[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 8615 Introduced in House (IH)]
<DOC>
119th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 8615
To combat China's unfair and non-market-oriented trade practices
related to the shipbuilding industry, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
April 30, 2026
Mrs. Kim (for herself, Mr. Lawler, and Mrs. Radewagen) introduced the
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To combat China's unfair and non-market-oriented trade practices
related to the shipbuilding industry, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Facilitating
Leadership and Expertise through Exchange and Training in Shipbuilding
Now Act of 2026'' or the ``FLEETS Now Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Definitions.
TITLE I--MATTERS RELATING TO SHIPBUILDING AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA
Sec. 101. Strategic ports; United States International Development
Finance Corporation.
Sec. 102. Briefing and report on China Ocean Shipping Company Shipping
Heavy Industry and China State Shipbuilding
Corporation.
TITLE II--MATTERS RELATING TO SHIPBUILDING AND THE UNITED STATES, ITS
ALLIES AND PARTNERS, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
Sec. 201. Statement of policy to counter shipbuilding practices of the
People's Republic of China.
Sec. 202. International shipbuilding coordination responsibility.
Sec. 203. Assistant Secretary for Water, Environment, and Space
Affairs.
Sec. 204. Exchange program for shipbuilding industry experts.
Sec. 205. Maritime investigators.
Sec. 206. Allied maritime framework.
Sec. 207. Maritime group of nations.
Sec. 208. International Maritime Organization.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The People's Republic of China (hereafter in this
section referred to as the ``PRC'') has deployed unfair and
non-market-oriented practices in the maritime, logistics, and
shipbuilding sectors to achieve a long-term dominant position
in the shipbuilding ecosystem. In response, the United States
Trade Representative launched an investigation under title III
of the Trade Act of 1974 in April 2024, and reaffirmed its
allegations in a notice of proposed actions in February 2025.
(2) The PRC's Military-Civil Fusion strategy uses the
opacity of China's business ecosystem to channel commercial
activities--including foreign shipbuilding orders--into
upgrading its naval industrial base. By integrating commercial
and military production at shared shipyards, the PRC enables
the transfer of capital, technology, personnel, and supply
chains to China's defense industrial base, strengthening
military capabilities through civilian contracts.
(3) The PRC frames its shipbuilding and maritime sectors as
strategic industries that must be targeted to build economic,
technological and military power. This targeting necessarily
means the displacement of foreign firms from existing markets,
and taking new markets as they present, which diminishes
competition. The United States has not taken sufficient action
to counter the PRC and protect United States enterprises.
(4) By achieving dominant market positions, the PRC
exercises increasing influence over global supply, pricing, and
access to goods and services.
(5) The PRC's targeting of the maritime, logistics, and
shipbuilding sectors creates dependencies on China, increasing
risk and reducing supply chain resilience. The PRC seeks to
displace foreign competitors throughout the maritime value
chain in domestic and foreign markets, increasing the world's
dependence on the PRC for products, services, and technology.
(6) International dependencies on the PRC increases risks
(potential disruptions, whether natural, accidental, or
politically motivated) for individual firms and their workers,
for economic sectors, and supply chain resilience. The PRC has
demonstrated its willingness to weaponize dependencies for the
purpose of economic coercion.
(7) The PRC's control over Chinese economic actors in the
maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors enables China to
direct and influence commercial behavior in pursuit of market
dominance in ways that run counter to fair competition and
market-oriented principles.
(8) The PRC's industrial plans identify a matrix of
mechanisms that are used to achieve market dominance, including
government financial support, barriers for foreign firms,
consolidation policies, measures associated with forced
technology transfer and intellectual property theft, state-led
investments, and government procurement.
(9) As a result of the PRC's market distortion, Chinese
maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors accrue a wide
range of non-market advantages, such as artificially low costs
or preferential supply from China's non-market excess capacity,
including in steel, China's lack of effective labor rights, and
China's control over digital logistics services.
(10) The PRC's direct intervention in the shipbuilding
market makes ships built in the United States and elsewhere
commercially less competitive. Less than one percent of new
commercial ships are built in the United States and domestic
shipbuilding is almost exclusively for military use.
(11) In 2024, the PRC accounted for 53.3 percent of the
global shipbuilding industry and the China State Shipbuilding
Corporation built more commercial ships by tonnage in 2024 than
the entire United States shipbuilding industry has built since
the end of World War II.
