Short titles

This Act may be cited as the

Building Options for the Lasting Security of Taiwan through European Resolve Act

or the

BOLSTER Act

Findings

Congress finds the following:(1)In an October 2022 speech before the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, General Secretary Xi Jinping declared that the People's Republic of China (referred to in this Act as the PRC) has not ruled out the use of force regarding Taiwan.(2)The Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, published on February 6, 2023, noted that Beijing is working to meet its goal of fielding a military by 2027 designed to deter U.S. intervention in a future cross-Strait crisis..(3)The risk of economic disruption following a conflict in the Taiwan Strait could amount to approximately $2,000,000,000,000 in a blockade scenario, which would immediately, and potentially irreversibly impact global trade and investment, key supply chains for semiconductors, and other trade and national security priorities.(4)The European Union's foreign and security policy service, the European External Action Service, recognizes that the European Union may use sanctions to promote the objectives of its Common Foreign and Security Policy, all of which have potential relevance in the event of military action or coercion against Taiwan.(5)The European Union has imposed sanctions on—(A)PRC officials and entities responsible for human rights abuses in Xinjiang; and(B)PRC entities for their support of Russia’s illegal and unprovoked war in Ukraine.(6)In July 2022, Jorge Toledo Albinana, Ambassador of the European Union to the People’s Republic of China, said, In the event of a military invasion [of Taiwan], we have made it very clear that the European Union, with the United States and its allies, will impose similar or even greater measures than those we have now taken against Russia..(7)On January 18, 2023, the European Parliament passed a resolution calling upon all competent European Union institutions to urgently draw up a scenario-based strategy for tackling security challenges in Taiwan.. (8)In an April 18, 2023, speech to the European Parliament, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen emphasized that the European Union stand[s] strongly against any unilateral change of the status quo [in the Taiwan Strait], in particular by the use of force..(9)The PRC has supported Russia’s illegal, full-scale invasion of Ukraine by resupplying Russia’s defense industrial base.(10)Taiwan has—(A)aligned itself with European Union sanctions against Russia in response to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine; and(B)provided Ukraine more than $113,000,000 in financial support and more than 950 metric tons of humanitarian supplies.

Consultations, plans, reports, and briefings

(a)

Consultations with European governments regarding sanctions against the PRC under certain circumstances

(1)

In general

The head of the Office of Sanctions Coordination at the Department of State, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control at the Department of the Treasury, shall engage in regular consultations with the International Special Envoy for the Implementation of European Union Sanctions and appropriate government officials of European countries, including the United Kingdom, to develop coordinated plans and share information on independent plans to impose sanctions and other economic measures against the PRC, as appropriate, if the PRC is found to be involved in—(A)overthrowing or dismantling the governing institutions in Taiwan, including engaging in disinformation campaigns in Taiwan that promote the strategic interests of the PRC;(B)occupying any territory controlled or administered by Taiwan as of the date of the enactment of this Act;(C)violating the territorial integrity of Taiwan;(D)taking significant action against Taiwan, including—(i)creating a naval blockade or other quarantine of Taiwan;(ii)seizing the outer lying islands of Taiwan; or(iii)initiating a cyberattack that threatens civilian or military infrastructure in Taiwan; or (E)providing assistance that helps the security forces of the Russian Federation in executing Russia's unprovoked, illegal war against Ukraine.(2)

Semiannual congressional briefings

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and semiannually thereafter for the following 5 years, the head of the Office of Sanctions Coordination shall provide a briefing regarding the progress of the consultations required under paragraph (1) to—(A)the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;(B)the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate;(C)the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and (D)the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.(b)

Coordination of humanitarian support in a Taiwan contingency

(1)

Plan

Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (referred to in this section as the Administrator), in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall develop a plan to deliver humanitarian aid to Taiwan in the event of a blockade, quarantine, or military invasion of Taiwan by the People's Liberation Army (referred to in this Act as the PLA).(2)

Consultation requirement

In developing the plan required under paragraph (1), the Administrator shall consult with the European Commission’s Emergency Response Coordination Centre and appropriate government officials of European countries regarding cooperation to provide aid to Indo-Pacific countries as the result of a blockade, quarantine, or military invasion of Taiwan by the PLA, including the extent to which European countries could backfill United States humanitarian aid to other parts of the world. (3)

Congressional engagement

Upon completion of the plan required under paragraph (1), the Administrator shall provide a briefing regarding the details of such plan and the consultations required under paragraph (2) to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. (c)

Report on the economic impacts of PRC military action against Taiwan

(1)

In general

Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that contains an independent assessment of the expected economic impact of—(A)a 30-day blockade or quarantine of Taiwan by the PLA; and(B)a 180-day blockade or quarantine of Taiwan by the PLA.(2)

Assessment elements

The assessment required under paragraph (1) shall contain a description of—(A)the impact of the blockade or quarantine of Taiwan on global trade and output;(B)the 10 economic sectors that would be most disrupted by a sustained blockade of Taiwan by the PLA; and(C)the expected economic impact of a sustained blockade of Taiwan by the PLA on the domestic economies of European countries that are members of NATO or the European Union.(3)

Independent assessment

(A)

In general

The assessment required under paragraph (1) shall be conducted by a federally-funded research and development center or another appropriate independent entity with expertise in economic analysis.(B)

Use of data from previous studies

The entity conducting the assessment required under paragraph (1) may use and incorporate information contained in previous studies on matters relevant to the elements of the assessment.

