<enum>I</enum><header>International coordination and engagement on critical undersea infrastructure</header> <section commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" section-type="subsequent-section" id="HB0A4420672C44B00A72B57836144F9A4"><enum>101.</enum><header display-inline="yes-display-inline">Findings</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">Congress makes the following findings:</text> <paragraph id="HC6626816D23246CAA9DC5B9562F4E885"><enum>(1)</enum><text>Sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure poses a growing threat to United States and allied security and economic prosperity.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="HB567ACB437F145CDB5D8CE231077DD21"><enum>(2)</enum><text>In recent years, numerous critical undersea infrastructure sites were destroyed or damaged, including—</text> <subparagraph id="HB34FEA375EA544808327D06962836B64"><enum>(A)</enum><text>in January 2022, the reported damage to subsea telecommunications cables connecting the Norwegian mainland with the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard, home of SvalSAT, the largest commercial satellite ground station on Earth;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HDCA48FAEBFAF43E7AB21EF04DC523FF3"><enum>(B)</enum><text>in September 2022, the reported damage to 3 of the 4 trunklines of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipelines, at sites northeast and southeast of the Danish island of Bornholm in the Western Baltic Sea;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HCED516E12FBF4F1AA661BA4823F9D084"><enum>(C)</enum><text>in February 2023, the reported damage to subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting the main island of Taiwan to the Matsu Islands in the Taiwan Strait;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HBCF26BA55BB8460CBF1E52BD50D5D0E9"><enum>(D)</enum><text>in October 2023, the reported damage to the Finland-to-Estonia Balticconnector natural gas pipeline spanning the Gulf of Finland, in addition to the reported damage to subsea telecommunications cables connecting Estonia and Sweden and Finland and Estonia;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HDD0B0595AB1E4A0590FDBA042A02BEE2"> <enum>(E)</enum> <text>in November 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-to-Germany C-Lion1 subsea telecommunications cables and the Lithuania-to-Sweden BCS subsea telecommunications cable in the Central Baltic Sea;</text> </subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H9BEFC76C886D4242B39811A1DAF8AD5D" commented="no"> <enum>(F)</enum> <text>in December 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-to-Estonia EstLink2 subsea electricity interconnection cable and nearby subsea telecommunications cables in the Gulf of Finland;</text> </subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H7E6D6FBBA4B44A07A7C437B762067436"><enum>(G)</enum><text>in January 2025, the reported damage to the Trans-Pacific Express subsea telecommunications cable connecting Taiwan to the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan, among other global democracies;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H0BEA45AB9FEF4F8FA8A004DEA9467A7A"><enum>(H)</enum><text>in February 2025, the reported damage to a subsea telecommunications cable connecting the main island of Taiwan with the Penghu Islands in the Taiwan Strait;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HAF8F4C2666654447A99E8DCEB07A7E70"><enum>(I)</enum><text>in January 2026, the reported damage to subsea telecommunications cables from Latvia in the Central Baltic Sea linking Liepāja and Šventoji; and</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HD3597A1DD5514A1099031DA64A25C5AC"> <enum>(J)</enum> <text>in January 2026, the reported damage to the Elisa cable connecting Finland and Estonia involving a vessel named the Fitburg.</text> </subparagraph></paragraph> <paragraph id="H447272C53DAD46B583FE33F8C2BDFB08"><enum>(3)</enum><text>Following subsea fiber-optic cable cuts in the Baltic Sea in December 2024, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) established the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network to conduct information and threat intelligence sharing among private and public sector actors to protect subsea cables.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="HDD11B2A7830146A68B238994F2A92245"><enum>(4)</enum><text>On February 21, 2025, the European Union published an EU Action Plan on Cable Security to include the development and deployment of an Integrated Surveillance Mechanism for Submarine cables work to establish a dedicated regional hub in the Baltic Sea to serve as a test bed of the integrated surveillance approach.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H9A64AEFA364D44A5B0A92C709ECB8C17"><enum>(5)</enum><text>The Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) published guidelines for Strengthening Resilience and Repair of Submarine Cables and most recently announced plans to <quote>build a secure, diverse and resilient submarine cable network</quote> and <quote>to facilitate the expeditious deployment, repair, maintenance, removal, and protection of submarine cables, between ASEAN Member States</quote>.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="HC780D1AEEADB464F90E335196723F697"><enum>(6)</enum><text>On July 1, 2025, the Quad, represented by the United States, India, Japan, and Australia, met to reaffirm its commitment to the Quad Partnership on Cable Connectivity and Resilience. In the meeting, the Quad underscored the need for digital infrastructure collaboration, organizing a subsea cables forum to be hosted by the United States and India and encouraging regulatory harmonization between Quad partners. Through this initiative, the Quad seeks to defend and promote resilient, secure, and transparent digital infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific region.</text></paragraph></section> <section id="H9A1971CECDC444E3A5975C17D2E3C03A"><enum>102.</enum><header>Sense of Congress</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that—</text> <paragraph id="HE991D73E3BB247AABC3460E40EC5F195"><enum>(1)</enum><text>critical undersea infrastructure represents vital strategic and economic links between the United States and its partners and allies;</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="HFB3BE4459BE7498BABECD43C9EA45730"><enum>(2)</enum><text>according to NATO, <quote>undersea cables carry an estimated $10 trillion in transfers every day; two-thirds of the world’s oil and gas is either extracted at sea or transported by sea; and around 95 percent of global data flows are transmitted via undersea cables</quote>;</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="HCC6DDC923E47485582EDD217A4AE1765"><enum>(3)</enum><text>since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there has been a marked increase in high-profile suspected sabotage incidents resulting in damage to critical undersea infrastructure, especially across Northern Europe and East Asia;</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="HA35446BEE01348A295EF1A55E82C02C4"><enum>(4)</enum><text>the United States Government has an important role to play in advancing United States interests in international bodies that oversee the protection of critical undersea infrastructure, including promoting network resilience and redundancy, and advancing regulations in support of these goals;</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="HD0DBDD2FFFA94307946C9488542EA43B"> <enum>(5)</enum> <text>the United States Government should play a more active role in NATO initiatives such as the NATO Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure, the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell, the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network, and the NATO-EU Task Force on the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure, allied maritime security efforts such as the Joint Expeditionary Force, Indo-Pacific initiatives, including the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, and international organizations such as the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), in order to advance United States national security and economic interests;</text> </paragraph> <paragraph id="H962633EE27B846BDB00738725F9CD842"><enum>(6)</enum><text>the United States should lead efforts to promote the deployment of resilient critical undersea infrastructure networks, enhance situational awareness, strengthen preparedness, and formalize collective responses among allies and partners through enhanced information sharing and coordination; and</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H3B18C6FD54504DB1BEFA309F32D5127B"><enum>(7)</enum><text>while critical undersea infrastructure owners and other associated private sector stakeholders carry significant responsibility in safeguarding this infrastructure, the United States Government and allied foreign governments need to play a greater role.</text></paragraph></section> <section id="H1C82C1906B6E4581A111259BB2131B71"><enum>103.</enum><header>Enhancing United States Government engagement at the International Cable Protection Committee and other relevant international bodies to safeguard United States interests</header> <subsection id="H302FC23D4C63420BBDC87A95583D96D7"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text>The Secretary of State, in coordination with the interagency committee, shall seek to increase United States Government engagement in international bodies, including the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), to advance United States national security and economic interests as it relates to critical undersea infrastructure.</text></subsection> <subsection id="H7350EF80E540478DB9075000A40C70FB"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Report</header><text>Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes the following:</text> <paragraph id="H36E210768B4C4563A46750BD834C0227"><enum>(1)</enum><text>A description of how increased United States Government engagement within the ICPC could support United States national security objectives as it relates to the protection of critical undersea infrastructure.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H6A04BB73EDDF4207BF3C4FA21C7021DA"><enum>(2)</enum><text>A description of key objectives for promoting and protecting United States national security interests within the ICPC.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H37BA89C7A3A54BD3AE29A717F83A2943"><enum>(3)</enum><text>A description of how the People’s Republic of China entities leverage their engagement within the ICPC to further their strategic interests.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H23B1387EC7A2463198ED919756481C92"><enum>(4)</enum><text>A description of how encouraging other countries and regional bodies to join the ICPC can better ensure coordinated, consistent global undersea subsea telecommunications infrastructure policies.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H6FD631FDB61E4FB0B74D07DAE587F72C"><enum>(5)</enum><text>A description of other international bodies relevant for critical undersea infrastructure where the United States should increase its diplomatic engagement.</text></paragraph></subsection></section> <section id="HBEFA5CADD5EE4D63BFC5F06A48979553"><enum>104.</enum><header>Imposition of sanctions with respect to critical undersea infrastructure sabotage</header> <subsection id="H199CCEEB6BD9496A9C711ACE6DBAFACD"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text>The President, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to any foreign person that the President determines, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, is responsible for acts of sabotage or facilitates acts of sabotage against critical undersea infrastructure, including—</text> <paragraph id="H4411AFF066F94925ACB9880F02AE2E7E"><enum>(1)</enum><text>any foreign vessel or entity the owner or operator of which knowingly—</text> <subparagraph id="H4FD1D9D510BC4240B060C0E23AC7A94F"><enum>(A)</enum><text>commits acts of sabotage; or</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H6A702A456D074AF49E7A1D8CBE9BB869"><enum>(B)</enum><text>conducts preparatory surveillance, logistical support, security, or other services that facilitate or enable an act of sabotage; and</text></subparagraph></paragraph> <paragraph id="H6211F7AB942A41D6B9E931618B2C23E5"><enum>(2)</enum><text>any foreign person that the President determines knowingly—</text> <subparagraph id="HCB39B602F2FD40CD99A5FA5F6A35B7F2"><enum>(A)</enum><text>owns, operates, or manages the vessel or entity described in paragraph (1);</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H455CE803E29A496A88B068811C35F580"><enum>(B)</enum><text>provides underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance necessary for such a vessel or entity;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H710AE7658B6D45C3A3D7DA41D55EAD4B"><enum>(C)</enum><text>facilitates deceptive or structured transactions to support a vessel or entity described in paragraph (1);</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H4BDC5B1EF1EB40D092CF3DEF16401E54"><enum>(D)</enum><text>provides port or logistics services or facilities for technology upgrades or installation of equipment for, or retrofitting or tethering of, a vessel described in paragraph (1) for the purpose of evading sanctions;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H636DAE46A8744557B378ECEFD5994638"><enum>(E)</enum><text>provided documentation, registration, or flagging services for a vessel described in paragraph (1) for the purpose of evading sanctions; or</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HF325762145E54A48A486CB1027118BE5"><enum>(F)</enum><text>serves as a captain, principal officer, or senior leadership of such a vessel or entity.