

119TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

# H. R. 8069

To enhance United States Government strategic coordination of the security, installation, maintenance, and repair of international subsea fiber-optic cables.

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## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 24, 2026

Mr. WILSON of South Carolina (for himself and Mr. MEEKS) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on the Judiciary, Intelligence (Permanent Select), and Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

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## A BILL

To enhance United States Government strategic coordination of the security, installation, maintenance, and repair of international subsea fiber-optic cables.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

### 3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Strategic Subsea Ca-  
5 bles Act of 2026”.

### 6 **SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

7 The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

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Sec. 301. Improving United States Government coordination of subsea telecommunications infrastructure.

Sec. 302. Strengthening information sharing between United States Government and private sector actors on subsea telecommunications infrastructure.

### 1 **SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.**

2 In this Act:

3 (1) AGENCY.—The term “agency” has the  
4 meaning given the term in section 3502 of title 44,  
5 United States Code.

6 (2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-  
7 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-  
8 mittees” means—

9 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations  
10 and the Committee on Appropriations of the  
11 Senate; and

1 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and  
2 the Committee on Appropriations of the House  
3 of Representatives.

4 (3) APPROPRIATE FEDERAL AGENCIES.—The  
5 term “appropriate Federal agencies” means the fol-  
6 lowing:

7 (A) The Department of Commerce.

8 (B) The Department of Defense.

9 (C) The Department of Homeland Secu-  
10 rity.

11 (D) The Office of the Director of National  
12 Intelligence.

13 (E) The Department of State.

14 (F) The Federal Communications Commis-  
15 sion.

16 (G) The Department of the Treasury.

17 (H) The Department of the Judiciary.

18 (I) Any additional Federal agencies, as de-  
19 termined by the President.

20 (4) CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE.—  
21 The term “critical undersea infrastructure” refers to  
22 both subsea telecommunications infrastructure and  
23 subsea energy infrastructure.

1           (5) INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE.—The term  
2           “interagency committee” means the entity estab-  
3           lished under section 301(b) of this Act.

4           (6) NON-FEDERAL ENTITY.—The term “non-  
5           Federal entity” means any nongovernmental entity  
6           that is an individual, organization, or business in-  
7           volved in the operation, maintenance, repair, or con-  
8           struction of critical subsea infrastructure, including  
9           critical undersea infrastructure owners.

10          (7) SABOTAGE.—The term “sabotage” means  
11          actions, or preparations for future actions, taken  
12          with the intent to cause defective production, oper-  
13          ation, or damage to critical underseas infrastructure,  
14          including the integrity of data transmitted via  
15          subsea telecommunications infrastructure.

16          (8) SUBSEA ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE.—The  
17          term “subsea energy infrastructure” means a subsea  
18          cable, pipeline, or other equipment installed on, be-  
19          neath, or within the seabed, including—

20                (A) to transmit electricity, including via  
21                subsea electricity cables, subsea electricity  
22                transformers, or equipment related to the sup-  
23                port of offshore energy production installations;

(B) to transport natural gas, oil, or hydrogen between land-based or offshore infrastructure; and

(C) associated landing stations and facilities.

(9) SUBSEA TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE.—The term “subsea telecommunications infrastructure” means subsea fiber-optic cables and related equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed, and used to transmit communications, data, voice, video, or other electronic signals, as well as associated landing stations and facilities.

## **TITLE I—INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION AND ENGAGEMENT ON CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE**

### **SEC. 101. FINDINGS.**

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure poses a growing threat to United States and allied security and economic prosperity.

(2) In recent years, numerous critical undersea infrastructure sites were destroyed or damaged, including—

1 (A) in January 2022, the reported damage  
2 to subsea telecommunications cables connecting  
3 the Norwegian mainland with the Norwegian  
4 archipelago of Svalbard, home of SvalSAT, the  
5 largest commercial satellite ground station on  
6 Earth;

7 (B) in September 2022, the reported dam-  
8 age to 3 of the 4 trunklines of the Nord Stream  
9 1 and Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipelines, at  
10 sites northeast and southeast of the Danish is-  
11 land of Bornholm in the Western Baltic Sea;

12 (C) in February 2023, the reported dam-  
13 age to subsea telecommunications infrastructure  
14 connecting the main island of Taiwan to the  
15 Matsu Islands in the Taiwan Strait;

16 (D) in October 2023, the reported damage  
17 to the Finland-to-Estonia Balticconnector nat-  
18 ural gas pipeline spanning the Gulf of Finland,  
19 in addition to the reported damage to subsea  
20 telecommunications cables connecting Estonia  
21 and Sweden and Finland and Estonia;

22 (E) in November 2024, the reported dam-  
23 age to the Finland-to-Germany C-Lion1 subsea  
24 telecommunications cables and the Lithuania-

1 to-Sweden BCS subsea telecommunications  
2 cable in the Central Baltic Sea;

