[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4112 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>






117th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 4112

   To address issues involving the economic statecraft of the United 
                    States, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 28, 2022

 Mr. Menendez introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
             referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
   To address issues involving the economic statecraft of the United 
                    States, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Economic 
Statecraft for the Twenty-First Century Act''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title.
Sec. 2. Findings.
                           TITLE I--CONFRONT

                     Subtitle A--Economic Coercion

Sec. 101. Mandatory disclosure of Chinese debt in aid-related 
                            applications.
Sec. 102. Coordination with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
                            and Development on Chinese engagement.
Sec. 103. Countering Chinese Economic Coercion Task Force.
Sec. 104. Strategy to counter Chinese economic coercion on countries 
                            and entities that support Taiwan.
                    Subtitle B--Investment Security

Sec. 111. Provision of assistance to allies and partners with respect 
                            to reviewing foreign investment.
                      Subtitle C--Anti-competition

Sec. 121. Improvement of anti-counterfeiting measures.
Sec. 122. Intellectual property violators list.
Sec. 123. Report on subsidies provided by Government of People's 
                            Republic of China.
                       Subtitle D--Supply Chains

Sec. 131. Definitions.
Sec. 132. Department of State diplomatic strategy on semiconductor 
                            manufacturing equipment export controls.
Sec. 133. Prohibition on commercial export of semiconductor 
                            manufacturing equipment to People's 
                            Republic of China.
Sec. 134. Annual semiconductor industry monitoring report on the 
                            People's Republic of China.
Sec. 135. Supply chain coordination.
Sec. 136. Statement of policy on international cooperation to secure 
                            critical mineral supply chains.
Sec. 137. Prioritization of efforts and assistance to secure critical 
                            mineral supply chains.
Sec. 138. Leveraging international support.
                           TITLE II--COMPETE

                       Subtitle A--Infrastructure

Sec. 201. Sense of Congress on the Build Back Better World initiative.
Sec. 202. Office of Strategic Investments in United States 
                            International Development Finance 
                            Corporation.
Sec. 203. Prohibition on transfer of sovereign loan guarantees to 
                            United States International Development 
                            Finance Corporation.
Sec. 204. Strategy for promoting and strengthening nearshoring.
Sec. 205. Sense of Congress on the Blue Dot Initiative.
Sec. 206. Sense of Congress on the Three Seas Initiative.
                           Subtitle B--Energy

Sec. 211. Sense of Congress regarding United States engagement at the 
                            World Economic Forum.
Sec. 212. Clean energy efforts of the United States International 
                            Development Finance Corporation.
Sec. 213. Consistency in United States policy on development finance 
                            and climate change.
Sec. 214. Energy diplomacy and security within the Department of State.
Sec. 215. United States and European Union cooperation on climate 
                            finance for developing countries.
                         Subtitle C--Technology

Sec. 221. United States leadership and representation in standards-
                            setting bodies.
Sec. 222. Sense of Congress on cooperation with the G20 Digital Economy 
                            Working Group.
Sec. 223. Statement of policy on artificial intelligence and the global 
                            economy.
Sec. 224. Diplomatic strategy for artificial intelligence.
Sec. 225. International collaboration on research and development.
   Subtitle D--International Financial Institutions and Multilateral 
                         Economic Organizations

Sec. 231. Statement of policy on United States leadership at 
                            international financial institutions.
Sec. 232. Loans to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust of the 
                            International Monetary Fund.
Sec. 233. Clearing World Bank Group arrears.
Sec. 234. 10th general capital increase for the Inter-American 
                            Development Bank.
Sec. 235. Participation of Taiwan in Inter-American Development Bank.
Sec. 236. Increased United States cooperation with Asia-Pacific 
                            Economic Cooperation.
                         Subtitle E--Resilience

Sec. 241. Sense of Congress regarding United States leadership in 
                            recovery and resiliency.
Sec. 242. Sense of Congress regarding improving resilience capacities 
                            through foreign assistance.
Sec. 243. Office of Economic Resiliency.
Sec. 244. Establishment of Resilience Trust Fund at the World Bank.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) As of 2020, the United States accounts for nearly 25 
        percent of the world's gross domestic product, amounting to 
        approximately $20,953,000,000,000. The United States has major 
        business dealings on almost every continent with involvement in 
        multilateral financial systems, bilateral and multilateral 
        economic partnerships, and a robust economy that held nearly 30 
        percent of the world's share of research and development in 
        2019.
            (2) Since World War II, the United States has been a leader 
        in the global economy, as demonstrated by its membership in 
        economic-focused multilateral organizations such as the World 
        Bank, the International Finance Corporation, the International 
        Labour Organization, and the Group of Twenty (G20). The United 
        States has leveraged its economic advantage to ensure its 
        national security in countless instances, such as through the 
        investment of billions of dollars used to rebuild Europe and 
        restore world order following World War II.
            (3) The robust economy of the United States is directly 
        tied to its ability to engage economically, diplomatically, and 
        militarily with allies and adversaries. In a 2019 Pew Research 
        study, of the countries surveyed, 46 percent of Asia-Pacific 
        countries, 37 percent of European countries, and 47 percent of 
        Middle Eastern countries view the United States as the world's 
        leading economic power. African countries that had an overall 
        more favorable impression of the People's Republic of China 
        have consequently been engaging in greater economic 
        partnerships with the People's Republic of China, amounting to 
        approximately $2,960,000,000 in 2020.
            (4) According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
        and Development, about 70 percent of global economic activity 
        occurs through global value chains. Driven by a greater 
        outsourcing of service industry work and greater financial and 
        business service linkages with Europe, the United States has 
        increased its engagement with global value chains in both the 
        manufacturing and services industries. Although the United 
        States has attempted to encourage value-based practices in 
        international business through business advisories, public 
        diplomacy, and other economic tools, countries like the 
        People's Republic of China do not operate with such value-
        oriented business operations.
            (5) In 2020, exports made up 10 percent of the United 
        States economy, and the United States utilizes export controls 
        to safeguard its economic edge and national security interests. 
        As has been seen in the case of export controls imposed through 
        the Entity List maintained by the Bureau of Industry and 
        Security of the Department of Commerce to restrict dual-use 
        trade with the People's Republic of China, such controls 
        curtail potential militant activity by the People's Liberation 
        Army in the South China Sea, human rights abuses, and the use 
        of semiconductor technology for military purposes. The expanded 
        usage of export controls can continue to benefit United States 
        economic security.
            (6) International financial institutions such as the World 
        Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Inter-American 
        Development Bank, and the African Development Bank have key 
        roles in encouraging regional cooperation, sustaining economic 
        development, reducing global greenhouse gas emissions, and 
        reducing global poverty. Those values are in line with United 
        States international development practices, a commonality that 
        can be leveraged for greater coordinated cooperation in the 
        future, especially in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
        including as follows:
                    (A) To meet the needs of developing countries that 
                need to repay debt amounting to approximately 
                $860,000,000,000 in 2020, United States cooperation 
                with key multilateral organizations in the smooth 
                rollout of the Debt Service Suspension Initiative 
                Refresher can ensure global economic recovery from the 
                pandemic while mitigating the risk of loan default.
                    (B) The rise in debt transparency has become a 
                critical issue as more countries become unaware of the 
                full extent of their sovereign debt as a result of 
                predatory lending and poor debt management. The 
                continued support by the United States of international 
                financial institutions can facilitate reforms that go 
                beyond the 2003 proposal of the International Monetary 
                Fund for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism.
            (7) Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has 
        had devastating effects on global supply chains and economic 
        productivity, the economy of the People's Republic of China 
        continues to grow. As a result, global investors are looking 
        more toward the People's Republic of China, instead of the 
        United States, for potential economic activity and are willing 
        to turn a blind eye to the People's Republic of China's human 
        rights violations, including its use of forced labor in the 
        Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
            (8) The United States, as a major economic leader, has a 
        role in preventing predatory economic practices, such as loans 
        to developing countries from the Government of the People's 
        Republic of China through the Belt and Road Initiative. As the 
        People's Republic of China has come to fill the role of an 
        economic leader to many developing countries with its lending, 
        the United States stands to lose economically from its trading 
        partners being stuck in billion dollar debt traps. Furthermore, 
        such predatory practices have come to the United States with 
        the increase of foreign investment in the United States from 
        $4,400,000,000,000 to $4,630,000,000,000 over the course of 
        2020.

                           TITLE I--CONFRONT

                     Subtitle A--Economic Coercion

SEC. 101. MANDATORY DISCLOSURE OF CHINESE DEBT IN AID-RELATED 
              APPLICATIONS.

    (a) In General.--The United States International Development 
Finance Corporation, the United States Agency for International 
Development, the Trade and Development Agency, the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation, and other independent and executive branch agencies 
responsible for disbursing foreign aid and development assistance shall 
require all applicants for United States aid to disclose any debt the 
applicant may owe to any entity known to be owned or controlled by the 
Government of the People's Republic of China, including loan amounts, 
duration, rates, and contractual provisions.
    (b) Limitation.--United States foreign aid and development 
assistance may not be used to amortize any loan principal owed to any 
entity known to be owned or controlled by the Government of the 
People's Republic of China.

SEC. 102. COORDINATION WITH THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
              AND DEVELOPMENT ON CHINESE ENGAGEMENT.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall coordinate with 
willing Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development member 
countries--
            (1) to study the effects of the People's Republic of 
        China's Belt and Road Initiative and other predatory economic 
        practices;
            (2) to create a shared set of facts and promote more 
        transparency with respect to such practices, including a joint 
        stocktaking of the People's Republic of China's distortive 
        economic practices, such as subsidies and other forms of 
        market-distorting state intervention in the People's Republic 
        of China's economy, and the negative global spillovers from 
        such practices;
            (3) to establish a solid definitional foundation for future 
        dialogues on the People's Republic of China's unfair economic 
        practices and a clear understanding of common concerns and 
        priorities among member countries; and
            (4) to issue joint informational reports that contain the 
        results of such data gathering efforts.

SEC. 103. COUNTERING CHINESE ECONOMIC COERCION TASK FORCE.