</text></subparagraph></paragraph></subsection> <subsection id="HD1E99430497A4C169ED33DCEF5D3B084"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Report required</header><text>Not later than 15 days after imposing sanctions with respect to a foreign person under subsection (a), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives, a report that includes a detailed justification for the imposition of the sanctions.</text></subsection> <subsection id="H773DC768BFFF46B9988311575963FF42"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Sanctions described</header><text>The sanctions described in this subsection are the following:</text> <paragraph id="H8CCADDF618314CC48CD9C3E73EA93E35"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Blocking of property</header><text>The President shall exercise all of the powers granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/50/1701">50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.</external-xref>) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of a foreign person described in subsection (a), if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="HA4DDF6AF79FE44419FBA3F9DBAF4A9BD"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole</header> <subparagraph id="H5F8F967587EA4AD2871E3C3C1B84FE15"><enum>(A)</enum><header>Visas, admission, or parole</header><text>An alien described in subsection (a) shall be—</text> <clause id="HB4BF1E3E5927401881CF430A72B78EBA"><enum>(i)</enum><text>inadmissible to the United States;</text></clause> <clause id="H5848E5D8F2D94A15B22F86BA16B35256"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and</text></clause> <clause id="HC2795AC4DD3D444186B5B74F52A632C4"><enum>(iii)</enum><text>otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/8/1101">8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.</external-xref>).</text></clause></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HDA6FAF1AF9CE410D89024A08FA96DC9F"><enum>(B)</enum><header>Current visas revoked</header> <clause id="H7E4D282A0EAC4EE79E612DBB1C26A6D8"><enum>(i)</enum><header>In general</header><text>The visa or other entry documentation of an alien described in subsection (a) shall be revoked, regardless of when such visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.</text></clause> <clause id="H677E2E4BD1AC4479AEFF29EAECE9225C"><enum>(ii)</enum><header>Immediate effect</header><text>A revocation under clause (i) shall—</text> <subclause id="H00F55595A0AD476DB4143A3C57CBF88D"><enum>(I)</enum><text>take effect immediately; and</text></subclause> <subclause id="H23EE20D42011448BAA2EF7AC9158E589"><enum>(II)</enum><text>automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the possession of the alien.</text></subclause></clause></subparagraph></paragraph></subsection> <subsection id="HBA3140A9096E45E4870C29F98E2F6DCD"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Implementation; penalties</header> <paragraph id="H3EA32FE8D7D74FCBB14CF31B6109D26D"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Implementation</header><text>The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H14DDA1B1A812402C843057D57BF863B4"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Penalties</header><text>A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this section or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/50/1705">50 U.S.C. 1705</external-xref>) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section.</text></paragraph></subsection> <subsection id="HFBE932C5A0E04D56B8BA765A41157447"><enum>(e)</enum><header>Exceptions</header> <paragraph id="H91281932EF15405BBBAB59E2E5BD5177"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Exception to comply with United Nations Headquarters Agreement and law enforcement activities</header><text>Sanctions under this section shall not apply with respect to the admission or parole of an alien to the United States if admitting or paroling the alien is necessary—</text> <subparagraph id="H5B69FB517519401787B713F305D6EE12"><enum>(A)</enum><text>to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations of the United States; or</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HBF5115D0DBAB4340AB66D15E11F17A73"><enum>(B)</enum><text>to carry out or assist authorized law enforcement activity in the United States.</text></subparagraph></paragraph> <paragraph id="H1424DFD608DF4EABB6D86AEA797E7BD0"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Exception to comply with intelligence activities</header><text>Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/50/3091">50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.</external-xref>) or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H2AB850104CF941CC918C0631B62EB744"><enum>(3)</enum><header>Exception relating to importation of goods</header> <subparagraph id="HCD6BDBC30A174558AF3ED19DEE0DD322"><enum>(A)</enum><header>In general</header><text>A requirement to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property under this section shall not include the authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H244607B935B94ECBBFAA8CF2115E52AE"><enum>(B)</enum><header>Good defined</header><text>In this paragraph, the term <term>good</term> means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data.</text></subparagraph></paragraph></subsection> <subsection id="H137AB1DC1D2B48D1A088EE84CEA5D29B"><enum>(f)</enum><header>Definitions</header><text>In this section:</text> <paragraph id="H7B8C9B27C3874B6DB82AED6C2B549466"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Admission; admitted; alien</header><text>The terms <term>admission</term>, <term>admitted</term>, and <term>alien</term> have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/8/1101">8 U.S.C. 1101</external-xref>).</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H6BBA954FF1964480A843EA727EC792AA"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Foreign person</header><text>The term <term>foreign person</term> means an individual or entity that is not a United States person.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H6DDF0149EE82477185D1B536F07D81D6"><enum>(3)</enum><header>United States person</header><text>The term <term>United States person</term> means—</text> <subparagraph id="H00574E9793824E12B75E675AA800F510"><enum>(A)</enum><text>any United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HE9CAF0BAF4C245F0B4C677D11104C4A8"><enum>(B)</enum><text>an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including any foreign branch of such an entity; or</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HF8D756CC613C487089821ABAE9A9A6F7"><enum>(C)</enum><text>any person in the United States.</text></subparagraph></paragraph></subsection> <subsection id="H13D3E840392F4826817044792223445F"><enum>(g)</enum><header>National security interests waiver</header><text>The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section if, before issuing the waiver, the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—</text> <paragraph id="H4CD224DF2F4A4B1392884C0F1662138A"><enum>(1)</enum><text>a certification in writing that the issuance of the waiver is in the national security interests of the United States; and</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H5F9985CFFCEC41E1999AD2897DB59DA3"><enum>(2)</enum><text>a report explaining the basis for the certification.</text></paragraph></subsection></section> <section id="H2350A404A5CD43B8922BD999F9293D51"><enum>105.</enum><header>Report on activities by the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation</header> <subsection id="HF9613643BC7C4C069754AFC134C78697"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Report</header><text>Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes the following:</text> <paragraph id="H15DA274B5BA341FEA686F0C92348AA7B"><enum>(1)</enum><text>A description, with respect to the applicable reporting period, of the subsea cable manufacturing, installation, and maintenance capabilities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H4E78D42E46424BF486D8514D9B558634"><enum>(2)</enum><text>An analysis of the mission, capabilities, and activities of the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, including—</text> <subparagraph id="H580C9958561A474B849ECEE5437EF07C"><enum>(A)</enum><text>a description of GUGI operations and capabilities in deep water and littoral infrastructure surveillance, seabed warfare, and sabotage, including recent activity trends and development of new weapons systems;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HAD00575946EB453B9D2A15D4BC99F9C7"><enum>(B)</enum><text>a description of GUGI’s use of ostensibly civilian research vessels to conduct critical undersea infrastructure surveillance, seabed warfare, and potential sabotage;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H496CE36E6E584BA69BEB9226A799C517"><enum>(C)</enum><text>an assessment of the impact of sanctions on the ability of GUGI to procure advanced technologies and equipment, as well as its efforts to circumvent those sanctions; and</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HB561CF959DE14703BCB2D9CEDF5224F5"><enum>(D)</enum><text>a list of suspected GUGI research or scientific vessels, including vessel names and International Maritime Organization and Maritime Mobile Service Identity numbers, and related equipment that are suspected of engaging in dual-use operations and probing of critical undersea infrastructure.</text></subparagraph></paragraph> <paragraph id="HB60C48D44FF7454C8ABB210F7DA49922"><enum>(3)</enum><text>An analysis of the missions, capabilities, and activities of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU), including—</text> <subparagraph id="HCCC3E02CA26F4CA6817886AB15BD7F4B"><enum>(A)</enum><text>a description of GRU operations and capabilities related to physical, electronic, and cyber surveillance, monitoring, and sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure and maritime logistics;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HC385A40A1AC24811A4C2A453A9688C28"><enum>(B)</enum><text>a description of the use of Russian civilian merchant and fishing vessels by the GRU, including a list of fishing and merchant vessel names and International Maritime Organization and Maritime Mobile Service Identity Numbers believed to be involved in surveillance or sabotage activities; and</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H0B55BBFCD334449285ACFBBA72AA043A"><enum>(C)</enum><text>an assessment of the impact of sanctions on the ability of GUGI to procure advanced technologies and equipment, as well as its efforts to circumvent those sanctions.</text></subparagraph></paragraph> <paragraph id="H54B0680DBF434D68A959651FFC47E710"><enum>(4)</enum><text>An analysis of the missions, capabilities, and activities of the People’s Liberation Army, the PRC Coast Guard, the China Ship Scientific Research Center, HMN Technologies, and other PRC-based entities, including unmarked or dual-use maritime militia or commercial vessels related to surveillance, monitoring, and sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, including—</text> <subparagraph id="H30CF3EFE31D64DC686B5E703C27DEB24"><enum>(A)</enum><text>a description of recent capability developments related to surveilling or sabotaging critical undersea infrastructure, including for both deep-sea and littoral purposes; and</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H4074ED41B20043CAB2952B3938990DA3"><enum>(B)</enum><text>a description of the PRC’s use of ostensibly civilian fishing, merchant, and research vessels for sabotage or surveillance of critical undersea infrastructure, including in the Indo-Pacific, Africa, Latin America, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere.