[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2006 Reported in Senate (RS)]

<DOC>





                                                       Calendar No. 152
118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2006

   To foster Tunisia's democratic institutions, to limit funds until 
Tunisia restores checks and balances, and to authorize the creation of 
                 a fund to support democratic reforms.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             June 15, 2023

Mr. Risch (for himself and Mr. Menendez) introduced the following bill; 
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

                             July 25, 2023

              Reported by Mr. Menendez, with an amendment
 [Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed 
                               in italic]

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
   To foster Tunisia's democratic institutions, to limit funds until 
Tunisia restores checks and balances, and to authorize the creation of 
                 a fund to support democratic reforms.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

<DELETED>SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    This Act may be cited as the ``Safeguarding Tunisian 
Democracy Act of 2023''.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 2. FINDINGS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    Congress makes the following findings:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In 2010 and 2011, waves of anti-government 
        protests and violence reshaped governments across the Middle 
        East and North Africa.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) While other countries in the Middle East and 
        North Africa experienced violent crackdown, rapid changes in 
        government, or descent into civil war, Tunisia's ``Jasmine 
        Revolution'' saw the ouster of autocratic President Zine El 
        Abidine Ben Ali and the emergence of a nascent, growing 
        democracy.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) On October 14, 2019, Tunisians overwhelmingly 
        elected Kais Saied, a constitutional law professor, as 
        President based on his pledges to combat corruption and improve 
        Tunisia's economic outlook.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) On July 25, 2021, President Saied unilaterally 
        suspended parliament and dismissed the Prime Minister, citing 
        exceptional circumstances and Article 80 of the 2014 
        constitution.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) On September 22, 2021, President Saied issued 
        Presidential Decree 117, consolidating full executive and 
        legislative powers within the presidency and authorizing 
        further decrees regulating the judiciary, media, political 
        parties, electoral law, freedoms and human rights.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) On February 6, 2022, President Saied dissolved 
        the Supreme Judicial Council, eliminating an independent 
        judiciary.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) On March 30, 2022, President Saied officially 
        dissolved parliament, further consolidating power and 
        eliminating checks and balances on the presidency.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) On June 30, 2022, President Saied unilaterally 
        introduced a new draft constitution, subject to a referendum, 
        consolidating broad powers under executive rule.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (9) On July 25, 2022, Saied claimed victory in a 
        constitutional referendum widely criticized for its lack of 
        credibility and participation.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (10) On September 13, 2022, President Saied 
        announced Presidential Decree 2022-54 on Cybercrime, imposing 
        prison terms for ``false information or rumors'' online and 
        crippling free speech.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (11) On September 15, 2022, President Saied 
        announced Presidential Decree 2022-55 which weakened the role 
        of political parties and imposed burdensome requirements to run 
        for parliament.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (12) On October 15, 2022, the International 
        Monetary Fund reached a staff-level agreement to support 
        Tunisia's economic policies with a 48-month arrangement under 
        the Extended Fund Facility of $1,900,000,000 and the potential 
        for more from international donors.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (13) On December 17, 2022, only 11 percent of 
        Tunisians participated in parliamentary elections, reflecting 
        dissatisfaction with the referendum, barriers to political 
        parties, and low public trust for democratic institutions in 
        Tunisia.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (14) On January 20, 2023, 4 political opponents of 
        President Saied were sentenced through military courts for 
        ``insulting a public official'' and disturbing public 
