[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 697 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>






118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 697

 Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives relating to the 
  Communist Party of China's ``Made In China 2025'' Plan and publicly-
known malign Communist Party of China's actions supporting the goals of 
                    its ``Made in China 2025'' plan.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 18, 2023

   Ms. Sherrill (for herself, Mr. Gallagher, and Mr. Krishnamoorthi) 
submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee 
                           on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION


 
 Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives relating to the 
  Communist Party of China's ``Made In China 2025'' Plan and publicly-
known malign Communist Party of China's actions supporting the goals of 
                    its ``Made in China 2025'' plan.

    Resolved,

SECTION 1. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA'S ``MADE IN CHINA 2025'' PLAN.

    The House of Representatives finds the following:
            (1) In 2006, the Communist Party of China (in this 
        resolution referred to as ``CCP'') intensified its focus on 
        science and technology innovation as a national goal under the 
        ``Medium- and Long-Term Plan for Science and Technology 
        Development'' and its 13th and 14th Five-Year Plans.
            (2) The ``Made in China 2025'' plan (in this resolution 
        referred to as ``MIC2025''), issued in 2015, under the 13th 
        Five Year Plan is the CCP's 10-year national science and 
        technology industrial policy that seeks to vault China into 
        global leadership in the research and manufacturing of advanced 
        science and technology tools, applications, and products, while 
        using a whole-of-society approach, deep government 
        intervention, and market protections for the People's Republic 
        of China (in this resolution referred to as ``PRC'') businesses 
        in the select sectors.
            (3) MIC2025 prioritizes raising high bars to foreign market 
        access, while increasing PRC investments in and government and 
        business focus on proactively acquiring technology and 
        knowledge abroad on these advanced science and technology 
        areas:
                    (A) Advanced information technology and 
                telecommunications services.
                    (B) Advanced machining and robotics.
                    (C) Aerospace engineering and equipment.
                    (D) Maritime infrastructure, equipment, and next 
                generation vessels.
                    (E) Advanced railway infrastructure.
                    (F) Renewable energy products, batteries, and 
                electric vehicles.
                    (G) Advanced materials.
                    (H) Innovative farming equipment, technology, and 
                agriculture.
                    (I) Biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and advanced 
                medical equipment.
                    (J) Next generation electrical equipment.
            (4) MIC2025 sector development will further integrate 
        emerging technologies, such as advance semiconductors, 3D 
        printing, cloud computing, big-data analytics, quantum 
        computing, artificial intelligence (AI), and new forms of 
        energy.
            (5) The PRC's leader Xi Jinping, who currently holds the 
        role of State Chairman of the PRC, General Secretary of the 
        Chinese Communist Party, and Chairman of the Central Military 
        Commission, states that CCP plans to lessen the PRC's reliance 
        on foreign markets for goods and services by 2025 and a goal 
        for at least seventy-percent self-sufficiency in MIC2025 areas 
        by using foreign technology acquisitions and joint ventures to 
        acquire, domestically produce, and then sell these goods 
        abroad.
            (6) The PRC's stated goal in its MIC2025 policy is to 
        advance production in the PRC from products that are ``Made in 
        China'' to those that are ``Created in China'', using the 
        underpinnings of MIC2025 to transform foreign innovations into 
        a homegrown industrial base to promote scientific, 
        technological, and manufacturing independence.
            (7) In 2021, the CCP's Central Committee published a 
        resolution on its self-made achievements over the course of the 
        past century, stating that PRC ``self-reliance in science and 
        technology'' and its ``bolstered . . . creation, protection, 
        and application of intellectual property rights'' are key 
        tenets of boosting the CCP's position, while not including 
        references to foreign trade or economic and commercial 
        partnerships as a part of its advancement.
            (8) In November 2022, during the CCP's Party Congress, the 
        CCP noted again that science and technological innovation are 
        core tenets of the PRC's development and according to the PRC's 
        Ministry of Science and Technology, international collaborative 
        science and technology efforts are ultimately focused on 
        boosting the PRC's security.
            (9) Importantly, that along with the MIC2025 plan, there is 
        a policy of ``dual-circulation'', both policies which are 
        overseen by General Secretary Xi Jinping, that seek to transfer 
        into the PRC the globe's innovative technical ideas and 
        products, produce them domestically for their own large 
        population, and then sell them abroad to obtain growing shares 
        of foreign markets, all the while protecting those domestic 
        businesses from foreign competition.
            (10) To further support ``dual-circulation'' and speed its 
        MIC2025 developments, the PRC uses officially sanctioned tools 
        such as unfair government subsidies, state-sponsored talent 
        acquisition programs, lax labor and environmental regulations, 
        coerced foreign investments and acquisitions, direct state 
        investments and policy direction, burdensome paperwork 
        requirements for foreign firms, and forced transfers of 
        intellectual property.
            (11) The CCP broadly uses a national concept of military-
        civil fusion to adapt and adopt civilian technologies--either 
        domestically produced or taken from abroad--to boost its 
        military capabilities.
            (12) The CCP has over the past few years and especially in 
        2023, broadened and deepened the scope of its 
        counterintelligence and data security laws, along with the use 
        of these laws against businesses from other countries.
            (13) MIC2025 is rapidly coming to a close, and the next 
        steps include a CCP desire to dominate international standard 
        setting by 2035 and be the global leader in technological 
        innovation, manufacturing, industrial production, and military 
        capabilities by 2049, supported by its 14th Five Year Plan and 
        its National Medium- to Long-Term Science and Technology 
        Development Plan. These plans' intentions focus on basic 
        science, domestication of critical commercial areas and getting 
        the PRC to the forefront of ``this century's critical 
        technologies''.

