[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3395 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>






118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 3395

           To reauthorize the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            December 5, 2023

 Mrs. Shaheen (for herself, Mr. Wicker, and Mr. Durbin) introduced the 
 following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 
                           Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
           To reauthorize the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and 
Sovereignty Act of 2023''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Section 2 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-347; 
22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended to read as follows:

``SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    ``Congress finds the following:
            ``(1) Consistently, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, the illegitimate 
        leader of Belarus, engages in a pattern of clear and persistent 
        violations of human rights, democratic governance, and 
        fundamental freedoms.
            ``(2) Alyaksandr Lukashenka has overseen and participated 
        in multiple fundamentally flawed presidential and parliamentary 
        elections undermining the legitimacy of executive, judicial, 
        and legislative authority in Belarus.
            ``(3) On August 9, 2020, the Government of Belarus 
        conducted a presidential election that was fraudulent and did 
        not meet international standards. There were serious 
        irregularities with ballot counting and the reporting of 
        election results. The Government of Belarus also put in place 
        restrictive measures that impeded the work of local independent 
        observers and did not provide sufficient notice to the OSCE to 
        allow for the OSCE to monitor the elections, as is customary.
            ``(4) Independent election monitors recognized Sviatlana 
        Tsikhanouskaya as the legitimate winner of the August 9, 2020 
        election for president in Belarus following her candidacy after 
        her husband, opposition leader Sergei Tikhanovsky, was 
        imprisoned for challenging Lukashenka for president in 2020.
            ``(5) Following threats to her safety, Sviatlana 
        Tsikhanouskaya was forced into exile in Lithuania after Mr. 
        Lukashenka claimed victory in the fraudulent 2020 elections, 
        and since that time, the Government of Lithuania has hosted the 
        Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the Belarusian Democratic 
        Leader, and the Government of Poland has hosted the Belarusian 
        United Transitional Cabinet.
            ``(6) Thousands of employees at Belarusian state-owned 
        enterprises went on strike across the country to protest Mr. 
        Lukashenka's illegitimate election and the subsequent 
        crackdowns on peaceful protestors to the contested results of 
        the election, including at some of Belarus's largest factories 
        such as the BelAZ truck plant, the Minsk Tractor Works, and the 
        Minsk Automobile Plant.
            ``(7) After the August 9, 2020, presidential election, the 
        Government of Belarus restricted the free flow of information 
        to silence the opposition and to conceal the regime's violent 
        crackdown on peaceful protestors, including by stripping the 
        accreditation of journalists from major foreign news outlets, 
        disrupting internet access, limiting access to social media and 
        other digital communication platforms, and detaining and 
        harassing countless journalists.
            ``(8) The Government of Belarus, led by Alyaksandr 
        Lukashenka, continues to subject thousands of pro-democracy 
        political activists and peaceful protesters to harassment, 
        beatings, enforced disappearance, and imprisonment, 
        particularly as a result of their attempts to peacefully 
        exercise their right to freedom of assembly and association, 
        including following violent crackdowns on peaceful protestors 
        and mass detentions of peaceful protesters resisting the 
        results of the contested 2020 election.
            ``(9) Women serve as the leading force in demonstrations 
        across the country, protesting police brutality and mass 
        detentions by wearing white, carrying flowers, forming 
        `solidarity chains', and unmasking undercover police trying to 
        arrest demonstrators.
            ``(10) The Government of Belarus, led by Alyaksandr 
        Lukashenka, suppresses independent media and journalists and 
        restricts access to the internet, including social media and 
        other digital communication platforms, in violation of the 
        right to freedom of speech and expression of those dissenting 
        from the dictatorship of Alyaksandr Lukashenka.
            ``(11) The Government of Belarus, led by Alyaksandr 
        Lukashenka, has criminalized access to independent media 
        sources and media channels, including foreign media, by 
        designating such sources and channels as extremist and 
        conducting arbitrary arrests and detainments of media workers, 
        activists, and users.
            ``(12) The Government of Belarus, led by Alyaksandr 
        Lukashenka, continues a systematic campaign of harassment, 
        repression, and closure of nongovernmental organizations, 
        including independent trade unions and entrepreneurs, creating 
        a climate of fear that inhibits the development of civil 
        society and social solidarity.
            ``(13) The Government of Belarus, led by Alyaksandr 
        Lukashenka, has pursued a policy undermining the country's 
        sovereignty and independence by making Belarus political, 
        economic, cultural, and societal interests subservient to those 
        of Russia.
            ``(14) Against the will of the majority of the Belarusian 
