Short titles

This Act may be cited as the

Promoting Reciprocity on Chinese Students Act

or the

PRC Students Act

Findings

Congress finds the following:(1)American students in the People's Republic of China (referred in this section as the PRC) face internal travel restrictions, censorship, and a growing threat of arrest or detention via exit bans and an expanded espionage law.(2)These restrictions and other threats have caused a cooling effect on the matriculation of United States students in Chinese universities, which has been compounded by anti-western sentiment. (3)There are currently fewer than 1,000 United States students studying in China, while there are an estimated 290,000 Chinese students studying in the United States. (4)The PRC has—(A)heightened surveillance and political controls on university campuses;(B)intensified internet censorship;(C)fortified its firewall, which blocks Google, Facebook, and other United States social media platforms; and(D)subjected students to biometric scanning to enter universities.(5)Additional restrictions imposed by the PRC include—(A)state censorship on topics deemed sensitive;(B)an ongoing campaign against western values;(C)democratic backsliding;(D)strict data protection laws; and (E)restrictive access to state archives.(6)Foreign students inside the PRC are required to register with local authorities when undertaking internal travel and certain areas in China, such as Xinjiang and Tibet, cannot be accessed by foreign students without required travel permits that must be obtained through an internal government-registered operator.(7)American students are explicitly restricted from attending—(A)the 2 universities that are directly administered by the PRC’s Central Military Commission, the National Defense University and the National University of Defense Technology;(B)any of the PRC's military academies; and(C)any other institution of higher education that does not appear on the China Scholarship Council’s list of approved universities.(8)The PRC has used exit bans to stop some foreigners from leaving the country and has engaged in arbitrary detentions.(9)The Counterespionage Law of the PRC, which was passed by the National People's Congress on April 26, 2023, expands the definition of espionage from covering state secrets and intelligence to any documents, data, materials or items related to national security, without specifying the parameters for how such terms are defined. The offenses previously covered by privacy provisions under the Criminal Law of the PRC had carried a maximum penalty of 3 years imprisonment, but were not often enforced. Under the new law, such offenses can result in imprisonment for life or the death penalty.(10)Chinese students in the United States and in other western countries have been accused of espionage and intelligence collection to bolster the PRC’s military base as part of the Chinese Communist Party's Military-Civil Fusion Policy.(11)In January 2024, a Chinese student studying at the University of Minnesota crashed a drone in a tree near Langley Air Force base in Hampton, Virginia. After flying to California the following day, the student was arrested and charged with espionage. (12) In September 2024, United States prosecutors alleged that 5 Chinese University of Michigan graduates, who claimed to be stargazing, were taking photos in the middle of the night of military vehicles at Camp Grayling during a United States National Guard training exercise that included Taiwanese military personnel.(13)According to the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party of the House of Representatives, the PRC operates nearly 500 foreign talent programs whose members are contractually obligated to return to the PRC with secrets and expertise gained in foreign universities and labs in order to drive military modernization and other technological development in the PRC.(14)On October 14, 2024, the Wall Street Journal reported that, according to European security officials—(A)Chinese students and guest scientists have become a prime conduit for Chinese espionage in the West;(B)Chinese spies masquerading as researchers have recently grown better at hiding their tracks;(C)some Chinese students enroll in language or literature courses and later switch to quantum computing or other sensitive areas; and(D)the PRC’s intelligence-gathering and security operations might comprise up to 600,000 people. (15)According to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, the People's Liberation Army has sponsored more than 2,500 military scientists and engineers to study abroad during the most recent 15 years in order to acquire technology needed to modernize the PRC’s military.

Purpose

The purpose of this Act is to introduce reciprocity into the Sino-American relationship by—(1)reducing the number of Chinese students in the United States to match the number of American students in the People's Republic of China as long as PRC restrictions against United States students persist; and(2)restricting the types of postsecondary study available to Chinese nationals in the United States to include sensitive topics with potential dual-use military application.

Gradual reduction of Chinese students in the United States

Section 214(m) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1184(m)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

(3)(A)Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the Secretary of State, beginning in fiscal year 2025, in collaboration with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall annually reduce by 50,000 the number of nationals of the People's Republic of China who are authorized to reside in the United States as nonimmigrants under subparagraph (F)(i), (J)(i), or (M)(i) of section 101(a)(15) compared to the number of such aliens so authorized during the previous fiscal year, until the number of such aliens is equal to the number of United States citizens who are enrolled in a postsecondary course of study in the People's Republic of China.(B)Nationals of the People's Republic of China who are admitted to the United States as nonimmigrants under section 101(a)(15)(F)(i) may not be enrolled at a United States institution of higher education in any postsecondary program involving a sensitive topic with potential dual-use military application, including—(i)naval architecture;(ii)marine engineering;(iii)aircraft engineering;(iv)artificial intelligence; (v)quantum computing; and(vi)any other area of study determined by the Secretary of Defense to involve a sensitive topic with potential dual-use military application.(C)(i)The Secretary of State shall submit a report to Congress as soon as the Secretary determines that the Government of the People's Republic of China—(I)has lifted internal travel restrictions relating to—(aa)the requirement that United States students register with local authorities when traveling within China; and (bb)the requirement that United States students obtain internal travel permits and guided tours to visit certain provinces within China, such as Xinjiang and Tibet;(II)is granting United States students within China access to the internet and Chinese research databases that is commensurate with the access available to the internet and United States research databases by Chinese students in the United States;(III)has discontinued threats of exit bans and the arbitrary detention of United States students; and(IV)is granting United States students access to all Chinese universities and institutions of higher education.(ii)Beginning on the first day of the first fiscal year beginning after the date on which the report required under clause (i) is submitted to Congress, the restriction on the admittance of Chinese students described in subparagraph (A) shall cease to have any force or effect.