[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4433 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>






118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 4433

To enhance United States cooperation with European countries to improve 
            the security of Taiwan, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 23, 2024

 Mr. Ricketts (for himself and Mrs. Shaheen) introduced the following 
  bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign 
                               Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
To enhance United States cooperation with European countries to improve 
            the security of Taiwan, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLES.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Building Options for the Lasting 
Security of Taiwan through European Resolve Act'' or the ``BOLSTER 
Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) In an October 2022 speech before the 20th National 
        Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, General Secretary Xi 
        Jinping declared that the People's Republic of China (referred 
        to in this Act as the ``PRC'') has not ruled out the use of 
        force regarding Taiwan.
            (2) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence's 
        Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 
        published on February 6, 2023, noted that ``Beijing is working 
        to meet its goal of fielding a military by 2027 designed to 
        deter U.S. intervention in a future cross-Strait crisis.''.
            (3) The risk of economic disruption following a conflict in 
        the Taiwan Strait could amount to approximately 
        $2,000,000,000,000 in a blockade scenario, which would 
        immediately, and potentially irreversibly impact global trade 
        and investment, key supply chains for semiconductors, and other 
        trade and national security priorities.
            (4) The European Union's foreign and security policy 
        service, the European External Action Service, recognizes that 
        the European Union may use sanctions to promote the objectives 
        of its Common Foreign and Security Policy, all of which have 
        potential relevance in the event of military action or coercion 
        against Taiwan.
            (5) The European Union has imposed sanctions on--
                    (A) PRC officials and entities responsible for 
                human rights abuses in Xinjiang; and
                    (B) PRC entities for their support of Russia's 
                illegal and unprovoked war in Ukraine.
            (6) In July 2022, Jorge Toledo Albinana, Ambassador of the 
        European Union to the People's Republic of China, said, ``In 
        the event of a military invasion [of Taiwan], we have made it 
        very clear that the European Union, with the United States and 
        its allies, will impose similar or even greater measures than 
        those we have now taken against Russia.''.
            (7) On January 18, 2023, the European Parliament passed a 
        resolution calling upon ``all competent European Union 
        institutions to urgently draw up a scenario-based strategy for 
        tackling security challenges in Taiwan.''.
            (8) In an April 18, 2023, speech to the European 
        Parliament, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen 
        emphasized that the European Union ``stand[s] strongly against 
        any unilateral change of the status quo [in the Taiwan Strait], 
        in particular by the use of force.''.
            (9) The PRC has supported Russia's illegal, full-scale 
        invasion of Ukraine by resupplying Russia's defense industrial 
        base.
            (10) Taiwan has--
                    (A) aligned itself with European Union sanctions 
                against Russia in response to the full-scale invasion 
                of Ukraine; and
                    (B) provided Ukraine more than $113,000,000 in 
                financial support and more than 950 metric tons of 
                humanitarian supplies.

SEC. 3. CONSULTATIONS, PLANS, REPORTS, AND BRIEFINGS.

