[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3192 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
117th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 3192
To advance a policy to ensure peace and security across the Taiwan
Strait.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
November 4, 2021
Mr. Risch (for himself, Mr. Crapo, Mr. Hagerty, Mr. Cornyn, Mr. Rubio,
and Mr. Romney) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To advance a policy to ensure peace and security across the Taiwan
Strait.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Taiwan Deterrence
Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
TITLE I--DETERRENCE POLICY REGARDING TAIWAN
Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Statement of policy.
TITLE II--BOLSTERING UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN DEFENSE AND SECURITY
Sec. 201. Report on capability development by Taiwan.
Sec. 202. Authorization of appropriations for Foreign Military
Financing grant assistance to Taiwan.
Sec. 203. Eligibility of Taiwan for Foreign Military Sales and export
status under the Arms Export Control Act.
Sec. 204. Report on advancing the defense of Taiwan.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives.
(2) People's liberation army; pla.--The terms ``People's
Liberation Army'' and ``PLA'' mean the armed forces of the
People's Republic of China.
(3) PRC; china.--The terms ``PRC'' and ``China'' mean the
People's Republic of China.
TITLE I--DETERRENCE POLICY REGARDING TAIWAN
SEC. 101. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Taiwan is a model democracy in the Indo-Pacific, with
open and fair elections, strong market-led economic growth, and
high levels of individual freedoms.
(2) The United States and Taiwan share a robust unofficial
relationship with close cooperation on a wide range of issues,
including global health, economic issues, military and defense,
development, and people-to-people exchanges.
(3) Taiwan is a key economic partner of the United States,
serving as the 10th largest trading partner of the United
States as of October 2021 and home to critical high-tech supply
chains.
(4) The People's Republic of China has greatly increased
its political, diplomatic, economic, and military coercion
campaigns across the Taiwan Strait, especially since 2016.
(5) The PRC seeks to annex Taiwan through whatever means
may ultimately be required. The insistence by the Chinese
Communist Party that so-called ``reunification'' is Taiwan's
only option makes that goal inherently coercive. In January
2019, President Xi stated that the PRC ``make[s] no promise to
renounce the use of force and reserve[s] the option of taking
all necessary means''. Taiwan's embodiment of democratic values
and economic liberalism challenges President Xi's goal of
achieving national rejuvenation. The PRC plans to exploit
Taiwan's dominant strategic position in the First Island Chain
and to project power into the Second Island Chain and beyond.
(6) The People's Liberation Army has exponentially
increased its military activity in the Taiwan Strait. As of
October 2021, the Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan
recorded that more than 600 Chinese military sorties have flown
into the Air Defense Identification Zone of Taiwan in 2021
alone. That is an increase of 50 percent compared to 2020. That
same month, the PLA made its largest ever air incursion into
the Air Defense Identification Zone of Taiwan, sending almost
150 planes in total over a number of days.
(7) In response, on October 3, 2021, the Department of
State said it was ``very concerned by the People's Republic of
China's provocative military activity near Taiwan, which is
destabilizing, risks miscalculations, and undermines regional
peace and stability'' and urged Beijing to ``cease its
military, diplomatic, and economic pressure and coercion
against Taiwan''.
(8) The PRC has increased the frequency and scope of its
exercises and operations targeting Taiwan, such as amphibious
assault and live-fire exercises in the Taiwan Strait, PLA Air
Force flights that encircle Taiwan, and flights across the
unofficial median line in the Taiwan Strait. The destruction of
Hong Kong's autonomy by the Government of the PRC potentially
accelerates the timeline of a Taiwan scenario and makes the
defense of Taiwan an even more urgent priority.
(9) In October 2021, the PRC adopted export controls on
Chinese goods to Taiwan in an attempt to put more economic
pressure on Taiwan. That follows an increase in PRC tactics to
squeeze the economy of Taiwan, including banning certain
exports and adopting the ``31 measures'' policy to induce brain
drain on the island by providing government-sponsored
incentives for Taiwanese talent and businesses to move to the
mainland.
