[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3854 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
118th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 3854
To combat transnational repression abroad, to strengthen tools to
combat authoritarianism, corruption, and kleptocracy, to invest in
democracy research and development, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
February 29, 2024
Mr. Cardin (for himself and Mr. Wicker) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To combat transnational repression abroad, to strengthen tools to
combat authoritarianism, corruption, and kleptocracy, to invest in
democracy research and development, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``International
Freedom Protection Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Definitions.
Sec. 4. Combating transnational repression abroad.
Sec. 5. Strengthening tools to combat authoritarianism.
Sec. 6. Combating corruption and kleptocracy.
Sec. 7. Investing in democracy research and development.
Sec. 8. Addressing authoritarians in the multilateral system.
Sec. 9. Confronting digital authoritarianism.
Sec. 10. Protecting political prisoners.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) According to Freedom House's 2023 report, ``Freedom in
the World'', democracy experienced a worldwide decline for 17
consecutive years and has been weakened by factors, such as
attacks on democratic institutions, impunity, corruption,
disinformation, human rights violations, and conflict.
(2) Since 2006, autocratic forces and illiberal forces have
been on the rise, with emboldened autocrats from China, Russia,
and Iran--
(A) refining their tactics to undermine democracy
globally;
(B) suppressing dissent to sustain their own
regimes; and
(C) frequently collaborating with each another in
such efforts.
(3) The rise of authoritarianism--
(A) undermines the national security of the United
States and the security of our democratic allies and
partners;
(B) creates instability;
(C) weakens the rule of law; and
(D) increases the risk of war.
(4) Democracies are ill-prepared to fight back against the
growing complexity and emerging challenges posed by autocratic
and illiberal forces.
(5) There is an urgent need to update the United States
Government's approach to countering authoritarianism by
strengthening and revitalizing the relevant tools, strategies,
and institutions.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate;
(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Relevant federal agencies.--The term ``relevant Federal
agencies'' means--
(A) the Department of State;
(B) the United States Agency for International
Development; and
(C) other Federal agencies that are relevant for
purposes of this Act.
(3) Transnational repression.--The term ``transnational
repression''--
(A) means acts by governments (either directly or
through others) to silence, intimidate, or exact
reprisal against individuals outside their sovereign
borders, including members of diaspora populations,
political opponents, civil society activists, human
rights defenders, journalists, and members of ethnic or
religious minority groups; and
(B) may include--
(i) extrajudicial killings;
(ii) physical assaults and intimidation;
(iii) arbitrary detentions;
(iv) renditions;
(v) deportations;
(vi) unexplained or enforced
disappearances;
(vii) physical or online surveillance or
stalking;
(viii) unwarranted passport cancellation or
control over other identification documents;
(ix) abuse of international law enforcement
systems;
(x) unlawful asset freezes;
(xi) digital threats, such as cyberattacks,
targeted surveillance and spyware, online
harassment, and intimidation; and
(xii) coercion by proxy, such as harassment
of, or threats or harm to, family and
associates of private individuals who remain in
their country of origin.
SEC. 4. COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION ABROAD.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Amidst a backdrop of global democratic decline,
authoritarian governments are increasingly collaborating and
employing aggressive tactics across borders to silence, coerce,
harass, or harm individuals for peacefully exercising their
rights and fundamental freedoms.
(2) Governments commit transnational repression through
physical and digital means. The advancement of digital
technology provides new tools for censoring, surveilling,
harassing, and targeting individuals deemed to be threats
across international borders. This is particularly significant
for dissidents and journalists forced abroad who rely on
communications technology to amplify their messages and
communicate with their professional and personal support
networks.
(3) Since 2014, Freedom House has documented 854 direct
physical incidents of transnational repression committed by 38
governments in 91 countries. Nonphysical acts of transnational
repression are occurring even more frequently. The combined
effect of these direct threats produces a chilling effect that
compels countless more people to modify their behavior due to
fear of transnational repression.