SEC. 2. PUBLICLY-KNOWN MALIGN CCP ACTIONS SUPPORTING ITS MIC2025 GOALS.

    The House of Representatives finds the following:
            (1) In March 2023, the PRC Commerce Minister stated that 
        2023 would be a year of ``Invest[ing] in China'', in front of 
        global business executives, stating the PRC sought to boost 
        investments in its manufacturing and high-tech sectors and that 
        the PRC would reduce restrictions on foreign firms. However, 
        the government took immediate actions to the contrary.
            (2) In April 2023, the National People's Congress passed an 
        updated and newly expanded counterespionage law stating that 
        any, ``attempts to illegally obtain or share state secrets or 
        other data, materials, or items related to national security or 
        national interests, which are carried out by or for foreign 
        elements other than an espionage organization . . .'' is 
        punishable, without defining ``national security'', ``national 
        interests'', or organizations of concern, while reiterating the 
        policy that all aspects of society are to collect, report, and 
        defend against any transgressions against the government.
            (3) In 2023, PRC authorities raided global consulting firms 
        Bain & Company, Capvision, and Mintz Group on the grounds of 
        collecting and assessing PRC business data, which have been a 
        routine part of these companies' business operations.
            (4) General Secretary Xi Jinping has overseen an expansive 
        growth in national security laws that are loosely defined and 
        nebulously enforced with no legal recourse and requiring 
        mandatory cooperation. These laws include the new 
        Counterespionage Law, the National Security Law, the Foreign 
        NGO Management Law, the National Intelligence Law, the Hong 
        Kong National Security Law, and the Data Security Law.
            (5) In 2023, PRC regulators put on notice United States 
        semiconductor company Micron Technologies by embarking on a 
        surprise investigation without claiming any vulnerabilities in 
        Micron's products and without concrete evidence that PRC 
        regulators needed to ``secur[e] the information of 
        infrastructure of [China's] supply chain'', ostensibly for 
        national security reasons.
            (6) In 2023, the PRC's State Administration for Market 
        Regulation reportedly slowed and denied its review process 
        slowed its review process of United States global acquisitions 
        and mergers, while requiring United States firms make available 
        all of their products in the PRC that are available to other 
        countries in a likely effort to dull United States export 
        controls.
            (7) In 2022, the Department of Justice indicted the PRC 
        firm Hytera Communications Corp for retro-engineering and 
        stealing proprietary Motorola technology, which Hytera then 
        sold abroad.
            (8) In 2021, a PRC front company named ``LinkOcean'' 
        falsified its business information to steal and transfer to a 
        PRC military university on the Department of Commerce's Entity 
        List over $100,000 in special underwater marine technologies.
            (9) In 2020, the PRC software technology firm Baidu used 
        fake ad-clicking software to boost its ad revenues, while 
        stealing user information and transmitting it back to the PRC.
            (10) Since 2020, the CCP has not fulfilled its obligations 
        under the Phase One Trade Agreement between the United States 
        and the PRC and continues to require the transfer of sensitive 
        United States agricultural company knowledge to PRC firms.
            (11) In 2019, United States firm Akhan Semiconductor's 
        proprietary glass was stolen by PRC telecommunications firm 
