[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1674 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
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118th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 1674
To provide for better security and accountability with respect to the
strategic and non-strategic nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation
and the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
May 18, 2023
Mr. Cotton (for himself, Mr. Risch, Mr. Rubio, Mr. Cramer, Mr. Scott of
Florida, Mr. Barrasso, Mr. Budd, Mr. Ricketts, Mr. Hagerty, Mr. Rounds,
and Mr. Cruz) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To provide for better security and accountability with respect to the
strategic and non-strategic nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation
and the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``No START Treaty Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States and the Russian Federation signed the
New START Treaty in April 2010, and the treaty entered into
force in February 2011.
(2) The central limits of the New START Treaty prohibit the
United States and the Russian Federation from possessing any
more than 700 deployed strategic nuclear launchers, 800
deployed and non-deployed strategic nuclear launchers, and
1,550 nuclear warheads attributed to those deployed launchers.
(3) The New START Treaty includes an inspection and
verification regime that includes 18 on-site inspections per
year, data exchanges and notifications, and a Bilateral
Consultative Commission as a compliance and implementation
convening body.
(4) The New START Treaty allows each party the right to
withdraw if it decides that extraordinary events related to the
subject matter of the treaty jeopardize its supreme interests.
(5) The New START Treaty placed no constraints on Russia's
estimated 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons, which can be
delivered by a variety of ground-based, air-based, and sea-
based platforms. In contrast, the United States possesses only
a small inventory of aircraft-deliverable non-strategic nuclear
gravity bombs.
(6) The New START Treaty did not constrain the arsenal of
the People's Republic of China, which is now engaged in a
strategic breakout of its nuclear forces. The Department of
Defense estimates that China will have about 1,000 operational
nuclear warheads by 2030 and about 1,500 warheads by 2035 if it
continues at its current pace.
(7) The Department of Defense acknowledged in its 2022
Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the
People's Republic of China that China took only two years to
double its nuclear arsenal, far sooner than the Department's
2020 estimate that it would take China until 2030 to double its
nuclear arsenal.
(8) Even when the Russian Federation was found compliant
with the New START Treaty, it developed multiple strategic
nuclear-armed systems that circumvented the spirit and intent
of the treaty, such as a nuclear-powered cruise missile and
nuclear-powered torpedo.
(9) In March 2020, the United States and the Russian
Federation mutually agreed to suspend New START Treaty
inspections due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
(10) On February 3, 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken
announced the unconditional extension of the New START Treaty
for an additional five years, until February 5, 2026, the
maximum extension allowed by the treaty.
(11) The Russian Federation refused United States requests
in August 2022 to resume New START inspections and refused to
engage in the Bilateral Consultative Commission with the United
States in November 2022 to work towards resuming inspections.
(12) Given Russia's refusal to resume mandatory inspections
and refusal to participate in the Bilateral Consultative
Commission as required by the treaty, the Department of State
declared in January 2023 that Russia was noncompliant with the
New START Treaty.
(13) In February 2023, President of the Russian Federation
Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would ``suspend'' its
participation in the New START Treaty. The New START Treaty has
no provision for suspension. Russia shortly thereafter ceased
providing to the United States the data on its nuclear arsenal
that is required under the treaty.
(14) The United States remains in compliance with the
central limits of the New START Treaty and attempted in good
faith to resume mutual inspections under the treaty.
(15) The United States has not deployed a new nuclear-
capable delivery system in over 30 years, while the Russian
Federation has in that same time deployed over a dozen new
nuclear-capable delivery systems. Russia also has active
nuclear production facilities that enable it to produce large
numbers of new warheads.
(16) The United States nuclear modernization program of
record does not expand the United States nuclear arsenal from
current levels, while the People's Republic of China is growing
its nuclear arsenal as part of what former Commander of the
United States Strategic Command, Admiral Richard, has labeled
``breathtaking''. China's deployed forces will achieve
effective parity with the United States arsenal deployed under
the New START Treaty by 2035, if not sooner.