(12) The state-owned shipbuilding conglomerates like China
Ocean Shipping Company Shipping Heavy Industry and China State
Shipbuilding Corporation are China's largest commercial
shipbuilding corporations and the primary entities responsible
for the buildup of the People's Liberation Army Navy into the
world's largest navy enabling the PRC to increase its capacity
to undermine United States national security interests.
(13) The shipbuilding capacity of the United States has
been weakened by decades of neglect, leading to a contraction
of a once vibrant domestic maritime workforce while
simultaneously empowering our adversaries, eroding United
States national security, and reducing American jobs in the
maritime sector.
(14) Increasing domestic shipbuilding capacity is essential
to restoring America's maritime strength and self-sufficiency.
This will require coordinated action across procurement policy,
capital investment, supplier resilience, and workforce
development.
(15) According to America's Maritime Action Plan from
February 2026, the United States does not have the capacity
necessary to scale up the domestic shipbuilding industry to the
rate required to meet national priorities.
(16) For decades, the United States strategic position and
shipbuilding industrial capacity have been weakened, in part,
by cumbersome Government procurement processes, a lack of
strategic support for construction of commercial vessels in
domestic shipyards, and the degradation of Federal financial
investment in the Maritime Industrial Base.
(17) Strengthening the United States maritime sector
requires leveraging international and industry partnerships to
align trade policies to enhance investment in the United States
maritime sector. By creating clear pathways for foreign direct
investments in United States shipyards, suppliers, and maritime
infrastructure, the United States can expand domestic capacity
while reinforcing relationships abroad.
(18) Currently, foreign firms are severely disadvantaged in
competing with the resources of the Chinese state, resulting in
lost sales, under-investment in capacity, diminished ability to
attract financing, and lost jobs and lower wages.
(19) Foreign companies, including firms based in many
United States-allied countries purchase 75 percent of the ships
built at China's dual-use shipyards, funneling billions of
dollars in revenue and transferring key technologies into the
People's Liberation Army naval industrial base.
(20) The United States does not have a single agency or
department charged with designing and implementing industrial
shipbuilding policy. As a result, there is no single official
charged with protecting and expanding the domestic shipbuilding
industry in the United States. This creates inefficiency in
reinvigorating the United States shipbuilding industry and
confusion when engaging international partners about joint
strategies for diversifying shipbuilding supply chains.
(21) The President's Maritime Action Plan outlines a
strategy for reclaiming America's maritime strength, ensuring
the Nation can defend its interests and ferry its trade. In
implementing the Maritime Action Plan, the United States will
modernize its procurement processes and streamline regulations
to accelerate shipbuilding and reduce costs.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Allied country.--The term ``allied country'' has the
meaning given such term in section 2350f(d) of title 10, United
States Code.
(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate.
(3) Deck-plate professional.--The term ``deck-plate
professional'' means a skilled worker who operates directly on
the production floor as a skilled tradesperson with specialized
expertise related to a ship's systems and functionality.
(4) Foreign country of concern.--The term ``foreign country
of concern'' has the meaning given the term ``covered nation''
in section 4872(f) of title 10, United States Code.
(5) Unreasonable refusal to deal.--The term ``unreasonable
refusal to deal'' has the meaning given that term for purposes
of section 7(d) of the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 2022 (46
U.S.C. 41104 note).
TITLE I--MATTERS RELATING TO SHIPBUILDING AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA
SEC. 101. STRATEGIC PORTS; UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
FINANCE CORPORATION.
The Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of
2018 is amended--
(1) in section 1402(3) (22 U.S.C. 9601(3))--
(A) by striking subparagraph (A); and
(B) by redesignating subparagraphs (B) through (G)
as subparagraphs (A) through (F), respectively; and
(2) in section 1412(f) (22 U.S.C. 9612(f)), by adding at
the end the following:
``(4) Harbors or ports (as such terms are defined in
section 3 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 153))
and related infrastructure.''.
SEC. 102. BRIEFING AND REPORT ON CHINA OCEAN SHIPPING COMPANY SHIPPING
HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CHINA STATE SHIPBUILDING CORPORATION.
(a) Briefing.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
heads of other Federal agencies and departments the Secretary
determines relevant, shall brief the appropriate congressional
committees on--
(1) companies or entities with formal or informal financial
relationships with--
(A) the China Ocean Shipping Company Shipping Heavy
Industry; or
(B) the China State Shipbuilding Corporation; and
(2) the business practices of such companies and entities.
