[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1201 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
117th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 1201
To restore the United States international leadership on climate change
and clean energy, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
April 19, 2021
Mr. Menendez (for himself, Ms. Hirono, Mr. Cardin, Mrs. Shaheen, Mr.
Merkley, Mr. Schatz, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Kaine, Mr. Markey, Mr. Booker, and
Mr. Van Hollen) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To restore the United States international leadership on climate change
and clean energy, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``United States
Climate Leadership in International Mitigation, Adaptation, and
Technology Enhancement Act of 2021''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings; sense of Congress.
Sec. 3. Purpose.
Sec. 4. Definitions.
TITLE I--CLIMATE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
Sec. 101. Climate diplomacy.
Sec. 102. Enhancing United States security considerations for global
climate disruptions.
Sec. 103. Arctic diplomacy.
TITLE II--INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND CONVENTIONS
Sec. 201. Sense of Congress in support of the United States returning
to the Paris Agreement.
Sec. 202. Enhanced United States commitment to the Paris Agreement.
Sec. 203. Sense of Congress regarding ratification of the Kigali
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol.
Sec. 204. Compliance with the carbon offset and reduction scheme for
international aviation.
Sec. 205. Short-lived climate pollutants.
Sec. 206. International cooperation regarding clean transportation and
sustainable land use and community
development.
Sec. 207. Sense of Congress on United States reengagement with the
Group of Seven and the Group of Twenty on
climate action.
TITLE III--CLIMATE CHANGE DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND SUPPORT
Sec. 301. International Climate Change Adaptation, Mitigation, and
Security Program.
Sec. 302. United States contributions to the Green Climate Fund.
Sec. 303. Sense of Congress on United States engagements at the World
Economic Forum.
Sec. 304. Clean energy and the United States International Development
Finance Corporation.
Sec. 305. Consistency in United States policy on development finance
and climate change.
TITLE IV--CLEAN ENERGY DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Sec. 401. Energy diplomacy and security within the Department of State.
Sec. 402. Department of State primacy for energy diplomacy.
Sec. 403. Reports on United States participation in Mission Innovation
and the Clean Energy Ministerial.
Sec. 404. Reduced deforestation.
TITLE V--BILATERAL AND REGIONAL MULTILATERAL CLIMATE DIPLOMACY AND
COOPERATION
Sec. 501. North American Strategy.
Sec. 502. Accountability and cooperation with China.
Sec. 503. United States and European Union cooperation on climate
finance for developing countries.
Sec. 504. Sense of Congress on clean energy cooperation with India.
Sec. 505. Power Africa.
Sec. 506. Caribbean Energy Initiative.
Sec. 507. Sense of Congress on conservation of the Amazon River basin.
Sec. 508. Sense of Congress regarding renewable energy in Indonesia.
TITLE VI--WOMEN AND CLIMATE CHANGE ACT
Sec. 601. Short title.
Sec. 602. Findings.
Sec. 603. Definitions.
Sec. 604. Statement of policy.
Sec. 605. Federal Interagency Working Group on Women and Climate
Change.
Sec. 606. Development and implementation of strategy and policies to
prevent and respond to the effects of
climate change on women globally.
Sec. 607. Climate change within the Office of Global Women's Issues.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5C, published
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change on October 8,
2018, and the Fourth National Climate Assessment, first
published by the United States Global Change Research Program
in 2018, concluded that--
(A) the release of greenhouse gas emissions, most
notably the combustion of fossil fuels and the
degradation of natural resources that absorb
atmospheric carbon from human activity, are the
dominant causes of climate change during the past
century; and
(B) changes in the Earth's climate are--
(i) causing sea levels to rise;
(ii) increasing the global average
temperature of the Earth;
(iii) increasing the incidence and severity
of wildfires; and
(iv) intensifying the severity of extreme
weather, including hurricanes, cyclones,
typhoons, flooding, droughts, and other
disasters that threaten human life, healthy
communities, and critical infrastructure.
(2) An increase in the global average temperature of 2
degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrialized levels would
cause--
(A)(i) the displacement, and the forced internal
migration, of an estimated 143,000,000 people in Latin
America, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa by 2050 if
insufficient action is taken (according to the World
Bank); and
(ii) the displacement of an average of 17,800,000
people worldwide by floods every year (according to the
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre) because of the
exacerbating effects of climate change;
(B)(i) more than $500,000,000,000 in lost annual
economic output in the United States (a 10 percent
contraction from 2018 levels) by 2100 (according to the
Fourth National Climate Assessment); and
(ii) an additional 100,000,000 people worldwide to
be driven into poverty by 2030 (according to the World
Bank);
(C)(i) greater food insecurity and decreased
agricultural production due to climate change's effects
on the increased frequency and intensity of extreme
weather events; and
(ii) the proliferation of agricultural pests and
crop diseases, loss of biodiversity, degrading
ecosystems, and water scarcity (according to the United
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization); and
(D) more than 350,000,000 additional people
worldwide to be exposed to deadly heat stress by 2050.
(3) According to the International Monetary Fund, a
persistent annual increase in average global temperature of .04
degrees Celsius would reduce global real gross domestic product
per capita by 7.22 percent by 2100.
(4) According to the United Nations Environment Programme,
climate change is exacerbating unusual regional weather
conditions, which is driving the current and prolonged desert
locust outbreak that is threatening food security across East
Africa and Southeast Asia.
(5) According to the Intergovernmental Science-Policy
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services--
(A) an increase in the global average temperature
of between 1.5 and 2 degrees Celsius will result in a
significant reduction in the worldwide number of land
species;
(B) an increase in the global average temperature
of 2 degrees Celsius--
(i) will place 5 percent of world's species
at risk of extinction; and
(ii) will result in the destruction of more
than 99 percent of all coral reefs worldwide;
and
(C) an increase in the global average temperature
of 4.3 degrees Celsius will place 16 percent of world's
terrestrial species at risk of extinction.
(6) According to the International Energy Agency, the
United States, China, India, and the European Union (including
the United Kingdom) account for more than 58 percent of global
greenhouse gas emissions.
(7) China, which is the world's top greenhouse gases
emitter and has an outsized impact on the United States core
interest in climate stability--
(A) is likely to achieve its carbon emissions
mitigation pledge to the Paris Agreement, contained in
its 2015 nationally determined contribution, to
``peak'' emissions around 2030 ahead of schedule;
(B) announced, on September 22, 2020, a pledge to
achieve carbon neutrality by 2060; and
(C) has yet to announce an updated nationally
determined contribution.
(8) On October 26, 2020, Japan, the world's third largest
economy and fifth greatest carbon emitter, announced a pledge
to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. Despite apprehension
about growing nuclear energy sources, Japan aims to increase
its share of renewable and nuclear energy following new targets
unveiled next year.
(9) India has met its growing energy demands by becoming a
global leader in renewable energy generation. Despite
significant investments in renewable energy, and the
implementation of strong national greenhouse gas mitigation
policies, India continues to operate some of the world's
dirtiest fossil fuel power plants and has high emissions
generated from its transportation sector. India is a critical
market for foreign investment and will be a major competitor in
international clean energy development futures.
(10) India's leadership within the Clean Energy
Ministerial, the Mission Innovation initiative, and the
International Solar Alliance has put India at the forefront of
renewable energy development and helped India achieve a top 5
global rank among clean energy producers. Installed electricity
capacity from renewables in India grew by 144 percent between
2014 and 2020. Approximately $42,000,000,000 was invested into
India's renewable energy sector between 2014 and 2019.
(11) The European Union demonstrated its strong commitment
to climate action by making the ambitious pledge to reduce the
collective greenhouse gas emissions of its 27 member nations by
at least 55 percent by 2030 (compared to 1990 levels) and to
achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. The European Parliament went
even further, voting to reduce its collective economy wide
greenhouse gas emissions by 60 percent by 2030 (compared to
1990 levels). These commitments represent substantial
improvements from the previous goal of a 40 percent reduction
in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030.
(12) The European Union's member nations have also provided
the equivalent of approximately $120,000,000,000 between 2014
and 2020 in support and financing to build climate change
resilience and develop low carbon energy capacity throughout
the developing world.
(13) The European Union has traditionally been a steadfast
partner with United States in the United Nation's Framework
Convention on Climate Change by pushing for improved
accountability, transparency, and shared responsibility among
parties in mitigating global greenhouse gas emissions. As the
United States Government's executive branch has pulled away
from climate action commitments, the European Union has
increased its cooperation with coalitions of States through
partnerships such as the United States Climate Alliance.
(14) Among the world's top greenhouse gas emitters, the
United States is the only country that--
(A) has rescinded national policies to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions;
(B) has advanced policies aimed at bolstering
fossil fuel consumption and extraction, including
through the removal of Federal protections of public
lands that are critical wilderness areas vital to
maintaining healthy natural ecosystems; and
(C) has abstained or withdrawn itself from several
global cooperative efforts acknowledging and addressing
the climate crisis.
(15) United States leadership during deliberations over the
Paris Agreement--
(A) was exemplified by--
(i) its commitment to reduce national
emissions by 26 to 28 percent below 2005
levels;
(ii) its leadership in the ``Umbrella
Group'' and its role as cofounder of the ``High
Ambition Coalition'';
(iii) its co-facilitation of the UNFCCC;
(iv) its work with the Ad Hoc Working Group
on the Paris Agreement on agenda item 5:
Modalities, procedures and guidelines for the
transparency framework for action;
(v) its support for the enhanced
transparency framework for action and support
referred to in Article 13 of the Paris
Agreement;
(vi) its pledge of $3,000,000,000 to the
Green Climate Fund (of which the United States
still owed $2,000,000,000) in support of
developing countries' efforts to adapt to
climate change and to mitigate greenhouse gas
emissions; and
(vii) the development of critical bilateral
climate action cooperation initiatives with
China and India; and
(B) established the United States as essential to
uniting the world in climate action cooperation.
(16) The United States reversal on nearly all climate
action policies since 2017, including repealing the Clean Power
Plan (announced by President Obama in August 2015), canceling
contributions to the United Nation's Green Climate Fund,
abstaining from all G7 and G20 climate action communiques, and
withdrawing the United States from the Paris Agreement--
(A) undermines the viability of the Paris
Agreement;
(B) harms American diplomacy;
(C) disadvantages the ability of the United States
private sector to compete in a clean energy global
economy, for which the International Finance
Corporation estimates that investments spurred by the
Paris Agreement will creates up to $23,000,000,000,000
in new investment opportunities;
(D) erodes the United States leadership, standing,
and trust within the international community; and
(E) concedes leadership and economic opportunity to
foreign governments keen on taking advantage of the
United States absence from international climate action
initiatives.
(17) The Paris Agreement's central aim is--
(A) to strengthen the global response to the threat
of climate change by maintaining the global temperature
rise well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial
levels; and
(B) to pursue efforts to further limit the
temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius.
(18) The Paris Agreement--
(A) specifies the need for a strong global response
to climate change;
(B) acknowledges that all ``[p]arties should, when
taking action to address climate change, respect,
promote and consider their respective obligations on
human rights, the right to health, the rights of
indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants,
children, persons with disabilities and people in
vulnerable situations and the right to development, as
well as gender equality, empowerment of women and
intergenerational equity'';
(C) notes the importance of ``climate justice''
when mitigating and adapting to climate change;
(D) recognizes ``the need for an effective and
progressive response to the urgent threat of climate
change'';
(E) requires all parties to put forward their best
efforts through nationally determined contributions and
to strengthen these efforts in the future;
(F) requires each party to update its nationally
determined contribution every 5 years, with each
successive nationally determined contribution
representing a progression beyond the previous
nationally determined contribution, and reflecting the
party's highest possible ambition;
(G) recognizes that marine ecosystems covering more
than 70 percent of the Earth's surface have an integral
role in climate balance; and
(H) was developed under the UNFCCC, an
international environmental treaty which the United
States ratified, with the advice and consent of the
Senate on October 15, 1992.
(19) Seventy percent of the Paris Agreement signatories'
nationally determined contributions in support of the goals of
the Paris Agreement are ocean-inclusive, and 39 Paris Agreement
signatories are focused on the inclusion of ocean action in
nationally determined contributions through the Because the
Ocean initiative.
(20) The United States communicated its nationally
determined contribution--
(A) to achieve, by 2025, an economy-wide target of
reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 26 to 28
percent below its 2005 level; and
(B) to make best efforts to reduce its emissions by
28 percent.
(21) A thriving clean energy industry in the United States,
which employs more than 500,000 Americans, is essential in
achieving these targets.
(22) A number of existing laws and regulations in the
United States also are relevant to achieving this target,
including--
(A) the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.);
(B) the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-
486); and
(C) the Energy Independence and Security Act of
2007 (Public Law 110-140).
(23) On November 4, 2020, the United States withdrawal from
the Paris Agreement became effective, which at the time
resulted in the United States being the only state party (out
of 197 parties) to the UNFCCC that is not a party to the Paris
Agreement.
(24) On January 20, 2021, President Biden initiated the
process for reentering the United States into the Paris
Agreement. On February 19, 2021, the United States officially
rejoined the Paris Agreement.
(25) Article 8 of the Paris Agreement states, ``Parties
recognize the importance of averting, minimizing and addressing
loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate
change, including extreme weather events and slow onset events,
and the role of sustainable development in reducing the risk of
loss and damage.''. Such adverse effects include strong winds
from hurricanes and tropical storms, and flooding from storm
surges and heavy rain, that inflict losses on various sectors
of the United States economy.
(26) The Paris Agreement requires that parties ``should
strengthen their cooperation on enhancing action on adaptation,
taking into account the Cancun Adaptation Framework'', which
includes measures to enhance understanding, coordination and
cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement,
migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at the
national, regional and international levels.
(27) The Paris Agreement is an example of the multilateral,
international cooperation needed to overcome climate change-
related challenges facing the global community, such as
reducing emissions, promoting economic growth, and deploying
clean energy technologies.
(28) The Paris Agreement recognizes ``the fundamental
priority of safeguarding food security and ending hunger, and
the particular vulnerabilities of food production systems to
the adverse impacts of climate change.''.
(29) The Paris Agreement recognizes that--
(A) adaptation is a global challenge facing all
countries, with local, subnational, national, regional,
and international dimensions; and
(B) adapting to the effects of climate change is a
key component of the long-term global response to
climate change to protect people, livelihoods, and
ecosystems.
(30) American leadership during the Paris Agreement
negotiations encouraged widespread international participation
in the Paris Agreement.
(31) American States, cities, and businesses are stepping
up and pledging to meet the Paris Agreement goals in the wake
of absent and uncertain leadership by the President.
(32) The Paris Agreement--
(A) has driven innovation in developing cleaner,
more reliable, and more affordable forms of energy;
(B) has demonstrated that addressing climate change
and providing affordable energy to American consumers
are not mutually exclusive; and
(C) has encouraged the United States to develop the
Mid-Century Strategy for Deep Decarbonization, which--
(i) was released on November 16, 2016; and
(ii) states, ``Energy efficiency
improvements enable the energy system to
provide the services we need with fewer
resources and emissions. Over the past several
years, the United States has demonstrated that
programs and standards to improve the energy
efficiency of buildings, appliances and
vehicles can cost-effectively cut carbon
pollution and lower energy bills, while
maintaining significant support from U.S.
industry and consumers.''.
(33) Global temperatures must be kept below 1.5 degrees
Celsius above pre-industrialized levels to avoid the most
severe impacts of a changing climate, which will require--
(A) global reductions in greenhouse gas emissions
from human sources of 40 to 60 percent from 2010 levels
by 2030; and
(B) net-zero global emissions by 2050.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) when the United States proffers a strong commitment and
focused leadership on climate action, the rest of the world
will likely follow its example;
(2) when the United States abdicates leadership on such
matters, other countries are likely to waiver on their
commitments to action and retract to insular posturing on
matters that require cooperation; and
(3) in order to avert the worst impacts of climate change,
which is in the core national interest of the United States,
the United States should--
(A) prioritize climate change in its foreign
policy, and ensure that climate change is taken into
account in all foreign policy decision making;
(B) set the standard for ambition on climate
action;
(C) use its diplomatic leverage to create
incentives for other countries to take strong action on
climate change;
(D) broker, with other world powers, bilateral
commitments on emissions reductions and climate finance
and support for developing countries, which are
critical for--
(i) building trust and consensus around
global cooperation on climate action; and
(ii) sending important investment signals
to private finance and private industry on
investment and development trends;
(E) be transparent in how the United States is
delivering on its commitments;
(F) ensure it is adopting and implementing
consistent policies and practices with respect to
climate change across bilateral and multilateral
development finance institutions;
(G) hold other world powers accountable for making
and meeting strong commitments;
(H) call for reciprocal standards of transparency;
and
(I) support developing countries, in an inclusive
manner--
(i) to expand deployment and access to
clean energy;
(ii) to plan and invest in climate change
adaptation solutions;
(iii) to improve climate change resilience
capacities; and
(iv) to promote--
(I) sustainable agriculture
practices;
(II) food security; and
(III) natural resource
conservation.
SEC. 3. PURPOSE.
The purpose of this Act is to provide authorities, resources,
policies, and recommended administrative actions--
(1) to restore United States global leadership on
addressing the climate crisis and make United States climate
action and climate diplomacy a more central tenet of United
States foreign policy;
(2) to improve the United States commitment to taking more
ambitious action to help mitigate global greenhouse gas
emission and improve developing countries' resilience and
adaptation capacities to the effects of climate change;
(3) to reclaim, accept, and fully engage diplomacy within a
variety of current and outstanding multilateral institutions
that the United States has withdrawn, withheld support, or
diminished meaningful engagement from in recent years;
(4) to encourage the pursuit of new bilateral cooperation
agreements with other world powers on initiatives to advance
global clean energy innovation and deployment and other
measures to mitigate global greenhouse gas emissions and
improve climate change adaptation capacities;
(5) to ensure that the United States national security
apparatus integrates critically important data on the
compounding effects that climate change is having on global
security risks by enhancing our understanding of how, where,
and when such effects are destabilizing countries and regions
in ways that may motivate conflict, displacement, and other
drivers of insecurity; and
(6) to authorize funding and programs to support a
reaffirmation of the United States commitments to international
cooperation and support for developing and vulnerable countries
to take climate action.
SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate;
(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Clean energy.--The term ``clean energy'' means--
(A) renewable energy and energy from systems;
(B) energy production processes that emit zero
greenhouse gas emissions, including nuclear power;
(C) systems and processes that capture and
permanently store greenhouse gas emissions from fossil
fuel production and electricity generation units;
(D) products, processes, facilities, or systems
designed to retrofit and improve the energy efficiency
and electricity generated from electrical generation
units, while using less fuel, less or fewer power
production resources, or less feedstocks; and
(E) zero emission vehicles.
(3) Climate action.--The term ``climate action'' means
enhanced efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and
strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-induced
impacts, including--
(A) climate-related hazards in all countries;
(B) integrating climate change measures into
national policies, strategies and planning; and
(C) improving education, awareness-raising, and
human and institutional capacity with respect to
climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact
reduction, and early warning.
