

119TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 6275

To require the Secretary of Commerce to submit a report annually on the advanced artificial intelligence capabilities of the People’s Republic of China, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NOVEMBER 21, 2025

Mr. MOYLAN (for himself, Mr. VINDMAN, and Mr. HUIZENGA) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

To require the Secretary of Commerce to submit a report annually on the advanced artificial intelligence capabilities of the People’s Republic of China, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “China AI Power Re-
5 port Act”.

6 **SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

7 It is the sense of Congress that—

1 (1) export controls on artificial intelligence
2 technologies and related capabilities must be dy-
3 namic and adaptive to effectively address the evol-
4 ving national security challenges posed by the Peo-
5 ple’s Republic of China (“China”);

6 (2) such controls should be regularly updated to
7 reflect rapid technological innovations, China’s ad-
8 vancing capabilities, and emerging methods of diver-
9 sion, circumvention, and avoidance, to ensure the
10 United States maintains its strategic advantage and
11 to protect the national security interests of the
12 United States; and

13 (3) to ensure Congress can exercise oversight
14 and, as necessary, update export control authorities
15 to enable necessary updates to export controls, Con-
16 gress must be kept fully and currently informed of
17 the current and projected future states of China’s
18 artificial intelligence capabilities.

19 **SEC. 3. REPORT ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE POWER OF**
20 **CHINA.**

21 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
22 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter
23 for 3 years, the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation
24 with the covered agency heads, shall submit to the Com-
25 mittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives

1 and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
2 fairs of the Senate a report on the advanced artificial in-
3 telligence capabilities of China, including the efforts by
4 China relating to supply chains for advanced artificial in-
5 telligence systems.

6 (b) COMPONENTS.—Each report required under sub-
7 section (a) shall also include the following:

8 (1) An assessment of integrated circuits de-
9 signed or optimized for advanced artificial intel-
10 ligence training or inference by leading artificial in-
11 telligence chip designers in China, including Huawei
12 Technologies Co., Ltd. and Cambricon Technologies,
13 that includes—

14 (A) with respect to such integrated cir-
15 cuits, the—

- 16 (i) total processing power;
17 (ii) integer and floating point oper-
18 ations per second at relevant precision lev-
19 els;
20 (iii) memory capacity and bandwidth;
21 (iv) interconnect bandwidth;
22 (v) power efficiency;
23 (vi) transistor count and die size;
24 (vii) process node used per design;
25 (viii) energy efficiency;

1 (ix) manufacturing cost and yield as-
2 sumptions;

3 (x) ability of the integrated circuit to
4 effectively run artificial intelligence models
5 trained on a different chip designer's inte-
6 grated circuit, including measurements
7 such as model inference in tokens per sec-
8 ond and cost per token with and without a
9 software application layer that improves
10 model translation ability;

11 (xi) the capability of the most ad-
12 vanced server configuration produced using
13 the chip designer's integrated circuits in-
14 cluding such technical specifications like
15 floating point operations per second, mem-
16 ory capacity and bandwidth, energy effi-
17 ciency, and ability to function at scale; and

18 (xii) any future specification that be-
19 comes relevant to the development of fu-
20 ture artificial intelligence capability; and

21 (B) with respect to such chip designers—

22 (i) the total number and types of inte-
23 grated circuits produced in the year pre-
24 ceding submission of such report and the

1 projected production number for the year
2 proceeding submission of such report;

3 (ii) the foundries used in the produc-
4 tion of the integrated circuits;

5 (iii) the software ecosystem, including
6 any parallel computing platforms, pro-
7 gramming models, or development frame-
8 works that enable accelerated computing
9 for artificial intelligence training or infer-
10 ence;

11 (iv) the method and extent to which
12 such integrated circuits are used in other
13 countries, including in the United States;
14 and

15 (v) the manufacturer's ability to
16 produce a software application layer re-
17 quired to achieve an improved token per
18 seconds and cost per token rate.