        people, Russian President Vladimir Putin has propped up the 
        Alyaksandr Lukashenka regime, including by offering security 
        assistance, providing significant financial support, and 
        sending Russian propagandists to help disseminate pro-regime 
        and pro-Kremlin propaganda on Belarus state television.
            ``(15) Efforts by the Government of the Russian Federation 
        to subsume Belarus into its sphere of influence and consider 
        Belarus as part of the Russian empire or as a `Union State' 
        include security, political, economic, and ideological 
        integration between Russia and Belarus, which intensified in 
        2020 after President Putin supported Mr. Lukashenka's 
        illegitimate election and resulted in the Government of Belarus 
        permitting Russian troops to use Belarusian territory to 
        conduct military exercises ahead of the February 2022 further 
        invasion of Ukraine and staging part of the February 2022 
        further invasion of Ukraine from Belarusian territory, 
        including by providing Russia with the use of airbases which 
        allowed Russia to shoot artillery and missiles from Belarusian 
        territory into Ukraine.
            ``(16) The United States Government and United States 
        partners and allies have imposed sanctions on Alyaksandr 
        Lukashenka and the Government of Belarus in response to anti-
        democratic activities and human rights abuses for more than 20 
        years, including in response to the Government of Belarus' 
        support for Russia's further invasion of Ukraine, which include 
        property blocking and visa restrictions and export 
        restrictions.
            ``(17) The Kremlin has provided the Government of Belarus 
        with loans amounting to more than $1,500,000,000 dollars to 
        prop up Lukashenka's illegitimate regime and Russia continues 
        to provide Belarus with access to an economic market to avoid 
        the impacts of United States and allied countries' sanctions on 
        key Belarusian industries.
            ``(18) The Government of Belarus is relied upon by the 
        Government of the Russian Federation to increase production of 
        ammunition and other military equipment to facilitate the 
        Kremlin's crimes of aggression, war crimes, and crimes against 
        humanity during the illegal war in Ukraine.
            ``(19) Since before the 2022 further invasion of Ukraine, 
        the Government of Belarus has hosted Russian troops on 
        Belarusian territory and enabled the violation of Ukraine's 
        sovereignty by Russia in February 2022 and since the further 
        invasion of Ukraine, the Government of Belarus has also hosted 
        Russian mercenary fighters and reportedly hosted Russian 
        nuclear warheads.
            ``(20) The international community has seen credible 
        evidence that children forcibly removed from Ukraine by Russia 
        during the further invasion of Ukraine have transited through 
        the territory of Belarus or been illegally removed to the 
        territory of Belarus with support from Alyaksandr Lukashenka 
        and been subjected to Russian re-education programs.
            ``(21) The Government of Belarus' continued support of 
        Russia, especially in the unprovoked further invasion of 
        Ukraine, and continued oppression of the Belarusian people may 
        amount to crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of 
        aggression.
            ``(22) The Government of Belarus also threatens the safety, 
        security, and sovereignty of European countries, including NATO 
        allies Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, by facilitating illegal 
        migration through the territory of Belarus, resulting in 
        efforts by the United States to support a Customs and Border 
        Patrol Technical Assessment in Latvia to ensure European allies 
        and partners can secure their borders.
            ``(23) The Government of Lithuania and other United States 
        partners and allies host independent Belarusian free media, 
        including Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Minsk bureau, and 
        facilitate information and content in the Belarusian language, 
        which the Lukashenka regime has dismissed and de-facto outlawed 
        as an inferior language to Russian for the purpose of 
        facilitating Russification campaigns in Belarus.
            ``(24) The governments of Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and 
        other European partners host members of the Belarusian pro-
        democracy movement, including political leaders, free and 
        independent media, and exiled civil society groups and provide 
        essential support to these individuals and groups that make up 
        the Belarus democracy movement.
            ``(25) The Government of Belarus has further attempted to 
        suppress freedom of movement of Belarusian people and 
        Belarusian diaspora and retaliate against those Belarusians 
        living overseas and who have fled the Lukashenka regime by 
        refusing to provide overseas passport services.
            ``(26) The International Civil Aviation Organization found 
        that the Government of Belarus committed an act of unlawful 
        interference when it deliberately diverted Ryanair Flight 9478 
        in order to arrest two Belarusian citizens, including an 
        opposition activist and journalist.
            ``(27) The Belarus democracy movement has legitimate 
        aspirations for a transatlantic future for the people of 
        Belarus and continue to seek justice for those imprisoned and 
        oppressed by the Lukashenka regime and resist Russian 
        encroachment on Belarusian territory, culture, and identity.''.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    Section 3 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-347; 
22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended to read as follows:

``SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    ``It is the policy of the United States--
            ``(1) to condemn the conduct of the August 9, 2020, 
        presidential election and crackdown on opposition candidates, 
        members of the Coordination Council, peaceful protestors, 
        employees from state-owned enterprises participating in 
        strikes, independent election observers, and independent 
        journalists and bloggers;
            ``(2) to recognize Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya as the 
        Democratic Leader of Belarus;
            ``(3) to refuse to recognize Alyaksandr Lukashenka as the 
        legitimately elected leader of Belarus;
            ``(4) to seek to engage with the United Transitional 
        Cabinet as the executive body that represents the aspirations 
        and beliefs of the Belarusian people and as a legitimate 
        institution to participate in a dialogue on a peaceful 
        transition of power and support its stated objectives of--
                    ``(A) defending the independence and sovereignty of 
                the Republic of Belarus;
                    ``(B) representing the national interests of 
                Belarus;
                    ``(C) carrying out the de-facto de-occupation of 
                Belarus;
                    ``(D) restoring constitutional legality and the 
                rule of law;
                    ``(E) developing and implementing measures to 
                thwart illegal retention of power;
                    ``(F) ensuring the transition of power from 
                dictatorship to democracy;
                    ``(G) creating conditions for free and fair 
                elections in Belarus; and
                    ``(H) developing and implementing solutions needed 
                to secure democratic changes in Belarus;
            ``(5) to continue to call for the immediate release without 
        preconditions of all political prisoners in Belarus;
            ``(6) to continue to support the aspirations of the people 
        of Belarus for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law;
            ``(7) to continue to support actively the aspirations of 
        the people of the Republic of Belarus to preserve the 
        independence and sovereignty of their country and to pursue a 
        Euro-Atlantic future;
            ``(8) not to recognize any incorporation of Belarus into a 
        `Union State' with Russia, as this so-called `Union State' 
        would be both an attempt to absorb Belarus and a step to 
        reconstituting the totalitarian Soviet Union;
            ``(9) to condemn efforts by the Government of the Russian 
        Federation to undermine the sovereignty and independence of 
        Belarus, and to continue to implement policies, including 
        sanctions, that serve to punish Russia for its anti-democratic 
        and illegal actions involving Belarus;
            ``(10) to continue to reject the fraudulent victory of Mr. 
        Lukashenka on August 9, 2020, and to support calls for new 
        presidential and parliamentary elections, conducted in a manner 
        that is free and fair according to OSCE standards and under the 
        supervision of OSCE observers and independent domestic 
        observers;
            ``(11) to continue to call for the fulfillment by the 
        Government of Belarus of Belarus's freely undertaken 
        obligations as an OSCE participating state and as a signatory 
        of the Charter of the United Nations;
            ``(12) to support an OSCE role in mediating a dialogue 
        within Belarus between the government and genuine 
        representatives of Belarusian society;
            ``(13) to support international efforts to launch 
        investigations into the Government of Belarus and individuals 
        associated with the Government of Belarus for war crimes and 
        crimes against humanity against the people of Belarus and the 
        people of Ukraine for their actions during the further invasion 
        of Ukraine;
            ``(14) to support a United States diplomatic presence to 
        engage with the people of Belarus, including the regular 
        appointment of a United States Special Envoy to Belarus until 
        such a time that the credentials of a United States Ambassador 
        to Belarus are recognized by the Government of Belarus;