(10) The PRC launches massive cyber campaigns against
Taiwan. The Department of Cyber Security of Taiwan estimates
that there are approximately 20,000,000 to 40,000,000
cyberattacks every month, most of which are suspected to be by
the PRC. In July 2021, head of the Department of Cyber Security
of Taiwan Chien Hung-wei told United States media that there
was a ``rather high degree of confidence that many attacks
originated from our neighbor [the PRC]'' and warned that
Taiwan's ``critical infrastructure, such as gas, water, and
electricity are highly digitized, so [Taiwan] can easily fall
victim''.
(11) The PRC continues to isolate Taiwan diplomatically.
The PRC has refused to allow Taiwan to attend annual summits of
international organizations such as the International Civil
Aviation Organization, the International Criminal Police
Organization (INTERPOL), and the World Health Organization.
(12) The PRC also uses its economic might to punish
countries who seek closer ties with Taiwan. Most recently, in
September 2021, the PRC denied Lithuania certain export
licenses after Lithuania and Taiwan announced their intent to
establish a Taiwan representative office in the city of
Vilnius.
(13) The PRC uses economic incentives such as massive
investment promises to try to formalize relations with Taiwan's
remaining allies. Since 2016, seven countries--the Republic of
Kiribati, the Solomon Islands, the Dominican Republic, Burkina
Faso, the Republic of El Salvador, the Republic of Panama, and
the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe--have shifted
diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing.
(14) The PRC aims to use its growing military might in
concert with other instruments of its national power to
displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific and establish
hegemony over the region. Achieving the annexation of Taiwan is
a key step for the PRC to achieve those ambitions.
(15) The defense of Taiwan is critical to--
(A) retaining the credibility of the United States
as a defender of the democratic values and free-market
principles embodied by the people and government of
Taiwan;
(B) limiting the ability of the PLA to project
power beyond the First Island Chain, including to
United States territory, such as Guam and Hawaii;
(C) defending the territorial integrity of Japan;
and
(D) preventing the PLA from diverting military
planning, resources, and personnel to broader military
ambitions.
SEC. 102. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
(a) Objectives.--It is the policy of the United States, in ensuring
security in the Taiwan Strait, to pursue the following objectives:
(1) The balance of power in the Indo-Pacific remains
favorable to the United States and its allies and partners. The
United States and its allies and partners maintain unfettered
access to the region and the PRC neither dominates the region
nor coerces its neighbors, including Taiwan.
(2) The allies and partners of the United States, including
Taiwan--
(A) maintain confidence in United States leadership
and its commitment to the Indo-Pacific region;
(B) can withstand and combat subversion and undue
influence by the PRC; and
(C) work with the United States to promote shared
interests and values in the region.
(3) The combined influence of the United States and its
allies and partners is strong enough to demonstrate to the PRC
that the risks of attempts to annex Taiwan by coercion or force
outweigh the potential benefits.
(4) The United States deters the PRC from seeking military
or other aggressive unilateral action to change the status quo
on Taiwan or in the Taiwan Strait.
