full scope of
16 adversary cooperation, including how events in
17 one theater might trigger actions in another; and
18 (C) not later than 180 days after the date
19 of the enactment of this Act, submit to the Sec-
20 retary or Director who established the task force,
21 and to the appropriate committees of Congress,
22 a report—
23 (i) evaluating the impact of adversary
24 alignment on the relevant operations car-

ried out by the individual department, office, or agency of the task force; and

(ii) putting forth recommendations for such organizational changes as the task force considers necessary to ensure the department, office, or agency of the task force is well positioned to routinely evaluate and respond to the rapidly evolving nature of adversary cooperation and the attendant risks.

(3) *QUARTERLY INTERAGENCY MEETING.*—Not less frequently than quarterly, the heads of the task forces established under this section shall meet to discuss findings, problems, and next steps with respect to adversary alignment.

(b) *REPORT ON NATURE, TRAJECTORY, AND RISKS OF BILATERAL COOPERATION BETWEEN, AND MULTILATERAL COOPERATION AMONG, ADVERSARIES OF THE UNITED STATES.*—

(1) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the head of any Federal agency the Director considers appropriate, shall submit to the President, any Federal officer of Cabinet-level rank the Director considers appro-

1 *priate, and the appropriate committees of Congress, a*
2 *report on bilateral and multilateral cooperation*
3 *among adversaries of the United States and the re-*
4 *sulting risks of such cooperation.*

5 (2) *ELEMENTS.—The report required by para-*
6 *graph (1) shall include the following:*

7 (A) *A description of the current nature and*
8 *extent of bilateral or multilateral cooperation*
9 *among the People’s Republic of China, the Rus-*
10 *sian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran,*
11 *and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea*
12 *across the diplomatic, information, military,*
13 *and economic spheres, and an assessment of the*
14 *advantages that accrue to each adversary from*
15 *such cooperation.*

16 (B) *An assessment of the trajectory for co-*
17 *operation among the adversaries described in*
18 *subparagraph (A) during the 5-year period be-*
19 *ginning on the date on which the report is sub-*
20 *mitted.*

21 (C) *An outline of the risks to the United*
22 *States and allied diplomatic, military, intel-*
23 *ligence, and economic operations, and broader*
24 *security interests around the world, including*
25 *the following:*

1 (i) *The risk of technology transfers*
2 *dramatically increasing the military capa-*
3 *bilities of adversaries of the United States*
4 *and the impact on the relative balance of*
5 *United States and allied capabilities as*
6 *compared to that of the adversary.*

7 (ii) *The risk posed to the United States*
8 *by efforts made by adversaries to establish*
9 *alternate payment systems, in particular*
10 *with respect to the dominance of the United*
11 *States dollar and the effectiveness of United*
12 *States sanctions and export control tools.*

13 (iii) *The risk that an adversary of the*
14 *United States might assist or otherwise en-*
15 *able another adversary of the United States*
16 *in the event that one or more adversaries*
17 *become party to a conflict with the United*
18 *States.*

19 (iv) *The risk that adversary coopera-*
20 *tion poses a growing threat to United States*
21 *intelligence collection efforts.*

22 (D) *An evaluation of the vulnerabilities and*
23 *tension points within such adversary bilateral or*
24 *multilateral relationships, and an assessment of*

1 *the likely effect of efforts by the United States to*
2 *separate adversaries.*

3 (3) *FORM.*—*The report submitted pursuant to*
4 *paragraph (1) shall be submitted in classified form.*

5 (c) *REPORT ON STRATEGIC APPROACH.*—

6 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—*Not later than 180 days after*
7 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of*
8 *State and the Secretary of Defense, in consultation*
9 *with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of*
10 *Commerce, the Director of National Intelligence, and*
11 *the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, shall*
12 *submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a*
13 *report outlining the strategic approach of the United*
14 *States to adversary alignment and the necessary steps*
15 *to disrupt, frustrate, constrain, and prepare for ad-*
16 *versary cooperation during the two-year period begin-*
17 *ning on the date of the enactment of this Act.*

