[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1674 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>






118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1674

 To provide for better security and accountability with respect to the 
strategic and non-strategic nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation 
      and the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 18, 2023

Mr. Cotton (for himself, Mr. Risch, Mr. Rubio, Mr. Cramer, Mr. Scott of 
Florida, Mr. Barrasso, Mr. Budd, Mr. Ricketts, Mr. Hagerty, Mr. Rounds, 
 and Mr. Cruz) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
             referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
 To provide for better security and accountability with respect to the 
strategic and non-strategic nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation 
      and the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``No START Treaty Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The United States and the Russian Federation signed the 
        New START Treaty in April 2010, and the treaty entered into 
        force in February 2011.
            (2) The central limits of the New START Treaty prohibit the 
        United States and the Russian Federation from possessing any 
        more than 700 deployed strategic nuclear launchers, 800 
        deployed and non-deployed strategic nuclear launchers, and 
        1,550 nuclear warheads attributed to those deployed launchers.
            (3) The New START Treaty includes an inspection and 
        verification regime that includes 18 on-site inspections per 
        year, data exchanges and notifications, and a Bilateral 
        Consultative Commission as a compliance and implementation 
        convening body.
            (4) The New START Treaty allows each party the right to 
        withdraw if it decides that extraordinary events related to the 
        subject matter of the treaty jeopardize its supreme interests.
            (5) The New START Treaty placed no constraints on Russia's 
        estimated 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons, which can be 
        delivered by a variety of ground-based, air-based, and sea-
        based platforms. In contrast, the United States possesses only 
        a small inventory of aircraft-deliverable non-strategic nuclear 
        gravity bombs.
            (6) The New START Treaty did not constrain the arsenal of 
        the People's Republic of China, which is now engaged in a 
        strategic breakout of its nuclear forces. The Department of 
        Defense estimates that China will have about 1,000 operational 
        nuclear warheads by 2030 and about 1,500 warheads by 2035 if it 
        continues at its current pace.
            (7) The Department of Defense acknowledged in its 2022 
        Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the 
        People's Republic of China that China took only two years to 
        double its nuclear arsenal, far sooner than the Department's 
        2020 estimate that it would take China until 2030 to double its 
        nuclear arsenal.
            (8) Even when the Russian Federation was found compliant 
        with the New START Treaty, it developed multiple strategic 
        nuclear-armed systems that circumvented the spirit and intent 
        of the treaty, such as a nuclear-powered cruise missile and 
        nuclear-powered torpedo.
            (9) In March 2020, the United States and the Russian 
        Federation mutually agreed to suspend New START Treaty 
        inspections due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
            (10) On February 3, 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken 
        announced the unconditional extension of the New START Treaty 
        for an additional five years, until February 5, 2026, the 
        maximum extension allowed by the treaty.
            (11) The Russian Federation refused United States requests 
        in August 2022 to resume New START inspections and refused to 
        engage in the Bilateral Consultative Commission with the United 
        States in November 2022 to work towards resuming inspections.
            (12) Given Russia's refusal to resume mandatory inspections 
        and refusal to participate in the Bilateral Consultative 
        Commission as required by the treaty, the Department of State 
        declared in January 2023 that Russia was noncompliant with the 
        New START Treaty.
            (13) In February 2023, President of the Russian Federation 
        Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would ``suspend'' its 
        participation in the New START Treaty. The New START Treaty has 
        no provision for suspension. Russia shortly thereafter ceased 
        providing to the United States the data on its nuclear arsenal 
        that is required under the treaty.
            (14) The United States remains in compliance with the 
        central limits of the New START Treaty and attempted in good 
        faith to resume mutual inspections under the treaty.
            (15) The United States has not deployed a new nuclear-
        capable delivery system in over 30 years, while the Russian 
        Federation has in that same time deployed over a dozen new 
        nuclear-capable delivery systems. Russia also has active 
        nuclear production facilities that enable it to produce large 
        numbers of new warheads.
            (16) The United States nuclear modernization program of 
        record does not expand the United States nuclear arsenal from 
        current levels, while the People's Republic of China is growing 
        its nuclear arsenal as part of what former Commander of the 
        United States Strategic Command, Admiral Richard, has labeled 
        ``breathtaking''. China's deployed forces will achieve 
        effective parity with the United States arsenal deployed under 
        the New START Treaty by 2035, if not sooner.
            (17) In its resolution of advice and consent to 
        ratification of the New START Treaty in 2010, the Senate stated 
        that ``if, during the time the New START Treaty remains in 
        force, the President determines that there has been an 
        expansion of the strategic arsenal of any country not party to 
        the New START Treaty so as to jeopardize the supreme interests 
        of the United States, then the President should consult on an 
        urgent basis with the Senate to determine whether adherence to 
        the New START Treaty remains in the national interest of the 
        United States''. To date, the President has taken no action to 
        consult with the Senate on this issue, even though China's 
        actions clearly meet this standard.
            (18) For deterrence to be effective, United States 
        Strategic Command needs to be confident it can hold at risk 
        what an adversary values most, including its nuclear forces. 
        Therefore, the expansion of the nuclear arsenals of the Russian 
        Federation and the People's Republic of China directly impact 
        United States deterrence requirements.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) arms control is not an end in and of itself, and is 
        only useful if it strengthens the security of the United States 
        and its allies;
            (2) the extension of the New START Treaty in 2021 with no 
        conditions attached and no attempts to resolve the numerous 
        shortcomings of the original treaty harmed United States 
        national security and emboldened America's adversaries;
            (3) the Russian Federation is in material breach of its 
        commitments under the New START Treaty, and Russia's 
        ``suspension'' of the treaty represents a de facto withdrawal 
        from the treaty;
            (4) Russia's de facto withdrawal from the New START Treaty 
        removes the treaty's value to the national security interest of 
        the United States and its allies of limiting strategic nuclear 
        weapons, as the United States is now unable to confirm Russia 
        is adhering to the central limits of the treaty;
            (5) China's nuclear buildup meets the Senate criterion of 
        an expansion of the strategic arsenal of a country not party to 
        the New START Treaty that jeopardizes the supreme interests of 
        the United States;
            (6) Due to Russia's de facto withdrawal from the New START 
        Treaty and China's nuclear expansion, the New START Treaty is 
        no longer in the United States national interest and the United 
        States should withdraw;
            (7) after the New START Treaty expires or becomes defunct, 
        any new arms control agreement or treaty that sets numerical 
        limits on nuclear arsenals should limit the Russian 
        Federation's nuclear arsenal--strategic and non-strategic--and 
        should also restrict the nuclear arsenal of the People's 
        Republic of China without allowing China to increase its 
        arsenal to reach treaty limits;
            (8) the United States should not divest itself of, or slow 
        or halt the development or procurement of, any nuclear-capable 
        strategic or non-strategic delivery systems unless a new 
        nuclear arms control treaty is ratified that similarly 
        constrains the nuclear arsenals of both the Russian Federation 
        and the People's Republic of China; and
            (9) the United States should strengthen its nuclear forces, 
        to include growing the size of its nuclear arsenal, 
        strengthening its force posture, and acquiring additional 
        capabilities, to account for the growth in deterrence 
        requirements caused by the expansion of the nuclear arsenals of 
        the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation since 
        the New START Treaty was signed, as well as to hedge against a 
        Russian breakout from New START Treaty limits.

