[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 982 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

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117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 982

 To extend the life of the Minuteman III and redirect savings from the 
development of the new ground-based strategic deterrent program toward 
   the development of a universal coronavirus vaccine, and for other 
                               purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 25, 2021

Mr. Markey (for himself, Mr. Van Hollen, Mr. Sanders, and Mr. Merkley) 
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the 
                      Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
 To extend the life of the Minuteman III and redirect savings from the 
development of the new ground-based strategic deterrent program toward 
   the development of a universal coronavirus vaccine, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Investing in Cures Before Missiles 
Act of 2021'' or the ``ICBM Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) According to the Congressional Budget Office, the 
        projected cost to sustain and modernize the United States 
        nuclear arsenal, as of 2017, ``is $1.2 trillion in 2017 dollars 
        over the 2017-2046 period: more than $800 billion to operate 
        and sustain (that is, incrementally upgrade) nuclear forces and 
        about $400 billion to modernize them''. With inflation, the 
        cost rises to $1,700,000,000,000 and does not include the cost 
        of the additional nuclear capabilities proposed in the 2018 
        Nuclear Posture Review.
            (2) The Government Accountability Office found in July 2020 
        that the Department of Defense and the National Nuclear 
        Security Administration have still not taken meaningful steps 
        to address affordability concerns or heeded the Government 
        Accountability Office's recommendation to consider ``deferring 
        the start of or cancelling specific modernization programs'', 
        including the W87-1 warhead modification program, to address 
        increases in the weapons activities budget requests of the 
        National Nuclear Security Administration.
            (3) The ground-based strategic deterrent program is 
        expected to cost between $93,100,000,000 and $95,800,000,000, 
        which does not include the cost of the W87-1 warhead 
        modification program or the cost to produce new plutonium pits 
        for the warhead. The total estimated life cycle cost of the 
        ground-based strategic deterrent program is $264,000,000,000, 
        and the program is intended to replace 400 deployed Minuteman 
        III missiles with more than 600 new missiles, to allow for test 
        flights and spares.
            (4) The Air Force awarded a sole-source contract to 
        Northrop Grumman for the engineering and manufacturing 
        component of the ground-based strategic deterrent program in 
        September 2020, raising concerns that the absence of 
        competition for the award may result in higher than projected 
        costs to United States taxpayers.
            (5) The National Nuclear Security Administration is also in 
        the early stages of developing a replacement intercontinental 
        ballistic missile warhead, the W87-1, and expanding plutonium 
        pit production to build new warhead cores, costing at least 
        $12,000,000,000 and $9,000,000,000, respectively, to meet the 
        modernization needs of the ground-based strategic deterrent 
        program.
            (6) Maintaining and updating the current Minuteman III 
        missiles is possible for multiple decades and, according to the 
        Congressional Budget Office, through 2036, this would cost 
        $37,000,000,000 less in 2017 dollars than developing and 
        deploying the ground-based strategic deterrent program.
            (7) A public opinion poll conducted from October 12 to 28, 
        2020, by ReThink Media and the Federation of American 
        Scientists found that only 26 percent of registered voters in 
        the United States preferred replacing the Minuteman III 
        intercontinental ballistic missile with the ground-based 
        strategic deterrent, as compared to 60 percent of registered 
        voters who opposed replacing the Minuteman III missile.
            (8) On April 3, 2019, Lieutenant General Richard M. Clark, 
        then-Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence 
        and Nuclear Integration, noted in testimony before the 
        Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives 
        that we have ``one more opportunity'' to conduct life extension 
        on the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile, 
        indicating the technical feasibility of extending the Minuteman 
        III missile despite his stated preference for the ground-based 
        strategic deterrent.
            (9) Even in the absence of an intercontinental ballistic 
        missile leg of the triad, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review 
        signaled that the United States would have an assured 
        retaliatory capability in the form of several ballistic missile 
        submarines, which are, ``at present, virtually undetectable, 
        and there are no known, near-term credible threats to the 
        survivability of the [ballistic missile submarine] force'', a 
        benefit that will be enhanced as the Department of Defense 
        moves to replace the Ohio class ballistic submarine fleet with 
        the new Columbia class ballistic missile fleet.
            (10) While intercontinental ballistic missiles had 
        historically been the most responsive leg of the United States 
        nuclear triad, advances in ballistic missile submarine 
        communications to allow for the dissemination of emergency 
        action messages in wartime have negated that advantage.
            (11) Intercontinental ballistic missiles cannot be 
        recalled, leaving decision makers with mere minutes to decide 
        whether to launch the missiles before they are destroyed, known 
        as a posture of ``launch on warning'' or ``launch under 
        attack'' in the face of a perceived nuclear attack, greatly 
        increasing the risk of a national leader initiating a nuclear 
        war by mistake.
            (12) In 1983, Stanislav Petrov, a former lieutenant colonel 
        of the Soviet Air Defense Forces correctly identified a false 
        warning in an early warning system that showed several United 
        States incoming nuclear missiles, preventing Soviet leaders 
        from launching a retaliatory response, earning Colonel Petrov 
        the nickname ``the man who saved the world''.
            (13) Former Secretary of Defense William Perry, who once 
        briefed President Bill Clinton on a suspected Russian first 
        nuclear strike, wrote that the ground-based leg of the nuclear 
        triad is ``destabilizing because it invites an attack'' and 
        intercontinental ballistic missiles are ``some of the most 
        dangerous weapons in the world'' and ``could even trigger an 
        accidental nuclear war''.
            (14) General James Cartwright, former vice chair of the 
        Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander of the United States 
        Strategic Command, wrote, with Secretary Perry, ``[T]he 
        greatest danger is not a Russian bolt but a US blunder--that we 
        might accidentally stumble into nuclear war. As we make 
        decisions about which weapons to buy, we should use this simple 
        rule: If a nuclear weapon increases the risk of accidental war 
        and is not needed to deter an intentional attack, we should not 
        build it. . . . Certain nuclear weapons, such as . . . the 
        [intercontinental ballistic missile], carry higher risks of 
        accidental war that, fortunately, we no longer need to bear. We 
        are safer without these expensive weapons, and it would be 
        foolish to replace them.''.
            (15) General George Lee Butler, the former Commander-in-
        Chief of the Strategic Air Command and subsequently Commander-
        in-Chief of the United States Strategic Command, said, ``I 
        would have removed land-based missiles from our arsenal a long 
        time ago. I'd be happy to put that mission on the submarines. 
        So, with a significant fraction of bombers having a nuclear 
        weapons capability that can be restored to alert very quickly, 
        and with even a small component of Trident submarines--with all 
        those missiles and all those warheads on patrol--it's hard to 
        imagine we couldn't get by.''.
            (16) While a sudden ``bolt from the blue'' first strike 
        from a near-peer nuclear adversary is a highly unlikely 
        scenario, extending the Minuteman III would maintain the 
        purported role of the intercontinental ballistic missile leg of 
        the triad to absorb such an attack.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON EXTENSION OF LIFESPAN OF MINUTEMAN III 
              AND DEVELOPING A VACCINE OF MASS PREVENTION.