    (a) Consultations With European Governments Regarding Sanctions 
Against the PRC Under Certain Circumstances.--
            (1) In general.--The head of the Office of Sanctions 
        Coordination at the Department of State, in consultation with 
        the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control at the 
        Department of the Treasury, shall engage in regular 
        consultations with the International Special Envoy for the 
        Implementation of European Union Sanctions and appropriate 
        government officials of European countries, including the 
        United Kingdom, to develop coordinated plans and share 
        information on independent plans to impose sanctions and other 
        economic measures against the PRC, as appropriate, if the PRC 
        is found to be involved in--
                    (A) overthrowing or dismantling the governing 
                institutions in Taiwan, including engaging in 
                disinformation campaigns in Taiwan that promote the 
                strategic interests of the PRC;
                    (B) occupying any territory controlled or 
                administered by Taiwan as of the date of the enactment 
                of this Act;
                    (C) violating the territorial integrity of Taiwan;
                    (D) taking significant action against Taiwan, 
                including--
                            (i) creating a naval blockade or other 
                        quarantine of Taiwan;
                            (ii) seizing the outer lying islands of 
                        Taiwan; or
                            (iii) initiating a cyberattack that 
                        threatens civilian or military infrastructure 
                        in Taiwan; or
                    (E) providing assistance that helps the security 
                forces of the Russian Federation in executing Russia's 
                unprovoked, illegal war against Ukraine.
            (2) Semiannual congressional briefings.--Not later than 180 
        days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 
        semiannually thereafter for the following 5 years, the head of 
        the Office of Sanctions Coordination shall provide a briefing 
        regarding the progress of the consultations required under 
        paragraph (1) to--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate;
                    (B) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
                Affairs of the Senate;
                    (C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives; and
                    (D) the Committee on Financial Services of the 
                House of Representatives.
    (b) Coordination of Humanitarian Support in a Taiwan Contingency.--
            (1) Plan.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the United States 
        Agency for International Development (referred to in this 
        section as the ``Administrator''), in coordination with the 
        Secretary of State, shall develop a plan to deliver 
        humanitarian aid to Taiwan in the event of a blockade, 
        quarantine, or military invasion of Taiwan by the People's 
        Liberation Army (referred to in this Act as the ``PLA'').
            (2) Consultation requirement.--In developing the plan 
        required under paragraph (1), the Administrator shall consult 
        with the European Commission's Emergency Response Coordination 
        Centre and appropriate government officials of European 
        countries regarding cooperation to provide aid to Indo-Pacific 
        countries as the result of a blockade, quarantine, or military 
        invasion of Taiwan by the PLA, including the extent to which 
        European countries could backfill United States humanitarian 
        aid to other parts of the world.
            (3) Congressional engagement.--Upon completion of the plan 
        required under paragraph (1), the Administrator shall provide a 
        briefing regarding the details of such plan and the 
        consultations required under paragraph (2) to the Committee on 
        Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign 
        Affairs of the House of Representatives.
    (c) Report on the Economic Impacts of PRC Military Action Against 
Taiwan.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a report 
        to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
        Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives 
        that contains an independent assessment of the expected 
        economic impact of--
                    (A) a 30-day blockade or quarantine of Taiwan by 
                the PLA; and
                    (B) a 180-day blockade or quarantine of Taiwan by 
                the PLA.
            (2) Assessment elements.--The assessment required under 
        paragraph (1) shall contain a description of--
                    (A) the impact of the blockade or quarantine of 
                Taiwan on global trade and output;
                    (B) the 10 economic sectors that would be most 
                disrupted by a sustained blockade of Taiwan by the PLA; 
                and
                    (C) the expected economic impact of a sustained 
                blockade of Taiwan by the PLA on the domestic economies 
                of European countries that are members of NATO or the 
                European Union.
            (3) Independent assessment.--
                    (A) In general.--The assessment required under 
                paragraph (1) shall be conducted by a federally-funded 
                research and development center or another appropriate 
                independent entity with expertise in economic analysis.
                    (B) Use of data from previous studies.--The entity 
                conducting the assessment required under paragraph (1) 
                may use and incorporate information contained in 
                previous studies on matters relevant to the elements of 
                the assessment.