(b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States, in pursuit of
the objectives set forth in subsection (a)--
(1) to prioritize the Indo-Pacific region as the most
important political-military theater for United States foreign
policy;
(2) to prioritize resources for achieving United States
political and military objectives in that most critical region;
(3) to sustain the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et
seq.) and the Six Assurances provided by the United States to
Taiwan in July 1982 as the foundations for United States-Taiwan
relations;
(4) to deepen, to the fullest extent possible, the
extensive, close, and friendly relations of the United States
and Taiwan, including cooperation to support the development of
capable, ready, and modern forces necessary for the defense of
Taiwan;
(5) to encourage and facilitate Taiwan's accelerated
acquisition of asymmetric defense capabilities, which are
crucial to defending the islands of Taiwan from invasion,
including long-range precision fires, anti-ship missiles,
coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, undersea warfare,
advanced command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), and
resilient command and control capabilities;
(6) to increase the conduct of relevant and practical
training and exercises with the defense forces of Taiwan,
including, as appropriate, the Rim of the Pacific exercise,
combined training at United States Army combat training centers
and the United States Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center,
United States Air Force Red Flag and Green Flag exercises, and
bilateral naval exercises and training;
(7) to use, in service of the policy described in
paragraphs (5) and (6), existing tools such as foreign military
sales and direct commercial sales, identify new tools,
including foreign military financing for Taiwan under certain
conditions, and explore greater industrial cooperation and co-
production or co-development opportunities;
(8) to prioritize the timely review of and response to
requests from Taiwan for defense articles and services within
the United States acquisition system, and to ensure that such
prioritization is the top priority of relevant Cabinet
officials, including the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Defense;
(9) to prioritize building the capacity of Taiwan to
protect United States defense technology;
(10) to design major defense capabilities for export;
(11) to encourage Taiwan's domestic production of certain
defense capabilities;
(12) to expand professional military education and
technical training opportunities in the United States for
military personnel of Taiwan;
(13) to pursue a strategy of military engagement with
Taiwan that fully integrates exchanges at the strategic,
policy, and functional levels;
(14) to increase exchanges between senior defense officials
and general officers of the United States and Taiwan consistent
with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135; 132 Stat. 341),
especially for the purpose of enhancing cooperation on defense
planning and improving the interoperability of the military
forces of the United States and Taiwan;
(15) to conduct exchanges with Taiwan specifically focused
on improving the reserve force of Taiwan and to ensure the
effectiveness of the All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency;
(16) to deter acts of aggression or coercion by the PRC
against the interests of the United States and its allies,
especially regarding Taiwan, by showing PRC leaders that the
United States can and is willing to deny them the ability to
achieve their objectives, including by--
(A) consistently demonstrating the political will
of the United States to deepening existing treaty
alliances and growing new partnerships as a durable,
asymmetric, and unmatched strategic advantage to the
growing military capabilities and reach of the PRC;
(B) maintaining a system of forward-deployed bases
in the Indo-Pacific region as the most visible sign of
United States resolve and commitment to the region and
as platforms to ensure United States operational
readiness and advance interoperability with allies and
partners;
(C) adopting a more dispersed force posture
throughout the region, particularly the Western
Pacific, and pursuing maximum access for United States
mobile and relocatable launchers for long-range cruise,
ballistic, and hypersonic weapons throughout the Indo-
Pacific region;
(D) fielding long-range, precision-strike networks
to United States and allied forces, including ground-
launched cruise missiles, undersea and naval
capabilities, and integrated air and missile defense in
the First Island Chain and the Second Island Chain, in
order to impose high risks on the PRC for operating in
those zones and maximize the ability of the United
States to operate;
(E) strengthening extended deterrence to
demonstrate that escalation against key United States
interests would be costly, risky, and self-defeating;
and
(F) collaborating with allies and partners to
accelerate their roles in more equitably sharing the
burdens of mutual defense, including through the
acquisition and fielding of advanced capabilities and
training that will better enable them to repel PRC
aggression or coercion;
(17) to strengthen and deepen United States alliances and
partnerships, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific region, by pursuing
greater bilateral and multilateral cooperative initiatives that
ensure peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, advance shared
interests, and bolster partner countries' confidence that the
United States is and will remain a strong, committed, and
constant partner;
(18) to encourage and aid Taiwan to boost its own
capabilities and resiliency to avoid and deter PRC military
pressure in the Taiwan Strait;
(19) to maintain United States access to the Western
Pacific, including by--
(A) increasing the qualitative advantage of United
States forward-deployed forces in the Indo-Pacific
region;
(B) modernizing the United States military through
investments in existing and new major platforms,
emerging technologies, critical in-theater force
structure and enabling capabilities, operational
concepts, and access agreements; and
(C) operating and conducting exercises with allies
and partners--
(i) to prevent the PLA from gaining the
ability to project power and establish
contested zones within the First Island Chain
and the Second Island Chain;
(ii) to diminish the ability of the PLA to
coerce its neighbors; and
(iii) to maintain open sea and air lanes,
particularly in the Taiwan Strait, the East
China Sea, and the South China Sea;
(20) to deter the PRC from--
(A) coercing Taiwan, including by developing more
combat-credible forces that are integrated with Indo-
Pacific allies and partners of the United States in
contact, blunt, and surge layers and able to defeat any
PRC theory of victory in the First Island Chain or
Second Island Chain and beyond, as called for in the
2018 National Defense Strategy;
(B) using gray-zone tactics below the level of
armed conflict; or
(C) initiating armed conflict; and
(21) to convey to the PRC that, in the event that
deterrence by denial fails, the United States, if necessary--
(A) will impose prohibitive diplomatic, economic,
financial, reputational, and military costs on the PRC
for its aggression; and
(B) will defend itself and its allies regardless of
the point of origin of attacks against them.