    It is the policy of the United States that--
            (1) the operational life of the Minuteman III missiles can 
        be safely extended until at least 2050; and
            (2) investments in developing a universal coronavirus 
        vaccine and efforts to save lives from other types of 
        infectious diseases are a better use of United States taxpayer 
        resources than building a new and unnecessary intercontinental 
        ballistic missile.

SEC. 4. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR VACCINES INSTEAD OF MISSILES.

    (a) Transfer From Department of Defense.--Of the unobligated 
balances of appropriations made available for the Department of Defense 
for the research, development, test, and evaluation of the ground-based 
strategic deterrent program, the Secretary of Defense shall transfer 
$1,000,000,000 to the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases to conduct or support comprehensive research for the 
development of a universal coronavirus vaccine.
    (b) Transfer From National Nuclear Security Administration.--The 
Secretary of Energy shall transfer all unobligated balances of 
appropriations made available for the National Nuclear Security 
Administration for the W87-1 warhead modification program to the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to research and combat 
emerging and zoonotic infectious diseases.

SEC. 5. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR GROUND-BASED STRATEGIC 
              DETERRENT PROGRAM AND W87-1 WARHEAD MODIFICATION PROGRAM.

    None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made 
available for fiscal year 2022 may be obligated or expended for the 
ground-based strategic deterrent program or the W87-1 warhead 
modification program.

SEC. 6. INDEPENDENT STUDY ON EXTENSION OF MINUTEMAN III 
              INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES.

    (a) Independent Study.--Not later than 30 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall seek to enter 
into a contract with the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a 
study on extending the life of Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic 
missiles to 2050.
    (b) Matters Included.--The study under subsection (a) shall include 
the following:
            (1) A comparison of the costs through 2050 of--
                    (A) extending the life of Minuteman III 
                intercontinental ballistic missiles; and
                    (B) deploying the ground-based strategic deterrent 
                program.
            (2) An analysis of opportunities to incorporate 
        technologies into the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic 
        missile program as part of a service life extension program 
        that could also be incorporated in the future ground-based 
        strategic deterrent program, including, at a minimum, 
        opportunities to increase the resilience against adversary 
        missile defenses.
            (3) An analysis of the benefits and risks of incorporating 
        sensors and nondestructive testing methods and technologies to 
        reduce destructive testing requirements and increase the 
        service life and number of Minuteman III missiles through 2050.
            (4) An analysis and validation of the methods used to 
        estimate the operational service life of Minuteman II and 
        Minuteman III motors, taking into account the test and launch 
        experience of motors retired after the operational service life 
        of such motors in the rocket systems launch program.
            (5) An analysis of the risks and benefits of alternative 
        methods of estimating the operational service life of Minuteman 
        III motors, such as those methods based on fundamental physical 
        and chemical processes and nondestructive measurements of 
        individual motor properties.
            (6) An analysis of risks, benefits, and costs of 
        configuring a Trident II D5 submarine launched ballistic 
        missile for deployment in a Minuteman III silo.
            (7) An analysis of the impacts of the estimated service 
        life of the Minuteman III force associated with decreasing the 
        deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles delivery vehicle 
        force from 400 to 300.
            (8) An assessment on the degree to which the Columbia class 
        ballistic missile submarines will possess features that will 
        enhance the current invulnerability of ballistic missile 
        submarines of the United States to future antisubmarine warfare 
        threats.
            (9) An analysis of the degree to which an extension of the 
        Minuteman III would impact the decision of Russian Federation 
        to target intercontinental ballistic missiles of the United 
        States in a crisis, as compared to proceeding with the ground-
        based strategic deterrent.
            (10) A best case estimate of what percentage of the 
        strategic forces of the United States would survive a 
        counterforce strike from the Russian Federation, broken down by 
        intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile 
        submarines, and heavy bomber aircraft.
            (11) The benefits, risks, and costs of relying on the W-78 
        warhead for either the Minuteman III or a new ground-based 
        strategic deterrent missile as compared to proceeding with the 
        W-87 life extension.
            (12) The benefits, risks, and costs of adding additional 
        launchers or uploading submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
        with additional warheads to compensate for a reduced deployment 
        of intercontinental ballistic missiles of the United States.
    (c) Submission to Department of Defense.--Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the National Academy of 
Sciences shall submit to the Secretary a report containing the study 
conducted under subsection (a).
    (d) Submission to Congress.--Not later than 210 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall transmit to the 
appropriate congressional committees the report required by subsection 
(c), without change.
    (e) Form.--The report required by subsection (c) shall be submitted 
in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 7. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.

    In this Act, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
means--
            (1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
        Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
        Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
        Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
        House of Representatives.
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