(4) In 2023, the countries whose governments are committing
the highest number of direct physical acts of transnational
repression are China, Turkey, Tajikistan, Russia, and Egypt.
(5) Transnational repression is used by governments to
target perceived critics, who may include human rights
defenders, democracy activists, political opponents, members of
diaspora groups, and the family members of such individuals.
(b) Statement of Policy on Transnational Repression.--It is the
policy of the United States--
(1) to regard transnational repression as a direct threat
to the United States national interests of upholding and
promoting democratic values and human rights;
(2) to address transnational repression, including by
protecting targeted individuals and groups;
(3) to strengthen the actions of United States embassy and
mission staff in countering transnational repression, including
by--
(A) monitoring and documenting instances of
transnational repression;
(B) conducting regular outreach with at-risk or
affected populations to provide information regarding
available resources without putting such people at
further risk; and
(C) working with local and national law
enforcement, as appropriate, to support victims of
transnational repression;
(4) to develop policy and programmatic responses based on
input from--
(A) vulnerable populations who are at risk of, or
are experiencing, transnational repression;
(B) nongovernmental organizations working on issues
of transnational repression; and
(C) the private sector;
(5) to provide training to relevant Federal personnel--
(A) to enhance their understanding of transnational
repression; and
(B) to identify and combat threats of transnational
repression;
(6) to strengthen documentation and monitoring by the
United States Government of transnational repression in foreign
countries and within international organizations; and
(7) to seek to hold perpetrators of transnational
repression accountable, including through the use of targeted
sanctions and visa restrictions.
(c) Report on Transnational Repression.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 2 years thereafter, the
Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other
relevant Federal agencies, shall submit a report to the
appropriate congressional committees that assesses the efforts
of the United States Government to implement the policy
objectives described in subsection (b).
(2) Elements.--The report required under paragraph (1)
shall include--
(A) a detailed description and assessment of United
States Government efforts to monitor, prevent, and
respond to transnational repression abroad;
(B) a detailed accounting, disaggregated by
country, of the most common tactics of transnational
repression;
(C) instances of transnational repression occurring
within international organizations;
(D) a list of countries perpetrating acts of
transnational repression;
(E) a list of countries whose governments are known
to frequently cooperate with other governments in
committing transnational repression;
(F) a description of--
(i) efforts by personnel at United States
embassies and missions to support victims of or
those at risk of transnational repression; and
(ii) resources provided to United States
embassies and missions to support such efforts;
and
(G) a strategy to strengthen interagency efforts
and coordination to combat transnational repression,
which shall include--
(i) a plan, developed in consultation with
partner governments, civil society, the
business community, and other entities, to
promote respect for rule of law and human
rights in surveillance technology use, which
shall include--
(I) improving export licensing
policy, including by applying
additional scrutiny to export licensing
applications for products exported to
perpetrators;
(II) protecting personal digital
data from being used for the purposes
of transnational repression;
(III) establishing safeguards to
prevent the misuse of surveillance
technology, including elements such as
appropriate legal protections, a
prohibition on discrimination,
oversight and accountability
mechanisms, transparency on the
applicable legal framework, limiting
biometric tools for surveillance to
what is lawful and appropriate, testing
and evaluation, and training;
(IV) working to ensure, as
applicable, that such technologies are
designed, developed, and deployed with
safeguards to protect human rights
(including privacy), consistent with
the United Nations Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights;
(ii) public diplomacy efforts and plans
for, including the use of the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States at international
organizations, to promote awareness of and
oppose acts of transnational repression;
(iii) a plan to develop or enhance global
coalitions to monitor cases of transnational
repression at international organizations and
to strengthen alert mechanisms for key
stakeholders worldwide;
(iv) a description, as appropriate, of how
the United States Government has previously
provided, and will continue to provide, support
to civil society organizations in foreign
countries in which transnational repression
occurs--
(I) to improve the documentation,
investigation, and research of cases,
trends, and tactics of transnational
repression; and
(II) to promote accountability and
transparency in government actions
impacting victims of transnational
repression; and
(v) a description of new or existing
emergency assistance mechanisms, to aid at-risk
groups, communities, and individuals in
countries abroad in which transnational
repression occurs.