</text></subparagraph></paragraph> <paragraph id="HE452262C66E74484AEF2D0D4EF8EFC9F"><enum>(5)</enum><text>An assessment of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the PRC on surveillance or sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, including—</text> <subparagraph id="H16B6119D0ED849E2A6A3A36157120803"><enum>(A)</enum><text>any current or planned operational coordination against United States or allied and partner nation targets;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HFEB2A610EC684D22B828E8521FC2F9C5"><enum>(B)</enum><text>any joint research, development, testing, or evaluation of critical undersea infrastructure surveillance, sabotage, or seabed warfare capabilities;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HCE79D6AA67F04C5E9B5459E2AA56C527"><enum>(C)</enum><text>any technology transfers or joint training related to critical undersea infrastructure surveillance, sabotage, or seabed warfare; and</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HF13ABE8ED1834263943120E5DA76AA97"><enum>(D)</enum><text>any coordination in procurement of advanced technologies related to critical undersea infrastructure, surveillance, sabotage, or seabed warfare, or circumvention of sanctions against the Russian Federation.</text></subparagraph></paragraph> <paragraph id="H6181E1CBC9494C029520D2189A4B89ED"><enum>(6)</enum><text>A list of instances during the previous calendar year in which the United States, or allies and partners of the United States, documented anomalous behavior from vessels, either flagged, crewed, or operated by the PRC or Russia, around critical undersea infrastructure, including—</text> <subparagraph id="H85C858665B524DF795D5E1FEEFE2E5D6"><enum>(A)</enum><text>any official United States Government response to counter the anomalous behavior; and</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HE60451DA679546629F9B07021C1EBA78"><enum>(B)</enum><text>any coordinated diplomatic action with allies and partners.</text></subparagraph></paragraph> <paragraph id="H9D90F0CAFFB5421C95FEB21FC9C215F6"><enum>(7)</enum><text>An assessment of the extent to which PRC-based entities are involved in laying, maintaining, and repairing United States-invested cables.</text></paragraph></subsection> <subsection id="H91792E91F39F4DAAB78E04604ACA3D48"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Initial and subsequent reports</header><text>The initial report required under subsection (a) shall cover the period between January 1, 2022, through the date of the enactment of this Act. Subsequent reports required by subsection (a) shall cover the previous calendar year for the reporting period.</text></subsection> <subsection id="HF68CA2CB58024ACF8E923550254A5709"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Classification</header><text>The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.</text></subsection></section> <section id="HCC1273ABD586479BA4F57413CE977148"><enum>106.</enum><header>Report on potential sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes the assessment of the intelligence community, including dissents from individual agencies, of the likely cause and, if applicable, the attribution of the following instances of reported sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure:</text> <paragraph id="H0AB5F9576974456883829B216FEDFDED"><enum>(1)</enum><text>In January 2022, the reported damage to the subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting the Norwegian mainland with the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H5FB4DFAED3F94D0583DD6CDEA2C4389B"><enum>(2)</enum><text>The September 2022 sabotage of three of the four trunklines of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipelines, at sites northeast and southeast of the Danish island of Bornholm in the Western Baltic Sea, including—</text> <subparagraph id="HC00C4C08138D476CBED8D14E149CF4D9"><enum>(A)</enum><text>an assessment of the activities of Russian military vessels, including those with undersea warfare capabilities, at any of the Nord Stream blast sites in the months leading up to the incident;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HD1B180ED4EE542A19D8E84A332F18DE3"><enum>(B)</enum><text>a description of any Russian civilian or military vessels intercepted or diverted from the blast sites in the aftermath of the sabotage or vessels or underwater unmanned vehicles that gained access to the blast sites;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HC2B35CAA071A4D1B94A1DAD6D1BE0F1C"><enum>(C)</enum><text>an assessment of the technical feasibility of a small group of divers conducting the Nord Stream sabotage using the rental boat <quote>Andromeda</quote> in the weather and sea conditions present at the time;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H46402B0B36934DADB176650A40B6D25C"><enum>(D)</enum><text>an assessment of whether the Russian Federation’s documented practice of recruiting or coercing Ukrainians or other third country nationals to conduct sabotage operations on land targets is applicable to a maritime context;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H5DABC0C482AE493DAE2E87A64534F805"><enum>(E)</enum><text>an assessment of the fees and penalties for failure to honor gas delivery contracts that Gazprom or other Russian entities potentially faced due to the throttling of gas deliveries via the Nord Stream 1 pipeline in 2021;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HB77479A985674B4DB450AD933CDFE2D8"><enum>(F)</enum><text>an assessment of the insurance implications for Nord Stream 1 and 2, as well as its insurers and Western financiers, depending on the identity of the perpetrator;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HB9718C5243FB4E6D88BB4B07575C5A42"><enum>(G)</enum><text>a description of the law enforcement investigations by regional governments, the scope of their investigations, and their outcomes;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HD60772A181BB4A89AF19534BFD7C575E"><enum>(H)</enum><text>an assessment of whether any Russian vessels documented in close proximity to the Nord Stream blast sites in the months leading up to or immediately after the incident, including those with undersea surveillance or warfare capabilities, were present at other suspected sabotage sites either before or after the incident in question; and</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H2DD171EDAD6E4355A27269EAA7181133"><enum>(I)</enum><text>any information on potential attribution received from allied or partner nation communications through diplomatic or intelligence channels.</text></subparagraph></paragraph> <paragraph id="H688CAED435AC4049A5A8953DDEE37E10"><enum>(3)</enum><text>In February 2023, the reported damage to subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting the main island of Taiwan to the Matsu Islands in the Taiwan Strait.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H881D544344B94986A9CBCBC6ACFA068F"><enum>(4)</enum><text>In October 2023, the reported damage to the Finland-to-Estonia Baltic connector natural gas pipeline, in addition to subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting Estonia and Sweden and Finland and Estonia.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="HD62ACBCAC3DB4771B04687CE7A261458"> <enum>(5)</enum> <text>In November 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-to-Germany C-Lion1 subsea telecommunications cable and the Lithuania-to-Sweden BCS subsea telecommunications cable in the Central Baltic Sea.</text> </paragraph> <paragraph id="HFA717833E740403192A8CDDBB2554A30"><enum>(6)</enum><text>In December 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-to-Estonia EstLink2 subsea electricity interconnection cable and nearby subsea telecommunications cables in the Gulf of Finland.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H11859A23914143A3BE4BBEF513E6D556"><enum>(7)</enum><text>In January 2025, the reported damage to the Trans-Pacific Express subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting Taiwan to the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan, among other global democracies.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H8BE908680D9F454A8980CCA08E24A091"><enum>(8)</enum><text>In February 2025, the reported damage to a subsea telecommunications cable connecting the main island of Taiwan with the Penghu Islands in the Taiwan Strait.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="HB4CEEB70062C440EB4206E86E1670DED"><enum>(9)</enum><text>In January 2026, the reported damage to subsea telecommunications cables from Latvia in the Central Baltic Sea connecting Liepāja and Šventoji.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H2222008DC1814FE8B51A43FECEFFEBD4"> <enum>(10)</enum> <text>In January 2026, the reported damage to the Elisa cable connecting Finland and Estonia involving a vessel called the Fitburg.</text> </paragraph></section> <section id="H29135D4146894FE0A7BA5A49A5E351FE"><enum>107.</enum><header>Engaging foreign partners to strengthen the security of critical undersea infrastructure</header> <subsection id="HFD2D19A170914FE8B2569E19D7A6DD82"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Sense of Congress</header><text>It is the sense of Congress that—</text> <paragraph id="H9AD4B157CA39400DA49FB6D136A31A78"><enum>(1)</enum><text>as international critical undersea infrastructure expands, there are increasing challenges to the proper installation, maintenance, repair, and protection of international subsea cables that have the potential to undermine United States and foreign partner national security interests;</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H84BF38484B2A41688CAE2B317DBA89D4"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the United States is uniquely positioned to provide technical, material, and other forms of support to international partners to enhance the resilience of international critical undersea infrastructure;</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H4473051FD11C49D4A1C302FC2AAF7475"><enum>(3)</enum><text>the United States Government should enhance its diplomatic efforts to work alongside trusted allies to help foreign governments improve efforts to quickly and effectively install, maintain, repair, and protect international critical undersea infrastructure; and</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="HB73AB9330C1A4C0BA125CFE7B9ACB4B4"><enum>(4)</enum><text>given the importance of critical undersea infrastructure to United States and allied energy security and prosperity, adversaries are increasingly prioritizing capabilities designed to target United States and allied subsea energy infrastructure.</text></paragraph></subsection> <subsection id="H6C3F17254C0842DAA44C0059F656F545"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Commitment of personnel and resources</header><text>The Secretary of State shall devote sufficient personnel and resources towards—</text> <paragraph commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="H4CADC6E0D67B46339AD58B94A57B6627"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">engaging with foreign countries to improve security and reduce barriers to the installation, monitoring, maintenance, and repair of critical undersea infrastructure; and</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="HC5ED39AD24264BE28B1CA41CACCD4C59"><enum>(2)</enum><text>working with allies and partners to support the development of a multinational fleet of cable repair ships to respond rapidly to incidents of sabotage.</text></paragraph></subsection> <subsection id="H3E88A67C01134FA59EFED96553F31F52"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Report</header><text>Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the next 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that outlines efforts by the United States Government in the prior calendar year to work with international allies and partners to strengthen the security of and reduce barriers to the monitoring, maintenance, repair, and protection of international critical undersea infrastructure networks, including—</text> <paragraph id="H997295C8E4A249178F3487ED15300CA9"><enum>(1)</enum><text>a list of current foreign policies or laws that create barriers to United States-led efforts to install, maintain, repair, and protect international critical undersea infrastructure networks; and</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="HDAAABC5E09D2448C8774C3EC2CAB168F"><enum>(2)</enum><text>progress made in the previous calendar year as a result of United States engagement with allies and partners.</text></paragraph></subsection></section>