SEC. 4. ASSESSMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE 
              IMPROVEMENTS REQUIRED.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with 
the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report on United States nuclear deterrence.
    (b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
include the following elements:
            (1) An assessment of the adequacy of the current and 
        planned nuclear arsenal of the United States for purposes of 
        facing its adversaries, with a focus on the new dynamics 
        associated with facing two major nuclear powers simultaneously 
        in both peacetime and in conflict. The assessment shall 
        describe--
                    (A) the sufficiency of the size and structure of 
                the current and planned arsenal to maintain deterrence 
                with respect to two nuclear-peers without reduced 
                levels of risk or redundancy;
                    (B) the sufficiency of the size and structure of 
                the current and planned arsenal to maintain deterrence 
                of two nuclear-peers without reduced levels of risk or 
                redundancy should the Russian Federation grow its 
                nuclear forces beyond the levels allowed under the 
                central limits of the New START Treaty and should the 
                People's Republic of China continue to grow its nuclear 
                forces after reaching parity with the currently 
                deployed United States nuclear arsenal under the New 
                START Treaty;
                    (C) the impact of emerging technology, such as 
                nuclear-armed hypersonic weapons and fractional orbital 
                bombardment systems, on United States nuclear posture 
                and planning; and
                    (D) the current and planned sufficiency of nuclear 
                command, control, and communications capabilities in 
                crisis or conflict scenarios.
            (2) A proposed implementation plan to address any 
        deficiencies found in the assessment described in paragraph 
        (1). The plan shall include--
                    (A) needed changes to the planned nuclear force 
                structure and force posture based on any gaps in 
                deterrence and assurance capabilities;
                    (B) a proposal and timeline to improve the 
                survivability of the strategic bomber force;
                    (C) a proposal and timeline detailing the steps 
                necessary to return a portion of the strategic bomber 
                force to heightened alert status;
                    (D) a proposal and timeline detailing the steps 
                necessary to reduce the time necessary to upload 
                nuclear weapons to the bomber force;
                    (E) a proposal and timeline detailing the steps 
                necessary--
                            (i) to upload additional warheads to the 
                        Minuteman III ICBM fleet to its full capacity; 
                        and
                            (ii) to deploy Sentinel missiles as they 
                        come online with the maximum number of warheads 
                        that can be deployed on each missile; and
                    (F) a proposal and timeline detailing the steps 
                necessary to restore submarine-launched ballistic 
                missile tubes on Ohio-class submarines that were 
                rendered inoperable to comply with the terms of the New 
                START Treaty.
            (3) The national security implications of--
                    (A) any unilateral reductions of the United States 
                nuclear arsenal without corresponding reductions in 
                Russia and China's nuclear arsenal; and
                    (B) any unilateral reductions in the United States' 
                national and theater missile defense without 
                corresponding reductions in Russia and China's missile 
                defense.

