[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2148 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
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117th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 2148
To impose sanctions and other measures in response to the failure of
the Government of the People's Republic of China to allow an
investigation into the origins of COVID-19 at suspect laboratories in
Wuhan.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
June 21, 2021
Mr. Rubio introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To impose sanctions and other measures in response to the failure of
the Government of the People's Republic of China to allow an
investigation into the origins of COVID-19 at suspect laboratories in
Wuhan.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Coronavirus Origin Validation,
Investigation, and Determination Act of 2021'' or the ``COVID Act of
2021''.
SEC. 2. MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO FAILURE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO ALLOW AN INVESTIGATION OF
SUSPECT LABORATORIES IN WUHAN.
(a) In General.--If, by not later than the date that is 90 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President is unable to
certify that the Government of the People's Republic of China has
allowed a transparent international forensic investigation of suspect
laboratories in Wuhan to commence, including the Wuhan Institute of
Virology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (in this section referred
to as ``CAS''), the President shall--
(1) impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with
respect to individuals who hold positions of leadership in the
state-run CAS, including its more than 100 affiliated
institutes and laboratories, 13 local branches, and 2
universities;
(2) prohibit Federal funding for any joint research or
other collaborative projects between United States-based
researchers and CAS researchers across all academic fields,
including those employed by any of the more than 100 affiliated
institutes and laboratories of CAS, its 13 local branches or 2
universities, or the more than 430 science and technology
enterprises based in the People's Republic of China across 11
industries that were created by CAS or founded with CAS
investment; and
(3) prohibit United States-based researchers and
institutions that receive Federal funding from engaging in
collaborative projects involving gain-of-function research on
viruses with individuals or institutions based in the People's
Republic of China.
(b) Termination.--The requirements of subsection (a) shall
terminate on the date on which the Government of the People's Republic
of China allows the transparent international forensic investigation
described in that subsection to be conducted and concluded without--
(1) imposition of restrictions on the scope or subject
matter of the investigation; or
(2) limitations on the access of investigators to physical
sites, persons of interest, or relevant epidemiological,
serological, and virological data.
(c) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions to be imposed under
subsection (a)(1) are the following:
(1) Asset blocking.--
(A) In general.--The President shall exercise all
of the powers granted to the President under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and
prohibit all transactions in property and interests in
property described in subparagraph (B) if such property
and interests in property are in the United States,
come within the United States, or are or come within
the possession or control of a United States person.
(B) Property and interests in property described.--
The property and interests in property described in
this subparagraph are property or interests in property
of--
(i) an individual described in subsection
(a)(1); or
(ii) any family member or associate acting
for or on behalf of an individual described in
subsection (a)(1) and to whom that individual
transfers such property or interests in
property after the date on which the President
designates the individual for the imposition of
sanctions under that subsection.
(2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.--
(A) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien
described in subsection (a)(1) is--
(i) inadmissible to the United States;
(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other
documentation to enter the United States; and
(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted
or paroled into the United States or to receive
any other benefit under the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).
(B) Current visas revoked.--
(i) In general.--An alien described in
subsection (a)(1) is subject to revocation of
any visa or other entry documentation
regardless of when the visa or other entry
documentation is or was issued.
(ii) Immediate effect.--A revocation under
clause (i) shall--
(I) take effect immediately; and
(II) automatically cancel any other
valid visa or entry documentation that
is in the alien's possession.
(d) Implementation; Penalties.--
(1) Implementation.--The President may exercise the
authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and
205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to the extent necessary to carry out this
section.
(2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to
violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of
subsection (c)(1) or any regulation, license, or order issued
to carry out that subsection shall be subject to the penalties
set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to
the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act
described in subsection (a) of that section.
(e) Exceptions.--
(1) Exception for intelligence activities.--Sanctions under
this section shall not apply to any activity subject to the
reporting requirements under title V of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized
intelligence activities of the United States.
(2) Exception to comply with international obligations and
for law enforcement activities.--Sanctions under subsection
(c)(2) shall not apply with respect to an alien if admitting or
paroling the alien into the United States is necessary--
(A) to permit the United States to comply with the
Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United
Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and
entered into force November 21, 1947, between the
United Nations and the United States, or other
applicable international obligations; or
(B) to carry out or assist law enforcement activity
in the United States.
(3) Exception relating to importation of goods.--
(A) In general.--The authorities and requirements
to impose sanctions authorized under this section shall
not include the authority or a requirement to impose
sanctions on the importation of goods.
(B) Good defined.--In this paragraph, the term
``good'' means any article, natural or manmade
substance, material, supply, or manufactured product,
including inspection and test equipment, and excluding
technical data.
(f) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Admission; admitted; alien.--The terms ``admission'',
``admitted'', and ``alien'' have the meanings given those terms
in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1101).