    (a) Establishment.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall establish an interagency 
task force, which shall be known as the ``Countering Economic Coercion 
Task Force'' (referred to in this section as the ``Task Force'').
    (b) Duties.--
            (1) In general.--The Task Force shall--
                    (A) oversee the development and implementation of 
                an integrated United States Government strategy to 
                respond to coercive economic practices of the People's 
                Republic of China that are abusive, arbitrary, 
                pretextual, and contrary to international rules, which 
                shall include--
                            (i) systematically monitoring and 
                        evaluating--
                                    (I) the costs of such practices on 
                                United States businesses and overall 
                                United States economic performance;
                                    (II) instances in which such 
                                practices taken against a non-Chinese 
                                entity have benefitted United States 
                                parties; and
                                    (III) the impacts such practices 
                                have had on United States national 
                                interests;
                            (ii) facilitating coordination among 
                        Federal departments and agencies when 
                        responding to such practices; and
                            (iii) proactively deterring such economic 
                        coercion;
                    (B) consult with United States allies and partners 
                regarding--
                            (i) the feasibility and desirability of 
                        collectively identifying, assessing, and 
                        responding to the People's Republic of China's 
                        coercive economic practices;
                            (ii) actions that could be taken to expand 
                        international coordination; and
                            (iii) establishing a consistent, coherent, 
                        and collective international response to such 
                        coercive practices, including a long-term 
                        deterrence to such practices;
                    (C) effectively engage the United States private 
                sector, particularly sectors, groups, or other entities 
                that are susceptible to such coercive economic 
                practices, to identify their concerns regarding such 
                practices; and
                    (D) develop and implement a process for regularly 
                sharing relevant information, including classified 
                information, to the extent appropriate and practicable, 
                on such coercive economic practices with United States 
                allies, partners, and the private sector.
            (2) Consultation.--In carrying out its duties under this 
        subsection, the Task Force should regularly consult, to the 
        extent necessary and appropriate, with--
                    (A) relevant stakeholders in the private sector;
                    (B) Federal departments and agencies that are not 
                represented on the Task Force; and
                    (C) United States allies and partners.
    (c) Membership.--The President shall--
            (1) appoint the Chair of the Task Force from among the 
        staff of the National Security Council;
            (2) appoint the Vice Chair of the Task Force from among the 
        staff of the National Economic Council; and
            (3) direct the head of each of the following Federal 
        departments and agencies to appoint personnel, at the level of 
        Assistant Secretary or higher, to participate in the Task 
        Force:
                    (A) The Department of State.
                    (B) The Department of Commerce.
                    (C) The Department of the Treasury.
                    (D) The Department of Justice.
                    (E) The Office of the United States Trade 
                Representative.
                    (F) The Department of Agriculture.
                    (G) The Office of the Director of National 
                Intelligence and other appropriate elements of the 
                intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of the 
                National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)).
                    (H) The Securities and Exchange Commission.
                    (I) The United States International Development 
                Finance Corporation.
                    (J) Any other department or agency designated by 
                the President.
    (d) Reports.--
            (1) Initial report.--Not later than 1 year after the date 
        of the enactment of this Act, the Task Force shall submit a 
        report to the appropriate congressional committees that 
        includes--
                    (A) a comprehensive review of the array of economic 
                tools the Government of the People's Republic of China 
                employs or could employ to coerce other governments, 
                non-Chinese companies (including United States 
                companies), and multilateral institutions and 
                organizations, including the Government of the People's 
                Republic of China's continued efforts to codify 
                informal practices into its domestic law;
                    (B) the strategy developed pursuant to subsection 
                (b)(1)(A);
                    (C) an interagency definition of the People's 
                Republic of China's coercive economic practices that 
                captures--
                            (i) the use of informal or extralegal 
                        coercive economic practices; and
                            (ii) the illegitimate use of formal 
                        economic tools;
                    (D) a comprehensive review of the array of economic 
                and diplomatic tools that the United States Government 
                employs or could employ to respond to economic coercion 
                against the United States and United States allies and 
                partners;
                    (E) a list of unilateral or multilateral--
                            (i) proactive measures to defend or deter 
                        against the People's Republic of China's 
                        coercive economic practices; and
                            (ii) actions taken in response to the 
                        Government of the People's Republic of China's 
                        general use of coercive economic practices;
                    (F) an assessment of areas in which United States 
                allies and partners are vulnerable to the People's 
                Republic of China's coercive economic practices; and
                    (G) a description of the gaps in existing resources 
                or capabilities of Federal departments and agencies--
                            (i) to respond effectively to the People's 
                        Republic of China's coercive economic practices 
                        directed at United States entities; and
                            (ii) to assist United States allies and 
                        partners in their responses to such practices.
            (2) Interim reports.--
                    (A) First interim report.--Not later than 1 year 
                after the date on which the report is submitted 
                pursuant to paragraph (1), the Task Force shall submit 
                a report to the appropriate congressional committees 
                that includes--
                            (i) updates to the information required 
                        under subparagraphs (A) through (G) of 
                        paragraph (1); and
                            (ii) a description of the activities 
                        conducted by the Task Force to implement the 
                        strategy required under subsection (b)(1)(A).
                    (B) Second interim report.--Not later than 1 year 
                after the date on which the report is submitted 
                pursuant to subparagraph (A), the Task Force shall 
                submit a report to the appropriate congressional 
                committees that includes an update to the elements 
                required under the previously submitted report.
            (3) Final report.--Not later than 30 days after the date on 
        which the report required under paragraph (2)(B) is submitted 
        to the appropriate congressional committees, the Task Force 
        shall submit a final report to the appropriate congressional 
        committees and make such report available to the public on the 
        website of the Executive Office of the President. The final 
        report shall include--
                    (A) an analysis of the Government of the People's 
                Republic of China's coercive economic practices, 
                including the cost of such practices to United States 
                businesses;
                    (B) a description of areas of particular 
                vulnerability for United States businesses and the 
                businesses of United States partners and allies;
                    (C) recommendations on the best means for 
                continuing the effort to counter such coercive 
                practices; and
                    (D) a list of the cases that have been made public 
                pursuant to subsection (e).
            (4) Form.--
                    (A) Initial and interim reports.--The reports 
                required under paragraphs (1), (2)(A), and (2)(B) shall 
                be submitted in unclassified form, but may include 
                classified annexes.
                    (B) Final report.--The report required under 
                paragraph (3) shall be submitted in unclassified form, 
                but may include a classified annex.
    (e) Publicly Available List.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter until 
        its termination pursuant to subsection (f), the Task Force, to 
        the extent practicable, shall make available to the public on 
        the website of the Executive Office of the President a list of 
        instances during the most recent 6-month period that the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China has directed 
        coercive economic practices against a non-Chinese entity.
            (2) Updates.--The list required under paragraph (1)--
                    (A) shall be updated every 180 days; and
                    (B) shall be managed by the Secretary of State 
                after the Task Force is terminated pursuant to 
                subsection (f).
    (f) Sunset.--
            (1) In general.--The Task Force shall be terminated at the 
        end of the 60-day period beginning on the date on which the 
        final report required under subsection (d)(3) is submitted to 
        the appropriate congressional committees and made publicly 
        available.
            (2) Additional actions.--During the 60-day period referred 
        to in paragraph (1), the Task Force may conclude its 
        activities, including providing testimony to Congress 
        concerning its final report.

SEC. 104. STRATEGY TO COUNTER CHINESE ECONOMIC COERCION ON COUNTRIES 
              AND ENTITIES THAT SUPPORT TAIWAN.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter for the following 
5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to Congress a description 
of the strategy being used by the Department of State to respond to the 
Government of the People's Republic of China's increased economic 
coercion against countries who have strengthened their ties with, or 
support for, Taiwan.
    (b) Assistance for Lithuania.--The Secretary of State shall provide 
assistance to Lithuania to support its supply chain resilience efforts.

                    Subtitle B--Investment Security

SEC. 111. PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE TO ALLIES AND PARTNERS WITH RESPECT 
              TO REVIEWING FOREIGN INVESTMENT.

    The Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network, in 
consultation with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States and the Office of Technical Assistance of the Department of the 
Treasury, shall, to protect the national security of the United States 
and countries that are allies or partners of the United States, 
establish a formal process for--
            (1) the exchange of information relating to foreign 
        investment with the governments of such countries; and
            (2) the provision of assistance to those countries with 
        respect to--
                    (A) reviewing foreign investment transactions in 
                such countries;
                    (B) determining the beneficial ownership of parties 
                to such transactions; and
                    (C) identifying trends in investment and technology 
                that could pose risks to the national security of the 
                United States and such countries.

                      Subtitle C--Anti-competition

SEC. 121. IMPROVEMENT OF ANTI-COUNTERFEITING MEASURES.

    (a) Increased Inspections.--
            (1) Report on seizures of counterfeit goods.--Not later 
        than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 
        annually thereafter, the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and 
        Border Protection shall submit to the Committee on Finance of 
        the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
        Representatives a report on seizures by U.S. Customs and Border 
        Protection of counterfeit goods during the one-year period 
        preceding submission of the report, including the number of 
        such seizures disaggregated by category of good, source 
        country, and mode of transport.
            (2) Increased inspections of goods from certain 
        countries.--The Commissioner shall increase inspections of 
        imports of goods from each source country identified in the 
        report required by subsection (a) as one of the top source 
        countries of counterfeit goods, as determined by the 
        Commissioner.
    (b) Publication of Criteria for Notorious Markets List.--Not later 
than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less 
frequently than every 5 years thereafter, the United States Trade 
Representative shall publish in the Federal Register criteria for 
determining that a market is a notorious market for purposes of 
inclusion of that market in the list developed by the Trade 
Representative pursuant to section 182(e) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 
U.S.C. 2242(e)) (commonly known as the ``Notorious Markets List'').

SEC. 122. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VIOLATORS LIST.

    (a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than annually thereafter 
for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary 
of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade 
Representative, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall create 
a list (referred to in this section as the ``intellectual property 
violators list'') that identifies--
            (1) all centrally administered state-owned enterprises 
        incorporated in the People's Republic of China that have 
        benefitted from--
                    (A) a significant act or series of acts of 
                intellectual property theft that subjected an economic 
                sector of the United States or a company incorporated 
                in the United States to harm; or
                    (B) an act or government policy of involuntary or 
                coerced technology transfer of intellectual property 
                ultimately owned by a company incorporated in the 
                United States; and
            (2) any corporate officer of, or principal shareholder with 
        controlling interests in, an entity described in paragraph (1).
    (b) Rules for Identification.--To determine whether there is a 
credible basis for determining that an entity should be included on the 
intellectual property violators list, the Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade 
Representative, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall 
consider--
            (1) any finding by a court in the United States that the 
        entity has violated relevant United States laws intended to 
        protect intellectual property rights; or
            (2) substantial and credible information received from any 
        entity described in subsection (c) or other interested persons.
    (c) Consultation.--In carrying out this section, the Secretary of 
State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the United 
States Trade Representative, and the Director of National Intelligence, 
may consult, as necessary and appropriate, with--
            (1) other Federal agencies, including independent agencies;
            (2) entities in the private sector;
            (3) civil society organizations with relevant expertise; 
        and
            (4) the Governments of Australia, Canada, countries in the 
        European Union, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United 
        Kingdom.
    (d) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, 
        the Secretary of State shall publish in the Federal Register a 
        report that--
                    (A) lists the entities described in subsection 
                (a)(1);
                    (B) describes the circumstances surrounding acts or 
                policies described in subsection (a)(1)(B), including 
                any role of the Government of the People's Republic of 
                China;
                    (C) assesses, to the extent practicable, the 
                economic advantage derived by entities described in 
                subsection (a)(1); and
                    (D) assesses whether each entity described in 
                subsection (a)(1) is using or has used stolen 
                intellectual property in commercial activity in 
                Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, New 
                Zealand, South Korea, the United Kingdom, or the United 
                States.
            (2) Form.--The report published under paragraph (1) shall 
        be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.
            (3) Declassification and release.--The Director of National 
        Intelligence may authorize the declassification of information, 
        as appropriate, to inform the contents of the report published 
        under paragraph (1).
    (e) Requirement To Protect Confidential Business Information.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State and the head of any 
        other Federal agency involved in the production of the 
        intellectual property violators list shall protect from 
        disclosure any proprietary information submitted by a private 
        sector party and marked as confidential business information, 
        unless the party submitting the information--
                    (A) had notice, at the time of submission, that 
                such information would be disclosed by the Secretary; 
                or
                    (B) subsequently consents to the disclosure of such 
                information.
            (2) Nonconfidential version of report.--If confidential 
        business information is provided by a private sector party in 
        connection with the production of the intellectual property 
        violators list, the Secretary of State shall publish a 
        nonconfidential version of the report under subsection (d) in 
        the Federal Register that summarizes or deletes, if necessary, 
        the confidential business information.
            (3) Treatment as trade secrets.--Proprietary information 
        submitted by a private sector party under this section--
                    (A) shall be considered to be trade secrets and 
                commercial or financial information exempt under 
                subsection (b)(4) of section 552 of title 5, United 
                States Code, from being made available to the public 
                under subsection (a) of that section; and
                    (B) shall be exempt from disclosure without the 
                express approval of the party.