(4) Climate crisis.--The term ``climate crisis'' means the
social, economic, health, safety, and security impacts on
people, and the threats to biodiversity and natural ecosystem
health, which are attributable to the wide-variety of effects
on global environmental and atmospheric conditions as a result
of disruptions to the Earth's climate from anthropogenic
activities that generate greenhouse gas emissions or reduce
natural resource capacities to absorb and regulate atmospheric
carbon.
(5) Climate diplomacy.--The term ``climate diplomacy''
means methods of influencing the decisions and behavior of
foreign governments and peoples through dialogue, negotiation,
cooperation and other measures short of war or violence around
issues related to addressing global climate change, including--
(A) the mitigation of global greenhouse gas
emissions;
(B) discussion, analysis, and sharing of scientific
data and information on the cause and effects of
climate change;
(C) the security, social, economic, and political
instability risks associated with the effects of
climate change;
(D) economic cooperation efforts and trade matters
that are related to or associated with climate change
and greenhouse gas mitigation from the global economy;
(E) building resilience capacities and adapting to
the effects of change;
(F) sustainable land use and natural resource
conservation;
(G) accounting for loss and damage attributed to
the effects of climate change;
(H) just transition of carbon intense economies to
low or zero carbon economies and accounting for
laborers within affected economies; and
(I) technological innovations that reduce or
eliminate carbon emissions.
(6) Climate security.--The term ``climate security'' means
the effects of climate change on--
(A) United States national security concerns and
subnational, national, and regional political
stability; and
(B) overseas security and conflict situations that
are potentially exacerbated by dynamic environmental
factors and events, including--
(i) the intensification and frequency of
droughts, floods, wildfires, tropical storms,
and other extreme weather events;
(ii) changes in historical severe weather,
drought, and wildfire patterns;
(iii) the expansion of geographical ranges
of droughts, floods, and wildfires into regions
that had not regularly experienced such
phenomena;
(iv) global sea level rise patterns and the
expansion of geographical ranges affected by
drought; and
(v) changes in marine environments that
effect critical geostrategic waterways, such as
the Arctic Ocean, the South China Sea, the
South Pacific Ocean, the Barents Sea, and the
Beaufort Sea.
(7) Nationally determined contribution.--The term
``nationally determined contribution'' means a country's
pledged efforts to reduce national greenhouse gas emissions and
adapt to the effects of climate change, which may include a
financial pledge of support or financing to assist developing
countries achieve their climate action goals, in accordance
with paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Paris Agreement, which
requires each Party--
(A) to ``prepare, communicate and maintain
successive nationally determined contributions that it
intends to achieve''; and
(B) to ``pursue domestic mitigation measures, with
the aim of achieving the objectives of such
contributions''.
(8) Natural climate solutions.--The term ``natural climate
solutions'' mean actions to protect, sustainably manage, and
restore natural or modified ecosystems that--
(A) address climate change effectively and
adaptively; and
(B) simultaneously provide human well-being and
environmental benefits.
(9) Natural resources.--The term ``natural resources''
means the terrestrial, freshwater, estuarine, and marine fish,
wildlife, plants, land, air, water, habitats, and ecosystems.
(10) Net zero greenhouse gas emissions.--The term ``net
zero greenhouse gas emissions'' means that any anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions are balanced or offset by deliberate
activities that absorb or capture and permanently store
equivalent amounts of greenhouse gases from the atmosphere.
(11) Paris agreement.--The term ``Paris Agreement'' means
the international agreement adopted by parties to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change's 21st
Conference of Parties in Paris, France on December 12, 2015.
(12) Renewable energy.--The term ``renewable energy'' means
all forms of energy produced from sources that naturally occur
or are replenished in nature in a sustainable manner, including
bioenergy, geothermal energy, hydropower, ocean energy, solar
energy, and wind energy.
(13) Resilience.--The term ``resilience'' means the ability
of human made and natural systems (including their component
parts) to anticipate, absorb, cope, accommodate, or recover
from the effects of a hazardous event in a timely and efficient
manner, including through ensuring the preservation,
restoration, or improvement of its essential basic structures
and functions.
(14) UNFCCC.--The term ``UNFCCC'' means the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, done at New York May 9,
1992, and entered into force March 21, 1994.
(15) United states-mexico-canada agreement; usmca.--The
terms ``United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement'' and ``USMCA''
mean the Agreement between the United States of America, the
United Mexican States, and Canada, done at Buenos Aires
November 30, 2018.
TITLE I--CLIMATE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
SEC. 101. CLIMATE DIPLOMACY.
(a) In General.--The President and the Secretary of State shall
prioritize climate action and climate diplomacy in United States
foreign policy by--
(1) ensuring diplomacy, support, and interagency
coordination for bilateral and multilateral actions to address
the climate crisis; and
(2) improving coordination and integration of climate
action across all bureaus and United States missions abroad.
(b) Climate Action Integration.--The Secretary of State, through
the Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the
Environment and any other designees, shall--
(1) prioritize climate action and clean energy within the
bureaus and offices under the leadership of the Under Secretary
for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment;
(2) ensure that such bureaus and offices are coordinating
with other bureaus of the Department of State regarding the
integration of climate action and climate diplomacy as a cross-
cutting imperative across the Department of State;
(3) encourage all Under Secretaries of State--
(A) to assess how issues related to climate change
and United States climate action are integrated into
their operations and programs;
(B) to coordinate crosscutting actions and
diplomatic efforts that relate to climate action; and
(C) to make available the technical assistance and
resources of the bureaus and offices with relevant
expertise to provide technical assistance and expert
support to other bureaus within the Department of State
regarding climate action, clean energy development, and
climate diplomacy;
(4) manage the integration of scientific data on the
current and anticipated effects of climate change into applied
strategies and diplomatic engagements across programmatic and
regional bureaus of the Department of State and into the
Department of State's decision-making processes;
(5) ensure that the relevant bureaus and offices provide
appropriate technical support and resources--
(A) to the President, the Secretary of State, and
their respective designees charged with addressing
climate change and associated issues;
(B) to United States diplomats advancing United
States foreign policy related to climate action; and
(C) for the appropriate engagement and integration
of relevant domestic agencies in international climate
change affairs, including United States participation
in multilateral fora; and
(6) carry out other activities, as directed by the
Secretary of State, that advance United States climate-related
foreign policy objectives, including global greenhouse gas
mitigation, climate change adaptation activities, and global
climate security.
(c) Responsibilities of the Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs.--The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs shall
ensure that all foreign missions are--
(1) advancing United States bilateral climate diplomacy;
(2) engaging strategically on opportunities for bilateral
climate action cooperation with foreign governments; and
(3) utilizing the technical resources and coordinating
adequately with the bureaus reporting to the Under Secretary of
State for Economic Growth, Energy and the Environment.
(d) Report.--Not later than 200 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of State for Economic
Growth, Energy, and the Environment, in cooperation with the Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, shall submit a report to the
appropriate congressional committees that--
(1) assesses how climate action and United States climate
diplomacy is integrated across the Bureaus of the Department of
State; and
(2) includes recommendations on strategies to improve cross
bureau coordination and understanding of United States climate
action and climate diplomacy.
(e) Effect of Elimination of Positions.--If the positions of Under
Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment and
the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs are eliminated or
undergo name changes, the responsibilities of such Under Secretaries
under this section shall be reassigned to other Under Secretaries of
State, as appropriate.
(f) Climate Change Experts in Key Embassies.--Not later than 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
State shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives that--
(1) identifies the number of personnel of the Department of
State and the United States Agency for International
Development who--
(A) dedicate a significant portion of their work to
climate change mitigation, climate change adaptation,
food security, or clean energy matters; and
(B) are stationed at United States missions in
countries that are highly vulnerable to the effects or
major greenhouse gas emitters;
(2) analyzes the need for Federal climate change policy
specialist personnel in United States embassies, United States
Agency for International Development missions, and other United
States diplomatic and international development missions; and
(3) includes--
(A) recommendations for increasing climate change
expertise within United States missions abroad among
foreign service officers; and
(B) options for assigning to such missions climate
change attaches from the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Department of Energy, the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of
Agriculture, the Department of the Interior, or other
relevant Federal agencies.
(g) Climate Change Advisors.--The Secretary of State, or the
Secretary's designee, shall have primary responsibility for the
management and execution of United States climate diplomacy and related
foreign policy and shall make appropriate arrangements with the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency,
the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Agriculture, the
Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
and other relevant Federal agencies and departments to assign personnel
from such agencies and departments to serve as dedicated advisors on
climate change matters in embassies of the United States or in other
United States diplomatic or international development missions.
(h) Climate Change Support and Financing.--The Secretary of State
shall facilitate the coordination among the Department of State and
other relevant departments and agencies, including the United States
Agency for International Development, the Department of the Treasury,
the United States Trade and Development Agency, and the United States
International Development Finance Corporation, of contributing
development finance or foreign assistance relevant to United States
international climate action and in support of United States climate
diplomacy.
(i) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section.
SEC. 102. ENHANCING UNITED STATES SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR GLOBAL
CLIMATE DISRUPTIONS.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in consultation with other
relevant agencies, shall conduct biennial comprehensive evaluations of
present and ongoing disruptions to the global climate system,
including--
(1) the intensity, frequency, and range of natural
disasters;
(2) the scarcity of global natural resources, including
fresh water;
(3) global food, health, and energy insecurities;
(4) conditions that contribute to--
(A) intrastate and interstate conflicts;
(B) foreign political and economic instability;
(C) international migration of vulnerable and
underserved populations;
(D) the failure of national governments; and
(E) gender-based violence; and
(5) United States and allied military readiness,
operations, and strategy.
(b) Purposes.--The purposes of the evaluations conducted under
subsection (a) are--
(1) to support the practical application of scientific data
and research on climate change's dynamic effects around the
world to improve resilience, adaptability, security, and
stability despite growing global environmental risks and
changes;
(2) to ensure that the strategic planning and mission
execution of United States international development and
diplomatic missions adequately account for heightened and
dynamic risks and challenges associated with the effects of
climate change;
(3) to improve coordination between United States science
agencies conducting research and forecasts on the causes and
effects of climate change and United States national security
agencies;
(4) to better understand the disproportionate effects of
global climate disruptions on women, girls, indigenous
communities, and other historically marginalized populations;
and
(5) to inform the development of the climate security
strategy described in subsection (d).
(c) Scope.--The evaluations conducted under subsection (a) shall--
(1) examine developing countries' vulnerabilities and risks
associated with global, regional, and localized effects of
climate change; and
(2) assess and make recommendations on necessary measures
to mitigate risks and reduce vulnerabilities associated with
effects, including--
(A) sea level rise;
(B) freshwater resource scarcity;
(C) wildfires; and
(D) increased intensity and frequency of extreme
weather conditions and events, such as flooding,
drought, and extreme storm events, including tropical
cyclones.
(d) Climate Security Strategy.--The Secretary shall use the
evaluations required under subsection (a)--
(1) to inform the development and implementation of a
climate security strategy for the Bureau of Conflict and
Stabilization Operations, the Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs, embassies, consulates, regional bureaus, and other
offices and programs operating chief of mission authority,
including those with roles in conflict avoidance, prevention
and security assistance, or humanitarian disaster response,
prevention, and assistance; and
(2) in furtherance of such strategy, to assess, develop,
budget for, and (upon approval) implement plans, policies, and
actions--
(A) to account for the impacts of climate change to
global human health, safety, governance, oceans, food
production, fresh water and other critical natural
resources, settlements, infrastructure, marginalized
groups, and economic activity;
(B) to evaluate the climate change vulnerability,
security, susceptibility, and resiliency of United
States interests and non-defense assets abroad;
(C) to coordinate the integration of climate change
risk and vulnerability assessments into all foreign
policy and security decision-making processes,
including awarding foreign assistance;
(D) to evaluate specific risks to certain regions
and countries that are--
(i) vulnerable to the effects of climate
change; and
(ii) strategically significant to the
United States;
(E) to enhance the resilience capacities of foreign
countries to the effects of climate change as a means
of reducing the risks of conflict and instability;
(F) to advance principles of good governance by
encouraging foreign governments, particularly nations
that are least capable of coping with the effects of
climate change--
(i) to conduct climate security
evaluations; and
(ii) to facilitate the development of
climate security action plans to ensure
stability and public safety in disaster
situations in a humane and responsible fashion;
(G) to evaluate the vulnerability, security,
susceptibility, and resiliency of United States
interests and nondefense assets abroad;
(H) to build international institutional capacity
to address climate security implications and to advance
United States interests, regional stability, and global
security; and
(I) other activities that advance--
(i) the utilization and integration of
climate science in national security planning;
and
(ii) the clear understanding of how the
effects of climate change can exacerbate
security risks and threats.
SEC. 103. ARCTIC DIPLOMACY.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the rapidly changing Arctic environment--
(A) creates new national and regional security
challenges due to increased military activity in the
Arctic;
(B) heightens the risks of potential conflicts
spilling over into the Arctic region from interventions
and theaters of tension in other regions of the world;
(C) threatens maritime safety due to inadequate
regional resource capacity to patrol the increase in
vessel traffic this remote region is experiencing from
the growing expanses of open Arctic water from
diminished annual levels of sea ice;
(D) impacts public safety due to increased human
activity in the Arctic region where search and rescue
capacity remains very limited; and
(E) threatens the health of the Arctic's fragile
and historically pristine environment and the unique
and highly sensitive species found in the Arctic's
marine and terrestrial ecosystems; and
(2) the United States should reduce the consequences
outlined in paragraph (1) by--
(A) carefully evaluating the wide variety and
extremely dynamic set of security and safety risks
unfolding in the Arctic;
(B) developing policies and making preparations for
mitigating and responding to threats and risks in the
Arctic;
(C) adequately funding the National Earth System
Prediction Capability to substantively improve weather,
ocean, and ice predictions on time scales necessary for
ensuring regional security and trans-Arctic shipping;
(D) investing in resources, including a
significantly expanded icebreaker fleet, to ensure that
the United States has adequate capacity to prevent and
respond to security threats in the Arctic region; and
(E) pursuing diplomatic engagements with all
nations in the Arctic region to reach an agreement
for--
(i) maintaining peace and stability in the
Arctic region; and
(ii) fostering cooperation on stewardship
and safety initiatives in the Arctic region.
(b) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Arctic nations.--The term ``Arctic Nations'' means the
8 nations with territory or exclusive economic zones that
extend north of the 66.56083 parallel latitude north of the
equator, namely Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway,
Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Sweden, and Iceland.
(2) Arctic region.--The term ``Arctic Region'' means the
geographic region north of the 66.56083 parallel latitude north
of the equator.
(c) Designation.--The Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs shall designate a
deputy assistant secretary serving within the Bureau of Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs as ``Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Arctic Affairs'', who shall be responsible for
affairs in the Arctic Region.
(d) Duties.-- The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arctic Affairs
shall--
(1) facilitate the development and coordination of United
States foreign policy in the Arctic Region relating to--
(A) meeting national security needs;
(B) protecting the Arctic environment and
conserving its biological resources;
(C) promoting environmentally sustainable natural
resource management and economic development;
(D) strengthening institutions for cooperation
among the Arctic Nations;
(E) involving Arctic indigenous people in decisions
that affect them; and
(F) enhancing scientific monitoring and research on
local, regional, and global environmental issues;
(2) coordinate the diplomatic objectives, and, as
appropriate, represent the United States within multilateral
fora that address international cooperation and foreign policy
matters in the Arctic Region;
(3) help inform transnational commerce and commercial
maritime transit in the Arctic Region;
(4) coordinate the integration of scientific data on the
current and projected effects of climate change on the Arctic
Region and ensure that such data is applied to the development
of security strategies for the Arctic Region;
(5) make available the methods and approaches on the
integration of climate science to other regional security
planning programs in the Department of State to better ensure
that broader decision-making processes may more adequately
account for the effects of climate change;
(6) serve as a key point of contact for other Federal
agencies, including the Department of Defense, the Department
of the Interior, the Department of Homeland Security, and the
Intelligence Community, on Arctic Region security issues;
(7) develop and facilitate the implementation of an Arctic
Region Security Policy in accordance with subsection (f);
(8) use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States
to encourage other countries and international multilateral
organizations to support the principles of the Arctic Region
Security Policy implemented pursuant to subsection (f); and
(9) perform such other duties and exercise such powers as
the Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs and the Secretary of State
shall prescribe.
(e) Rank and Status.--The Secretary of State may change the title
of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arctic Affairs designated under
subsection (c) to Special Representative or Special Envoy with the rank
of Ambassador if--
(1) the President nominates the person so designated to
that rank and status; and
(2) the Senate confirms such person to such rank and
status.
(f) Arctic Region Security Policy.--The Arctic Region Security
Policy shall include requirements for the Bureau of Conflict and
Stabilization Operations, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs,
embassies, regional bureaus, and other offices with a role in conflict
avoidance, prevention and security assistance, or humanitarian disaster
response, prevention, and assistance to assess, develop, budget for,
and implement plans, policies, and actions--
(1) to enhance the resilience capacities of Arctic Nations
to the effects of climate change and increased civilian and
military activity from Arctic Nations and other nations that
may result from increased accessibility of the Arctic Region
due to decreased sea ice, warmer ambient air temperatures and
other effects of climate change, as a means of reducing the
risk of conflict and instability;
(2) to assess specific added risks to the Arctic Region and
Arctic Nations that--
(A) are vulnerable to the effects of climate
change; and
(B) are strategically significant to the United
States;
(3) to account for the impacts on human health, safety,
stresses, reliability, food production, fresh water and other
critical natural resources, and economic activity;
(4) to coordinate the integration of climate change risk
and vulnerability assessments into the decision-making process
on foreign assistance awards to Arctic Nations;
(5) to advance principles of good governance by encouraging
and cooperating with Arctic Nations on collaborative
approaches--
(A) to sustainably manage natural resources in the
Arctic Region;
(B) to share the burden of ensuring maritime safety
in the Arctic Region;
(C) to prevent the escalation of security tensions
by mitigating against the militarization of the Arctic
Region;
(D) to develop mutually agreed upon multilateral
policies among Arctic Nations on the management of
maritime transit routes through the Arctic Region and
work cooperatively on the transit policies for access
to and transit in the Arctic Region by non-Arctic
Nations; and
(E) to facilitate the development of Arctic Region
Security Action Plans to ensure stability and public
safety in disaster situations in a humane and
responsible fashion; and
(6) to evaluate the vulnerability, security,
susceptibility, and resiliency of United States interests and
nondefense assets in the Arctic Region.