19 (2) An assessment of leading semiconductor
20 fabrication facilities in China that produce logic inte-
21 grated circuits for use in advanced artificial intel-
22 ligence training or inference, including such facilities
23 owned or operated by the Semiconductor Manufac-
24 turing International Corporation, that includes, with
25 respect to such facilities, the—

1 (A) total monthly production capacity per
2 advanced process node with non-planar transis-
3 tors or $16/14$ nm and below and the percentage
4 of that monthly production capacity dedicated
5 to production of logic integrated circuits for use
6 in advanced artificial training or inference;

7 (B) yield for producing such logic inte-
8 grated circuits for use in advanced artificial in-
9 telligence training or inference at each facility
10 with an assessment of that yield in industry rel-
11 evant terms, such as compared to Chinese
12 firms, compared to non-Chinese firms, or how
13 many are in current industry-leading
14 datacenters;

15 (C) most advanced process node under pro-
16 duction;

17 (D) types and volume of semiconductor
18 manufacturing equipment used, the country of
19 origin for such equipment, and the export con-
20 trol regulatory regime under which such equip-
21 ment was procured;

22 (E) collaborations, licit or illicit, between
23 Chinese firms or their subsidiaries and non-Chi-
24 nese firms and the advancements those collabo-
25 rations produce for the Chinese firm;

1 (F) progress Chinese firms are making at
2 indigenizing export controlled technologies;

3 (G) market share Chinese firms have in
4 China and internationally; and

5 (H) year-over-year trends in leading semi-
6 conductor fabrication facilities during at least
7 the preceding 5-year period;

8 (3) An assessment of leading semiconductor
9 fabrication facilities in China that produce memory
10 integrated circuits used for advanced artificial intel-
11 ligence training or inference, including such facilities
12 owned or operated by ChangXin Memory Tech-
13 nologies or Yangtze Memory Technologies Corp.,
14 that includes—

15 (A) with respect to such circuits, the—

16 (i) most advanced generation of high-
17 bandwidth memory, including the technical
18 specifications and stack height;

19 (ii) smallest half-pitch and the per-die
20 capacity of other dynamic random access
21 memory integrated circuits; and

22 (iii) highest number of layers in three-
23 dimensional NOT-AND memory inte-
24 grated circuits;

25 (B) with respect to such facilities, the—

1 (i) yield and total monthly production
2 capacity for memory integrated circuits, in-
3 cluding dynamic random access memory
4 such as high-bandwidth memory, and
5 NOT-AND memory; and

6 (ii) types and volume of semicon-
7 ductor manufacturing equipment used, in-
8 cluding the country of origin of such equip-
9 ment and the export control regulatory re-
10 gime such equipment was procured under.

11 (C) collaborations, licit or illicit, between
12 Chinese firms or their subsidiaries and non-Chi-
13 nese firms and the advancements those collabo-
14 rations produce for the Chinese firm;

15 (D) progress Chinese firms are making at
16 indigenizing export controlled technologies;

17 (E) market share Chinese firms have in
18 China and internationally; and

19 (F) year-over-year trends in China's ad-
20 vanced memory integrated circuit production
21 for a minimum of the 5 previous years.

22 (4) An assessment of leading semiconductor
23 manufacturing equipment companies in China, in-
24 cluding NAURA Technology Group, KINGSEMI,
25 Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment Inc., Shang-

hai Micro Electronics Equipment, and Shenzhen
SiCarrier Technologies Co., Ltd, that includes—

(A) a categorical breakdown of annual unit
production volume and technical specifications,
including minimum feature size, throughput,
and defect rate, of all major equipment classes
installed or under development for wafer pro-
duction in foundries in China, including—

(i) lithography tools, including photo-
lithography, nanoimprint, and electron
beam lithography tools;

(ii) etch equipment, including wet
etching and dry etching;

(iii) deposition equipment, including
chemical vapor deposition, physical vapor
deposition, and atomic layer deposition;

(iv) cleaning systems;

(v) chemical mechanical planarization
tools;

(vi) ion implantation and diffusion
systems;

(vii) wafer inspection, metrology, and
process control tools;

- 1 (viii) back-end packaging equipment,
2 including wafer dicing equipment and wire
3 bonders;
- 4 (ix) capabilities and advancements in
5 advanced packaging technologies;
- 6 (x) thermal processing equipment;
- 7 (xi) bonding equipment, including
8 thermo compression bonders and hybrid
9 bonders;
- 10 (xii) environmental control systems;
- 11 (xiii) laser systems; and
- 12 (xiv) reticle and photomask writing
13 and inspection tools;
- 14 (B) the country of origin and supplier
15 company for each piece of semiconductor manu-
16 facturing equipment used in foundries in China
17 for advanced-node logic or high-bandwidth
18 memory production by such companies;
- 19 (C) the foreign-sourced subcomponents in-
20 tegrated into the semiconductor manufacturing
21 equipment produced by such companies, includ-
22 ing precision motion stages, lasers, electrostatic
23 chucks, optical systems, radio frequency genera-
24 tors, or extreme-purity gas handling systems;