SEC. 5. REQUIREMENTS FOR FUTURE NUCLEAR ARMS AGREEMENTS.

    (a) Requirements.--The President and any representative of the 
President shall not negotiate, sign, or otherwise agree to any treaty 
with the Russian Federation pertaining to nuclear weapons where the 
number of nuclear warheads or nuclear-capable delivery systems 
possessed by the Russian Federation would be numerically equal in size 
to, or greater than, the nuclear arsenal of the United States, unless 
such treaty or agreement--
            (1) also restricts the size of the nuclear arsenal of the 
        People's Republic of China without allowing China to build up 
        to treaty limits;
            (2) includes an inspection regime and other verification 
        measures to ensure with high confidence that the Russian 
        Federation and the People's Republic of China are compliant 
        with the terms of the treaty or agreement;
            (3) includes an inspection regime of the relevant nuclear 
        facilities of the People's Republic of China that is comparable 
        to the treaty's or agreement's inspection regime of the 
        relevant nuclear facilities of the Russian Federation;
            (4) includes current and future Russian strategic nuclear 
        systems of a strategic character that are not currently limited 
        by the New START Treaty, including--
                    (A) non-ballistic missiles of intercontinental 
                ranges;
                    (B) underwater unmanned systems of intercontinental 
                ranges; and
                    (C) hypersonic glide vehicles that can be delivered 
                by systems of intercontinental ranges; and
            (5) includes current and future non-strategic nuclear 
        weapons and delivery systems.
    (b) Prohibition on Unilateral Reductions.--
            (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the 
        President shall not reduce the size of the United States 
        nuclear arsenal without a nuclear arms treaty approved with the 
        advice and consent of the Senate, pursuant to article II, 
        section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States 
        that satisfies the requirements described in subsection (a).
            (2) Exception.--The prohibition in paragraph (1) does not 
        apply to the following activities:
                    (A) The maintenance or sustainment of United States 
                nuclear systems.
                    (B) Ensuring the safety, security, or reliability 
                of United States nuclear systems.
                    (C) Facilitating the transition of existing legacy 
                systems to modern delivery systems.
    (c) Prohibition on Bargaining With Missile Defense.--The President 
shall not negotiate, sign, or otherwise agree to any agreement or 
treaty with the Russian Federation or the People's Republic of China 
that would limit or reduce the United States national or theater 
missile defenses unless the United States has already ratified a treaty 
that satisfies the requirements described in subsection (a).
    (d) Withholding of Funds.--Beginning on the date that is one year 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, no funds shall be expended 
to implement the New START Treaty, any successor agreement to the New 
START Treaty, or any other new or newly amended nuclear arms control 
treaty or agreement with the Russian Federation that limits the numbers 
of nuclear warheads or nuclear-capable delivery systems possessed by 
the United States unless--
            (1) such treaties or agreements satisfy the requirements 
        described in subsection (a); or
            (2) a different treaty or agreement is already in effect 
        that satisfies the requirements described in subsection (a).
    (e) Waiver.--The President may waive the prohibition in subsection 
(d) with respect to a particular new or newly amended agreement or 
treaty if--
            (1) two-thirds of the Senate first agrees to a joint 
        resolution of approval in support of the new or newly amended 
        agreement or treaty; and
            (2) the President certifies to the appropriate 
        congressional committees that the agreement or treaty is in the 
        national security interests of the United States and does not 
        harm the deterrent capability of the United States.

SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee 
                on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on 
                Appropriations of the Senate; and
                    (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee 
                on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations 
                of the House of Representatives.
            (2) New start treaty.--the term ``New START Treaty'' means 
        the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian 
        Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation 
        of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed April 8, 2010, and entered 
        into force February 5, 2011.
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