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H. R. 8177

To enhance the security, resilience, and protection of critical undersea infrastructure vital to Taiwan’s national security, economic stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics employed by the People’s Republic of China, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 2, 2026

Mr. LAWLER (for himself, Mr. MIN, and Mr. STANTON) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To enhance the security, resilience, and protection of critical undersea infrastructure vital to Taiwan’s national security, economic stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics employed by the People’s Republic of China, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Critical Undersea In-
5 frastructure Resilience Initiative Act”.

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 Congress finds the following:

3 (1) The Government of the People’s Republic of
4 China (PRC) has increasingly used gray zone tactics
5 to undermine the security of Taiwan and change the
6 status quo in the Taiwan Strait, including suspected
7 sabotage of undersea cables in and around Taiwan,
8 such as the incidents involving the severing of cables
9 around the Matsu Islands of Taiwan and other key
10 regions in 2023 and 2025.

11 (2) Undersea cables and other critical undersea
12 infrastructure are a primary vulnerability for Tai-
13 wan that could be targeted by the PRC to cripple
14 the communication capabilities of Taiwan in the
15 event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait and of
16 broader hybrid warfare tactics. Disruption of critical
17 undersea infrastructure would significantly impact
18 the ability of Taiwan to communicate both domesti-
19 cally and internationally, leading to a breakdown in
20 military, economic, and social functions.

21 (3) The vulnerability of Taiwan to attacks on
22 critical undersea infrastructure has been com-
23 pounded by an increasing number of foreign vessels
24 suspected of involvement in sabotage, including
25 PRC-linked vessels, which pose direct threats to Tai-
26 wan’s critical infrastructure.

1 (4) The ability of the PRC to disrupt or dam-
2 age critical undersea infrastructure is a critical ele-
3 ment of its strategy aimed at disrupting Taiwan’s
4 military and civil communications and isolating Tai-
5 wan in the event of a blockade, quarantine, or other
6 attempt to force unification with the PRC.

7 (5) Recent activities by foreign adversaries, par-
8 ticularly the PRC, have increased the risk of sabo-
9 tage and disruption to critical undersea infrastruc-
10 ture serving Taiwan and other nations, including—

11 (A) in February 2023, two vessels reg-
12 istered to the PRC severed two undersea cables
13 that effectively cut internet access to the
14 13,000 residents of Taiwan’s Matsu Islands,
15 who had to rely on microwave radio trans-
16 missions to provide limited internet access for
17 50 days until a cable ship was able to complete
18 repairs;

19 (B) in January 2025, Taiwan’s Chunghwa
20 Telecom reported damage to an undersea cable
21 north of Taipei and identified a “suspicious ves-
22 sel” registered as the Shunxin-39 and the Xin
23 Shun-39, which had traveled in a criss-cross
24 pattern while dragging its anchor near where
25 the cable was damaged;

1 (C) in January 2025, a Mongolia-flagged
2 vessel named the Baoshun was driven away by
3 Taiwan's coast guard after suspicious move-
4 ments off the coast of New Taipei; and

5 (D) in February 2025, Taiwan's coast
6 guard detained the Togo-flagged Hong Tai 58
7 near Taiwan's Penghu Islands after an under-
8 sea cable in the area was severed, with the cap-
9 tain later admitting to dropping the ship's an-
10 chor in the area and that he "might have bro-
11 ken the cable".

12 (6) Since 2023, there have been at least 11
13 cases of damage to undersea cables around Taiwan
14 and a similar number in the Baltic Sea, with au-
15 thorities in Taiwan and Europe suspecting PRC and
16 Russian involvement and possible coordination in
17 several incidents. Those incidents highlight the vul-
18 nerability of critical undersea infrastructure, as well
19 as the difficulty of proving sabotage or holding per-
20 petrators accountable.

21 (7) The sabotage of critical undersea infrastruc-
22 ture constitutes gray zone tactics designed to desta-
23 bilize and undermine international security while
24 falling short of direct military confrontation.

1 (8) Several regional mechanisms have been es-
2 tablished to bolster the security of undersea cables,
3 including the Nordic Warden initiative for maritime
4 domain awareness and the Quad Partnership for
5 Cable Connectivity and Resilience, aimed at enhanc-
6 ing the security and resilience of undersea cables in
7 the Indo-Pacific.

8 (9) Taiwan is the world’s 21st largest economy
9 by purchasing power parity and deeply integrated in
10 the global information and communications tech-
11 nology supply chain. Any restrictions to its internet
12 connectivity or energy security would have a direct
13 impact on the world’s economy.