3 (F) in December 2024, the reported dam-  
4 age to the Finland-to-Estonia EstLink2 subsea  
5 electricity interconnection cable and nearby  
6 subsea telecommunications cables in the Gulf of  
7 Finland;

8 (G) in January 2025, the reported damage  
9 to the Trans-Pacific Express subsea tele-  
10 communications cable connecting Taiwan to the  
11 United States, the Republic of Korea, and  
12 Japan, among other global democracies;

13 (H) in February 2025, the reported dam-  
14 age to a subsea telecommunications cable con-  
15 necting the main island of Taiwan with the  
16 Penghu Islands in the Taiwan Strait;

17 (I) in January 2026, the reported damage  
18 to subsea telecommunications cables from Lat-  
19 via in the Central Baltic Sea linking Liepāja  
20 and Šventoji; and

21 (J) in January 2026, the reported damage  
22 to the Elisa cable connecting Finland and Esto-  
23 nia involving a vessel named the Fitburg.

24 (3) Following subsea fiber-optic cable cuts in  
25 the Baltic Sea in December 2024, the North Atlan-

1       tic Treaty Organization (NATO) established the  
2       Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network to conduct  
3       information and threat intelligence sharing among  
4       private and public sector actors to protect subsea ca-  
5       bles.

6           (4) On February 21, 2025, the European  
7       Union published an EU Action Plan on Cable Secu-  
8       rity to include the development and deployment of  
9       an Integrated Surveillance Mechanism for Sub-  
10      marine cables work to establish a dedicated regional  
11      hub in the Baltic Sea to serve as a test bed of the  
12      integrated surveillance approach.

13          (5) The Association of Southeast Asian States  
14      (ASEAN) published guidelines for Strengthening  
15      Resilience and Repair of Submarine Cables and  
16      most recently announced plans to “build a secure,  
17      diverse and resilient submarine cable network” and  
18      “to facilitate the expeditious deployment, repair,  
19      maintenance, removal, and protection of submarine  
20      cables, between ASEAN Member States”.

21          (6) On July 1, 2025, the Quad, represented by  
22      the United States, India, Japan, and Australia, met  
23      to reaffirm its commitment to the Quad Partnership  
24      on Cable Connectivity and Resilience. In the meet-  
25      ing, the Quad underscored the need for digital infra-



1 structure collaboration, organizing a subsea cables  
2 forum to be hosted by the United States and India  
3 and encouraging regulatory harmonization between  
4 Quad partners. Through this initiative, the Quad  
5 seeks to defend and promote resilient, secure, and  
6 transparent digital infrastructure across the Indo-  
7 Pacific region.

8 **SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

9 It is the sense of Congress that—

10 (1) critical undersea infrastructure represents  
11 vital strategic and economic links between the  
12 United States and its partners and allies;

13 (2) according to NATO, “undersea cables carry  
14 an estimated \$10 trillion in transfers every day; two-  
15 thirds of the world’s oil and gas is either extracted  
16 at sea or transported by sea; and around 95 percent  
17 of global data flows are transmitted via undersea ca-  
18 bles”;

19 (3) since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine  
20 in 2022, there has been a marked increase in high-  
21 profile suspected sabotage incidents resulting in  
22 damage to critical undersea infrastructure, especially  
23 across Northern Europe and East Asia;

24 (4) the United States Government has an im-  
25 portant role to play in advancing United States in-

1       terests in international bodies that oversee the pro-  
2       tection of critical undersea infrastructure, including  
3       promoting network resilience and redundancy, and  
4       advancing regulations in support of these goals;

5           (5) the United States Government should play  
6       a more active role in NATO initiatives such as the  
7       NATO Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical  
8       Undersea Infrastructure, the Critical Undersea In-  
9       frastructure Coordination Cell, the Critical Undersea  
10      Infrastructure Network, and the NATO-EU Task  
11      Force on the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure, al-  
12      lied maritime security efforts such as the Joint Ex-  
13      peditionary Force, Indo-Pacific initiatives, including  
14      the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and  
15      Resilience, and international organizations such as  
16      the International Cable Protection Committee  
17      (ICPC), in order to advance United States national  
18      security and economic interests;

19           (6) the United States should lead efforts to pro-  
20      mote the deployment of resilient critical undersea in-  
21      frastructure networks, enhance situational aware-  
22      ness, strengthen preparedness, and formalize collec-  
23      tive responses among allies and partners through en-  
24      hanced information sharing and coordination; and

1           (7) while critical undersea infrastructure own-  
2           ers and other associated private sector stakeholders  
3           carry significant responsibility in safeguarding this  
4           infrastructure, the United States Government and  
5           allied foreign governments need to play a greater  
6           role.

