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<dc:title>118 S2318 IS: Rings of Fire Act of 2023</dc:title>
<dc:publisher>U.S. Senate</dc:publisher>
<dc:date>2023-07-13</dc:date>
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<dc:language>EN</dc:language>
<dc:rights>Pursuant to Title 17 Section 105 of the United States Code, this file is not subject to copyright protection and is in the public domain.</dc:rights>
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<distribution-code display="yes">II</distribution-code><congress>118th CONGRESS</congress><session>1st Session</session><legis-num>S. 2318</legis-num><current-chamber>IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES</current-chamber><action><action-date date="20230713">July 13, 2023</action-date><action-desc><sponsor name-id="S376">Ms. Ernst</sponsor> introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the <committee-name committee-id="SSAS00">Committee on Armed Services</committee-name></action-desc></action><legis-type>A BILL</legis-type><official-title>To develop a strategy for deploying ground-based theater-range missiles in the Indo-Pacific region, and for other purposes.</official-title></form><legis-body><section id="S1" section-type="section-one"><enum>1.</enum><header>Short title</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">This Act may be cited as the <quote><short-title>Rings of Fire Act of 2023</short-title></quote>.</text></section><section id="idca06691f653a4ae0944eb64923b42b94"><enum>2.</enum><header>Indo-Pacific missile strategy</header><subsection id="id2eeb02d9ed2e47fc97a496dbc3467e8c"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Findings</header><text>Congress makes the following findings:</text><paragraph id="id8b2b478d3f544046ab6985e2a9cd8ae1"><enum>(1)</enum><text>The 2022 National Defense Strategy states: <quote>The [People’s Republic of China (PRC)] has expanded and modernized nearly every aspect of the [People’s Liberation Army (PLA)], with a focus on offsetting U.S. military advantages. The PRC is therefore the pacing challenge for the Department.</quote>.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idd36617686d1d4d1cbc79df0013677056"><enum>(2)</enum><text>The 2020 report of the Department of Defense entitled <quote>Annual Report to Congress Involving the People’s Republic of China</quote> states that—</text><subparagraph commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="idae6ca839c7e247a7a06cf14bdd9876a2"><enum>(A)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline"><quote>[t]he PRC has more than 1,250 ground-launched ballistic missiles (GLBMs) and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The United States currently fields one type of conventional GLBM with a range of 70 to 300 kilometers and no GLCMs.</quote>; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="idf0dd665d2b3348108285103d20d2909e"><enum>(B)</enum><text><quote>[i]n 2021, the [People's Liberation Army Rocket Force] launched approximately 135 ballistic missiles for testing and training. This was more than the rest of the world combined excluding ballistic missile employment in conflict zones.</quote>.</text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id17da4bedabe84ebc94e042fb842649b2"><enum>(3)</enum><text>In 2019, the United States withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which eliminated ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range capability between 500 and 5,500 kilometers and their associated launchers, due to the Russian Federation’s continuing violation of the treaty.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idc454ed27d27746b886f0bd4b1519b510"><enum>(4)</enum><text>The United States does not deploy or develop ground-based intermediate-range missiles.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="ida2da5155c48a42cdb7631023c4ee2a7a"><enum>(5)</enum><text>In September 2021, the United States entered a security partnership with the United Kingdom and Australia (commonly known as <quote>AUKUS</quote>). In April 2022, AUKUS leaders committed to <quote>commence new trilateral cooperation on hypersonic technologies, counter-hypersonic defense systems, and electronic warfare capabilities, as well as to deepen cooperation … on defense innovation.</quote>.</text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="idab601e90297049639a1e288c645728ae"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Sense of Congress</header><text>It is the sense of Congress that—</text><paragraph id="id8ce12743273e46b687b3e70c61ff9813"><enum>(1)</enum><text>United States conventional ground-based theater-range missile systems in the Indo-Pacific region provide operational and strategy utility in—</text><subparagraph id="idb051d018e5c54489b205a7c97c6227ac"><enum>(A)</enum><text>availability of persistent, prompt, and survivable strike options;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id98d3ededdea14b609e2eb600b2453cf7"><enum>(B)</enum><text>deterrence of enemy attack or escalation;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id0e603e96e8cd45cc8309282637728b24"><enum>(C)</enum><text>imposition