SEC. 123. REPORT ON SUBSIDIES PROVIDED BY GOVERNMENT OF PEOPLE'S 
              REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the 
Secretary of State, in coordination with the United States Trade 
Representative and the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report that identifies--
            (1) subsidies provided by the central government of the 
        People's Republic of China to enterprises in the People's 
        Republic of China; and
            (2) discriminatory treatment favoring enterprises in the 
        People's Republic of China over foreign market participants.
    (b) Elements of Report.--In compiling each report under subsection 
(a), the Secretary of State shall consider--
            (1) regulatory and other policies enacted or promoted by 
        the central government of the People's Republic of China that--
                    (A) discriminate in favor of enterprises in the 
                People's Republic of China at the expense of foreign 
                market participants;
                    (B) shield centrally administered, state-owned 
                enterprises from competition; or
                    (C) otherwise suppress market-based competition;
            (2) financial subsidies, including favorable lending terms, 
        from or promoted by the central government of the People's 
        Republic of China or centrally administered, state-owned 
        enterprises in the People's Republic of China that materially 
        benefit enterprises in the People's Republic of China over 
        foreign market participants in contravention of generally 
        accepted market principles; and
            (3) any subsidy that meets the definition of subsidy under 
        article 1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
        Measures referred to in section 101(d)(12) of the Uruguay Round 
        Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(12)).
    (c) Form of Report.--Each report required by subsection (a) may be 
submitted in classified form.
    (d) Consultation.--In carrying out this section, the Secretary of 
State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce and the United 
States Trade Representative, may, as necessary and appropriate, consult 
with--
            (1) other Federal agencies, including independent agencies;
            (2) the private sector; and
            (3) civil society organizations with relevant expertise.
    (e) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
        Finance of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
        Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

                       Subtitle D--Supply Chains

SEC. 131. DEFINITIONS.

    In this subtitle:
            (1) Covered item.--The term ``covered item'' includes 
        semiconductor manufacturing equipment, including extreme 
        ultraviolet photolithography equipment and argon fluoride 
        immersion photolithography equipment.
            (2) Critical mineral.--The term ``critical mineral'' has 
        the meaning given the term in section 7002(a) of the Energy Act 
        of 2020 (30 U.S.C. 1606(a)).
            (3) Export; in-country transfer; reexport.--The terms 
        ``export'', ``in-country transfer'', and ``reexport'' have the 
        meanings given those terms in section 1742 of the Export 
        Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801).

SEC. 132. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY ON SEMICONDUCTOR 
              MANUFACTURING EQUIPMENT EXPORT CONTROLS.

    (a) Required Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with 
the Secretary of Commerce, the heads of other relevant Federal 
agencies, and private sector entities, shall develop a strategy to 
diplomatically engage the governments of the Netherlands, Japan, and 
other appropriate countries for the purposes of coordinating, 
developing, and instituting controls on the export of covered items to 
the People's Republic of China.
    (b) Aspects of the Strategy.--The diplomatic strategy required by 
subsection (a) shall include--
            (1) a review of United States technological assets and 
        capabilities in semiconductor manufacturing equipment, 
        including photolithography;
            (2) an assessment of how export controls on semiconductor 
        manufacturing equipment can be integrated into a broader United 
        States technology strategy that includes support for--
                    (A) research and development;
                    (B) investment screening;
                    (C) talent recruitment and retention;
                    (D) standard setting;
                    (E) international partnerships; and
                    (F) supply chain security;
            (3) a plan of action to guide relevant United States 
        engagement with the Netherlands, Japan, and other appropriate 
        countries, including conducting bilateral and multilateral 
        engagements to formulate export controls on semiconductor 
        manufacturing equipment;
            (4) a plan of action to guide United States engagement with 
        foreign entities that develop, construct, and export 
        semiconductor manufacturing equipment;
            (5) a review of the potential diplomatic, economic, and 
        security effects of implementing export controls on 
        semiconductor manufacturing equipment;
            (6) an analysis of the impact of export controls on 
        semiconductor manufacturing equipment on the semiconductor 
        manufacturing industry and artificial intelligence chipmaking 
        capabilities of the People's Republic of China;
            (7) a review of the potential economic impacts on United 
        States entities if export controls on semiconductor 
        manufacturing equipment are implemented; and
            (8) specific, measurable metrics of success for United 
        States diplomatic activities related to semiconductor 
        manufacturing equipment.
    (c) Objectives of the Strategy.--The objectives of the diplomatic 
strategy required by subsection (a) are--
            (1) to formulate a political arrangement among the United 
        States, Japan, the Netherlands, and other appropriate countries 
        for the control of exports of covered items to the People's 
        Republic of China;
            (2) to maintain United States and allied technological 
        advantages in semiconductor manufacturing equipment;
            (3) to protect the interests of United States and allied 
        companies operating in the field of semiconductor manufacturing 
        and semiconductor manufacturing equipment; and
            (4) to ensure the United States continues to engage with 
        allies on efforts involving the development and protection of a 
        free, equitable, open, secure, and stable digital domain.
    (d) Form.--The strategy required by subsection (a) shall be 
submitted to the appropriate congressional committees in unclassified 
form, but may include a classified annex.
    (e) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
        Commerce, Science, and Transportation; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
        Energy and Commerce.

SEC. 133. PROHIBITION ON COMMERCIAL EXPORT OF SEMICONDUCTOR 
              MANUFACTURING EQUIPMENT TO PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) In General.--Following the completion of the strategy required 
by section 132, the President shall prohibit the export, reexport, and 
in-country transfer of covered items to the People's Republic of China.
    (b) Additional Controls.--The President may prescribe such 
additional regulations and export controls as are necessary to carry 
out the strategy required by section 132.
    (c) Waivers.--The President may waive the application of controls 
under subsection (a) or (b) with respect to a covered item if the 
President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that 
the export, reexport, or in-country transfer of the covered item is in 
the national security interests of the United States.
    (d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Committee on 
        Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Energy and Commerce, and the Committee on Financial Services of 
        the House of Representatives.

SEC. 134. ANNUAL SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY MONITORING REPORT ON THE 
              PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) Report Required.--Not later than May 1, 2023, and annually 
thereafter, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce, in 
concurrence with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency, shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on the semiconductor manufacturing 
capabilities of the People's Republic of China.
    (b) Contents.--The report required by subsection (a) shall 
include--
            (1) a detailed assessment of the domestic semiconductor 
        manufacturing capabilities of the People's Republic of China;
            (2) a detailed assessment of year-by-year technological 
        development efforts by the People's Republic of China in the 
        fields of semiconductor manufacturing and artificial 
        intelligence chipmaking, including relevant government plans 
        and initiatives;
            (3) a detailed assessment of engagement between the 
        People's Republic of China and other foreign countries with 
        respect to semiconductor manufacturing equipment capabilities;
            (4) an analysis of the impact of United States and allied 
        export controls on covered items on development of 
        semiconductor manufacturing in the People's Republic of China; 
        and
            (5) an assessment of whether such export controls remain 
        effective in curbing the development of semiconductor 
        manufacturing equipment capabilities in the People's Republic 
        of China.
    (c) Form.--
            (1) In general.--The report required by subsection (a) 
        shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
        classified annex.
            (2) Public availability.--The unclassified portion of the 
        report required by subsection (a) shall be made available on a 
        publicly accessible internet website of the Federal Government.
    (d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on 
        Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Select Committee 
        on Intelligence of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Financial Services, and 
        the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
        Representatives.

SEC. 135. SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION.

    (a) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of 
Commerce, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
report on how the United States is coordinating with its partners and 
allies--
            (1) to secure global supply chains, including supply chains 
        for--
                    (A) semiconductor manufacturing and advanced 
                packaging;
                    (B) large capacity batteries, including batteries 
                for electric vehicles;
                    (C) critical minerals; and
                    (D) pharmaceuticals and active pharmaceutical 
                ingredients;
            (2) to develop common standards for transparent, trusted, 
        and sustainable supply chains; and
            (3) to end reliance on the People's Republic of China for 
        such supply chains.
    (b) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on 
        Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Select Committee 
        on Intelligence of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Financial Services, and 
        the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
        Representatives.

SEC. 136. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO SECURE 
              CRITICAL MINERAL SUPPLY CHAINS.

    It is the policy of the United States to partner, consult, and 
coordinate with foreign governments (at the national and subnational 
levels), civil society, international organizations, international 
financial institutions, subnational communities, commercial and 
recreational mining industry leaders, and the private sector, in a 
concerted effort--
            (1) to increase knowledge and raise awareness of the links 
        between mining and refining of critical minerals, national 
        security, climate change, and clean energy development;
            (2) to improve, in countries in which such mining and 
        refining is conducted, resource mobilization and processing, 
        transport, and mineral refining capacity;
            (3) to develop other strategies to maximize economic 
        benefits from critical mineral resource development for the 
        countries and communities in which such development takes 
        place;
            (4) to promote transparency and combat--
                    (A) human rights abuses, exploitive labor 
                practices, and corruption within the critical mineral 
                extraction industry; and
                    (B) the influence the industry has on poor 
                governance, democratic backsliding, and declines in the 
                rule of law;
            (5) to support--
                    (A) strengthening systems and bilateral and 
                multilateral partnerships for reducing the 
                monopolization of critical minerals and the 
                exploitation of workers in the critical mineral 
                extraction industry and reducing corruption as a 
                means--
                            (i) to ensure the availability of critical 
                        minerals at competitive market-rate costs;
                            (ii) to uphold adequate labor standards to 
                        ensure critical minerals are not produced at 
                        the expense of the lives and livelihoods of 
                        workers in the critical mineral extraction 
                        industry; and
                            (iii) to maintain the integrity of 
                        institutions governing the extraction and 
                        refinement of critical minerals;
                    (B) deployment of and access to advanced 
                technologies to recycle critical minerals to extend use 
                and application beyond a single use; and
                    (C) implementation of management measures to track 
                and report instances of corruption and exploitation in 
                the critical mineral extraction industry; and
            (6) to work cooperatively with international partners--
                    (A) to ensure that the Extractive Industries 
                Transparency Initiative has full unimpeded and 
                uninfluenced access to global critical mineral 
                industrial operations;
                    (B) to establish--
                            (i) an alliance to counter any state or 
                        private monopolization on the control, supply 
                        chains, or industrial processing and extraction 
                        of critical mineral resources;
                            (ii) measurable targets for reducing 
                        corruption and exploitation of workers in the 
                        critical mineral extraction industry; and
                            (iii) action plans to achieve such targets 
                        and a mechanism to provide regular reporting;
                    (C) to promote consumer education, awareness, and 
                outreach on exploitation of workers in the critical 
                mineral extraction industry; and
                    (D) to share best practices in materials management 
                and industrial systems operations to maximize the 
                benefit of critical mineral resources.

SEC. 137. PRIORITIZATION OF EFFORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO SECURE CRITICAL 
              MINERAL SUPPLY CHAINS.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall, in coordination with 
the heads of other relevant Federal agencies--
            (1) lead and coordinate efforts to implement the policy 
        described in section 136; and
            (2) develop strategies and implement programs that 
        prioritize engagement and cooperation with foreign governments, 
        subnational, national, and local stakeholders and the private 
        sector to expedite efforts and assistance in foreign 
        countries--
                    (A) to partner with, encourage, and advise national 
                and subnational governments on the development and 
                execution, where practicable, of projects, programs, 
                and initiatives--
                            (i) to improve the capacity, security, and 
                        standards of operations of critical minerals 
                        supply chains;
                            (ii) to monitor and track how well critical 
                        minerals supply chains are functioning 
                        internationally, based on uniform and 
                        transparent standards developed in cooperation 
                        with municipal, industrial, and civil society 
                        stakeholders; and
                            (iii) to conduct outreach campaigns to 
                        raise public awareness of the importance of 
                        proper management and oversight of critical 
                        mineral supply chains;
                    (B) to partner with and provide technical 
                assistance to investors and national and international 
                institutions, including private sector actors, to 
                develop new business opportunities and solutions to 
                uphold the highest standards in critical mineral supply 
                chains and implement best practices in foreign 
                countries by--
                            (i) improving and expanding the capacity of 
                        foreign industries to responsibly employ 
                        extractive industry management practices;
                            (ii) improving and expanding the capacity 
                        and transparency of tracking mechanisms for 
                        critical minerals to reduce exploitation and 
                        corruption;
                            (iii) eliminating incentives that undermine 
                        responsible supply chain management; and
                            (iv) building the capacity of countries--
                                    (I) to reduce, monitor, regulate, 
                                and manage the extraction, refinement, 
                                and transport of critical minerals 
                                appropriately and transparently; and
                                    (II) to encourage private 
                                investment in critical mineral 
                                extraction and refinement.
    (b) Prioritization.--In carrying out subsection (a), the Secretary 
of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal 
agencies, shall prioritize assistance to countries and regional 
organizations in regions with--
            (1) rapidly developing economies; and
            (2) past instances of human rights abuses, exploitation, 
        and corruption.
    (c) Effectiveness Measurement.--In prioritizing and expediting 
efforts and assistance under this section, the Secretary of State, in 
consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall 
use clear, accountable, and metric-based targets to measure the 
effectiveness of assistance in achieving the policy described in 
section 136.