7   **SEC. 103. ENHANCING UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EN-**  
8                           **GAGEMENT AT THE INTERNATIONAL CABLE**  
9                           **PROTECTION COMMITTEE AND OTHER REL-**  
10                          **EVANT INTERNATIONAL BODIES TO SAFE-**  
11                          **GUARD UNITED STATES INTERESTS.**

12           (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordi-  
13           nation with the interagency committee, shall seek to in-  
14           crease United States Government engagement in inter-  
15           national bodies, including the International Cable Protec-  
16           tion Committee (ICPC), to advance United States national  
17           security and economic interests as it relates to critical un-  
18           dersea infrastructure.

19           (b) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date  
20           of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for  
21           5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to  
22           the appropriate congressional committees that includes the  
23           following:

24                   (1) A description of how increased United  
25           States Government engagement within the ICPC

1 could support United States national security objec-  
2 tives as it relates to the protection of critical under-  
3 sea infrastructure.

4 (2) A description of key objectives for pro-  
5 moting and protecting United States national secu-  
6 rity interests within the ICPC.

7 (3) A description of how the People’s Republic  
8 of China entities leverage their engagement within  
9 the ICPC to further their strategic interests.

10 (4) A description of how encouraging other  
11 countries and regional bodies to join the ICPC can  
12 better ensure coordinated, consistent global undersea  
13 subsea telecommunications infrastructure policies.

14 (5) A description of other international bodies  
15 relevant for critical undersea infrastructure where  
16 the United States should increase its diplomatic en-  
17 gagement.

18 **SEC. 104. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**  
19 **CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE SAB-**  
20 **OTAGE.**

21 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President, in coordination  
22 with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the  
23 Treasury, shall impose the sanctions described in sub-  
24 section (c) with respect to any foreign person that the  
25 President determines, on or after the date of the enact-

1 ment of this Act, is responsible for acts of sabotage or  
2 facilitates acts of sabotage against critical undersea infra-  
3 structure, including—

4 (1) any foreign vessel or entity the owner or op-  
5 erator of which knowingly—

6 (A) commits acts of sabotage; or

7 (B) conducts preparatory surveillance,  
8 logistical support, security, or other services  
9 that facilitate or enable an act of sabotage; and

10 (2) any foreign person that the President deter-  
11 mines knowingly—

12 (A) owns, operates, or manages the vessel  
13 or entity described in paragraph (1);

14 (B) provides underwriting services or in-  
15 surance or reinsurance necessary for such a  
16 vessel or entity;

17 (C) facilitates deceptive or structured  
18 transactions to support a vessel or entity de-  
19 scribed in paragraph (1);

20 (D) provides port or logistics services or  
21 facilities for technology upgrades or installation  
22 of equipment for, or retrofitting or tethering of,  
23 a vessel described in paragraph (1) for the pur-  
24 pose of evading sanctions;

1 (E) provided documentation, registration,  
2 or flagging services for a vessel described in  
3 paragraph (1) for the purpose of evading sanc-  
4 tions; or

5 (F) serves as a captain, principal officer,  
6 or senior leadership of such a vessel or entity.

7 (b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 15 days  
8 after imposing sanctions with respect to a foreign person  
9 under subsection (a), the President shall submit to the ap-  
10 propriate congressional committees, the Committee on  
11 Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate, and  
12 the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Rep-  
13 resentatives, a report that includes a detailed justification  
14 for the imposition of the sanctions.

15 (c) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions de-  
16 scribed in this subsection are the following:

17 (1) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—The President  
18 shall exercise all of the powers granted by the Inter-  
19 national Emergency Economic Powers Act (50  
20 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block  
21 and prohibit all transactions in all property and in-  
22 terests in property of a foreign person described in  
23 subsection (a), if such property and interests in  
24 property are in the United States, come within the

1 United States, or are or come within the possession  
2 or control of a United States person.

3 (2) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR  
4 PAROLE.—

5 (A) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—An  
6 alien described in subsection (a) shall be—

7 (i) inadmissible to the United States;

8 (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other  
9 documentation to enter the United States;  
10 and

11 (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted  
12 or paroled into the United States or to re-  
13 ceive any other benefit under the Immigra-  
14 tion and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et  
15 seq.).

16 (B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

17 (i) IN GENERAL.—The visa or other  
18 entry documentation of an alien described  
19 in subsection (a) shall be revoked, regard-  
20 less of when such visa or other entry docu-  
21 mentation is or was issued.

22 (ii) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A revoca-  
23 tion under clause (i) shall—

24 (I) take effect immediately; and

1 (II) automatically cancel any  
2 other valid visa or entry documenta-  
3 tion that is in the possession of the  
4 alien.

5 (d) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

6 (1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may ex-  
7 ercise all authorities provided under sections 203  
8 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic  
9 Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out  
10 this section.

11 (2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, at-  
12 tempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a  
13 violation of this section or any regulation, license, or  
14 order issued to carry out this section shall be subject  
15 to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c)  
16 of section 206 of the International Emergency Eco-  
17 nomic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same ex-  
18 tent as a person that commits an unlawful act de-  
19 scribed in subsection (a) of that section.