            ``(15) to continue to work closely with the European Union, 
        the United Kingdom, Canada, and other countries and 
        international organizations, to promote the principles of 
        democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in Belarus;
            ``(16) to remain open to reevaluating United States policy 
        toward Belarus as warranted by demonstrable progress made by 
        the Government of Belarus consistent with the aims of this Act, 
        as stated in this section;
            ``(17) to express concern in the event that social media or 
        technology companies move to block independent media content or 
        participate in media blackouts that prevent free and 
        independent media services from transmitting information into 
        Belarus;
            ``(18) to continue to support Belarusian language and 
        cultural programs, including by supporting Belarusian language 
        independent media programs, and Belarusian civil society, 
        including efforts to restore democracy and the regular function 
        of democratic institutions in Belarus;
            ``(19) to work with the Belarusian democratic movement and 
        European allies and partners to ensure Belarusian nationals 
        living outside of Belarus have access to national 
        identification documentation following the Lukashenka regime's 
        decision to stop supplying overseas passport services to 
        Belarusians;
            ``(20) to provide technical support to the United 
        Transitional Cabinet of Belarus and European allies and 
        partners to develop and implement national identification 
        documents (New Belarusian Passport) that will enable the more 
        than 2,000,000 Belarusians living abroad to access freedom of 
        movement and essential services while maintaining Belarusian 
        national identity and unity;
            ``(21) to include Belarusian nationals living in Ukraine as 
        of February 24, 2022, in the Uniting For Ukraine program to 
        provide a pathway for Belarusian nations and their immediate 
        family members outside of the United States to come to the 
        United States and stay for a period of not more than two years 
        of parole and subject those Belarusian nationals to the same 
        qualifications for entry into the program as Ukrainian 
        nationals;
            ``(22) to engage in the United States-Belarus democratic 
        movement strategic dialogue when necessary to reaffirm 
        commitments to promoting freedom and democracy in Belarus and 
        promote efforts to restore free and open presidential and 
        parliamentary elections in Belarus that are conducted 
        consistent with OSCE standards and under the supervision of 
        OSCE observers and independent domestic observers;
            ``(23) to refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the 
        Lukashenka regime to enter into any international agreements or 
        treaties;
            ``(24) to advocate for the inclusion of the Belarus 
        democratic movement to participate in international 
        institutions and be granted Permanent Observer Status by the 
        United Nations General Assembly;
            ``(25) to establish a Belarus service at Voice of America 
        through the United States Agency for Global Media that 
        broadcasts in the Belarusian language;
            ``(26) to continue to support the Governments of Lithuania, 
        Latvia, and Poland in providing critical support to the 
        Belarusian government, civil society, and media in exile;
            ``(27) to transfer when applicable existing bilateral 
        funding for Belarus toward sustaining pro-democracy and civil 
        society initiatives outside the territory of Belarus;
            ``(28) to continue to ban ticket sales for air travel to 
        Belarus until such a time that civilians do not face random 
        arrests by the Government of Belarus, a ban that was enacted 
        following the unlawful actions of the Government of Belarus to 
        deliberately divert Ryanair Flight 9478; and
            ``(29) to continue to work with international allies and 
        partners to coordinate support for the people of Belarus and 
        their legitimate aspirations for a free, open, and democratic 
        society and the regular conduct of free and fair elections.''.