TITLE II--INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND CONVENTIONS
SEC. 201. SENSE OF CONGRESS IN SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES RETURNING
TO THE PARIS AGREEMENT.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) President Trump's decision to withdraw the United
States from the Paris Agreement was a mistake that harmed the
leadership, economic, national security, and diplomatic
interests of the United States;
(2) the United States expeditious return to the Paris
Agreement is a critical first step to restoring United States
leadership among, and in cooperation with, the international
community;
(3) resuming United States global leadership in the Paris
Agreement's implementation process is critical to ensuring that
the rules and procedures for implementing the Paris Agreement
achieve maximum benefits for the United States;
(4) prioritizing the immediate preparation and
communication of an updated United States nationally determined
contribution in support of the Paris Agreement will demonstrate
a renewed and increasingly ambitious United States commitment
to climate action, which should incorporate--
(A) strategies for achieving domestic greenhouse
gas emissions reductions that achieve the United States
2015 national determined contribution to the Paris
Agreement;
(B) an ambitious 2030 mitigation target
representing a mid-term goal that signifies the
emission reductions trajectory the United States needs
to be on to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions
by 2050;
(C) commitments to engage constructively with
parties to the Paris Agreement regarding the
development of strategies to secure ambitious
commitments from all parties and to ensure adequate
progress on mitigating greenhouses sufficiently to
prevent 1.5 degree Celsius increase of warming;
(D) announced intentions of the United States to
accept and fulfill United States obligations to other
international agreements to reduce global greenhouse
gas emissions, including the International Civil
Aviation Organization's Carbon Offset and Reduction
Scheme for International Aviation and the Kigali
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol;
(E) an intention to resume the United States
cooperation and support for cooperative climate action
detailed and announced in various climate change
communiques produced by the G7, the G20, the Arctic
Council, the United Nations, and others for which the
United States has recently abstained;
(F) a platform and policy incentives for the United
States private sector, and State and local governments
to accurately account for their contributions to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions;
(G) a new, increased contribution pledge to the
Green Climate Fund, and contributions to other
complementary multilateral funds;
(H) a commitment to resume a leadership role within
the Green Climate Fund to achieve accountability,
transparency, and management reforms; and
(I) other activities that advance United States
climate-related foreign policy objectives, including
global greenhouse gas mitigation, climate change
adaptation activities, and global climate security;
(5) United States collaboration with other nations,
especially developing countries most impacted by the need to
transition carbon intensive industrial sectors, and the
workforces of these affected industries, on the global
transition to environmentally sustainable economies and
societies to ensure workers benefit from opportunities that
arise in a transition to economies powered by clean energy,
including engagements on--
(A) realizing the potential to create significant
net gains in employment opportunities through increases
in the number of decent jobs through investments in
environmentally sustainable production and consumption
and management of natural resources;
(B) improving the quality of jobs and increased
incomes on a large scale from more productive
processes, and environmentally sustainable products and
services in sectors such as agriculture, renewable
energy, transport, construction, recycling, and
tourism;
(C) social inclusion through improved access to
affordable, environmentally sustainable energy and
payments for environmental services, which are of
particular relevance to women and residents in rural
areas who face more economic challenges;
(D) protections from the effects of economic
restructuring that would otherwise result in the
displacement of workers and possible job losses;
(E) training and access to new job opportunities
attributable to new environmentally sustainable and
clean energy powered enterprises and workplaces;
(F) attracting new environmentally sustainable and
clean energy powered enterprises and workplaces to
communities transitioning to low carbon economies and
assist with adapting to climate change to avoid loss of
assets and livelihoods and involuntary migration; and
(G) avoiding adverse effects on the incomes of poor
households from higher energy and commodity prices; and
(6) the United States should communicate its intention to
achieve net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.
SEC. 202. ENHANCED UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO THE PARIS AGREEMENT.
(a) Sense of Congress Regarding Need for Updated United States
Nationally Determined Contribution.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) all parties determine their voluntary contributions to
the Paris Agreement, in accordance with Article 4.2 of the
Paris Agreement;
(2) the development and submission of a new United States
nationally determined contribution should be prioritized, in
accordance with Article 4.9 of the Paris Agreement;
(3) the new United States nationally determined
contribution should--
(A) represent an ambitious 2030 target, in
accordance with Articles 4.2 and 4.3 of the Paris
Agreement; and
(B) put the United States on an appropriate
trajectory towards achieving net zero greenhouse gas
emissions by 2050; and
(4) the plan required under subsection (b) should--
(A) be developed in accordance with Article 4.13 of
the Paris Agreement;
(B) inform United States obligations under Article
13.7 of the Paris Agreement; and
(C) clearly demonstrate how the United States will
achieve the target referred to in paragraph (3).
(b) Plan for Developing the United States Nationally Determined
Contribution.--At least 20 days before the United States submits a new
or provisional nationally determined contribution, the President shall
consult with, and provide embargoed drafts of the nationally determined
contribution to, the appropriate congressional committees.
(c) Public Transparency.--The President shall make available to the
public a plan for the United States to meet its nationally determined
contribution, which shall include--
(1) ambitious, economy-wide, short-term greenhouse gas
emissions reductions targets for 2025 and 2030, with relevant
addenda to the plan following its initial submission;
(2) considerations made for populations, regions,
industries, and constituencies that could be affected by
actions to meet the targets described in paragraph (1) and the
failure to meet such targets, including the effect of such
actions on--
(A) United States jobs, wages, and pay;
(B) the cost of energy (such as electricity and
gasoline) for consumers; and
(C) the ability to develop and deploy new,
innovative, domestically produced technologies;
(3) a description of how the United States may use--
(A) multilateral and bilateral diplomatic tools, in
addition to the expert committee established under
Article 15 of the Paris Agreement, to encourage and
assist other parties to the Paris Agreement to fulfill
their announced contributions; and
(B) the mechanisms under Articles 12 and 13 of the
Paris Agreement to urge enhanced actions from other
parties to achieve the overall objectives of the Paris
Agreement;
(4) a description of how the Paris Agreement's loss and
damage provisions would affect infrastructure resiliency in the
United States;
(5) a coherent and stable policy framework for sustainable
enterprise development and decent work opportunities for all
United States residents that--
(A) is developed through engagement in social
dialogue, particularly in--
(i) communities that have historically
experienced environmental injustice; and
(ii) communities with economies that are
heavily dependent on fossil fuel production or
consumption; and
(B) maintains such social dialogue, in line with
international labor standards--
(i) at all stages, from policy design to
implementation and evaluation; and
(ii) at all levels, from the national level
to the enterprise; and
(6) an accounting of other relevant activities that advance
United States foreign policy objectives of--
(A) advancing global greenhouse gas mitigation;
(B) supporting climate change adaptation
activities; and
(C) improving global climate security.
(d) Education and Public Awareness.--
(1) In general.--The plan developed under subsection (c)
shall be consistent with Article 12 of the Paris Agreement,
which states ``Parties shall cooperate in taking measures, as
appropriate, to enhance climate change education, training,
public awareness, public participation and public access to
information, recognizing the importance of these steps with
respect to enhancing actions under this Agreement.''.
(2) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this Act may be
construed to require or prohibit the President from including
in the plan developed under subsection (b), consistent with the
prohibition described in section 438 of the General Education
Provisions Act (20 U.S.C. 1232a), recommendations to support
State and local educational agencies, in integrating
instruction on human-caused climate change and the societal,
environmental, and economic effects of such climate change into
curricula taught in elementary and secondary schools under the
control of such State and local educational agencies, in order
to meet the goals and ambitions of the Paris Agreement to
ensure climate education and awareness in schools.
(e) Sense of Congress Regarding the Accountability of Parties to
the Paris Agreement.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States shall use its diplomatic leverage and the mechanisms of the
Paris Agreement that promote transparency, reporting, and
accountability among parties to seek to play critical leadership roles
on the Paris Agreement's critical working groups, subsidiary bodies,
and constituted bodies--
(1) to maximize the United States ability to hold other
parties accountable for meeting the commitments to the Paris
Agreement; and
(2) to ensure that all parties commit to and meet ambitious
greenhouse gas emissions reductions targets.
SEC. 203. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING RATIFICATION OF THE KIGALI
AMENDMENT TO THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The chemical refrigerant alternative, hydrofluorocarbon
(HFC), and its chemical derivatives identified in Annex F of
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, done at Montreal September 16, 1987, which replaced
hydrochlorofluorocarbon (HCFC) and chlorofluorocarbon (CFC),
are short-lived and highly potent greenhouse gases.
(2) Some HFCs are 4,000 times more potent greenhouse gases
than carbon dioxide. The expansion of mass production and
worldwide use of HFCs have significantly contributed to the
recent worsening of the global climate crisis.
(3) In October 15, 2016, the parties at the 28th Meeting of
Parties to the Montreal Protocol, with the support of the
United States, adopted an amendment (referred to in the Act as
the ``Kigali Amendment'') to the Montreal Protocol to globally
phase down the production and application of
hydrofluorocarbons, most commonly used as refrigerants in air
conditioners and for cold storage.
(4) The Kigali Amendment calls for parties to cut the
production and consumption of HFCs by more than 80 percent
during a 30-year period--
(A) to eliminate an estimated 80,000,000,000 metric
tons of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions by 2050;
and
(B) to avoid up to 0.5 degree Celsius warming by
the end of the century, while continuing to protect the
ozone layer.
(5) United States ratification of the Kigali Amendment will
require the advice and consent of the Senate. There is broad
bipartisan support for the Kigali Amendment in the Senate, as
evidenced by a letter sent by 13 Republican senators to the
President on June 4, 2018, urging the President to submit the
Kigali Amendment to the Senate for advice and consent.
(6) The Environmental Protection Agency received sufficient
domestic legal authority to comply with the international
obligations of the Kigali Amendment under title II of the
Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2021 (division G of Public Law 116-260),
which was enacted on December 27, 2020.
(7) As of the date of the introduction of the Act, the
President has not submitted the Kigali Amendment to the Senate
for advice and consent and the United States Government has
neither ratified nor implemented policies to comply with the
Kigali Amendment.
(8) The Kigali Amendment, which has been ratified by 100
parties, entered into force on January 1, 2019.
(9) Adoption of the Kigali Amendment and United States
ratification of and compliance with the Kigali Amendment is
supported broadly by affected industry stakeholders and
environmental public interest organizations.
(10) Industries in the United States that use and produce
fluorocarbons--
(A) contribute more than $158,000,000,000 annually
in goods and services to the economy of the United
States; and
(B) employ more than 700,000 individuals, with an
annual industry-wide payroll of more than
$32,000,000,000.
(11) Foreign competitors to United States chemical
refrigerant and refrigeration equipment based and operating in
countries that have ratified the Kigali Amendment and are
implementing policies in compliance with the Kigali Amendment
are gaining an advantage on United States based industries in
the manufacturing and used of next-generation chemicals and
equipment.
(12) The United States ratification of the Kigali
Amendment--
(A) would support and promote the technological
leadership of the United States industries to lead
global production and marketing of replacement
refrigerants and equipment in compliance with the
Kigali Amendment; and
(B) according to industry analysis, would
potentially create approximately 33,000 new
manufacturing jobs in the United States and add
approximately $12,500,000,000 per year to the economy
of the United States.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the President should immediately submit the Kigali
Amendment to the Senate for advice and consent; and
(2) the Senate should promptly provide its advice and
consent on the Kigali Amendment.
SEC. 204. COMPLIANCE WITH THE CARBON OFFSET AND REDUCTION SCHEME FOR
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION.
The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall
promulgate regulations establishing uniform policies and take other
necessary actions to implement the terms of the Carbon Offset and
Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (commonly known as
``CORSIA''), which was adopted by International Civil Aviation
Organization in October 2016 as Assembly Resolution A39-3, and any
amendments to such Resolution with which the United States concurs, as
means to secure a single global carbon emissions market-based mechanism
to facilitate the participation of operators of civil aircraft of the
United States in international aviation.
SEC. 205. SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANTS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) High-GWP hfc.--The term ``high-GWP HFC'' means newly
manufactured hydrofluorocarbons with a global warming potential
calculated over a 100-year period of greater than 150, as
described in the Fifth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
(2) Short-lived climate pollutants.--The term ``short-lived
climate pollutants'' means--
(A) black carbon;
(B) methane; and
(C) high-GWP HFC.
(b) In General.--The President shall direct the United States
representatives to appropriate international bodies and conferences
(including the United Nations Environment Programme, the UNFCCC, the
Montreal Protocol, the Arctic Council, the Group of 7, the Group of 20,
the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation, the Arctic Council, the Climate and Clean Air Coalition on
Short-Lived Climate Pollutants, and the Global Alliance for Climate-
Smart Agriculture) to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United
States, consistent with the broad foreign policy goals of the United
States, to advocate that each such body or conference--
(1) commit to significantly increasing efforts to reduce
short-lived climate pollutants;
(2) invest in and develop alternative energy sources,
industrial and agricultural processes, appliances, and products
to replace sources of short-lived climate pollutants;
(3) enhance coordination with the private sector--
(A) to increase production and distribution of
clean energy alternatives, industrial processes, and
products that will replace sources of short-lived
climate pollutants;
(B) to develop action plans to mitigate short-lived
climate pollutants from various private sector
operations;
(C) to encourage best technology, methods, and
management practices for reducing short-lived climate
pollutants;
(D) to craft specific financing mechanisms for the
incremental costs associated with mitigating short-live
climate pollutants; and
(E) to grow economic opportunities and develop
markets, as appropriate, for short-lived climate
pollutants trading, capture, and other efforts that
support economic growth using low and zero carbon
energy sources;
(4) provide technical assistance to foreign regulatory
authorities and governments to remove unnecessary barriers to
investment in short-lived climate mitigation solutions,
including--
(A) the use of safe and affordable clean energy;
(B) the implementation of policies requiring
industrial and agricultural best practices for
capturing or mitigating the release of methane from
extractive, agricultural, and industrial processes; and
(C) climate assessment, scientific research,
monitoring, and technological development activities;
(5) develop and implement clear, accountable, and metric-
based targets to measure the effectiveness of projects
described in paragraph (4); and
(6) engage international partners in an existing
multilateral forum (or, if necessary, establish through an
international agreement a new multilateral forum) to improve
global cooperation for--
(A) creating tangible metrics for evaluating
efforts to reduce short-lived climate pollutants;
(B) developing and implementing best practices for
phasing out sources of short-lived climate pollutants,
including expanding capacity for innovative instruments
to mitigate short-lived climate pollutants at the
national and subnational levels of foreign countries,
particularly countries with little capacity to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions and deploy clean energy
facilities, and countries that lack sufficient policies
to advance such development;
(C) encouraging the development of standards and
practices, and increasing transparency and
accountability efforts for the reduction of short-lived
climate pollutants;
(D) integrating tracking and monitoring systems
into industrial processes;
(E) fostering research to improve scientific
understanding of--
(i) how high concentrations of short-lived
climate pollutants affect human health, safety,
and our climate;
(ii) changes in the amount and regional
concentrations of black carbon and methane
emissions, based on scientific modeling and
forecasting;
(iii) effective means to sequester short-
lived climate pollutants; and
(iv) other related areas of research the
United States representatives deem necessary;
(F) encouraging the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, and other international finance
organizations--
(i) to prioritize efforts to combat short-
lived climate pollutants; and
(ii) to enhance transparency by providing
sufficient and adequate information to
facilitate independent verification of their
climate finance reporting;
(G) encouraging observers of the Arctic Council
(including India and China) to adopt mitigation plans
consistent with the findings and recommendations of the
Arctic Council's Framework for Action on Black Carbon
and Methane;
(H) collaborating on technological advances in
short-lived climate pollutant mitigation, sequestration
and reduction technologies; and
(I) advising foreign countries, at both the
national and subnational levels, regarding the
development and execution of regulatory policies,
services, and laws pertaining to reducing the creation
and the collection and safe management of short-lived
climate pollutants.
(c) Enhancing International Outreach and Partnership of United
States Agencies Involved in Greenhouse Gas Reductions.--
(1) Finding.--Congress recognizes the success of the United
States Climate Alliance and the greenhouse gas reduction
programs and strategies established by the Environmental
Protection Agency's Center for Corporate Climate Leadership.
(2) Authorization of efforts to build foreign
partnerships.--The Secretary of State shall work with the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to build
partnerships, as appropriate, with the governments of foreign
countries and to support international efforts to reduce short-
lived climate pollutants and combat climate change.
(d) Negotiation of New International Agreements and Reassertion of
Targets in Existing Agreements.--Not later than 1 year after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a
report to Congress that--
(1) assesses the potential for negotiating new
international agreements, new targets within existing
international agreements or cooperative bodies, and the
creation of a new international forum to mitigate globally
short-lived climate pollutants to support the efforts described
in subsection (b);
(2) describes the provisions that could be included in such
agreements;
(3) assesses potential parties to such agreements;
(4) describes a process for reengaging with Canada and
Mexico regarding the methane targets agreed to at the 2016
North American Leaders' Summit; and
(5) describes a process for reengaging with the countries
of the Arctic Council regarding the methane and black carbon
targets that were negotiated in 2015 through the Framework for
Action.
(e) Consideration of Short-Lived Climate Pollutants in Negotiating
International Agreements.--In negotiating any relevant international
agreement with any country or countries after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the President shall--
(1) consider the impact short-lived climate pollutants are
having on the increase in global average temperatures and the
resulting global climate change;
(2) consider the effects that climate change is having on
the environment; and
(3) ensure that the agreement strengthens efforts to
eliminate short-lived climate pollutants from such country or
countries.
SEC. 206. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION REGARDING CLEAN TRANSPORTATION AND
SUSTAINABLE LAND USE AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Agriculture, forestry, and other land use accounted for
24 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions during 2010,
which--
(A) is caused primarily from agriculture
(cultivation of crops and livestock) and deforestation;
and
(B) does not take into account the carbon dioxide
that ecosystems remove from the atmosphere by
sequestering carbon in biomass, dead organic matter,
and soils, which offset approximately 20 percent of
emissions from this sector.
(2) The transportation sector accounts for 14 percent of
global gas emissions and 28 percent of the United States
greenhouse gas emissions.
(3) According to the National Center for Biotechnology
Information's report, ``National Mitigation Potential from
Natural Climate Solutions in the Tropics''--
(A) better land stewardship is needed to achieve
the Paris Agreement's temperature goal of holding the
increase of global average temperatures well below 2
degrees Celsius, particularly in the tropics;
(B) as countries enhance their nationally
determined contributions, confusion persists about the
potential contribution of better land stewardship to
meeting such goal;
(C) in 50 percent of the tropical countries, cost-
effective natural climate solutions could mitigate more
than 50 percent of national emissions;
(D) in more than 25 percent of the tropical
countries, cost effective natural climate solutions
potential is greater than national emissions; and
(E) natural climate solutions can transform
national economies and contribute to sustainable
development goals.
(4) According to the International Energy Agency--
(A) global transport emissions increased by less
than 0.5 percent in 2019 (compared with an average
annual increase of 1.9 percent since 2000), owing to
efficiency improvements, electrification, and greater
use of biofuels;
(B) transportation is responsible for 24 percent of
direct carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel
combustion;
(C) electric car deployment has grown rapidly since
2010, with the global stock of electric passenger cars
passing 5,000,000 in 2018 (an increase of 63 percent
from the previous year);
(D) in 2018--
(i) approximately 45 percent of all
electric cars on the road were in China;
(ii) approximately 24 percent of such cars
were in Europe; and
(iii) approximately 22 percent of such cars
were in the United States;
(E) existing measures to increase efficiency and
reduce energy demand must be deepened and extended for
compliance with the Sustainable Development Scenario of
the International Energy Agency's World Energy Model;
(F) prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, emissions from
aviation and shipping were increasing faster than all
other transportation modes; and
(G) energy demand and emissions have continued to
rise in all modes of road transport (cars, trucks,
buses, and 2- and 3-wheelers), particularly in heavy-
duty road freight transport, which account for 75
percent of global transportation sector emissions.
(5) The worldwide market share of sport utility vehicles
rose 15 percentage points between 2014 and 2019, and now
comprises 40 percent of the global light-duty vehicle market.