20 (e) EXCEPTIONS.—

21 (1) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH UNITED NA-  
22 TIONS HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT AND LAW EN-  
23 FORCEMENT ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under this sec-  
24 tion shall not apply with respect to the admission or



1 parole of an alien to the United States if admitting  
2 or paroling the alien is necessary—

3 (A) to permit the United States to comply  
4 with the Agreement regarding the Head-  
5 quarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake  
6 Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force  
7 November 21, 1947, between the United Na-  
8 tions and the United States, or other applicable  
9 international obligations of the United States;  
10 or

11 (B) to carry out or assist authorized law  
12 enforcement activity in the United States.

13 (2) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTEL-  
14 LIGENCE ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under this section  
15 shall not apply to any activity subject to the report-  
16 ing requirements under title V of the National Secu-  
17 rity Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any au-  
18 thorized intelligence activities of the United States.

19 (3) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF  
20 GOODS.—

21 (A) IN GENERAL.—A requirement to block  
22 and prohibit all transactions in all property and  
23 interests in property under this section shall not  
24 include the authority or requirement to impose  
25 sanctions on the importation of goods.

1 (B) GOOD DEFINED.—In this paragraph,  
2 the term “good” means any article, natural or  
3 manmade substance, material, supply or manu-  
4 factured product, including inspection and test  
5 equipment, and excluding technical data.

6 (f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

7 (1) ADMISSION; ADMITTED; ALIEN.—The terms  
8 “admission”, “admitted”, and “alien” have the  
9 meanings given those terms in section 101 of the  
10 Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).

11 (2) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term “foreign per-  
12 son” means an individual or entity that is not a  
13 United States person.

14 (3) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term  
15 “United States person” means—

16 (A) any United States citizen or an alien  
17 lawfully admitted for permanent residence to  
18 the United States;

19 (B) an entity organized under the laws of  
20 the United States or of any jurisdiction within  
21 the United States, including any foreign branch  
22 of such an entity; or

23 (C) any person in the United States.

24 (g) NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS WAIVER.—The  
25 President may waive the application of sanctions under

1 this section if, before issuing the waiver, the President  
2 submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

3 (1) a certification in writing that the issuance  
4 of the waiver is in the national security interests of  
5 the United States; and

6 (2) a report explaining the basis for the certifi-  
7 cation.

8 **SEC. 105. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES BY THE PEOPLE’S RE-**  
9 **PUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE RUSSIAN FED-**  
10 **ERATION.**

11 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date  
12 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for  
13 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the  
14 heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit a  
15 report to the appropriate congressional committees that  
16 includes the following:

17 (1) A description, with respect to the applicable  
18 reporting period, of the subsea cable manufacturing,  
19 installation, and maintenance capabilities of the Peo-  
20 ple’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Fed-  
21 eration.

22 (2) An analysis of the mission, capabilities, and  
23 activities of the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Re-  
24 search (GUGI) of the Armed Forces of the Russian  
25 Federation, including—

1 (A) a description of GUGI operations and  
2 capabilities in deep water and littoral infra-  
3 structure surveillance, seabed warfare, and sab-  
4 otage, including recent activity trends and de-  
5 velopment of new weapons systems;

6 (B) a description of GUGI's use of osten-  
7 sibly civilian research vessels to conduct critical  
8 undersea infrastructure surveillance, seabed  
9 warfare, and potential sabotage;

10 (C) an assessment of the impact of sanc-  
11 tions on the ability of GUGI to procure ad-  
12 vanced technologies and equipment, as well as  
13 its efforts to circumvent those sanctions; and

14 (D) a list of suspected GUGI research or  
15 scientific vessels, including vessel names and  
16 International Maritime Organization and Mari-  
17 time Mobile Service Identity numbers, and re-  
18 lated equipment that are suspected of engaging  
19 in dual-use operations and probing of critical  
20 undersea infrastructure.

21 (3) An analysis of the missions, capabilities,  
22 and activities of the Main Directorate of the General  
23 Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federa-  
24 tion (GRU), including—

1 (A) a description of GRU operations and  
2 capabilities related to physical, electronic, and  
3 cyber surveillance, monitoring, and sabotage of  
4 critical undersea infrastructure and maritime  
5 logistics;

6 (B) a description of the use of Russian ci-  
7 vilian merchant and fishing vessels by the GRU,  
8 including a list of fishing and merchant vessel  
9 names and International Maritime Organization  
10 and Maritime Mobile Service Identity Numbers  
11 believed to be involved in surveillance or sabo-  
12 tage activities; and

13 (C) an assessment of the impact of sanc-  
14 tions on the ability of GUGI to procure ad-  
15 vanced technologies and equipment, as well as  
16 its efforts to circumvent those sanctions.