SEC. 4. SPECIAL ENVOY FOR BELARUS.

    (a) Special Envoy.--The President shall appoint a Special Envoy for 
Belarus within the Department of State (referred to in this section as 
the ``Special Envoy'').
    (b) Qualifications.--The Special Envoy--
            (1) should be a person of recognized distinction in the 
        field of European security, geopolitics, democracy, and human 
        rights; and
            (2) may be a career foreign service officer.
    (c) Central Objective.--The central objective of the Special Envoy 
is to coordinate and promote efforts--
            (1) to improve respect for the fundamental human rights of 
        the people of Belarus;
            (2) to sustain focus on the national security implications, 
        for the United States, of Belarus's political and military 
        alignment; and
            (3) to respond to the political, economic, and security 
        impacts of events in Belarus on neighboring countries and the 
        wider region.
    (d) Duties and Responsibilities.--The Special Envoy shall--
            (1) engage in discussions with Belarusian officials 
        regarding human rights and political, economic, and security 
        issues in Belarus;
            (2) support international efforts to promote human rights 
        and political freedoms in Belarus, including coordination and 
        dialogue between the United States and the United Nations, the 
        Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the 
        European Union, Belarus, and the other countries in Eastern 
        Europe;
            (3) consult with nongovernmental organizations that have 
        attempted to address human rights and political and economic 
        instability in Belarus;
            (4) make recommendations regarding the funding of 
        activities promoting human rights, democracy, the rule of law, 
        and the development of a market economy in Belarus;
            (5) review strategies for improving protection of human 
        rights in Belarus, including technical training and exchange 
        programs;
            (6) develop an action plan for holding to account the 
        perpetrators of the human rights violations, documented in the 
        United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights report on the 
        situation of human rights in Belarus in the run-up to the 2020 
        presidential election and its aftermath (Human Rights Council 
        Resolution 49/36);
            (7) engage with member countries of the North Atlantic 
        Treaty Organization, the Organization for Security and 
        Cooperation in Europe, and the European Union with respect to 
        the implications of Belarus's political and security alignment 
        for transatlantic security; and
            (8) work within the Department of State and among 
        partnering countries to sustain focus on the political 
        situation in Belarus.
    (e) Role.--The position of Special Envoy--
            (1) shall be a full-time position;
            (2) may not be combined with any other position within the 
        Department of State;
            (3) shall only exist for the period during which United 
        States diplomatic operations in Belarus at the United States 
        Embassy in Minsk have been suspended; and
            (4) shall oversee the operations and personnel of the 
        Belarus Affairs Unit of the Department of State.
    (f) Report on Activities.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 
[five] years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Special 
Envoy, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
report that describes the activities undertaken pursuant to subsection 
(d) during the reporting period.
    (g) Termination.--The position of Special Envoy for Belarus Affairs 
and the authorities provided by this section shall terminate on the 
date that is [five] years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 5. STRATEGIC DIALOGUE WITH THE BELARUS DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT.

    (a) Strategic Dialogue.--The President shall direct the Secretary 
of State to host a strategic dialogue with the Belarus Democracy 
Movement not fewer than once every 12 months following the date of the 
enactment of this Act.
    (b) Central Objective.--The central objective of the strategic 
dialogue required under subsection (a) is to coordinate and promote 
efforts--
            (1) to consider the efforts needed to return to democratic 
        rule in Belarus, including the efforts needed to support free 
        and fair elections in Belarus;
            (2) to support the day-to-day functions of the Belarus 
        Democracy Movement, which represents the legitimate aspirations 
        of the Belarusian people, and ensure that Belarusians living 
        outside the territory of Belarus have adequate access to 
        essential services; and
            (3) to respond to the political, economic, and security 
        impacts of events in Belarus and Russia on neighboring 
        countries and the wider region.
    (c) Termination.--The strategic dialogue with the Belarus Democracy 
Movement and the authorities provided by this section shall terminate 
on the date that is [five] years after the date of the enactment of 
this Act.

SEC. 6. ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND SOVEREIGNTY 
              IN BELARUS.

    Section 4 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-347; 
22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended--
            (1) in subsection (c)--
                    (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``, including by 
                establishing a Belarus service at Voice of America to 
                include broadcasts in the Belarusian language'' after 
                ``within Belarus'';
                    (B) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``in the 
                Belarusian language'' after ``and Internet media'';
                    (C) by striking paragraphs (11) and (14);
                    (D) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (10) as 
                paragraphs (4) through (11), respectively;
                    (E) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following 
                new paragraph:
            ``(3) countering internet and media censorship and 
        repressive surveillance technology that seeks to limit free 
        association, control access to information, and prevent 
        citizens from exercising their rights to free speech;'';
                    (F) in paragraph (11), as redesignated by 
                subparagraph (C), by inserting ``and the development of 
                Belarusian cultural programs'' after ``supporting the 
                development of Belarusian language education'';
                    (G) in paragraph (12), by inserting ``, including 
                refugees from Belarus in Ukraine and refugees from 
                Ukraine fleeing Russia's unprovoked war following the 
                February 2022 further invasion of Ukraine'' after 
                ``supporting political refugees in neighboring European 
                countries fleeing the crackdown in Belarus'';
                    (H) in paragraph (13)--
                            (i) by inserting ``and war crimes'' after 
                        ``human rights abuses''; and
                            (ii) by striking the semicolon and 
                        inserting ``; and''; and
                    (I) by redesignating paragraph (15) as paragraph 
                (14);
            (2) in subsection (f), by striking ``2020'' and inserting 
        ``2023''; and
            (3) by striking subsection (g).

