

119TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. 10008

To promote democracy, defend human rights, and impose accountability on the Government of Turkey for systemic political repression, censorship, transnational repression, and violations of international law.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 30, 2026

Ms. TITUS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Financial Services, and the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To promote democracy, defend human rights, and impose accountability on the Government of Turkey for systemic political repression, censorship, transnational repression, and violations of international law.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the
5 “Turkey Human Rights Promotion Act of 2026”.

6 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for
7 this Act is as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
- Sec. 2. Findings.
- Sec. 3. Definitions.
- Sec. 4. Statement of policy.
- Sec. 5. Sense of Congress on press freedom.
- Sec. 6. Sense of Congress on internet freedom.
- Sec. 7. Sense of Congress on protecting lawyers and promoting fair trials.
- Sec. 8. Sense of Congress on accountability for human rights violations.
- Sec. 9. Limitations on certain security assistance.
- Sec. 10. Political prisoners assistance.
- Sec. 11. Annual report.
- Sec. 12. Support for civil society and independent media.

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 Congress makes the following findings:

3 (1) The United States values its longstanding
 4 alliance with the Republic of Turkey, its friendship
 5 with the Turkish people, and remains committed to
 6 supporting a healthy Turkish democracy.

7 (2) Articles I and II of the North Atlantic
 8 Treaty require Member States of the North Atlantic
 9 Treaty Organization (NATO) to conduct themselves
 10 in a manner that promotes peace abroad and
 11 strengthens democratic institutions at home, affirm-
 12 ing that the NATO alliance is founded on shared
 13 democratic principles.

14 (3) The Republic of Turkey joined NATO in
 15 1952, the first nation—along with Greece—to join
 16 the alliance after its founding.

17 (4) Since the attempted coup of July 2016, the
 18 Government of Turkey has intensified its crackdown
 19 on freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, and

1 association. In its World 2026 assessment, Freedom
2 House rated Turkey to be “Not Free”.

3 (5) In the years following the coup attempt, the
4 Government of Turkey has pursued a sweeping and
5 systematic campaign of domestic and transnational
6 repression targeting journalists, academics, students,
7 lawyers, opposition politicians, Kurds, Alevis, and in-
8 dividuals associated with the Hizmet (Gulen) Move-
9 ment.

10 (6) Since 2016, Turkish authorities have used
11 vague and overly broad anti-terrorism laws to inves-
12 tigate over 3,000,000 individuals for alleged ter-
13 rorism-related offenses and to detain or arrest large
14 numbers of people for peaceful civic or religious ac-
15 tivities, according to the Stockholm Center for Free-
16 dom.

17 (7) The Government of Turkey has used the
18 failed 2016 coup as justification for a sweeping
19 crackdown. In the immediate aftermath, authorities
20 detained tens of thousands of people accused of aid-
21 ing the coup or supporting terrorism and dismissed
22 thousands of public employees. At least 4,156 judges
23 and prosecutors and more than 5,800 academics
24 were dismissed on terrorism-related grounds.

1 (8) The April 2017 constitutional referendum,
2 advanced by the ruling Justice and Development
3 Party (AKP) and held under a state of emergency,
4 shifted Turkey from a parliamentary to a presi-
5 dential system, concentrating sweeping powers in the
6 presidency. The Venice Commission warned that the
7 amendments “represent a dangerous step back-
8 wards” and risk the country’s degeneration into an
9 authoritarian presidential system. Although the state
10 of emergency formally ended in 2018, many emer-
11 gency-era measures remain in force, and restrictions
12 on fundamental freedoms persist.

13 (9) According to the United States Department
14 of State’s 2022 Human Rights Report, President
15 Erdogan’s 2018 anti-terror legislation continues to
16 restrict basic freedoms and undermine judicial inde-
17 pendence. Since 2016, Turkish authorities have dis-
18 missed or suspended more than 60,000 police and
19 military personnel, removed roughly 125,000 civil
20 servants, purged approximately one-third of the judi-
21 ciary, arrested or imprisoned more than 95,000 peo-
22 ple, and closed over 1,500 nongovernmental organi-
23 zations on terrorism-related grounds.