(b) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment
of this Act, and annually thereafter for 3 years, the President shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that
includes the following:
(1) A description of each current and former subsidiary of
the China Ocean Shipping Company Shipping Heavy Industry and
the China State Shipbuilding Corporation.
(2) Any trading practices of any such entities that are
subject to review by the United States Trade Representative for
being unreasonable, discriminatory, or violating trade
agreements.
(3) The degree and extent of direct involvement by the
Government of the People's Republic of China in the governance,
strategic direction, planning, and commercial operations of--
(A) the China Ocean Shipping Company Shipping Heavy
Industry;
(B) the China State Shipbuilding Corporation; and
(C) the Chinese shipbuilding industry.
(4) A description of each shipyard in China that is
producing warships for the People's Liberation Army Navy or
producing dual-use commercial ships, including ferries and
barges, that may be used by the People's Liberation Army Navy.
(5) An indication of which such shipyards are conducting
business with non-People's Republic of China foreign entities
and potentially thereby facilitating the modernization of the
People's Liberation Army Navy.
TITLE II--MATTERS RELATING TO SHIPBUILDING AND THE UNITED STATES, ITS
ALLIES AND PARTNERS, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
SEC. 201. STATEMENT OF POLICY TO COUNTER SHIPBUILDING PRACTICES OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
It is the policy of the United States to develop a domestic
capacity to produce ships for both commercial and military application
independent of supply chains that include materials sourced from the
People's Republic of China. Such policy shall be given effect, among
other things, through a comprehensive effort, in coordination with
allies and partners of the United States where appropriate, that
includes--
(1) relevant knowledge transfer to and skillset development
of a shipbuilding labor force in the United States;
(2) securing direct investment in United States shipyards
by allies and partners; and
(3) the development of a coherent long-term strategy to
diversify shipbuilding supply chains and expand domestic
shipbuilding capacity, incorporating all relevant Federal
agencies and departments.
SEC. 202. INTERNATIONAL SHIPBUILDING COORDINATION RESPONSIBILITY.
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the President shall designate an individual as the primary point of
contact in the United States Government for purposes of--
(1) attracting international shipbuilding investment
opportunities in the United States;
(2) leading cooperation with the governments of foreign
countries on international shipbuilding supply chain
diversification; and
(3) leading engagement on behalf of the United States
Government for coordination of international shipbuilding
industries in a manner that creates supply chain resilience and
protects the national security interests of the United States.
SEC. 203. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR WATER, ENVIRONMENT, AND SPACE
AFFAIRS.
Section 9 of the Department of State Appropriations Authorization
Act of 1973 (22 U.S.C. 2655a) is amended to read as follows:
``SEC. 9. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR WATER, ENVIRONMENT, AND SPACE
AFFAIRS.
``(a) Establishment.--There is authorized to be in the Department
of State an Assistant Secretary for Water, Environment, and Space
Affairs, who shall be responsible to the Under Secretary for Economic
Affairs for matters pertaining to space, oceans and maritime diplomacy,
polar affairs, environmental quality, freshwater, fisheries, wildlife
and wildlife trafficking, conservation, and such other related duties
as the Secretary may from time to time designate.
``(b) Responsibilities.--In addition to the responsibilities
described under subsection (a), the Assistant Secretary for Water,
Environment, and Space Affairs shall maintain continuous observation
and coordination of all matters pertaining to oceans and maritime
diplomacy, fisheries, natural resource conservation, and outer space in
the conduct of foreign policy, including, as appropriate, the
following:
``(1) Developing United States policy on global
environmental security issues with respect to oceans,
fisheries, the Antarctic region, waste and global pollution,
and water and other natural resource management and
conservation.
``(2) Representing the Department in bilateral and
multilateral negotiations involving the law of the sea,
including--
``(A) freedom of navigation, overflight, and other
lawful uses of the ocean;
``(B) maritime security;
``(C) United States maritime zones, including the
United States extended continental shelf;
``(D) marine science;
``(E) the sustainable management and protection of
marine habitats and resources;
``(F) marine pollution; and
``(G) maritime claims and boundaries.
``(3) Leading United States engagement on Antarctica and in
international oceans agreements and conventions with foreign
governments and international organizations, to promote
solutions that advance United States national security,
economic, and environmental interests.