119 HR 8069 IH: Strategic Subsea Cables Act of 2026 U.S. House of Representatives 2026-03-24 text/xml EN Pursuant to Title 17 Section 105 of the United States Code, this file is not subject to copyright protection and is in the public domain.

Short title

This Act may be cited as the

Strategic Subsea Cables Act of 2026

Table of contents

The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title.

Sec. 2. Table of contents.

Sec. 3. Definitions.

TITLE I—International coordination and engagement on critical undersea infrastructure

Sec. 101. Findings.

Sec. 102. Sense of Congress.

Sec. 103. Enhancing United States Government engagement at the International Cable Protection Committee and other relevant international bodies to safeguard United States interests.

Sec. 104. Imposition of sanctions with respect to critical undersea infrastructure sabotage.

Sec. 105. Report on activities by the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation.

Sec. 106. Report on potential sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure.

Sec. 107. Engaging foreign partners to strengthen the security of critical undersea infrastructure.

TITLE II—Department of State critical undersea infrastructure expertise

Sec. 201. Expanding critical undersea infrastructure-related expertise at the Department of State.

TITLE III—Subsea telecommunications infrastructure coordination, construction, and repair

Sec. 301. Improving United States Government coordination of subsea telecommunications infrastructure.

Sec. 302. Strengthening information sharing between United States Government and private sector actors on subsea telecommunications infrastructure.

Definitions

In this Act: (1)

Agency

The term agency has the meaning given the term in section 3502 of title 44, United States Code. (2)

Appropriate congressional committees

The term appropriate congressional committees means— (A)the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and (B)the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. (3)

Appropriate Federal agencies

The term appropriate Federal agencies means the following: (A)The Department of Commerce. (B)The Department of Defense. (C)The Department of Homeland Security. (D)The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (E)The Department of State. (F)The Federal Communications Commission. (G)The Department of the Treasury. (H)The Department of the Judiciary. (I)Any additional Federal agencies, as determined by the President. (4)

Critical undersea infrastructure

The term critical undersea infrastructure refers to both subsea telecommunications infrastructure and subsea energy infrastructure. (5)

Interagency committee

The term interagency committee means the entity established under section 301(b) of this Act. (6)

Non-Federal entity

The term non-Federal entity means any nongovernmental entity that is an individual, organization, or business involved in the operation, maintenance, repair, or construction of critical subsea infrastructure, including critical undersea infrastructure owners. (7)

Sabotage

The term sabotage means actions, or preparations for future actions, taken with the intent to cause defective production, operation, or damage to critical underseas infrastructure, including the integrity of data transmitted via subsea telecommunications infrastructure. (8)

Subsea energy infrastructure

The term subsea energy infrastructure means a subsea cable, pipeline, or other equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed, including— (A)to transmit electricity, including via subsea electricity cables, subsea electricity transformers, or equipment related to the support of offshore energy production installations; (B) to transport natural gas, oil, or hydrogen between land-based or offshore infrastructure; and (C)associated landing stations and facilities. (9)

Subsea telecommunications infrastructure

The term subsea telecommunications infrastructure means subsea fiber-optic cables and related equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed, and used to transmit communications, data, voice, video, or other electronic signals, as well as associated landing stations and facilities.