(6) China is the world's largest automobile market, with
more than 23,700,000 light vehicles sold in China in 2018. As
China's road network rapidly continues to expand, the number of
vehicle miles traveled per capita will most likely lead to
growth in China's transportation sector carbon dioxide
emissions.
(7) Even with India's advancement of policies to promote
electric vehicles and biofuels--
(A) India relies heavily on oil, and comprises 29
percent of India's total energy consumption;
(B) prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, India was the
world's fastest growing aviation market, with passenger
numbers for domestic and international flights doubling
since 2010;
(C) India is planning to build 100 new airports
between 2020 and 2035, and industry analysts have
projected up to 520,000,000 Indian air travelers
annually by 2037; and
(D) the World Health Organization reports that 15
of the cities worldwide with the worst air pollution
are in India, largely due to urban vehicle emissions.
(8) In 2013, Mexico became the first vehicle market in
Latin America to establish fuel economy or carbon dioxide
emissions standards.
(9) The Department of State, the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency
do not have a program in place to encourage other countries to
adopt standards that are compatible with United States fuel
economy and emissions standards.
(10) Many countries adopt European emissions standards
rather than United States standards, in part because of
European diplomatic engagement, disadvantaging United States
automakers in international markets.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to
partner, consult, and coordinate with foreign governments, civil
society, international financial institutions, subnational communities,
agribusiness and automobile industry leaders, and the private sector in
a concerted effort--
(1) to raise awareness of--
(A) the greenhouse gas emission contributions from
agriculture, forestry, other land uses, and the
transportation sector to the annual total of
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions globally; and
(B) the importance of working cooperatively on the
development of multi-faceted and country specific
policies and strategies--
(i) to effectively reduce greenhouse gas
emissions from agriculture, forestry, other
land uses, and the transportation sector; and
(ii) to promote economic growth,
opportunities, sustainable land management, and
equitable access to mobility, transportation
services, and resources among all populations;
(2) to mitigate land use sector emissions through enhanced
land use planning, sustainable agriculture practices,
sustainable forest management, and community-led conservation
and development and other natural climate solutions;
(3) to use the voice and vote of the United States in
multilateral institutions to advance international efforts to
advance sustainable land-use planning, climate-smart
agriculture, sustainable forest management, and community-led
conservation and development;
(4) to improve the reliability and sustainability of
transportation systems, particularly in developing countries,
through a focus on mitigating carbon emissions, improving
health and safety outcomes through improved land use and
community design, and improved mobility for all populations;
(5) to promote collaboration regarding international
research and development in--
(A) zero-emission vehicles;
(B) sustainable urban development and smart growth;
and
(C) advanced low carbon biofuels for
transportation;
(6) to facilitate and support the ability of parties to the
Paris Agreement to more accurately monitor, record, and report
transportation sector emissions;
(7) to develop greater cooperation among parties for
strengthening the rules and ambition of the Paris Agreement's
mitigation targets for transportation sector emissions;
(8) to improve the structural integrity of critical
transportation infrastructure to withstand current and
forecasted effects of climate change and support community
resilience, improved access to jobs, and adaptability to the
effects of climate change; and
(9) to explore new opportunities or seek enhanced
initiatives within existing multilateral and bilateral
agreements to develop mechanisms and policies for reducing
transportation sector greenhouse gas emissions.
(c) International Cooperation.--In implementing the policy
described in subsection (b), the President should direct the United
States representatives to appropriate international bodies to use the
influence of the United States, consistent with the broad foreign
policy goals of the United States, to advocate that each such body--
(1) promote transportation sector investment in--
(A) electric vehicles and other low and zero carbon
transportation technologies; and
(B) sustainable land use development that
incorporates--
(i) multi-modal transportation designs
aimed at reducing--
(I) traffic congestion;
(II) carbon emissions from motor
vehicles;
(III) travel times between high
volume destinations within a community;
(IV) vehicle crashes and other
threats to motorist and pedestrian
safety; and
(V) stormwater runoff from
impervious road surfaces, vehicle
conflicts with wildlife, habitat
destruction, and other forms of
environmental degradation commonly
associated with roads and motor
vehicles;
(ii) multi-use community designs and dense
development that accounts for locating
residential development near essential goods,
services, and job opportunities (to reduce
individual reliance of motorized personal
transportation); and
(iii) transportation systems designed--
(I) to maximize the safety of all
users; and
(II) to reduce the probability of
motorized vehicle crashes, including
motorized vehicle crashes that injure
or kill pedestrians and bicyclists;
(2) strive to improve mobility by advancing equitable
access to transportation services among all populations,
particularly historically underserved or marginalized
populations and communities;
(3) improve environmental quality and community health
outcomes through--
(A) safer and more efficient multi-modal
transportation systems that reduce vehicle pollution
and congestion;
(B) reductions in the amount of impervious
surfaces; and
(C) integration of safe pedestrian and bicycling
infrastructure;
(4) addresses unique transportation and economic needs of
countries' diverse populations and communities in ways that
also support a country's achievement of ambitious greenhouse
gas mitigation commitments;
(5) enhance coordination and engagement with private sector
stakeholders;
(6) provide technical assistance to foreign regulatory
authorities and governments to remove barriers to investment in
transportation systems, infrastructure and electric vehicles
and low and zero carbon fuels; and
(7) use clear, accountable, and metric-based targets to
measure the effectiveness of such projects.
(d) Vehicle Fuel Economy and CO<INF>2</INF> Emissions Diplomacy
Initiative.--
(1) Development.--The Secretary of State, in consultation
with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of
Transportation, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, shall
develop a Vehicle Fuel Economy and CO<INF>2</INF> Emissions
Diplomacy Initiative to promote the worldwide adoption of
vehicle fuel economy and vehicle carbon dioxide emissions
standards that are compatible with United States standards.
(2) Responsibilities and duties.--
(A) Diplomatic efforts.--The Secretary of State
shall lead diplomatic efforts to encourage foreign
governments to adopt vehicle fuel economy standards and
vehicle carbon dioxide emissions standards.
(B) Technical assistance.--The Administrator of the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
shall provide technical assistance to other countries
to help such countries to develop new standards,
testing regimes, and compliance strategies.
(3) Program scope.--The Vehicle Fuel Economy and
CO<INF>2</INF> Emissions Diplomacy Initiative should--
(A) have the goal of reducing oil consumption by at
least 2,000,000 barrels per day by 2030, in addition to
the reduction anticipated by the implementation of
standards in existence as of the date of the enactment
of this Act;
(B) include input in developing the program from
leaders in United States industry; and
(C) focus special attention on Latin America.
SEC. 207. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON UNITED STATES REENGAGEMENT WITH THE
GROUP OF SEVEN AND THE GROUP OF TWENTY ON CLIMATE ACTION.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) President Trump has abstained from several heads of
state meetings on climate action and cooperation with the heads
of state from countries comprising the Group of Seven (referred
to in this section as the ``G7'') and the Group of Twenty
(referred to in this section as the ``G20'').
(2) The G7 summit held in Charlevoix, Quebec in June 2018
produced a climate action communique that was signed by the
heads of state from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and
the United Kingdom, but was not signed by the United States.
(3) The G7 climate action communique states, ``Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the
European Union reaffirm their strong commitment to implement
the Paris Agreement, through ambitious climate action, in
particular through reducing emissions while stimulating
innovation, enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening and
financing resilience and reducing vulnerability; as well as
ensuring a just transition, including increasing efforts to
mobilize climate finance from a wide variety of sources.''.
(4) In 2019, the United States blocked the G7 from making
any new or additional commitments on climate change, to the
expressed disappointment and frustration of the other six heads
of state.
(5) The G7, without the active participation of the United
States, continues to work together to fulfill clean energy
commitments on initiatives such as the 2014 Rome Initiative for
Energy Security, the 2015 Hamburg Initiative for Sustainable
Energy Security, the 2016 Kitakyushu Initiative on Energy
Security for Global Growth, and the Africa Renewable Energy
Initiative. However, United States objections to global
cooperative climate action have prevented the G7 from
undertaking new clean energy and climate action initiatives in
recent years.
(6) The 2018 Buenos Aires Leaders Declaration by the G20--
(A) recognizes the risks that climate change poses
to global security, global health, and economic
development; and
(B) affirms the significance of the Paris
Agreement.
(7) The United States insisted on the inclusion of a
statement in the G20 Buenos Aires Leaders Declaration, for
which the United States was the only subscriber, expressing
dissenting opinions on international climate action cooperation
and equivocation on ``utilizing all energy sources and
technologies, while protecting the environment''.
(8) In 2019, the G20 narrowly avoided concluding without a
leaders' declaration, when the President unsuccessfully tried
to pressure the other 19 heads of state to weaken commitments
on combating climate change in the 2019 G20 Osaka Leaders
Declaration, leaving the United States to provide a dissenting
provision articulating its outlier position on climate action
in the Declaration.
(b) In General.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President, acting through the Secretary of
State, shall initiate a China-focused agenda at the G7, with respect
to--
(1) trade and investment issues and enforcement;
(2) establishing and promulgating international
infrastructure standards;
(3) the erosion of democracy in Hong Kong;
(4) human rights concerns in Xinjiang, Tibet, and other
areas in the People's Republic of China;
(5) the security of 5G telecommunications;
(6) anti-competitive behavior;
(7) coercive and indentured international finance and
conditional provision of foreign assistance;
(8) international influence campaigns;
(9) climate change;
(10) China's domestic and international investments in new
coal power plants;
(11) environmental standards; and
(12) coordination with like-minded regional partners,
including the Republic of Korea and Australia.
(c) Briefing on Progress of Negotiations.--Not later than 1 year
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall
provide a briefing to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives
regarding the progress of any negotiations described in subsection (b).
(d) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should--
(1) in the next G7 communique and G20 Leaders'
Declaration--
(A) renounce the United States contrarian positions
on climate change expressed in the 2018 and 2019
official documents of the G7 and G20 summits;
(B) renew its commitment to climate cooperation and
support for fulfilling the goals of the Paris Agreement
in the context of the G7 and the G20;
(C) lead efforts to formalize new mechanisms and
commitments to climate action cooperation between the
heads of state of the G7 and of the G20, which are
aimed at--
(i) increasing ambition on greenhouse gas
mitigation; and
(ii) strengthening support for climate
finance in developing countries, particularly
countries that are most vulnerable to the
effects of climate change; and
(D) challenge the heads of state of the G7 and the
G20 to leverage private financing and increase grants
and official development assistance in clean energy and
sustainable development projects in their own countries
and in developing countries, especially countries that
are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change;
and
(2) initiate the China-focused agenda described in
subsection (b) at the G7.
TITLE III--CLIMATE CHANGE DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND SUPPORT
SEC. 301. INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION, MITIGATION, AND
SECURITY PROGRAM.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Convention.--The term ``Convention'' means the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, done at New
York May 9, 1992, and entered into force March 21, 1994.
(2) Most vulnerable communities and populations.--The term
``most vulnerable communities and populations'' means
communities and populations that are at risk of substantial
adverse effects of climate change and have limited capacity to
respond to such effects, including women, impoverished
communities, children, indigenous peoples, and formal and
informal workers.
(3) Most vulnerable developing countries.--The term ``most
vulnerable developing countries'' means, as determined by the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, developing countries that are at risk of
substantial adverse effects of climate change and have limited
capacity to respond to such effects, considering the approaches
included in any international treaties and agreements.
(4) Program.--The term ``Program'' means the International
Climate Change Adaptation, Mitigation, and Security Program
established pursuant to subsection (c).
(b) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to provide authorities
for additional, new, current, and ongoing bilateral and regional
international development assistance, and, as appropriate, to leverage
private resources, in support of host country driven projects,
planning, policies, and initiatives designed to improve the ability of
host countries--
(1) to primarily produce reliable renewable energy and
reduce or mitigate carbon emissions from the power sector while
facilitating the transition in key global markets from
electricity generated from fossil fuel power to low-cost clean
energy sources, in a manner that is equitable for workers and
communities;
(2) to adapt and become more resilient to current and
forecasted effects of climate change; and
(3) to employ--
(A) sustainable land use practices that mitigate
desertification and reduce greenhouse gas emissions
from deforestation and forest degradation; and
(B) agricultural production practices that reduce
poverty while improving soil health, protecting water
quality, and increasing food security and nutrition.
(c) Establishment of Program.--The Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Administrator
of the United States Agency for International Development, shall
establish a program, to be known as the ``International Climate Change
Adaptation, Mitigation, and Security Program'', to provide bilateral
and regional assistance to developing countries for programs, projects,
and activities described in subsection (e).
(d) Supplement Not Supplant.--Assistance provided under this
section shall be used to supplement, and not to supplant, any other
Federal, State, or local resources available to carry out activities
that fit the characteristics of the Program.
(e) Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United States to ensure
that the Program provides resources to developing countries,
particularly the most vulnerable communities and populations in such
countries, to support the development and implementation of programs,
projects, and activities that--
(1) reduce greenhouse gas emissions through the integration
and deployment of clean energy, which may include transmission,
distribution, and interconnections to renewable energy, while
facilitating the transition in key global markets from
electricity generated from fossil fuel power to low-cost
renewable energy sources, in a manner that is equitable for
workers and communities;
(2) advance the use of clean energy technologies facing
financial or other barriers to widespread deployment that could
be addressed through support under the Program to reduce,
sequester, or avoid greenhouse gas emissions;
(3) improve the availability, viability, and accessibility
of zero emission vehicles, including support for design and
development of transportation networks and land use practices
that mitigate carbon emissions in the transportation sector;
(4) support building capacities that may include--
(A) developing and implementing methodologies and
programs for measuring and quantifying greenhouse gas
emissions and verifying emissions mitigation, including
building capacities to conduct emissions inventories
and meet reporting requirements under the Paris
Agreement;
(B) assessing, developing, and implementing
technology and policy options for greenhouse gas
emissions mitigation and avoidance of future emissions,
including sector-based and cross-sector mitigation
strategies;
(C) enhancing the technical capacity of regulatory
authorities, planning agencies, and related
institutions in developing countries to improve the
deployment of clean energy technologies and practices,
including through increased transparency;
(D) training and instruction regarding the
installation and maintenance of renewable energy
technologies; and
(E) activities that support the development and
implementation of frameworks for intellectual property
rights in developing countries;
(5) improve resilience, sustainable economic growth, and
adaptation capacities in response to and in spite of the
effects of climate change;
(6) promote appropriate job training and access to new job
opportunities in new economic sectors and industries that
emerge due to the transition from fossil fuel energy to clean
energy, with full labor protections in accordance with
international labor standards;
(7) reduce the vulnerability and increase the resilience
capacities of communities to the effects of climate change,
including effects on--
(A) water availability;
(B) agricultural productivity and food security;
(C) flood risk;
(D) coastal resources;
(E) biodiversity;
(F) economic livelihoods;
(G) health and diseases;
(H) housing and shelter; and
(I) human migration;
(8) help countries and communities adapt to changes in the
environment through enhanced community planning, preparedness,
and growth strategies that take into account current and
forecasted regional and localized effects of climate change;
(9) conserve and restore natural resources, ecosystems, and
biodiversity threatened by the effects of climate change to
ensure such resources, ecosystems, and biodiversity are healthy
and continue to provide natural protections from the effects of
climate change such as extreme weather;
(10) provide resources, information, scientific data and
modeling, innovative best practices, and technical assistance
to support vulnerable developing countries and communities
adapt their economies, communities, and security planning
efforts to the effects of climate change;
(11) promote sustainable and climate-resilient societies,
including through improvements to make critical infrastructure
less vulnerable to the effects of climate change;
(12) encourage the adoption of policies and measures,
including sector-based and cross-sector policies and measures,
that substantially reduce, sequester, or avoid greenhouse gas
emissions from the domestic energy and transportation sectors
of developing countries;
(13) reduce deforestation and land degradation to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions and implement sustainable forestry
practices;
(14) promote sustainable land use activities, including
supporting development planning, design, and construction with
respect to transportation systems and land use that
incorporates--
(A) multi-modal transportation designs aimed at
reducing--
(i) traffic congestion;
(ii) carbon emissions from motor vehicles;
(iii) travel times between high volume
destinations within a community;
(iv) motor vehicle crashes and other
threats to motorist and pedestrian safety; and
(v) stormwater runoff from impervious road
surfaces, motor vehicle conflicts with
wildlife, habitat destruction, and other forms
of environmental degradation commonly
associated with roads and motor vehicles;
(B) multi-use community designs and dense
development that account for locating residential
development near essential goods, services, and job
opportunities to reduce individual reliance on
motorized personal transportation; and
(C) transportation systems designed to--
(i) maximize the safety of all users;
(ii) improve mobility by advancing
equitable access to transportation services
among all populations, particularly
historically underserved or marginalized
populations and communities; and
(iii) reduce the probability of vehicle
crashes and pedestrian and bicyclist injuries
and mortalities;
(15) promote sustainable agricultural practices that
mitigate carbon emissions, conserve soil, and improve food and
water security of communities;
(16) foster partnerships with private sector entities and
nongovernmental international development organizations to
assist with developing solutions and economic opportunities
that support projects, planning, policies, and initiatives
described in subsection (b);
(17) provide technical assistance and strengthen capacities
of developing countries to meet the goals of the conditional
nationally determined contributions of those countries;
(18) establish investment channels designed to leverage
private sector financing in--
(A) clean energy;
(B) sustainable agriculture and natural resource
management; and
(C) the transportation sector as described in
paragraph (3); and
(19) provide technical assistance and support for non-
extractive activities that provide alternative economic growth
opportunities while preserving critical habitats and natural
carbon sinks.
(f) Provision of Assistance.--
(1) In general.--The Administrator of the United States
Agency for International Development, under the direction of
the Secretary of State, and in consultation with the Secretary
of the Treasury and, as appropriate, the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Secretary of Energy, and
the Secretary of Agriculture, shall provide assistance under
the Program--
(A) in the form of bilateral assistance pursuant to
the requirements under subsection (g);
(B) to multilateral funds or international
institutions with programs for climate mitigation or
adaptation in developing countries consistent with the
policy described in subsection (e); or
(C) through a combination of the mechanisms
specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B).
(2) Limitation.--
(A) Conditional distribution to multilateral funds
or international institutions.--In any fiscal year, the
Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development, under the direction of the
Secretary of State, may provide up to 40 percent of the
assistance available to carry out the Program to 1 or
more multilateral funds or international institutions
that meet the requirements of subparagraph (B).
(B) Multilateral fund or international institution
eligibility.--A multilateral fund or international
institution is eligible to receive assistance under
subparagraph (A)--
(i) if--
(I) such fund or institution is
established pursuant to--
(aa) the Convention; or
(bb) an agreement
negotiated under the
Convention; or
(II) the assistance is directed to
1 or more multilateral funds or
international development institutions,
pursuant to an agreement negotiated
under the Convention; and
(ii) if such fund or institution--
(I) specifies the terms and
conditions under which the United
States is to provide assistance to the
fund or institution, and under which
the fund or institution is to provide
assistance to recipient countries; and
(II) ensures that assistance from
the United States to the fund or
institution and the principal and
income of the fund or institution are
disbursed only--
(aa) to support projects,
planning, policies, and
initiatives described in
subsection (b);
(bb) consistent with the
policy described in subsection
(e); and
(cc) in regular
consultation with relevant
governing bodies of the fund or
institution that--
(AA) include
representation from
countries among the
most vulnerable
developing countries;
and
(BB) provide public
access.