TITLE II--BOLSTERING UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN DEFENSE AND SECURITY
SEC. 201. REPORT ON CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT BY TAIWAN.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Secretary of State should expand and strengthen
existing measures under the United States Conventional Arms
Transfer Policy to provide capabilities to Taiwan, prioritizing
Taiwan in accordance with United States strategic imperatives;
(2) the United States should design for export to Taiwan
capabilities critical to maintaining a favorable military
balance in the region, including long-range precision fires,
air and missile defense systems, anti-ship cruise missiles,
land attack cruise missiles, conventional hypersonic systems,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities,
and command and control systems;
(3) the United States should pursue, to the maximum extent
possible, anticipatory technology security and foreign
disclosure policy on the systems described in paragraph (2);
and
(4) the Secretary of State should--
(A) urge Taiwan to invest in sufficient quantities
of munitions to meet contingency requirements and avoid
the need for accessing United States stocks in wartime;
and
(B) cooperate with Taiwan to deliver such
munitions, or when necessary, to increase the capacity
of Taiwan to produce such munitions.
(b) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report that--
(A) describes United States priorities for building
more capable Taiwan security forces and organizations;
and
(B) identifies statutory, regulatory, or other
obstacles to advancing such priorities.
(2) Matters to be included.--The report required by
paragraph (1) shall--
(A) provide a priority list of defense and military
capabilities that Taiwan must possess for the United
States to be able to achieve its military objectives in
the Indo-Pacific region;
(B) identify, from the list referred to in
subparagraph (A), the capabilities that are best
provided, or can only be provided, by the United
States;
(C) identify--
(i) actions required to prioritize United
States Government resources and personnel to
expedite fielding the capabilities identified
under subparagraph (B); and
(ii) steps needed to fully account for and
a plan to integrate all means of United States
foreign military sales, direct commercial
sales, security assistance, and all applicable
authorities of the Department of State and the
Department of Defense;
(D) assess the major obstacles to fulfilling
requirements for United States security assistance for
Taiwan, including resources and personnel limits,
legislative and policy barriers, and factors related to
specific partner countries;
(E) identify limitations on the ability of the
United States to provide the capabilities described in
paragraph (A), including the capabilities identified
under subparagraph (B), because of existing United
States treaty obligations or United States statutes,
regulations, or other policies;
(F) recommend changes to existing statutes,
regulations, or other policies that would reduce or
eliminate limitations on providing critical
capabilities to Taiwan;
(G) identify requirements to streamline the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations under
subchapter M of chapter I of title 22, Code of Federal
Regulations, that would enable more effective delivery
of capabilities to Taiwan;
(H) recommend improvements to the process for
developing requirements for Taiwan's capabilities; and
(I) recommend other statutory, regulatory, or
policy changes that would improve delivery timelines.
(3) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
SEC. 202. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FOREIGN MILITARY
FINANCING GRANT ASSISTANCE TO TAIWAN.
