[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 8824 Introduced in House (IH)]

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118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 8824

 To require the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to strengthen 
 United States-European nuclear energy cooperation and combat Russian 
        malign influence in the nuclear energy sector in Europe.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 25, 2024

Mr. Keating (for himself, Mr. Foster, and Mr. Huizenga) introduced the 
 following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
 To require the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to strengthen 
 United States-European nuclear energy cooperation and combat Russian 
        malign influence in the nuclear energy sector in Europe.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``The U.S.-European Nuclear Energy 
Cooperation Act of 2024''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation initiated 
        a full-scale invasion of Ukraine which has severely threatened 
        energy security in the United States, Europe, and around the 
        world.
            (2) The security of Ukraine's energy grid has been vital to 
        Ukraine's success in its defense of its territory and ensuring 
        the Ukrainian government can effectively provide goods and 
        services to Ukrainian citizens.
            (3) Ukraine has operated four nuclear power plants with 15 
        reactors, primarily Russian-designed water-water energetic 
        reactor (VVER) reactors, and remains dependent on nuclear power 
        for its energy security.
            (4) Russia, in its war of aggression against Ukraine, has 
        systematically targeted Ukraine's energy infrastructure through 
        heavy shelling and targeted attacks, particularly in the winter 
        months when innocent Ukrainian civilians are most vulnerable.
            (5) Since March 2022, Russian forces have illegally 
        occupied the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station, the largest 
        nuclear power plant in Europe, and Russian forces have 
        surrounded the station with landmines, further threatening 
        regional security.
            (6) Russian-designed VVER reactors have been built across 
        Europe, including in Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
        Finland, Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, Turkey, and Ukraine.
            (7) Russia uses its nuclear power plant designs and fuel 
        services to spread malign influence and threaten United States 
        and European energy security.
            (8) As of 2021, Russia owned about 20 percent of the total 
        uranium conversion infrastructure worldwide and in 2020, had 
        the largest uranium enrichment capacity at close to 46 percent.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) in countries seeking or developing a nuclear power 
        industry, the Department of State should prioritize the 
        utilization of products and services from the United States, 
        and then prioritize products and services from Europe and other 
        allied or partner countries, including Canada, Japan, the 
        United Kingdom, and the Republic of Korea when not directly 
        competing with the United States; and
            (2) the United States and its allies must focus on 
        cooperation, including capacity building and early-stage 
        project support, to expand the nuclear industry in Europe in a 
        way that maintains nonproliferation, security, and safety 
        standards and aligns with international obligations and 
        treaties while combating Russian and Chinese malign influence.

SEC. 4. STRATEGY.

    (a) Strategy Required.--The Secretary of State, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Energy and the heads of other relevant Federal 
departments and agencies, shall develop a strategy to strengthen United 
States-European nuclear energy cooperation and combat Russian malign 
influence in the nuclear energy sector in Europe.
    (b) Elements.--The strategy required by subsection (a) shall 
include, at a minimum, the following elements:
            (1) An overview and assessment of the Secretary of State's 
        efforts to broaden participation by United States nuclear 
        industry entities in Europe and promote the accessibility and 
        competitiveness of United States, European, and partner 
        technologies and services against Russian and Chinese 
        technologies in Europe.
            (2) An overview of different nuclear reactor types that are 
        currently deployed or under regulatory review in Europe, 
        including large light-water reactors, small modular light-water 
        reactors, and non-light-water reactors, and--
                    (A) what role, if any, each reactor type could have 
                in reducing Russia's influence over European energy 
                supply by 2030, 2035, 2040, 2045, and 2050;
                    (B) challenges that each reactor type may face with 
                rapid deployment, including costs, market barriers to 
                first-of-a-kind designs, supply chain constraints, and 
                regulatory requirements;
                    (C) the impacts of each reactor type on maintaining 
                strong nonproliferation standards, including the 
                minimization of weapons-usable nuclear material; and
                    (D) opportunities for the use of United States, 
                European, and partner technologies and services in the 
                deployment or potential deployment of each reactor 
                type.
            (3) An overview of different fuel cycles that are currently 
        deployed or under consideration in Europe, including use of low 
        enriched uranium, including high assay low enriched uranium, 
        and spent fuel reprocessing, along with an analysis of the 
        implications of each fuel cycle on--
                    (A) reducing and eliminating Russia's market share 
                in Europe for uranium, conversion, enrichment, and 
                reactor fuel between now and 2030;
                    (B) achieving long-term energy security free of 
                Russian influence; and
                    (C) maintaining strong nonproliferation standards, 
                including the minimization of weapons-usable material 
                as well as high nuclear safety and security standards.
            (4) An overview of nuclear reactor designs and fuel cycle 
        infrastructure that the United States Government is currently 
        funding the development of, and--
                    (A) the potential, if any, that each of these 
                technologies have to decrease or eliminate Russia's 
                market share in the United States and Europe for 
                nuclear power reactors, uranium mining and milling, 
                conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, deconversion, 
                and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing in the short, 
                medium, and long term;
                    (B) the impact of these technologies on the 
                minimization of weapons-usable nuclear material, 
                including the use of highly enriched uranium or 
                plutonium fuels; and
                    (C) an assessment of the use cases for each of 
                these designs and fuel cycles.
            (5) An overview of the United States Government's 
        diplomatic engagements regarding the nuclear energy sector in 
        Europe.
            (6) A list of countries in Europe with active nuclear power 
        programs, and--
                    (A) an analysis of each country's nuclear energy 
                policy;
                    (B) an overview of existing areas of cooperation 
                with regards to nuclear energy between each country 
                and--
                            (i) the United States;
                            (ii) other European and friendly countries; 
                        and
                            (iii) adversarial countries including China 
                        and Russia; and
                    (C) an overview of potential areas for future 
                cooperation between each country and the United States 
                with regards to nuclear energy.
            (7) An overview of Russian and Chinese influence in the 
        European nuclear energy sector.
            (8) An overview of how the United States Government is 
        working with allies and partners to counter Russian malign 
        influence within the European energy sector to include steps 
        taken to counter Russian influence in the mining and milling, 
        conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication processes as well 
        as in reactor construction.
            (9) An overview of how the United States Government 
        balances the urgent strategic need for collaboration with 
        allies and partners on countering Russia's influence on nuclear 
        energy in Europe, with commercial competitiveness issues that 
        may arise between United States companies and companies in 
        Europe, Canada, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.
            (10) An assessment of Rosatom's role in Russia's energy 
        sector, to include an overview of strengths and vulnerabilities 
        of the conglomerate.
    (c) Submission.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees the strategy required by 
subsection (a).
    (d) Form.--The strategy required by subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex, so 
long as such annex is provided separately from the unclassified 
strategy.

SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    There is authorized to be appropriated $30,000,000 for each of 
fiscal years 2025 through 2029 to support critically needed engagement 
in Europe consistent with the strategy required by section 4(a) on 
countering Russian malign influence and with a particular focus on 
responsible nuclear power program capacity building, early stage 
nuclear power project support, and countering Russian disinformation 
campaigns.

SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives;
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate;
                    (C) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the 
                House of the Representatives; and
                    (D) the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 
                of the Senate.
            (2) High assay low enriched uranium.--The term ``high assay 
        low enriched uranium'' means uranium enriched so that the 
        concentration of the fissile isotope uranium-235 (U-235) is 
        between 5 percent and 20 percent of the mass of uranium.
            (3) Low enriched uranium.--The term ``low enriched 
        uranium'' means fuel in which the weight percent of U-235 in 
        the uranium is less than 20 percent.
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