        order.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (15) On January 29, 2023, only 11 percent of 
        Tunisians participated in parliamentary run-off elections, 
        reaffirming low public trust for democratic institutions in 
        Tunisia.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (16) On February 1, 2023, President Saied extended 
        the state of emergency until the end of 2023.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (17) On February 10, 2023, President Saied 
        announced strengthened diplomatic ties with the Government of 
        Syria, a United States-designated State Sponsor of 
        Terrorism.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (18) On February 11, 2023, and in the following 
        weeks, President Saied launched a political crackdown by 
        arresting political activists, journalists, and business 
        leaders for allegedly plotting against the state, including by 
        opening a criminal investigation against a former Nidaa Tounes 
        parliamentarian.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (19) On February 21, 2023, President Saied 
        justified widespread arrests and harassment of African migrants 
        and Black Tunisians by accusing ``hordes of irregular 
        migrants'' of criminality and violence, claiming a ``criminal 
        enterprise hatched at the beginning of this century to change 
        the demographic composition of Tunisia'' threatened national 
        security.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (20) On February 22, 2023, Tunisian authorities 
        arrested Republican Party leader Issam Chebbi and National 
        Salvation Front member Chaima Issa.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (21) On February 24, 2023, Tunisian authorities 
        arrested National Salvation Front member Jawher Ben 
        Mbarek.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (22) On April 17, 2023, President Kais Saied vowed 
        ``relentless war'' against opposition figures, jailed Ennahdha 
        party leader Rached Ghannouchi, detained president of the 
        National Salvation Front coalition Nejib Chebbi, and shuttered 
        Ennahdha offices and those of an ideologically broad opposition 
        coalition.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (23) As of April 20, 2023, an International 
        Monetary Fund loan for Tunisia remains stalled as President 
        Saied's characterized necessary reforms as ``foreign diktats'' 
        and decried proposed cuts in subsidies as socially 
        destabilizing.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It shall be the policy of the United States--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) to forge a strong and lasting partnership with 
        the Government of Tunisia to support shared national security 
        interests to include countering the enduring threat of 
        transnational terrorism and promoting regional 
        stability;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) to develop and implement a security strategy 
        that builds partner capacity to address shared threats and 
        cements the role of the United States as the partner of 
        choice;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) to encourage standards and training for the 
        Tunisian Armed Forces that enshrines military professionalism 
        and respect for civil-military relations;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) to support the Tunisian people's aspirations 
        for a democratic future and support democratic principles in 
        Tunisia, to include a robust civil society, respect for 
        freedoms of expression and association, press freedom, 
        separation of powers, and the rule of law;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) to support the Tunisian people's livelihoods 
        and aspirations for economic dignity;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) to work in tandem with our G7 and other 
        partners to promote Tunisia's return to democratic principles 
        in a manner that halts democratic backsliding, stabilizes the 
        economic crisis, spurs economic development, and mitigates 
        destabilizing migration flows; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) to readjust bilateral United States foreign 
        assistance, including security assistance, based on the 
        progress of the Government of Tunisia toward meeting the 
        democratic aspirations and economic needs of the Tunisian 
        people.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 4. LIMITATION ON FUNDS; CREATION OF TUNISIA DEMOCRACY 
              SUPPORT FUND; REPORT.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--Effective upon the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the 
Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) shall limit funding to Tunisia, as provided 
        for in subsection (b); and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) is authorized to establish a ``Tunisia 
        Democracy Support Fund'', as provided for in subsection (c), to 