17 (4) An analysis of the missions, capabilities,  
18 and activities of the People's Liberation Army, the  
19 PRC Coast Guard, the China Ship Scientific Re-  
20 search Center, HMN Technologies, and other PRC-  
21 based entities, including unmarked or dual-use mari-  
22 time militia or commercial vessels related to surveil-  
23 lance, monitoring, and sabotage of critical undersea  
24 infrastructure, including—

1 (A) a description of recent capability devel-  
2 opments related to surveilling or sabotaging  
3 critical undersea infrastructure, including for  
4 both deep-sea and littoral purposes; and

5 (B) a description of the PRC's use of os-  
6 tensibly civilian fishing, merchant, and research  
7 vessels for sabotage or surveillance of critical  
8 undersea infrastructure, including in the Indo-  
9 Pacific, Africa, Latin America, Europe, and the  
10 Western Hemisphere.

11 (5) An assessment of cooperation between the  
12 Russian Federation and the PRC on surveillance or  
13 sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, includ-  
14 ing—

15 (A) any current or planned operational co-  
16 ordination against United States or allied and  
17 partner nation targets;

18 (B) any joint research, development, test-  
19 ing, or evaluation of critical undersea infra-  
20 structure surveillance, sabotage, or seabed war-  
21 fare capabilities;

22 (C) any technology transfers or joint train-  
23 ing related to critical undersea infrastructure  
24 surveillance, sabotage, or seabed warfare; and

1 (D) any coordination in procurement of  
2 advanced technologies related to critical under-  
3 sea infrastructure, surveillance, sabotage, or  
4 seabed warfare, or circumvention of sanctions  
5 against the Russian Federation.

6 (6) A list of instances during the previous cal-  
7 endar year in which the United States, or allies and  
8 partners of the United States, documented anoma-  
9 lous behavior from vessels, either flagged, crewed, or  
10 operated by the PRC or Russia, around critical un-  
11 dersea infrastructure, including—

12 (A) any official United States Government  
13 response to counter the anomalous behavior;  
14 and

15 (B) any coordinated diplomatic action with  
16 allies and partners.

17 (7) An assessment of the extent to which PRC-  
18 based entities are involved in laying, maintaining,  
19 and repairing United States-invested cables.

20 (b) INITIAL AND SUBSEQUENT REPORTS.—The ini-  
21 tial report required under subsection (a) shall cover the  
22 period between January 1, 2022, through the date of the  
23 enactment of this Act. Subsequent reports required by  
24 subsection (a) shall cover the previous calendar year for  
25 the reporting period.

1 (c) CLASSIFICATION.—The report required under  
2 subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but  
3 may include a classified annex.

4 **SEC. 106. REPORT ON POTENTIAL SABOTAGE OF CRITICAL**  
5 **UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE.**

6 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-  
7 ment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in  
8 coordination with the Secretary of State and the heads  
9 of other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit to the Se-  
10 lect Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Perma-  
11 nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of  
12 Representatives, and the appropriate congressional com-  
13 mittees a report that includes the assessment of the intel-  
14 ligence community, including dissents from individual  
15 agencies, of the likely cause and, if applicable, the attribu-  
16 tion of the following instances of reported sabotage of crit-  
17 ical undersea infrastructure:

18 (1) In January 2022, the reported damage to  
19 the subsea telecommunications infrastructure con-  
20 necting the Norwegian mainland with the Norwegian  
21 archipelago of Svalbard.

22 (2) The September 2022 sabotage of three of  
23 the four trunklines of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord  
24 Stream 2 natural gas pipelines, at sites northeast



1 and southeast of the Danish island of Bornholm in  
2 the Western Baltic Sea, including—

3 (A) an assessment of the activities of Rus-  
4 sian military vessels, including those with un-  
5 dersea warfare capabilities, at any of the Nord  
6 Stream blast sites in the months leading up to  
7 the incident;

8 (B) a description of any Russian civilian or  
9 military vessels intercepted or diverted from the  
10 blast sites in the aftermath of the sabotage or  
11 vessels or underwater unmanned vehicles that  
12 gained access to the blast sites;

13 (C) an assessment of the technical feasi-  
14 bility of a small group of divers conducting the  
15 Nord Stream sabotage using the rental boat  
16 “Andromeda” in the weather and sea conditions  
17 present at the time;

18 (D) an assessment of whether the Russian  
19 Federation’s documented practice of recruiting  
20 or coercing Ukrainians or other third country  
21 nationals to conduct sabotage operations on  
22 land targets is applicable to a maritime context;

23 (E) an assessment of the fees and pen-  
24 alties for failure to honor gas delivery contracts  
25 that Gazprom or other Russian entities poten-

1 tially faced due to the throttling of gas deliv-  
2 eries via the Nord Stream 1 pipeline in 2021;

3 (F) an assessment of the insurance impli-  
4 cations for Nord Stream 1 and 2, as well as its  
5 insurers and Western financiers, depending on  
6 the identity of the perpetrator;

7 (G) a description of the law enforcement  
8 investigations by regional governments, the  
9 scope of their investigations, and their out-  
10 comes;

11 (H) an assessment of whether any Russian  
12 vessels documented in close proximity to the  
13 Nord Stream blast sites in the months leading  
14 up to or immediately after the incident, includ-  
15 ing those with undersea surveillance or warfare  
16 capabilities, were present at other suspected  
17 sabotage sites either before or after the incident  
18 in question; and

19 (I) any information on potential attribu-  
20 tion received from allied or partner nation com-  
21 munications through diplomatic or intelligence  
22 channels.