24 (10) A 2020 Human Rights Watch report
25 found that the Government of Turkey continues to

1 arbitrarily detain and prosecute lawyers, in violation
2 of its obligations under the International Covenant
3 on Civil and Political Rights and the European Con-
4 vention on Human Rights. According to the Inter-
5 national Bar Association's Human Rights Institute
6 and the Arrested Lawyers Initiative, more than
7 1,700 lawyers have been prosecuted, over 700 placed
8 in pretrial detention, and at least 553 collectively
9 sentenced to more than 3,380 years in prison.

10 (11) Turkey ranks 163 out of 180 countries in
11 the 2026 World Press Freedom Index. The Euro-
12 pean Court of Human Rights has repeatedly found
13 that Turkey unlawfully detains and prosecutes jour-
14 nalists. At least 314 journalists were tried between
15 2022 and 2023, and several, including Hatice
16 Duman, Mustafa Gok, and Erdal Susem, remain im-
17 prisoned for life. In the second quarter of 2025
18 alone, authorities arrested 10 journalists and tried
19 103 journalists in 73 cases, resulting in 10 convic-
20 tions.

21 (12) An estimated 43,000 political prisoners re-
22 main incarcerated in Turkey, according to Prison
23 Insider.

24 (13) Arbitrary arrests and unfair trials persist
25 as Turkey's judiciary remains vulnerable to executive

1 interference, with inconsistent and contradictory rul-
2 ings from high courts. The case of civil society lead-
3 er Osman Kavala, arrested in 2017 on unfounded
4 charges, exemplifies this deterioration. Despite a
5 2019 binding ruling by the European Court of
6 Human Rights ordering his release, Turkish courts
7 have refused to comply. After briefly being acquit-
8 ted, Kavala was rearrested on espionage charges
9 and, in April 2022, sentenced to life imprisonment
10 without parole, prompting Council of Europe in-
11 fringement proceedings.

12 (14) The Government of Turkey continues to
13 detain Selahattin Demirtas, a leading Kurdish politi-
14 cian arrested in 2016. The European Court of
15 Human Rights has repeatedly ruled that his deten-
16 tion is unlawful and ordered his immediate release,
17 yet domestic courts have failed to enforce these
18 judgments. In May 2024, Demirtas was sentenced to
19 42 years in prison on politically motivated charges
20 related to the 2014 Kobani protests.

21 (15) The Government of Turkey continues to
22 detain political opposition leaders like Ekrem
23 Imamoğlu, the Mayor of Istanbul and President
24 Erdogan’s primary political opponent, on bogus cor-
25 ruption, bribery, and money laundering charges.

1 Since March 2025, President Erdogan’s administra-
2 tion has escalated a crackdown on political opposi-
3 tion, resulting in the arrest of over 500 people.

4 (16) The Government of Turkey continues to
5 censor online expression, prosecuting thousands for
6 social media activity, including for liking or sharing
7 posts. Authorities routinely block online content and
8 have restricted access to major platforms during pe-
9 riods of political unrest. In 2024 alone, Turkey
10 blocked more than 311,000 web addresses, contrib-
11 uting to a total of over 1,264,000 websites and do-
12 mains blocked since 2007.

13 (17) President Erdogan’s 2023 reelection ex-
14 tended more than two decades of AKP dominance
15 characterized by restrictions on assembly, associa-
16 tion, expression, and electoral interference, as docu-
17 mented by the Organization for Security and Co-op-
18 eration in Europe. Between 2021 and 2023, the
19 Constitutional Court considered a case seeking to
20 ban a major pro-Kurdish party, sharply limiting its
21 ability to campaign. Authorities continue to use
22 disinformation and anti-terrorism laws to target po-
23 litical opponents, and ahead of the 2023 elections,
24 courts compelled X (formerly Twitter) to remove nu-
25 merous accounts and hundreds of posts.

1 (18) In October 2022, the Government of Tur-
2 key amended its internet, press, and penal code laws
3 to create a vague new offense, “public dissemination
4 of misleading information”, and expanded state au-
5 thority over online speech. Social media companies
6 that do not comply with government demands face
7 severe fines and bandwidth throttling. These amend-
8 ments enable prison sentences of up to three years
9 and have resulted in arrests, including the detention
10 of 78 individuals in February 2023, for criticizing
11 the government’s earthquake response.