        encourage reforms that restore Tunisian democracy and rule of 
        law.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Limitation on Funds.--Of the funds authorized to be 
appropriated or otherwise made available in fiscal years 2024 and 2025 
to carry out chapters 1 and 8 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), chapters 1 through 6, 8, and 9 of 
part II of such Act (22 U.S.C. 2301 et seq.), and section 23 of the 
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) for the Government of Tunisia, 
an aggregate amount of 25 percent for each such fiscal year shall be 
withheld from obligation, with the exception of funding for Tunisian 
civil society, until the Secretary of State determines and certifies to 
the appropriate congressional committees that the state of emergency 
declared on July 25, 2021, has been terminated.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Tunisia Democracy Support Fund Authorized.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In general.--There is authorized to be 
        appropriated to the Secretary of State $100,000,000 for each of 
        the fiscal years 2024 and 2025, which shall be used to 
        establish the ``Tunisia Democracy Support Fund'' for the 
        purpose of encouraging reforms that restore Tunisia's 
        democratic institutions and rule of law.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Limitation.--Funds authorized to be 
        appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall not be available 
        for obligation until the Secretary of State certifies in 
        writing to the appropriate congressional committees that the 
        Government of Tunisia has demonstrated measurable progress 
        towards the democratic benchmarks outlined in subsection 
        (d).</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Democratic Benchmarks.--Pursuant to subsection (c)(2), 
the democratic benchmarks to be addressed in the Secretary of State's 
certification are whether the Government of Tunisia--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) appropriately empowers Parliament to serve the 
        Tunisian people and serve as an independent, co-equal branch of 
        government essential to a healthy democracy;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) restores judicial independence and establishes 
        the Constitutional Court in a manner that fosters an 
        independent judiciary and serves as a check on the 
        presidency;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) is taking credible steps to respect freedoms 
        of expression, association, and the press;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) creates an enabling operating environment in 
        which Tunisian civil society organizations can operate without 
        undue interference, including permitting international 
        funding;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) ceases use of military courts to try 
        civilians; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) ceases efforts to intimidate Tunisian 
        independent media through arbitrary arrests and criminal 
        prosecutions of journalists on illegitimate charges.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (e) Initial Report, Annual Report and Briefing.--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) Initial report.--Not later than 120 days after 
        the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter 
        through 2028, the Secretary of State shall provide a report and 
        accompanying briefing on the state of Tunisia's democracy and 
        associated progress on the democratic benchmarks outlined in 
        subsection (d) to the appropriate congressional 
        committees.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Form of report.--The report required by 
        paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
        include a classified annex.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (f) Waiver.--The Secretary of State may waive the 
limitation on funding under subsection (b) if the Secretary, not later 
than 15 days before the waiver is to take effect, certifies to the 
appropriate congressional committees that such waiver is in the 
national interest of the United States. The Secretary shall submit with 
the certification a detailed justification explaining the reasons for 
the waiver.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (g) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
congressional committees'' means--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
        Senate;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Committee on Appropriations of the 
        Senate;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
        of Representatives; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) the Committee on Appropriations of the House 
        of Representatives.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 5. TERMINATION.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    This Act shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after 
the date of the enactment of this Act.</DELETED>

