[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 763 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
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117th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. RES. 763
Establishing a Senate Select Committee on the United States withdrawal
from Afghanistan.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
September 14, 2022
Mr. Hawley submitted the following resolution; which was referred to
the Committee on Rules and Administration
_______________________________________________________________________
RESOLUTION
Establishing a Senate Select Committee on the United States withdrawal
from Afghanistan.
Resolved,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This resolution may be cited as the ``Senate Select Committee on
the Afghanistan Withdrawal Resolution''.
SEC. 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.
There is established a select committee of the Senate, to be known
as the Select Committee on the United States Withdrawal from
Afghanistan (referred to in this resolution as the ``Senate Select
Committee''), to investigate and report on the United States withdrawal
from Afghanistan.
SEC. 3. MEMBERSHIP.
(a) In General.--The Senate Select Committee shall be composed of
20 Members of the Senate appointed according to the following:
(1) The majority leader of the Senate shall appoint 2
members.
(2) The minority leader of the Senate shall appoint 2
members.
(3) The chairman of the Committee on Armed Services shall
appoint 2 members.
(4) The ranking member of the Committee on Armed Services
shall appoint 2 members.
(5) The chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations
shall appoint 2 members.
(6) The ranking member of the Committee on Foreign
Relations shall appoint 2 members.
(7) The chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs shall appoint 2 members.
(8) The ranking member of the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs shall appoint 2 members.
(9) The chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence
shall appoint 2 members.
(10) The ranking member of the Select Committee on
Intelligence shall appoint 2 members.
(b) Appointment of Co-Chairs.--The majority leader and the minority
leader of the Senate shall each appoint 1 co-chair of the Senate Select
Committee from the members appointed to the Senate Select Committee.
(c) Date.--Members of the Senate Select Committee shall be
appointed not later than 14 calendar days after the date on which the
Senate agrees to this resolution.
(d) Period of Appointment.--Members of the Senate Select Committee
shall be appointed for the life of the Senate Select Committee.
(e) Vacancies.--A vacancy in the Senate Select Committee--
(1) shall not affect the powers of the Senate Select
Committee; and
(2) shall be filled in the same manner as the original
appointment.
SEC. 4. INVESTIGATION AND REPORT.
(a) In General.--The Senate Select Committee shall investigate and,
not later than 1 year after the date of agreement to this resolution,
shall submit a report to the Senate on the United States withdrawal
from Afghanistan.
(b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
address the following:
(1) Intelligence products available to the United States
Government over the course of the withdrawal, including as
related to--
(A) anticipated timelines for a Taliban takeover of
Afghanistan, especially as the Taliban seized control
of Afghanistan districts and provinces, often without
fighting, in early to mid 2021;
(B) the ability of the Afghan National Defense and
Security Forces to prevent a Taliban takeover of
Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the United States
Armed Forces and associated combat, logistical, and
other support;
(C) the willingness of then-President of the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ashraf Ghani and other
Afghan political leaders to remain in Afghanistan as
the military situation deteriorated, including any
plans such leaders may have made to escape Afghanistan
as the Taliban advanced;
(D) any other intelligence that may have informed
decisions by the United States Government regarding the
timeline for the withdrawal of its forces, moving of
its embassy in Kabul, initiation of a noncombatant
evacuation operation, force requirements for a
noncombatant evacuation operation, or related matters;
and
(E) any dissenting views shared in writing or other
formats, including verbally, by United States
diplomats, military commanders, or other government
officials regarding the topics described in
subparagraphs (A) through (D).
(2) The failure to secure Hamid Karzai International
Airport, relocate the United States Embassy in Kabul, and
initiate a noncombatant evacuation operation prior to Kabul's
imminent collapse, despite warnings by military commanders on
the ground that such a collapse was increasingly likely and
could occur rapidly, including--
(A) the failure by the United States Government to
accelerate the fortification of the Hamid Karzai
International Airport, the relocation of the United
States Embassy in Kabul, or the initiation of the
noncombatant evacuation operation in response to
warnings that the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan was increasingly likely to collapse and
could do so rapidly;
(B) the development of a ``trigger assessment
tool'' or other conditions-based planning aids to
support monitoring of and timely response to the
deteriorating security environment in Afghanistan,
including use of such aids by Department of Defense and
Department of State officials in Afghanistan;
(C) table-top exercises or other planning events
held at agency or interagency levels, with particular
focus on planning assumptions, associated timelines,
and participant reactions to the planning events;
(D) any decision by the Department of State or
other Federal agency to delay or deprioritize planning
for a noncombatant evacuation operation, including for
the purpose of demonstrating confidence in the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan;
(E) any suggestion by Department of State or other
United States Government officials that executing a
noncombatant evacuation operation would constitute
failure for the United States in Afghanistan, as
reported by the United States Central Command
investigation of the Abbey Gate bombing; and
(F) any orders, instructions, or other guidance
provided to Department of Defense officials to prevent
such officials from planning for a noncombatant
evacuation operation with multinational partners, as
reported by the United States Central Command
investigation of the Abbey Gate bombing.
