

119TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. 10183

To authorize certain actions with respect to Serbia.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AUGUST 27, 2026

Mr. WILSON of South Carolina (for himself and Mr. KEATING) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To authorize certain actions with respect to Serbia.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Supporting the Rule
5 of law, Building Institutional Justice, and Accountability
6 Act” or “SRBIJA Act”.

7 **SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.**

8 In this Act—

1 (1) the term “European Union” means the po-
2 litical and economic union of that name, including
3 its member states and institutions;

4 (2) the term “NATO” means the North Atlan-
5 tic Treaty Organization; and

6 (3) the term “Secretary” means the Secretary
7 of State.

8 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

9 It is the sense of Congress that—

10 (1) Serbia has experienced serious democratic
11 backsliding, as reflected in the 2024 Country Report
12 on Human Rights and European Parliament’s 2025
13 report on Serbia, which cited significant problems
14 with the rule of law, judicial independence, media
15 freedom, and corruption;

16 (2) the Government of Serbia, under the leader-
17 ship of President Aleksandar Vučić and the ruling
18 coalition, has responded to sustained student-led and
19 civic protests with measures that international ob-
20 servers, the European Parliament, and United Na-
21 tions experts have characterized as including exces-
22 sive use of force, arrests of demonstrators, and pres-
23 sure on independent media;

24 (3) the Government of Serbia has simulta-
25 neously pursued a foreign policy deepening political,

1 economic, and security ties with the Russian Federa-
2 tion and the People’s Republic of China, even as it
3 maintains formal candidate status for European
4 Union membership;

5 (4) the United States has an enduring interest
6 in a stable, democratic, and sovereign Serbia that is
7 committed to regional peace and security and firmly
8 anchored in Euro-Atlantic institutions and free from
9 malign external influence;

10 (5) the collapse of the renovated railway station
11 canopy in Novi Sad on November 1, 2024, which
12 killed sixteen people, and which many Serbian citi-
13 zens attribute to corruption-linked negligence in
14 state infrastructure contracting, warrants a full,
15 transparent, and independent accounting;

16 (6) the Secretary should press the Government
17 of Serbia to permit independent, credible investiga-
18 tions into the Novi Sad disaster and into allegations
19 of excessive force against peaceful protesters, and to
20 hold accountable any officials found responsible;

21 (7) Serbia and Iran have deepened technological
22 and political ties despite extensive United States and
23 international sanctions on Iran, signing a memo-
24 randum of understanding on information and com-
25 munications technology and artificial intelligence co-

1 operation in February 2025 and holding bilateral po-
2 litical consultations in April 2025; and

3 (8) in July 2026, the Government of Serbia
4 sent a cabinet minister to Tehran as President
5 Vučić’s personal envoy to the funeral of former Ira-
6 nian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, joining delega-
7 tions from Russia and China at a time when most
8 European governments were not represented.

9 **SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

10 It is the policy of the United States—

11 (1) to support the aspirations of the citizens of
12 Serbia for transparent, accountable, and democratic
13 governance and impress upon the Government of
14 Serbia that deepened United States engagement de-
15 pends on credible, verifiable progress toward demo-
16 cratic accountability and rule of law;

17 (2) to impose financial and visa sanctions on
18 malign actors who contribute to the destabilizing sit-
19 uation in the Western Balkans, including in Serbia
20 under Executive Order 14033 as well as those in the
21 Western Balkans who support the Russian Federa-
22 tion’s malign actions around the world under Execu-
23 tive Order 14024; and

24 (3) to impose sanctions described in section
25 8335 of the Western Balkans Democracy and Pros-

1 perity Act (22 U.S.C. 10704) for foreign persons
2 who the President determines have—

3 (A) undertaken actions or policies that
4 threaten the peace, security, stability, or terri-
5 torial integrity of any area or state in the West-
6 ern Balkans;

7 (B) engaged or attempted to engage in ac-
8 tions or policies that undermine democratic
9 processes or institutions in the Western Bal-
10 kans;

11 (C) engaged or attempted to engage in cor-
12 ruption related to the Western Balkans, includ-
13 ing corruption by or on behalf of, a government
14 in the Western Balkans, or a current or former
15 government official in the Western Balkans;

16 (D) engaged or attempting to engage in se-
17 rious human rights abuses in the Western Bal-
18 kans; or

19 (E) engaged or attempted to engage in,
20 acts that obstruct or threaten the implementa-
21 tion of any regional security, peace, coopera-
22 tion, or mutual recognition agreement or frame-
23 work or accountability mechanism related to the
24 Western Balkans, including—

25 (i) the Prespa Agreement of 2018;

1 (ii) the Ohrid Framework Agreement
2 of 2001;

3 (iii) United Nations Security Council
4 Resolution 1244;

5 (iv) the Dayton Accords;

6 (v) the Conclusions of the Peace Im-
7 plementation Conference Council held in
8 London in December 1995, including the
9 decisions or conclusions of the High Rep-
10 resentative, the Peace Implementation
11 Council, or its Steering Board; and

12 (vi) the International Criminal Tri-
13 bunal for the former Yugoslavia, or, with
14 respect to the former Yugoslavia, the
15 International Residual Mechanism for
16 Criminal Tribunals.