Consultations with the European Union and European governments regarding increasing political and economic relations with Taiwan

(a)

Findings

Congress finds the following:(1)Representative offices in Taiwan have been established by—(A)16 of the 27 European Union member states;(B)the European Union;(C)the United Kingdom; and (D)Switzerland.(2)Taiwan has representative offices in—(A)19 of the 27 European Union countries;(B)the United Kingdom; and(C)Switzerland.(3)The PRC has used its economic power to pressure Taiwan’s diplomatic allies to cut ties and switch diplomatic recognition to the PRC, which has reduced Taiwan’s diplomatic allies to just 12, including The Holy See.(4)On November 18, 2021, Taiwan formally opened the Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania, which is the first such office in Europe that uses Taiwan in its title rather than the PRC-preferred title, Taipei, despite actions of economic coercion imposed on Lithuania by the PRC. (5)Since 2020, legislative bodies in Poland, Lithuania, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Italy, Switzerland, Ireland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden, Denmark, and Slovakia have passed legislation or resolutions that call for— (A)deepening ties and exchanges with Taiwan;(B)supporting Taiwan’s participation in international organizations; or (C)maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.(6)Since 2020, parliamentary delegations from Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Spain, France, Finland, Romania, Portugal, Belgium, Sweden, Ireland, Italy, Estonia, Latvia, and the European Union have visited Taiwan.(7)In May 2023, representatives from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Czech Republic joined the United States, Australia, and Japan in a joint statement calling for Taiwan’s inclusion in the 76th World Health Assembly.(8)The November 2023 Group of 7 Japan 2023 Foreign Ministers’ Statement expressed support for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations, including in the World Health Assembly and WHO technical meetings..(9)As of 2022, Taiwan was the European Union’s 13th largest trading partner overall and its 5th largest Asian trading partner.(10)Taiwan is a leading investor in the Czech Republic, which currently hosts more than $1,000,000,000 in foreign direct investment from Taiwan, resulting in thousands of jobs for Czech citizens.(11)From 2021 to 2022, trade between Lithuania and Taiwan increased by 50 percent. Taiwan has invested in Lithuania's emerging chip sector, laser companies, and other high-tech industries.(12)In June 2022, the European Commission, for the first time, upgraded its trade and investment dialogues with Taiwan, which had been ongoing at the technical level for more than 20 years, to the ministerial and director-general level for the first time in recognition of the benefit from higher-level coordination.(13)In August 2023, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited announced partnerships with various European technology firms and investments of $3,500,000,000 to build its first semiconductor plant in Europe in Germany.(14)On November 8, 2023, the Government of the United Kingdom signed an Enhanced Trade Partnership agreement with Taiwan. This is the first such agreement between Taiwan and a European country.(15)On December 13, 2023 the European Parliament passed a resolution that—(A)urges the European Union to pursue a resilient supply chain agreement with Taiwan; and (B)calls for a bilateral investment agreement between Taiwan and the European Union to enhance a 2-way partnership in digital trade and cyber resilience.(b)

Sense of Congress

It is the sense of Congress that—(1)the United States, Europe, and Taiwan are like-minded partners that—(A)share common values, such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights; and (B)enjoy a close trade and economic partnership;(2)bolstering political, economic, and people-to-people relations with Taiwan would benefit the European Union, individual European countries, and the United States;(3)the European Union can play an important role in helping Taiwan resist the economic coercion of the PRC by negotiating with Taiwan regarding new economic, commercial, and investment agreements;(4)the United States and European countries should coordinate and increase diplomatic efforts to facilitate Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations;(5)the United States and European countries should—(A)publicly and repeatedly emphasize the differences between their respective One China policies and the PRC's One China principle; and(B)counter the PRC’s propaganda and false narratives about United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI), which claim the resolution recognizes PRC territorial claims to Taiwan; and (6)Taiwan’s inclusion in the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council’s Secure Supply Chain working group would bring valuable expertise and enhance transatlantic cooperation in the semiconductor sector.(c)

Congressional briefing

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and semiannually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State shall provide a briefing to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives regarding the Department of State’s engagements with the European Union and the governments of European countries to increase political and economic relations with Taiwan, including—(1)public statements of support for Taiwan’s democracy and its meaningful participation in international organizations;(2)unofficial diplomatic visits to and from Taiwan by high-ranking government officials and parliamentarians;(3)the establishment of parliamentary caucuses or groups that promote strong relations with Taiwan;(4)strengthening subnational diplomacy, including diplomatic and trade-related visits to and from Taiwan by local government officials;(5)strengthening coordination between United States and European business chambers, universities, think tanks, and other civil society groups with similar groups in Taiwan;(6)establishing new representative, economic, or cultural offices in a European country or in Taiwan;(7)promoting direct flights to and from Taiwan;(8)facilitating visits by religious leaders to Taiwan; and(9)increasing economic engagement and trade relations.