(C) Congressional notification.--The Secretary of
State, the Administrator of the United States Agency
for International Development, or the Secretary of the
Treasury shall notify the appropriate congressional
committees not later than 15 days before providing
assistance to a multilateral fund or international
institution under this subsection.
(3) Local consultations.--Programs, projects, and
activities supported by assistance provided under this
subsection shall require consultations with local communities,
particularly the most vulnerable communities and populations in
such communities, and indigenous peoples in areas in which any
programs, projects, or activities are planned to engage such
communities and peoples through adequate disclosure of
information, public participation, consultation, and the free
prior and informed consent of such peoples, including full
consideration of the interdependence of vulnerable communities
and ecosystems to promote the resilience of local communities.
(g) Bilateral Assistance.--
(1) In general.--Except to the extent inconsistent with
this subsection, the administrative authorities under the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) shall
apply to the implementation of this subsection to the same
extent and in the same manner as such authorities apply to the
implementation of such Act in order to provide the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development with the authority to provide assistance to
countries, including the most vulnerable developing countries,
for programs, projects, and activities consistent with the
purposes described in subsection (b) and the policy described
in subsection (e).
(2) Considerations.--In carrying out this subsection, the
Administrator shall ensure that--
(A) the environmental impact of proposed programs,
projects, and activities is assessed through adequate
consultation, public participation, and disclosure of
information; and
(B) programs, projects, and activities under this
subsection--
(i) avoid environmental degradation, to the
maximum extent practicable; and
(ii) are aligned, to the maximum extent
practicable, with broader development, poverty
alleviation, or natural resource management
objectives and initiatives in the recipient
country.
(3) Community engagement.--The Administrator shall seek to
ensure that--
(A) local communities, particularly the most
vulnerable communities and populations in areas in
which any programs, projects, or activities are carried
out under this subsection, are engaged in the design,
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of such
programs, projects, and activities through disclosure
of information, public participation, and consultation;
and
(B) the needs and interests of the most vulnerable
communities and populations are addressed in national
or regional climate change adaptation plans.
(4) Consultation and disclosure.--For each country
receiving assistance under this subsection, the Administrator
shall establish a process for consultation with, and disclosure
of information to, local, national, and international
stakeholders regarding any programs, projects, or activities
carried out under this subsection.
(h) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated to carry out this section $2,000,000,000 for fiscal year
2022 and each fiscal year thereafter.
SEC. 302. UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND.
(a) United States Contributions.--On behalf of the United States,
the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State--
(1) shall jointly coordinate contributions to the Green
Climate Fund; and
(2) may contribute to the Green Climate Fund, in addition
to the amounts authorized under subsection (d), additional
amounts from other relevant foreign assistance accounts.
(b) Limits on Country Access.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall
use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to ensure
that--
(1) the Fund does not provide more than approximately 15
percent of the resources of the Fund to any one country;
(2) each country that receives amounts from the Fund
submits to the governing body of the Fund an investment plan
that describes how--
(A) energy efficiency or production projects will
achieve significant and lasting reductions in national-
level greenhouse gas emissions; and
(B) adaptation projects will--
(i) provide long-term enhancements to
national and food security;
(ii) protect lives and livelihoods;
(iii) ensure lasting access to freshwater
resources; or
(iv) advance public health outcomes; and
(3) in the case of a country that is not classified by the
World Bank as having a low-income economy, provides for not
less than 15 percent of the total cost of the plan to be
contributed from the public funds of the country.
(c) Project and Program Requirements.--The Secretary of the
Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall use the
voice, vote, and influence of the United States to ensure that support
from the Fund is used exclusively to support the deployment by
developing countries of clean energy technologies and the development
of projects that improve the resilience capacities and ability of
countries to adapt to the effects of climate change, including, as
appropriate, through the provision of technical support or support for
policy or institutional reforms.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--In addition to the amounts
authorized to be appropriated under section 301(h), there are
authorized to be appropriated for contributions to the Green Climate
Fund--
(1) $4,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2022;
(2) $4,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2023;
(3) $2,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2024; and
(4) $2,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2025.
(e) Report to Congress.--Not later than 240 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of
the Treasury shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report describing--
(1) the purpose of and progress on each project supported
by the Fund; and
(2) how each such project furthers the investment plan
described in subsection (b)(2) of each country in which the
project is implemented.
SEC. 303. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON UNITED STATES ENGAGEMENTS AT THE WORLD
ECONOMIC FORUM.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) In 2020, the World Economic Forum (referred to in this
section as the ``WEF'') in Davos, Switzerland, put addressing
the climate crisis at the top of its agenda. World and business
leaders reinforced the need for urgent action to avoid human
destruction from the clear and present climate crisis.
(2) At the 2020 annual meeting of the WEF, the President,
accompanied by the Secretary of the Treasury, delivered a
contrarian message, claiming, ``To embrace the possibilities of
tomorrow, we must reject the perennial prophets of doom and
their predictions of the apocalypse.''.
(3) Nevertheless, the WEF, without support from the United
States, announced climate initiatives on sustainable markets,
reaching carbon neutrality on insurance investment portfolios,
decarbonizing the automotive sector through circular economies,
and transitioning to healthier, more sustainable food systems.
(4) The one initiative the United States did agree to join
is the Trillion Tree Campaign, which aims to grow, restore, and
conserve 1 trillion trees by 2030.
(5) The President's dismissal of the threat climate change
poses to economic growth and global security has isolated the
United States from the 117 represented countries at the WEF
that support its climate agenda and are accelerating their
national commitments in other international fora to address
climate change.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that at the
2021 WEF, or at an appropriate time and venue as early as possible in
2021--
(1) the Secretary of State should commit to restoring
diplomatic engagement and cooperation on mobilizing investment
and support for growing the global economy while achieving net
zero global greenhouse gas emissions by 2050;
(2) the Secretary of the Treasury should announce--
(A) the intention of the United States Government
to divest from future investment and support for fossil
fuel energy and extraction projects in developing
countries; and
(B) the establishment of an international clean
energy private finance fund to support the development
of large-scale renewable energy projects in middle
income countries;
(3) the Chief Executive Officer of the United States
International Development Finance Corporation should commit
to--
(A) divesting the United States International
Development Finance Corporation from future fossil fuel
energy development and extraction projects; and
(B) investing a significant portion of the annual
portfolio of the United States International
Development Finance Corporation in clean energy
development projects; and
(4) the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development should commit to prioritizing
building resilience and adaption capacities in the most
climate-vulnerable countries.
SEC. 304. CLEAN ENERGY AND THE UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
FINANCE CORPORATION.
(a) In General.--Section 1451 of the Better Utilization of
Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9671) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(j) Clean Energy.--
``(1) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this subsection, the Chief Executive
Officer of the Corporation shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report--
``(A) highlighting the substantial commitment of
the Corporation to invest in renewable and other clean
energy technologies;
``(B) setting forth--
``(i) a plan to significantly reduce
greenhouse gas emissions associated with
projects and subprojects within the
Corporation's portfolio, as required by
paragraph (2); and
``(ii) a plan for facilitating the
transition in key global markets from
electricity generated from fossil fuel power to
clean, low-cost renewable energy sources, in a
manner that is equitable for workers and
communities, as required by paragraph (3); and
``(C) detailing the efforts of the Corporation to
reduce all greenhouse gas emissions associated with
projects and subprojects within the Corporation's
portfolio, including a full accounting of the
reductions, achieved in accordance with the plan
described in paragraph (2).
``(2) Plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.--
``(A) In general.--Not later than one year after
the date of the enactment of this subsection, the
Corporation shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a climate change mitigation
plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions associated with
projects and subprojects within the Corporation's
portfolio by, relative to October 1, 2020--
``(i) not less than 60 percent by 2025; and
``(ii) 100 percent by 2028.
``(B) Implementation.--The Corporation shall begin
implementation of the plan required by subparagraph (A)
not later than 20 days after submitting the plan to the
appropriate congressional committees.
``(C) Report required.--Not later than one year
after the date on which the Corporation begins
implementation under subparagraph (B) of the plan
required by subparagraph (A), and every 2 years
thereafter until the Corporation achieves the goal of
reducing greenhouse gas emissions associated with
projects and subprojects within the Corporation's
portfolio by 100 percent, the Corporation shall submit
a report to the appropriate congressional committees on
the Corporation's progress and efforts to achieve the
greenhouse gas emissions reductions goals of the plan.
``(3) Clean electricity transition.--The Corporation shall
seek, in providing support for projects under title II, to
facilitate the transition in key global markets from
electricity generated from fossil fuel power to clean, low-cost
renewable energy sources, in a manner that is equitable for
workers and communities, by--
``(A) enabling the phase-out of uneconomic coal-
fired power plants that are shielded from competition
from renewable energy sources by noncompetitive market
structures such as long-term contracts and regulated
tariffs;
``(B) using low-cost capital--
``(i) to refinance existing debt on
uneconomic coal-fired power plants;
``(ii) to reinvest in renewable energy
sources to replace such plants;
``(iii) to support a just transition to
renewable energy for affected workers and
communities by generating decent jobs that
adhere to international labor standards all
along the renewable energy supply chain; and
``(iv) to support the upgrading of jobs and
skills as well as job creation and improved
productivity in more labor-intensive industries
that offer employment opportunities on a wide
scale; and
``(C) considering--
``(i) competitive approaches, like reverse
auctions, to ensure the best value in investing
in renewable energy sources; and
``(ii) partnering, as appropriate, with--
``(I) the United States Agency for
International Development; and
``(II) the Department of the
Treasury with respect to efforts by
multilateral development banks (as
defined in section 1701(c) of the
International Financial Institutions
Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c))).''.
(b) Conforming Repeal.--Section 7079(b) of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2010 (Public Law 111-117; 123 Stat. 3396) is
amended by striking ``comment:'' and all that follows and inserting
``comment.''.
SEC. 305. CONSISTENCY IN UNITED STATES POLICY ON DEVELOPMENT FINANCE
AND CLIMATE CHANGE.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the
strength and credibility of United States climate policy is undermined
when there is a lack of consistency between the policies and practices
implemented at the United States International Development Finance
Corporation and the policies and practices the Corporation promotes at
the international financial institutions.
(b) Enhancing Transparency at Multilateral Development Banks.--The
Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States executive
director of each international financial institution to use the voice
and vote of the United States to advocate for enhancing transparency by
providing sufficient and adequate information to facilitate independent
verification of the climate finance reporting of the institution.
(c) Policy Alignment.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct
the United States executive director of each international financial
institution to use the voice and vote of the United States--
(1) to challenge policy-based loans or lending through
financial intermediaries that directly or indirectly supports
fossil fuels; and
(2) to seek to ensure that all loans, grants, policies, and
strategies of the institution are aligned with the objectives
of the Paris Agreement.
(d) Prohibition.--Section 1451 of the Better Utilization of
Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9671), as
amended by section 304, is further amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(k) Consistency in Environmental and Social Policies.--The
Corporation may not adopt any environmental or social policy that
provides less protection for communities and the environment than the
level of protection required under title XIII of the International
Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262m et seq.).''.
(e) International Financial Institution Defined.--In this section,
the term ``international financial institution'' has the meaning given
that term in section 1701(c) of the International Financial
Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)).
TITLE IV--CLEAN ENERGY DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
SEC. 401. ENERGY DIPLOMACY AND SECURITY WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
(a) Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources.--Section
1(c) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C.
2651a(c)) is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following:
``(4) Assistant secretary of state for energy resources.--
``(A) Authorization for assistant secretary.--
Subject to the numerical limitation specified in
paragraph (1), there is authorized to be established in
the Department of State an Assistant Secretary of State
for Energy Resources.
``(B) Personnel.--The Secretary of State, in
collaboration with the Assistant Secretary of State for
Energy Resources, and in accordance with the
authorization under subparagraph (A), shall ensure that
sufficient personnel are dedicated to energy matters
within the Bureau of Energy Resources in order--
``(i) to formulate and implement
international policies, in coordination with
the Secretary of Energy, as appropriate, aimed
at protecting and advancing United States
energy security interests and international
energy development and access to electricity,
in accordance with the United Nation's
sustainable development goals in ways that
ensure responsible development of global energy
resources by effectively managing United States
bilateral and multilateral relations;
``(ii) to ensure that analyses of public
health and national security implications of
global energy and environmental developments
are reflected in the decision-making process
within the Department of State;
``(iii) to incorporate energy security and
clean energy development priorities into the
activities of the Department related to matters
involving global energy development, accounting
for the effects global energy development has
on--
``(I) United States national
security;
``(II) quality of life and public
health of people, households, and
communities, particularly vulnerable
and underserved populations affected
by, or proximate to, energy
development, transmission, and
distribution projects;
``(III) United States economic
interests;
``(IV) emissions of greenhouse
gases that contribute to global climate
change; and
``(V) local and regional land use,
air and water quality, and risks to
public health of communities described
in subclause (II);
``(iv) to coordinate energy activities
within the Department of State and with
relevant Federal departments and agencies;
``(v) to work internationally--
``(I) to support socially and
environmentally responsible development
of energy resources that mitigate
carbon emissions, and the distribution
of such resources for the benefit of
the United States and United States
allies and trading partners for their
energy security, climate security, and
economic development needs;
``(II) to promote--
``(aa) the availability of
clean energy technologies,
including carbon capture and
storage;
``(bb) energy sector
innovation;
``(cc) well-functioning
global markets for clean energy
resources and technologies; and
``(dd) expertise for the
benefit of the United States
and United States allies and
trading partners;
``(III) to resolve international
disputes regarding the exploration,
development, production, or
distribution of energy resources;
``(IV) to support the economic,
security, and commercial interests of
United States persons operating in the
energy markets of foreign countries;
and
``(V) to support and coordinate
international efforts--
``(aa) to alleviate energy
poverty;
``(bb) to protect
vulnerable, exploited, and
underserved populations that
are affected or displaced by
energy development projects;
``(cc) to account for and
mitigate greenhouse gas
emissions from energy
development projects;
``(dd) to promote fair
labor practices, labor
protections for workers, and
training for and access to
good-paying jobs within the
clean energy sector; and
``(ee) to increase access
to clean energy for vulnerable
and underserved communities;
``(vi) to lead the United States commitment
to the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative; and
``(vii) to coordinate energy security and
climate security and other relevant functions
within the Department of State undertaken as of
the date of the enactment of this paragraph
by--
``(I) the Bureau of Economic and
Business Affairs;
``(II) the Bureau of Oceans and
International Environmental and
Scientific Affairs; and
``(III) other offices within the
Department of State.''.
(b) Elimination of Authority for Coordinator for International
Energy Affairs.--Section 931 of the Energy Independence and Security
Act of 2007 (42 U.S.C. 17371) is amended--
(1) by striking subsections (a) and (b); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (c) and (d) as subsections
(a) and (b), respectively.
SEC. 402. DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRIMACY FOR ENERGY DIPLOMACY.
(a) In General.--The Department of State shall have primacy for all
United States diplomatic engagements with regard to international
energy affairs.
(b) Interagency Coordination.--The Secretary of State, as
appropriate, shall coordinate with and use the technical expertise and
resources of the Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Department of the Interior, and other relevant Federal
agencies and departments in the planning and execution of United States
foreign policy goals and objectives related to international energy
affairs.
SEC. 403. REPORTS ON UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN MISSION INNOVATION
AND THE CLEAN ENERGY MINISTERIAL.
(a) Mission Innovation.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a report that details the scope and
nature of United States participation in Mission Innovation,
including--
(1) who in the United States Government serves as the lead
for Mission Innovation;
(2) what objectives the United States has used Mission
Innovation to advance;
(3) what partnerships the United States has established
through Mission Innovation and the date on which any
partnerships the United States brokered were announced;
(4) how the United States has leveraged Mission Innovation
to engage in technology transfer arrangements with foreign
governments;
(5) how the United States has attracted private sector
entities to contribute to and participate in Mission
Innovation;
(6) the total amount of funding provided by the United
States Government to Mission Innovation each year since the
establishment of Mission Innovation; and
(7) the outline of a strategic engagement plan and
objectives for delivering new energy technology innovation
outcomes through Mission Innovation.
(b) Clean Energy Ministerial.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Energy shall submit
to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that details the
scope and nature of United States participation in the Clean Energy
Ministerial, including--
(1) the number of Clean Energy Ministerial meetings that
the Secretary of Energy has participated in;
(2) the diplomatic objectives, including with respect to
energy technologies and private sector entities, that the
United States has aimed to promote within the Clean Energy
Ministerial;
(3) the consensus initiatives, if any, among the chiefs of
party to the Clean Energy Ministerial that the United States
objected to, refused to join, or refrained from contributing to
the development of; and
(4) a plan for restoring United States leadership in using
the Clean Energy Ministerial to promote the development and
deployment of renewable energy and carbon mitigation
technologies from the energy and transportation sectors.
(c) Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In this section, the term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the
Senate;
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives; and
(4) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of
Representatives.
SEC. 404. REDUCED DEFORESTATION.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Administrator.--Except as otherwise expressly provided,
the term ``Administrator'' means the Administrator of the
United States Agency for International Development.
(2) Deforestation.--The term ``deforestation'' means a
change in land use from a forest (including peatlands) to any
other land use.
(3) Developing country.--The term ``developing country''
means a country eligible to receive official development
assistance according to the income guidelines of the
Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development.
(4) Emissions reductions.--The term ``emissions
reductions'' means greenhouse gas emissions reductions achieved
from reduced or avoided deforestation under this section.
(5) Forest.--
(A) In general.--The term ``forest'' means a
terrestrial ecosystem, including wetland forests,
comprised of native tree species generated and
maintained primarily through natural ecological and
evolutionary processes.
(B) Exclusion.--The term ``forest'' does not
include plantations, such as crops of trees planted by
humans primarily for the purposes of harvesting.
(6) Forest degradation.--The term ``forest degradation'' is
any reduction in the carbon stock of a forest due to the
effects of human land-use activities, including such land-use
activities on peatlands.
(7) Human rights defender.--The term ``human rights
defender'' means an individual, group, or association that
peacefully contributes to the effective elimination of all
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms of peoples
and individuals, including in relation to mass, flagrant, or
systematic such violations, such as those resulting from
apartheid, all forms of racial discrimination, colonialism,
foreign domination or occupation, aggression or threats to
national sovereignty, national unity, or territorial integrity,
and the refusal to recognize the right of peoples to self-
determination and the right of every people to exercise full
sovereignty over its wealth and natural resources.
(8) Intact forest.--The term ``intact forest'' means an
unbroken expanse of natural ecosystems within the global extent
of forest cover that--
(A) covers an area of at least 500 square
kilometers and is at least 10 kilometers in each
direction; and
(B) contains forest and non-forest ecosystems
minimally influenced by human economic activity and
large enough that all native biodiversity, including
viable populations of wide-ranging species, could be
maintained.
(9) Leakage.--The term ``leakage'' means the unexpected
loss of anticipated carbon benefits due to the displacement of
activities in a project area to areas outside the project,
resulting in carbon emissions.