12 (19) Following the February 2023 earthquake,
13 authorities restricted access to X and other major
14 platforms for as many as 12 hours, hindering rescue
15 coordination and humanitarian response. Similar re-
16 strictions followed the 2022 Istanbul bombing, dem-
17 onstrating the Government’s readiness to impose in-
18 formation controls during crises.

19 (20) The Radio and Television Supreme Coun-
20 cil continues to impose arbitrary fines and broadcast
21 suspensions on critical media outlets. Foreign out-
22 lets, including Deutsche Welle and Voice of America,
23 had their Turkish-language websites blocked after
24 refusing to comply with restrictive licensing and cen-
25 sorship requirements.

1 (21) The October 2022 amendments also
2 threaten the security of private messaging services.
3 Regulations issued by the Information and Commu-
4 nication Technologies Authority (BTK) require pro-
5 viders to allow government access to user commu-
6 nications, undermining cybersecurity safeguards and
7 expanding surveillance authorities.

8 (22) The Government of Turkey continues to
9 target LGBTQIA+ people and restrict peaceful
10 demonstrations. According to ILGA—Europe’s 2026
11 Rainbow Map, Turkey ranks 47 out of 50, among
12 the worst in Europe for LGBTQIA+ equality. Tur-
13 key also has the highest recorded number of mur-
14 dered transgender people in Europe. Authorities en-
15 force nationwide bans on pride events and have used
16 violent tactics and mass detentions to suppress
17 them. A draft bill introduced in October 2025 would
18 criminalize “behavior contrary to biological sex,”
19 raise the age for gender-affirming surgery, and im-
20 pose prison terms of up to four years for same-sex
21 marriage or civil-union ceremonies.

22 (23) In March 2021, Turkey withdrew from the
23 Istanbul Convention, a landmark treaty on pre-
24 venting violence against women. Legal experts state
25 that the withdrawal violates both domestic and inter-

1 national law and reflects broader efforts to roll back
2 protections for women, LGBTQIA+ people, and
3 fundamental freedoms.

4 (24) Since 2014, the Government of Turkey has
5 increasingly targeted critics beyond its borders, in-
6 cluding in the United States. Freedom House re-
7 ports that Turkish authorities have pursued oppo-
8 nents in more than 31 countries and secured the
9 rendition of at least 58 individuals without due proc-
10 ess.

11 (25) Following the 2016 coup attempt, the Gov-
12 ernment of Turkey escalated its campaign of
13 transnational repression, forcibly returning or ab-
14 ducting more than 100 individuals, primarily edu-
15 cators linked to Hizmet-affiliated schools. Turkish
16 authorities have pressured foreign governments to
17 transfer or close these schools and have repeatedly
18 abused INTERPOL Red Notices and diffusions to
19 pursue dissidents abroad.

20 (26) Turkish-Americans and lawful permanent
21 residents in the United States have reported threats,
22 intimidation, and harassment linked to politicized
23 Turkish government blacklists.

24 **SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.**

25 In this Act:

1 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
2 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
3 mittees” means—

4 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations
5 and the Committee on Appropriations of the
6 Senate; and

7 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
8 the Committee on Appropriations of the House
9 of Representatives.

10 (2) POLITICAL PRISONER.—The term “political
11 prisoner” means a person who has been deprived of
12 his or her personal liberty if—

13 (A) the detention has been imposed in vio-
14 lation of one of the fundamental guarantees set
15 out in the European Convention on Human
16 Rights, particularly—

17 (i) freedom of thought, conscience,
18 and religion;

19 (ii) freedom of expression and infor-
20 mation; and

21 (iii) freedom of assembly and associa-
22 tion;

23 (B) the detention has been imposed for
24 purely political reasons without connection to
25 any offense;

1 (C) for political motives, the length of the
2 detention or its conditions are clearly out of
3 proportion to the offense of which the person
4 has been found guilty or is suspected;

5 (D) for political motives, he or she is de-
6 tained in a discriminatory manner as compared
7 to other persons; or

8 (E) the detention is the result of pro-
9 ceedings which were clearly unfair and appear
10 to be connected with political motives of the au-
11 thorities.