18 (2) *ELEMENTS.*—*The report required by para-*
19 *graph (1) shall include the following:*

20 (A) *A detailed description of the methods*
21 *and tools available to the United States to dis-*
22 *rupt the most dangerous elements of adversary*
23 *cooperation, including the growing connectivity*
24 *between the defense industrial bases of each ad-*
25 *versary.*

1 (B) *A timeline for using diplomatic engage-*
 2 *ment, intelligence diplomacy, security coopera-*
 3 *tion, and foreign assistance, as appropriate—*

4 (i) *to educate allies and partners about*
 5 *the increasing risk of adversary alignment;*

6 (ii) *to secure the support of allies and*
 7 *partners in combating adversary alignment;*
 8 *and*

9 (iii) *to assess and help address, as ap-*
 10 *propriate, the vulnerabilities and capability*
 11 *gaps of allies and partners to counter*
 12 *threats from adversary alignment.*

13 (C) *A plan for ensuring the integrity of*
 14 *United States methods of economic statecraft, in-*
 15 *cluding an assessment of the efficiency of the*
 16 *United States sanctions and export control en-*
 17 *forcement apparatus and any accompanying*
 18 *resourcing requirements.*

19 (D) *A clear plan to bolster deterrence with-*
 20 *in the priority theaters of the Indo-Pacific re-*
 21 *gion, Europe, and the Middle East by—*

22 (i) *increasing United States and allied*
 23 *munitions stockpiles, particularly such*
 24 *stockpiles that are most critical for sup-*
 25 *porting frontline partners such as Israel,*

1 *Taiwan, and Ukraine in the event of ag-*
2 *gression by a United States adversary;*

3 (ii) *facilitating collaborative efforts*
4 *with allies for the co-production, co-mainte-*
5 *nance, and co-sustainment of critical muni-*
6 *tions and platforms required by the United*
7 *States and allies and partners of the United*
8 *States in the event of a future conflict with*
9 *the People's Republic of China, the Russian*
10 *Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, or*
11 *the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;*
12 *and*

13 (iii) *more effectively using funding*
14 *through the United States Foreign Military*
15 *Financing program to support allied and*
16 *partner domestic defense production that*
17 *can contribute to deterrence in each such*
18 *priority theater.*

19 (E) *A plan for digitizing and updating*
20 *war-planning tools of the Department of Defense*
21 *not later than 1 year after the date on which the*
22 *report is submitted to ensure that United States*
23 *war planners are better equipped to update and*
24 *modify war plans in the face of rapidly evolving*
25 *information on adversary cooperation.*

1 (F) *An assessment of the capability gaps*
 2 *and vulnerabilities the United States would face*
 3 *in deterring an adversary in the event that the*
 4 *United States is engaged in a conflict with an-*
 5 *other adversary, and a plan to work with allies*
 6 *and partners to address such gaps and*
 7 *vulnerabilities.*

8 (3) *FORM.*—*The report required by paragraph*
 9 *(1) shall be submitted in classified form.*

10 (d) *APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-*
 11 *FINED.*—*In this section, the term “appropriate committees*
 12 *of Congress” means—*

13 (1) *the Committee on Armed Services, the Select*
 14 *Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign*
 15 *Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, the*
 16 *Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,*
 17 *and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Trans-*
 18 *portation of the Senate; and*

19 (2) *the Committee on Armed Services, the Per-*
 20 *manent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Com-*
 21 *mittee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appro-*
 22 *priations, the Committee on Financial Services, and*
 23 *the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House*
 24 *of Representatives.*

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119TH CONGRESS
1ST Session
S. 1883

A BILL

To require the executive branch to develop a whole-of-government strategy to disrupt growing co-operation among the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which are the foremost adversaries of the United States, and mitigate the risks posed to the United States.

JUNE 18, 2025
Reported with an amendment