Sense of Congress

It is the sense of Congress that— (1)United States export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment and advanced integrated circuits are critical for United States national security and the Artificial Intelligence race with the People’s Republic of China (PRC); (2)the efficacy of export controls requires rigorous, data-driven evaluation and assessment; (3)export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment and advanced integrated circuits to the PRC have impacted the PRC’s military modernization efforts, indigenous semiconductor industry, and advanced artificial intelligence development; and (4)given the stakes of the strategic and technology competition with the PRC, the American public benefits from public disclosure of the real-world data and impact analysis to understand the national security, foreign policy, and economic impact of specific export control policies.

Report on impact and effectiveness of semiconductor and advanced computing export controls

(a)

In general

Not later than 360 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (in this section referred to as the Assistant Secretary), in coordination with the Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security and the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the impact and effectiveness of United States semiconductor export controls on the People’s Republic of China (PRC). (b)

Elements

The report required by subsection (a) shall include a comprehensive inventory of all United States export controls concerning semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) destined for the PRC. For each such control, the report should detail the following: (1)A short description of the control and when it was imposed. (2)Whether the control constitutes a technology control, an end-use control, or an end-user control. (3)Whether such control is unilateral in nature or has been implemented by any international partners and allies. (4)An analysis, including quantitative data and evidence to the maximum extent practicable, on— (A)the intended goal or stated purpose of the control when it was originally imposed; (B)the impact of the control on the PRC’s military, intelligence, and surveillance capabilities; (C)the impact of the control on the PRC’s ability to develop, manufacture, and acquire advanced integrated circuits; (D)the impact of the control on the broader PRC indigenous semiconductor industry, its revenue, and global market share; (E) the impact of the control on PRC artificial intelligence capabilities, including, but not limited to, computing capacity, model usage, and data-processing capacity; (F) the impact of the control on the revenue and global market share of United States companies, and, if negatively impacted, whether that revenue went to companies headquartered in allied countries or to PRC companies; (G)the impact of the control on United States long-term technology leadership and global competitiveness; and (H)a determination as to whether the control has been and remains effective in achieving its stated national security objective. (5)An analysis of whether the availability of comparable items, software, or technology from sources outside the United States has undermined the effectiveness of the control. In detailing such foreign availability, the Assistant Secretary shall include whether the foreign availability originates from within the PRC or from allies and partners of the United States. (c)

Additional elements

The report required by subsection (a) shall also identify— (1)controls that have been the most successful in constraining the PRC’s strategic capabilities; (2)a list of controls, if any, that have failed to constrain the PRC and disproportionately harm United States industry without a corresponding advancement in United States national security and foreign policy, and the reason for why the control has failed to constrain the PRC; (3)recommendations on how to bolster cooperation with United States industry to enhance compliance with the controls and the overall effectiveness of controls; and (4)a set of recommendations to improve the efficacy of the export control regime, including— (A)specific refinements to existing controls; (B)methods for bolstering enforcement efforts; and (C)recommendations for closing diversion loopholes. (d)

Stakeholder engagement

In carrying out the requirements under subsection (a), the Assistant Secretary shall engage relevant stakeholders to inform the assessment of United States export controls, including— (1)relevant Federal departments and agencies; (2)private sector entities from the United States semiconductor, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and advanced computing sectors; and (3)individuals from academic institutions, think tanks, and other research organizations with relevant expertise; (e)

Form

The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form and posted on the Department’s website. The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research may include a classified annex as appropriate.