1 (D) collaborations, licit or illicit, between
2 Chinese firms or their subsidiaries and non-Chi-
3 nese firms and the advancements those collabo-
4 rations produce for the Chinese firm;

5 (E) progress Chinese firms are making at
6 indigenizing export controlled technologies;

7 (F) market share Chinese firms have in
8 China and internationally; and

9 (G) year-over-year trends in leading semi-
10 conductor manufacturing equipment companies
11 in China for a minimum of the 5 previous
12 years.

13 (5) An assessment of electronic design automa-
14 tion (EDA) software used in the design of integrated
15 circuits for advanced artificial intelligence applica-
16 tions in China, including software developed or pro-
17 vided by leading Chinese EDA companies such as
18 Empyrean Technology Co., Ltd. and Primarius
19 Technologies Co., Ltd., that includes—

20 (A) with respect to such software tools,
21 the—

22 (i) range of design stages supported,
23 including front-end design such as archi-
24 tecture and register-transfer level design,
25 logic synthesis, verification, physical de-

1 sign, place-and-route, timing closure, and
2 final signoff;

3 (ii) compatibility with advanced proc-
4 ess nodes, including sub-7 nanometer tech-
5 nologies, gate-all-around devices, and
6 three-dimensional integration;

7 (iii) capabilities for designing artificial
8 intelligence-specific components of such in-
9 tegrated circuits, including tensor proc-
10 essing cores, systolic array processing
11 units, matrix multiplier units, and high-
12 bandwidth memory interfaces;

13 (iv) ability to model and optimize for
14 power, performance, and thermal con-
15 straints in artificial intelligence workloads;

16 (v) scale and performance of the soft-
17 ware in handling large designs, such as
18 chips exceeding 50–100 billion transistors;
19 and

20 (vi) integration with cloud compute
21 resources or distributed workflows for
22 large-scale artificial intelligence chip devel-
23 opment;

24 (B) with respect to such companies, the—

1 (i) total market share within China
2 and internationally, including the share of
3 advanced-node integrated circuits designed
4 or optimized for advanced artificial intel-
5 ligence training or inference designs sup-
6 ported by each company; and

7 (ii) types, volume, and origin of crit-
8 ical technology components used in soft-
9 ware development, including intellectual
10 property cores, third-party libraries,
11 verification suites, and artificial intel-
12 ligence-assisted optimization algorithms;

13 (C) progress Chinese firms are making at
14 indigenizing export-controlled or foreign-origin
15 technologies used in EDA, including high-per-
16 formance computing integration, advanced
17 verification engines, and proprietary intellectual
18 property cores;

19 (D) year-over-year trends for China's EDA
20 industry over a minimum of the previous 5
21 years, including technology adoption, market
22 share, and software capability evolution; and

23 (E) identification of technical gaps relative
24 to leading global EDA providers, particularly in

1 relation to artificial intelligence-focused design,
2 advanced nodes, and large-scale verification.

3 (6) An assessment of the advanced artificial in-
4 telligence models determined by the Secretary to be
5 the most relevant to the national security of the
6 United States that were developed by artificial intel-
7 ligence laboratories or companies based in China, es-
8 pecially those laboratories and companies affiliated
9 with the People's Liberation Army or any university
10 in China, including the most advanced models, open-
11 weight and closed-weight models, based on model
12 size, total compute used during training, benchmark
13 performance, and any other advanced capabilities
14 the Secretary determines relevant, that includes,
15 with respect to each such model—

16 (A) the number of model parameters;

17 (B) the total training compute used, meas-
18 ured in floating-point operations and their rel-
19 evant precision level;

20 (C) the model performance on benchmark
21 tasks;

22 (D) an evaluation of the extent to which
23 the model exhibits advanced cyber offensive ca-
24 pabilities, an advanced understanding of biologi-
25 cal and virological application domains, and the