SEC. 138. LEVERAGING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT.

    In implementing the policy described in section 136, the President 
shall direct the Secretary of State and the heads of other relevant 
Federal agencies, to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United 
States, consistent with the broad development goals of the United 
States--
            (1) to work with countries and the private sector to break 
        up the monopolization of critical mineral industries;
            (2) to commit to promoting transparent private sector 
        development in the critical minerals sector;
            (3) to enhance coordination with the private sector to 
        increase access to critical minerals;
            (4) to provide technical assistance to the regulatory 
        authorities of countries that are members of the body to remove 
        unnecessary barriers to investment; and
            (5) to utilize clear, accountable, and metric-based targets 
        to measure the effectiveness of such actions.

                           TITLE II--COMPETE

                       Subtitle A--Infrastructure

SEC. 201. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE BUILD BACK BETTER WORLD INITIATIVE.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States should exercise leadership in the 
        Build Back Better World initiative of the Group of Seven (G7) 
        to mobilize public and private sector capital and expertise 
        toward meeting the infrastructure needs of low- and middle-
        income countries, estimated to exceed $40,000,000,000,000, over 
        the next two decades;
            (2) the initiative should also advance strategic 
        objectives, including--
                    (A) strengthening partnerships with emerging market 
                and developing countries to promote quality, 
                transparent infrastructure investment that also 
                supports good governance and the rule of law;
                    (B) combating climate change through sustainable 
                infrastructure projects that aid partner countries in 
                the transition to net zero emissions, reduce their 
                vulnerabilities to climate change, and improve their 
                resilience;
                    (C) promoting public health and health security 
                through infrastructure projects that increase the 
                availability, accessibility, and affordability of 
                health care in partner countries;
                    (D) increasing internal and external connections in 
                digital, transportation, and energy infrastructure in 
                partner countries;
                    (E) improving education, economic opportunities, 
                and standards of living in marginalized communities in 
                partner countries, including for women and girls, 
                racial and ethnic minorities, individuals with 
                disabilities, individuals who are lesbian, gay, 
                bisexual, transgender, or queer (commonly referred to 
                as ``LGBTQ+''), and individuals with low incomes; and
                    (F) providing partners a principled, sustainable 
                alternative to exploitative, coercive, and harmful 
                infrastructure investments; and
            (3) the United States should establish a Build Back Better 
        World Task Force--
                    (A) to coordinate its development finance agencies, 
                such as the United States International Development 
                Finance Corporation, Export-Import Bank of the United 
                States, the Trade and Development Agency, the 
                Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the United States 
                Agency for International Development;
                    (B) to engage international partners such as the 
                G7, multilateral development banks, international 
                financial institutions, multinational corporations and 
                banks, non-governmental organizations, and other 
                industrial-country partners;
                    (C) to leverage other development finance 
                institutions, such as the Blue Dot Network, the 
                Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network, and 
                the Transaction Advisory Fund; and
                    (D) to produce strategic guidance that identifies 
                international infrastructure projects and details 
                implementation plans, including--
                            (i) an explanation of how each 
                        infrastructure project advances the strategic 
                        objectives described in paragraph (2);
                            (ii) a description of consultations, 
                        criteria, and justification for such projects;
                            (iii) distribution of such projects across 
                        economic sectors and geographical regions;
                            (iv) budget estimates, proposed sources of 
                        financing, and required appropriations for such 
                        projects;
                            (v) lists of timelines and contractual 
                        parties and their respective rights and 
                        responsibilities with respect to such projects; 
                        and
                            (vi) certification that such projects--
                                    (I) meet specified standards, such 
                                as those of the Blue Dot Network; and
                                    (II) will not have negative impacts 
                                on the environment, local communities, 
                                national sovereignty, or economic 
                                growth.

SEC. 202. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC INVESTMENTS IN UNITED STATES 
              INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION.

     The BUILD Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.) is amended--
            (1) in section 1413 (22 U.S.C. 9613)--
                    (A) in subsection (a), by inserting ``a Strategic 
                Investments Officer,'' after ``Development Officer,'';
                    (B) in subsection (g)(2)(F), by striking 
                ``subsection (i)'' and inserting ``subsection (j)'';
                    (C) by redesignating subsections (h) and (i) as 
                subsections (i) and (j), respectively;
                    (D) by inserting after subsection (g) the following 
                new subsection:
    ``(h) Strategic Investments Officer.--
            ``(1) Appointment.--Subject to the approval of the Board, 
        the Chief Executive Officer shall appoint a Strategic 
        Investments Officer from among individuals with experience in 
        international economic policy, who--
                    ``(A) shall report directly to the Board; and
                    ``(B) shall be removable only by a majority vote of 
                the Board.
            ``(2) Duties.--The Strategic Investments Officer shall--
                    ``(A) coordinate efforts to develop the 
                Corporation's initiatives--
                            ``(i) to counter predatory state-directed 
                        investment and coercive economic practices of 
                        adversaries of the United States; and
                            ``(ii) to preserve the sovereignty of 
                        partner countries;
                    ``(B) coordinate the Corporation's strategic 
                investment policies and implementation efforts with the 
                Department of State, the Export-Import Bank of the 
                United States, the Trade and Development Agency, and 
                other relevant United States Government departments and 
                agencies, including by directly liaising with missions 
                of the Department of State to ensure that departments, 
                agencies, and missions have training, awareness, and 
                access to the Corporation's tools with respect to 
                strategic investment policy and projects;
                    ``(C) manage the responsibilities of the 
                Corporation under section 1442(b)(5) and paragraphs 
                (1)(C) and (3)(C) of section 1443(b);
                    ``(D) support the Chief Development Officer in 
                coordinating and implementing the activities of the 
                Corporation under section 1445; and
                    ``(E) be an ex officio member of the Development 
                Advisory Council established under subsection (j), and 
                attend each meeting of the Council.'';
                    (E) in subsection (i)(3)(C), as so redesignated, by 
                striking ``subsection (i)'' and inserting ``subsection 
                (j)''; and
                    (F) by adding at the end the following new 
                subsection:
    ``(k) Strategic Investments Advisory Council.--
            ``(1) In general.--There is established a Strategic 
        Investments Advisory Council (in this subsection referred to as 
        the `Council') to advise the Board on strategic investment 
        objectives of the Corporation.
            ``(2) Membership.--Members of the Council shall be 
        appointed by the Board, on the recommendation of the Chief 
        Executive Officer and the Strategic Investment Officer, and 
        shall be composed of not more than 9 members from the 
        Department of State, the Department of Commerce, the Department 
        of Defense, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of 
        Energy, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy.
            ``(3) Functions.--The Board shall call upon members of the 
        Council, either collectively or individually, to advise the 
        Board regarding the extent to which the Corporation is meeting 
        the strategic investment goals of the United States and any 
        suggestions for improvements with respect to such goals, 
        including opportunities in countries and project development 
        and implementation challenges and opportunities.
            ``(4) Federal advisory committee act.--The Council shall 
        not be subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. 
        App.).'';
            (2) in section 1442 (22 U.S.C. 9652)--
                    (A) in subsection (b)--
                            (i) in paragraph (3), by striking ``; and'' 
                        and inserting a semicolon;
                            (ii) in paragraph (4)(B), by striking the 
                        period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and
                            (iii) by adding at the end the following 
                        new paragraph:
            ``(5) develop standards for, and a method for ensuring, 
        appropriate strategic investment metrics of the Corporation's 
        portfolio.''; and
                    (B) in subsection (d), by striking ``1413(i)'' and 
                inserting ``1413(j)''; and
            (3) in section 1443 (22 U.S.C. 9653)--
                    (A) in subsection (a)--
                            (i) in paragraph (3), by striking ``; and'' 
                        and inserting a semicolon;
                            (ii) in paragraph (4), by striking the 
                        period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and
                            (iii) by adding at the end the following 
                        new paragraph:
            ``(5) the impact of the strategic investments made by the 
        Corporation, which shall be included in a classified annex.''; 
        and
                    (B) in subsection (b)--
                            (i) in paragraph (1)--
                                    (I) in subparagraph (A), by 
                                striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
                                semicolon;
                                    (II) in subparagraph (B), by adding 
                                ``and'' at the end; and
                                    (III) by adding at the end the 
                                following new subparagraph:
                    ``(C) the impact of the Corporation's strategic 
                investment efforts on United States foreign policy 
                goals;''; and
                            (ii) in paragraph (3)--
                                    (I) in subparagraph (A), by 
                                striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
                                semicolon; and
                                    (II) by adding at the end the 
                                following new subparagraph:
                    ``(C) outcomes of the strategic investments 
                portfolio, and whether or not such investments are 
                meeting the foreign policy objectives of the United 
                States; and''.

SEC. 203. PROHIBITION ON TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGN LOAN GUARANTEES TO 
              UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 
              CORPORATION.

    (a) In General.--Section 1463(c)(1) of the Better Utilization of 
Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9683(c)(1)) 
is amended by striking ``the Corporation or any other appropriate 
department or agency of the United States Government'' and inserting 
``any appropriate department or agency of the United States Government 
(other than the Corporation)''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
take effect as if included in the enactment of the Better Utilization 
of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9601 et 
seq.).