<enum>I</enum><header>International coordination and engagement on critical undersea infrastructure</header> <section commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" section-type="subsequent-section" id="HB0A4420672C44B00A72B57836144F9A4"><enum>101.</enum><header display-inline="yes-display-inline">Findings</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">Congress makes the following findings:</text> <paragraph id="HC6626816D23246CAA9DC5B9562F4E885"><enum>(1)</enum><text>Sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure poses a growing threat to United States and allied security and economic prosperity.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="HB567ACB437F145CDB5D8CE231077DD21"><enum>(2)</enum><text>In recent years, numerous critical undersea infrastructure sites were destroyed or damaged, including—</text> <subparagraph id="HB34FEA375EA544808327D06962836B64"><enum>(A)</enum><text>in January 2022, the reported damage to subsea telecommunications cables connecting the Norwegian mainland with the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard, home of SvalSAT, the largest commercial satellite ground station on Earth;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HDCA48FAEBFAF43E7AB21EF04DC523FF3"><enum>(B)</enum><text>in September 2022, the reported damage to 3 of the 4 trunklines of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipelines, at sites northeast and southeast of the Danish island of Bornholm in the Western Baltic Sea;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HCED516E12FBF4F1AA661BA4823F9D084"><enum>(C)</enum><text>in February 2023, the reported damage to subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting the main island of Taiwan to the Matsu Islands in the Taiwan Strait;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HBCF26BA55BB8460CBF1E52BD50D5D0E9"><enum>(D)</enum><text>in October 2023, the reported damage to the Finland-to-Estonia Balticconnector natural gas pipeline spanning the Gulf of Finland, in addition to the reported damage to subsea telecommunications cables connecting Estonia and Sweden and Finland and Estonia;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HDD0B0595AB1E4A0590FDBA042A02BEE2"> <enum>(E)</enum> <text>in November 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-to-Germany C-Lion1 subsea telecommunications cables and the Lithuania-to-Sweden BCS subsea telecommunications cable in the Central Baltic Sea;</text> </subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H9BEFC76C886D4242B39811A1DAF8AD5D" commented="no"> <enum>(F)</enum> <text>in December 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-to-Estonia EstLink2 subsea electricity interconnection cable and nearby subsea telecommunications cables in the Gulf of Finland;</text> </subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H7E6D6FBBA4B44A07A7C437B762067436"><enum>(G)</enum><text>in January 2025, the reported damage to the Trans-Pacific Express subsea telecommunications cable connecting Taiwan to the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan, among other global democracies;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H0BEA45AB9FEF4F8FA8A004DEA9467A7A"><enum>(H)</enum><text>in February 2025, the reported damage to a subsea telecommunications cable connecting the main island of Taiwan with the Penghu Islands in the Taiwan Strait;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HAF8F4C2666654447A99E8DCEB07A7E70"><enum>(I)</enum><text>in January 2026, the reported damage to subsea telecommunications cables from Latvia in the Central Baltic Sea linking Liepāja and Šventoji; and</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HD3597A1DD5514A1099031DA64A25C5AC"> <enum>(J)</enum> <text>in January 2026, the reported damage to the Elisa cable connecting Finland and Estonia involving a vessel named the Fitburg.</text> </subparagraph></paragraph> <paragraph id="H447272C53DAD46B583FE33F8C2BDFB08"><enum>(3)</enum><text>Following subsea fiber-optic cable cuts in the Baltic Sea in December 2024, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) established the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network to conduct information and threat intelligence sharing among private and public sector actors to protect subsea cables.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="HDD11B2A7830146A68B238994F2A92245"><enum>(4)</enum><text>On February 21, 2025, the European Union published an EU Action Plan on Cable Security to include the development and deployment of an Integrated Surveillance Mechanism for Submarine cables work to establish a dedicated regional hub in the Baltic Sea to serve as a test bed of the integrated surveillance approach.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H9A64AEFA364D44A5B0A92C709ECB8C17"><enum>(5)</enum><text>The Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) published guidelines for Strengthening Resilience and Repair of Submarine Cables and most recently announced plans to <quote>build a secure, diverse and resilient submarine cable network</quote> and <quote>to facilitate the expeditious deployment, repair, maintenance, removal, and protection of submarine cables, between ASEAN Member States</quote>.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="HC780D1AEEADB464F90E335196723F697"><enum>(6)</enum><text>On July 1, 2025, the Quad, represented by the United States, India, Japan, and Australia, met to reaffirm its commitment to the Quad Partnership on Cable Connectivity and Resilience. In the meeting, the Quad underscored the need for digital infrastructure collaboration, organizing a subsea cables forum to be hosted by the United States and India and encouraging regulatory harmonization between Quad partners. Through this initiative, the Quad seeks to defend and promote resilient, secure, and transparent digital infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific region.</text></paragraph></section> <section id="H9A1971CECDC444E3A5975C17D2E3C03A"><enum>102.</enum><header>Sense of Congress</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that—</text> <paragraph id="HE991D73E3BB247AABC3460E40EC5F195"><enum>(1)</enum><text>critical undersea infrastructure represents vital strategic and economic links between the United States and its partners and allies;</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="HFB3BE4459BE7498BABECD43C9EA45730"><enum>(2)</enum><text>according to NATO, <quote>undersea cables carry an estimated $10 trillion in transfers every day; two-thirds of the world’s oil and gas is either extracted at sea or transported by sea; and around 95 percent of global data flows are transmitted via undersea cables</quote>;</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="HCC6DDC923E47485582EDD217A4AE1765"><enum>(3)</enum><text>since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there has been a marked increase in high-profile suspected sabotage incidents resulting in damage to critical undersea infrastructure, especially across Northern Europe and East Asia;</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="HA35446BEE01348A295EF1A55E82C02C4"><enum>(4)</enum><text>the United States Government has an important role to play in advancing United States interests in international bodies that oversee the protection of critical undersea infrastructure, including promoting network resilience and redundancy, and advancing regulations in support of these goals;</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="HD0DBDD2FFFA94307946C9488542EA43B"> <enum>(5)</enum> <text>the United States Government should play a more active role in NATO initiatives such as the NATO Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure, the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell, the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network, and the NATO-EU Task Force on the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure, allied maritime security efforts such as the Joint Expeditionary Force, Indo-Pacific initiatives, including the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, and international organizations such as the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), in order to advance United States national security and economic interests;</text> </paragraph> <paragraph id="H962633EE27B846BDB00738725F9CD842"><enum>(6)</enum><text>the United States should lead efforts to promote the deployment of resilient critical undersea infrastructure networks, enhance situational awareness, strengthen preparedness, and formalize collective responses among allies and partners through enhanced information sharing and coordination; and</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H3B18C6FD54504DB1BEFA309F32D5127B"><enum>(7)</enum><text>while critical undersea infrastructure owners and other associated private sector stakeholders carry significant responsibility in safeguarding this infrastructure, the United States Government and allied foreign governments need to play a greater role.</text></paragraph></section> <section id="H1C82C1906B6E4581A111259BB2131B71"><enum>103.</enum><header>Enhancing United States Government engagement at the International Cable Protection Committee and other relevant international bodies to safeguard United States interests</header> <subsection id="H302FC23D4C63420BBDC87A95583D96D7"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text>The Secretary of State, in coordination with the interagency committee, shall seek to increase United States Government engagement in international bodies, including the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), to advance United States national security and economic interests as it relates to critical undersea infrastructure.</text></subsection> <subsection id="H7350EF80E540478DB9075000A40C70FB"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Report</header><text>Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes the following:</text> <paragraph id="H36E210768B4C4563A46750BD834C0227"><enum>(1)</enum><text>A description of how increased United States Government engagement within the ICPC could support United States national security objectives as it relates to the protection of critical undersea infrastructure.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H6A04BB73EDDF4207BF3C4FA21C7021DA"><enum>(2)</enum><text>A description of key objectives for promoting and protecting United States national security interests within the ICPC.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H37BA89C7A3A54BD3AE29A717F83A2943"><enum>(3)</enum><text>A description of how the People’s Republic of China entities leverage their engagement within the ICPC to further their strategic interests.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H23B1387EC7A2463198ED919756481C92"><enum>(4)</enum><text>A description of how encouraging other countries and regional bodies to join the ICPC can better ensure coordinated, consistent global undersea subsea telecommunications infrastructure policies.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H6FD631FDB61E4FB0B74D07DAE587F72C"><enum>(5)</enum><text>A description of other international bodies relevant for critical undersea infrastructure where the United States should increase its diplomatic engagement.</text></paragraph></subsection></section> <section id="HBEFA5CADD5EE4D63BFC5F06A48979553"><enum>104.</enum><header>Imposition of sanctions with respect to critical undersea infrastructure sabotage</header> <subsection id="H199CCEEB6BD9496A9C711ACE6DBAFACD"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text>The President, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to any foreign person that the President determines, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, is responsible for acts of sabotage or facilitates acts of sabotage against critical undersea infrastructure, including—</text> <paragraph id="H4411AFF066F94925ACB9880F02AE2E7E"><enum>(1)</enum><text>any foreign vessel or entity the owner or operator of which knowingly—</text> <subparagraph id="H4FD1D9D510BC4240B060C0E23AC7A94F"><enum>(A)</enum><text>commits acts of sabotage; or</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H6A702A456D074AF49E7A1D8CBE9BB869"><enum>(B)</enum><text>conducts preparatory surveillance, logistical support, security, or other services that facilitate or enable an act of sabotage; and</text></subparagraph></paragraph> <paragraph id="H6211F7AB942A41D6B9E931618B2C23E5"><enum>(2)</enum><text>any foreign person that the President determines knowingly—</text> <subparagraph id="HCB39B602F2FD40CD99A5FA5F6A35B7F2"><enum>(A)</enum><text>owns, operates, or manages the vessel or entity described in paragraph (1);</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H455CE803E29A496A88B068811C35F580"><enum>(B)</enum><text>provides underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance necessary for such a vessel or entity;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H710AE7658B6D45C3A3D7DA41D55EAD4B"><enum>(C)</enum><text>facilitates deceptive or structured transactions to support a vessel or entity described in paragraph (1);</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H4BDC5B1EF1EB40D092CF3DEF16401E54"><enum>(D)</enum><text>provides port or logistics services or facilities for technology upgrades or installation of equipment for, or retrofitting or tethering of, a vessel described in paragraph (1) for the purpose of evading sanctions;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H636DAE46A8744557B378ECEFD5994638"><enum>(E)</enum><text>provided documentation, registration, or flagging services for a vessel described in paragraph (1) for the purpose of evading sanctions; or</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HF325762145E54A48A486CB1027118BE5"><enum>(F)</enum><text>serves as a captain, principal officer, or senior leadership of such a vessel or entity.