

119TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

# S. 1731

To require the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to develop a strategy in response to the global basing intentions of the People's Republic of China.

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## IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 13, 2025

Mr. COONS (for himself, Mr. RICKETTS, Mr. KAINE, Mr. CORNYN, and Ms. SLOTKIN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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## A BILL

To require the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to develop a strategy in response to the global basing intentions of the People's Republic of China.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLES.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Combating PRC Over-  
5 seas and Unlawful Networked Threats through Enhanced  
6 Resilience Act of 2025” or the “COUNTER Act of 2025”.

7 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

8 According to multiple sources, including the 2024 an-  
9 nual report to Congress, titled “Military and Security De-

1 velopments Involving the People’s Republic of China” and  
2 known informally as the “China Military Power Report”—

3 (1) the PRC is seeking to expand its overseas  
4 logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA  
5 to project and sustain military power at greater dis-  
6 tances;

7 (2) a global PLA logistics network could dis-  
8 rupt United States military operations as the PRC’s  
9 global military objectives evolve;

10 (3) in August 2017, the PRC officially opened  
11 the first overseas PLA military base near the com-  
12 mercial port of Doraleh in Djibouti;

13 (4) in June 2022, the PRC and Cambodia  
14 hosted a ceremony to mark the groundbreaking on  
15 PRC-built upgrades to Ream Naval Base, including  
16 a joint logistics and training center and a pier to ac-  
17 commodate larger ships;

18 (5) officials from Cambodia and the PRC offi-  
19 cially inaugurated expanded port features at the  
20 Ream Naval Base in April 2025; and

21 (6) in addition to the base in Djibouti and the  
22 PRC’s access to the port at the Ream Naval Base  
23 in Cambodia, the PRC is likely pursuing access to  
24 additional military facilities to support naval, air,  
25 and ground forces projection in many countries, in-

1 cluding Angola, Bangladesh, Burma, Cuba, Equa-  
2 torial Guinea, Gabon, Indonesia, Kenya, Mozam-  
3 bique, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New  
4 Guinea, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka,  
5 Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, and the United  
6 Arab Emirates.

7 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

8 While the executive branch has undertaken case-by-  
9 case efforts to forestall the establishment of new PRC  
10 bases in several countries, it is the sense of Congress that  
11 future efforts to counter the PRC's global basing inten-  
12 tions must—

13 (1) proceed with the urgency required to ad-  
14 dress the strategic implications of the PRC's actions;

15 (2) reflect sufficient interagency coordination  
16 with respect to a problem that necessitates a whole-  
17 of-government approach;

18 (3) ensure that the United States Government  
19 maintains a proactive posture rather than a reactive  
20 posture in order to maximize strategic decision  
21 space;

22 (4) identify a comprehensive menu of actions  
23 that would be influential in shaping a partner's deci-  
24 sion making regarding giving the PRC military ac-  
25 cess to its sovereign territory;

1           (5) appropriately prioritize the subject of the  
2           PRC's global basing intentions within the context of  
3           the overall United States strategic competition with  
4           the PRC;

5           (6) factor in the potential contributions of key  
6           allies and partners to help respond to the PRC's  
7           pursuit of global basing, many of which—

8                   (A) have historic ties and influence in  
9                   many of the geographic areas the PRC is tar-  
10                  geting for potential future bases; and

11                   (B) rely on the same basic intelligence pic-  
12                  ture to form our baseline understanding of the  
13                  PRC's global intentions;

14           (7) establish and ensure sufficient resourcing  
15           for enduring organizational structures to effectively  
16           address the issue of PRC global basing intentions;  
17           and

18           (8) ensure that future force posture, freedom of  
19           movement, and other interests of the United States  
20           and our allies are not jeopardized by the continued  
21           expansion of PRC bases.

22 **SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.**

23           In this Act:

1           (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-  
2       TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-  
3       mittees” means—

4           (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of  
5       the Senate;

6           (B) the Committee on Armed Services of  
7       the Senate;

8           (C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of  
9       the Senate;

10          (D) the Committee on Appropriations of  
11       the Senate;

12          (E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of  
13       the House of Representatives;

14          (F) the Committee on Armed Services of  
15       the House of Representatives;

16          (G) the Permanent Select Committee on  
17       Intelligence of the House of Representatives;  
18       and

19          (H) the Committee on Appropriations of  
20       the House of Representatives.