SEC. 204. STRATEGY FOR PROMOTING AND STRENGTHENING NEARSHORING.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) In 2019, the People's Republic of China was the top 
        supplier of goods imported into the United States, providing 
        significant quantities of rare earth minerals, pharmaceutical 
        ingredients, medical equipment, and other goods vital to the 
        economic prosperity and national security of the United States.
            (2) The COVID-19 pandemic and production outages and 
        shipping disruptions in the People's Republic of China have 
        jeopardized worldwide access to critical goods, contributing to 
        an unprecedented, ongoing supply chain crisis that has exposed 
        the severe risks of concentrating global supply chains in the 
        People's Republic of China and demonstrated the need for the 
        United States to increase supply chain resiliency and diversity 
        through reshoring and nearshoring initiatives.
            (3) Relocating supply chains from the People's Republic of 
        China to Latin America and the Caribbean is in the commercial 
        and security interests of the United States and offers several 
        significant advantages for the United States Government and 
        United States entities, including--
                    (A) reduced transit times to markets in the United 
                States, which will lower freight costs, enable quicker 
                adaptability to fluctuating consumer demand, and lessen 
                the large carbon footprint of current supply chains;
                    (B) having supply chains located in countries with 
                which the United States has longstanding bilateral ties 
                and shared democratic values, lessening the risk of 
                geopolitical disruptions to supply chains; and
                    (C) having supply chains located in countries with 
                existing comparative advantages for sourcing and 
                manufacturing key critical goods that cannot be 
                entirely sourced from or manufactured in the United 
                States, including rare earth minerals, pharmaceuticals, 
                medical goods, and semiconductors.
            (4) Switching 15 percent of United States imports from its 
        top 10 source countries outside of the Western Hemisphere to 
        countries in Latin America and the Caribbean would increase the 
        exports of the region by approximately $72,000,000,000 
        annually, helping the region recover from the effects of the 
        COVID-19 pandemic while also reducing pressures encouraging 
        migration to the United States.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States--
            (1) to work with allies and partners of the United States 
        in the Western Hemisphere to achieve more resilient, diverse, 
        and secure supply chains;
            (2) to pursue nearshoring initiatives to relocate supply 
        chains to Latin America and the Caribbean, particularly for 
        products unlikely to be sourced or manufactured in the United 
        States, while simultaneously pursuing reshoring initiatives to 
        increase domestic production in the United States; and
            (3) to engage with regional governments, multilateral 
        development banks, and the private sector to develop and 
        advance joint efforts to incentivize entities to relocate 
        supply chains to, and strengthen supply chains within, the 
        Western Hemisphere.
    (c) Strategy.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
heads of other relevant Federal agencies, as determined by the 
Secretary, shall develop and implement a strategy to increase supply 
chain resiliency and security by promoting and strengthening 
nearshoring efforts to relocate supply chains from the People's 
Republic of China to the Western Hemisphere.
    (d) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (c) shall--
            (1) be informed by consultations with the governments of 
        allies and partners of the United States in the Western 
        Hemisphere and labor organizations and trade unions in the 
        United States;
            (2) provide a description of how reshoring and nearshoring 
        initiatives can be pursued in a complementary fashion to 
        strengthen the national interests of the United States;
            (3) include an assessment of--
                    (A) the status and effectiveness of current efforts 
                by regional governments, multilateral development 
                banks, and the private sector to promote nearshoring to 
                the Western Hemisphere;
                    (B) major challenges hindering those efforts; and
                    (C) how the United States can strengthen the 
                effectiveness of those efforts;
            (4) identify countries in Latin America and the Caribbean 
        with comparative advantages for sourcing and manufacturing 
        critical goods and countries with the greatest nearshoring 
        opportunities;
            (5) identify how activities by the United States Agency for 
        International Development and the United States International 
        Development Finance Corporation can effectively be leveraged to 
        strengthen and promote nearshoring to Latin America and the 
        Caribbean;
            (6) advance diplomatic initiatives to secure specific 
        national commitments by governments in Latin America and the 
        Caribbean to undertake efforts to create favorable conditions 
        for nearshoring in the region, including commitments--
                    (A) to develop formalized national nearshoring 
                strategies;
                    (B) to address corruption and rule of law concerns;
                    (C) to modernize digital and physical 
                infrastructure;
                    (D) to lower trade barriers;
                    (E) to improve ease of doing business; and
                    (F) to finance and incentivize nearshoring 
                initiatives;
            (7) advance diplomatic initiatives to harmonize standards 
        and regulations, expedite customs operations, and facilitate 
        economic integration in Latin America and the Caribbean; and
            (8) develop and implement programs to finance, incentivize, 
        or otherwise promote nearshoring to the Western Hemisphere in 
        accordance with the assessments and identifications made 
        pursuant to paragraphs (3), (4), and (5), including, at 
        minimum, programs--
                    (A) to develop physical and digital infrastructure;
                    (B) to promote transparency in procurement 
                processes;
                    (C) to provide technical assistance in implementing 
                national nearshoring strategies;
                    (D) to mobilize private investment; and
                    (E) to secure commitments by private sector 
                entities to relocate supply chains from the People's 
                Republic of China to the Western Hemisphere.
    (e) Coordination With Multilateral Development Banks.--In 
implementing the strategy required under subsection (c), the Secretary 
of State and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, as 
determined by the Secretary, shall coordinate with the United States 
Executive Director to the Inter-American Development Bank and the 
United States Executive Director to the World Bank.
    (f) Annual Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the 
Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations 
of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives the strategy required under subsection (c) and a 
description of progress made in the implementation of that strategy.

SEC. 205. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE BLUE DOT INITIATIVE.

     It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Blue Dot Network helps public and private investors 
        finance infrastructure projects that are inclusive, 
        transparent, sustainable, environmentally and socially 
        responsible, and compliant with international standards, laws, 
        and regulations;
            (2) the Blue Dot Network helps mitigate threats such as the 
        predatory infrastructure investment practices of the People's 
        Republic of China and critical shortfalls in global 
        infrastructure financing;
            (3) the Blue Dot Network advances the interests of the 
        United States through setting principal international 
        standards, but also requires sufficient investments in other 
        tools of economic statecraft such as the United States 
        International Development Finance Corporation and the 
        Millennium Challenge Corporation to be effective;
            (4) the United States International Development Finance 
        Corporation should deepen its cooperation with Japan Bank for 
        International Cooperation and the Department of Foreign Affairs 
        and Trade of Australia to promote the Blue Dot Network and 
        finance certified projects;
            (5) the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
        Development must continue to update and refine its 
        methodologies and metrics for infrastructure project 
        certification based on guidelines such as the Group of Twenty 
        (G20) Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment;
            (6) the Blue Dot Network must complement other principled 
        development finance initiatives such as the Infrastructure 
        Technology and Assistance Network and the Transaction Advisory 
        Fund of the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network;
            (7) future development finance initiatives should build on 
        the foundations of the initiatives described in paragraph (6); 
        and
            (8) the governments of other countries committed to good 
        governance, international law, and infrastructure investment 
        should work with the Blue Dot Network to certify infrastructure 
        projects and attract public and private sector investments.

SEC. 206. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE THREE SEAS INITIATIVE.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Three Seas Initiative promotes security, economic 
        integration, modernization, and prosperity in Central and 
        Eastern Europe through critical investments energy, 
        transportation, and digital infrastructure;
            (2) the United States International Development Finance 
        Corporation should finalize its approved investment of 
        $300,000,000 and approve an additional $700,000,000 investment 
        in the Three Seas Initiative to fulfill its 2020 commitments;
            (3) Central and Eastern Europe must develop better north-
        south infrastructure and economic integration to break the 
        dominance by the Russian Federation of east-west trade 
        corridors and regional energy supplies;
            (4) in the wake of the premeditated, unprovoked, and 
        unjustified invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, the 
        Three Seas Initiative has never been more important for the 
        security of its 12 participants: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
        the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
        Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia;
            (5) the Three Seas Initiative should prioritize 
        construction of regional liquid natural gas terminals that can 
        help diversify the region's energy supplies and reduce the 
        malign influence of the Russian Federation;
            (6) the People's Republic of China's $14,000,000,000 of 
        infrastructure investments in the region have degraded the 
        environment, eroded the rule of law, infringed upon state 
        sovereignty, and pose a national security threat;
            (7) the Digital Economy Cooperation Initiative should 
        cooperate with the Three Seas Initiative to further modernize 
        the region's economy and develop the regions digital, 
        communications, and financial infrastructure;
            (8) the European Union has made substantial contributions 
        to the objectives of the Three Seas Initiative and should 
        continue to do so through mechanisms such as the Connecting 
        Europe Facility; and
            (9) the United States should encourage regional initiatives 
        such as the Three Seas Initiative to galvanize public and 
        private sector investments in regional infrastructure projects 
        that adhere to environmental, equitable, social, and 
        sustainable standards.

                           Subtitle B--Energy

SEC. 211. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES ENGAGEMENT AT THE 
              WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM.

    It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State, the 
Secretary of the Treasury, the Administrator of the United States 
Agency for International Development, and the Chief Executive Officer 
of the United States International Development Finance Corporation 
should make climate finance commitments at the World Economic Forum.

SEC. 212. CLEAN ENERGY EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL 
              DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION.

    (a) In General.--The Chief Executive Officer of the United States 
International Development Finance Corporation shall strive to reduce 
the net carbon footprint of the Corporation's entire investment 
portfolio to zero by 2028.
    (b) Priority.--In carrying out the goal described in subsection 
(a), the Chief Executive Officer shall prioritize projects in countries 
struggling with transitioning from carbon intensive electricity to 
clean energy.
    (c) Report.--The Chief Executive Officer shall submit a report to 
Congress that describes the Corporation's efforts to meet the goals 
described in subsections (a) and (b).

SEC. 213. CONSISTENCY IN UNITED STATES POLICY ON DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 
              AND CLIMATE CHANGE.

    It is the policy of the United States to ensure that its engagement 
with multilateral international financial institution's is consistent 
with United States policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in order 
to achieve worldwide net-zero carbon emissions by 2050.

SEC. 214. ENERGY DIPLOMACY AND SECURITY WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

    Section 1(c) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 
(22 U.S.C. 2651a(c)) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``24'' and inserting 
        ``25'';
            (2) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6); and
            (3) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following:
            ``(5) Assistant secretary of state for energy resources.--
        Subject to the numerical limitation specified in paragraph (1), 
        there is authorized to be established in the Department of 
        State an Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources who 
        shall be responsible to the Secretary of State for matters 
        pertaining to the formulation and implementation of 
        international policies--
                    ``(A) to protect United States energy security 
                interests; and
                    ``(B) to promote responsible global clean energy 
                production.''.

SEC. 215. UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN UNION COOPERATION ON CLIMATE 
              FINANCE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should restore its historic alliance with countries of the 
European Union regarding climate action by renewing the commitment to 
advancing shared values, principles, goals, and global cooperation for 
addressing climate change and achieving the goals of the decision of 
the 21st Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change adopted in Paris December 12, 2015 
(commonly known as the ``Paris Agreement'').
    (b) Discretionary Clean Energy Development Finance Fund.--The Chief 
Executive Officer of United States International Development Finance 
Corporation shall partner with the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development to establish the Discretionary Clean Energy Development 
Finance Fund.
    (c) Energy Transition Assistance for Eastern Europe.--Title V of 
the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989 (22 U.S.C. 
5451 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 504. ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TRANSITIONING 
              FROM FOSSIL FUELS TO CLEAN ENERGY.

    ``(a) Authorization of Assistance.--The Administrator of the United 
States Agency for International Development, in consultation with the 
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Energy, and the Secretary of 
Commerce, is authorized to establish a program to support workers and 
communities in Eastern European countries that are struggling with the 
transition from fossil fuel dependent economies to clean energy 
economies.
    ``(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated, for each of the fiscal years 2023 through 2027, such sums 
as may be necessary to carry out the program authorized under 
subsection (a).''.
    (d) United States-European Union Working Group.--The Secretary of 
State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary 
of Energy, shall seek to establish a formal United States-European 
Union Working Group that will develop a strategy to respond to the 
People's Republic of China's Belt and Road Initiative.