</text></subparagraph></paragraph></subsection> <subsection id="HD1E99430497A4C169ED33DCEF5D3B084"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Report required</header><text>Not later than 15 days after imposing sanctions with respect to a foreign person under subsection (a), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives, a report that includes a detailed justification for the imposition of the sanctions.</text></subsection> <subsection id="H773DC768BFFF46B9988311575963FF42"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Sanctions described</header><text>The sanctions described in this subsection are the following:</text> <paragraph id="H8CCADDF618314CC48CD9C3E73EA93E35"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Blocking of property</header><text>The President shall exercise all of the powers granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/50/1701">50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.</external-xref>) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of a foreign person described in subsection (a), if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="HA4DDF6AF79FE44419FBA3F9DBAF4A9BD"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole</header> <subparagraph id="H5F8F967587EA4AD2871E3C3C1B84FE15"><enum>(A)</enum><header>Visas, admission, or parole</header><text>An alien described in subsection (a) shall be—</text> <clause id="HB4BF1E3E5927401881CF430A72B78EBA"><enum>(i)</enum><text>inadmissible to the United States;</text></clause> <clause id="H5848E5D8F2D94A15B22F86BA16B35256"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and</text></clause> <clause id="HC2795AC4DD3D444186B5B74F52A632C4"><enum>(iii)</enum><text>otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/8/1101">8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.</external-xref>).</text></clause></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HDA6FAF1AF9CE410D89024A08FA96DC9F"><enum>(B)</enum><header>Current visas revoked</header> <clause id="H7E4D282A0EAC4EE79E612DBB1C26A6D8"><enum>(i)</enum><header>In general</header><text>The visa or other entry documentation of an alien described in subsection (a) shall be revoked, regardless of when such visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.</text></clause> <clause id="H677E2E4BD1AC4479AEFF29EAECE9225C"><enum>(ii)</enum><header>Immediate effect</header><text>A revocation under clause (i) shall—</text> <subclause id="H00F55595A0AD476DB4143A3C57CBF88D"><enum>(I)</enum><text>take effect immediately; and</text></subclause> <subclause id="H23EE20D42011448BAA2EF7AC9158E589"><enum>(II)</enum><text>automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the possession of the alien.</text></subclause></clause></subparagraph></paragraph></subsection> <subsection id="HBA3140A9096E45E4870C29F98E2F6DCD"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Implementation; penalties</header> <paragraph id="H3EA32FE8D7D74FCBB14CF31B6109D26D"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Implementation</header><text>The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H14DDA1B1A812402C843057D57BF863B4"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Penalties</header><text>A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this section or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/50/1705">50 U.S.C. 1705</external-xref>) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section.</text></paragraph></subsection> <subsection id="HFBE932C5A0E04D56B8BA765A41157447"><enum>(e)</enum><header>Exceptions</header> <paragraph id="H91281932EF15405BBBAB59E2E5BD5177"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Exception to comply with United Nations Headquarters Agreement and law enforcement activities</header><text>Sanctions under this section shall not apply with respect to the admission or parole of an alien to the United States if admitting or paroling the alien is necessary—</text> <subparagraph id="H5B69FB517519401787B713F305D6EE12"><enum>(A)</enum><text>to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations of the United States; or</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HBF5115D0DBAB4340AB66D15E11F17A73"><enum>(B)</enum><text>to carry out or assist authorized law enforcement activity in the United States.</text></subparagraph></paragraph> <paragraph id="H1424DFD608DF4EABB6D86AEA797E7BD0"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Exception to comply with intelligence activities</header><text>Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/50/3091">50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.</external-xref>) or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H2AB850104CF941CC918C0631B62EB744"><enum>(3)</enum><header>Exception relating to importation of goods</header> <subparagraph id="HCD6BDBC30A174558AF3ED19DEE0DD322"><enum>(A)</enum><header>In general</header><text>A requirement to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property under this section shall not include the authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H244607B935B94ECBBFAA8CF2115E52AE"><enum>(B)</enum><header>Good defined</header><text>In this paragraph, the term <term>good</term> means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data.</text></subparagraph></paragraph></subsection> <subsection id="H137AB1DC1D2B48D1A088EE84CEA5D29B"><enum>(f)</enum><header>Definitions</header><text>In this section:</text> <paragraph id="H7B8C9B27C3874B6DB82AED6C2B549466"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Admission; admitted; alien</header><text>The terms <term>admission</term>, <term>admitted</term>, and <term>alien</term> have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/8/1101">8 U.S.C. 1101</external-xref>).</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H6BBA954FF1964480A843EA727EC792AA"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Foreign person</header><text>The term <term>foreign person</term> means an individual or entity that is not a United States person.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H6DDF0149EE82477185D1B536F07D81D6"><enum>(3)</enum><header>United States person</header><text>The term <term>United States person</term> means—</text> <subparagraph id="H00574E9793824E12B75E675AA800F510"><enum>(A)</enum><text>any United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HE9CAF0BAF4C245F0B4C677D11104C4A8"><enum>(B)</enum><text>an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including any foreign branch of such an entity; or</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HF8D756CC613C487089821ABAE9A9A6F7"><enum>(C)</enum><text>any person in the United States.</text></subparagraph></paragraph></subsection> <subsection id="H13D3E840392F4826817044792223445F"><enum>(g)</enum><header>National security interests waiver</header><text>The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section if, before issuing the waiver, the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—</text> <paragraph id="H4CD224DF2F4A4B1392884C0F1662138A"><enum>(1)</enum><text>a certification in writing that the issuance of the waiver is in the national security interests of the United States; and</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H5F9985CFFCEC41E1999AD2897DB59DA3"><enum>(2)</enum><text>a report explaining the basis for the certification.</text></paragraph></subsection></section> <section id="H2350A404A5CD43B8922BD999F9293D51"><enum>105.</enum><header>Report on activities by the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation</header> <subsection id="HF9613643BC7C4C069754AFC134C78697"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Report</header><text>Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes the following:</text> <paragraph id="H15DA274B5BA341FEA686F0C92348AA7B"><enum>(1)</enum><text>A description, with respect to the applicable reporting period, of the subsea cable manufacturing, installation, and maintenance capabilities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H4E78D42E46424BF486D8514D9B558634"><enum>(2)</enum><text>An analysis of the mission, capabilities, and activities of the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, including—</text> <subparagraph id="H580C9958561A474B849ECEE5437EF07C"><enum>(A)</enum><text>a description of GUGI operations and capabilities in deep water and littoral infrastructure surveillance, seabed warfare, and sabotage, including recent activity trends and development of new weapons systems;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HAD00575946EB453B9D2A15D4BC99F9C7"><enum>(B)</enum><text>a description of GUGI’s use of ostensibly civilian research vessels to conduct critical undersea infrastructure surveillance, seabed warfare, and potential sabotage;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H496CE36E6E584BA69BEB9226A799C517"><enum>(C)</enum><text>an assessment of the impact of sanctions on the ability of GUGI to procure advanced technologies and equipment, as well as its efforts to circumvent those sanctions; and</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HB561CF959DE14703BCB2D9CEDF5224F5"><enum>(D)</enum><text>a list of suspected GUGI research or scientific vessels, including vessel names and International Maritime Organization and Maritime Mobile Service Identity numbers, and related equipment that are suspected of engaging in dual-use operations and probing of critical undersea infrastructure.</text></subparagraph></paragraph> <paragraph id="HB60C48D44FF7454C8ABB210F7DA49922"><enum>(3)</enum><text>An analysis of the missions, capabilities, and activities of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU), including—</text> <subparagraph id="HCCC3E02CA26F4CA6817886AB15BD7F4B"><enum>(A)</enum><text>a description of GRU operations and capabilities related to physical, electronic, and cyber surveillance, monitoring, and sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure and maritime logistics;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HC385A40A1AC24811A4C2A453A9688C28"><enum>(B)</enum><text>a description of the use of Russian civilian merchant and fishing vessels by the GRU, including a list of fishing and merchant vessel names and International Maritime Organization and Maritime Mobile Service Identity Numbers believed to be involved in surveillance or sabotage activities; and</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H0B55BBFCD334449285ACFBBA72AA043A"><enum>(C)</enum><text>an assessment of the impact of sanctions on the ability of GUGI to procure advanced technologies and equipment, as well as its efforts to circumvent those sanctions.</text></subparagraph></paragraph> <paragraph id="H54B0680DBF434D68A959651FFC47E710"><enum>(4)</enum><text>An analysis of the missions, capabilities, and activities of the People’s Liberation Army, the PRC Coast Guard, the China Ship Scientific Research Center, HMN Technologies, and other PRC-based entities, including unmarked or dual-use maritime militia or commercial vessels related to surveillance, monitoring, and sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, including—</text> <subparagraph id="H30CF3EFE31D64DC686B5E703C27DEB24"><enum>(A)</enum><text>a description of recent capability developments related to surveilling or sabotaging critical undersea infrastructure, including for both deep-sea and littoral purposes; and</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H4074ED41B20043CAB2952B3938990DA3"><enum>(B)</enum><text>a description of the PRC’s use of ostensibly civilian fishing, merchant, and research vessels for sabotage or surveillance of critical undersea infrastructure, including in the Indo-Pacific, Africa, Latin America, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere.</text></subparagraph></paragraph> <paragraph id="HE452262C66E74484AEF2D0D4EF8EFC9F"><enum>(5)</enum><text>An assessment of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the PRC on surveillance or sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, including—</text> <subparagraph id="H16B6119D0ED849E2A6A3A36157120803"><enum>(A)</enum><text>any current or planned operational coordination against United States or allied and partner nation targets;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HFEB2A610EC684D22B828E8521FC2F9C5"><enum>(B)</enum><text>any joint research, development, testing, or evaluation of critical undersea infrastructure surveillance, sabotage, or seabed warfare capabilities;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HCE79D6AA67F04C5E9B5459E2AA56C527"><enum>(C)</enum><text>any technology transfers or joint training related to critical undersea infrastructure surveillance, sabotage, or seabed warfare; and</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HF13ABE8ED1834263943120E5DA76AA97"><enum>(D)</enum><text>any coordination in procurement of advanced technologies related to critical undersea infrastructure, surveillance, sabotage, or seabed warfare, or circumvention of sanctions against the Russian Federation.