Consultations with European governments on supporting Taiwan’s self-defense

(a)

Findings

Congress finds the following:(1)In September 2021, the European Commission released the European Union Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, which acknowledges that increased tensions between the PRC and Taiwan could impact European security and economic prosperity.(2)In 2019, 2021, and 2023, the French Navy sent warships to transit the Taiwan Strait and in 2021, the British Navy frigate HMS Richmond transited the Taiwan Strait.(3)In November 2021, the German Navy committed to sending vessels to the Indo-Pacific every 2 years to expand cooperation with like-minded states advocating for freedom of navigation and a rules-based international order.(4)European deterrence efforts in the Taiwan Strait support the United States’ strategic interests, as the United States also sends warships through the Taiwan Strait to promote deterrence and respond to aggressive behavior by the PRC towards Taiwan. (5)In April 2023, European Commission Vice-President Josep Borrell Fontelles called on European navies to patrol the Taiwan Strait to show Europe’s commitment to freedom of navigation.(6)In August 2023, French President Emmanuel Macron signed into law legislation emphasizing that France would defend freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific region, including the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.(7)European countries, including France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and Lithuania, have developed Indo-Pacific strategies.(8)At the 2022 Madrid Summit, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization unveiled a new Strategic Concept, stating that allies will work together to address the systemic challenges posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security and underscored the importance of the Indo-Pacific for NATO, given that developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security..(9)In September 2022, the North Atlantic Council held its first dedicated discussion about the status of Taiwan, its democratic government, and its critical role in the manufacturing of microchips globally.(10)In 2022, the United Kingdom approved a substantial increase in exports of submarine components and technology to Taiwan to upgrade its naval forces.(11)In 2024, Taiwan’s defense ministry signed an agreement with France’s DCI Group for the supply of parts and accessories to maintain its Lafayette-class frigates. (b)

Sense of Congress

It is the sense of Congress that—(1)preserving peace and security in the Taiwan Strait is a shared interest of the United States and Europe;(2)European countries, particularly countries with experience combating Russian aggression and malign activities, can provide Taiwan with lessons learned from their total defense programs to mobilize the military and civilians in a time of crisis;(3)the United States and Europe should increase coordination to strengthen Taiwan’s cybersecurity, especially for critical infrastructure and network defense operations;(4)the United States and Europe should work with Taiwan—(A)to improve its energy resiliency;(B)to strengthen its food security;(C)to combat misinformation, disinformation, digital authoritarianism, and foreign interference; and(D)to provide expertise on how to improve defense infrastructure;(5)European naval powers, in coordination with the United States, should increase freedom of navigation transits through the Taiwan Strait; and(6)European naval powers, the United States, and Taiwan should establish exchanges and partnerships among their coast guards to counter coercion by the PRC.(c)

Congressional briefings

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and semiannually thereafter for the following 5 years the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall provide a briefing to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives regarding discussions with governments of European NATO countries about contributions to Taiwan’s self-defense through—(1)public statements of support for Taiwan’s security;(2)arms transfers or arms sales, particularly of weapons consistent with an asymmetric defense strategy;(3)transfers or sales of dual-use items and technology;(4)transfers or sales of critical nonmilitary supplies, such as food and medicine;(5)increasing the military presence of such countries in the Indo-Pacific region;(6)joint training and military exercises;(7)enhancing Taiwan’s critical infrastructure resiliency, including communication and digital infrastructure;(8)coordination to counter disinformation; (9)coordination to counter offensive cyber operations; and(10)any other matter deemed important by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.

Expedited licensing for European countries transferring military equipment to Taiwan

(a)

In general

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall establish an expedited decision-making process for blanket third party transfers of defense articles and services from NATO countries to Taiwan, including transfers and re-transfers of United States origin grant, Foreign Military Sales, and Direct Commercial Sales end-items not covered by an exemption under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations under subchapter M of chapter I of title 22, Code of Federal Regulations. (b)

Availability

The expedited decision-making process described in subsection (a)—(1)shall be available for classified and unclassified items; and(2)shall, to the extent practicable—(A)require the approval, return, or denial of any licensing application to export defense articles and services that is related to a government-to-government agreement within 15 days after the submission of such application; and(B)require the completion of the review of all other licensing requests not later than 30 days after the submission of such application.