Middle East integrated maritime domain awareness and interdiction capability

(a)

In general

The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall seek to build upon the historic opportunities created by the Abraham Accords and the incorporation of Israel into the area of responsibility of the United States Central Command to develop a Middle East integrated maritime domain awareness and interdiction capability for the purpose of protecting the people, infrastructure, and territory of such countries from— (1)manned and unmanned naval systems, undersea warfare capabilities, and anti-ship missiles of Iran and groups affiliated with Iran; and (2)violent extremist organizations, criminal networks, and piracy activities that threaten lawful commerce in the waterways within the area of responsibility of the United States Naval Forces Central Command. (b)

Strategy

(1)

In general

Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a strategy for the cooperation described in subsection (a). (2)

Matters to be included

The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall include the following: (A)An assessment of the threats posed to ally or partner countries in the Middle East by— (i)manned and unmanned naval systems, undersea warfare capabilities, and anti-ship missiles of Iran and groups affiliated with Iran; and (ii)violent extremist organizations, criminal networks, and piracy activities that threaten lawful commerce in the waterways within the area of responsibility of the United States Naval Forces Central Command. (B)A description of existing multilateral maritime partnerships currently led by the United States Naval Forces Central Command, including the Combined Maritime Forces (including its associated Task Forces 150, 151, 152, and 153), the International Maritime Security Construct (including its Coalition Task Force SENTINEL), and the Navy's Task Force 59, and a discussion of the role of such partnerships in building an integrated maritime security capability. (C)A description of efforts made and lessons learned in advancing the integration of Israel into the existing multilateral maritime partnerships described in subparagraph (B). (D)A description of efforts among countries in the Middle East to coordinate intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance capabilities and indicators and warnings with respect to the threats described in subparagraph (A), and a description of any impediment to optimizing such efforts. (E)A description of the current Department of Defense systems that, in coordination with ally and partner countries in the Middle East— (i)provide awareness of and defend against such threats; and (ii)address current capability gaps. (F)An explanation of the manner in which an integrated maritime domain awareness and interdiction architecture would improve collective security in the Middle East. (G)A description of existing and planned efforts to engage ally and partner countries in the Middle East in establishing such an architecture. (H)An identification of the elements of such an architecture that may be acquired and operated by ally and partner countries in the Middle East, and a list of such elements for each such ally and partner. (I)An identification of the elements of such an architecture that may only be provided and operated by members of the United States Armed Forces. (J)An identification of any challenge to optimizing such an architecture in the Middle East. (K)An assessment of progress and key challenges in the implementation of the strategy required by paragraph (1) using the metrics identified in accordance with paragraph (3). (L)Recommendations for improvements in the implementation of such strategy based on such metrics. (M)An assessment of any capabilities or lessons from the Navy’s Task Force 59 that may be leveraged to support an integrated maritime domain awareness and interdiction capability in the Middle East. (N)A description and assessment of the joint bilateral and multinational maritime exercises conducted in the Middle East since the establishment of the Navy’s Task Force 59, including a discussion of the manner in which such exercises have impacted the efforts and lessons detailed under subparagraphs (C), (D), and (M). (O)A description of collaboration opportunities between the intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance capabilities of the Navy’s Task Force 59 and the Air Force’s Task Force 99 to support a joint-service approach to maritime domain awareness with sea-based and air-based unmanned assets. (P)Any other matter the Secretary of Defense considers relevant. (3)

Metrics

The Secretary of Defense shall identify metrics to assess progress in the implementation of the strategy required by paragraph (1). (4)

Format

The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex. (c)

Feasibility study

(1)

In general

The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study on the feasibility and advisability of establishing a fund for an integrated maritime domain awareness and interdiction capability to protect the people, infrastructure, and territory of ally and partner countries in the Middle East from— (A)manned and unmanned naval systems, undersea warfare capabilities, and anti-ship missiles of Iran and groups affiliated with Iran; and (B)violent extremist organizations, criminal networks, and piracy activities that threaten lawful commerce in the waterways of the Middle East. (2)

Element

The study required by paragraph (1) shall include an assessment of funds that could be contributed by ally and partner countries of the United States. (3)

Report

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the results of the study conducted under paragraph (1). (d)

Protection of sensitive information

Any activity carried out under this section shall be conducted in a manner that appropriately protects sensitive information and the national security interests of the United States. (e)

Appropriate committees of Congress defined

In this section, the term appropriate committees of Congress means— (1)the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (2)the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.