SEC. 4. CONSULTATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION AND EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS 
              REGARDING INCREASING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
              WITH TAIWAN.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) Representative offices in Taiwan have been established 
        by--
                    (A) 16 of the 27 European Union member states;
                    (B) the European Union;
                    (C) the United Kingdom; and
                    (D) Switzerland.
            (2) Taiwan has representative offices in--
                    (A) 19 of the 27 European Union countries;
                    (B) the United Kingdom; and
                    (C) Switzerland.
            (3) The PRC has used its economic power to pressure 
        Taiwan's diplomatic allies to cut ties and switch diplomatic 
        recognition to the PRC, which has reduced Taiwan's diplomatic 
        allies to just 12, including The Holy See.
            (4) On November 18, 2021, Taiwan formally opened the 
        Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania, which is the 
        first such office in Europe that uses Taiwan in its title 
        rather than the PRC-preferred title, ``Taipei'', despite 
        actions of economic coercion imposed on Lithuania by the PRC.
            (5) Since 2020, legislative bodies in Poland, Lithuania, 
        France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Italy, 
        Switzerland, Ireland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden, Denmark, and 
        Slovakia have passed legislation or resolutions that call for--
                    (A) deepening ties and exchanges with Taiwan;
                    (B) supporting Taiwan's participation in 
                international organizations; or
                    (C) maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan 
                Strait.
            (6) Since 2020, parliamentary delegations from Slovakia, 
        the Czech Republic, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Spain, France, 
        Finland, Romania, Portugal, Belgium, Sweden, Ireland, Italy, 
        Estonia, Latvia, and the European Union have visited Taiwan.
            (7) In May 2023, representatives from the United Kingdom, 
        France, Germany, and the Czech Republic joined the United 
        States, Australia, and Japan in a joint statement calling for 
        Taiwan's inclusion in the 76th World Health Assembly.
            (8) The November 2023 Group of 7 Japan 2023 Foreign 
        Ministers' Statement expressed ``support for Taiwan's 
        meaningful participation in international organizations, 
        including in the World Health Assembly and WHO technical 
        meetings.''.
            (9) As of 2022, Taiwan was the European Union's 13th 
        largest trading partner overall and its 5th largest Asian 
        trading partner.
            (10) Taiwan is a leading investor in the Czech Republic, 
        which currently hosts more than $1,000,000,000 in foreign 
        direct investment from Taiwan, resulting in thousands of jobs 
        for Czech citizens.
            (11) From 2021 to 2022, trade between Lithuania and Taiwan 
        increased by 50 percent. Taiwan has invested in Lithuania's 
        emerging chip sector, laser companies, and other high-tech 
        industries.
            (12) In June 2022, the European Commission, for the first 
        time, upgraded its trade and investment dialogues with Taiwan, 
        which had been ongoing at the technical level for more than 20 
        years, to the ministerial and director-general level for the 
        first time in recognition of the benefit from higher-level 
        coordination.
            (13) In August 2023, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing 
        Company Limited announced partnerships with various European 
        technology firms and investments of $3,500,000,000 to build its 
        first semiconductor plant in Europe in Germany.
            (14) On November 8, 2023, the Government of the United 
        Kingdom signed an Enhanced Trade Partnership agreement with 
        Taiwan. This is the first such agreement between Taiwan and a 
        European country.
            (15) On December 13, 2023 the European Parliament passed a 
        resolution that--
                    (A) urges the European Union to pursue a resilient 
                supply chain agreement with Taiwan; and
                    (B) calls for a bilateral investment agreement 
                between Taiwan and the European Union to enhance a 2-
                way partnership in digital trade and cyber resilience.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States, Europe, and Taiwan are like-minded 
        partners that--
                    (A) share common values, such as democracy, the 
                rule of law and human rights; and
                    (B) enjoy a close trade and economic partnership;
            (2) bolstering political, economic, and people-to-people 
        relations with Taiwan would benefit the European Union, 
        individual European countries, and the United States;
            (3) the European Union can play an important role in 
        helping Taiwan resist the economic coercion of the PRC by 
        negotiating with Taiwan regarding new economic, commercial, and 
        investment agreements;
            (4) the United States and European countries should 
        coordinate and increase diplomatic efforts to facilitate 
        Taiwan's meaningful participation in international 
        organizations;
            (5) the United States and European countries should--
                    (A) publicly and repeatedly emphasize the 
                differences between their respective ``One China'' 
                policies and the PRC's ``One China'' principle; and
                    (B) counter the PRC's propaganda and false 
                narratives about United Nations General Assembly 
                Resolution 2758 (XXVI), which claim the resolution 
                recognizes PRC territorial claims to Taiwan; and
            (6) Taiwan's inclusion in the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology 
        Council's Secure Supply Chain working group would bring 
        valuable expertise and enhance transatlantic cooperation in the 
        semiconductor sector.
    (c) Congressional Briefing.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, and semiannually thereafter for the 
following 5 years, the Secretary of State shall provide a briefing to 
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives regarding the 
Department of State's engagements with the European Union and the 
governments of European countries to increase political and economic 
relations with Taiwan, including--
            (1) public statements of support for Taiwan's democracy and 
        its meaningful participation in international organizations;
            (2) unofficial diplomatic visits to and from Taiwan by 
        high-ranking government officials and parliamentarians;
            (3) the establishment of parliamentary caucuses or groups 
        that promote strong relations with Taiwan;
            (4) strengthening subnational diplomacy, including 
        diplomatic and trade-related visits to and from Taiwan by local 
        government officials;
            (5) strengthening coordination between United States and 
        European business chambers, universities, think tanks, and 
        other civil society groups with similar groups in Taiwan;
            (6) establishing new representative, economic, or cultural 
        offices in a European country or in Taiwan;
            (7) promoting direct flights to and from Taiwan;
            (8) facilitating visits by religious leaders to Taiwan; and
            (9) increasing economic engagement and trade relations.