``(4) Coordinating the development of policies and programs
to conserve and manage economically important ecosystems,
including, forests, wetlands, drylands, and coral reefs.
``(5) Developing policies and programs to address
international threats to natural resources, such as illicit
trade, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, wildlife
trafficking, and illegal logging and associated trade.
``(6) Developing and implementing United States foreign
policy related to air, water and soil pollution and risks to
human health and the environment caused by the transboundary
movement of hazardous chemicals and waste and other forms of
pollution to promote environmental security, with trade
partners and in multilateral institutions.
``(7) Representing the Department in bilateral and
multilateral engagements including organizations, institutions,
and negotiation of international agreements on related issues.
``(8) Developing policies and programs, in coordination
with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the
Department of Commerce, and other relevant Federal departments
and agencies, as appropriate, to support partnerships between
the United States and international and private industry
partners in the development of infrastructure and policies that
expand economic growth in outer space, including--
``(A) countering malign efforts by foreign
adversaries and other actors that threaten United
States interests in civil and commercial space; and
``(B) expanding access to foreign markets for
United States commercial industry, including by
encouraging reforms that reduce barriers to trade and
cooperation with United States civil and commercial
space actors.
``(9) Leading bilateral and multilateral engagements
related to civil and commercial space activities, resilient
space services, burden sharing, and other matters related to
international space law and diplomacy and other United States
international obligations and commitments.
``(10) Leading United States Government engagement with
international Global Navigation Satellite Systems providers to
ensure compatibility and encourage interoperability of civil
global navigation satellite services on United States-based
global positioning systems, including through the International
Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems.
``(11) Leading Department efforts to implement
international arrangements and promote cooperation on Earth
observation satellite systems.
``(12) Leading Department engagement in multilateral and
bilateral forums on international space policy, space law, and
commercial and civil treaties or agreements.
``(13) Leading Department efforts on transparency in space
by maintaining the official United States space object registry
and promoting best practices for safe operations in space,
preservation of the space environment, space traffic
coordination, and space situational awareness.
``(14) Leading Department efforts to align foreign space
law, regulatory, and policy frameworks with United States-
endorsed models, approaches, and best practices.
``(15) At the direction of the Under Secretary for Economic
Affairs and the Secretary of State, represent the United States
in international maritime diplomacy matters, including--
``(A) the creation and operation of the Allied
Maritime Framework under section 206 of the FLEETS Now
Act;
``(B) the development of the report under section
103; and
``(C) leading United States engagement in the
Maritime Group of Nations under section 207 of the
FLEETS Now Act.
``(16) Authoring any reports produced by the Department
which examine the maritime claims and boundaries of coastal
countries and assessing their consistency with international
law.
``(17) Performing such other duties as the Under Secretary
for Economic Affairs may from time to time designate.
``(c) Appointment.--
``(1) Initial appointment.--On the date of the enactment of
the FLEETS Now Act, the individual serving as the Assistant
Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and
Scientific Affairs on the day before such date of enactment
shall be the Assistant Secretary for Water, Environment, and
Space Affairs.
``(2) Subsequent appointment.--Any subsequent appointment
of an individual to the position of Assistant Secretary for
Water, Environment, and Space Affairs shall be subject to the
advice and consent of the Senate.
``(d) Establishment of Bureau of Water, Environment, and Space
Affairs.--The Secretary shall establish a Bureau of Water, Environment,
and Space Affairs, which shall perform such functions related to space,
oceans, environmental quality, fisheries, wildlife, wildlife
trafficking, and conservation affairs as the Under Secretary for
Economic Affairs may prescribe.
``(e) Assistant Secretary.--The Assistant Secretary for Water,
Environment, and Space Affairs shall be the head of the Bureau of
Water, Environment, and Space Affairs.''.
SEC. 204. EXCHANGE PROGRAM FOR SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY EXPERTS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress that the
Secretary of State should initiate an exchange visitor program of
technical shipbuilding expertise to increase shipbuilding knowledge,
training, experience, and expertise in the American shipbuilding
workforce.
(b) Authorization To Provide for Exchanges.--Section 102(b) of the
Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2452(b)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (11), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (12), by striking the period and inserting
``; and''; and
(3) by inserting at the end the following:
``(13) interchanges and visits between the United
States and other countries of marine engineers, naval
architects, electrical engineers, deck-plate
professionals, marine surveyors, shipyard
infrastructure analysts, quality assurance and quality
control personnel, shipyard project managers, and other
experts related to the shipbuilding industry until the
date that is 2 years after the date of the enactment of
this paragraph.''.
