[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 10137 Introduced in House (IH)]

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119th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                               H. R. 10137

To direct the Inspector General of the Department of Defense to report 
 to Congress regarding complaints of insider trading on prediction and 
   energy markets during Operation Epic Fury, and for other purposes.


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                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            August 20, 2026

Mr. Whitesides (for himself, Mr. Bacon, and Mr. Moulton) introduced the 
 following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services

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                                 A BILL


 
To direct the Inspector General of the Department of Defense to report 
 to Congress regarding complaints of insider trading on prediction and 
   energy markets during Operation Epic Fury, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``No Insider Trading on National 
Security Act of 2026''.

SEC. 2. INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ON INSIDER TRADING DURING OPERATION 
              EPIC FURY.

    (a) In General.--Not later than January 1, 2027, the Inspector 
General of the Department of Defense shall submit to the Committees on 
Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report 
on all complaints received by the Inspector General regarding insider 
trading on prediction and energy markets during Operation Epic Fury.
    (b) Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall include--
            (1) the number of complaints received regarding insider 
        trading as described in subsection (a);
            (2) identification of whether such complaints were against 
        members of the Armed Forces, civilian employees of the 
        Department of Defense, or contractors;
            (3) the outcomes of those complaints, including whether 
        they were substantiated and any accountability actions taken;
            (4) any identified trends associated with the complaints;
            (5) an assessment of the operational risks and security 
        vulnerabilities posed by activities identified in the 
        complaints; and
            (6) recommendations for possible safeguards to detect, 
        deter, and reduce the likelihood of such insider trading 
        happening in the future.
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