14 (10) To counter the threats described in this
15 section and safeguard the resilience of Taiwan, it is
16 imperative for the United States and its allies to
17 take decisive action to bolster Taiwan’s defenses for
18 critical undersea infrastructure and foster inter-
19 national cooperation to protect those critical assets.

20 **SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.**

21 In this section:

22 (1) **CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE.**—
23 The term “critical undersea infrastructure”
24 means—

1 (A) subsea energy infrastructure, including
2 a subsea cable, pipeline, or other equipment in-
3 stalled on, beneath, or within the seabed, to
4 transmit electricity (including via subsea elec-
5 tricity cables, subsea electricity transformers, or
6 equipment related to the support of offshore en-
7 ergy production installations) or to transport
8 natural gas, oil, or hydrogen between land-
9 based or off-shore infrastructure, as well as as-
10 sociated landing stations and facilities; or

11 (B) subsea telecommunications infrastruc-
12 ture, including subsea fiber-optic cables and re-
13 lated equipment installed on, beneath, or within
14 the seabed, and used to transmit communica-
15 tions, data, voice, video, or other electronic sig-
16 nals, as well as associated landing stations and
17 facilities.

18 (2) SABOTAGE.—The term “sabotage” means
19 actions, or preparations for future actions, taken
20 with the intent to cause defective production of, op-
21 eration of, or damage to critical undersea infrastruc-
22 ture, including the integrity of data transmitted via
23 subsea telecommunications infrastructure.

1 **SEC. 4. TAIWAN CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE**
2 **RESILIENCE INITIATIVE.**

3 (a) **ESTABLISHMENT.**—Not later than 360 days after
4 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
5 State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the
6 Secretary of Homeland Security, the Commandant of the
7 Coast Guard, and such other heads of agencies as the Sec-
8 retary of State considers relevant, shall establish an initia-
9 tive to be known as the “Taiwan Critical Undersea Infra-
10 structure Initiative” (in this section referred to as the
11 “Initiative”).

12 (b) **PRIORITY.**—The Initiative shall prioritize the pro-
13 tection and resilience of critical undersea infrastructure
14 near Taiwan, with a focus on countering threats from the
15 PRC.

16 (c) **KEY FOCUS AREAS.**—

17 (1) **ADVANCED MONITORING AND DETECTION**
18 **CAPABILITIES.**—In carrying out the Initiative, the
19 Secretary of State, in coordination with the Sec-
20 retary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of
21 Defense, shall develop and deploy advanced critical
22 undersea infrastructure monitoring systems capable
23 of detecting disruptions or potential sabotage in
24 real-time, including by informing Taiwan, as appro-
25 priate, of early warnings about risks to Taiwan’s

critical undersea infrastructure from global intelligence networks.

(2) RAPID RESPONSE PROTOCOLS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall—

(i) in cooperation with regional partners, establish rapid response protocols for damaged critical undersea infrastructure or mitigating disruptions; and

(ii) work with allies and partners of the United States to help Taiwan and regional partners develop the logistical capacity to respond quickly to attacks on critical undersea infrastructure and minimize downtime.

(B) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated \$20,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2027 through 2032 to carry out subparagraph (A).

(3) ENHANCING MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS.—In carrying out the Initiative—

(A) the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the Coast Guard, in collaboration with the Coast Guard of Taiwan and regional partners, shall enhance maritime domain

1 awareness around Taiwan, focusing on the abil-
2 ity to detect and interdict suspicious vessels or
3 activities near critical undersea infrastructure;
4 and

5 (B) the Commandant of the Coast Guard
6 shall assist in joint patrols and surveillance,
7 particularly in the Taiwan Strait and sur-
8 rounding maritime zones, to monitor potential
9 threats and prevent sabotage.

10 (4) INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR PRO-
11TECTION.—

12 (A) IN GENERAL.—In carrying out the Ini-
13 tiative, the Secretary of State shall seek to es-
14 tablish cooperative frameworks with regional
15 and global partners to protect undersea cable
16 networks near Taiwan.

17 (B) ELEMENTS.—The frameworks estab-
18 lished under subparagraph (A) shall provide for
19 participation by the United States in joint
20 drills, intelligence-sharing platforms, and col-
21 laborative surveillance operations to enhance
22 collective security against sabotage.

23 (5) TAIWAN-SPECIFIC CABLE HARDENING.—In
24 carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State
25 shall encourage and support the hardening of critical

1 undersea infrastructure near Taiwan, including rein-
2 forcing cables, improving burial depths, and using
3 more resilient materials to reduce vulnerability to
4 natural disasters and sabotage.