12 (3) PRISONER OF CONSCIENCE.—The term
13 “prisoner of conscience” means any person who—

14 (A) is imprisoned or otherwise physically
15 restricted solely for the peaceful exercise of the
16 individual’s human rights; and

17 (B) has not used violence or advocated vio-
18 lence or hatred.

19 **SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

20 It is the policy of the United States—

21 (1) to support democracy, peace, and human
22 rights in Turkey, and to press the Government of
23 Turkey to comply with its obligations under the
24 North Atlantic Treaty;

1 (2) to oppose the abuse of counterterrorism
2 laws and authorities, including targeting journalists,
3 political opponents, dissidents, recognized and unrec-
4 ognized ethnic and religious minorities, and others
5 engaged in exercising their right to freedoms of ex-
6 pression, peaceful assembly, or association;

7 (3) to consider those detained or imprisoned
8 under counterterrorism authorities on politically mo-
9 tivated grounds to be prisoners of conscience or po-
10 litical prisoners, as appropriate, unless there is pro-
11 bative evidence of specific criminal misconduct pre-
12 sented in proceedings that comply with international
13 fair trial standards;

14 (4) to use all diplomatic tools to advocate that
15 all prisoners of conscience and political prisoners in
16 Turkey should be unconditionally released and
17 charges expunged;

18 (5) to press the Government of Turkey to re-
19 peal or amend—

20 (A) all anti-terrorism laws and regulations
21 that allow the government to unjustly target
22 journalists, political opponents, dissidents, and
23 minorities;

24 (B) all laws and regulations that violate
25 the right to freedoms of expression, peaceful as-

1 sembly, or association in a manner not per-
2 mitted by international legal standards, includ-
3 ing laws and regulations that seek to punish
4 those who insult political figures or denigrate
5 the Turkish nation or state institutions; and

6 (C) all laws and regulations that violate
7 the right to a fair trial;

8 (6) to oppose the export to Turkey by any
9 country of surveillance technologies, including soft-
10 ware, that could be used to monitor the activities of
11 journalists, political opponents, dissidents, or minor-
12 ity communities;

13 (7) to condemn the Government of Turkey's use
14 of transnational repression, including the abuse of
15 INTERPOL notices, renditions, and other
16 extraterritorial measures to target critics abroad;

17 (8) to protect United States persons and lawful
18 permanent residents from harassment, intimidation,
19 and other forms of foreign political retaliation by or
20 on behalf of the Government of Turkey; and

21 (9) to condition United States security coopera-
22 tion and assistance, as appropriate, on measurable
23 improvements in respect for human rights, rule of
24 law, and compliance with binding international
25 human rights judgments.

1 **SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PRESS FREEDOM.**

2 It is the sense of Congress that—

3 (1) the Government of Turkey must take steps
4 to significantly improve the dire climate for journal-
5 ists and those supporting the journalism profession,
6 including—

7 (A) ending the enforcement of draconian
8 laws and regulations that restrict freedom of
9 expression; and

10 (B) unconditionally releasing all journalists
11 and media workers who have been imprisoned
12 for fulfilling their professional responsibilities;

13 (2) the Department of State should provide as-
14 sistance and warnings of impending politically moti-
15 vated detention or harm to journalists and media
16 workers in danger in Turkey, regardless of citizen-
17 ship status, including journalists working for Kurd-
18 ish media organizations;

19 (3) United States Government officials should
20 prioritize demands to release unfairly detained jour-
21 nalists and media workers in their communications
22 with Turkish officials; and

23 (4) press freedom and the freedom of expres-
24 sion are fundamental human rights and should be
25 upheld and protected in Turkey and everywhere
26 where those rights are under threat.

1 **SEC. 6. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNET FREEDOM.**

2 It is the sense of Congress that—

3 (1) the Government of Turkey must cease its
4 ongoing crackdown on free expression on the inter-
5 net, including by repealing or amending laws that
6 allow the government to block a website or remove
7 content from the website if there is sufficient sus-
8 picion that the site is insulting political figures;

9 (2) the Department of State should support
10 and pressure the Government of Turkey—

11 (A) to halt its frequent requests that social
12 media companies block accounts and content of
13 journalists and media outlets; and

14 (B) to ensure that the Radio and Tele-
15 vision Supreme Council does not arbitrarily re-
16 strict online streaming services through a costly
17 and opaque licensing regime; and

18 (3) escalating controls regulating internet use
19 are an attempt by the Government of Turkey to si-
20 lence one of the last platforms for independent jour-
21 nalism in the country.