(10) Leakage prevention activities.--The term ``leakage
prevention activities'' means activities in developing
countries that are directed at preserving existing forest
carbon stocks, including forested wetlands and peatlands that
might, absent such activities, be lost through leakage.
(11) National deforestation reduction activities.--The term
``national deforestation reduction activities'' means
activities in developing countries that reduce a quantity of
greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation that is calculated
by measuring actual emissions against a national deforestation
baseline established pursuant to subparagraphs (B) and (C) of
subsection (d)(4).
(12) Subnational deforestation and forest degradation
reduction activities.--The term ``subnational deforestation and
forest degradation reduction activities'' means activities in
developing countries that reduce a quantity of greenhouse gas
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation that is
calculated by measuring actual emissions using an appropriate
baseline, or an alternative determined under subsection
(d)(4)(B)(ii), established by the Administrator at the State or
provincial level.
(b) Purposes.--The purposes of this section are to provide United
States assistance to developing countries to develop, implement, and
improve actions that reduce deforestation and forest degradation or
conserve or restore forest ecosystems--
(1) to protect the value of forest ecosystems with respect
to permanent carbon capture and sequestration in a manner in
which such value is measurable, reportable, and verifiable; and
(2) in a manner that--
(A) is consistent with and enhances the
implementation of complementary United States policies
that support the good governance of forests,
biodiversity conservation, and environmentally
sustainable development;
(B) takes into consideration the views and
participation of local communities and most vulnerable
communities and populations (as defined in section
301(a)), particularly forest-dependent communities; and
(C) incorporates the right to free prior and
informed consent of indigenous peoples.
(c) Emissions Reductions Through Reduced Deforestation.--
(1) Establishment of program.--Not later than 1 year after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator, in
consultation with the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the head
of any other appropriate agency, shall establish a program to
provide assistance to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from
deforestation in developing countries, in accordance with this
section.
(2) Objectives.--The objectives of the program established
under paragraph (1) shall be--
(A) to achieve--
(i) emissions reductions of at least
7,000,000,000 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent
in 2025;
(ii) cumulative emissions reductions of at
least 11,000,000,000 tons of carbon dioxide
equivalent by December 31, 2030; and
(iii) additional emissions reductions in
subsequent years;
(B) to build capacity to reduce deforestation at a
national level in developing countries experiencing
deforestation, which may include--
(i) preparing developing countries to
participate in international markets for
international offset credits for reduced
emissions from deforestation; and
(ii) supporting the development of domestic
policy frameworks to ensure effective,
efficient, and equitable benefit-sharing of the
proceeds of such credits issued by national and
subnational governments;
(C) to preserve forest carbon stocks in countries
where such forest carbon may be vulnerable to leakage,
particularly in developing countries with largely
intact native forests;
(D) to build the scientific knowledge and
institutional capacity to help developing countries--
(i) monitor the effects of climate change
on their forests;
(ii) develop and implement strategies to
conserve their forests; and
(iii) support forest-dependent communities
adapt to climate change; and
(E) to the extent practicable, to reduce
deforestation in ways that reduce the vulnerability and
increase the resilience to climate effects for forests
and forest-dependent communities.
(d) Requirements for International Deforestation Reduction
Program.--
(1) Eligible countries.--
(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph
(B), the Administrator may provide assistance under
this section only with respect to a developing country
that--
(i) the Administrator, in consultation with
the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency and the Secretary of
Agriculture, determines--
(I) is experiencing deforestation
or forest degradation; or
(II) has standing forest carbon
stocks that may be at risk of
deforestation or degradation;
(ii) has the legal regimes, standards, and
safeguards to ensure that the rights and
interests of indigenous peoples and forest-
dependent communities are protected in
accordance with the standards established under
paragraph (4); and
(iii) has entered into a bilateral or
multilateral agreement or arrangement with the
United States, or is part of an international
program supported by the United States to
prevent deforestation, that establishes the
conditions of participation by the country in
the program established under this section,
which shall include an agreement to meet the
standards established under paragraph (4) for
the activities to which such standards apply.
(B) Exception.--A developing country that does not
meet the requirement described in paragraph (1)(A)(ii)
may receive assistance under this section for the
purpose of building capacity to meet such requirement.
(2) Authorized activities.--Subject to the requirements of
this section, in providing assistance under this section, the
Administrator may support activities to achieve the objectives
described in subsection (c)(2), including activities such as--
(A) national deforestation reduction activities;
(B) subnational deforestation and forest
degradation reduction activities, including pilot
activities, policies, and measures that reduce
greenhouse gas emissions and are subject to significant
uncertainty;
(C) activities to measure, monitor, and verify
deforestation, avoided deforestation, and rates of
deforestation, including, if applicable, spatially
explicit land use plans that identify intact and
primary forest areas and managed forest areas;
(D) leakage prevention activities;
(E) the development and implementation of
measurement, monitoring, reporting, and verification
capacities and governance structures, including legal
regimes, standards, processes, and safeguards, as
established under paragraph (4), to enable a country to
quantify emissions reductions for purposes of
purchasing or trading subnational emissions reduction
credits in carbon markets;
(F) the identification of, and actions to address,
the drivers of land use emissions;
(G) programs that would exclude from the United
States illegally harvested timber or products made from
illegally harvested timber, in accordance with and
consistent with the objectives of the Lacey Act
Amendments of 1981 (16 U.S.C. 3371 et seq.);
(H) the development and strengthening of governance
capacities to reduce deforestation and other land use
emissions and to combat illegal logging and associated
trade, including the development of systems for
independent monitoring of the efficacy of forest law
enforcement and increased enforcement cooperation,
including joint efforts with Federal agencies, to
enforce the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981 (16 U.S.C.
3371 et seq.);
(I) the provision of incentives for policy reforms
to achieve the objectives described in subsection
(c)(2);
(J) the development of pilot projects--
(i) to examine where mitigation and
adaptation activities in forest ecosystems
coincide; and
(ii) to explore means for enhancing the
resilience of forest ecosystems and forest-
dependent communities;
(K) the promotion of mechanisms to deliver
resources for local action and to address the needs,
rights, interests, and participation of local and
indigenous communities; and
(L) monitoring and evaluation of the results of the
activities conducted under this section.
(3) Mechanisms.--The Administrator shall apply the
administrative authorities under the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), except to the extent
inconsistent with the provisions of this section, to the same
extent and in the same manner as such authorities apply to the
implementation of such Act in order to support activities to
achieve the objectives described in subsection (c)(2) by--
(A) developing and implementing programs and
project-level activities that achieve such objectives;
(B) to the extent practicable, giving priority in
any review process to activities under paragraph
(2)(A); and
(C) as appropriate, considering multi-year funding
arrangements in carrying out the purposes of this
section.
(4) Standards.--The Administrator, in consultation with the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency and the
Secretary of Agriculture, shall establish program standards
that--
(A) ensure that emissions reductions achieved
through supported activities--
(i) are additional, measurable, verifiable,
and monitored;
(ii) account for leakage, uncertainty, and
permanence; and
(iii) at a minimum, meet the standards
established under the emissions unit criteria
of the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme
for International Aviation (CORSIA) developed
by the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO);
(B) require--
(i) the establishment of a national
deforestation baseline for each country with
national deforestation reduction activities
that is used to account for reductions achieved
from such activities; or
(ii) if a developing country has
established policies and taken measures to
reduce emissions from disturbed peatlands,
deforestation, or forest degradation, but has
not established a national baseline, the
provision of a credible, transparent, accurate,
and conservative alternative for quantifying
emissions;
(C) provide that each national deforestation
baseline established under subparagraph (B)(i)--
(i) is national, or subnational on an
interim basis, in scope;
(ii) is consistent with nationally
appropriate mitigation commitments or actions
with respect to deforestation, taking into
consideration--
(I) the average annual historical
deforestation rates of the country
during a period of at least 5 years;
and
(II) the applicable drivers of
deforestation and other factors to
ensure additionality;
(iii) establishes a trajectory that would
result in zero net deforestation by not later
than 20 years after the date on which the
baseline is established;
(iv) is adjusted over time to account for
changing national circumstances; and
(v) is designed to account for all
significant sources of greenhouse gas emissions
from deforestation in the country;
(D) with respect to assistance provided for
activities described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of
paragraph (2), require emissions reductions to be
achieved and verified before the provision of any
assistance under this section;
(E) with respect to accounting for subnational
deforestation and forest degradation reduction
activities that lack the standardized or precise
measurement and monitoring techniques needed for a full
accounting of changes in emissions or baselines, or are
subject to other sources of uncertainty, apply a
conservative discount factor to reflect the uncertainty
regarding the levels of reductions achieved;
(F) ensure that activities under this section are
designed, carried out, and managed--
(i) using forest management practices that,
in an open and transparent process--
(I) improve the livelihoods of
forest communities in a manner that
promotes the maintenance of intact
forests, protects associated
biodiversity, and restores native
forest species and ecosystems while
avoiding the introduction of invasive
nonnative species;
(II) maintain natural biodiversity,
resilience, and carbon storage capacity
of forests;
(III) to the extent practicable, do
not adversely affect the permanence of
forest carbon stocks or emissions
reductions;
(IV) include broad stakeholder
participation and the free prior and
informed consent of affected indigenous
peoples; and
(V) take into account the needs and
interests of local communities, forest-
dependent communities, indigenous
peoples, and vulnerable social groups;
(ii) in consultation with, and with the
full and effective participation of, local
communities, indigenous peoples, and forest-
dependent communities in affected areas, as
partners and primary stakeholders, before and
during the design, planning, implementation,
monitoring, and evaluation of activities; and
(iii) with equitable sharing of profits and
benefits derived from the activities with local
communities, indigenous peoples, and forest-
dependent communities; and
(G) with respect to assistance for all activities
under this section, seek to ensure the establishment
and enforcement of legal regimes, standards, processes,
and safeguards by the country in which the activities
are conducted, as a condition of such assistance or as
a proposed activity for which such assistance may be
provided, which--
(i) protect the rights and interests of
local communities, indigenous peoples, forest-
dependent communities, human rights defenders,
and vulnerable social groups;
(ii) promote consultations with local
communities, indigenous peoples, and forest-
dependent communities in affected areas, as
partners and primary stakeholders, before and
during the design, planning, implementation,
monitoring, and evaluation of activities under
this section; and
(iii) ensure equitable sharing of profits
and benefits from incentives for emissions
reductions or leakage prevention with local
communities, indigenous peoples, and forest-
dependent communities.
(5) Scope.--
(A) Reduced emissions.--The Administrator shall
include reduced emissions from forest degradation and
disturbance of peatlands within the scope of activities
under this section.
(B) Expansion of authorized activities.--If the
Administrator determines, in consultation with the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
and the Secretary of Agriculture, that sufficient
methodologies and technical capacities exist to
measure, monitor, and account for the emissions
referred to in subparagraph (A), the Administrator may
expand the authorized activities under this section, as
appropriate, to include reduced soil carbon-derived
emissions associated with deforestation and degradation
of forested wetlands and peatlands, consistent with a
comprehensive approach to maintaining and enhancing
forests, increasing climate resiliency, reducing
emissions, and increasing removals of greenhouse gases.
(6) Accounting.--The Administrator shall use a publicly
accessible registry to account for and register the emissions
reductions achieved through assistance provided under this
section each year, after appropriately discounting for
uncertainty and other relevant factors as required by the
standards established under paragraph (4).
(7) International deforestation reduction program insurance
account for noncompletion or reversal.--In furtherance of the
objectives described in subsection (c)(2), the Administrator
shall develop and implement a program that--
(A) addresses noncompletion or reversal with
respect to any greenhouse gas emissions that were not,
or are no longer, sequestered; and
(B) may include a mechanism to hold in reserve a
portion of the amount allocated for projects to support
the program.
(8) Extension of assistance.--
(A) In general.--The Administrator may extend, for
an additional 5 years, the period during which
assistance is authorized for activities supported by
assistance under this section, if the Administrator
determines that--
(i) the country in which the activities are
conducted is making substantial progress toward
adopting and implementing a program to achieve
reductions in deforestation measured against a
national baseline;
(ii) the greenhouse gas emissions
reductions achieved as a result of the
activities are not resulting in significant
leakage;
(iii) such greenhouse gas emissions
reductions are being appropriately discounted
to account for any leakage that is occurring;
and
(iv) such extension would further advance
or ensure achievement of the objectives of the
activities.
(B) Assistance for subnational deforestation and
forest degradation reduction activities.--
(i) In general.--If the Administrator
extends the period during which assistance is
authorized for activities under subparagraph
(A), the Administrator shall determine, based
on the criteria specified that subparagraph,
whether such assistance should include
assistance for subnational deforestation and
forest degradation reduction activities.
(ii) Continued assistance.--The
Administrator may extend the period during
which assistance is authorized for subnational
deforestation and forest degradation reduction
activities beyond the 5-year period described
in subparagraph (A) in order to further the
objectives described in subparagraph (B) or (C)
of subsection (c)(2).
(9) Coordination with foreign assistance.--Subject to the
direction of the President, the Administrator shall, to the
extent practicable and consistent with the objectives described
in subsection (c)(2), seek to align activities under this
section with broader development, poverty alleviation, or
natural resource management objectives and initiatives in
countries receiving assistance under this section.
(10) Assistance as supplement.--The provision of assistance
for activities under this section shall be used to supplement,
and not to supplant, any other Federal, State, or local support
available to carry out activities under this section.
(11) Funding limitation.--Of the funds made available to
carry out this section in any fiscal year, not more than 7
percent may be used for the administrative expenses of the
United States Agency for International Development in support
of activities described in paragraph (2). Such amount shall be
in addition to other amounts otherwise available for such
purposes.
(12) Indonesia.--Not less than 10 percent of the funds made
available in any fiscal year to carry out this section shall be
used for activities described in paragraph (2) in Indonesia.
(e) Legal Effect.--
(1) In general.--Nothing in this section may be construed
to supersede, limit, or otherwise affect any restriction
imposed by Federal law (including regulations) on any
interaction between an entity located in the United States and
an entity located in a foreign country.
(2) Role of the secretary of state.--Nothing in this
section may be construed to affect the role of the Secretary of
State or the responsibilities of the Secretary under section
622(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2382(c)).
(f) International Financial Institutions.--The President shall
direct the United States representatives to the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund, and other international financial
institutions (as defined in section 1701(c) of the International
Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c))) to prioritize efforts
to combat deforestation.
TITLE V--BILATERAL AND REGIONAL MULTILATERAL CLIMATE DIPLOMACY AND
COOPERATION
SEC. 501. NORTH AMERICAN STRATEGY.
(a) In General.--The President shall develop a strategy to seek
opportunities for trilateral cooperation between the United States,
Mexico, and Canada--
(1) to support increased ambition on reducing greenhouse
gas emissions among these countries; and
(2) to advance collaboration on the development and
promotion of shared climate action goals and interests within
multilateral bodies and conferences, including aligning, to the
extent possible, the voices, votes, and influence, consistent
with the broad foreign policy goals of the United States, to
address issues related to climate change and clean energy
development.
(b) Elements and Priorities.--The strategy described in subsection
(a) shall include efforts--
(1) to ensure that potential projects and investments
pursued under the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement--
(A) are compatible with long-term climate goals and
the collective targets established under the Paris
Agreement; and
(B) meet all environmental and social
responsibility standards required under the USMCA;
(2) to explore shared and common interests and cooperative
actions to promote clean energy development, climate security,
and climate change mitigation strategies within institutions
(such as the UNFCCC, the Montreal Protocol, the Green Climate
Fund, the Group of Twenty and the United Nations) with
programs, initiatives and actions to address the climate crisis
that may include--
(A) providing support in developing mid-century
low-carbon strategies;
(B) extending coal finance restrictions to coal
mining operations; and
(C) strengthening and expanding carbon pricing by--
(i) considering the cost of carbon in long-
term decision making;
(ii) supporting the development of national
or subnational systems;
(iii) sharing technical expertise; and
(iv) making efforts to align pricing
instruments where feasible;
(3) to commit to a methane reduction goal and cooperate to
reduce black carbon and to recommit to the formal agreement
reached at the June 2016 North American Leaders Summit in
Ottawa to reduce methane emissions from the oil and gas sector
by 40 to 45 percent by 2025, and to work to develop a new, more
ambitious target for 2030;
(4) to develop and implement a North American strategy for
sustainable transportation--
(A) to encourage State and provincial leaders to
negotiate interstate and interprovincial sustainable
transportation agreements between Mexican, American,
and Canadian jurisdictions;
(B) to expand the West Coast Electric Highway
between Canada, the United States, and Mexico; and
(C) to work with automakers to standardize charging
infrastructure;
(5) to develop and implement coordinated forest and land
use strategies to further contribute to emissions mitigation
through the adoption of practices and policies that increase
carbon sequestration in new and existing forests and reduce
emissions from forest conversion to other land uses;
(6) to strengthen resilience and equity among low-income
and indigenous communities; and
(7) to engage international partners in an existing
multilateral forum or, if necessary, establish a new
multilateral forum to improve global cooperation by--
(A) encouraging the adoption of an emissions
reduction target by the International Maritime
Organization; and
(B) collaborating with the International Civil
Aviation Organization to establish a market-based
measure to reduce aviation emissions.
SEC. 502. ACCOUNTABILITY AND COOPERATION WITH CHINA.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) successful mitigation of global greenhouse gas
emissions to sufficiently avoid the worst forecasted effects of
climate change requires global cooperation and coordination of
efforts;
(2) all other countries look towards the United States and
China, as the world's largest emitters and largest economies,
for leadership by example to effectively mitigate greenhouse
gas emissions, develop and deploy energy generation
technologies, and integrate sustainable adaptation solutions to
the inevitable effects of climate change;
(3) given the volume of China's greenhouse gas emissions
and the scientific imperative to swiftly reduce global
greenhouse gas emissions to net-zero emissions around 2050,
China should--
(A) revise its long-term pledge;
(B) seek to immediately peak its emissions;
(C) begin reducing its greenhouse gas emissions
significantly to meet a more ambitious long-term 2050
reductions target; and
(D) update its nationally determined contribution
along a trajectory that aligns with achieving a more
ambitious net-zero by 2050 emissions target;
(4) it is in the United States national interest to
prioritize climate change in its bilateral engagement with
China, as global climate risks cannot be mitigated without a
significant reduction in Chinese domestic and overseas
emissions;
(5) the United States and China, to the extent practicable,
should coordinate on making and delivering ambitious pledges to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with aspirations towards
achieving net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050;
(6) the United States and its allies should work together,
using diplomatic and economic tools, to hold China accountable
for any failure by China--
(A) to increase ambition in its 2030 nationally
determined contribution, in line with net zero
greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 before the 26th
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC scheduled for
November 2021 and meeting a more ambitious nationally
determined contribution;
(B) to work faithfully to uphold the principles,
goals, and rules of the Paris Agreement;
(C) to avoid and prohibit efforts to undermine or
devolve the Paris Agreement's rule or underlying
framework, particularly within areas of accountability
transparency, and shared responsibility among all
parties;
(D) to eliminate greenhouse gas intensive projects
from China's Belt and Road Initiative and other
overseas investments, including--
(i) working with allies and partners of the
United States to eliminate support for coal
power production projects in China's Belt and
Road Initiative;
(ii) providing financing and project
support for cleaner and less risky
alternatives; and
(iii) undertaking ``parallel initiatives''
to enhance capacity building programs and
overseas sustainable investment criteria,
including in areas such as integrated energy
planning, power sector reform, just transition,
distributed generation, procurement,
transparency, and standards to support low-
emissions growth in developing countries; and
(E) to phase out existing coal power plants and
reduce net coal power production;
(7) the United States should pursue confidence-building
opportunities for the United States and China to undertake
``parallel initiatives'' on clean energy research, development,
finance, and deployment, including through economic and
stimulus measures with clear, mutually agreed upon rules and
policies to protect intellectual property, ensure equitable,
nonpunitive provision of support, and verify implementation,
which would provide catalytic progress towards delivering a
global clean energy transformation that benefits all people;
and
(8) the United States should pursue cooperative initiatives
to shift toward the import and consummation of forest and
agricultural commodities that are produced in a manner that
does not contribute to deforestation.