</text></subparagraph></paragraph> <paragraph id="H6181E1CBC9494C029520D2189A4B89ED"><enum>(6)</enum><text>A list of instances during the previous calendar year in which the United States, or allies and partners of the United States, documented anomalous behavior from vessels, either flagged, crewed, or operated by the PRC or Russia, around critical undersea infrastructure, including—</text> <subparagraph id="H85C858665B524DF795D5E1FEEFE2E5D6"><enum>(A)</enum><text>any official United States Government response to counter the anomalous behavior; and</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HE60451DA679546629F9B07021C1EBA78"><enum>(B)</enum><text>any coordinated diplomatic action with allies and partners.</text></subparagraph></paragraph> <paragraph id="H9D90F0CAFFB5421C95FEB21FC9C215F6"><enum>(7)</enum><text>An assessment of the extent to which PRC-based entities are involved in laying, maintaining, and repairing United States-invested cables.</text></paragraph></subsection> <subsection id="H91792E91F39F4DAAB78E04604ACA3D48"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Initial and subsequent reports</header><text>The initial report required under subsection (a) shall cover the period between January 1, 2022, through the date of the enactment of this Act. Subsequent reports required by subsection (a) shall cover the previous calendar year for the reporting period.</text></subsection> <subsection id="HF68CA2CB58024ACF8E923550254A5709"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Classification</header><text>The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.</text></subsection></section> <section id="HCC1273ABD586479BA4F57413CE977148"><enum>106.</enum><header>Report on potential sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes the assessment of the intelligence community, including dissents from individual agencies, of the likely cause and, if applicable, the attribution of the following instances of reported sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure:</text> <paragraph id="H0AB5F9576974456883829B216FEDFDED"><enum>(1)</enum><text>In January 2022, the reported damage to the subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting the Norwegian mainland with the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H5FB4DFAED3F94D0583DD6CDEA2C4389B"><enum>(2)</enum><text>The September 2022 sabotage of three of the four trunklines of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipelines, at sites northeast and southeast of the Danish island of Bornholm in the Western Baltic Sea, including—</text> <subparagraph id="HC00C4C08138D476CBED8D14E149CF4D9"><enum>(A)</enum><text>an assessment of the activities of Russian military vessels, including those with undersea warfare capabilities, at any of the Nord Stream blast sites in the months leading up to the incident;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HD1B180ED4EE542A19D8E84A332F18DE3"><enum>(B)</enum><text>a description of any Russian civilian or military vessels intercepted or diverted from the blast sites in the aftermath of the sabotage or vessels or underwater unmanned vehicles that gained access to the blast sites;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HC2B35CAA071A4D1B94A1DAD6D1BE0F1C"><enum>(C)</enum><text>an assessment of the technical feasibility of a small group of divers conducting the Nord Stream sabotage using the rental boat <quote>Andromeda</quote> in the weather and sea conditions present at the time;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H46402B0B36934DADB176650A40B6D25C"><enum>(D)</enum><text>an assessment of whether the Russian Federation’s documented practice of recruiting or coercing Ukrainians or other third country nationals to conduct sabotage operations on land targets is applicable to a maritime context;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H5DABC0C482AE493DAE2E87A64534F805"><enum>(E)</enum><text>an assessment of the fees and penalties for failure to honor gas delivery contracts that Gazprom or other Russian entities potentially faced due to the throttling of gas deliveries via the Nord Stream 1 pipeline in 2021;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HB77479A985674B4DB450AD933CDFE2D8"><enum>(F)</enum><text>an assessment of the insurance implications for Nord Stream 1 and 2, as well as its insurers and Western financiers, depending on the identity of the perpetrator;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HB9718C5243FB4E6D88BB4B07575C5A42"><enum>(G)</enum><text>a description of the law enforcement investigations by regional governments, the scope of their investigations, and their outcomes;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HD60772A181BB4A89AF19534BFD7C575E"><enum>(H)</enum><text>an assessment of whether any Russian vessels documented in close proximity to the Nord Stream blast sites in the months leading up to or immediately after the incident, including those with undersea surveillance or warfare capabilities, were present at other suspected sabotage sites either before or after the incident in question; and</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H2DD171EDAD6E4355A27269EAA7181133"><enum>(I)</enum><text>any information on potential attribution received from allied or partner nation communications through diplomatic or intelligence channels.</text></subparagraph></paragraph> <paragraph id="H688CAED435AC4049A5A8953DDEE37E10"><enum>(3)</enum><text>In February 2023, the reported damage to subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting the main island of Taiwan to the Matsu Islands in the Taiwan Strait.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H881D544344B94986A9CBCBC6ACFA068F"><enum>(4)</enum><text>In October 2023, the reported damage to the Finland-to-Estonia Baltic connector natural gas pipeline, in addition to subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting Estonia and Sweden and Finland and Estonia.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="HD62ACBCAC3DB4771B04687CE7A261458"> <enum>(5)</enum> <text>In November 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-to-Germany C-Lion1 subsea telecommunications cable and the Lithuania-to-Sweden BCS subsea telecommunications cable in the Central Baltic Sea.</text> </paragraph> <paragraph id="HFA717833E740403192A8CDDBB2554A30"><enum>(6)</enum><text>In December 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-to-Estonia EstLink2 subsea electricity interconnection cable and nearby subsea telecommunications cables in the Gulf of Finland.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H11859A23914143A3BE4BBEF513E6D556"><enum>(7)</enum><text>In January 2025, the reported damage to the Trans-Pacific Express subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting Taiwan to the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan, among other global democracies.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H8BE908680D9F454A8980CCA08E24A091"><enum>(8)</enum><text>In February 2025, the reported damage to a subsea telecommunications cable connecting the main island of Taiwan with the Penghu Islands in the Taiwan Strait.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="HB4CEEB70062C440EB4206E86E1670DED"><enum>(9)</enum><text>In January 2026, the reported damage to subsea telecommunications cables from Latvia in the Central Baltic Sea connecting Liepāja and Šventoji.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H2222008DC1814FE8B51A43FECEFFEBD4"> <enum>(10)</enum> <text>In January 2026, the reported damage to the Elisa cable connecting Finland and Estonia involving a vessel called the Fitburg.</text> </paragraph></section> <section id="H29135D4146894FE0A7BA5A49A5E351FE"><enum>107.</enum><header>Engaging foreign partners to strengthen the security of critical undersea infrastructure</header> <subsection id="HFD2D19A170914FE8B2569E19D7A6DD82"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Sense of Congress</header><text>It is the sense of Congress that—</text> <paragraph id="H9AD4B157CA39400DA49FB6D136A31A78"><enum>(1)</enum><text>as international critical undersea infrastructure expands, there are increasing challenges to the proper installation, maintenance, repair, and protection of international subsea cables that have the potential to undermine United States and foreign partner national security interests;</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H84BF38484B2A41688CAE2B317DBA89D4"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the United States is uniquely positioned to provide technical, material, and other forms of support to international partners to enhance the resilience of international critical undersea infrastructure;</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H4473051FD11C49D4A1C302FC2AAF7475"><enum>(3)</enum><text>the United States Government should enhance its diplomatic efforts to work alongside trusted allies to help foreign governments improve efforts to quickly and effectively install, maintain, repair, and protect international critical undersea infrastructure; and</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="HB73AB9330C1A4C0BA125CFE7B9ACB4B4"><enum>(4)</enum><text>given the importance of critical undersea infrastructure to United States and allied energy security and prosperity, adversaries are increasingly prioritizing capabilities designed to target United States and allied subsea energy infrastructure.</text></paragraph></subsection> <subsection id="H6C3F17254C0842DAA44C0059F656F545"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Commitment of personnel and resources</header><text>The Secretary of State shall devote sufficient personnel and resources towards—</text> <paragraph commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="H4CADC6E0D67B46339AD58B94A57B6627"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">engaging with foreign countries to improve security and reduce barriers to the installation, monitoring, maintenance, and repair of critical undersea infrastructure; and</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="HC5ED39AD24264BE28B1CA41CACCD4C59"><enum>(2)</enum><text>working with allies and partners to support the development of a multinational fleet of cable repair ships to respond rapidly to incidents of sabotage.</text></paragraph></subsection> <subsection id="H3E88A67C01134FA59EFED96553F31F52"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Report</header><text>Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the next 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that outlines efforts by the United States Government in the prior calendar year to work with international allies and partners to strengthen the security of and reduce barriers to the monitoring, maintenance, repair, and protection of international critical undersea infrastructure networks, including—</text> <paragraph id="H997295C8E4A249178F3487ED15300CA9"><enum>(1)</enum><text>a list of current foreign policies or laws that create barriers to United States-led efforts to install, maintain, repair, and protect international critical undersea infrastructure networks; and</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="HDAAABC5E09D2448C8774C3EC2CAB168F"><enum>(2)</enum><text>progress made in the previous calendar year as a result of United States engagement with allies and partners.</text></paragraph></subsection></section> <enum>II</enum><header>Department of State critical undersea infrastructure expertise</header> <section id="HF96CE5E942F5441BB0A56E27FDCDE44F"><enum>201.</enum><header>Expanding critical undersea infrastructure-related expertise at the Department of State</header> <subsection id="H8AD121A2361C49AA8E58BC66D0559EEB"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text>The Secretary of State shall assign not fewer than 10 full-time equivalent individuals, of which not fewer than 5 individuals shall be assigned to the Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy to cover subsea telecommunications infrastructure, in order to support the Department of State’s interagency engagement on matters related to critical undersea infrastructure protection, including—</text> <paragraph id="HE20C31944F6A4293BBEC9694ADE7E1FC"><enum>(1)</enum><text>protection and resilience;</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H52A8994D3ADC4042B431861830887541"><enum>(2)</enum><text>coordination with United States allies and partners; and</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="HF63CD95DC056439A9377C16639145448"><enum>(3)</enum><text>United States engagement in international bodies that cover critical undersea infrastructure.</text></paragraph></subsection> <subsection id="H190FD553ACAF45E8B9E881AE5E8449F7"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Assignment</header><text>The Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy may not dual-hat currently employed personnel in meeting the minimum hiring requirement outlined in subsection (a).