22 **SEC. 7. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PROTECTING LAWYERS**
23 **AND PROMOTING FAIR TRIALS.**

24 It is the sense of Congress that—

25 (1) the Government of Turkey must—

1 (A) halt its indiscriminate detention and
2 prosecution of lawyers, judges, prosecutors, and
3 court officials, and its targeting of lawyers' as-
4 sociations;

5 (B) repeal laws restricting the right of law-
6 yers to discharge their professional duties, the
7 rights of suspects to legal counsel, and the right
8 of lawyer-client privileged communication;

9 (C) ensure that lawyers can visit detainees
10 in police custody, and remind police and pros-
11 ecutors of the protected role of lawyers under
12 Article 14 of the International Covenant on
13 Civil and Political Rights, Articles 5 and 6 of
14 the European Convention on Human Rights,
15 and the United Nations Basic Principles on the
16 Role of Lawyers; and

17 (D) end the practice of prosecuting lawyers
18 based on whom they have represented as cli-
19 ents;

20 (2) the Department of State should pressure
21 the Government of Turkey—

22 (A) to abolish extended pretrial detention,
23 consistent with Turkey's Judicial Reform Strat-
24 egy;

1 (B) to reverse the April 2017 amendment
2 to Article 159 of the Constitution of Turkey,
3 which allows for political control over the nomi-
4 nation procedures to the Council of Judges and
5 Prosecutors; and

6 (C) to ensure the independence of judges
7 and of the judiciary system, with particular
8 focus on the Ministry of Justice; and

9 (3) the independence of any country's judicial
10 system suffers when lawyers—

11 (A) are subject to intimidation and harass-
12 ment in their work; and

13 (B) are identified with the causes of their
14 clients.

15 **SEC. 8. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ACCOUNTABILITY FOR**
16 **HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.**

17 It is the sense of Congress that if the Government
18 of Turkey does not promptly take effective steps to ad-
19 dress the human rights violations described in this Act—

20 (1) the President of the United States should
21 impose sanctions pursuant to the Global Magnitsky
22 Human Rights Accountability Act (subtitle F of title
23 XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note)
24 with respect to officials of the Government of Tur-

1 key determined to be responsible for or complicit in,
2 or to have directly or indirectly engaged in—

3 (A) the detention of prisoners of conscience
4 and political prisoners;

5 (B) the politically motivated detention of
6 journalists;

7 (C) restricting of freedom of free expres-
8 sion through social media; and

9 (D) other gross violations of internationally
10 recognized human rights;

11 (2) the President should confirm that United
12 States security assistance provided to the Govern-
13 ment of Turkey is fully consistent with the condi-
14 tions mandated in section 36 of the Arms Export
15 Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776) and the human rights
16 provisions contained in section 620M of the Foreign
17 Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d);

18 (3) the Secretary of the Treasury should in-
19 struct the United States executive director of each
20 international financial institution to oppose any loan,
21 grant, policy, or strategy determined to be directly
22 enabling the Government of Turkey to violate the
23 human rights of its citizens; and

24 (4) the Secretary of State should impose visa
25 restrictions under the announced “Khashoggi Ban”,

1 pursuant to section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration
2 and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(C)) on—

3 (A) individuals who, acting on behalf of the
4 government, are believed to have been directly
5 engaged in serious, extraterritorial counter-dis-
6 sident activities, including those who—

7 (i) suppress, harass, surveil, threaten,
8 or harm journalists, activists, or other per-
9 sons perceived to be dissidents for their
10 work; or

11 (ii) engage in such activities with re-
12 spect to the families or other close associ-
13 ates of such persons; and

14 (B) family members of individuals de-
15 scribed in subparagraph (A), as appropriate.