23 (3) In February 2023, the reported damage to  
24 subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting

1 the main island of Taiwan to the Matsu Islands in  
2 the Taiwan Strait.

3 (4) In October 2023, the reported damage to  
4 the Finland-to-Estonia Baltic connector natural gas  
5 pipeline, in addition to subsea telecommunications  
6 infrastructure connecting Estonia and Sweden and  
7 Finland and Estonia.

8 (5) In November 2024, the reported damage to  
9 the Finland-to-Germany C-Lion1 subsea tele-  
10 communications cable and the Lithuania-to-Sweden  
11 BCS subsea telecommunications cable in the Central  
12 Baltic Sea.

13 (6) In December 2024, the reported damage to  
14 the Finland-to-Estonia EstLink2 subsea electricity  
15 interconnection cable and nearby subsea tele-  
16 communications cables in the Gulf of Finland.

17 (7) In January 2025, the reported damage to  
18 the Trans-Pacific Express subsea telecommuni-  
19 cations infrastructure connecting Taiwan to the  
20 United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan,  
21 among other global democracies.

22 (8) In February 2025, the reported damage to  
23 a subsea telecommunications cable connecting the  
24 main island of Taiwan with the Penghu Islands in  
25 the Taiwan Strait.

1           (9) In January 2026, the reported damage to  
2       subsea telecommunications cables from Latvia in the  
3       Central Baltic Sea connecting Liepāja and Šventoji.

4           (10) In January 2026, the reported damage to  
5       the Elisa cable connecting Finland and Estonia in-  
6       volving a vessel called the Fitburg.

7   **SEC. 107. ENGAGING FOREIGN PARTNERS TO STRENGTHEN**  
8                   **THE SECURITY OF CRITICAL UNDERSEA IN-**  
9                   **FRASTRUCTURE.**

10       (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
11   gress that—

12           (1) as international critical undersea infrastruc-  
13       ture expands, there are increasing challenges to the  
14       proper installation, maintenance, repair, and protec-  
15       tion of international subsea cables that have the po-  
16       tential to undermine United States and foreign part-  
17       ner national security interests;

18           (2) the United States is uniquely positioned to  
19       provide technical, material, and other forms of sup-  
20       port to international partners to enhance the resil-  
21       ience of international critical undersea infrastruc-  
22       ture;

23           (3) the United States Government should en-  
24       hance its diplomatic efforts to work alongside trust-  
25       ed allies to help foreign governments improve efforts

1 to quickly and effectively install, maintain, repair,  
2 and protect international critical undersea infra-  
3 structure; and

4 (4) given the importance of critical undersea in-  
5 frastructure to United States and allied energy secu-  
6 rity and prosperity, adversaries are increasingly  
7 prioritizing capabilities designed to target United  
8 States and allied subsea energy infrastructure.

9 (b) COMMITMENT OF PERSONNEL AND RE-  
10 SOURCES.—The Secretary of State shall devote sufficient  
11 personnel and resources towards—

12 (1) engaging with foreign countries to improve  
13 security and reduce barriers to the installation, mon-  
14 itoring, maintenance, and repair of critical undersea  
15 infrastructure; and

16 (2) working with allies and partners to support  
17 the development of a multinational fleet of cable re-  
18 pair ships to respond rapidly to incidents of sabo-  
19 tage.

20 (c) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date  
21 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for  
22 the next 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to  
23 the appropriate congressional committees a report that  
24 outlines efforts by the United States Government in the  
25 prior calendar year to work with international allies and

1 partners to strengthen the security of and reduce barriers  
 2 to the monitoring, maintenance, repair, and protection of  
 3 international critical undersea infrastructure networks, in-  
 4 cluding—

5 (1) a list of current foreign policies or laws that  
 6 create barriers to United States-led efforts to install,  
 7 maintain, repair, and protect international critical  
 8 undersea infrastructure networks; and

9 (2) progress made in the previous calendar year  
 10 as a result of United States engagement with allies  
 11 and partners.

