Findings

Congress makes the following findings:(1)The Inter-American Development Bank (referred to in this Act as the IDB) was established in 1959 and—(A)is the premier multilateral development bank in the Western Hemisphere;(B)is the largest source of development financing for Latin America and the Caribbean; and(C)issued more than $140,000,000,000 in loans and grants between 2011 and 2021.(2)The IDB—(A)has 48 member states, of which 26 are borrowing members in the Latin America and the Caribbean region; and(B)constitutes a critical forum for fostering collective action and meeting shared regional challenges, including COVID–19 recovery and response.(3)Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the People’s Republic of China are among the 22 non-borrowing, non-Western Hemisphere members of the IDB.(4)Taiwan—(A)has been an observer at the IDB since 1991;(B)has contributed to a specialized financial intermediary development fund at IDB Lab since 2006;(C)has been a non-regional member country of the Central American Bank for Economic Integration since 1992;(D)is a member of the Asian Development Bank, the World Trade Organization, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the International Chamber of Commerce; and(E)is a participant of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Competition Committee, its Steel Committee, and its Fisheries Committee.(5)Taiwan’s economy is the 7th largest in Asia and the 20th largest in the world by purchasing power parity.(6)Taiwan has been a model contributor of foreign aid in Latin America and the Caribbean, allocating between 30 percent and 50 percent of its foreign aid budget to Latin America and the Caribbean. (7)Since 2010, Taiwan’s International Cooperation and Development Fund has funded 95 projects in Central America, 64 projects in the Caribbean, and 21 projects in South America. (8)Taiwan has been a firm supporter of Haiti as it confronts multiple simultaneous crises—(A)by providing more than $145,000,000 in financing to modernize Haiti’s electrical grid;(B)by delivering 280,000 masks at the height of the COVID–19 pandemic; and(C)by pledging $500,000 in disaster relief immediately after the August 14, 2021, earthquake in Haiti. (9)According to data from the Pan American Development Foundation, communities receiving assistance from Taiwan display increased—(A)food security;(B)income generation; and (C)capacity to recover from natural disasters.(10)Taiwan has placed special emphasis on fostering development in Central America and in the Caribbean, including by signing the Agreement on the Republic of China (Taiwan)—Central America Economic Development Fund in 1998. (11)Through its non-regional partner status at the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, Taiwan has provided $266,700,000 in financial assistance to help Central American countries respond to the COVID–19 pandemic. On April 22, 2021, the Central American Bank for Economic Integration announced the opening of its Representative Office in Taiwan, deepening investment ties between Taiwan and Central America.(12)Taiwan maintains diplomatic relations with 9 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and 8 representative offices in 7 other countries in the region.(13)Since 2016, the Government of the People’s Republic of China has engaged in aggressive economic diplomacy to compel the withdrawal of diplomatic recognition for Taiwan, most notably in Panama, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador, all of which have terminated longstanding and productive diplomatic relationships with Taiwan and granted diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China. (14)The Government of the People’s Republic of China—(A)announced a $1,100,000,000 construction project in Panama on the day that Panama switched its recognition from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China; and (B)similarly offered assistance packages to the Dominican Republic and El Salvador in 2018 in exchange for these countries ceasing their diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. (15)Taiwan’s international engagement has faced increased resistance from the Government of the People’s Republic of China, which has used its influence to deny Taiwan’s invitations to multilateral fora. For example, Taiwan was not invited to the 2016 Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), despite participating as a guest at ICAO’s 2013 summit. Taiwan’s requests to participate in the General Assembly of the International Criminal Police Organization (commonly known as INTERPOL) were also rejected. (16)Taiwan’s inclusion in multilateral organizations, such as the IDB, advances peace and stability in the world and in the Western Hemisphere specifically. (17)Congress has demonstrated a longstanding policy of supporting Taiwan’s participation in international bodies that address shared transnational challenges by—(A)authorizing the Secretary of State, in Public Law 106–137, Public Law 107–10, and Public Law 108–235, to initiate a United States plan for supporting Taiwan’s participation as an observer in the activities of the World Health Organization;(B)directing the Secretary of State, in Public Law 113–17, to report on a strategy to obtain observer status for Taiwan at the International Civil Aviation Organization Assembly; and (C)directing the Secretary of State, in Public Law 114–139, to develop a strategy to obtain observer status for Taiwan at the INTERPOL Assembly. (18)Despite these efforts, Taiwan has not received an invitation to attend as an observer any of the events of the international organizations referred to in paragraph (17) since 2016.