(3) Form of report.--The report required under paragraph
(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
(d) Training of United States Personnel.--The Secretary of State,
in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies,
shall provide personnel of the Department of State and other relevant
Federal agencies, whether serving in the United States or overseas,
with training regarding--
(1) identifying physical and nonphysical threats of
transnational repression;
(2) foreign governments that are most frequently involved
in transnational repression;
(3) foreign governments that are known to frequently
cooperate with other governments in committing transnational
repression;
(4) digital surveillance and cyber tools commonly used in
transnational repression;
(5) safe outreach methods for vulnerable populations at
risk of transnational repression; and
(6) tools to respond to transnational repression threats,
including relevant authorities which may be invoked.
(e) Training of Foreign Service Officers and Presidential
Appointees.--Section 708(a)(1) of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22
U.S.C. 4028(a)(1)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) in subparagraph (D), by striking the period at the end
and inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(E) for Foreign Service Officers and Presidential
appointees, including chiefs of mission, in missions
abroad who work on political, economic, public
diplomacy, security, or development issues, a dedicated
module of instruction on transnational repression (as
such term is defined in section 3(3) of the
International Freedom Protection Act), including--
``(i) how to recognize threats of
transnational repression;
``(ii) an overview of relevant laws that
can be invoked to combat such threats; and
``(iii) how to support individuals
experiencing transnational repression.''.
SEC. 5. STRENGTHENING TOOLS TO COMBAT AUTHORITARIANISM.
(a) Transnational Repression.--The President shall consider the use
of transnational repression by a foreign person in determining whether
to impose sanctions with respect to such foreign person under--
(1) the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act
(22 U.S.C. 10101 et seq.);
(2) section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2023
(division K of Public Law 117-328; 8 U.S.C. 1182 note); or
(3) any other relevant statutory provision granting human
rights-related sanctions authority under which a foreign person
has been sanctioned.
(b) Modifications to the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act.--Section 1263 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114-328; 22
U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) in paragraph (3), by striking ``or'' at the
end;
(B) by striking paragraph (4); and
(C) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following:
``(4) is responsible for or complicit in, or has directly
or indirectly engaged in, significant actions or policies that
undermine democratic processes or institutions; or
``(5) has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided
financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or
services in support of, an activity described in this
subsection.''; and
(2) in subsection (d)(2), by striking subparagraph (B) and
inserting the following:
``(B) Requests relating to corruption.--A request
described in paragraph (1) with respect to whether a
foreign person has engaged in an activity described in
paragraph (3) or (5) of subsection (a) shall be
submitted to the President in writing jointly by the
chairperson and the ranking member of--
``(i) any of the appropriate congressional
committees of the Senate; and
``(ii) any of the appropriate congressional
committees of the House of Representatives.
``(C) Requests relating to undermining democracy.--
A request described in paragraph (1) with respect to
whether a foreign person has engaged in an activity
described in subsection (a)(4) shall be submitted in
writing to the President jointly by the chairperson and
ranking member of any of the appropriate congressional
committees.''.
(c) Anti-Kleptocracy and Human Rights Ineligibility.--
(1) Ineligibility.--
(A) Significant corruption or human rights
violations.--Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and
(3), a foreign government official shall be ineligible
for entry into the United States if the Secretary of
State determines that such official was knowingly
directly or indirectly involved in--
(i) significant corruption, including
corruption related to the extraction of natural
resources; or
(ii) a gross violation of human rights,
including the wrongful detention of--
(I) locally employed staff of a
United States diplomatic mission; or
(II) a United States citizen or
national.
(B) Undermining democratic governance.--Except as
provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), a foreign
government official may be ineligible for entry into
the United States if the Secretary of State determines
that such official was knowingly directly or indirectly
involved in significant actions that undermine
democratic governance.
