Short titles

This Act may be cited as the

Taiwan Actions Supporting Security by Undertaking Regular Engagements Act

or the

Taiwan ASSURE Act

Findings

Congress makes the following findings: (1)Consistent with the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409), the United States has grown its strategic partnership with Taiwan’s vibrant democracy of 23,000,000 people. (2)Section 2(b) of the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301(b)) declares that it is the policy of the United States— (A)to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area; and (B)to declare that peace and stability in the [Western Pacific] area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern. (3)In recent years, the Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has intensified its efforts to diplomatically isolate and intimidate Taiwan through— (A)punitive economic measures; (B)increased military provocations; and (C)exertions of malign influence to undermine democracy in Taiwan. (4)To ensure the durability of the United States policy under the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 115–409), it is necessary— (A)to reinforce— (i)Taiwan’s international participation; (ii)Taiwan’s global economic integration; and (iii)the credibility of Taiwan’s military deterrent; and (B)to simultaneously take measures to reduce the risk of miscalculation among the PRC, the United States, and Taiwan. (5)Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations in which statehood is not a requirement benefits the global community, as evidenced by the fact that Taiwan was the first to inform the World Health Organization of cases of atypical pneumonia reported in Wuhan, China, on December 31, 2019. (6)Despite the COVID–19 pandemic creating an opportunity for the Government of the PRC to launch a disinformation campaign aimed at sowing internal social division and undermining confidence in the response of Taiwanese authorities, Taiwan has been overwhelmingly successful in controlling the pandemic. (7)The Global Cooperation and Training Framework, a United States-Taiwan-Japan platform for Taiwan to share its expertise with the world, has sponsored nearly 30 workshops since 2015 to share Taiwan’s knowledge on issues such as addressing COVID–19 misinformation, disaster relief, women’s empowerment, and good governance. (8)Section 2(b)(2) of the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301(b)(2)) states it is the policy of the United States to declare that peace and stability in the [Western Pacific] area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern. (9)The PRC’s recent military activities around Taiwan, including conducting 10 transits and military exercises near Taiwan since January 2021 and 380 sorties into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone in 2020 (the greatest number since 1996), have destabilized Northeast Asia. (10)Increased air and sea activity in and around the Taiwan Strait and the East China Sea by the PRC, Taiwan, the United States, and Japan increase the likelihood of accidents that may— (A)escalate tensions around Taiwan; and (B)undermine the stability across the Taiwan Strait and regional peace in the Northeast Asia.

Sense of Congress

It is the sense of Congress that— (1)United States engagement with Taiwan should focus on actions, activities, and programs that mutually benefit the United States and Taiwan; (2)the United States should prioritize— (A)people-to-people exchanges; (B)bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation; and (C)assisting Taiwan’s efforts to participate in international institutions; (3)the United States should pursue new engagement initiatives with Taiwan, such as— (A)enhancing cooperation on science and technology; (B)joint infrastructure development in third countries; (C)renewable energy and environmental sustainability development; and (D)investment screening coordination; (4)the United States should expand its financial support for the Global Cooperation and Training Framework, and encourage like-minded countries to co-sponsor workshops, to showcase Taiwan’s capacity to contribute to solving global challenges in the face of the Government of the PRC’s campaign to isolate Taiwan in the international community; (5)to advance the goals of the April 2021 Department of State guidance expanding unofficial United States-Taiwan contacts, the United States, Taiwan, and Japan should aim to host Global Cooperation and Training Framework workshops timed to coincide with plenaries and other meetings of international organizations in which Taiwan is unable to participate; (6)the United States should support efforts to engage regional counterparts in Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues on the stability across the Taiwan Strait, which are important for increasing strategic awareness amongst all parties and the avoidance of conflict; (7)United States arms sales to Taiwan should support Taiwan’s asymmetric defense capabilities, as outlined in Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept, and improve Taiwan’s military deterrent; (8)bilateral confidence-building measures and crisis stability dialogues between the United States and the PRC are important mechanisms for maintaining deterrence and stability across the Taiwan Strait and should be prioritized; and (9)the United States and the PRC should prioritize the use of a fully operational military crisis hotline to provide a mechanism for the leadership of the two countries to communicate directly in order to quickly resolve misunderstandings that could lead to military escalation.

Definitions

In this Act: (1)

Appropriate congressional committees

The term appropriate congressional committees means— (A)the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; (B)the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; (C)the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and (D)the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. (2)

China; PRC

The terms China and PRC mean the People’s Republic of China. (3)

Taiwan authorities

The term Taiwan authorities means officials of the Government of Taiwan.

Authorization of appropriations for the Global Cooperation and Training Framework

There are authorized to be appropriated for the Global Cooperation and Training Framework under the Economic Support Fund authorized under section 531 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346), $6,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2022 through 2025, which may be expended for trainings and activities that increase Taiwan’s economic and international integration.

Enhancing partnership

(a)

National guard partnership program

(1)

In general

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the appropriate Taiwan authorities, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees regarding the feasibility and advisability of establishing a National Guard partnership program between United States National Guard forces and the Armed Forces Reserve Command of Taiwan (referred to in this section as Taiwan’s Reserve Command). (2)

Objectives

The report required under paragraph (1) shall examine how the establishment of a National Guard partnership program would— (A)advance Taiwan’s Reserve Command’s ability to recruit, train, and equip its forces, including its ability to require and provide regular individual and collective training to all reserve forces; (B)cultivate relationships among United States and Taiwan reserve forces at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels; (C)enhance Taiwan’s ability to respond to humanitarian disasters; and (D)strengthen Taiwan’s ability to defend against outside military aggression. (3)

Contents

The report required under paragraph (1) shall include— (A)a comprehensive assessment of the policy opportunities and drawbacks associated with establishing a National Guard partnership program; (B)an assessment of any statutory or administrative barriers to establishing such a program, including a determination of the feasibility and advisability of— (i)modifying existing National Guard partnership authorities; or (ii)establishing new authorities, as appropriate; (C)an evaluation of the capacity of— (i)United States National Guard forces to support such a program; and (ii)Taiwan’s Reserve Command forces to absorb such a program; (D)a determination of the most appropriate entities within the Department of Defense and Taiwan’s Reserve Command to lead such a program; and (E)a determination of additional resources and authorities that may be required to execute such a program. (4)

Form of report

The report required under paragraph (1) shall be unclassified, but may include a classified annex if the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State determine that the inclusion of a classified annex is appropriate. (b)

Taiwan’s asymmetric defense strategy

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a classified report, with an unclassified summary, assessing the implementation of Taiwan’s asymmetric defense strategy, including the priorities identified in Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept.

Supporting confidence building measures and stability dialogues

(a)

Annual report

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit an unclassified report, with a classified annex, to the appropriate congressional committees that includes— (1)a description of all military-to-military dialogues and confidence-building measures between the United States and the PRC during the 10-year period ending on the date of the enactment of this Act; (2)a description of all bilateral and multilateral diplomatic engagements with the PRC in which cross-Strait issues were discussed during such 10-year period, including Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues; (3)a description of the efforts in the year preceding the submission of the report to conduct engagements described in paragraphs (1) and (2); and (4)a description of how and why the engagements described in paragraphs (1) and (2) have changed in frequency or substance during such 10-year period. (b)

Authorization of appropriations

There are authorized to be appropriated for the Department of State, and, as appropriate, the Department of Defense, no less than $2,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2022 through 2025, which shall be used to support existing Track 1.5 and Track 2 strategic dialogues facilitated by independent nonprofit organizations in which participants meet to discuss cross-Strait stability issues.