1 ability to substantially automate or accelerate
2 artificial intelligence research, and a comparison
3 of such models to the most advanced artificial
4 intelligence models from United States developers;
5

6 (E) if the model is open-weight, an evaluation
7 of the files provided and the security implications
8 of following the developer's deployment
9 instructions;

10 (F) a description of the algorithmic alignment
11 training used;

12 (G) the type and scale of compute infrastructure
13 used in training and inference, including the cluster
14 configurations, the number and type of integrated
15 circuits specifically designed or optimized for advanced
16 artificial intelligence training or inference, how such
17 integrated circuits were acquired and from which companies,
18 where those clusters are located, and how they
19 are being accessed;
20

21 (H) the manner and extent to which the
22 model is used throughout society in China, including
23 throughout the following industries or
24 sectors:

25 (i) the People's Liberation Army;

1 (ii) the surveillance and intelligence
2 collection functions of the Chinese Com-
3 munist Party (CCP), including the geno-
4 cide of Uyghur Muslims and other reli-
5 gious and ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang
6 Uyghur Autonomous Region;

7 (iii) the Government of China;

8 (iv) business and finance;

9 (v) education;

10 (vi) healthcare;

11 (vii) critical infrastructure sectors, in-
12 cluding the power grid and transportation;
13 and

14 (viii) any other sectors that the Sec-
15 retary determines to be relevant, such as
16 high-risk industries where artificial intel-
17 ligence failure would have outsized safety
18 or mission consequences.

19 (I) whether and where such models are de-
20 ployed for public use, including API access or
21 mobile app deployment;

22 (J) the manner and extent to which such
23 models are diffused in other countries, including
24 the United States;

1 (K) the alignment of those models to CCP
2 propaganda;

3 (L) the potential of those models to inject
4 or create vulnerabilities for users or other ways
5 they could be used to further CCP national se-
6 curity objectives;

7 (M) an assessment of global market share
8 of Chinese models and the effect that global
9 market share is enabling China to set artificial
10 intelligence hardware or software standards;
11 and

12 (N) the total number of tokens inferenced
13 globally using the model, the types of hardware
14 utilized for such inference and the percent
15 breakdown between company of origin for such
16 hardware, and the percentage of global
17 inferenced tokens attributable to the model.

18 (7) An assessment of emerging artificial intel-
19 ligence research in China, based on indicators such
20 as academic publications, patent filings, and re-
21 search funding, including—

22 (A) the development of novel artificial in-
23 telligence algorithms and techniques, including
24 advancements in reinforcement learning, nat-
25 ural language processing, or computer vision,

1 with a focus on algorithms and techniques most
2 relevant for developing or deploying the most
3 advanced artificial intelligence systems;

4 (B) advancements in hardware designed to
5 enhance artificial intelligence capabilities, in-
6 cluding custom integrated circuits, quantum
7 computing technologies, or neuromorphic com-
8 puting systems, with a focus on hardware ad-
9 vancements most relevant for developing or de-
10 ploying the most advanced artificial intelligence
11 systems;

12 (C) the scale and focus of research efforts,
13 including the number of researchers, institu-
14 tions, and collaborations involved, and the fund-
15 ing levels and sources, with a focus on those
16 most relevant for developing or deploying the
17 most advanced frontier artificial intelligence
18 systems;

19 (D) an evaluation of the potential impact
20 of such research on future artificial intelligence
21 capabilities relevant to national security com-
22 petitiveness; and

23 (E) a description of licit or illicit methods
24 or tactics such as unauthorized model distilla-
25 tion used by Chinese entities to steal non-Chi-

1 nese artificial intelligence related intellectual
2 property.

3 (8) An assessment of the aggregate public fund-
4 ing and capital flows supporting artificial intel-
5 ligence development in China, including—

6 (A) the sum total of China’s national, pro-
7 vincial, and municipal investment in artificial
8 intelligence;

9 (B) subsidies that are underwriting the
10 costs of artificial intelligence development in
11 areas such as compute, infrastructure, water,
12 and energy;

13 (C) an assessment of foreign capital invest-
14 ments, including the total amount invested and
15 a breakdown by entity, including the country of
16 origin and the amount invested; and

17 (D) an assessment of the PRC-based enti-
18 ties that have received the funding, including
19 the name of the entity and the amount of fund-
20 ing received.