SEC. 5. CONSULTATIONS WITH EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS ON SUPPORTING TAIWAN'S 
              SELF-DEFENSE.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) In September 2021, the European Commission released the 
        European Union Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, 
        which acknowledges that increased tensions between the PRC and 
        Taiwan could impact European security and economic prosperity.
            (2) In 2019, 2021, and 2023, the French Navy sent warships 
        to transit the Taiwan Strait and in 2021, the British Navy 
        frigate HMS Richmond transited the Taiwan Strait.
            (3) In November 2021, the German Navy committed to sending 
        vessels to the Indo-Pacific every 2 years to expand cooperation 
        with like-minded states advocating for freedom of navigation 
        and a rules-based international order.
            (4) European deterrence efforts in the Taiwan Strait 
        support the United States' strategic interests, as the United 
        States also sends warships through the Taiwan Strait to promote 
        deterrence and respond to aggressive behavior by the PRC 
        towards Taiwan.
            (5) In April 2023, European Commission Vice-President Josep 
        Borrell Fontelles called on European navies to patrol the 
        Taiwan Strait to show Europe's commitment to freedom of 
        navigation.
            (6) In August 2023, French President Emmanuel Macron signed 
        into law legislation emphasizing that France would defend 
        freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific region, including the 
        South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.
            (7) European countries, including France, Germany, the 
        United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and 
        Lithuania, have developed Indo-Pacific strategies.
            (8) At the 2022 Madrid Summit, the North Atlantic Treaty 
        Organization unveiled a new Strategic Concept, stating that 
        allies will work together ``to address the systemic challenges 
        posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security'' and underscored 
        the importance of the Indo-Pacific for NATO, ``given that 
        developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic 
        security.''.
            (9) In September 2022, the North Atlantic Council held its 
        first dedicated discussion about the status of Taiwan, its 
        democratic government, and its critical role in the 
        manufacturing of microchips globally.
            (10) In 2022, the United Kingdom approved a substantial 
        increase in exports of submarine components and technology to 
        Taiwan to upgrade its naval forces.
            (11) In 2024, Taiwan's defense ministry signed an agreement 
        with France's DCI Group for the supply of parts and accessories 
        to maintain its Lafayette-class frigates.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) preserving peace and security in the Taiwan Strait is a 
        shared interest of the United States and Europe;
            (2) European countries, particularly countries with 
        experience combating Russian aggression and malign activities, 
        can provide Taiwan with lessons learned from their ``total 
        defense'' programs to mobilize the military and civilians in a 
        time of crisis;
            (3) the United States and Europe should increase 
        coordination to strengthen Taiwan's cybersecurity, especially 
        for critical infrastructure and network defense operations;
            (4) the United States and Europe should work with Taiwan--
                    (A) to improve its energy resiliency;
                    (B) to strengthen its food security;
                    (C) to combat misinformation, disinformation, 
                digital authoritarianism, and foreign interference; and
                    (D) to provide expertise on how to improve defense 
                infrastructure;
            (5) European naval powers, in coordination with the United 
        States, should increase freedom of navigation transits through 
        the Taiwan Strait; and
            (6) European naval powers, the United States, and Taiwan 
        should establish exchanges and partnerships among their coast 
        guards to counter coercion by the PRC.
    (c) Congressional Briefings.--Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, and semiannually thereafter for the 
following 5 years the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Defense, shall provide a briefing to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Armed Services of the 
Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
Representatives regarding discussions with governments of European NATO 
countries about contributions to Taiwan's self-defense through--
            (1) public statements of support for Taiwan's security;
            (2) arms transfers or arms sales, particularly of weapons 
        consistent with an asymmetric defense strategy;
            (3) transfers or sales of dual-use items and technology;
            (4) transfers or sales of critical nonmilitary supplies, 
        such as food and medicine;
            (5) increasing the military presence of such countries in 
        the Indo-Pacific region;
            (6) joint training and military exercises;
            (7) enhancing Taiwan's critical infrastructure resiliency, 
        including communication and digital infrastructure;
            (8) coordination to counter disinformation;
            (9) coordination to counter offensive cyber operations; and
            (10) any other matter deemed important by the Secretary of 
        State and the Secretary of Defense.

SEC. 6. EXPEDITED LICENSING FOR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TRANSFERRING 
              MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO TAIWAN.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall establish an 
expedited decision-making process for blanket third party transfers of 
defense articles and services from NATO countries to Taiwan, including 
transfers and re-transfers of United States origin grant, Foreign 
Military Sales, and Direct Commercial Sales end-items not covered by an 
exemption under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations under 
subchapter M of chapter I of title 22, Code of Federal Regulations.
    (b) Availability.--The expedited decision-making process described 
in subsection (a)--
            (1) shall be available for classified and unclassified 
        items; and
            (2) shall, to the extent practicable--
                    (A) require the approval, return, or denial of any 
                licensing application to export defense articles and 
                services that is related to a government-to-government 
                agreement within 15 days after the submission of such 
                application; and
                    (B) require the completion of the review of all 
                other licensing requests not later than 30 days after 
                the submission of such application.
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