of operational costs on enemy forces;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="ida978415bf5fc4cdb9c2d3c015aee4d31"><enum>(D)</enum><text>responsive strikes against time-critical enemy targets; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id0696a806bd66498283174c97fd340ca1"><enum>(E)</enum><text>destruction of high-value targets to enable other joint forces; and</text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="idbf4fbc64d1174d529e973310ab776b60"><enum>(2)</enum><text>an Indo-Pacific Missile Strategy should—</text><subparagraph id="id85d00bb49fec49b28387bac688433922"><enum>(A)</enum><text>provide coherent direction to concept and capability development, including procurement, deployment, and employment;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id48721314b9774a459306e72fbc8878b4"><enum>(B)</enum><text>distribute integrated capabilities at operationally relevant ranges;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="iddb6319327f744c56acb9ba86bd0518f6"><enum>(C)</enum><text>coordinate and differentiate strike missions among United States military services and its allies; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id9e864b182c964ac38662007fa0e29a78"><enum>(D)</enum><text>pursue co-development and co-production of capabilities with partners, including through existing institutional mechanisms.</text></subparagraph></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id2b06481624b4469fb9b098d50e24355a"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Strategy</header><paragraph id="id556a51afd08f4324b3dcd95ace796676"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In general</header><text>Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees (as defined in section 101 of title 10, United States Code) a strategy for deploying ground-based theater-range missile in the Indo-Pacific region.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id6d041e60d26b400e813cc78e6d5bbcd5"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Elements</header><text>The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:</text><subparagraph id="idcd54ead9eeba4b0499c07e27167634cf"><enum>(A)</enum><text>An assessment of gaps in conventional theater-range precision strike capabilities in the area of responsibility of the United States Indo-Pacific Command.</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id599e51a36e9d47f1ba29e06a493de797"><enum>(B)</enum><text>An identification of military requirements for conventional ground-based theater-range missile systems, including range, propulsion, payload, launch platform, weapon effects, and other operationally relevant factors.</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idbc5257f359284e6cb80b99ced74c474f"><enum>(C)</enum><text>An identification of prospective basing locations in the area of responsibility of the United States Indo-Pacific Command.</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="ida9287bfc6ec842d89434b20308644be2"><enum>(D)</enum><text>A description of operational concepts for employment, including integration with short-range and multi-domain fires, in denial operations in the Western Pacific.</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id784de1f419074e1893ddb55de9718ae9"><enum>(E)</enum><text>An identification of prospective allies and institutional mechanisms for co-development of new theater-range conventional missiles.</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idf2b21e73e6fc4554ac3a3e8ccbc4e077"><enum>(F)</enum><text>An assessment of the cost, schedule, and feasibility of ground-based theater-range missiles programs, including any potential cost-sharing structure through existing institutional mechanisms.</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id920f0a9a62974969bdb166e7c1c941f2"><enum>(G)</enum><text>The designation of a theater component commander responsible for theater missile strategy.</text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="idc85241073b6244419a96632e34eb4835"><enum>(3)</enum><header>Form</header><text>The strategy required by paragraph (1) may be submitted in classified form but shall include an unclassified summary.</text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id2b5503fe5bc749379b36ab5deb5baa95"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Definitions</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">In this section:</text><paragraph id="id1f2d46831ac74730acb9096c2bfac066"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Ground-Based Theater-Range Missile</header><text>The term <term>ground-based theater-range missile</term> means a conventional mobile ground-launched ballistic or cruise missile system with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. </text></paragraph><paragraph id="idb6f5a67c03ae4a9d970384c0f90ea021"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Intermediate-range</header><text>With respect to a missile system, the term <term>intermediate-range</term> means a missile system with a range between 3,000 and 5,500 kilometers. </text></paragraph></subsection></section></legis-body></bill> 