5 **SEC. 5. COUNTERING PRC GRAY ZONE TACTICS.**

6 (a) WORKING WITH PARTNERS TO COUNTER PRC
7 SABOTAGE.—The President shall work with like-minded
8 international partners to implement strategies that di-
9 rectly counter the Government of the PRC’s critical under-
10 sea infrastructure sabotage activities as part of its gray
11 zone warfare, including by increasing diplomatic pressure
12 on the PRC to adhere to international norms regarding
13 the protection of critical undersea infrastructure.

14 (b) RAISING AWARENESS.—The President shall work
15 with like-minded international partners to raise global
16 awareness of the risks posed by the PRC’s sabotage of
17 critical undersea infrastructure, including through public
18 diplomacy efforts, information sharing, and participation
19 in international forums that address gray zone tactics and
20 the protection of critical undersea infrastructure.

21 **SEC. 6. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**
22 **CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE SAB-**
23 **OTAGE.**

24 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President, in coordination
25 with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the

1 Treasury, shall impose the sanctions described in sub-
2 section (c) with respect to any foreign person that the
3 President determines, on or after the date of the enact-
4 ment of this Act, is responsible for acts of sabotage, or
5 facilitates acts of sabotage, against undersea infrastruc-
6 ture critical to the security of Taiwan or other United
7 States allies or partners, including—

8 (1) any foreign vessel or entity the owner or op-
9 erator of which knowingly—

10 (A) commits acts of sabotage; or

11 (B) conducts preparatory surveillance,
12 logistical support, security, or other services
13 that facilitate or enable an act of sabotage; and

14 (2) any foreign person that knowingly—

15 (A) owns, operates, or manages a vessel or
16 entity described in paragraph (1);

17 (B) provides underwriting services or in-
18 surance or reinsurance necessary for such a
19 vessel or entity;

20 (C) facilitates deceptive or structured
21 transactions to support such a vessel or entity;

22 (D) provides port or logistics services or
23 facilities for technology upgrades or installation
24 of equipment for, or retrofitting or tethering of,

1 such a vessel for the purpose of evading sanc-
2 tions;

3 (E) provides documentation, registration,
4 or flagging services for such a vessel for the
5 purpose of evading sanctions; or

6 (F) serves as a captain, principal officer,
7 or senior leader of such a vessel or entity.

8 (b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 15 days
9 after imposing sanctions with respect to a foreign person
10 under subsection (a), the President shall submit to the ap-
11 propriate congressional committees a report that includes
12 a detailed justification for the imposition of the sanctions.

13 (c) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions de-
14 scribed in this subsection are the following:

15 (1) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—The President
16 shall exercise all of the powers granted by the Inter-
17 national Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
18 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block
19 and prohibit all transactions in all property and in-
20 terests in property of a foreign person described in
21 subsection (a), if such property and interests in
22 property are in the United States, come within the
23 United States, or are or come within the possession
24 or control of a United States person.

1 (2) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR
2 PAROLE.—

3 (A) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—An
4 alien described in subsection (a) shall be—

5 (i) inadmissible to the United States;

6 (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other
7 documentation to enter the United States;
8 and

9 (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted
10 or paroled into the United States or to re-
11 ceive any other benefit under the Immigra-
12 tion and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et
13 seq.).

14 (B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

15 (i) IN GENERAL.—The visa or other
16 entry documentation of an alien described
17 in subsection (a) shall be revoked, regard-
18 less of when such visa or other entry docu-
19 mentation is or was issued.

20 (ii) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A revoca-
21 tion under clause (i) shall—

22 (I) take effect immediately; and

23 (II) automatically cancel any
24 other valid visa or entry documenta-

1 tion that is in the possession of the
2 alien.

3 (d) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

4 (1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may ex-
5 ercise all authorities provided under sections 203
6 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic
7 Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out
8 this section.

9 (2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, at-
10 tempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a
11 violation of this section or any regulation, license, or
12 order issued to carry out this section shall be subject
13 to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c)
14 of section 206 of the International Emergency Eco-
15 nomic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same ex-
16 tent as a person that commits an unlawful act de-
17 scribed in subsection (a) of that section.

18 (e) EXCEPTIONS.—

19 (1) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH UNITED NA-
20 TIONS HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT AND LAW EN-
21 FORCEMENT ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under this sec-
22 tion shall not apply with respect to the admission or
23 parole of an alien into the United States if admit-
24 ting or paroling the alien is necessary—

1 (A) to permit the United States to comply
2 with the Agreement regarding the Head-
3 quarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake
4 Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force
5 November 21, 1947, between the United Na-
6 tions and the United States, or other applicable
7 international obligations of the United States;
8 or

9 (B) to carry out or assist authorized law
10 enforcement activity in the United States.

11 (2) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTEL-
12 LIGENCE ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under this section
13 shall not apply to any activity subject to the report-
14 ing requirements under title V of the National Secu-
15 rity Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any au-
16 thorized intelligence activities of the United States.