SEC. 205. MARITIME INVESTIGATORS.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall, in coordination with
the Chair of the Federal Maritime Commission, detail to countries
described in subsection (b) personnel from the Division for Trade
Policy and Negotiations of the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs
for the purpose of investigating--
(1) unfair shipping practices, including price-fixing,
market manipulation, or unreasonable refusal to deal;
(2) specific actions by foreign governments to deny port of
entry to United States-flagged vessels;
(3) flags of convenience to determine if lower safety,
labor, and environmental standards in foreign countries create
unfavorable shipping conditions for United States trade;
(4) anticompetitive agreements between ocean carriers and
marine terminal operators for potential antitrust issues; and
(5) mapping the financial relationships of shipping
companies of the People's Republic of China, including the
Ocean Alliance.
(b) Locations of Investigators.--The personnel described in
subsection (a) shall be detailed to diplomatic and consular posts in
countries that meet each of the following criteria:
(1) The country is among the top 5 countries globally by
ship registry size and maintains an ``open registry'', allowing
foreign-owned vessels to register under the flag of such
country without a residency requirement (also known as a ``flag
of convenience'' policy).
(2) The country is among the top 15 countries globally with
respect to not less than 2 of the following criteria:
(A) Shipbuilding, as measured by tonnage as a
percentage of global total.
(B) Number of citizens or nationals who are
merchant mariners.
(C) Number of commercially owned ships greater than
1,000 gross weight tonnage.
(c) Inclusion of Findings in Investment Climate Statement.--Section
707(b) of the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (22 U.S.C.
9903) is amended by inserting after paragraph (11) the following new
paragraph:
``(12) Information about unfair business practices in the
maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors in each
applicable country or region, including--
``(A) price-fixing;
``(B) market manipulation;
``(C) unreasonable refusal to deal (as such term is
defined for purposes of section 7(d) of the Ocean
Shipping Reform Act of 2022 (46 U.S.C. 41104 note));
and
``(D) anticompetitive agreements between ocean
carriers and marine terminal operators.''.
(d) Disclosure of Certain Investments by Countries Receiving Aid.--
Section 7031(b)(2) of division K of the Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2014 (Public Law 113-76; 128 Stat. 510) is amended by inserting
``and investments in maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors''
after ``allocation practices)''.
SEC. 206. ALLIED MARITIME FRAMEWORK.
(a) In General.--The President, acting through the individual
designated pursuant to section 202 and in coordination with other
relevant agencies and departments, shall engage allied countries to
develop a shared framework to enhance collective capacity to design,
produce, and maintain military and civilian ships, through--
(1) enhancing information exchange between such countries
regarding such design, production, and maintenance;
(2) expanding procompetitive industrial collaboration with
respect to such ships; and
(3) strengthening the marine industries and the
shipbuilding industries in allied countries.
(b) Elements.--The framework required in subsection (a) shall
include--
(1) the establishment of a mechanism to--
(A) ensure countries participating in the framework
can access reciprocal ports and shipping support during
crises and conflicts;
(B) co-develop best-in-class design principles for
the construction of ships;
(C) collaborate, on a reciprocal basis, on the
construction, repair, interoperability, and other
capabilities of new ships to reduce costs;
(D) establish guiding principles for production
line sequencing and supply chain management;
(E) coordinate Cabinet or Minister-level
recommendations to drive down the production costs of
ships and accelerate the delivery of ships, consistent
with relevant laws in the relevant countries;
(F) establish a process for determining specific
ship types or industry niches that are best suited for
allied cooperation, including icebreakers, support
ships, oilers, tankers, liquified natural gas carriers,
undersea vessels, research vessels, and dual-fuel
ships; and
(G) develop a mechanism to incentivize financial
investments from foreign sources and remove barriers to
foreign direct investment in shipbuilding;
(2) the establishment of a joint workforce-development
program between participating shipyards and partner networks
engaged in the production of ships for the purpose of training,
information sharing, and the exchange of technical advisors;
(3) the establishment of a mechanism to develop and share
research and development and leverage innovation to promote
sustainability and mutual benefit;
(4) an agreement among countries participating in the
framework to procure ships and ship components from shipyards
identified by the participants as shipyards with specialized
capabilities and experience in ship production; and
(5) an agreement among countries participating in the
framework to prevent leakage of dual-use technologies to
companies connected to the military of the People's Republic of
China.