12 **TITLE II—DEPARTMENT OF**  
 13 **STATE CRITICAL UNDERSEA**  
 14 **INFRASTRUCTURE EXPER-**  
 15 **TISE**

16 **SEC. 201. EXPANDING CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUC-**  
 17 **TURE-RELATED EXPERTISE AT THE DEPART-**  
 18 **MENT OF STATE.**

19 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall as-  
 20 sign not fewer than 10 full-time equivalent individuals, of  
 21 which not fewer than 5 individuals shall be assigned to  
 22 the Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy to cover  
 23 subsea telecommunications infrastructure, in order to sup-  
 24 port the Department of State’s interagency engagement

1 on matters related to critical undersea infrastructure pro-  
2 tection, including—

3 (1) protection and resilience;

4 (2) coordination with United States allies and  
5 partners; and

6 (3) United States engagement in international  
7 bodies that cover critical undersea infrastructure.

8 (b) ASSIGNMENT.—The Bureau for Cyberspace and  
9 Digital Policy may not dual-hat currently employed per-  
10 sonnel in meeting the minimum hiring requirement out-  
11 lined in subsection (a).

12 (c) NOTIFICATION.—Not later than 15 days after ful-  
13 filling the hiring requirement in subsection (a), the Sec-  
14 retary of State shall notify the Committee on Foreign Re-  
15 lations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Af-  
16 fairs of the House of Representatives.

17 (d) INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON CRITICAL UN-  
18 DERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE SABOTAGE.—Not later than  
19 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the  
20 Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congres-  
21 sional committees a report on how the United States Gov-  
22 ernment plans to prioritize diplomatic engagement within  
23 relevant international bodies to spur increased information  
24 sharing between allied and partner governments and rel-

1 evant private sector companies on critical undersea infra-  
2 structure sabotage.

3 **TITLE III—SUBSEA TELE-**  
4 **COMMUNICATIONS INFRA-**  
5 **STRUCTURE COORDINATION,**  
6 **CONSTRUCTION, AND REPAIR**

7 **SEC. 301. IMPROVING UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CO-**  
8 **ORDINATION OF SUBSEA TELECOMMUNI-**  
9 **CATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE.**

10 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-  
11 ings:

12 (1) According to a December 2024 Department  
13 of Homeland Security white paper, “There currently  
14 exists no forum in which the full scope of the  
15 [subsea] cable industry can effectively collaborate  
16 with the U.S. government to identify and address  
17 shared challenges.”.

18 (2) United States Federal Government respon-  
19 sibilities for the protection of subsea telecommuni-  
20 cations infrastructure, damage reporting, informa-  
21 tion and intelligence sharing, and emergency re-  
22 sponse are overseen by various government actors  
23 through a multitude of mechanisms spanning several  
24 Federal departments and agencies.



1           (3) In order for the subsea cable industry to  
2           align with United States economic and security in-  
3           terests and help industry prepare security risk miti-  
4           gation measures, the United States Government  
5           must provide the industry a clearer concept of oper-  
6           ations, assessed risks to cable supply chain and in-  
7           frastructure, enhanced and standardized security  
8           measures, defined lines of effort in cases of emer-  
9           gency, and definitive cost analysis.

10          (b) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than one year after  
11 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall  
12 establish an interagency committee (referred to in this Act  
13 as the “interagency committee”) comprised of the heads  
14 of the appropriate Federal agencies, to lead United States  
15 Government efforts to—

16           (1) protect and improve the resilience of subsea  
17 telecommunications infrastructure;

18           (2) facilitate subsea telecommunications cable  
19 licensing and permitting; and

20           (3) address other matters related to subsea tele-  
21 communications infrastructure deemed appropriate  
22 and necessary by the President.

23          (c) COORDINATION.—The President shall direct the  
24 interagency committee to conduct an overview of the  
25 United States Federal Government’s operational authori-

1 ties for subsea telecommunications infrastructure security  
2 and resilience. The overview shall include—

3 (1) an interagency concept of operations for  
4 partnering with non-Federal entities, including  
5 subsea telecommunications infrastructure owners  
6 and operators, to secure and repair subsea tele-  
7 communications infrastructure systems in a variety  
8 of crisis scenarios; and

9 (2) an interagency review and action plan to  
10 streamline subsea telecommunications infrastructure  
11 licensing, funding, and permitting processes in order  
12 to promote United States international leadership in  
13 cable connectivity and deployments and risk-based  
14 prioritization and standardization of additional secu-  
15 rity and resilience assessments.

16 (d) ANALYSIS OF SUBSEA TELECOMMUNICATIONS  
17 INFRASTRUCTURE SABOTAGE.—

18 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct  
19 the heads of the relevant Federal agencies to develop  
20 strategies to coordinate closely within the inter-  
21 agency process and with subsea telecommunications  
22 infrastructure industry stakeholders to review subsea  
23 telecommunications infrastructure sabotage, includ-  
24 ing by leveraging analysis from industry-wide data,  
25 to—

1 (A) identify trends;

2 (B) refine attributions, particularly in  
3 cases where subsea telecommunications infra-  
4 structure has been intentionally damaged by  
5 malicious actors;

6 (C) identify high-risk geographic areas for  
7 subsea telecommunications infrastructure con-  
8 struction;

9 (D) identify Federal Government functions  
10 and private sector engagement methods to sup-  
11 port the security of subsea telecommunications  
12 infrastructure; and

13 (E) inform future risk mitigation efforts to  
14 reduce damage to subsea telecommunications  
15 infrastructure systems.