SEC. 503. UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN UNION COOPERATION ON CLIMATE
FINANCE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.
(a) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is--
(1) to restore the historic alliance between the United
States and countries of the European Union on climate action;
and
(2) to renew the United States commitment to advancing
global cooperation on addressing climate change and achieving
the goals of the Paris Agreement.
(b) Sense of Congress Regarding the United States-European Union
Security and Development Dialogue.--It is the sense of Congress that
the United States should restart the United States-European Union
Security and Development Dialogue to focus specifically on climate
action, climate security, and clean energy cooperation, including--
(1) partnering and formulating strategies to counter
efforts to weaken or change critical elements of the
implementation of the Paris Agreement that would disadvantage
the United States or the European Union;
(2) building coalitions of like-minded parties committed to
achieving large reductions in greenhouse gas emissions under
the Paris Agreement and putting pressure on all parties to do
the same;
(3) coordination on joint strategies to promote climate
action by the People's Republic of China, and deter Chinese
domestic and international investment in high carbon
infrastructure;
(4) finding opportunities to engage and facilitate private
sector collaboration regarding clean energy and innovations on
greenhouse gas emissions reductions;
(5) exploring the creation of United States-European Union
clean energy and climate adaptation, development, and finance
mechanisms to support and leverage private sector investment in
projects and activities to improve developing countries'
resilience capacities, ability to adapt and thrive in the face
of the effects of climate change and clean energy development;
(6) scientific research, modeling, forecasting, and data
collaboration to improve global understanding and preparation
for the compounding effects of climate change; and
(7) intelligence sharing.
(c) Development Finance Cooperation.--
(1) In general.--The President should seek opportunities to
partner with European Development Finance Institutions to
develop financing tools based on shared development finance
criteria and mechanisms to support investments in developing
countries that support low carbon economic development and
promote climate change resiliency and adaptation.
(2) Partnership fund.--The Chief Executive Officer of the
United States International Development Finance Corporation
should partner with the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development to create a fund or multilateral financing
mechanism to support clean energy development and climate
change adaptation and resilience activities in developing
countries.
(3) Response to the people's republic of china's belt and
road initiative.--The President shall work with European
counterparts to establish a formal United States-European
Commission Working Group to develop a comprehensive strategy to
respond to the Belt and Road Initiative established by the
Government of the People's Republic of China. United States
participants in this proposed working group shall seek to
integrate existing efforts into the strategy, including--
(A) the European Union Strategy on Connecting
Europe and Asia;
(B) the Three Seas Initiative;
(C) the Blue Dot Network among the United States,
Japan, and Australia;
(D) a European Union-Japan initiative that has
leveraged $65,000,000,000 for infrastructure projects
and emphasizes transparency standards; and
(E) efforts to address the Government of the
People's Republic of China's use of the United Nations
to advance the Belt and Road Initiative, including the
proliferation of memoranda of understanding between the
People's Republic of China and United Nations funds and
programs on the implementation of the Belt and Road
Initiative.
(4) Co-financing of infrastructure projects.--
(A) Authorization of appropriations.--Subject to
subparagraph (B), there are authorized to be
appropriated such sums as may be necessary to co-
finance infrastructure projects that could otherwise be
included within China's Belt and Road Initiative.
(B) Conditions.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to
subparagraph (A) may not be expended unless--
(i) the United States can leverage existing
and future projects that have entered into
contracts with the Belt and Road Initiative to
further promote transparency and debt
sustainability; and
(ii) the projects to be financed--
(I) promote the public good;
(II) will not promote the use of
fossil fuels; and
(III) will have substantially lower
greenhouse gas intensity than the
proposed Belt and Road Initiative
alternative.
(d) Support for Eastern European Democracy Act.--Section 2 of the
Support for Eastern European Democracy Act (22 U.S.C. 5401) is
amended--
(1) in subsection (b)(2)--
(A) in subparagraph (H), by striking ``and'' at the
end;
(B) in subparagraph (I), by adding ``and'' at the
end; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
``(J) helping workers and communities in countries
most dependent on fossil fuel energy that may be
vulnerable to socioeconomic changes due to the European
Union's transition to net zero greenhouse gas
emissions.''; and
(2) in subsection (c), by adding at the end the following:
``(26) Just transition assistance.--Assistance to support
workers and communities in countries most dependent on fossil
fuel energy and most vulnerable to socioeconomic changes due to
the European Union's transition to net zero greenhouse gas
emissions.''.
SEC. 504. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CLEAN ENERGY COOPERATION WITH INDIA.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States should support efforts to strengthen
India's resilience capacities that ensure people, households,
communities, institutions, and systems can assess, anticipate,
prevent, adapt to, cope with, and recover from shocks and
stresses associated with the effects of climate change;
(2) the United States, through the Bureau of Energy
Resources of the Department of State, the United States Agency
for International Development, the United States International
Development Finance Corporation, the Department of Energy, the
Export-Import Bank of the United States, and the International
Trade Administration, should encourage private sector
investment in, and financing for, the development and
deployment of clean energy and climate mitigation technologies
in India;
(3) robust cooperation between the United States and India
to develop and deploy clean energy technologies, including
private sector cooperation, should be a top bilateral energy
diplomacy priority and the top priority in the countries'
energy diplomacy and should include--
(A) clean energy;
(B) electric vehicles and expansive charging
station networks;
(C) next-generation refrigeration equipment and
refrigerants; and
(D) other technologies and chemicals that are in
the interest of United States industry leaders in the
refrigeration and chemical coolant industries that are
compliant with the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal
Protocol;
(4) the collaboration between the United States and India
on the development and deployment of clean energy technologies
has resulted in innovative new technologies that have helped
significantly lower the carbon emissions of the power sector in
India; and
(5) since demand for energy in India will increase with the
expansion of the economy and middle class of India, it is in
the interest of United States national security and global
security for the United States to support India in growing the
energy sector of India in environmentally and socially
responsible ways that mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and
improve the climate security of India.
SEC. 505. POWER AFRICA.
The Electrify Africa Act of 2015 (Public Law 114-121; 22 U.S.C.
2293 note) is amended--
(1) in section 3--
(A) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``mitigate and
lower carbon emissions from energy production,'' after
``development,'';
(B) in paragraph (7), by adding ``and'' at the end;
(C) by striking paragraph (8); and
(D) by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph
(8);
(2) in section 4--
(A) in subsection (a)--
(i) in paragraph (1), by striking ``an
appropriate mix of power solutions to provide
access to sufficient reliable, affordable, and
sustainable power in order to reduce poverty''
and inserting ``power solutions to provide
access to sufficient, reliable, affordable, and
sustainable power in order to reduce poverty
and energy sector carbon emissions''; and
(ii) in paragraph (2), by striking ``and
technological'' and inserting ``, advances a
country's mitigation commitments (or
conditional mitigation commitments) in
accordance with a country's nationally
determined contribution, and supports
technological''; and
(B) in subsection (b)--
(i) in paragraph (2)--
(I) in subparagraph (F), by
striking ``and'' at the end;
(II) in subparagraph (G), by
striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(III) by adding at the end the
following:
``(H) reduce carbon emissions from the energy
sector.''; and
(ii) in paragraph (4), by striking ``the
use of a broad power mix, including fossil fuel
and'';
(3) in section 5--
(A) in subsection (a)--
(i) in paragraph (6), by striking ``and''
at the end;
(ii) by redesignating paragraph (7) as
paragraph (8); and
(iii) by inserting after paragraph (6) the
following:
``(7) deploying renewable energy; and''; and
(B) by amending subsection (d) to read as follows:
``(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $750,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2021, 2022,
2023, 2024, and 2025 to provide assistance in accordance with
subsection (a) and section 3.'';
(4) in section 7(a)--
(A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by
inserting ``and every 2 years thereafter,'' after
``Act,''; and
(B) in paragraph (1), by striking ``power
generation'' each place such term appears and inserting
``renewable energy generation''; and
(5) by adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 8. COORDINATOR FOR POWER AFRICA.
``(a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of the United States Climate Leadership in International
Mitigation, Adaptation, and Technology Enhancement Act of 2021, the
Administrator for the United States Agency for International
Development, under the direction of the Secretary of State, shall
appoint a Coordinator for Power Africa, who shall serve in the Bureau
Economic Growth, Education, and the Environment of the United States
Agency for International Development.
``(b) Duties.--The Coordinator for Power Africa shall--
``(1) be primarily located at a mission in sub-Saharan
Africa;
``(2) lead--
``(A) the execution of the Power Africa Initiative
in accordance with the purpose and policies set forth
in sections 2 and 3; and
``(B) the development and execution of the strategy
established under section 4;
``(3) coordinate the Interagency Working Group established
under section 4(c);
``(4) manage the funding appropriated for the Power Africa
Initiative by Congress; and
``(5) execute the directives described in sections 5 and
6.''.
SEC. 506. CARIBBEAN ENERGY INITIATIVE.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The countries of the Caribbean are heavily reliant upon
imported oil to provide for approximately 90 percent of their
energy production.
(2) The level of dependence is even higher including--
(A) Jamaica, which relies on oil for 95.9 percent
of its electricity;
(B) Barbados, which relies on oil for 96 percent of
its electricity;
(C) The Virgin Islands, which relies on oil for
nearly 100 percent of its electricity; and
(D) St. Lucia, which relies on oil for 100 percent
of its electricity.
(3) Overreliance on imported fossil fuels has had a
detrimental effect on economic development, growth, and
competitiveness in the Caribbean.
(4) Since 1970, more than 80 percent of Caribbean coral
reefs have been lost due to coastal development and pollution.
Soot particulates and climate change caused by burning fossil
fuels have seriously damaged coral reefs, which are a
significant source of tourism dollars, fishing, biodiversity,
and natural beauty.
(5) Air pollution caused by burning oil for electricity--
(A) has serious health impacts in the form of
higher rates of asthma and other lung ailments; and
(B) can also exacerbate climate change.
(6) The Caribbean region is particularly vulnerable to sea
level rise and stronger storms.
(7) Between 2005 and 2018, the dependence of the countries
of the Caribbean on oil was perpetuated by the Venezuelan-led
Petrocaribe oil alliance, which--
(A) offered preferential terms for oil sales; and
(B) supplies some countries with up to 40 percent
of their energy production needs.
(8) The ongoing domestic economic crisis and political
turmoil in Venezuela has forced the Government of Venezuela to
retract its commitments to the Petrocaribe oil alliance and
step away as a regional power. Only Cuba still receives
preferential Petrocaribe pricing on fuel exports from
Venezuela, while other Petrocaribe member countries are
experiencing a destabilized flow of oil.
(9) China has spent more than $244,000,000,000 on energy
projects worldwide since 2000, 25 percent of which was spent in
Latin America and the Caribbean. Although the majority of this
spending was for oil, gas, and coal, China has also been the
largest investor in clean energy globally for almost a decade.
(10) The World Bank estimates that the Caribbean will need
$12,000,000,000 in power investments through 2035.
(11) Renewable energy technology costs have decreased
dramatically in recent years, offering a more viable economic
alternative for energy production. Solar energy prices have
fallen by 80 percent since 2008, causing significant market
growth, and according to data released by the International
Renewable Energy Agency, \1/3\ of global power capacity is
based in renewable energy.
(12) In 2016, the International Monetary Fund estimated
that transportation accounted for 36 percent of the total
primary energy consumed in the Caribbean subregion.
(13) According to the United Nations Environment Programme,
Latin America and the Caribbean could achieve annual savings of
$621,000,000,000 and a reduction of 1,100,000,000 tons of
CO<INF>2</INF> by 2050 if the region's energy and transport
sectors reach net zero emissions.
(14) The Caribbean has an abundance of onshore and offshore
resources needed for renewable energy, including sun, wind,
geothermal, and some hydropower production capacity.
(15) The United States Government is deeply engaged in
providing technical and policy assistance to countries of the
Caribbean on energy issues through--
(A) the Energy and Climate Partnership of the
Americas;
(B) Connecting the Americas 2022; and
(C) bilateral assistance programs.
(16) On February 19, 2014, at the North American Leaders'
Summit, President Barack Obama, Prime Minister Stephen Harper
of Canada, and President Enrique Pena Nieto of Mexico
reaffirmed their commitment to bring affordable, reliable, and
increasingly renewable power to the Caribbean, while opening
wider markets for clean energy and green technology.
(17) On June 19, 2015, President Barack Obama announced the
Caribbean Energy Security Initiative, which would partner with
individual countries--
(A) to transform its energy sector;
(B) to work to increase access to finance, good
governance, and diversification; and
(C) to maximize the impact of existing donor
effects.
(18) On May 4, 2016, at the United States-Caribbean-Central
American Energy Summit, the energy security task force formally
launched the Caribbean Sustainable Energy Roadmap and Strategy
(C-SERMS) as a mechanism to manage regional coordination and
action on energy security and agreed to expand the regional
market and transmission system.
(19) The United States has an important opportunity--
(A) to deepen this engagement;
(B) to work as a partner with Caribbean countries
on a more regional and coordinated basis;
(C) to help ease the region's dependence on
imported oil; and
(D) to promote affordable alternative sources of
energy.
(b) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Caribbean countries.--The term ``Caribbean countries''
means countries in the Caribbean region, but does not including
Cuba or Venezuela.
(2) Caribbean governments.--The term ``Caribbean
governments'' means the national governments of the Caribbean
countries.
(c) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to help
Caribbean countries--
(1) achieve greater energy security and improve domestic
energy resource mobilization;
(2) lower their dependence on imported fuels;
(3) eliminate the use of diesel, heavy fuel oil, other
petroleum products, and coal for the generation of electricity;
(4) increase production of renewable energy; and
(5) meet the greenhouse gas mitigation goals of their
national determined contributions to the Paris Agreement.
(d) Strategy.--
(1) Submission.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit
a multi-year strategy to the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives that describes how the Department of State will
promote regional cooperation with Caribbean countries--
(A) to lower dependence on imported fuels, grow
domestic clean energy production in the region,
strengthen regional energy security, and lower energy
sector greenhouse gas emissions;
(B) to decrease dependence on oil in the
transportation sector;
(C) to increase energy efficiency, energy
conservation, and investment in alternatives to
imported fuels;
(D) to improve grid reliability and modernize
electricity transmission networks;
(E) to advance deployment of innovative solutions
to expand community and individuals' access to
electricity;
(F) to help reform energy markets to encourage good
regulatory governance and to promote a climate of
private sector investment; and
(G) to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions from the
energy and transportation sector.
(2) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a)
shall include--
(A) a thorough review and inventory of United
States Government activities that are being carried out
bilaterally, regionally, and in coordination with
multilateral institutions--
(i) to promote energy and climate security
in the Caribbean region; and
(ii) to reduce the region's reliance on oil
for electricity generation;
(B) opportunities for marshaling regional
cooperation--
(i) to overcome market barriers resulting
from the small size of Caribbean energy
markets;
(ii) to address the high transportation and
infrastructure costs faced by Caribbean
countries;
(iii) to ensure greater donor coordination
between governments, multilateral institutions,
multilateral banks, and private investors; and
(iv) to expand regional financing
opportunities to allow for lower cost energy
entrepreneurship;
(C) measures to ensure that each Caribbean
government has--
(i) an independent utility regulator or
equivalent;
(ii) affordable access by third-party
investors to its electrical grid with minimal
regulatory interference;
(iii) effective energy efficiency and
energy conservation;
(iv) programs to address technical and
nontechnical issues;
(v) a plan to eliminate major market
distortions;
(vi) cost-reflective tariffs; and
(vii) no tariffs or other taxes on clean
energy solutions; and
(D) recommendations for how United States policy,
technical, and economic assistance can be used in the
Caribbean region--
(i) to advance renewable energy development
and the incorporation of renewable technologies
into existing energy grids and the development
and deployment of micro-grids where appropriate
and feasible to boost energy security and
reliability, particularly to underserved
communities;
(ii) to increase the generation of clean
energy sufficiently to replace and allow for
the retirement of obsolete fossil fuel energy
generation units in Caribbean countries;
(iii) to create regional financing
opportunities to allow for lower cost energy
entrepreneurship;
(iv) to deploy transaction advisors in the
region to help attract private investment and
break down any market or regulatory barriers;
and
(v) to establish a mechanism for each host
government to have access to independent legal
advice--
(I) to speed the development of
energy-related contracts; and
(II) to better protect the
interests of Caribbean governments and
citizens.
(3) Consultation.--In devising the strategy under this
subsection, the Secretary of State shall work with the
Secretary of Energy and shall consult with--
(A) the Secretary of the Interior;
(B) the Secretary of Commerce;
(C) the Secretary of the Treasury;
(D) the Board of Directors of the Export-Import
Bank of the United States;
(E) the Board of Directors of the Development
Finance Corporation;
(F) the Administrator of the United States Agency
for International Development;
(G) the Caribbean governments;
(H) the Inter-American Development Bank;
(I) the World Bank Group; and
(J) the Caribbean Electric Utility Services
Corporation.
SEC. 507. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CONSERVATION OF THE AMAZON RIVER BASIN.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Amazon River basin and the Amazon rainforest, often
referred to as Amazonia--
(A) covers more than 2,670,000 square miles in
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, French Guiana,
Guyana, Peru, Suriname, and Venezuela; and
(B) is home to more species of plants and animals
than any other terrestrial ecosystem on the planet,
housing nearly 30 percent of the world's species, which
apart from their intrinsic value as living organisms,
have potential value in the form of medicine, research,
textiles, food, and other products for the region's
population.
(2) Tens of millions of people depend on services afforded
by the Amazon forest, including--
(A) the use of rivers for transportation;
(B) reliance on logging and collection of non-
timber forest products as major industries for
employment; and
(C) the cultivation of nutrients in floodplain
areas for agriculture and areas for which the Amazon
Basin is a watershed.