        Huawei, who attempted to retro-engineer it in violation of 
        United States export control law.
            (12) In 2018, United States wind energy firm ASMC, after 
        signing a sales deal with the PRC firm Sinovel Wind Group Co., 
        Ltd., had its proprietary intellectual property stolen by 
        Sinovel, who then manufactured ASMC's products and sold the 
        products in the United States.
            (13) In 2017, PRC cyber actors were caught widely illicitly 
        collecting private business information on sectors across the 
        MIC2025 portfolio.
            (14) In 2016, a PRC seed company illicitly acquired and 
        intended to smuggle proprietary seeds from Iowa to the PRC, 
        while to this day the PRC agricultural seed market remains 
        blocked from foreign competition.
            (15) Throughout the 2020s, PRC state-sanctioned cyber actor 
        ``APT 41'' conducted operations in line with MIC2025, stealing 
        at least hundreds of billions of dollars worth of intellectual 
        property from multinational corporations, much of which was 
        emerging technology or not yet invented products.
            (16) According to a Center for Strategic and International 
        Studies analysis of publicly known PRC espionage cases, which 
        vastly outnumber any other foreign state, almost half of the 
        perpetrators were military affiliates, almost half used cyber 
        means to steal data, and over half sought to collect commercial 
        information.
            (17) The PRC's Tax Bureau previously ordered United States 
        companies doing business in the PRC to use software 
        purposefully loaded with malicious malware.
            (18) PRC ``Talent Programs'' have been used to select 
        certain well-placed individuals to target certain United States 
        research sectors to compromise intellectual property, 
        tarnishing the sanctity of open and transparent norms of 
        international research, international academic collaboration, 
        and America's vibrant and vital foreign student researcher 
        population.
            (19) The China Scholarship Council, which facilitates high 
        performing PRC students studying abroad and foreign students to 
        study in the PRC, has been found to require students sign 
        Council contracts that require reporting on their work to PRC 
        officials and limitations on students' academic freedom while 
        abroad.
            (20) The CCP allows forced labor, low environmental 
        standards, mandated overproduction of products, and minimal 
        worker safeguards, all of which act as non-monetary subsidies 
        to cheapen products from the PRC.
            (21) Since General Secretary Xi Jinping assumed power, he 
        re-asserted the role of state-owned enterprises in the economy 
        and increased the purchases of shares in private PRC 
        businesses.
            (22) The Department of Commerce, because of continued PRC 
        government intervention into important sectors of the PRC 
        economy, continues to certify that the PRC remains a non-market 
        economy, alongside the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of 
        Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, Georgia, the Kyrgyz 
        Republic, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, the 
        Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the Republic of 
        Uzbekistan, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
            (23) Upon widespread public acknowledgment and initial 
        United States action to confront MIC2025, the CCP still abides 
        by, but no longer publicly acknowledges MIC2025 or the detailed 
        plans, intentions, and activities to accomplish its 14th Five 
        Year Plan or long-term science and technology goals.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