21       (2) PLA.—The term “PLA” means the Peo-  
22       ple’s Liberation Army of the PRC.

23       (3) PRC.—The term “PRC” means the Peo-  
24       ple’s Republic of China.

1           (4) PRC GLOBAL BASING.—The term “PRC  
 2       global basing” means the establishment of physical  
 3       locations outside the geographic boundaries of the  
 4       PRC where the PRC maintains some element of the  
 5       People’s Liberation Army, PRC intelligence or secu-  
 6       rity forces, or infrastructure designed to support the  
 7       presence of PRC military, intelligence, or security  
 8       forces, for the purposes of potential power projec-  
 9       tion.

10 **SEC. 5. ASSESSMENT OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH’S C-PRC**  
 11 **GLOBAL BASING STRATEGY.**

12       (a) ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the  
 13       date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National  
 14       Intelligence shall submit an intelligence assessment, in  
 15       classified form, if needed, to the appropriate congressional  
 16       committees. The assessment shall analyze the risk posed  
 17       by PRC global basing to the United States or to any  
 18       United States allies with respect to their ability to project  
 19       power, maintain freedom of movement, and protect other  
 20       interests as a function of the PRC’s current or potential  
 21       locations identified pursuant to subsection (b)(2)(A).

22       (b) STRATEGY.—

23           (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days  
 24       after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-  
 25       retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of

1 Defense and other appropriate senior Federal offi-  
2 cials, shall submit a strategy to the appropriate con-  
3 gressional committees that contains the information  
4 described in paragraph (2).

5 (2) CONTENTS.—The strategy required under  
6 paragraph (1) shall—

7 (A) identify not fewer than 5 locations of  
8 chief concern where the PRC maintains a phys-  
9 ical presence, or is suspected to be seeking a  
10 physical presence, which could ultimately transi-  
11 tion into a PRC global base;

12 (B) include a comprehensive listing of ex-  
13 ecutive branch entities currently involved in ad-  
14 dressing aspects of PRC global basing, includ-  
15 ing any resource or personnel constraints lim-  
16 iting the ability to effectively address the issue  
17 of PRC global basing intentions;

18 (C) describe in detail all executive branch  
19 efforts—

20 (i) to mitigate the impacts of the loca-  
21 tions referred to in subparagraph (A); or

22 (ii) to prevent the PRC from estab-  
23 lishing new global bases; and

24 (D) for each of the locations referred to in  
25 subparagraph (A), identify the actions by the

1 United States or its allies that would be most  
2 effective to enable the respective foreign govern-  
3 ments to terminate plans for hosting a PRC  
4 base.

5 (c) TASK FORCE.—Not later than 90 days after sub-  
6 mitting the strategy described in subsection (b), the Sec-  
7 retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of De-  
8 fense and other appropriate senior Federal officials, shall  
9 establish an interagency task force—

10 (1) to implement the strategy described in sec-  
11 tion (b) to counter the PRC’s efforts at the locations  
12 of chief concern; and

13 (2) to identify mitigation measures that would  
14 prevent the PRC from establishing new bases in lo-  
15 cations beyond the locations of chief concern identi-  
16 fied pursuant to subsection (b)(2)(A).

17 (d) QUADRENNIAL REVIEWS AND REPORTS.—Not  
18 later than 4 years after the submission of the strategy re-  
19 quired under subsection (b), and not less frequently than  
20 once every 4 years thereafter, the Secretary of State, in  
21 coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Director  
22 of National Intelligence, and other appropriate senior Fed-  
23 eral officials, shall—



- 1           (1) conduct a review of the Executive Branch's
- 2           strategy and overall approach in response to the
- 3           PRC global basing intentions; and
- 4           (2) submit the results of such review, including
- 5           the information described in subsection (b)(2), to the
- 6           appropriate congressional committees.

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