(3) The decision to prioritize evacuating as many
individuals as possible over protecting members of the United
States Armed Forces and thoroughly vetting all prospective
evacuees, as reported by the United States Central Command
investigation of the Abbey Gate bombing, including--
(A) force protection measures, including obstacles,
barriers, and other measures, implemented at the Hamid
Karzai International Airport prior to and during
execution of the noncombatant evacuation operation; and
(B) force protection measures not implemented at
the Hamid Karzai International Airport, with an
explanation for why such force protection measures were
not implemented and implications of the failure to
implement such measures for risk to force during
execution of the noncombatant evacuation operation.
(4) Threat reporting prior to the suicide bombing at Abbey
Gate, additional force protection measures implemented in
response to such threat reporting, and additional force
protection measures not implemented in response to such threat
reporting, with an assessment of why certain additional force
protection measures were not taken.
(5) The failure to thoroughly vet evacuees prior to their
transfer to United States territory, military installations, or
other locations outside of Afghanistan, including detailed
descriptions of--
(A) any delays by the Department of State to send
adequate numbers of consular officials to Hamid Karzai
International Airport to facilitate thorough vetting of
prospective evacuees;
(B) any changes to guidance issued by the
Department of State regarding the vetting of
prospective evacuees over the course of the
noncombatant evacuation operation;
(C) any guidance issued by the President or other
United States Government officials to reduce standards
for or expedite vetting of prospective evacuees prior
to their removal from Afghanistan;
(D) any failure by the United States Government to
utilize all existing biometric databases or proper
identification standards when processing individuals to
be removed from Afghanistan; and
(E) any criminal incidents involving evacuees
following their transfer to United States territory.
(6) The total number of United States nationals left in
Afghanistan following the United States withdrawal from
Afghanistan, and the knowledge on the part of United States
Government officials of the total number of United States
nationals left in Afghanistan when such officials informed
Congress that the United States Government had not left
Americans behind in Afghanistan.
(7) Equipment provided by the United States to the Afghan
National Defense and Security Forces and recovered by the
Taliban following the collapse of the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces, including the type and amount of such
equipment recovered by the Taliban as well as the manner in
which the Taliban has been able to use such equipment.
(8) Detailed descriptions of--
(A) orders issued by the President related to the
United States withdrawal from Afghanistan, including
with regard to the relocation of the United States
Embassy in Kabul and the initiation and execution of
the noncombatant evacuation operation;
(B) analysis or recommendations provided by the
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Commander of United States Central Command, and other
national security leaders related to the United States
withdrawal from Afghanistan, including as related to--
(i) the deteriorating military situation in
Afghanistan; and
(ii) the consequent need to accelerate the
relocation of the United States Embassy in
Kabul and the initiation of the noncombatant
evacuation operation; and
(C) requests for forces or other requests for
additional authorities or resources made to the
President by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
State, or other national security leaders during the
United States withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the
President's responses to any such requests.
(9) Any other matters identified by members of the Senate
Select Committee.
(c) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.
SEC. 5. MEETINGS, HEARINGS, AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION.
(a) Meetings.--
(1) In general.--The Senate Select Committee shall meet at
the call of the co-chairs or at the request of at least 3
members.
(2) Quorum.--Half of the members of the Senate Select
Committee shall constitute a quorum.
(3) Voting.--Proxy voting shall be allowed on behalf of the
members of the Senate Select Committee.
(b) Hearings.--
(1) In general.--The Senate Select Committee shall, for the
purposes described in section 4, hold such hearings, compel
attendance of such witnesses, take or compel such testimony,
receive or compel such evidence, and administer such oaths as
the Senate Select Committee considers advisable.
(2) Frequency.--The Senate Select Committee shall hold an
open hearing no less frequently than once per month until it
has received open testimony from all of the witnesses listed in
paragraph (3).
(3) Witnesses.--The co-chairs shall hear testimony from the
following before the Senate Select Committee in open session,
even if the person holds a different public office or no longer
holds public office at the time of the hearing:
(A) Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs Jake Sullivan.