    It is the sense of the House of Representatives that--
            (1) the United States finds itself in not only a security 
        and diplomatic competition, but one heavily based upon economic 
        and commercial competition;
            (2) the CCP seeks to dominate the sectors in MIC2025 
        through unfair trade practices, such as forced labor, low 
        environmental standards, illegal subsidies, and stolen foreign 
        research and intellectual property, and then create and 
        recreate the products in the PRC often to be sold abroad at 
        cheaper-than-market rates, with the ultimate goal being to 
        undercut, if not bankrupt, United States businesses and stifle 
        United States manufacturing and investments in critical future 
        technologies;
            (3) all United States businesses, research institutions, 
        and United States Federal entities involved in cutting edge 
        research and design--no matter their size, funding, or where 
        they are located--are MIC2025 targets for CCP disruption, 
        intelligence collection, intellectual property theft, unfair 
        competitive practices, and commercial coercion;
            (4) United States science and technology firms should 
        prepare themselves for growing unfair trade practices and 
        continued theft of intellectual property, particularly as Xi 
        Jinping's tenure continues;
            (5) United States public, private, and non-profit 
        collaboration will drive United States innovation and must do 
        so with speed and purpose, as this era of strategic competition 
        will be won by close, coordinated, and collaborative work 
        between the United States public, private, and non-profit 
        sectors and strategic partners abroad;
            (6) United States businesses, non-profits, academia, and 
        Federal entities should review their security practices to 
        protect their buildings, technology, products, proprietary 
        knowledge, and personnel from all undue foreign interference 
        and espionage, including instituting thorough screenings and 
        reviews for business or research collaborations with countries 
        and entities that are named in sanctions or export control 
        documents or are known to use illicit third party entities, 
        such as ``shell companies'', to subvert import restrictions or 
        obfuscate dual-use military interests in seemingly benign 
        civilian research efforts;
            (7) United States businesses, non-profits, academia, and 
        Federal entities involved in MIC2025 areas should review and 
        invest in Federal and State guidelines on cybersecurity 
        practices and tools, research security standards, and 
        counterintelligence risk postures;
            (8) every United States Government agency and department 
        should orient their internal resources and postures to prepare 
        for an era of strategic competition with the CCP, which will 
        affect security, diplomatic, economic, and commercial factors;
            (9) Federal entities should also seek to boost outreach to 
        the private, academic, and non-profits sectors to find new ways 
        to partner in science and technical efforts, alongside new ways 
        to protect United States innovation;
            (10) United States Government agencies and departments 
        should review their regulations and processes to ensure that 
        internal rulemaking does not unnecessarily slow the United 
        States ability to compete with the CCP and that it protects 
        United States ingenuity and commercial products, while keeping 
        pace with the rate of scientific, technological, manufacturing, 
        and commercial advancements;
            (11) the Department of Commerce finds itself at the 
        frontline of global strategic competition;
            (12) Congress should support the Department of Commerce's 
        efforts at home and abroad while conducting rigorous oversight 
        to ensure the Department is prioritizing the long-term interest 
        of the national security, economic security, and well-being of 
        the United States;
            (13) Federal entities should support United States private 
        and research institutions organizations that seek to diversify 
        their supply chains, increase their understanding of the level 
        of PRC-produced content in their supply chains, or extend trade 
        relationships with new Pacific partners;
            (14) United States treaty allies and non-treaty partners 
        have a tremendous part to play in strategic competition and the 
        United States Government should seek to bolster diplomatic and 
        commercial relationships with these partners;
            (15) the United States desires a stable and fair playing 
        field in its commercial relationships abroad, with reciprocal 
        access and mutual benefits, and the United States values 
        international research and development relationships based upon 
        trust and goodwill; and
            (16) opposes the above-mentioned unfair, aggressive actions 
        and policies of the CCP and supports the people of the PRC in 
        creating an economy that is open to honest global partnership, 
        free from malign intent, and aligns with the norms of modern 
        global trade.
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