[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 718 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

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118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
S. RES. 718

 Expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States Government 
 should immediately place a moratorium on all federally funded gain-of-
         function research given the increased safety concerns.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              June 4, 2024

   Mr. Marshall (for himself, Mr. Braun, and Mr. Lee) submitted the 
 following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Health, 
                     Education, Labor, and Pensions

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION


 
 Expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States Government 
 should immediately place a moratorium on all federally funded gain-of-
         function research given the increased safety concerns.

Whereas the Obama Administration defined gain-of-function studies as research 
        that aims to increase the ability of infectious agents to cause disease 
        by enhancing its pathogenicity or by increasing its transmissibility;
Whereas the Obama Administration, on October 17, 2014, mandated a Federal 
        Government pause on new gain-of-function research, citing recent 
        concerns regarding biosafety and biosecurity;
Whereas the Obama Administration, on October 17, 2014, stated that new Federal 
        funding will not be released for gain-of-function research projects that 
        may be reasonably anticipated to confer attributes to the influenza, 
        Middle East respiratory syndrome (referred to in this preamble as 
        ``MERS''), or severe acute respiratory syndrome (referred to in this 
        preamble as ``SARS'') viruses such that such a virus would have enhanced 
        pathogenicity or transmissibility in mammals via the respiratory route;
Whereas in the lead up to the Obama Administration pausing new gain-of-function 
        research, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention noted an 
        increase in accidents involving leaks, spills, or other releases of 
        infectious material inside the laboratories receiving Federal funding;
Whereas the Cambridge Working Group, a consortium of some of the leading 
        international researchers and scientists, released a 2014 open letter 
        stating ``experiments involving the creation of potential pandemic 
        pathogens should be curtailed until there has been a quantitative, 
        objective and credible assessment of the risks, potential benefits, and 
        opportunities for risk mitigation, as well as comparison against safer 
        experimental approaches.'';
Whereas in 2014, after the Obama Administration mandated a pause on gain-of-
        function research, the National Institutes of Health (referred to in 
        this preamble as ``NIH''), led by Francis Collins, including the 
        National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (referred to in 
        this preamble as ``NIAID''), led by Anthony Fauci, continued to 
        authorize grants and research awards to organizations that study the 
        spread of viruses from animals to humans;
Whereas some such awards went to EcoHealth Alliance and its President, Peter 
        Daszak, who then disbursed research money to the Wuhan Institute of 
        Virology (referred to in this preamble as the ``WIV'') and East China 
        Normal University;
Whereas experiments advanced by EcoHealth Alliance during the pause included, 
        among other projects, combining genetic material from a ``parent'' 
        coronavirus, known as WIV1, with other viruses;
Whereas the results of such experiments demonstrated varying pathogenicity of 
        SARS-CoV-2 with different spike proteins in humanized mice;
Whereas a majority of scientists and researchers, including Dr. Lawrence Tabak 
        and Dr. Ralph Baric, an EcoHealth Alliance collaborator and top 
        coronavirus expert, when made aware of such experiment, admitted that 
        EcoHealth Alliance's coronavirus research appeared to meet the standard 
        criteria for gain-of-function research;
Whereas NIH and NIAID continued to support EcoHealth Alliance and other 
        organizations conducting gain-of-function research, according to the 
        Obama Administration's definition, through 2017, even though the pause 
        remained in effect;
Whereas on July 7, 2016, NIAID identified possible gain-of-function research 
        concerns in an experiment proposed by EcoHealth and conducted by the 
        WIV;
Whereas in May 2021, Anthony Fauci conceded that during the period between 2014 
        and 2017 that ``it is impossible to guarantee that researchers at the 
        Wuhan Institute of Virology did not use American funds to perform gain-
        of-function research on coronaviruses.'';
Whereas Anthony Fauci and NIAID did not alert senior White House officials 
        before lifting a ban on gain-of-function research in 2017;
Whereas in November 2019, 3 researchers from the WIV became sick enough to 
        receive hospital care, and according to United States officials, those 
        sick researchers were involved in coronavirus research;
Whereas the Chinese government deliberately delayed notifying the World Health 
        organization that it had detected SARS-like infections from an unknown, 
        novel pathogen well before it sent official notification in December 
        2019;
Whereas on April 24, 2020, NIH instructed EcoHealth to terminate all funding to 
        the WIV, and NIH terminated the WIV's entire sub-grant award;
Whereas in July 2020, NIH, having procedurally erred in its April 2020 
        termination of EcoHealth's grant, reinstated and then immediately 
        suspended EcoHealth's grant while requiring EcoHealth to meet certain 
        conditions, such as obtaining a sample of the SARS-CoV-2 virus that the 
        Wuhan lab used to determine its genetic sequence and arranging for an 
        independent team to examine the Wuhan lab and determine whether it had 
        possession of the SARS-CoV-2 virus prior to December 2019;
Whereas Peter Daszak reacted to those conditions by calling them 
        ``preposterous'';
