[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 434 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
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117th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 434
To seek a diplomatic resolution to Iran's nuclear program, and for
other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
February 24, 2021
Mr. Markey (for himself, Ms. Warren, Mr. Sanders, Ms. Duckworth, Mr.
Leahy, Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. Murphy, Ms. Baldwin, Mrs. Murray, Mr. Van
Hollen, and Mr. Merkley) introduced the following bill; which was read
twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To seek a diplomatic resolution to Iran's nuclear program, and for
other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Iran Diplomacy Act of 2021''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) On July 14, 2015, the People's Republic of China,
France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States,
the European Union, and Iran agreed to the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (JCPOA).
(2) When all parties fully implemented the JCPOA, it had
increased the amount of time it would take Iran to acquire
enough fissile material for one nuclear weapon, from
approximately two to three months to at least one year, if Iran
made the political decision to take such an action.
(3) The JCPOA blocked Iran's uranium, plutonium, and covert
pathways to a nuclear weapon, in the period when all sides had
fully implemented their commitments, in part by--
(A) imposing verifiable limits on Iran's uranium
enrichment and plutonium production capabilities;
(B) reducing the number of Iran's installed
centrifuges by two-thirds; and
(C) permitting the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) to monitor and verify all stages of
Iran's nuclear fuel cycle to include requesting short-
notice access to ``verify the non-diversion of declared
material'' and ``absence of undeclared nuclear material
and activities'' in Iran, consistent with its
provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol
to its IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
(4) The 2018 Department of State Compliance Report
concluded, ``Tehran's adherence to these commitments will
hinder its ability to produce a nuclear weapon even after the
time-bound provisions of the deal expire, helping to ensure
that its nuclear program remains exclusively peaceful in
nature''.
(5) On January 29, 2019, Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) Gina Haspel, testified before the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate that ``at the
moment, technically they [Iran] are in compliance,'' with the
JCPOA.
(6) On January 29, 2019, Director of National Intelligence
Dan Coats issued a worldwide threat assessment, which observed
that the United States ``[does] not believe that Iran is
currently undertaking the key activities we judge necessary to
produce a nuclear device'' and ``Iran's continued
implementation of the JCPOA has extended the amount of time
Iran would need to produce enough fissile material for a
nuclear weapon from a few months to about one year''.
(7) On May 8, 2018, President Donald J. Trump announced the
United States unilateral abrogation of the JCPOA, and announced
that the United States would re-impose all of its sanctions
that it had lifted after Iran verifiably met its nuclear-
related commitments under the agreement on its implementation
day of January 16, 2016.
(8) The United States abrogation of the JCPOA is a
violation of its commitments under the agreement and threatened
United States relations with European allies, whose cooperation
is necessary to counter Iran's malign influence in the Middle
East.
(9) Prior to Iran's first breach of the JCPOA on May 8,
2019, quarterly reports from the IAEA Board of Governors
Reports found that since ``implementation day,'' on January 16,
2016, Iran's nuclear program was consistent with the JCPOA's
restrictions.
(10) Following the removal of nearly all remaining waivers
to United States nuclear-related sanctions on May 2, 2019, the
Government of Iran committed a series of concerning, but
reversible, breaches of its commitments under the JCPOA,
including by--
(A) exceeding the allowable stock of low-enriched
uranium and heavy water;
(B) exceeding the allowable number of installed
centrifuges at its Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant;
(C) enriching uranium at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment
Plant;
(D) exceeding the permitted Low Enriched Uranium
(LEU) enrichment level of 3.67 percent of the Uranium
U-235 isotope and by enriching up to 20 percent; and
(E) beginning production of uranium metal;
(11) Since the full re-imposition of United States nuclear-
related sanctions in 2019, the Government of Iran has also
engaged in a series of escalatory actions outside its nuclear
program that have put the United States Armed Forces,
diplomats, and strategic partners at risk and have heightened
the threat of an armed conflict with Iran.
(12) Tensions with Iran reached a high-point following the
unauthorized United States strike against Iranian General
Qassem Soleimani on January 3, 2020, and an Iranian ballistic
missile strike on January 7, 2020, on two United States bases
in Iraq, which left 110 United States service members with
traumatic brain injuries.
(13) On January 5, 2020, Iran announced that it would no
longer comply with the limits of the JCPOA, while also noting
that it would not take the escalatory step of withdrawing from
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at
Washington, London, and Moscow, July 1, 1968 (NPT), which
commits Iran to IAEA safeguards and obligates it to not obtain
a nuclear weapon.
(14) On December 21, 2020, the foreign ministers of each of
the remaining parties to the JCPOA affirmed their continued
``commitment to preserve the agreement,'' and called for the
``full and effective implementation of the JCPOA'' by all
parties, heralding it as ``significant achievement of
multilateral diplomacy that contributes to regional and
international security''.
(15) Congressional review of the JCPOA under the Iran
Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (Public Law 114-17; 129
Stat. 201) is already complete, and that Act still provides a
meaningful role for congressional oversight of the JCPOA
through its reporting requirements that assess Iran's ongoing
compliance with the agreement.
(16) During Secretary of State Antony Blinken's January 19,
2021, nomination hearing before the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate, he testified that President Joseph R.
Biden's position is that ``if Iran returns to compliance with
the JCPOA, we would do the same thing and then use that as a
platform, working with our allies and partners to build a
longer and stronger agreement to also capture some of the other
issues that need to be dealt with regard to missiles, with
regard to Iran's activities and destabilizing activities in the
region''.
SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States as follows:
(1) Full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA) would represent a meaningful step to both
preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon and a costly future armed
conflict.
(2) The United States and Iran should promptly return to
full compliance with all of their commitments under the JCPOA.
(3) After such time that all sides return to their
commitments under the JCPOA, the United States should lead
international efforts to--
(A) strengthen the restrictions Iran's on ballistic
missile program and counter the proliferation of such
technology to other countries and actors;
(B) address the sunset of select provisions of the
JCPOA and other elements of the agreement that merit
strengthening; and
(C) advance any other diplomatic measures that
promote United States, regional, and international
security.
(4) The United States should reaffirm its commitment to
United Nations Security Resolution 2231 (2015).
(5) Through implementation of the President's January 21,
2021, National Security Memorandum -1, and other steps, the
United States will better foster an environment in which
financial institutions and entities can make practical use of
existing exemptions and mechanisms ``allowing for the sale of
agricultural commodities, food, medicine, and medical devices
to Iran,'' and help Iran battle the COVID-19 pandemic.
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