(C) Immediate family members.--The immediate family
members of an official described in subparagraph (A) or
(B) may be subject to the same restriction on entry
into the United States as such official.
(D) Referral.--The Secretary of State, in
implementing this subsection, shall, as appropriate,
provide information regarding the actions of officials
described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) to the Office of
Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the
Treasury, which shall determine whether to impose
sanctions authorized under Federal law to block the
transfer of property and interests in property, and all
financial transactions, in the United States involving
any such official.
(E) Designation or determination.--The Secretary of
State shall publicly or privately designate or make the
determination that the foreign government officials or
party members about whom the Secretary has made such
designation or determination regarding significant
corruption or gross violations of human rights, and
their immediate family members, without regard to
whether any such individual has applied for a visa.
(2) Exceptions.--
(A) In general.--Individuals are not ineligible for
entry into the United States pursuant to paragraph (1)
if such entry--
(i) would further important United States
law enforcement objectives; or
(ii) is necessary to permit the United
States to fulfill its obligations under the
Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the
United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26,
1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947,
between the United Nations and the United
States or under other international obligations
of the United States.
(B) Savings provision.--Nothing in paragraph (1)
may be construed to derogate from United States
Government obligations under applicable international
agreements or obligations.
(3) Waiver.--The Secretary of State may waive the
application of paragraph (1) with respect to any individual if
the Secretary determines that--
(A) such waiver would serve a compelling national
interest of the United States; or
(B) the circumstances that caused such individual
to be ineligible for entry into the United States have
sufficiently changed.
(4) Semiannual report.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days
thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit a
report, including a classified annex if necessary, to
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives. Each such report shall include--
(i) all relevant information relating to
corruption, human rights violations, or
undermining democratic governance that was a
factor in identifying, during the most recent
12-month period--
(I) individuals who are ineligible
for entry into the United States under
paragraph (1)(A);
(II) individuals about whom the
Secretary has made a designation or
determination pursuant to paragraph
(1)(E); and
(III) individuals who would be
ineligible for entry into the United
States under paragraph (1)(A), but were
excluded from such restriction pursuant
to paragraph (2);
(ii) a list of any waivers granted by the
Secretary pursuant to paragraph (3); and
(iii) a description of the justification
for each such waiver.
(B) Posting of report.--The unclassified portion of
each report required under subparagraph (A) shall be
posted on a publicly accessible website of the
Department of State.
(5) Clarification.--For purposes of paragraphs (1) and (4),
the records of the Department of State and of diplomatic and
consular offices of the United States pertaining to the
issuance or refusal of visas or permits to enter the United
States shall not be considered confidential.
(d) Restriction on Assistance in the Wake of a Coup D'etat.--
Chapter 1 of part III of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2751 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 620N. LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE IN THE WAKE OF A COUP D'ETAT.
``(a) In General.--Except as provided under subsections (b) and
(d), no assistance may be furnished under this Act or under the Arms
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751) to the central government of any
country in which the duly elected head of government was deposed by a
military coup d'etat or decree or a coup d'etat or decree in which the
military played a decisive role.
``(b) Exemption for National Security.--The Secretary of State,
after consultation with the heads of relevant Federal agencies, may
waive the restriction on assistance described in subsection (a) if the
Secretary certifies and reports to the appropriate congressional
committees, not later than 30 days before the provision of such
assistance to such government, that such waiver is in the national
security interest of the United States.
``(c) Resumption of Assistance.--Assistance to a foreign government
that is subject to the restriction described in subsection (a) may be
resumed if the Secretary of State certifies and reports to the
appropriate congressional committees, not fewer than 30 days before the
resumption of such assistance, that a democratically elected government
has taken office subsequent to the termination of assistance pursuant
to subsection (a).
``(d) Exception for Democracy and Humanitarian Assistance.--The
restriction under subsection (a) shall not apply to any assistance
used--
``(1) to promote democratic elections or public
participation in the democratic processes;
``(2) to support a democratic transition; or
``(3) for humanitarian purposes.