</text></subsection> <subsection id="HB9F371CEFA5E417B88E42EEBDF15E8A8"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Notification</header><text>Not later than 15 days after fulfilling the hiring requirement in subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall notify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.</text></subsection> <subsection id="HA5ABFB0CC23546E6B185BAB22B08F952"><enum>(d)</enum><header>International cooperation on critical undersea infrastructure sabotage</header><text>Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on how the United States Government plans to prioritize diplomatic engagement within relevant international bodies to spur increased information sharing between allied and partner governments and relevant private sector companies on critical undersea infrastructure sabotage.</text></subsection></section> <enum>III</enum><header>Subsea telecommunications infrastructure coordination, construction, and repair</header> <section id="HBF0D2B77AB0C439399885D514200DE72"><enum>301.</enum><header>Improving United States Government coordination of subsea telecommunications infrastructure</header> <subsection id="HB46BB73A01CA425DB135CCD4AF217443"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Findings</header><text>Congress makes the following findings:</text> <paragraph id="H6FDB89D23FCF4A0EAEBDCF6556E93180"><enum>(1)</enum><text>According to a December 2024 Department of Homeland Security white paper, <quote>There currently exists no forum in which the full scope of the [subsea] cable industry can effectively collaborate with the U.S. government to identify and address shared challenges.</quote>.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H1787DB36A981435D9C304EDAF409F01D"><enum>(2)</enum><text>United States Federal Government responsibilities for the protection of subsea telecommunications infrastructure, damage reporting, information and intelligence sharing, and emergency response are overseen by various government actors through a multitude of mechanisms spanning several Federal departments and agencies.</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H30AA88C5D0C14D298952DC49873D0C2D"><enum>(3)</enum><text>In order for the subsea cable industry to align with United States economic and security interests and help industry prepare security risk mitigation measures, the United States Government must provide the industry a clearer concept of operations, assessed risks to cable supply chain and infrastructure, enhanced and standardized security measures, defined lines of effort in cases of emergency, and definitive cost analysis.</text></paragraph></subsection> <subsection id="H85D696D92D774551983AF5FB502F4918"> <enum>(b)</enum> <header>Establishment</header> <text>Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish an interagency committee (referred to in this Act as the <quote>interagency committee</quote>) comprised of the heads of the appropriate Federal agencies, to lead United States Government efforts to—</text> <paragraph id="H1662C259CE174316B075BAAA314F110D"> <enum>(1)</enum> <text>protect and improve the resilience of subsea telecommunications infrastructure;</text> </paragraph> <paragraph id="H6481B34AD0E048D982FE369E28E12E34"> <enum>(2)</enum> <text>facilitate subsea telecommunications cable licensing and permitting; and</text> </paragraph> <paragraph id="H8B3C37747F1C45C69551880DF3C22962"> <enum>(3)</enum> <text>address other matters related to subsea telecommunications infrastructure deemed appropriate and necessary by the President.</text> </paragraph> </subsection> <subsection id="H396C733F3B364851A0D96030BD06A86B"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Coordination</header><text>The President shall direct the interagency committee to conduct an overview of the United States Federal Government’s operational authorities for subsea telecommunications infrastructure security and resilience. The overview shall include—</text> <paragraph id="HA656AF5BB0E841E08B35D393E79B78D3"><enum>(1)</enum><text>an interagency concept of operations for partnering with non-Federal entities, including subsea telecommunications infrastructure owners and operators, to secure and repair subsea telecommunications infrastructure systems in a variety of crisis scenarios; and</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H73C59C46F6AF45FE806EEBAE5636816E"><enum>(2)</enum><text>an interagency review and action plan to streamline subsea telecommunications infrastructure licensing, funding, and permitting processes in order to promote United States international leadership in cable connectivity and deployments and risk-based prioritization and standardization of additional security and resilience assessments.</text></paragraph></subsection> <subsection id="HBA06F8578D2D438EBB3A2C7572B0ADDC"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Analysis of subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage</header> <paragraph id="HB322123E87AF49C3B6C1B44E11B31323"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In general</header><text>The President shall direct the heads of the relevant Federal agencies to develop strategies to coordinate closely within the interagency process and with subsea telecommunications infrastructure industry stakeholders to review subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage, including by leveraging analysis from industry-wide data, to—</text> <subparagraph id="H6238AF7FC31C4E15A826838C7AB49A23"><enum>(A)</enum><text>identify trends;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H247AB33946EB4008BAFF22CB531B570E"><enum>(B)</enum><text>refine attributions, particularly in cases where subsea telecommunications infrastructure has been intentionally damaged by malicious actors;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HFF6EE065BF55497B9907365F9B92D2D2"><enum>(C)</enum><text>identify high-risk geographic areas for subsea telecommunications infrastructure construction;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H3A88FAEE3E114969ACA6C8617AEB0D30"><enum>(D)</enum><text>identify Federal Government functions and private sector engagement methods to support the security of subsea telecommunications infrastructure; and</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H78A13829A3EB4402B35D82DC2E1AC0C3"><enum>(E)</enum><text>inform future risk mitigation efforts to reduce damage to subsea telecommunications infrastructure systems.</text></subparagraph></paragraph> <paragraph id="HC78AB6A02F984B30984FD2FE85EC9BFF"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Strategy elements</header><text>The strategies required under paragraph (1) shall include—</text> <subparagraph id="H31E7296103594B9DB3A0140B255AA560"><enum>(A)</enum><text>resourcing requirements;</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="HAFD33D364F754367BA2C201449E057F8"><enum>(B)</enum><text>coordination with United States allies and partners and relevant subsea telecommunications infrastructure industry stakeholders; and</text></subparagraph> <subparagraph id="H31890C0893F84767A064D581035748F0"><enum>(C)</enum><text>the necessary technical expertise to make attributions for subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage.</text></subparagraph></paragraph></subsection> <subsection id="HBA358FD603A743728FE1348AF482F06B"><enum>(e)</enum><header>Report</header><text>Not later than 30 days after establishing the required interagency committee under subsection (b), the President shall submit to Congress a report that includes the following elements:</text> <paragraph id="H268AA855076D4946B2C0FF2BD28DBAFD"><enum>(1)</enum><text>Any resources required to sufficiently staff the interagency committee and United States Federal agencies overseeing the objectives outlined in subsection (b).</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H30049BC8366A4256A2D84362E703A752"><enum>(2)</enum><text>A detailed plan for how the interagency committee will advance the objectives outlined in subsection (b).</text></paragraph></subsection></section> <section id="HA7A76856BA564BACA61197573FDEBB2D"><enum>302.</enum><header>Strengthening information sharing between United States Government and private sector actors on subsea telecommunications infrastructure</header> <subsection id="HCD4C27F914694900B1CF5A7874AD4C6C"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Public-Private sector information sharing</header><text>Consistent with the necessary protections of classified information, the sourcing of relevant intelligence material, and privacy and civil liberties, all appropriate agencies shall, with the approval of the interagency committee and in coordination, as appropriate, with intelligence sharing partnerships with trusted allies, in support of the maintenance, repair, and protection of subsea telecommunications infrastructure, issue procedures to establish and promote—</text> <paragraph id="H29E39E34A51641DFBC97EB17F004A66D"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the timely sharing of classified information regarding subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage and any indications of potential sabotage held by members of the interagency committee with non-Federal entities that possess the necessary security clearances;</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="HD9D8104B418C486D8EB2D978190A32B6"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the timely sharing between the interagency committee and non-Federal entities of information related to subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage, information relating to indications of potential sabotage, or authorized uses under this Act, in the possession of the interagency committee that may be declassified and shared at an unclassified level;</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H80E13DF83CD04D29B89E063D3F09BCAA"><enum>(3)</enum><text>the timely sharing between the interagency committee and non-Federal entities of unclassified, including controlled unclassified, information regarding subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage and indications of potential sabotage held by members of the interagency committee or non-Federal entities;</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H63B413E0A21E45608165F04B340DE26A"><enum>(4)</enum><text>the timely sharing between the interagency committee and non-Federal entities, when and if appropriate, of information relating to indications of potential subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage or authorized uses under this title, held by the interagency committee or non-Federal entities about subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage, in order to prevent or mitigate any potential adverse effects from such sabotage; and</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H2AE6BDED7AF140E3893A8504C5FDA38E"><enum>(5)</enum><text>the timely release of funds to meet cost, schedule, and performance metrics.</text></paragraph></subsection> <subsection id="HC6AAFF4F81724220B8915A067B289CB3"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Development of procedures</header><text>The procedures developed under subsection (b) shall—</text> <paragraph id="H6AD4F3331837421EAB666F50633FF80F"><enum>(1)</enum><text>ensure the interagency committee has and maintains the capacity to identify and inform subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage and indications of potential subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage in real time to the appropriate Federal agencies or non-Federal entities consistent with the protection of classified information;</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H5F329924E68047C3A91E422D9C7A3679"><enum>(2)</enum><text>incorporate, whenever possible, existing processes, roles, and responsibilities of members of the interagency committee and non-Federal entities for information sharing, including subsea telecommunications infrastructure-specific information sharing and analysis entities; and</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H7A6DAFC2F07541BBA59BE0EF1697178F"><enum>(3)</enum><text>require members of the interagency committee and other appropriate Federal agencies which are sharing subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage indicators or defensive measures to employ any applicable security controls to defend against unauthorized access to or acquisition of such information.</text></paragraph></subsection> <subsection commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="HC12BDB0430614048A25BA206C0644559"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Submittal to Congress</header><text>The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the members of the interagency committee, shall—</text> <paragraph id="HC7B00102627A4137A13E1043E67F25FA"><enum>(1)</enum><text>not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, submit to Congress the procedures required under subsection (b); and</text></paragraph> <paragraph id="H2006C89D35554CCE885397569E6E4D8F"><enum>(2)</enum><text>not later than one year after submitting such procedures, and annually thereafter for 5 years, submit to Congress a report on the implementation and execution of information sharing with private sector actors in the previous year pursuant to subsection (a).</text></paragraph></subsection></section>