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Safeguarding Tunisian Democracy Act 
of 2023''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) In 2010 and 2011, waves of anti-government protests and 
        violence reshaped governments across the Middle East and North 
        Africa.
            (2) While other countries in the Middle East and North 
        Africa experienced violent crackdown, rapid changes in 
        government, or descent into civil war, Tunisia's ``Jasmine 
        Revolution'' saw the ouster of autocratic President Zine El 
        Abidine Ben Ali and the emergence of a nascent, growing 
        democracy.
            (3) On October 14, 2019, Tunisians overwhelmingly elected 
        Kais Saied, a constitutional law professor, as President based 
        on his pledges to combat corruption and improve Tunisia's 
        economic outlook.
            (4) On July 25, 2021, President Saied unilaterally 
        suspended parliament and dismissed the Prime Minister, citing 
        exceptional circumstances and Article 80 of the 2014 
        constitution.
            (5) On September 22, 2021, President Saied issued 
        Presidential Decree 117, consolidating full executive and 
        legislative powers within the presidency and authorizing 
        further decrees regulating the judiciary, media, political 
        parties, electoral law, freedoms and human rights.
            (6) On February 6, 2022, President Saied dissolved the 
        Supreme Judicial Council, eliminating an independent judiciary.
            (7) On March 30, 2022, President Saied officially dissolved 
        parliament, further consolidating power and eliminating checks 
        and balances on the presidency.
            (8) On June 30, 2022, President Saied unilaterally 
        introduced a new draft constitution, subject to a referendum, 
        consolidating broad powers under executive rule.
            (9) On July 25, 2022, Saied claimed victory in a 
        constitutional referendum widely criticized for its lack of 
        credibility and participation.
            (10) On September 13, 2022, President Saied announced 
        Presidential Decree 2022-54 on Cybercrime, imposing prison 
        terms for ``false information or rumors'' online and crippling 
        free speech.
            (11) On September 15, 2022, President Saied announced 
        Presidential Decree 2022-55 which weakened the role of 
        political parties and imposed burdensome requirements to run 
        for parliament.
            (12) On October 15, 2022, the International Monetary Fund 
        reached a staff-level agreement to support Tunisia's economic 
        policies with a 48-month arrangement under the Extended Fund 
        Facility of $1,900,000,000 and the potential for more from 
        international donors.
            (13) On December 17, 2022, only 11 percent of Tunisians 
        participated in parliamentary elections, reflecting 
        dissatisfaction with the referendum, barriers to political 
        parties, and low public trust for democratic institutions in 
        Tunisia.
            (14) On January 20, 2023, four political opponents of 
        President Saied were sentenced through military courts for 
        ``insulting a public official'' and disturbing public order.
            (15) On January 29, 2023, only 11 percent of Tunisians 
        participated in parliamentary run-off elections, reaffirming 
        low public trust for democratic institutions in Tunisia.
            (16) On February 1, 2023, President Saied extended the 
        state of emergency until the end of 2023.
            (17) On February 10, 2023, President Saied announced 
        strengthened diplomatic ties with the Government of Syria, a 
        United States-designated State Sponsor of Terrorism.
            (18) On February 11, 2023, and in the following weeks, 
        President Saied launched a political crackdown by arresting 
        political activists, journalists, and business leaders for 
        allegedly plotting against the state, including by opening a 
        criminal investigation against a former Nidaa Tounes 
        parliamentarian.
            (19) On February 21, 2023, President Saied justified 
        widespread arrests and harassment of African migrants and Black 
        Tunisians by accusing ``hordes of irregular migrants'' of 
        criminality and violence, claiming a ``criminal enterprise 
        hatched at the beginning of this century to change the 
        demographic composition of Tunisia'' threatened national 
        security.
            (20) On February 22, 2023, Tunisian authorities arrested 
        Republican Party leader Issam Chebbi and National Salvation 
        Front member Chaima Issa.
            (21) On February 24, 2023, Tunisian authorities arrested 
        National Salvation Front member Jawher Ben Mbarek.
            (22) On April 17, 2023, President Kais Saied vowed 
        ``relentless war'' against opposition figures, such as jailed 
        Ennahdha party leader Rached Ghannouchi, and shuttered Ennahdha 
        offices and the offices of an ideologically broad opposition 
        coalition.
            (23) As of April 20, 2023, an International Monetary Fund 
        loan for Tunisia remains stalled as President Saied's 
        characterized necessary reforms as ``foreign diktats'' and 
        decried proposed cuts in subsidies as socially destabilizing.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It shall be the policy of the United States--
            (1) to forge a strong and lasting partnership with the 
        Government of Tunisia to support shared national security 
        interests to include countering the enduring threat of 
        transnational terrorism and promoting regional stability;
            (2) to develop and implement a security strategy that 
        builds partner capacity to address shared threats and cements 
        the role of the United States as the partner of choice;
            (3) to encourage standards and training for the Tunisian 
        Armed Forces that enshrines military professionalism and 
        respect for civil-military relations;
            (4) to support the Tunisian people's aspirations for a 
        democratic future and support democratic principles in Tunisia, 
        to include a robust civil society, respect for freedoms of 
        expression and association, press freedom, separation of 
        powers, and the rule of law;
            (5) to support the Tunisian people's livelihoods and 
        aspirations for economic dignity;
            (6) to work in tandem with our G7 and other partners to 
        promote Tunisia's return to democratic principles in a manner 
        that halts democratic backsliding, stabilizes the economic 
        crisis, spurs economic development, and mitigates destabilizing 
        migration flows; and
            (7) to readjust bilateral United States foreign assistance, 
        including security assistance, based on the progress of the 
        Government of Tunisia toward meeting the democratic aspirations 
        and economic needs of the Tunisian people.