17 (3) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF
18 GOODS.—

19 (A) IN GENERAL.—A requirement to block
20 and prohibit all transactions in all property and
21 interests in property under this section shall not
22 include the authority or requirement to impose
23 sanctions on the importation of goods.

24 (B) GOOD DEFINED.—In this paragraph,
25 the term “good” means any article, natural or

1 manmade substance, material, supply or manu-
2 factured product, including inspection and test
3 equipment, and excluding technical data.

4 (f) NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS WAIVER.—The
5 President may waive the application of sanctions under
6 this section if, before issuing the waiver, the President
7 submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

8 (1) a certification in writing that the issuance
9 of the waiver is in the national security interests of
10 the United States; and

11 (2) a report explaining the basis for the certifi-
12 cation.

13 (g) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

14 (1) ADMISSION; ADMITTED; ALIEN; ETC.—The
15 terms “admission”, “admitted”, “alien”, and “law-
16 fully admitted for permanent residence” have the
17 meanings given those terms in section 101 of the
18 Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).

19 (2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
20 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
21 mittees” means—

22 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations
23 and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
24 Urban Affairs of the Senate; and

1 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
2 the Committee on Financial Services of the
3 House of Representatives.

4 (3) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term “foreign per-
5 son” means an individual or entity that is not a
6 United States person.

7 (4) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term
8 “United States person” means—

9 (A) any United States citizen or an alien
10 lawfully admitted for permanent residence to
11 the United States;

12 (B) an entity organized under the laws of
13 the United States or of any jurisdiction within
14 the United States, including any foreign branch
15 of such an entity; or

16 (C) any person in the United States.

17 **SEC. 7. SEMIANNUAL REPORT.**

18 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-
19 ment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter through
20 2032, the President shall submit to Congress a report de-
21 tailing—

22 (1) any incidents of interference or sabotage re-
23 lated to critical undersea infrastructure near Tai-
24 wan; and

1 (2) any actions taken in response to such inci-
2 dents.

3 **SEC. 8. INTERAGENCY CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR**
4 **CROSS-STRAIT CRISIS.**

5 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
6 United States to be prepared for potential crises involving
7 Taiwan, including an attempt by the People’s Republic of
8 China (PRC) to change the status quo by force, through
9 comprehensive interagency contingency planning that ad-
10 dresses the catastrophic risks such crises would pose to
11 the national security of the United States.

12 (b) CROSS-STRAIT CONTINGENCY PLANNING
13 GROUP.—

14 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
15 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
16 shall establish a Cross-Strait Contingency Planning
17 Group—

18 (A) to be chaired by the National Security
19 Council; and

20 (B) consisting of senior officials from the
21 Department of State, the Department of De-
22 fense, the United States intelligence commu-
23 nity, and such other Federal agencies as may
24 be appropriate.

1 (2) FUNCTIONS.—The Cross-Strait Contingency
2 Planning Group shall—

3 (A) conduct scenario-based planning exer-
4 cises to prepare for potential crises involving
5 Taiwan, including blockade or quarantine sce-
6 narios, the seizure of an outlying island, mili-
7 tary contingencies, economic coercion, cyber at-
8 tacks, and hybrid threats;

9 (B) identify critical vulnerabilities in sup-
10 ply chains, financial systems, critical infrastruc-
11 ture, and security posture of the United States
12 and allies and partners of the United States
13 that would be affected by a crisis involving Tai-
14 wan;

15 (C) develop integrated contingency plans
16 that coordinate diplomatic, military, economic,
17 cyber, and homeland security responses across
18 the Group;

19 (D) assess the adequacy of existing au-
20 thorities, resources, and decision-making proc-
21 esses to execute such contingency plans;

22 (E) identify gaps in capabilities, authori-
23 ties, or coordination mechanisms and rec-
24 ommend solutions;

1 (F) share risk assessments with allies and
2 partners of the United States, as appropriate;
3 and

4 (G) regularly test and refine contingency
5 plans.

6 (3) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180
7 days after the establishment of the Cross-Strait
8 Contingency Planning Group under paragraph (1),
9 and annually thereafter for 10 years, the Cross-
10 Strait Contingency Planning Group shall submit to
11 Congress a classified report that includes—

12 (A) a description of contingency scenarios
13 assessed and planning activities conducted by
14 the Group;

15 (B) an assessment of the preparedness of
16 the United States and allies and partners of the
17 United States to respond to a crisis involving
18 Taiwan, including identification of capability
19 gaps and resource requirements;

20 (C) recommendations for legislative action,
21 policy changes, or resource allocation to en-
22 hance such preparedness; and

23 (D) a description of exercises conducted
24 and lessons learned by the Group.

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