16 (2) STRATEGY ELEMENTS.—The strategies re-  
17 quired under paragraph (1) shall include—

18 (A) resourcing requirements;

19 (B) coordination with United States allies  
20 and partners and relevant subsea telecommuni-  
21 cations infrastructure industry stakeholders;  
22 and

23 (C) the necessary technical expertise to  
24 make attributions for subsea telecommuni-  
25 cations infrastructure sabotage.

1 (e) REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after estab-  
 2 lishing the required interagency committee under sub-  
 3 section (b), the President shall submit to Congress a re-  
 4 port that includes the following elements:

5 (1) Any resources required to sufficiently staff  
 6 the interagency committee and United States Fed-  
 7 eral agencies overseeing the objectives outlined in  
 8 subsection (b).

9 (2) A detailed plan for how the interagency  
 10 committee will advance the objectives outlined in  
 11 subsection (b).

12 **SEC. 302. STRENGTHENING INFORMATION SHARING BE-**  
 13 **TWEEN UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND**  
 14 **PRIVATE SECTOR ACTORS ON SUBSEA TELE-**  
 15 **COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE.**

16 (a) PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECTOR INFORMATION SHAR-  
 17 ING.—Consistent with the necessary protections of classi-  
 18 fied information, the sourcing of relevant intelligence ma-  
 19 terial, and privacy and civil liberties, all appropriate agen-  
 20 cies shall, with the approval of the interagency committee  
 21 and in coordination, as appropriate, with intelligence shar-  
 22 ing partnerships with trusted allies, in support of the  
 23 maintenance, repair, and protection of subsea tele-  
 24 communications infrastructure, issue procedures to estab-  
 25 lish and promote—

1           (1) the timely sharing of classified information  
2           regarding subsea telecommunications infrastructure  
3           sabotage and any indications of potential sabotage  
4           held by members of the interagency committee with  
5           non-Federal entities that possess the necessary secu-  
6           rity clearances;

7           (2) the timely sharing between the interagency  
8           committee and non-Federal entities of information  
9           related to subsea telecommunications infrastructure  
10          sabotage, information relating to indications of po-  
11          tential sabotage, or authorized uses under this Act,  
12          in the possession of the interagency committee that  
13          may be declassified and shared at an unclassified  
14          level;

15          (3) the timely sharing between the interagency  
16          committee and non-Federal entities of unclassified,  
17          including controlled unclassified, information regard-  
18          ing subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabo-  
19          tage and indications of potential sabotage held by  
20          members of the interagency committee or non-Fed-  
21          eral entities;

22          (4) the timely sharing between the interagency  
23          committee and non-Federal entities, when and if ap-  
24          propriate, of information relating to indications of  
25          potential subsea telecommunications infrastructure

1 sabotage or authorized uses under this title, held by  
2 the interagency committee or non-Federal entities  
3 about subsea telecommunications infrastructure sab-  
4 otage, in order to prevent or mitigate any potential  
5 adverse effects from such sabotage; and

6 (5) the timely release of funds to meet cost,  
7 schedule, and performance metrics.

8 (b) DEVELOPMENT OF PROCEDURES.—The proce-  
9 dures developed under subsection (b) shall—

10 (1) ensure the interagency committee has and  
11 maintains the capacity to identify and inform subsea  
12 telecommunications infrastructure sabotage and in-  
13 dications of potential subsea telecommunications in-  
14 frastructure sabotage in real time to the appropriate  
15 Federal agencies or non-Federal entities consistent  
16 with the protection of classified information;

17 (2) incorporate, whenever possible, existing  
18 processes, roles, and responsibilities of members of  
19 the interagency committee and non-Federal entities  
20 for information sharing, including subsea tele-  
21 communications infrastructure-specific information  
22 sharing and analysis entities; and

23 (3) require members of the interagency com-  
24 mittee and other appropriate Federal agencies which  
25 are sharing subsea telecommunications infrastruc-

1       ture sabotage indicators or defensive measures to  
2       employ any applicable security controls to defend  
3       against unauthorized access to or acquisition of such  
4       information.

5       (c) SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS.—The Director of Na-  
6       tional Intelligence, in consultation with the members of  
7       the interagency committee, shall—

8               (1) not later than 60 days after the date of the  
9       enactment of this Act, submit to Congress the proce-  
10      dures required under subsection (b); and

11              (2) not later than one year after submitting  
12      such procedures, and annually thereafter for 5 years,  
13      submit to Congress a report on the implementation  
14      and execution of information sharing with private  
15      sector actors in the previous year pursuant to sub-  
16      section (a).

○