(B) Secretary of State Antony Blinken.
(C) Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin.
(D) Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro
Mayorkas.
(E) Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines.
(F) Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
William Burns.
(G) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
Mark Milley.
(H) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin
Kahl.
(I) Former United States Ambassador to Afghanistan
Ambassador John Bass.
(J) Former United States Ambassador to Afghanistan
Ambassador Ross Wilson.
(K) Former Commander of United States Forces
Afghanistan--Forward Rear Admiral Peter Vasely.
(L) Former Commanding General of Joint Task Force--
Crisis Response Brigadier General Farrell J. Sullivan.
(M) Former Commanding General of 82nd Airborne
Division Lieutenant General Christopher T. Donahue.
(N) Any other individuals, including former United
States Government officials, identified by the co-
chairs or a group of 3 members of the Senate Select
Committee.
(4) Transparency.--The Senate Select Committee may receive
classified testimony in a closed session, but any witnesses
questioned in a closed session shall also testify in an open
session, in the interest of public transparency.
(5) Questioning.--Co-chairs shall permit members of the
Senate Select Committee to question witnesses at a hearing for
periods longer than 5 minutes or multiple periods of 5 minutes,
at the request of a member.
(6) Procedures.--
(A) Announcement.--The co-chairs of the Senate
Select Committee shall make a public announcement of
the date, time, place, and subject matter of any
hearing to be conducted, not less than 7 days in
advance of such hearing, unless the co-chairs determine
that there is good cause to begin such hearing at any
earlier date.
(B) Written statement.--A witness appearing before
the Senate Select Committee shall file a written
statement of proposed testimony and respond in writing
to any advance questions from the Senate Select
Committee at least 2 calendar days before the
appearance of the witness unless the requirement is
waived by the co-chairs.
(c) Cooperation From Federal Agencies.--
(1) Technical assistance.--Upon written request of the co-
chairs, a Federal agency shall provide technical assistance to
the Senate Select Committee in order for the Senate Select
Committee to carry out its duties.
(2) Provision of information.--The National Security
Council, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National
Intelligence, the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies
shall expeditiously provide information requested by the Senate
Select Committee related to the investigation and report under
required under section 4, and in no case later than 3 weeks
after a request by a member of the Senate Select Committee.
(3) Limitation on exclusions.--Federal agencies shall not
withhold information from the Senate Select Committee,
including for reasons of classification, executive privilege,
or attorney-client privilege.
(d) Subpoena Authority.--Members of the Senate Select Committee are
authorized to--
(1) compel by subpoena the furnishing of information by
United States Government officials and other individuals,
including former United States Government officials; and
(2) take or order the taking of depositions, including
pursuant to subpoena, in the same manner as a standing
committee of the Senate.
SEC. 6. ADMINISTRATION.
(a) Funding.--There shall be paid, out of the contingent fund of
the Senate from the appropriations account ``Miscellaneous Items,''
such sums as may be necessary for the expenses of the Senate Select
Committee, subject to the rules and regulations of the Senate.
(b) Expenses.--In carrying out its functions, the Senate Select
Committee is authorized to incur expenses in the same manner and under
the same conditions as the Joint Economic Committee is authorized under
section 11 of the Employment Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1024).
(c) Staffing.--
(1) Staff director.--The co-chairs, acting jointly, shall
hire the staff director of the Senate Select Committee.
(2) Other staff.--The co-chairs, acting jointly, may employ
such additional staff as they determine necessary for the
Senate Select Committee to carry out its duties.
(3) Compensation.--The co-chairs, acting jointly, may
appoint and fix the compensation of the staff director and
additional staff as they determine necessary, within the
guidelines for employees of the Senate and following all
applicable rules and employment requirements of the Senate.
(4) Ethical standards.--Members and staff of the Senate
Select Committee shall comply with the ethics rules of the
Senate.
(d) Facilities.--The Senate Select Committee shall have priority
access to--
(1) rooms of the Senate for purposes of meetings, hearings,
and other Senate Select Committee functions; and
(2) secure facilities for purpose of receiving classified
testimony and handling other classified materials.
(e) Termination.--The Senate Select Committee shall terminate on
the later of the following:
(1) 30 days after the submission of the report required
under section 4(a).
(2) 30 days after the Senate Select Committee has held open
hearings with all of the witnesses listed under section
5(b)(3).
(3) The expiration of the Congressional session during
which the Senate agrees to this resolution.
(f) Disposition of Records.--Upon the termination of the Senate
Select Committee, the records of the Senate Select Committee shall
become the records of the Committee on Armed Services.
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