                         Subtitle C--Technology

SEC. 221. UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AND REPRESENTATION IN STANDARDS-
              SETTING BODIES.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to 
ensure that the United States leads in the innovation of critical and 
emerging technologies, such as next-generation telecommunications, 
artificial intelligence, quantum computing, semiconductors, and 
biotechnology, by--
            (1) providing necessary investment and concrete incentives 
        for the private sector to accelerate development of such 
        technologies;
            (2) modernizing export controls and investment screening 
        regimes and associated policies and regulations;
            (3) enhancing United States leadership in technical 
        standards-setting bodies and avenues for developing norms 
        regarding the use of emerging critical technologies;
            (4) reducing United States barriers and increasing 
        incentives for collaboration with allies and partners on the 
        research and co-development of critical technologies;
            (5) collaborating with allies and partners to protect 
        critical technologies by--
                    (A) crafting multilateral export control measures;
                    (B) building capacity for defense technology 
                security;
                    (C) safeguarding chokepoints in supply chains; and
                    (D) ensuring diversification; and
            (6) designing major defense capabilities for export to 
        allies and partners.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States must lead in international bodies 
        that set the governance norms and rules for critical digitally 
        enabled technologies in order to ensure that those technologies 
        operate within a free, secure, interoperable, and stable 
        digital domain;
            (2) the United States, along with allies and partners, 
        should lead an international effort that utilizes all of the 
        economic and diplomatic tools at its disposal to combat the 
        expanding use of information and communications technology 
        products and services to surveil, repress, and manipulate 
        populations (also known as ``digital authoritarianism'');
            (3) the United States should lead a global effort to ensure 
        that freedom of information, including the ability to safely 
        consume or publish information without fear of undue reprisals, 
        is maintained as the digital domain becomes an increasingly 
        integral mechanism for communication;
            (4) the United States should lead a global effort to 
        develop and adopt a set of common principles and standards for 
        critical technologies to ensure that the use of such 
        technologies cannot be abused by malign actors, whether those 
        actors are governments or other entities, and that those actors 
        do not threaten democratic governance or human rights;
            (5) the United States and its allies and partners should 
        maintain participation and leadership at international 
        standards-setting bodies for 5th and future generation mobile 
        telecommunications systems and infrastructure;
            (6) the United States should work with its allies and 
        partners to encourage and facilitate the development of secure 
        supply chains and networks for 5th and future generation mobile 
        telecommunications systems and infrastructure; and
            (7) the maintenance of a high standard of security in 
        telecommunications and cyberspace between the United States and 
        its allies and partners is a national security interest of the 
        United States.
    (c) Enhancing Representation and Leadership of United States at 
International Standards-Setting Bodies.--
            (1) In general.--The President shall--
                    (A) establish an interagency working group to 
                provide assistance and technical expertise to enhance 
                the representation and leadership of the United States 
                at international bodies that set standards for 
                equipment, systems, software, and virtually defined 
                networks that support 5th and future generation mobile 
                telecommunications systems and infrastructure, such as 
                the International Telecommunication Union and the 3rd 
                Generation Partnership Project; and
                    (B) work with allies, partners, and the private 
                sector to increase productive engagement with respect 
                to the standards described in subparagraph (A).
            (2) Interagency working group.--The interagency working 
        group described in paragraph (1) shall--
                    (A) be chaired by the Secretary of State or a 
                designee of the Secretary of State; and
                    (B) consist of the head (or designee) of each 
                Federal department or agency the President determines 
                appropriate.
            (3) Briefings.--
                    (A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the 
                date of the enactment of this Act, and subsequently 
                thereafter as provided under subparagraph (B), the 
                interagency working group described in paragraph (1) 
                shall provide a strategy to the Committee on Foreign 
                Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign 
                Affairs of the House of Representatives that 
                addresses--
                            (i) promotion of United States leadership 
                        at international standards-setting bodies for 
                        equipment, systems, software, and virtually 
                        defined networks relevant to 5th and future 
                        generation mobile telecommunications systems 
                        and infrastructure, taking into account the 
                        different processes followed by the various 
                        international standard-setting bodies;
                            (ii) diplomatic engagement with allies and 
                        partners to share security risk information and 
                        findings pertaining to equipment that supports 
                        or is used in 5th and future generation mobile 
                        telecommunications systems and infrastructure 
                        and cooperation on mitigating such risks;
                            (iii) China's presence and activities at 
                        international standards-setting bodies relevant 
                        to 5th and future generation mobile 
                        telecommunications systems and infrastructure, 
                        including information on the differences in the 
                        scope and scale of China's engagement at such 
                        bodies compared to engagement by the United 
                        States or its allies and partners and the 
                        security risks raised by Chinese proposals in 
                        such standards-setting bodies; and
                            (iv) engagement with private sector 
                        communications and information service 
                        providers, equipment developers, academia, 
                        federally funded research and development 
                        centers, and other private sector stakeholders 
                        to propose and develop secure standards for 
                        equipment, systems, software, and virtually 
                        defined networks that support 5th and future 
                        generation mobile telecommunications systems 
                        and infrastructure.
                    (B) Subsequent briefings.--Upon receiving a request 
                from the appropriate congressional committees, or as 
                determined appropriate by the chair of the interagency 
                working group described in paragraph (1), the 
                interagency working group shall provide such committees 
                an updated briefing that covers the matters described 
                in clauses (i) through (iv) of subparagraph (A).

SEC. 222. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COOPERATION WITH THE G20 DIGITAL ECONOMY 
              WORKING GROUP.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Group of Twenty (G20) Digital Economy Working Group 
        advances national and international interests through promoting 
        principled and practical standards; and
            (2) the United States should continue to support, engage, 
        and exercise leadership in the working group--
                    (A) to maximize the benefits and minimize the harms 
                of the $70,000,000,000 and growing global digital 
                economy;
                    (B) to increase international digital connectivity 
                and trade;
                    (C) to modernize the global economy with new 
                technologies such as blockchain, artificial 
                intelligence, and machine learning;
                    (D) to protect cross border data flow and data free 
                flow with trust;
                    (E) to promote social inclusion through digital 
                quality control, consumer protection, child protection, 
                and equitable access to new technologies;
                    (F) to improve efficiency and interoperability for 
                technologies and regulations in the public sector;
                    (G) to advance the past initiatives of the working 
                group such Smart Cities, Digital Security, and the 
                Connecting Humanity 2030 Initiative; and
                    (H) to enable progress toward the United Nations 
                Sustainable Development Goals.

SEC. 223. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE GLOBAL 
              ECONOMY.

    It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to prioritize diplomacy and international engagement in 
        the artificial intelligence strategies and policies of the 
        United States;
            (2) to prioritize artificial intelligence issues in United 
        States diplomacy;
            (3) to collaborate with allies and partners to--
                    (A) research, develop, produce, and invest in 
                artificial intelligence technologies that support 
                economic prosperity, collective security, democracy, 
                and human rights;
                    (B) promote commitments and international law 
                related to artificial intelligence that reflect shared 
                values;
                    (C) ensure that artificial intelligence 
                technologies are safe, secure, and trustworthy;
                    (D) create and maintain artificial intelligence-
                related technical and institutional infrastructure;
                    (E) share artificial intelligence-related data, 
                technology, and knowledge, subject to appropriate 
                safeguards and restrictions;
                    (F) prevent the unwanted transfer of sensitive 
                artificial intelligence-related technical information;
                    (G) coordinate artificial intelligence-related 
                export controls and investment screening procedures; 
                and
                    (H) educate and train new cohorts of artificial 
                intelligence researchers, developers, and 
                practitioners;
            (4) to incorporate perspectives and expertise from 
        industry, academia, and civil society into United States 
        diplomatic activities related to artificial intelligence;
            (5) to engage with bilateral and multilateral organizations 
        active in artificial intelligence research, development, and 
        policy; and
            (6) to use diplomacy and foreign assistance to support 
        activities for deploying artificial intelligence that create 
        broadly shared prosperity, account for relevant artificial 
        intelligence safety and security concerns, and uphold human 
        rights and democratic values.

SEC. 224. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and every 2 years thereafter, the Secretary of 
State shall develop and submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a strategy for United States diplomacy related to artificial 
intelligence.
    (b) Contents.--Each strategy required by subsection (a) shall 
include the following:
            (1) A review of relevant prior and ongoing initiatives, the 
        outcomes of those initiatives, and key ongoing challenges to 
        those initiatives.
            (2) The objectives and priorities that will be used to 
        guide the diplomacy of the United States Government related to 
        artificial intelligence, including objectives and priorities 
        related to each of the following:
                    (A) Promoting human rights and democratic values in 
                the development and deployment of artificial 
                intelligence technologies, including by advancing 
                relevant international law and principles.
                    (B) Deterring and disrupting malicious and 
                oppressive uses of artificial intelligence.
                    (C) Fostering United States collaboration with 
                allies and partners in artificial intelligence research 
                and development.
                    (D) Developing appropriate technical standards, 
                metrics, and measurement techniques for artificial 
                intelligence.
                    (E) Mitigating safety risks of artificial 
                intelligence.
                    (F) Maintaining secure supply chains for artificial 
                intelligence technology and its inputs, including 
                computing hardware.
                    (G) Ensuring the integrity of the artificial 
                intelligence research and development activities of the 
                United States and its allies and partners.
                    (H) Ensuring the equitable deployment and adoption 
                of artificial intelligence technology, including 
                through trade, foreign assistance, and development 
                finance.
                    (I) Involving the private sector and civil society.
                    (J) Responding to the artificial intelligence 
                activities and strategies of other countries, including 
                the People's Republic of China.
            (3) Specific, measurable indicators of progress 
        corresponding to the objectives and priorities described in 
        paragraph (2).
            (4) For each strategy other than the first strategy 
        required by subsection (a), an assessment of whether and how 
        progress with respect to each of the indicators identified in 
        the preceding strategy was realized.
            (5) A detailed implementation plan, including timelines, 
        designations of lead and supporting implementing entities of 
        the United States Government, budgetary estimates (as 
        applicable), and descriptions of any additional budgetary 
        resources, technical expertise, legal authorities, or personnel 
        needed for implementation of the strategy.
            (6) Any other matters the Secretary considers relevant.
    (c) Consultation.--In preparing each strategy required by 
subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall consult with--
            (1) the Secretary of Defense;
            (2) the Secretary of Homeland Security;
            (3) the Secretary of Commerce;
            (4) the Secretary of Energy;
            (5) the Director of the National Science Foundation;
            (6) the Director of the Office of Science and Technology 
        Policy;
            (7) the heads of such other relevant Federal agencies and 
        departments as the Secretary of State considers appropriate; 
        and
            (8) such nongovernmental partners as the Secretary 
        considers appropriate.
    (d) Form.--Each strategy required by subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
    (e) Publication.--The Secretary of State shall make each strategy 
required by subsection (a) (without its classified annex, if any) 
available on a publicly accessible website.
    (f) Definition of Appropriate Congressional Committees.--In this 
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 225. INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) Innovation in artificial intelligence and other 
        emerging technology domains has become increasingly global. 
        According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
        Development, worldwide spending on research and development 
        more than tripled between 2000 and 2020. The United States 
        accounted for almost 70 percent of such spending in 1960, but 
        less than \1/3\ in 2018.
            (2) Many allies and partners of the United States are 
        technological powers in their own right, with robust research 
        and development activities and world-leading capabilities in 
        fields such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, 
        robotics, and biotechnology.
            (3) Adversaries of the United States, including the 
        People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and Iran, 
        also emphasize technology and innovation in their geopolitical 
        strategies. In particular, the Chinese Communist Party believes 
        innovation is essential to its continued rule and is investing 
        heavily in research and development as part of a strategy to 
        ``leapfrog'' the United States into global leadership.
            (4) The United States and its allies and partners 
        collectively control a much larger share of research and 
        development activity than the People's Republic of China. 
        Together, the United States and 6 like-minded countries, 
        namely, Japan, Germany, South Korea, India, France, and the 
        United Kingdom, account for more than \1/2\ of global spending 
        on research and development, while the People's Republic of 
        China accounts for approximately \1/4\.
            (5) The National Science Board's ``Vision 2030'' report, 
        issued in May 2020, states, ``Staying at the frontiers of 
        discovery requires leaning into internationalism, particularly 
        given the nation's falling share of global knowledge 
        production, paired with the rising importance and impact of 
        international collaboration and knowledge- and technology-
        intensive industries.''.
            (6) Previously, in 2008, the National Science Board 
        reported, ``The U.S. Government could play a more effective 
        role in supporting international S&E (science and engineering) 
        partnerships by developing a coherent international S&E 
        strategy to coordinate the activities and objectives of the 
        various Federal agencies that play a role in such partnerships. 
        . . . No single U.S. agency is responsible for coordinating or 
        supporting international S&E partnerships, and few U.S. 
        agencies that do S&E work have explicit missions in 
        international relations.''.
            (7) As of March 2022, numerous Federal departments and 
        offices administer joint research and development activities 
        with international partners, including the Office of 
        International Science and Engineering within the National 
        Science Foundation, the Division of International Relations 
        within the National Institutes of Health, and the Office of 
        International Science & Technology Cooperation within the 
        Department of Energy.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) international collaboration on research and development 
        is critical to maintaining United States leadership in 
        artificial intelligence and other critical technologies; and
            (2) Federal initiatives related to international 
        collaboration on research and development should be--
                    (A) consistently and adequately funded; and
                    (B) coordinated across agencies to increase impact, 
                minimize undue duplication, and ensure alignment with 
                policies and strategic objectives of the United States.
    (c) Government Accountability Office Report.--Not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller 
General of the United States shall prepare and release to the public a 
report that--
            (1) enumerates and describes all significant Federal 
        initiatives related to international collaboration on research 
        and development in emerging technologies in existence as of the 
        date on which the report is released;
            (2) assesses whether those initiatives are equipped to 
        achieve their stated goals;
            (3) assesses whether those initiatives are properly managed 
        and coordinated within and across Federal agencies; and
            (4) recommends appropriate actions with respect to 
        paragraphs (1) through (3).
    (d) Independent Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall seek to 
        enter into a contract with an appropriately qualified 
        independent research entity, such as a federally funded 
        research and development center or other nonprofit 
        organization, to produce a report on Federal activities related 
        to international collaboration on research and development.
            (2) Elements.--The report described in paragraph (1) 
        shall--
                    (A) assess the effectiveness of Federal activities 
                related to international collaboration conducted as of 
                the date on which the report is produced;
                    (B) identify key opportunities for enhanced 
                collaboration on research and development with allies 
                and partners of the United States;
                    (C) identify key challenges to United States 
                collaboration on research and development with allies 
                and partners;
                    (D) propose a Federal strategy and corresponding 
                implementation plan for future Federal activities 
                related to international collaboration on research and 
                development; and
                    (E) recommend other appropriate actions for the 
                Secretary of State, other officials of the Department 
                of State, Congress, and other relevant governmental and 
                nongovernmental actors, and identify any additional 
                resources or legal authorities necessary to carry out 
                such actions.
            (3) Completion.--The contract described in paragraph (1) 
        shall require delivery of the report described in that 
        paragraph not later than 1 year after the date on which the 
        contract is executed.
            (4) Publication.--The Secretary of State shall make the 
        report described in paragraph (1) available on a publicly 
        accessible website.