SEC. 7. INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING, INTERNET FREEDOM, AND ACCESS TO 
              INFORMATION IN BELARUS.

    Section 5 of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty 
Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a)(1), by inserting ``and Voice of 
        America'' after ``Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty''; and
            (2) in subsection (b)(1)--
                    (A) by striking ``2020'' and inserting ``2023'';
                    (B) in subparagraph (A) by inserting ``, including 
                through social media platforms,'' after 
                ``communications in Belarus''; and
                    (C) in subparagraph (C) by inserting ``, including 
                by ensuring private companies do not comply with media 
                blackouts directed by or favored by the Government of 
                Belarus'' after ``access and block content online''.

SEC. 8. SANCTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF BELARUS.

    Section 6 of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty 
Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended--
            (1) in subsection (b)--
                    (A) by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (5) as 
                paragraphs (3) through (6), respectively;
                    (B) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following 
                new paragraph:
            ``(2) The release of Ukrainian nationals illegally held in 
        Belarus, including those illegally transferred to Belarus after 
        the 2022 Russian further invasion of Ukraine.'';
                    (C) in paragraph (3), as redesignated by 
                subparagraph (A), by inserting ``, and people who 
                protested the support of the Government of Belarus for 
                the further Russian invasion of Ukraine and cooperation 
                of the Government of Belarus with Russia'' after 
                ``August 9, 2020''; and
                    (D) in paragraph (5), as so redesignated, by 
                inserting ``, or for providing support in connection 
                with the illegal further Russian invasion of Ukraine'' 
                after ``August 9, 2020''; and
            (2) in subsection (c)--
                    (A) in the subsection heading, by inserting ``and 
                the February, 24, 2022, Further Invasion of Ukraine'' 
                after ``Election'';
                    (B) by redesignating paragraphs (5) through (9) as 
                paragraphs (6) through (10), respectively;
                    (C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following 
                new paragraph:
            ``(5) assisted the Government of Belarus in--
                    ``(A) supporting security cooperation with the 
                Government of Russia in advance of the February 24, 
                2022, further invasion of Ukraine;
                    ``(B) supporting the presence of Russian 
                mercenaries in the territory of Belarus; or
                    ``(C) supporting ongoing security cooperation with 
                the Government of Russia, including the Government of 
                Belarus' decision to host Russian tactical nuclear 
                weapons;''; and
                    (D) in paragraph (6), as redesignated by 
                subparagraph (B), by inserting ``, or in connection 
                with the 2022 Russian further invasion of Ukraine'' 
                after ``August 9, 2020''.

SEC. 9. MULTILATERAL COOPERATION.

    Section 7 of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty 
Act of 2020 (Public Law 108-347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (1); by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
        semicolon;
            (2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and 
        inserting ``; and''; and
            (3) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new 
        paragraphs:
            ``(3) to condemn the continued collaboration between the 
        Government of Belarus and the Government of Russia, 
        particularly as it relates to the further invasion of Ukraine, 
        and further the purposes of this Act, including, as 
        appropriate, to levy sanctions and additional measures against 
        the Government of Belarus for its complicity in war crimes and 
        crimes against humanity committed in the territory of Ukraine; 
        and
            ``(4) to provide technical assistance to the Belarus 
        democracy movement on the creation and international 
        recognition of national identity documentation following the 
        Lukashenka regime's decision to cease overseas passport 
        services for Belarusian nationals, with the objective of 
        maintaining Belarusian national identity and unity but 
        providing Belarusians living overseas with freedom of movement 
        and the ability to access essential services.''.

SEC. 10. PARTICIPATION OF BELARUS IN UNITING FOR UKRAINE.

    The Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2004 
(Public Law 108-347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended--
            (1) by redesignating sections 8 and 9 as sections 9 and 10, 
        respectively; and
            (2) by inserting after section 7 the following new section:

``SEC. 8. PARTICIPATION OF BELARUS IN UNITING FOR UKRAINE.