21 (9) The aggregate artificial intelligence com-
22 putational capacity in China, including—

23 (A) a detailed analysis of computational
24 capacity of the 5 most capable entities in
25 China, including the number and types of inte-

1 grated circuits and server systems used and
2 their aggregate computational power;

3 (B) the countries and companies with re-
4 spect to which China sourced their computa-
5 tional capacity; and

6 (C) the locations and specifications, includ-
7 ing energy and computational capacity, of
8 datacenters used for advanced artificial intel-
9 ligence training and inference.

10 (10) An assessment of leading humanoid robot
11 manufacturers in China, including Unitree Robotics
12 and Fourier, that includes—

13 (A) with respect to such manufacturers,
14 the—

15 (i) production capacity per year; and

16 (ii) unit cost and pricing trends for
17 such robots intended for commercial de-
18 ployment; and

19 (B) with respect to the humanoid robots
20 produced by such manufactures—

21 (i) the number, type, and country and
22 company of origin of the semiconductor
23 components, including integrated circuits,
24 used to build, run, or train such robots;

1 (ii) the country and company of origin
2 and the technical specifications of critical
3 components used in such robots, including
4 actuators, sensors, and battery systems,
5 and if not Chinese, the progress toward
6 indigenization;

7 (iii) a description of the tasks such ro-
8 bots can perform;

9 (iv) whether such robots are teleoper-
10 ated, operated through hard-coded instruc-
11 tions, or function autonomously using arti-
12 ficial intelligence models;

13 (v) whether inference is performed lo-
14 cally or via remote cloud services;

15 (vi) the number of such robots de-
16 ployed across China, including in the mili-
17 tary, manufacturing, logistics, health care,
18 security, and personal assistance sectors;

19 (vii) the extent to which, and ways in
20 which, such robots are diffused in other
21 countries, including in the United States;
22 and

23 (viii) an assessment of the cybersecu-
24 rity and other vulnerabilities of Chinese or-
25 igin robotic systems.

1 (11) An assessment of the most advanced or
2 widely used artificial intelligence-powered applica-
3 tions developed by Chinese entities or built on Chi-
4 nese artificial intelligence models, including—

5 (A) the artificial intelligence models used
6 to power these applications, including the com-
7 pany and country of origin for each model and
8 whether the models are open-weight or closed-
9 weight;

10 (B) the means of deployment and the ex-
11 tent to which such applications are used, in-
12 cluding in the United States;

13 (C) the purposes, capabilities, and pro-
14 moted uses of the applications;

15 (D) an analysis of how data collected or
16 generated by the applications is used, including
17 for artificial intelligence model training, surveil-
18 lance, or other national security-relevant pur-
19 poses; and

20 (E) an evaluation of the potential risks
21 posed by these applications to United States
22 national security, foreign policy objectives, or
23 data privacy.

1 (12) An assessment of the regulatory frame-
2 work governing artificial intelligence development,
3 deployment, and usage in China, that includes—

4 (A) the explicit restrictions on artificial in-
5 telligence models, including laws, regulations,
6 and government policies that directly limit or
7 control the development, deployment, or use of
8 artificial intelligence models in China;

9 (B) an analysis of the implicit restrictions
10 on artificial intelligence models, including cen-
11 sorship, data access limitations, or other indi-
12 rect controls that may constrain artificial intel-
13 ligence model capabilities;

14 (C) how such explicit and implicit restric-
15 tions impact the development, deployment, and
16 diffusion of artificial intelligence models both
17 within China and internationally, including the
18 effects on innovation, competitiveness, and na-
19 tional security;

20 (D) an analysis of efforts by the CCP to
21 acquire greater insight into advanced artificial
22 intelligence and reduce strategic surprise, such
23 as efforts that require advanced artificial intel-
24 ligence developers to disclose information about

1 artificial intelligence systems or provide models
2 to government entities;

3 (E) an analysis of efforts in China to as-
4 sess or mitigate national security or public safe-
5 ty threats from advanced artificial intelligence
6 systems, including efforts to prevent loss of con-
7 trol from autonomous artificial intelligence sys-
8 tems; and

9 (F) the goals for artificial intelligence de-
10 velopment explicitly and implicitly stated by the
11 CCP.