Whereas based on tips from the scientific community that suspected EcoHealth's 
        science research at the WIV may have caused the COVID-19 pandemic 
        outbreak, NIH investigated EcoHealth's compliance with its grant 
        agreement terms, including the gain-of-function provisions in June 2016 
        and again from April 2020 to April 2023 and concluded that EcoHealth was 
        noncompliant;
Whereas in October 2021, NIH acknowledged to Congress that EcoHealth Alliance 
        did not have access to laboratory notebooks or other records supporting 
        its research, even though keeping such records was a requirement of the 
        NIH grant;
Whereas although EcoHealth's Year 5 Research Performance Progress Report for its 
        research activities was due to NIH in September 2019, EcoHealth did not 
        submit the report until August 3, 2021;
Whereas on October 20, 2021, it was revealed than an experiment in EcoHealth's 
        Year 5 Progress Report (for research between June 2018 and May 2019) 
        exhibited virus growth greater than one log, thus constituting gain-of-
        function research, which should have triggered immediate suspension and 
        reporting to NIAID according to contract agreements;
Whereas instead of EcoHealth taking either action, EcoHealth used language in 
        its report that obfuscated the severity and timing of the gain-of-
        function experiments, which contradicted the Obama-era pause on gain-of-
        function research and the additional terms of agreement NIH added to 
        EcoHealth's grant in June 2016;
Whereas in October 2021, NIH updated the definition of gain-of-function research 
        to focus more on enhanced pandemic potential pathogens (referred to in 
        this preamble as ``ePPP''), which meant that because the majority of 
        gain-of-function research does not include ePPPs, once considered gain-
        of-function research now fell outside the scope of the stricter 
        oversight required for ePPP studies;
Whereas NIH determined that no evidence existed to support the testimony Peter 
        Daszak gave to Congress on November 14, 2023, that EcoHealth was 
        prevented from submitting its Year 5 Research Performance Progress 
        Report to NIH due to a technical problem in NIH's system;
Whereas in April 2023, when NIH reinstated EcoHealth's suspended grant and 
        imposed new conditions, NIH stated that it was executing a corrective 
        action plan to EcoHealth that satisfied NIH's compliance efforts 
        regarding gain-of-function research;
Whereas as part of the April 2023 reinstatement, EcoHealth pledged it would not 
        perform work in, or with, Chinese-affiliated institutions;
Whereas the prime reasoning for EcoHealth's reinstatement was EcoHealth's 
        representation to NIAID that EcoHealth had access to sequences and 
        samples that were required to be supplied to the Federal Government as a 
        condition of receiving Federal grants, which still needed analysis;
Whereas EcoHealth was not forthcoming and failed to disclose to NIAID that those 
        samples were stored in China at the WIV, which was EcoHealth's 
        subcontractor that conducted the coronavirus gain-of-function research 
        that could have caused the COVID-19 pandemic;
Whereas as of new guidance issued in May 2024, the Biden Administration removed 
        avian influenza and current forms of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes 
        Covid-19, from the category of pathogens of pandemic potential, thus 
        excluding them from updated rules governing gain-of-function research;
Whereas effective May 14, 2024, the Department of Health and Human Services 
        (referred to in this preamble as ``HHS'') announced it would commence 
        official debarment proceedings against EcoHealth Alliance and implement 
        a government-wide suspension of United States taxpayer funds to include 
        a hold on all active grants;
Whereas on May 21, 2024, HHS, in an effort to protect public interest, suspended 
        and recommended debarment of Peter Daszak's individual ability to 
        receive any Federal funds;
Whereas both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Energy 
        have assessed that the COVID-19 pandemic was a result of a lab leak from 
        the WIV;
Whereas the majority members of the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus 
        Pandemic of the Committee on Oversight and Accountability of the House 
        of Representatives (referred to in this preamble as the 
        ``Subcommittee'') reported that EcoHealth's actions were often enabled 
        by NIH and NIAID and the failures of NIH and NIAID to properly oversee 
        EcoHealth's research projects;
Whereas the majority members of the Subcommittee found that EcoHealth's actions 
        were often enabled by the lack of grant management and oversight by NIH 
        and NIAID; and
Whereas the majority members of the Subcommittee believe that such NIH and NIAID 
        grant management oversight failures necessitate both Congressional and 
        Executive action to increase transparency and grantee oversight: Now, 
        therefore, be it
    Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that Congress should 
immediately consider the Viral Gain-of-Function Research Moratorium Act 
(S. 81, 118th Congress, as introduced on January 25, 2023), which 
would--
            (1) define gain-of-function research as any research that--
                    (A) could confer attributes to the influenza, 
                Middle East respiratory syndrome, or severe acute 
                respiratory syndrome viruses such that such a virus 
                would have enhanced pathogenicity or transmissibility 
                in any organism; or
                    (B) involves methods that could enhance potential 
                pandemic pathogens or related risky research with 
                potentially dangerous pathogens; and
            (2) prohibit, notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
        research grants supported by Federal funds from being awarded 
        to institutions of higher education, or other research 
        organizations, that are conducting gain-of-function research.
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