    ``(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            ``(1) there are a significant number of Belarusian 
        nationals residing in Ukraine and suffering from Russian 
        aggression during the further Russian invasion of Ukraine; and
            ``(2) Belarusian nationals may experience threats to their 
        physical security due to political persecution or retribution 
        or human rights abuses if they return to Belarus.
    ``(b) Uniting for Ukraine Participation.--
            ``(1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date 
        of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of State and 
        the Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide a pathway for 
        Belarusian nationals living in Ukraine following the February 
        24, 2022, further invasion of Ukraine to participate in the 
        Uniting for Ukraine program.
            ``(2) Exception.--The Secretary of State and the Secretary 
        of Homeland Security may delay implementation of the pathway 
        required under paragraph (1) if they determine that it is 
        counter to United States national security interests.''.

SEC. 11. REPORTS.

    Section 9 of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty 
Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note), as redesignated 
by section 8(1) of this Act, is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a)--
                    (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``2020'' and 
                inserting ``2023''; and
                    (B) in paragraph (2)--
                            (i) in subparagraph (G), by striking ``; 
                        and'' and inserting a semicolon;
                            (ii) in subparagraph (H), by striking the 
                        period at the end and inserting a semicolon; 
                        and
                            (iii) by adding at the end the following 
                        new subparagraphs:
                    ``(I) an assessment of how the Government of Russia 
                is working to achieve deeper security cooperation and 
                interdependence or integration with Belarus;
                    ``(J) a description of the Government of Belarus 
                actions to support the 2022 further Russian invasion of 
                Ukraine and ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine;
                    ``(K) a description of how the Government of 
                Belarus supports, adopts, and deploys Russian 
                disinformation campaigns or Belarusian disinformation 
                campaigns; and
                    ``(L) an identification of Belarusian officials 
                involved in continued support to Russia and the further 
                invasion of Ukraine and an identification of Russian 
                officials involved in continued support to Belarus and 
                the further invasion of Ukraine.'';
            (2) in subsection (b)(1)--
                    (A) by striking ``2020'' and inserting ``2023'';
                    (B) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``; and'' and 
                inserting a semicolon;
                    (C) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period at 
                the end and inserting a semicolon; and
                    (D) by adding at the end the following new 
                subparagraphs:
                    ``(C) an identification of efforts by the 
                Government of Belarus and the Government of Russia to 
                circumvent sanctions, including those imposed by the 
                United States in response to the further invasion of 
                Ukraine;
                    ``(D) an assessment of the shared assets and 
                business interests of Vladimir Putin and Alyaksandr 
                Lukashenka and the Government of Belarus and the 
                Government of Russia; and
                    ``(E) a determination on the possibility for 
                Belarus to host free and fair elections during the 
                parliamentary elections scheduled for 2024 and the 
                presidential election scheduled for 2025, including a 
                proposal of how the United States may support a return 
                to democracy in the anticipated elections in 
                Belarus.''; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
    ``(c) Report on Efforts To Enable Belarusians Living Outside the 
Territory of Belarus to Travel Freely.--
            ``(1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date 
        of the enactment of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and 
        Sovereignty Act of 2023, the Secretary of State, in 
        coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall 
        submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
        describing efforts to provide Belarusians living outside the 
        territory of Belarus with national identification documents.
            ``(2) Elements.--The report required under paragraph (1) 
        shall include the following elements:
                    ``(A) An assessment of the European Union's efforts 
                to provide Belarusians living overseas with national 
                identification documents that maintain Belarusian 
                nationality but enable Belarusians living overseas to 
                travel freely and access essential services.
                    ``(B) A description of efforts to provide technical 
                assistance to the Belarus democratic movement on the 
                creation of national identification documents that 
                fulfill the needs described in subparagraph (A).
            ``(3) Form.--The report required by this subsection shall 
        be transmitted in unclassified form but may contain a 
        classified annex.''.

SEC. 12. DEFINITIONS.

    Section 10(1)(B) of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 (Public Law 
108-347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note), as redesignated by section 10(1) of this 
Act, is amended by striking ``Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs'' and inserting ``the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs''.
                                 <all>