   Subtitle D--International Financial Institutions and Multilateral 
                         Economic Organizations

SEC. 231. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AT 
              INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

    It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to recognize rising debt stock in emerging market and 
        developing countries as a national security and economic 
        security threat and raise its importance in multilateral fora;
            (2) to leverage the voice and vote of the United States in 
        international financial institutions to prevent future 
        unsustainable debt stocks in emerging market and developing 
        countries;
            (3) to promote rule-writing standards for transparency and 
        disclosure that hold both debtors and creditors accountable, 
        allow accurate debt sustainability assessments, and promote 
        better debt management;
            (4) to lead the international community in translating the 
        G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments beyond the Debt 
        Service Suspension Initiative (commonly known as the ``Common 
        Framework'') into tangible action, including effective 
        standstill for debt payments and credit revisions for 
        petitioner countries and finalizing the debt treatment for the 
        petitioner countries, beginning with Chad, Ethiopia, and 
        Zambia;
            (5) to reduce timelines and increase confidence in outcomes 
        for the Common Framework so that private creditors continue to 
        provide sufficient finances to petitioner countries and other 
        countries witness the benefits of petitioning;
            (6) to expand the Common Framework and offer its financial 
        assistance to other heavily indebted lower-middle-income 
        countries, beyond those currently covered;
            (7) to cooperate with counterparts in the Group of Twenty 
        (G20), the International Monetary Fund, private credit rating 
        agencies, and regulators, to explore and develop new bond and 
        loan contract issuance standards that authorize temporary 
        suspensions of debt services to both private and public 
        creditors without triggering a default in crisis situations;
            (8) to engage with petitioner countries, before those 
        countries exhaust their reserves, to strategize their ascension 
        into the Common Framework and prevent further economic costs;
            (9) to leverage the voice and vote of the United States in 
        the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank so that the 
        Fund and the Bank complete preliminary assessments of the debt 
        relief needed by each country eligible for Common Framework 
        treatment before such countries petition for debt relief;
            (10) that assessments described in paragraph (9) should--
                    (A) include realistic growth and fiscal 
                projections;
                    (B) include implications of Common Framework debt 
                relief; and
                    (C) be based on accurate and comprehensive debt 
                data;
            (11) to support the International Monetary Fund lending 
        into arrears for the Common Framework in the case that private 
        lenders fail to uphold their initial commitments;
            (12) to leverage the voice and vote of the United States in 
        international financial intuitions to promote and finance 
        international initiatives to procure and deploy more affordable 
        and accessible COVID-19 vaccinations and treatments for 
        emerging market and developing countries;
            (13) to address the near-term problems associated with the 
        pandemic-induced global recession and also longer term problems 
        of unsustainable credit lending and borrowing that victimizes 
        emerging market and developing countries; and
            (14) to consider the impact of the monetary policies of the 
        United States and future increases in interest rates on 
        emerging market and developing countries and mitigate related 
        harms.

SEC. 232. LOANS TO THE POVERTY REDUCTION AND GROWTH TRUST OF THE 
              INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND.

    (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--
            (1) In general.--There are authorized to be appropriated to 
        the Secretary of the Treasury for fiscal year 2022 
        $102,000,000, for contribution to the Poverty Reduction and 
        Growth Trust or other special purpose vehicle of the 
        International Monetary Fund.
            (2) Availability of amounts.--Amounts appropriated pursuant 
        to the authorization of appropriations under paragraph (1) 
        shall remain available until September 30, 2031.
    (b) Use of Amounts.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to the 
authorization of appropriations under subsection (a) shall be 
available--
            (1) to cover the cost (as defined in section 502 of the 
        Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 661a)) of loans made 
        by the Secretary of the Treasury to the Poverty Reduction and 
        Growth Trust or other special purpose vehicle of the 
        International Monetary Fund; and
            (2) to subsidize gross obligations for the principal amount 
        of direct loans not to exceed 15,000,000,000 Special Drawing 
        Rights.
    (c) Nonapplicability of Certain Limitation.--Section 5(f) of the 
Bretton Woods Agreements Act (22 U.S.C. 286c(f)) shall not apply to any 
loans made pursuant to this section to the Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Trust or other special purpose vehicle of the International Monetary 
Fund on or before September 30, 2031.
    (d) Authorization of Certain Transactions.--The Exchange 
Stabilization Fund and the financing account corresponding to 
transactions with the International Monetary Fund are authorized to 
enter into such transactions as are necessary to effectuate loans made 
pursuant to this section and denominated in Special Drawing Rights to 
the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust or other special purpose vehicle 
of the International Monetary Fund.

SEC. 233. CLEARING WORLD BANK GROUP ARREARS.

     Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall provide the World Bank Group 
with all necessary amounts to address the United States arrears in 
contributions from fiscal years 2019 and 2020.

SEC. 234. 10TH GENERAL CAPITAL INCREASE FOR THE INTER-AMERICAN 
              DEVELOPMENT BANK.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the spread of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-
        19, has had a significant impact on economic, social, and 
        humanitarian conditions throughout Latin America and the 
        Caribbean;
            (2) the Inter-American Development Bank is the preeminent 
        multilateral development bank dedicated to regional economic 
        and social development and the betterment of lives across Latin 
        America and the Caribbean;
            (3) the Bank has played an integral role in supporting 
        member countries with the coordination and implementation of 
        policies to mitigate the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the 
        Venezuelan refugee and migration crisis, and other crises in 
        the Western Hemisphere;
            (4) a capital increase for the Bank would greatly increase 
        its capacity to provide financing, institutional knowledge, and 
        technical support to foster recovery and inclusion initiatives 
        between regional governments, private sector entities, and 
        international organizations; and
            (5) the United States, as a founding member of the Bank, 
        should support a capital stock increase to ensure the Bank is 
        prepared to offer additional support to member countries 
        severely impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and other crises.
    (b) Tenth General Capital Increase.--
            (1) Support for a general capital increase.--The President 
        shall take steps to support a tenth general capital increase 
        for the Inter-American Development Bank.
            (2) Diplomatic engagement.--The President shall advance 
        diplomatic engagement to build support among member countries 
        of the Bank for a tenth general capital increase for the Bank 
        in order to strengthen the capacity of the Bank--
                    (A) to support Latin American and Caribbean 
                countries in their efforts to address the COVID-19 
                pandemic and the related economic impact; and
                    (B) to advance inclusive economic and social 
                development in the Americas.
            (3) Progress report.--Not later than 45 days after the date 
        of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the 
        Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee 
        on Financial Services of the House of Representatives a report 
        detailing efforts to carry out paragraphs (1) and (2).
            (4) Tenth capital increase.--The Inter-American Development 
        Bank Act (22 U.S.C. 283 et seq.) is amended by adding at the 
        end the following:

``SEC. 42. TENTH CAPITAL INCREASE.

    ``(a) Vote Authorized.--The United States Governor of the Bank is 
authorized to vote in favor of a resolution to increase the capital 
stock of the Bank by $80,000,000,000 over a period not to exceed 5 
years.
    ``(b) Subscription Authorized.--
            ``(1) In general.--The United States Governor of the Bank 
        may subscribe on behalf of the United States to 1,990,714 
        additional shares of the capital stock of the Bank.
            ``(2) Limitation.--Any subscription by the United States to 
        the capital stock of the Bank shall be effective only to such 
        extent and in such amounts as are provided in advance in 
        appropriations Acts.
    ``(c) Limitations on Authorization of Appropriations.--
            ``(1) In general.--In order to pay for the increase in the 
        United States subscription to the Bank under subsection (b), 
        there is authorized to be appropriated $24,014,857,191 for 
        payment by the Secretary of the Treasury.
            ``(2) Allocation of funds.--Of the amount authorized to be 
        appropriated under paragraph (1)--
                    ``(A) $600,371,430 shall be for paid in shares of 
                the Bank; and
                    ``(B) $23,414,485,761 shall be for callable shares 
                of the Bank.''.
    (c) Support for Environmental Sustainability Initiatives of Inter-
American Development Bank.--
            (1) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
        the Inter-American Development Bank should--
                    (A) establish its own environmental grant-making 
                and financing facility in order to implement and expand 
                environmental policies, metrics, and standards, to 
                strengthen resilience and disaster preparedness, and to 
                improve sustainability and conservation; and
                    (B) continue to strengthen environmental safeguards 
                as an element of economic development in the Western 
                Hemisphere.
            (2) Diplomatic engagement.--The President shall advance 
        diplomatic engagement to build support among member countries 
        of the Bank for the creation of an environmental fund and 
        financing facility as part of the tenth general capital 
        increase for the Bank.