``(e) Defined Term.--In this section, the term `appropriate
congressional committees' means--
``(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
``(2) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
``(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives; and
``(4) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.''.
SEC. 6. COMBATING CORRUPTION AND KLEPTOCRACY.
(a) Prioritization.--The Secretary of State and the Administrator
of the United States Agency for International Development shall combat
authoritarianism by prioritizing governance and anti-corruption
activities and programs that--
(1) enhance the transparency, accountability, and
responsiveness of governments across relevant sectors;
(2)(A) improve the detection and exposure of corruption
crimes, including crimes that cross borders;
(B) improve citizen oversight and advocacy;
(C) protect free expression and civic activism; and
(D) support investigative journalism and media
independence;
(3)(A) expand the investigation and prosecution of corrupt
acts;
(B) hold corrupt actors accountable;
(C) promote the adoption and implementation of
anticorruption preventive measures; and
(D) promote good governance, public administration, and
impartial judiciaries;
(4) address corruption in key sectors, whether at the level
of--
(A) delivery of services to citizens;
(B) important governmental processes, such as
procurement; or
(C) priority economic sectors;
(5) strengthen democratic norms and standards at the local,
national, regional, and international levels;
(6) augment cooperation with the private sector and key
industries to root out corruption that--
(A) harms competitiveness, economic growth, and
development; and
(B) taints critical supply chains;
(7) address corrosive capital and the strategic use of
corruption by authoritarian states to undermine democracy and
good governance; and
(8) provide essential skills and resources to civil society
and media--
(A) to counter corruption; and
(B) to address the weak governance and poor human
rights conditions that cultivate corruption.
(b) Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Rewards Program.--Section 36(b) of
the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2708(b))
is amended--
(1) in paragraph (13), by striking ``or'' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (14), by striking the period at the end
and inserting ``; or''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(15) the restraining, seizing, forfeiting, or
repatriating of stolen assets linked to foreign government
corruption and the proceeds of such corruption.''.
SEC. 7. INVESTING IN DEMOCRACY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.
(a) Program for Democracy Research and Development.--The Secretary
of State, in consultation with the Administrator of the United States
Agency for International Development, shall establish a program for
democracy research and development that--
(1) supports research and development by the Department of
State, the United States Agency for International Development,
and the National Endowment for Democracy on policies and
programs relating to democracy efforts;
(2) drives innovation within such agencies regarding the
response to complex, multidimensional challenges to democracy,
including--
(A) combating transnational kleptocracy;
(B) mitigating hyperpolarization;
(C) countering malign authoritarian influence; and
(D) leveraging emerging technology for democracy;
(3) incentivizes collaboration among governments,
nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to
identify and mitigate threats to global democracy;
(4) identifies lessons learned and best practices for
democracy programs and diplomatic approaches to create feedback
loops and shape future evidence-based programming and
diplomacy;
(5) encourages private sector actors to establish and
implement business practices that will--
(A) strengthen democratic institutions;
(B) bolster democratic processes; and
(C) support democracy activists and human rights
defenders; and
(6) strengthens the resilience of democratic actors and
institutions.
(b) Report.--Not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives that describes the efforts and results of the
program established pursuant to subsection (a).
SEC. 8. ADDRESSING AUTHORITARIANS IN THE MULTILATERAL SYSTEM.