(2) Gain-of-function.--The term ``gain-of-function'', with
respect to the study of viruses, means--
(A) the use of gene editing to increase the
transmissibility, virulence, immunogenicity, or host
tropism of a virus by artificially inserting genomic
components from one virus into the backbone of another
virus, which results in the creation of a new chimeric
virus, particularly when the resultant chimeric virus
is pathogenic to humans; or
(B) serial passaging in a cell culture to increase
the transmissibility, virulence, immunogenicity, or
host tropism of a virus by selectively applying
pressure to a culture to artificially induce its
mutation or RNA recombination with one or more viruses.
(3) Transparent international forensic investigation.--The
term ``transparent international forensic investigation'', with
respect to investigating the origin of SARS-CoV-2, means an
inquiry that is objective, data-driven, inclusive of broad
expertise, subject to independent oversight, and properly
managed to exclude individuals with conflicts of interest and
under which the following takes place:
(A) Relevant research laboratories and hospitals
open their records to examination by the investigative
team and grant the investigative team unfettered access
to any and all facilities and other sites of interest,
and to any and all forms of epidemiological or
virological data of interest, including serological
records pertaining to the earliest confirmed or
suspected cases of COVID-19, or cases of similar
illnesses that may have been misdiagnosed, which
appeared in and around Wuhan in the fall and winter of
2019. Investigators document the veracity and source of
the data upon which their analysis is based in a manner
that allows independent experts to reproduce their
analysis and validate any conclusions they may draw.
(B) The international team is allowed to perform a
full forensic investigation of the Wuhan Institute of
Virology, and if necessary, the Wuhan Center for
Disease Prevention and Control and the Wuhan Institute
of Biological Products, and all other laboratories in
Wuhan that the team might identify as warranting
examination. The team is allowed to review the
biosafety level under which bat coronavirus research
was conducted, and to interview any and all personnel
currently or previously employed at those laboratories,
or related experts who may have information pertinent
to the investigation. All laboratory logs and notebooks
kept by Shi Zhengli and other researchers at the Wuhan
Institute of Virology who have conducted gain-of-
function experiments between 2007 and the date of the
enactment of this Act, as well as their published and
unpublished work in Chinese and English, are presented
in a full and unaltered condition for examination by
the team. The team is given unlimited access to the
full range of virus cultures, isolates, genetic
sequences, databases, and patient specimens stored at
these facilities as well as all chimeric synthetic
viruses grown in vitro by cell culture passaging or
engineered by genomic editing between 2007 and the date
of the enactment of this Act. Such access must include
the opportunity to examine the Wuhan Institute of
Virology's database of approximately 22,000 samples and
virus sequences, including 15,000 taken from bats,
which was previously available to the public but taken
offline in September 2019. The team is further allowed
to examine in full all training procedures in effect at
the laboratory prior to the pandemic, including those
pertaining to recordkeeping and safety procedures and
strategies to prevent the accidental escape of
potential pathogens.
(C) The investigative team analyzes in detail all
research related to the 293 bat coronaviruses
reportedly isolated by Shi Zhengli and her team at the
Wuhan Institute of Virology between 2012 and 2015,
particularly RaTG13 and RaBtCoV/4991, including all
virus isolates and cultures. The Wuhan Institute of
Virology discloses the content of all classified and
unpublished studies that the Institute reportedly
conducted with the People's Liberation Army if such
studies involved gain-of-function research. The team is
able to test all laboratory personnel for antibodies
and other serological indicators of past infection of
COVID-19. The team is given access to all other records
kept by the Wuhan Institute of Virology, including
security logs, surveillance video footage, audio
recordings, and electronic logs of employees entering
and leaving the facility. The investigative team is
permitted to take samples and conduct testing of the
physical facilities where gain-of-function research has
been conducted, including, if necessary, sewer samples.
Unfettered access is also granted to the abandoned
copper mine in Mojiang Hani Autonomous County in Yunnan
province, where Wuhan Institute of Virology researchers
are known to have collected bat virus specimens,
including of RaTG13, during the decade preceding the
date of the enactment of this Act.
(D) The international team is comprised of members
chosen by the governments of the United States, Canada,
the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Germany,
Australia, Japan, and India. The team includes
molecular biologists, virologists, epidemiologists, and
experts in biosafety and biosecurity. Individuals who
have previously ruled out the possibility of either
zoonotic transmission or a laboratory leak are
disqualified from participation. The Government of the
People's Republic of China may appoint Chinese experts
to accompany and advise the team as it conducts its
work in the People's Republic of China, but the
Government of the People's Republic of China has no
authority to dictate the selection of team members and
cannot obstruct the participation of any individual
selected by the individual's government for the team.
The central, provincial, and municipal authorities of
the People's Republic of China facilitate the work of
the investigative team and refrain from imposing any
restrictions on the scope, scale, and duration of the
investigation.
(4) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) an individual who is a United States citizen or
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to
the United States;
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the
United States or any jurisdiction within the United
States, including a foreign branch of such an entity;
or
(C) any person in the United States.
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