16 **SEC. 9. LIMITATIONS ON CERTAIN SECURITY ASSISTANCE.**

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—No funds authorized to be appro-
18 priated or otherwise made available for Foreign Military
19 Financing, Foreign Military Sales, or other security assist-
20 ance programs for the Government of Turkey may be obli-
21 gated or expended unless the Secretary of State certifies
22 to the appropriate congressional committees that the Gov-
23 ernment of Turkey—

24 (1) has taken demonstrable and sustained steps
25 to reduce the number of prisoners of conscience and

1 political prisoners, including by releasing individuals
2 detained solely for the peaceful exercise of their
3 human rights;

4 (2) has ceased the misuse of counterterrorism
5 and disinformation laws to criminalize peaceful ex-
6 pression, association, and political participation;

7 (3) is taking concrete steps to comply with
8 binding judgments of the European Court of Human
9 Rights, including in cases concerning Osman Kavala
10 and Selahattin Demirtas; and

11 (4) has ceased, or is no longer systematically
12 engaging in, acts of transnational repression tar-
13 geting individuals abroad for exercising their funda-
14 mental freedoms.

15 (b) WAIVER.—The Secretary of State may waive the
16 application of subsection (a) on a case-by-case basis if the
17 Secretary determines and reports to the appropriate con-
18 gressional committees that such waiver is in the vital na-
19 tional security interest of the United States, and includes
20 a justification for the waiver and a description of efforts
21 to promote the reforms described in subsection (a).

22 **SEC. 10. POLITICAL PRISONERS ASSISTANCE.**

23 The Secretary of State shall provide assistance to
24 civil society organizations in Turkey that work to secure
25 the release of prisoners of conscience and political pris-

1 oners in Turkey, and to current and former prisoners of
2 conscience and political prisoners in Turkey, including—

3 (1) support for the documentation of human
4 rights violations with respect to prisoners of con-
5 science and politically motivated prisoners;

6 (2) support for advocacy in Turkey to raise
7 awareness of issues relating to prisoners of con-
8 science and political prisoners;

9 (3) support for efforts to repeal or amend laws
10 or regulations that are used to imprison individuals
11 as prisoners of conscience or political prisoners; and

12 (4) the delegation of specific United States mis-
13 sion staff who will observe trials in politically moti-
14 vated cases, including in Southeast Turkey.

15 **SEC. 11. ANNUAL REPORT.**

16 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
17 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter
18 for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the ap-
19 propriate congressional committees a report on the imple-
20 mentation of this Act.

21 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report re-
22 quired under subsection (a) shall include—

23 (1) an assessment of the number, conditions,
24 and legal status of prisoners of conscience and polit-
25 ical prisoners in Turkey;

1 (2) a description of restrictions on freedom of
2 expression, association, assembly, and the press, in-
3 cluding online censorship and blocking of social
4 media platforms and websites;

5 (3) a description of incidents of transnational
6 repression, including renditions, attempted abduc-
7 tions, physical attacks, or misuse of INTERPOL no-
8 tices targeting individuals in other countries, includ-
9 ing the United States;

10 (4) an assessment of any use by the Govern-
11 ment of Turkey of United States-origin goods, serv-
12 ices, or technologies to facilitate surveillance, censor-
13 ship, or other serious human rights abuses;

14 (5) a description of efforts by the Government
15 of Turkey to restrict and repress political opposition
16 parties and leaders, including attempts to eliminate
17 meaningful political disagreement and debate;

18 (6) a description of efforts by the Government
19 of Turkey to amend the Constitution of the Republic
20 of Turkey to marginalize political opposition and
21 consolidate power around one political party or poli-
22 tician; and

23 (7) a description of the sanctions, visa restric-
24 tions, and other measures taken pursuant to this
25 Act and other applicable authorities.

1 **SEC. 12. SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY AND INDEPENDENT**
2 **MEDIA.**

3 The Secretary of State and the Administrator of the
4 United States Agency for International Development, as
5 appropriate, shall expand support for—

6 (1) independent journalists and media outlets in
7 Turkey, including those operating in exile;

8 (2) civil society organizations documenting
9 human rights violations or providing assistance to
10 victims of politically motivated persecution;

11 (3) digital rights advocates and organizations
12 working to enhance secure communications, privacy,
13 and cybersecurity for at-risk communities; and

14 (4) initiatives promoting human rights edu-
15 cation, legal literacy, and public awareness regarding
16 fundamental freedoms in Turkey.

○