SEC. 207. MARITIME GROUP OF NATIONS.
(a) Establishment.--The Secretary of State shall seek to establish
a group, to be known as the ``Maritime Group of Nations'', to
coordinate regulatory and commerce policies to facilitate a new
maritime multimodalism for commercial shipping.
(b) Participation.--
(1) Inclusion.--The Secretary of State should invite to the
Maritime Group of Nations appropriate counterparts from the
governments of countries that meet each of the following
criteria:
(A) The country is of significant importance for
the purposes of establishing and advancing the
objectives of the Maritime Group of Nations, as
determined by the Secretary of State.
(B) The country additionally is among the top 15
countries globally with respect to at least two of the
following criteria:
(i) Shipbuilding, as measured by tonnage as
a percentage of global total.
(ii) Number of citizens or nationals who
are merchant mariners.
(iii) Number of commercially owned ships
greater than 1,000 gross weight tonnage.
(2) Exclusion.--The Maritime Group of Nations established
under subsection (a) may not include a foreign country of
concern.
(c) Functions.--The Maritime Group of Nations established under
subsection (a) should consider the following:
(1) Supporting the establishment of maritime prosperity
zones across a diverse geography, including areas outside
traditional coast shipbuilding and ship repair centers, to--
(A) incentivize and leverage national private
capital and investment by allied countries in the
maritime industries and waterfront communities; and
(B) strengthen industrial base capacity and
readiness through shipbuilding, workforce development,
and expanded manufacturing incentives.
(2) Supporting the implementation of a coordinated,
reciprocal fee on foreign-built vessels, to--
(A) provide consistent funding to strengthen the
merchant marine enterprise; and
(B) support investments in commercial shipbuilding,
fleet expansion, industrial base resilience, and
maritime workforce development.
(3) Developing standardized reciprocal trade agreements
that--
(A) would ensure fair competition; and
(B) reduce dependency on adversarial supply chains.
(4) Coordinating a collective position with respect to
regulations and guidelines issued by the International Maritime
Organization that protects domestic shipbuilding industries.
(5) Implementing and contributing to the exchange visitor
program authorized by the amendments made by section 204.
SEC. 208. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION.
The Secretary of State shall direct the United States Ambassador to
the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United
States mission to the United Nations to urge the International Maritime
Organization of the United Nations, and the members of its Council,
to--
(1) revise the International Maritime Organization's Net-
Zero Framework, specifically to--
(A) exclude any limits on conventional crude or
diesel, liquified natural gas, or any other type of
marine propulsion technology and instead champion an
``energy all'' approach that does not restrict or
constrain current or breakthrough fuel types;
(B) remove any financial penalties, carbon taxes,
or multilateral funds which are used to help nations
decarbonize;
(C) eliminate penalties on liquified natural gas,
recognize biofuels as viable marine fuels, and support
industry-led advances in alternative fuels and other
technologies without creating undue advantage or
disadvantage to certain fuels or technologies through
regulation;
(D) withdraw or phase out of any regional shipping
emissions reduction schemes, including the Emissions
Trading System of the European Union;
(E) support an ``opt-in'' model with respect to the
rules of such organization; and
(F) remove any net-zero 2050 targets the President
determines unreasonable;
(2) advance the candidacy of United States citizens into
senior-level positions within the--
(A) International Maritime Organization Assembly;
(B) International Maritime Organization Council;
and
(C) main committees of the International Maritime
Organization, including--
(i) the Maritime Safety Committee;
(ii) the Marine Environment Protection
Committee;
(iii) the Legal Committee;
(iv) the Technical Cooperation Committee;
(v) the Facilitation Committee; and
(vi) any Sub-Committee;
(3) advance the candidacy of a United States citizen to
fill the position of Secretary-General of the International
Maritime Organization;
(4) combat the anti-competitive practices of the People's
Republic of China by investigating and regulating the
deliberate use of policies and practices to give domestic
shipbuilding industries a competitive advantage over foreign
rivals (also known as ``industrial targeting'');
(5) advocate for the consistent enforcement of existing
safety and technical rules to ensure foreign-flagged vessels
meet International Maritime Organization standards without
requiring unilateral United States regulations; and
(6) de-link United States domestic environmental
requirements from international certificates to reduce
compliance friction for United States shipyards.
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