12 (13) An assessment of China's global artificial
13 intelligence standards diplomacy efforts, including—

14 (A) mapping the fora where Chinese actors
15 aimed to shape global standards;

16 (B) jurisdictions where Chinese-promoted
17 standards, model laws, guidance, or procure-
18 ment criteria have been adopted or referenced;

19 (C) the effects on procurement and vendor
20 eligibility; and

21 (D) opportunities for the United States to
22 shape global artificial intelligence standards and
23 counter Chinese efforts.

24 (14) An assessment of the degree to which enti-
25 ties in China remotely accessed artificial intelligence

1 computational resources, including through cloud
2 services, international data centers, or through cir-
3 cumvention or avoidance of United States export
4 controls.

5 (15) An assessment of the methods, pathways,
6 quantities, and companies and countries of origin of
7 United States-controlled integrated circuits specifi-
8 cally designed or optimized for advanced artificial in-
9 telligence training or inference, including graphics
10 processing units or application-specific integrated
11 circuits, that have been diverted to mainland China,
12 the estimated total compute capacity enabled
13 through these chip diversions, and the percent of
14 China's total compute capacity enabled through
15 these chip diversions.

16 (16) An assessment of the effectiveness of
17 United States export controls in restricting access by
18 China to artificial intelligence-relevant technologies,
19 including an identification of loopholes within United
20 States export controls and recommendations for leg-
21 islative and administrative action to strengthen ex-
22 port controls and enforcement that is consistent with
23 United States national security and foreign policy
24 objectives.

1 (c) PRIORITIZATION.—In conducting the assessments
2 required under subsection (b), the Secretary shall
3 prioritize the identification and analysis of—

4 (1) semiconductors, semiconductor manufac-
5 turing equipment, and critical components of semi-
6 conductor manufacturing equipment that are, or are
7 likely to become, critical to the supply chains for the
8 training or inference of the most advanced artificial
9 intelligence systems; and

10 (2) items that enable or could enable advanced
11 model performance, are associated with systems that
12 pose significant national security or strategic impli-
13 cations to the United States, or are likely to be
14 foundational to the development of future advanced
15 artificial intelligence systems, including those not yet
16 deployed or publicly disclosed.

17 (d) REFERENCE CLASS.—Where applicable, the Sec-
18 retary shall provide context to all statistics regarding Chi-
19 na’s artificial intelligence power in the report by pre-
20 senting China’s capabilities and production numbers in
21 comparison to relevant United States and partner country
22 production numbers and capabilities.

23 (e) COORDINATION WITH EXPERT ENTITIES.—In
24 carrying out this section, the Secretary may consult and
25 coordinate with other Federal departments and agencies,

1 private industry or research organizations, federally fund-
2 ed research and development centers, national labora-
3 tories, academic institutions, relevant media outlets, or
4 any other entities with expertise in semiconductor tech-
5 nologies, artificial intelligence, or national security that
6 the Secretary determines relevant.

7 (f) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a)
8 shall be submitted in unclassified form and may contain
9 a classified annex.

10 (g) MANDATORY UNCLASSIFIED ELEMENTS.—In the
11 unclassified portion of the report required under sub-
12 section (a), the Secretary shall include—

13 (1) the number of integrated circuits specifi-
14 cally designed or optimized for advanced artificial in-
15 telligence training or inference produced by leading
16 entities in China in the year preceding submission of
17 such report;

18 (2) the projected production numbers of inte-
19 grated circuits from China specifically designed or
20 optimized for advanced artificial intelligence training
21 or inference, including identification of foundries re-
22 sponsible for such production, for the year pro-
23 ceeding submission of such report; and

24 (3) the extent to which and ways artificial intel-
25 ligence-relevant technologies in China, including in-

1 tegrated circuits, models, semiconductor manufac-
2 turing equipment, and humanoid robots are diffused
3 in other countries, including the United States.

4 (h) DEFINITIONS.—In this Act:

5 (1) SECRETARY.—The term “Secretary” means
6 the Secretary of Commerce.

7 (2) COVERED AGENCY HEADS.—The term “cov-
8 ered agency heads” means the—

9 (A) Secretary of State;

10 (B) Secretary of Defense;

11 (C) Secretary of Energy;

12 (D) Director of National Intelligence;

13 (E) Director for the White House Office of
14 Science and Technology Policy; and

15 (F) head of any other relevant Federal de-
16 partment or agency the Secretary determines
17 necessary.

○