Short title

This Act may be cited as the

End Iranian Terrorism Act of 2023

Sense of Congress

It is the sense of Congress that—(1)the Islamic Republic of Iran has long provided hundreds of millions of dollars in material support to Hamas and other terrorist groups, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad, that directly threaten Israel;(2)Iran poses a threat to regional and global security and has earned approximately $80,000,000,000 in oil revenues since 2021;(3)the People’s Republic of China, seeking to secure reliable sources of Middle Eastern energy, has purchased roughly $47,000,000,000 in Iranian petroleum products since 2021 and is undercutting the enforcement of sanctions imposed by the United States with respect to Iran;(4)illicit purchases of Iranian petroleum products by the People's Republic of China and other countries fund the Iranian regime’s suppression of human rights in Iran, provide valuable resources for Iran’s terrorist proxies, and provide additional resources for support by Iran for the Russian Federation in its unprovoked war in Ukraine, contrary to United States policy;(5)lack of sanctions and sanctions enforcement directly undercuts United States policy objectives in the Indo-Pacific region, Europe, the Middle East, and beyond;(6)increasing encroachment by the People's Republic of China in the Middle East and North Africa, include involvement of the People's Republic of China in illicit oil trade, runs counter to the national security interests of the United States; and(7)the United States should immediately enforce existing sanctions, including sanctions provided for in Executive Order 13846 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to reimposing certain sanctions with respect to Iran), and expand sanctions designations to include persons that store Iranian oil, ship-to-ship oil transfer operators, ports and port operators, refineries and refinery operators, and other individuals and entities, particularly in the People's Republic of China, dealing in Iranian-origin oil and petrochemicals.

Appropriate congressional committees defined

In this Act, the term appropriate congressional committees means—(1)the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and(2)the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

Strategy to counter role of the People's Republic of China in evasion of sanctions with respect to Iran

(a)

In general

Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a written strategy, and provide to those committees an accompanying briefing, on the role of the People's Republic of China in evasion of sanctions imposed by the United States with respect to Iranian-origin petroleum products that includes an assessment of options—(1)to strengthen the enforcement of such sanctions; and (2)to expand sanctions designations targeting the involvement of the People's Republic of China in the production, transportation, storage, refining, and sale of Iranian-origin petroleum products.(b)

Elements

The strategy required by subsection (a) shall include—(1)a description of the use of sanctions in effect before the date of the enactment of this Act to target individuals and entities of the People's Republic of China that are directly or indirectly associated with smuggling of Iranian-origin petroleum products;(2)an assessment of—(A)the People's Republic of China’s petroleum refining capabilities;(B)which of the People's Republic of China's refineries are at high risk of processing Iranian-origin petroleum products and why;(C)Iranian-owned entities operating in the People's Republic of China and involved in petroleum refining supply chains;(D)the People's Republic of China’s role in global petroleum refining supply chains;(E)how the People's Republic of China leverages its role in global petroleum supply chains to achieve political objectives;(F)the People's Republic of China’s petroleum importing and exporting partners;(G)what percent of the People's Republic of China’s energy consumption is linked to illegally imported Iranian-origin petroleum products;(H)the amount of money the People's Republic of China saves by illegally importing discounted Iranian-origin petroleum products rather than paying market price;(I)what level of influence the Chinese Communist Party holds over non-state, semi-independent teapot refineries; and(J)the challenges limiting the ability of the United States to impose or enforce sanctions with respect to such refineries, including—(i)Lawen Namu Petroleum Trading Company;(ii)Qihang Energy; and(iii)Shangang Guomao; (3)a detailed plan for—(A)monitoring the maritime domain for smuggling of Iranian-origin petroleum products in violation of sanctions imposed by the United States, including through—(i)automatic identification system monitoring;(ii)satellite imagery;(iii)vessel comparison and tanker classification;(iv)receiving tips from operators; and(v)creating a database of reported potential sanctions violations;(B)identifying the individuals, entities, and vessels responsible for such smuggling, including—(i)vessels—(I)operated by the National Iranian Tanker Company or any other Chinese or Iranian entity subject to sanctions imposed by the United States;(II)transporting petrochemicals subject to sanctions;(III)conducting ship-to-ship transfers of such petrochemicals;(IV)with deactivated automatic identification systems; or(V)that engage in flag hopping by changing national registries;(ii)individuals or entities—(I)storing petrochemicals subject to sanctions; or(II)refining or otherwise processing such petrochemicals; and(iii)through the use of port entry and docking permission of vessels subject to sanctions;(C)assessing the viability of seizing targets identified as belonging to entities smuggling Iranian-origin petroleum products in violation of sanctions imposed by the United States, including—(i)location;(ii)origin and destination;(iii)seaworthiness; and(iv)asset value;(D)seizing, prosecuting, and, if appropriate, liquidating viable targets identified as belonging to entities involved in such smuggling;(E)deterring individuals and entities from violating sanctions by educating and engaging—(i)insurance providers;(ii)parent companies; and(iii)vessel operators;(F)collaborating with allies and partners of the United States engaged in the Arabian Peninsula, including through standing or new maritime task forces, to build sanctions enforcement capacity through assistance and training to defense and law enforcement services; and(G)using public communications and global diplomatic engagements to highlight the role of petroleum product smuggling in supporting Iran’s human rights abuses and destabilizing terrorism activities; and(4)an assessment of—(A)the total number of vessels smuggling Iranian-origin petroleum products;(B)the total number of vessels smuggling such petroleum products destined for the People's Republic of China;(C)the number of vessels smuggling such petroleum products specifically from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps;(D)the most strategic locations for intercepting smuggled Iranian-origin petroleum products destined for the People's Republic of China;(E)interference from the People's Republic of China in attempts by the United States to investigate or enforce sanctions on Iranian petroleum product exports;(F)the effectiveness of the use of sanctions with respect to insurers of entities that own or operate vessels involved in smuggling Iranian-origin petroleum products;(G)the distinction between the total number of suspected violations of sanctions related to smuggling of Iranian-origin petroleum products and the number of vessels legally viable to seize and prosecute in litigation, if any, and an accompanying explanation for each;(H)the personnel and resources needed to enforce sanctions with respect to Iranian-origin petroleum products; and(I)the impact of smuggled Iranian-origin petroleum products on global energy markets.(c)

Form

The strategy required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified index.

Imposition of sanctions

(a)

In general

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall—(1)identify each foreign entity, including any member of the Chinese Communist Party or an entity organized under the laws of the People's Republic of China or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China, that the President determines meets the criteria for the imposition of sanctions under—(A)the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172;50 U.S.C. 1701 note); (B)the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.);(C)section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a); (D)the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8701 et seq.);(E)the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8801 et seq.);(F)title I of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9401 et seq.);(G)any Executive order imposing sanctions with respect to Iran issued under the authority provided by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.); or (H)any other provision of law imposing sanctions with respect to Iran; and(2)impose sanctions applicable under existing law with respect to each such entity. (b)

Report required

Not later than 30 days after the imposition of sanctions under subsection (a) with respect to a foreign entity, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the sanctions imposed.