It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State and the
United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations should use
the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United
Nations and with other multilateral bodies--
(1)(A) to promote the full participation of civil society
actors within the United National Human Rights Council and
other multilateral bodies;
(B) to closely monitor instances of reprisals against such
actors; and
(C) to support the use of targeted sanctions, censure of
member states, and other diplomatic measures to hold
responsible any person who engages in reprisals against human
rights defenders and civil society within such multilateral
bodies;
(2) to reform the process for suspending the rights of
membership in the United Nations Human Rights Council for
member states that commit gross and systemic violations of
human rights, including--
(A) ensuring information detailing the member
state's human rights record is publicly available
before a vote for membership or a vote on suspending
the rights of membership of such member state; and
(B) making publicly available the vote of each
member state on the suspension of rights of membership
from the United Nations Human Rights Council;
(3) to reform the rules for electing members to the United
Nations Human Rights Council to seek to ensure that member
states that have committed gross and systemic violations of
human rights are not elected to the Human Rights Council; and
(4) to oppose the election to the United Nations Human
Rights Council of any member state--
(A) that engages in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights,
as determined pursuant to section 116 or 502B of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n and
2304);
(B) the government of which has repeatedly provided
support for acts of international terrorism, as
determined pursuant to section 620A of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371);
(C) that is designated as a Tier 3 country under
section 110(b)(1)(C) of the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107(b)(1)(C));
(D) that is included on the list published by the
Secretary of State pursuant to section 404(b)(1) of the
Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 (22 U.S.C. 2370c-
1(b)(1)) as a government that recruits and uses child
soldiers; or
(E) the government of which the United States
determines to have committed genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, or ethnic cleansing.
SEC. 9. CONFRONTING DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to combat digital authoritarianism, including the use
of digital technologies, that--
(A) restricts the exercise of civil and political
rights;
(B) weakens democratic processes and institutions,
including elections; or
(C) surveils, censors, or represses human rights
defenders, democracy activists, civil society actors,
independent media, or political opponents;
(2) to counter misinformation and disinformation,
especially in the digital domain;
(3) to promote internet freedom and elevate the protection
of human rights and democratic principles in the design and
deployment of current and emerging technologies; and
(4) to support efforts to counter government censorship and
surveillance, including efforts--
(A) to bypass internet shutdowns and other forms of
censorship, including blocks on services through
circumvention technologies; and
(B) to provide digital security and digital
activism support and training for democracy activists,
human rights defenders, journalists, and other at-risk
groups.
(b) Report.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional
committees that describes the Department of State's efforts to
implement the policy objectives described in subsection (a).
SEC. 10. PROTECTING POLITICAL PRISONERS.
(a) Report.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that includes, with
respect to unjustly detained political prisoners worldwide--
(1) a description of existing Department of State processes
and efforts to carry out the political prisoner-related
activities described in subsection (b);
(2) an assessment of any resource gaps or institutional
deficiencies that adversely impact the Department of State's
ability to engage in the activities described in subsection (b)
in order to respond to increasing numbers of unjustly detained
political prisoners; and
(3) a strategy for enhancing the efforts of the Department
of State and other Federal agencies to carry out the political
prisoner-related activities described in subsection (b).
(b) Political Prisoner-Related Activities.--The report required
under subsection (a) shall include a description of the Department of
State's efforts--
(1) to monitor regional and global trends concerning
unjustly detained political prisoners and maintain information
regarding individual cases;
(2) to consistently raise concerns regarding unjustly
detained political prisoners, including specific individuals,
through public and private engagement with foreign governments,
public reporting, and multilateral engagement;
(3) to routinely--
(A) attend the trials of political prisoners;
(B) conduct wellness visits of political prisoners,
to the extent practicable and pending approval from
political prisoners or their legal counsel;
(C) visit political prisoners incarcerated under
home arrest, subject to a travel ban, or confined in
detention; and
(D) report on the well-being of such political
prisoners;
(4) to regularly request information and specific actions
related to individual prisoners' medical conditions, treatment,
access to legal counsel, location, and family visits;
(5) to identify cases in which an imminent arrest, a
potential re-arrest, or physical violence poses a risk to an
at-risk individual;
(6) to utilize foreign assistance resources to provide
support to civil society and others advocating for the release
of unjustly detained political prisoners;
(7) to utilize embassy resources to provide shelter or
facilitate the safe evacuation of willing individuals and their
families, whenever feasible; and
(8) to use sanctions and other accountability mechanisms to
encourage the release of unjustly detained political prisoners.
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