(17) In its resolution of advice and consent to
ratification of the New START Treaty in 2010, the Senate stated
that ``if, during the time the New START Treaty remains in
force, the President determines that there has been an
expansion of the strategic arsenal of any country not party to
the New START Treaty so as to jeopardize the supreme interests
of the United States, then the President should consult on an
urgent basis with the Senate to determine whether adherence to
the New START Treaty remains in the national interest of the
United States''. To date, the President has taken no action to
consult with the Senate on this issue, even though China's
actions clearly meet this standard.
(18) For deterrence to be effective, United States
Strategic Command needs to be confident it can hold at risk
what an adversary values most, including its nuclear forces.
Therefore, the expansion of the nuclear arsenals of the Russian
Federation and the People's Republic of China directly impact
United States deterrence requirements.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) arms control is not an end in and of itself, and is
only useful if it strengthens the security of the United States
and its allies;
(2) the extension of the New START Treaty in 2021 with no
conditions attached and no attempts to resolve the numerous
shortcomings of the original treaty harmed United States
national security and emboldened America's adversaries;
(3) the Russian Federation is in material breach of its
commitments under the New START Treaty, and Russia's
``suspension'' of the treaty represents a de facto withdrawal
from the treaty;
(4) Russia's de facto withdrawal from the New START Treaty
removes the treaty's value to the national security interest of
the United States and its allies of limiting strategic nuclear
weapons, as the United States is now unable to confirm Russia
is adhering to the central limits of the treaty;
(5) China's nuclear buildup meets the Senate criterion of
an expansion of the strategic arsenal of a country not party to
the New START Treaty that jeopardizes the supreme interests of
the United States;
(6) Due to Russia's de facto withdrawal from the New START
Treaty and China's nuclear expansion, the New START Treaty is
no longer in the United States national interest and the United
States should withdraw;
(7) after the New START Treaty expires or becomes defunct,
any new arms control agreement or treaty that sets numerical
limits on nuclear arsenals should limit the Russian
Federation's nuclear arsenal--strategic and non-strategic--and
should also restrict the nuclear arsenal of the People's
Republic of China without allowing China to increase its
arsenal to reach treaty limits;
(8) the United States should not divest itself of, or slow
or halt the development or procurement of, any nuclear-capable
strategic or non-strategic delivery systems unless a new
nuclear arms control treaty is ratified that similarly
constrains the nuclear arsenals of both the Russian Federation
and the People's Republic of China; and
(9) the United States should strengthen its nuclear forces,
to include growing the size of its nuclear arsenal,
strengthening its force posture, and acquiring additional
capabilities, to account for the growth in deterrence
requirements caused by the expansion of the nuclear arsenals of
the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation since
the New START Treaty was signed, as well as to hedge against a
Russian breakout from New START Treaty limits.
SEC. 4. ASSESSMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE
IMPROVEMENTS REQUIRED.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with
the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on United States nuclear deterrence.
(b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
include the following elements:
(1) An assessment of the adequacy of the current and
planned nuclear arsenal of the United States for purposes of
facing its adversaries, with a focus on the new dynamics
associated with facing two major nuclear powers simultaneously
in both peacetime and in conflict. The assessment shall
describe--
(A) the sufficiency of the size and structure of
the current and planned arsenal to maintain deterrence
with respect to two nuclear-peers without reduced
levels of risk or redundancy;
(B) the sufficiency of the size and structure of
the current and planned arsenal to maintain deterrence
of two nuclear-peers without reduced levels of risk or
redundancy should the Russian Federation grow its
nuclear forces beyond the levels allowed under the
central limits of the New START Treaty and should the
People's Republic of China continue to grow its nuclear
forces after reaching parity with the currently
deployed United States nuclear arsenal under the New
START Treaty;
(C) the impact of emerging technology, such as
nuclear-armed hypersonic weapons and fractional orbital
bombardment systems, on United States nuclear posture
and planning; and
(D) the current and planned sufficiency of nuclear
command, control, and communications capabilities in
crisis or conflict scenarios.