SEC. 235. PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The Inter-American Development Bank was established in 
        1959 and--
                    (A) is the premier multilateral development bank in 
                the Western Hemisphere;
                    (B) is the largest source of development financing 
                for Latin America and the Caribbean; and
                    (C) issued more than $140,000,000,000 in loans and 
                grants between 2011 and 2021.
            (2) The Inter-American Development Bank--
                    (A) has 48 member states, of which 26 are borrowing 
                members in the Latin America and the Caribbean region; 
                and
                    (B) constitutes a critical forum for fostering 
                collective action and meeting shared regional 
                challenges, including COVID-19 recovery and response.
            (3) Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the People's Republic 
        of China are among the 22 non-borrowing, non-Western Hemisphere 
        members of the Inter-American Development Bank.
            (4) Taiwan--
                    (A) has been an observer at the Inter-American 
                Development Bank since 1991;
                    (B) has contributed to a specialized financial 
                intermediary development fund at IDB Lab since 2006;
                    (C) has been a non-regional member of the Central 
                American Bank for Economic Integration since 1992;
                    (D) is a member of the Asian Development Bank, the 
                World Trade Organization, the Asia-Pacific Economic 
                Cooperation, and the International Chamber of Commerce; 
                and
                    (E) is a participant of the Organisation for 
                Economic Co-operation and Development's Competition 
                Committee, its Steel Committee, and its Fisheries 
                Committee.
            (5) Taiwan's economy is the 7th largest in Asia and the 
        20th largest in the world by purchasing power parity.
            (6) Taiwan has been a model contributor of foreign aid in 
        Latin America and the Caribbean, allocating between 30 percent 
        and 50 percent of its foreign aid budget to Latin America and 
        the Caribbean.
            (7) Since 2010, Taiwan's International Cooperation and 
        Development Fund has funded 95 projects in Central America, 64 
        projects in the Caribbean, and 21 projects in South America.
            (8) Taiwan has been a firm supporter of Haiti as it 
        confronts multiple simultaneous crises--
                    (A) by providing more than $145,000,000 in 
                financing to modernize Haiti's electrical grid;
                    (B) by delivering 280,000 masks at the height of 
                the COVID-19 pandemic; and
                    (C) by pledging $500,000 in disaster relief 
                immediately after the August 14, 2021, earthquake in 
                Haiti.
            (9) According to data from the Pan American Development 
        Foundation, communities receiving assistance from Taiwan 
        display increased--
                    (A) food security;
                    (B) income generation; and
                    (C) capacity to recover from natural disasters.
            (10) Taiwan has placed special emphasis on fostering 
        development in Central America and in the Caribbean, including 
        by signing the Agreement on the Republic of China (Taiwan)--
        Central America Economic Development Fund in 1998.
            (11) Through its non-regional member status at the Central 
        American Bank for Economic Integration, Taiwan has provided 
        $266,700,000 in financial assistance to help Central American 
        countries respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. On April 22, 2021, 
        the Central American Bank for Economic Integration announced 
        the opening of its Representative Office in Taiwan, deepening 
        investment ties between Taiwan and Central America.
            (12) Nine countries in Latin America and the Caribbean 
        maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and Taiwan has 8 
        representative offices in 7 other countries in the region.
            (13) Since 2016, the Government of the People's Republic of 
        China has engaged in aggressive economic diplomacy to compel 
        the withdrawal of diplomatic recognition for Taiwan, most 
        notably in Panama, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador, all 
        of which have terminated longstanding and productive diplomatic 
        relationships with Taiwan and granted diplomatic recognition to 
        the People's Republic of China.
            (14) The Government of the People's Republic of China--
                    (A) announced a $1,100,000,000 construction project 
                in Panama on the day that Panama switched from 
                recognizing Taiwan to recognizing the People's Republic 
                of China as the government of China; and
                    (B) similarly offered assistance packages to the 
                Dominican Republic and El Salvador in 2018 in exchange 
                for those countries ceasing their diplomatic 
                recognition of Taiwan.
            (15) Taiwan's international engagement has faced increased 
        resistance from the Government of the People's Republic of 
        China, which has used its influence to deny Taiwan's 
        invitations to multilateral fora. For example, Taiwan was not 
        invited to the 2016 Assembly of the International Civil 
        Aviation Organization (ICAO), despite participating as a guest 
        at ICAO's 2013 summit. Taiwan's requests to participate in the 
        General Assembly of the International Criminal Police 
        Organization (commonly known as ``INTERPOL'') were also 
        rejected.
            (16) Taiwan's inclusion in multilateral organizations, such 
        as the Inter-American Development Bank, advances peace and 
        stability in the world and in the Western Hemisphere 
        specifically.
            (17) Congress has demonstrated a longstanding policy of 
        supporting Taiwan's participation in international bodies that 
        address shared transnational challenges by--
                    (A) authorizing the Secretary of State, in Public 
                Law 106-137, Public Law 107-10, and Public Law 108-235, 
                to initiate a United States plan for supporting 
                Taiwan's participation as an observer in the activities 
                of the World Health Organization;
                    (B) directing the Secretary of State, in Public Law 
                113-17, to report on a strategy to obtain observer 
                status for Taiwan at the International Civil Aviation 
                Organization Assembly; and
                    (C) directing the Secretary of State, in Public Law 
                114-139, to develop a strategy to obtain observer 
                status for Taiwan at the INTERPOL Assembly.
            (18) Despite these efforts, Taiwan has not received an 
        invitation to attend as an observer any of the events of the 
        international organizations referred to in paragraph (17) since 
        2016.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States fully supports Taiwan's participation 
        in, and contribution to, international organizations and 
        underscores the importance of the relationship between Taiwan 
        and the United States;
            (2) diversifying the Inter-American Development Bank's 
        donor base and increasing ally engagement in the Western 
        Hemisphere reinforces United States national interests;
            (3) Taiwan's significant contribution to the development 
        and economies of Latin America and the Caribbean demonstrate 
        that Taiwan's membership in the Inter-American Development Bank 
        as a non-borrowing member would benefit the Bank and the entire 
        Latin American and Caribbean region; and
            (4) non-borrowing membership in the Inter-American 
        Development Bank would allow Taiwan to substantially leverage 
        and channel the immense resources Taiwan already provides to 
        Latin America and the Caribbean to reach a larger number of 
        beneficiaries.
    (c) Plan for the Participation of Taiwan in the Inter-American 
Development Bank.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
Secretary of the Treasury, is authorized--
            (1) to initiate a United States plan to endorse non-
        borrowing membership in the Inter-American Development Bank for 
        Taiwan; and
            (2) to instruct the United States Governor of the Bank to 
        work with the Board of Governors of the Bank to admit Taiwan as 
        a non-borrowing member of the Bank.
    (d) Report Concerning Member State Status for Taiwan at the Inter-
American Development Bank.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, and not later than April 1 of each year 
thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary 
of the Treasury, shall submit an unclassified report to the Committee 
on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
of the House of Representatives that--
            (1) describes the United States plan to endorse and obtain 
        non-borrowing membership status for Taiwan at the Inter-
        American Development Bank;
            (2) includes an account of the efforts that the Secretary 
        of State and the Secretary of the Treasury have made to 
        encourage member states of the Bank to promote Taiwan's bid to 
        obtain non-borrowing membership at the Bank; and
            (3) identifies the steps that the Secretary of State and 
        the Secretary of the Treasury will take to endorse and obtain 
        non-borrowing membership status for Taiwan at the Bank in the 
        following year.

SEC. 236. INCREASED UNITED STATES COOPERATION WITH ASIA-PACIFIC 
              ECONOMIC COOPERATION.

    The Secretary of State shall pursue the following objectives at the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum:
            (1) Improving efficiency in supply chains, particularly 
        semi-conductor supply chains.
            (2) Encouraging continued public-private dialogues with 
        policymakers and promoting a common set of technology 
        standards, including the possibility of a digital trade 
        agreement.
            (3) Promoting the development and use of policy 
        recommendations for governments to support research and 
        development of clean energy (both renewable and non-renewable) 
        and adopting robust clean energy standards.
            (4) Advancing cooperation that reduces barriers to cross-
        border investment into emerging and growing markets.
            (5) Improving cybersecurity in the Asia-Pacific region and 
        developing tools for governments to combat cyber threats, 
        including ransomware, disinformation, and cyber hacks.

                         Subtitle E--Resilience

SEC. 241. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP IN 
              RECOVERY AND RESILIENCY.

    It is the sense of Congress that the United States must exercise 
leadership in the international community's response to the COVID-19 
pandemic regarding public health and economic recovery and resiliency, 
including by--
            (1) leveraging multilateral fora, such as the Group of 
        Seven (G7) and the Group of Twenty (G20), which constitute more 
        than 30 percent and 70 percent of the global economy, 
        respectively, to coordinate an effective international response 
        to persistent economic issues related to supply chains, 
        inflation, and inequality;
            (2) revitalizing the United Nations and its associated 
        institutions to coordinate and facilitate international 
        initiatives that--
                    (A) promote global health and economic security; 
                and
                    (B) build resilience to present and forecasted 
                shocks and stresses that impede economic growth or 
                trigger, contribute to, result in, or cause 
                backsliding;
            (3) empowering like-minded allies and partners to leverage 
        their respective strengths and assume greater responsibilities 
        in such international fora and institutions;
            (4) continuing to fund and finance international 
        initiatives, such as COVAX, to provide and distribute life-
        saving vaccinations and medical treatments for COVID-19;
            (5) promoting an equitable international economic recovery 
        that promotes building developing countries' resilience 
        capacities to address enduring disparities and challenges 
        facing lower and middle income countries in addition to more 
        recent challenges related to high-levels of global inflation 
        and market volatility; and
            (6) supporting an impartial, independent, and international 
        investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic to 
        derive lessons learned and prevent similar international 
        disasters in the future.

SEC. 242. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING IMPROVING RESILIENCE CAPACITIES 
              THROUGH FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.

    It is the sense of Congress that United States foreign assistance 
and development finance must better suit its foreign assistance and 
development finance institutions to improve global resilience 
capacities and mitigate the harmful effects of international shocks and 
stresses, including by--
            (1) equipping people, institutions, and international 
        systems with the tools and resources necessary to avoid, cope 
        with, and recover from modern threats, such as pandemic 
        diseases, climate change, and extreme weather, cybersecurity 
        compromises, and supply chain disruptions;
            (2) partnering with other countries to better assess their 
        vulnerabilities and risks to international shocks and 
        identifying sustainable strategies for mitigating risk and 
        improving resilience;
            (3) prioritizing funding for foreign assistance and 
        development finance initiatives that seek to prevent, respond 
        and reduce risks of international shocks;
            (4) expanding foreign capacity building initiatives in law 
        enforcement, public health, cybersecurity, food and energy 
        security;
            (5) strengthening institutions that facilitate economic 
        cooperation and transparency in times of international crisis 
        and uncertainty; and
            (6) providing support for countries to strengthen domestic 
        resource mobilization and access to effective and equitable 
        development finance in order to reduce dependence on foreign 
        assistance.

SEC. 243. OFFICE OF ECONOMIC RESILIENCY.

    Section 1 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 
U.S.C. 2651a) is amended--
            (1) by redesignating subsection (h) (as added by section 
        361 of Public Law 116-260) as subsection (k); and
            (2) by adding at the end the following:
    ``(l) Office of Economic Resiliency.--
            ``(1) In general.--There is established, within the Bureau 
        of Economic and Business Affairs of the Department of State, 
        the Office of Economic Resiliency (in this subsection referred 
        to as the `Office').
            ``(2) Function.--The Office, under the direction of the 
        Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Economic and Business 
        Affairs, shall lead United States' efforts to develop and 
        implement credible national action plans with partner countries 
        aimed at detecting, understanding, preventing impacts of, and 
        responding to present and forecasted shocks and stresses that 
        are destabilizing to countries' national security and economic 
        growth, including epidemics, pandemics, natural disasters, and 
        other destabilizing events.''.

SEC. 244. ESTABLISHMENT OF RESILIENCE TRUST FUND AT THE WORLD BANK.

    The United States Executive Director to the World Bank shall use 
the voice and vote of the United States to advocate for the 
establishment of a multi-donor trust fund to incentivize countries to 
develop and implement credible national action plans aimed at 
preventing, detecting, and responding to epidemics, pandemics, and 
other global destabilizing events.
                                 <all>