(a) Taiwan Security Programs.--In addition to amounts otherwise
authorized to be appropriated for Foreign Military Financing, there is
authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State for Taiwan
Foreign Military Finance grant assistance programs $2,000,000,000 for
each of fiscal years 2023 to 2032.
(b) Restrictions on Taiwan Foreign Military Financing.--Amounts
authorized to be appropriated under subsection (a) shall be available
only if--
(1) Taiwan commits to match spending on a dollar-for-dollar
basis; and
(2) the United States and Taiwan formally agree--
(A) to conduct joint long-range planning for
capability development; and
(B) on the expenditure of such amounts.
SEC. 203. ELIGIBILITY OF TAIWAN FOR FOREIGN MILITARY SALES AND EXPORT
STATUS UNDER THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT.
The Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) is amended--
(1) in sections 3(d)(2)(B), 3(d)(3)(A)(i), (3)(d)(5),
21(e)(2)(A), 36(b)(1), 36(b)(2), 36(b)(6), 36(c)(2)(A),
36(d)(2)(A), 62(c)(1), and 63(a)(2), by inserting ``Taiwan,''
before ``or New Zealand'' each place it appears;
(2) in section 3(b)(2), by inserting ``the Government of
Taiwan,'' before ``or the Government of New Zealand''; and
(3) in sections 21(h)(1)(A) and 21(h)(2), by inserting
``Taiwan,'' before ``or Israel'' each place it appears.
SEC. 204. REPORT ON ADVANCING THE DEFENSE OF TAIWAN.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for a period of seven
years, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall
jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on
Taiwan's enhancement of its self-defense capabilities.
(b) Matters To Be Included.--Each report required by subsection (a)
shall include the following:
(1) An assessment of the commitment of Taiwan to
implementing the tenets of the Overall Defense Concept, and
what steps Taiwan has and has not taken to implement those
tenets.
(2) An assessment of the efforts of Taiwan to acquire and
employ within its forces asymmetric capabilities, including--
(A) long-range precision fires;
(B) air and missile defense systems;
(C) anti-ship cruise missiles;
(D) land attack cruise missiles;
(E) conventional hypersonic systems;
(F) mining and countermining capabilities;
(G) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
capabilities;
(H) command and control systems; and
(I) any other defense capabilities the Secretary of
State and the Secretary of Defense jointly determine
are crucial to the defense of Taiwan.
(3) An evaluation of the balance between conventional and
asymmetric capabilities in the defense force of Taiwan as of
the date on which the report is submitted.
(4) An assessment of steps by Taiwan to enhance the overall
readiness of its defense forces, including--
(A) the extent to which Taiwan is requiring and
providing regular training to such forces;
(B) the extent to which such training is realistic
to the security environment Taiwan faces; and
(C) the sufficiency of the financial and budgetary
resources Taiwan is putting toward readiness of such
forces.
(5) An assessment of steps by Taiwan to ensure that the
Taiwan Reserve Command can recruit, train, and equip its
forces.
(6) An evaluation of--
(A) the severity of manpower shortages in the
military of Taiwan, including in the reserve forces;
(B) the impact of such shortages in the event of a
conflict scenario; and
(C) Taiwan's efforts to address such shortages.
(7) An assessment of efforts by Taiwan to boost its
civilian defenses, including any informational campaigns to
make aware the risks of Taiwan's security environment to the
population of Taiwan.
(8) An assessment of efforts by Taiwan to secure its
critical infrastructure, including in transportation,
telecommunications networks, and energy.
(9) An assessment of efforts by Taiwan to enhance its
cybersecurity, including the security of civilian government
and military networks.
(10) An assessment of any significant gaps in any of the
matters described in paragraphs (1) through (9) with respect to
which the United States assesses that additional action is
needed.
(11) A description of cooperative efforts between the
United States and Taiwan on the matters described in paragraphs
(1) through (10).
(12) A description of resistance within the Government of
Taiwan to implementing the matters described in paragraphs (1)
through (9) or to United States support or engagement with
regard to those matters.
(c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted
in classified form, but may include an unclassified summary.
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