(2) A proposed implementation plan to address any
deficiencies found in the assessment described in paragraph
(1). The plan shall include--
(A) needed changes to the planned nuclear force
structure and force posture based on any gaps in
deterrence and assurance capabilities;
(B) a proposal and timeline to improve the
survivability of the strategic bomber force;
(C) a proposal and timeline detailing the steps
necessary to return a portion of the strategic bomber
force to heightened alert status;
(D) a proposal and timeline detailing the steps
necessary to reduce the time necessary to upload
nuclear weapons to the bomber force;
(E) a proposal and timeline detailing the steps
necessary--
(i) to upload additional warheads to the
Minuteman III ICBM fleet to its full capacity;
and
(ii) to deploy Sentinel missiles as they
come online with the maximum number of warheads
that can be deployed on each missile; and
(F) a proposal and timeline detailing the steps
necessary to restore submarine-launched ballistic
missile tubes on Ohio-class submarines that were
rendered inoperable to comply with the terms of the New
START Treaty.
(3) The national security implications of--
(A) any unilateral reductions of the United States
nuclear arsenal without corresponding reductions in
Russia and China's nuclear arsenal; and
(B) any unilateral reductions in the United States'
national and theater missile defense without
corresponding reductions in Russia and China's missile
defense.
SEC. 5. REQUIREMENTS FOR FUTURE NUCLEAR ARMS AGREEMENTS.
(a) Requirements.--The President and any representative of the
President shall not negotiate, sign, or otherwise agree to any treaty
with the Russian Federation pertaining to nuclear weapons where the
number of nuclear warheads or nuclear-capable delivery systems
possessed by the Russian Federation would be numerically equal in size
to, or greater than, the nuclear arsenal of the United States, unless
such treaty or agreement--
(1) also restricts the size of the nuclear arsenal of the
People's Republic of China without allowing China to build up
to treaty limits;
(2) includes an inspection regime and other verification
measures to ensure with high confidence that the Russian
Federation and the People's Republic of China are compliant
with the terms of the treaty or agreement;
(3) includes an inspection regime of the relevant nuclear
facilities of the People's Republic of China that is comparable
to the treaty's or agreement's inspection regime of the
relevant nuclear facilities of the Russian Federation;
(4) includes current and future Russian strategic nuclear
systems of a strategic character that are not currently limited
by the New START Treaty, including--
(A) non-ballistic missiles of intercontinental
ranges;
(B) underwater unmanned systems of intercontinental
ranges; and
(C) hypersonic glide vehicles that can be delivered
by systems of intercontinental ranges; and
(5) includes current and future non-strategic nuclear
weapons and delivery systems.
(b) Prohibition on Unilateral Reductions.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the
President shall not reduce the size of the United States
nuclear arsenal without a nuclear arms treaty approved with the
advice and consent of the Senate, pursuant to article II,
section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States
that satisfies the requirements described in subsection (a).
(2) Exception.--The prohibition in paragraph (1) does not
apply to the following activities:
(A) The maintenance or sustainment of United States
nuclear systems.
(B) Ensuring the safety, security, or reliability
of United States nuclear systems.
(C) Facilitating the transition of existing legacy
systems to modern delivery systems.
(c) Prohibition on Bargaining With Missile Defense.--The President
shall not negotiate, sign, or otherwise agree to any agreement or
treaty with the Russian Federation or the People's Republic of China
that would limit or reduce the United States national or theater
missile defenses unless the United States has already ratified a treaty
that satisfies the requirements described in subsection (a).
(d) Withholding of Funds.--Beginning on the date that is one year
after the date of the enactment of this Act, no funds shall be expended
to implement the New START Treaty, any successor agreement to the New
START Treaty, or any other new or newly amended nuclear arms control
treaty or agreement with the Russian Federation that limits the numbers
of nuclear warheads or nuclear-capable delivery systems possessed by
the United States unless--
(1) such treaties or agreements satisfy the requirements
described in subsection (a); or
(2) a different treaty or agreement is already in effect
that satisfies the requirements described in subsection (a).
(e) Waiver.--The President may waive the prohibition in subsection
(d) with respect to a particular new or newly amended agreement or
treaty if--
(1) two-thirds of the Senate first agrees to a joint
resolution of approval in support of the new or newly amended
agreement or treaty; and
(2) the President certifies to the appropriate
congressional committees that the agreement or treaty is in the
national security interests of the United States and does not
harm the deterrent capability of the United States.
SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee
on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee
on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations
of the House of Representatives.
(2) New start treaty.--the term ``New START Treaty'' means
the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation
of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed April 8, 2010, and entered
into force February 5, 2011.
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