SEC. 4. LIMITATION ON FUNDS; CREATION OF TUNISIA DEMOCRACY SUPPORT 
              FUND; REPORT.

    (a) In General.--Effective upon the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the Secretary of State , in conjunction with the Administrator of 
the United States Agency for International Development--
            (1) shall limit funding to Tunisia, as provided for in 
        subsection (b); and
            (2) is authorized to establish a ``Tunisia Democracy 
        Support Fund'', as provided for in subsection (c), to encourage 
        reforms that restore Tunisian democracy and rule of law.
    (b) Limitation on Funds.--Of the amounts authorized to be 
appropriated or otherwise made available in fiscal years 2024 and 2025 
to carry out chapters 1 and 8 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), chapters 1 through 6, 8, and 9 of 
part II of such Act (22 U.S.C. 2301 et seq.), and section 23 of the 
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) for the Government of Tunisia, 
25 percent the amount made available under each such authority for each 
such fiscal year shall be withheld from obligation, with the exception 
of funding for Tunisian civil society, until the Secretary of State 
determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees 
that the Government of Tunisia--
            (1) has ceased its use of military courts to try civilians;
            (2) is making clear and consistent progress in releasing 
        political prisoners; and
            (3) has terminated all states of emergency.
    (c) Tunisia Democracy Support Fund Authorized.--
            (1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated to 
        the Secretary of State $100,000,000 for each of the fiscal 
        years 2024 and 2025, which shall be used to establish the 
        ``Tunisia Democracy Support Fund'' for the purpose of 
        encouraging reforms that--
                    (A) restore Tunisia's democratic institutions;
                    (B) restore the rule of law; and
                    (C) stabilize the Tunisian economy.
            (2) Limitation.--Funds authorized to be appropriated 
        pursuant to paragraph (1) shall not be available for obligation 
        until the Secretary of State certifies in writing to the 
        appropriate congressional committees that the Government of 
        Tunisia has demonstrated measurable progress towards the 
        democratic benchmarks outlined in subsection (d).
    (d) Democratic Benchmarks.--Pursuant to subsection (c)(2), the 
democratic benchmarks to be addressed in the Secretary of State's 
certification are whether the Government of Tunisia--
            (1) appropriately empowers Parliament to serve the Tunisian 
        people and serve as an independent, co-equal branch of 
        government essential to a healthy democracy;
            (2) restores judicial independence and establishes the 
        Constitutional Court in a manner that fosters an independent 
        judiciary and serves as a check on the presidency;
            (3) is taking credible steps to respect freedoms of 
        expression, association, and the press;
            (4) creates an enabling operating environment in which 
        Tunisian civil society organizations can operate without undue 
        interference, including permitting international funding; and
            (5) ceases efforts to intimidate Tunisian independent media 
        through arbitrary arrests and criminal prosecutions of 
        journalists on illegitimate charges.
    (e) Initial Report, Annual Report and Briefing.--
            (1) Initial report.--Not later than 120 days after the date 
        of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter through 
        2028, the Secretary of State shall provide a report and 
        accompanying briefing to the appropriate congressional 
        committees that describes--
                    (A) the state of Tunisia's democracy and associated 
                progress on the democratic benchmarks outlined in 
                subsection (d); and
                    (B) how United States foreign assistance is funding 
                programs to support progress towards achieving such 
                benchmarks.
            (2) Form of report.--The report required by paragraph (1) 
        shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
        classified annex.
    (f) Waiver.--The Secretary of State may waive the limitation on 
funding under subsection (b) if the Secretary, not later than 15 days 
before the waiver is to take effect, certifies to the appropriate 
congressional committees that such waiver is in the national interest 
of the United States. The Secretary shall submit with the certification 
a detailed justification explaining the reasons for the waiver.
    (g) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
congressional committees'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
            (2) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
            (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives; and
            (4) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
        Representatives.

SEC. 5. SUNSET.

    This Act shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after the date 
of the enactment of this Act.
                                                       Calendar No. 152

118th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                                S. 2006

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

   To foster Tunisia's democratic institutions, to limit funds until 
Tunisia restores checks and balances, and to authorize the creation of 
                 a fund to support democratic reforms.

_______________________________________________________________________

                             July 25, 2023

                       Reported with an amendment