17 **SEC. 5. REPORT AND STRATEGY.**

18 (a) REPORT.—

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
20 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
21 retary, in coordination with the Director of National
22 Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, shall sub-
23 mit to the appropriate congressional committees an
24 unclassified report, which may include a classified
25 annex, examining—

1 (A) the extent of Russian political, eco-
2 nomic, energy, and security influence in Serbia;

3 (B) the extent of investment, infrastruc-
4 ture, and political and security-sector ties be-
5 tween Serbia and the People’s Republic of
6 China, including any implications for NATO
7 and European Union interests in the Western
8 Balkans; and

9 (C) the extent to which Serbia’s close eco-
10 nomic, political, and other ties with the Russian
11 Federation and the People’s Republic of China
12 risk United States interests, including when
13 pursuing bilateral cooperation in the fields of
14 defense, telecommunications, and national secu-
15 rity.

16 (2) DEFINITION.—In this subsection, the term
17 “appropriate congressional committees” means—

18 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations,
19 the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the
20 Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
21 and

22 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
23 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
24 and the Committee on Armed Services of the
25 House of Representatives.

1 (b) STRATEGY.—

2 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
3 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary,
4 in coordination with the heads of other relevant Fed-
5 eral departments and agencies, shall submit to the
6 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
7 resentatives and the Committee on Foreign Rela-
8 tions of the Senate a detailed strategy that—

9 (A) outlines specific objectives for bilateral
10 engagement that reflect the current domestic
11 political environment in Serbia including an as-
12 sessment of how the U.S.-Serbia Strategic Dia-
13 logue will further these objectives;

14 (B) assesses the tools, resources, and for-
15 eign assistance funding available to support
16 independent media, civil society, and judicial re-
17 form in Serbia;

18 (C) assesses whether the Government of
19 Serbia has taken credible steps to investigate
20 the Novi Sad disaster and allegations of exces-
21 sive force against protesters;

22 (D) assesses the extent to which the Gov-
23 ernment of Serbia’s foreign and security policy
24 remains aligned, or has diverged, from that of

1 NATO and the European Union, including
2 through its ties to Russia and China;

3 (E) includes bilateral consultations on
4 issues of corruption, public procurement, and
5 rule of law including in the context of EXPO
6 2027; and

7 (F) includes a path forward for the United
8 States to support continued progress in the Eu-
9 ropean Union-led dialogue between Serbia and
10 Kosovo in accordance with section 8340 of the
11 Western Balkans Democracy and Prosperity
12 Act (22 U.S.C. 10709).

13 (2) FORM.—The report required by paragraph
14 (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, with a
15 classified annex as necessary.

16 **SEC. 6. U.S.-SERBIA STRATEGIC DIALOGUE.**

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall cease partici-
18 pation in the U.S.-Serbia Strategic Dialogue unless the
19 Secretary, at a minimum, addresses the following issues
20 during any iteration of the U.S.-Serbia Strategic Dia-
21 logue:

22 (1) Serbia's relations with Russia, China, and
23 Iran.

24 (2) Ensuring free and fair elections in Serbia.

1 (3) Anti-corruption, public procurement, and
2 rule of law reform in Serbia.

3 (4) Strengthening democratic governance, the
4 freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly in
5 Serbia.

6 (b) CERTIFICATION REQUIRED.—Not less than 10
7 days prior to any iteration of the U.S.-Serbia Strategic
8 Dialogue, the Secretary shall submit in writing to the
9 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representa-
10 tives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
11 ate a certification that the issues described in subsection
12 (a) will be addressed and a detailed overview of how the
13 Secretary or the appropriate Department of State rep-
14 resentative at the Dialogue plans to address the issues
15 during that iteration of the Dialogue.

16 (c) CESSATION OF FUNDING.—If the Secretary fails
17 to provide the certification required by subsection (b), no
18 Department of State official or employee is authorized to
19 participate in the U.S.-Serbia Strategic Dialogue or ex-
20 pend any appropriations to that end.

21 **SEC. 7. ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE TO SERBIA.**

22 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
23 gress that, after the submission of the certification de-
24 scribed in subsection (c), should the Government of Serbia
25 take steps to reinforce its Euro-Atlantic path, including

1 a credible and independent accounting of the Novi Sad
2 canopy collapse and accountability for excessive use of
3 force against peaceful protesters—

4 (1) the President should take steps to improve
5 the bilateral relationship between the United States
6 and Serbia, including actions to bolster Serbia’s
7 democratic institutions and its resilience to malign
8 foreign influence;

9 (2) the Secretary, in consultation with other
10 heads of relevant Federal departments and agencies,
11 should seek to further enhance people-to-people con-
12 tacts and academic exchanges between the United
13 States and Serbia; and

14 (3) the President, in consultation with the Sec-
15 retary of Defense, should maintain, and as appro-
16 priate, expand security and defense cooperation with
17 Serbia consistent with Serbia’s alignment with
18 NATO and European Union security priorities.

19 (b) IN GENERAL.—Upon submission to Congress of
20 the certification described in subsection (c), additional as-
21 sistance is authorized to be provided to Serbia.

22 (c) CERTIFICATION DESCRIBED.—The certification
23 described in this subsection is a certification submitted to
24 Congress by the President that Serbia has shown signifi-
25 cant and sustained progress toward independent judicial

1 accountability, media freedom, and alignment of its for-
2 eign and security policy with that of the European Union
3 and NATO.

4 **SEC. 8. SUNSET.**

5 This Act shall cease to have any force or effect begin-
6 ning on the date that is five years after the date of the
7 enactment of this Act.

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