(3) The Amazon River has long been recognized as an
important repository of biodiversity and natural resources, not
only for local peoples and indigenous communities, but also for
the rest of the world due to--
(A) its fresh water, which provides countless
services for humans in the form of water agriculture,
transportation, and food and serves as an important
habitat for countless species, including over 2,500
species of fish and river dolphins;
(B) its medicinal plants, which are continually
used by local peoples to treat traditional diseases,
including malaria (one of the most lethal diseases in
the tropics), and which constitute 70 percent of the
plant species in the world found to have anti-cancer
properties;
(C) its important role as an oxygen source,
producing 20 percent of the Earth's oxygen and earning
the Amazon forest the nickname ``lungs of our Earth''
for its role in taking in enormous amounts of the
carbon dioxide emitted by human activity and the
burning of fossil fuels and replacing it with the
oxygen we breathe through the process of
photosynthesis;
(D) its food supply, which is associated with
rainforests, including coffee, rice, chocolate,
tomatoes, potatoes, bananas, black pepper, pineapples,
and corn;
(E) its role in climate control caused by its
exchange of enormous quantities of water and energy
with the surrounding atmosphere, which is estimated as
being responsible for creating 75 percent of its own
rainfall, which feeds the nearby rivers through
evapotranspiration before flowing directly into the
ocean and influencing the currents that impact the
climate; and
(F) ecotourism, which produces annual profits of
more than $11,600,000, which benefits the local
economy, enhances the quality of living through
securing more jobs, and educates global citizens
regarding the importance of maintaining the world's
natural spaces.
(4) Public opinion research, conducted by the Brazilian
polling firm Datafolha in 2020, found that--
(A) 87 percent of the respondents felt strongly
that conservation of the Amazon is very important;
(B) 73 percent of the respondents are concerned
with the rate of increased deforestation in the Amazon
basin;
(C) 77 percent of the respondents believed strongly
that the conduct and policies of the ministries
responsible for management and conservation of the
Amazon have contributed to deforestation in the Amazon;
(D) 92.5 percent of the respondents believe Brazil
should prioritize the pursuit of economic activities in
the Amazon basin that do not contribute to
deforestation; and
(E) only 5.6 percent of the respondents think that
forests need to be cut down to promote economic growth
in the region.
(5) The recent 8,850 square kilometer reduction of the
Amazon forest, exacerbated by climate change, has resulted in a
significant decrease in the ample benefits described in
paragraph (3), in addition to the displacement of many
indigenous peoples due to the lessened economic opportunity.
(6) Clear cutting has disrupted the habitat for plants and
animals in the region, fracturing the fragile forest ecology by
causing species to migrate and sometimes disappear.
(7) As of September 2020, Brazil's National Institute for
Space Research reported that 45,067 fires have burned in the
Amazon River basin and more than 63,000 fires have burned in
all of Brazil in 2020.
(8) The removal of trees from the Amazon River basin has
decreased water and nutrient uptake, while increasing runoff
with greater loads of both nitrogen and phosphorus
concentrations, deteriorating the quality of fresh water, and
putting the environment at greater risk for disasters like
flooding and landslides.
(9) The Government of Brazil has historically recognized
the negative repercussions of deforestation via processes like
clear cutting, which had facilitated Brazil's establishment and
maintenance of numerous successful conservation policies and
payments for environmental service programs, such as--
(A) Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
Forest Degradation projects, such as the Juma project
in Amazonas and the Surui project in Acre and
subnational-scale program in Acre and Mato Grosso,
which seek to reduce global warming by stopping
emissions related to deforestation;
(B) jurisdictional programs involving the
collaboration of several groups, including farmers,
government officials, businesses, and nongovernmental
organizations, to achieve consensus on sustainability
milestones;
(C) the Amazon Fund, which is primarily funded by
the Government of Norway to implement payments for
forest conservation activities; and
(D) the Bolsa Floresta program in the Brazilian
state of Amazonas, which pays landowners and
communities to help protect forest areas.
(10) United States and multilateral cooperation efforts to
protect and restore the Amazon have yielded significant
beneficial impacts, such as--
(A) the reduction of deforestation by more than 80
percent; and
(B) the World Bank's establishment of more than 25
percent of the areas protected from correspondence.
(11) The UNESCO World Heritage site verifies the importance
of the Amazon River basin being one of the richest areas in the
planet in terms of biodiversity, ecological and biological
processes. Deforestation and potential new policies could
harmfully limit its natural resources if their benefits are not
taken into serious consideration.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the President should--
(A) engage with the Government of Brazil, through
bilateral and multilateral efforts, on its Amazon
development and deforestation policies, in support of
the Brazilian people's and the private sector's
interest in conserving the Amazon rainforest;
(B) promote stewardship and conservation policies
that support sustainable economic growth activities in
the Amazon River basin;
(C) consider the Government of Brazil's management
and land use conversion of the Amazon River basin
policies when assessing, negotiating, or developing new
bilateral agreements with Brazil, including trade
agreements, or engaging in relevant international
forums;
(D) in the spirit of Brazil's leadership hosting
the 1992 Rio Summit, which led to the establishment of
the UNFCCC, urge the Government of Brazil to enhance
the ambition of Brazil's efforts to mitigate greenhouse
gas emissions; and
(E) encourage the Government of Brazil, through
bilateral and multilateral efforts, to immediately work
proactively to address climate change and to promote
low carbon and sustainable economic development;
(2) the United States Ambassador to Brazil should
immediately engage with the Government of Brazil to support
improvements to stewardship efforts of the Amazon rainforest
and to assist with urgent efforts to combat fires burning
across the Amazon River basin by--
(A) amplifying the Brazilian people's concerns--
(i) about climate change and seeking
opportunities for cooperative climate action
through the United States-Brazil bilateral
relationship; and
(ii) with Brazil's management and land use
conversion policies affecting the Amazon River
basin;
(B) reinforcing United States support for the
important role civil society is playing to keep the
public informed about the importance of Amazon
conservation, particularly as it relates to regulating
carbon in the Earth's atmosphere; and
(C) offering support for efforts to combat fires in
the Amazon River basin that are exacerbating Brazil's
environmental crisis; and
(3) the Secretary of the Treasury should provide financial
and technical assistance to combat wildfires burning across the
Brazil, including in the Amazon River basin.
(c) Policy Statement.--The Secretary of State shall elevate
bilateral engagements around cooperation and peer-to-peer
accountability on Brazil's climate action commitments by--
(1) supporting the efforts of the Government of Brazil to
increase sustainable development of the Amazon region,
including by strengthening environmental enforcement and ending
illegal deforestation;
(2) encouraging the Government of Brazil to enforce its
conservation laws, which include--
(A) restoring the responsibility of managing
indigenous reserves and the demarcation of lands back
to indigenous peoples;
(B) deescalating violence against indigenous
peoples, prosecuting individuals and entities that
threaten or harm indigenous peoples or communities, and
maintain the National Indian Foundation;
(C) addressing activities that increase
deforestation rates in the Amazon basin, which
include--
(i) curtailing indigenous people's land
rights; and
(ii) unsustainable cattle ranching, soy
bean farming, mining, hydropower dam
construction, and highway construction
activities;
(D) threatening to degrade Brazil's carbon
emissions reductions commitments that are heavily based
upon the conservation of Brazil's rainforests; and
(E) addressing challenges for civil society to
operate, oversee, and advocate for the continued
conservation and restoration of the Amazon River basin;
(3) encouraging, to the maximum extent practicable, the
Government of Brazil to develop and deliver ambitious pledges
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions under the Paris Agreement,
while holding Brazil accountable for delivering on its
commitments;
(4) supporting the voice of Brazilian civil society and the
role civil society plays in advancing civil society's efforts
to protect Brazil's natural resources and helping ensure civil
society's abilities to operate, oversee, and advocate for the
continued conservation and restoration of the Amazon River
basin;
(5) advancing the rights and protections of indigenous
peoples whose communities, well-being, and opportunities for
economic growth are frequently put at risk by deforestation,
extractive industries, commercial scale agriculture, and
hydropower dam construction;
(6) listening to and engaging with the people of Brazil on
their country's commitments to advancing conservation efforts
in the Amazon River basin that allow for sustainable economic
growth, while protecting the Amazon rainforest and Amazon River
basin's important and unique resources despite the proposed
changes;
(7) renewing support for programs that support Amazonian
nations, civil society, and local leaders, including indigenous
communities, in maintaining critically important conservation
efforts to protect and restore the Amazon River basin
ecosystem; and
(8) supporting efforts by subnational governments and the
private sector to advance sustainable development and reduce
deforestation in the Amazon region.
SEC. 508. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING RENEWABLE ENERGY IN INDONESIA.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) cooperation on the development and deployment of
renewable energy technologies should be a priority in relations
between the United States and Indonesia and the top priority in
the countries' energy diplomacy;
(2) it is in the interest of United States to support the
growth of Indonesia's renewable energy sector in
environmentally and socially responsible ways that--
(A) reduce reliance on fossil fuels in ways that do
not increase pressure on the land sector or increase
land-based emissions;
(B) mitigate greenhouse gas emissions;
(C) provide economic opportunities; and
(D) improve the climate security of Indonesia;
(3) the United States, through the Bureau of Energy
Resources of the Department of State, the United States
International Development Finance Corporation, the Department
of Energy, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the
International Trade Administration, and the United States
Agency for International Development, should encourage private
sector investment in and financing for the development and
deployment of renewable power sources in Indonesia;
(4) the United States should--
(A) support and encourage Indonesia to pursue
ambitious growth from solar and wind sources of energy
generation; and
(B) provide technical assistance to the Government
of Indonesia and subnational authorities on regulatory
reforms and addressing other barriers to deployment of
renewable energy; and
(5) it is in the interest of United States refrigeration
and refrigerant production industries to help serve Indonesia's
increased demand for refrigeration and air conditioning, and
the adoption of the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol,
is driving innovation and investments in next-generation
refrigeration equipment and refrigerants in Indonesia.
TITLE VI--WOMEN AND CLIMATE CHANGE ACT
SEC. 601. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Women and Climate Change Act''.
SEC. 602. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Women in the United States and around the world are--
(A) the linchpin of families and communities; and
(B) often the first to feel the immediate and
adverse effects of social, environmental, and economic
stresses on their families and communities.
(2) The United Nations has recognized, as a central
organizing principle for its work, that ``no enduring solution
to society's most threatening social, economic and political
problems can be found without the full participation, and the
full empowerment, of the world's women.''.
(3) The United Nations Development Programme's Human
Development Report 2013 predicted that the number of people
living in extreme poverty could increase by up to 3,000,000,000
by 2050 unless environmental disasters are averted by
coordinated global action.
(4) Climate change is already forcing the most vulnerable
communities and populations in developing countries to face
unprecedented climate stress, including--
(A) slow onset effects of climate change, such as
sea level rise, increasing temperatures, water
scarcity, and drought; and
(B) severe weather events and floods, which can
lead to reduced agricultural productivity, food
insecurity, and increased disease.
(5) Climate change--
(A) exacerbates issues of resource scarcity and
lack of accessibility to primary natural resources,
forest resources, and arable land for food production;
(B) contributes to increased tension and
instability, particularly in countries and regions with
poor or weak governance systems; and
(C) increases the workload and stresses on women
farmers, who are estimated to produce nearly 50 percent
of the food consumed in most developing countries,
which exacerbates food insecurity.
(6) Women will disproportionately face harmful impacts from
climate change, particularly in poor and developing countries
in which women regularly assume increased responsibility for--
(A) growing the family's food;
(B) collecting water, fuel, and other resources;
(C) earning money; and
(D) sending remittances.
(7) Epidemics, such as malaria and Zika, are expected to
worsen and spread due to variations in climate, putting women
and girls (especially those who are pregnant, who are
lactating, or who hope to become pregnant) and children without
access to prevention and medical services at risk.
(8) The direct and indirect effects of climate change have
a disproportionate impact on marginalized women, including
refugees, displaced persons, migrants, religious, racial, or
ethnic minorities, adolescent girls, lesbian and trans women,
women living in poverty, and women and girls with disabilities
and those infected with HIV.
(9) Conflict has a disproportionate impact on the most
vulnerable communities and populations, including women, and
can be exacerbated in regions of the world with changing or
harsher climates, leading to migration, forced displacement,
and conflicts over scarce natural resources, including land and
water.
(10) Internally displaced, refugee, and stateless women and
girls face extreme violence and threats, including--
(A) being forced to exchange sex for food and
humanitarian supplies;
(B) being at increased risk of gender-based
violence, sexual exploitation, and abuse;
(C) reduced access to services and care; and
(D) increased risk for contracting HIV or sexually
transmitted infections, having an unplanned pregnancy,
and experiencing poor reproductive health.
(11) Climate change is predicted to lead to increasing
frequency and intensity of extreme weather conditions,
precipitating the occurrence of natural disasters around the
globe.
(12) The relocation and death of women as a result of
climate change-related disasters often has devastating impacts
on social support networks, family ties, and the coping
capacity of families and communities.
(13) The ability of women to adapt to climate change is
constrained by underlying gender inequality, including a lack
of--
(A) economic freedoms;
(B) property, land tenure, and inheritance rights;
(C) access to financial resources, education,
family planning, and reproductive healthcare services;
and
(D) quality tools, equipment, and technology that
support economic opportunity and independence.
(14) Despite having unique capabilities and knowledge to
promote, plan, and execute activities to enhance communities'
climate change adaption and resilience capacities, women often
have insufficient resources, are not empowered to take such
actions, and are often excluded from leadership and decision-
making processes.
(15) Women have a multiplier effect because women use their
income and resources, when given the necessary tools, to
increase the well-being of their children and families, playing
a critical role in reducing food insecurity, poverty, and
socioeconomic effects of climate change.
(16) Women are often underrepresented in the development
and formulation of policy regarding mitigation and adaptation
to climate change, even though women are often in the best
position to provide and consult on adaptive strategies.
SEC. 603. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) Ambassador-at-large.--The term ``Ambassador-at-Large''
means the Ambassador-at-Large for the Office of Global Women's
Issues of the Department of State.
(2) Climate-displaced person.--The term ``climate-displaced
person'' means any person who, for reasons of sudden or
progressive change in the environment that adversely affects
his or her life or living conditions--
(A) is obliged to leave his or her habitual home,
either within his or her country of nationality or in
another country;
(B) is in need of a durable resettlement solution;
and
(C) whose government cannot or will not provide
such durable resettlement solution.
(3) Disparate impact.--The term ``disparate impact'' refers
to the historical and ongoing impacts of the pattern and
practice of discrimination in employment, education, housing,
banking, health, and nearly every other aspect of life in the
economy, society, or culture that have an adverse impact on
minorities, women, or other protected groups, regardless of
whether such practices were motivated by discriminatory intent.
(4) Environmental disasters.--The term ``environmental
disasters'' means specific events caused by human activity that
result in seriously negative effects on the environment.
(5) Special coordinator.--The term ``Special Coordinator''
means the senior coordinator appointed pursuant to section
607(c).
(6) Working group.--The term ``Working Group'' means the
Federal Interagency Working Group on Women and Climate Change
established under section 605.
SEC. 604. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
(a) In General.--It is the policy of the United States, in
partnership with affected countries, donor country governments,
international financial institutions, international nongovernmental
organizations, multilateral organizations, and civil society groups,
especially those led by women--
(1) to combat the leading causes of climate change;
(2) to mitigate the effects of climate change on women and
girls; and
(3) to elevate the participation of women in policy,
program, and community decision-making processes with respect
to climate change.
(b) Implementation.--The policy described in subsection (a) shall
be carried out by--
(1) establishing the Federal Interagency Working Group on
Women and Climate Change to prevent and respond to the effects
of climate change on women globally; and
(2) implementing a coordinated, integrated, evidence-based,
and comprehensive strategy on women and climate change through
United States policies.
SEC. 605. FEDERAL INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON WOMEN AND CLIMATE
CHANGE.
(a) Establishment.--There is established in the Department of State
the Federal Interagency Working Group on Women and Climate Change.
(b) Chairperson.--The Ambassador-at-Large, or the Special
Coordinator, shall serve as the chairperson of the Working Group.
(c) Membership.--
(1) In general.--The Working Group shall be composed of a
senior-level representative from each of the Federal agencies
and bureaus and offices of the Department of State described in
paragraph (2), as selected by the head of the respective agency
or subagency.
(2) Federal agencies.--The Federal agencies and bureaus and
offices of the Department of State described in this paragraph
are--
(A) the Department of State, including--
(i) the Office of Global Women's Issues;
(ii) the Office of Civil Rights;
(iii) the Bureau of Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs;
(iv) the Bureau of Population, Refugees,
and Migration;
(v) the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor; and
(vi) the Bureau of International
Organization Affairs;
(B) the United States Agency for International
Development;
(C) the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention;
(D) the Environmental Protection Agency;
(E) the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration;
(F) the National Institutes of Health;
(G) the National Science Foundation;
(H) the Council on Environmental Quality; and
(I) the Millennium Challenge Corporation.
(3) Representatives of additional agencies.--The
Ambassador-at-Large, or the Special Coordinator, may request
the participation of representatives of other relevant agencies
or departments on a limited-time basis.
(d) Functions.--The Working Group shall--
(1) coordinate and integrate the development of all
policies and activities of the Federal Government relating to--
(A) combating the effects of climate change on
women in the national and international sphere; and
(B) improving the response and strategy of the
Federal Government to fight climate change for the
security of the United States and the international
community;
(2) allow each member of the Working Group to act as a
representative for the Working Group within the Federal
department or agency of such member to facilitate
implementation of the Working Group policies within such
department or agency;
(3) ensure that all relevant Federal departments and
agencies comply with appropriate guidelines, policies, and
directives from the Working Group pertaining to issues and
responsibilities related to climate change and women;
(4) ensure that Federal departments or agencies, State
governments, and relevant congressional committees, in
consultation with nongovernmental organizations and policy
experts in the field and State and local government officials
who administer or direct policy for programs relating to
climate change and women--
(A) have access to, receive, and appropriately
disseminate best practices in the administration of
such programs;
(B) have adequate resources to maximize the public
awareness of such programs;
(C) increase the reach of such programs;
(D) collect and share relevant data, including sex
and age disaggregated data; and
(E) issue relevant guidance; and
(5) identify and disseminate best practices to each
relevant Federal department and agency regarding how to improve
the collection of data relevant to the disparate impact of
climate change on women (especially marginalized women),
including--
(A) unpaid and paid care work;
(B) access to decent work opportunities;
(C) community advocacy, activism, and
representation;
(D) access to education for women and girls;
(E) access to comprehensive health care, including
reproductive health and rights;
(F) participation in professional trades, including
agriculture;
(G) rights and access to resources, such as land,
financial services and credit, training, and tools and
equipment;
(H) abilities to achieve durable solutions to
displacement, including integration, return, or
resettlement;
(I) food insecurity and desertification;
(J) community infrastructure, multilevel government
adaptability, and climate resilience;
(K) climate and weather-related crisis response,
including safety from gender-based violence; and
(L) women's involvement and leadership in the
development of frameworks and policies for climate
resilience.
(e) Consultation.--The Working Group may consult and obtain
recommendations from such independent nongovernmental policy experts,
State and local government officials, independent groups and
organizations, or other groups or organizations as the Ambassador-at-
Large, or the Special Coordinator, determines will assist in carrying
out the mission of the Working Group.
(f) Frequency of Meetings.--The Working Group shall meet not less
frequently than quarterly to discuss and develop policies, projects,
and programs referred to in subsection (d).
SEC. 606. DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATEGY AND POLICIES TO
PREVENT AND RESPOND TO THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON
WOMEN GLOBALLY.
(a) Initial Strategy Required.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Ambassador-at-Large, or the
Special Coordinator, in consultation with the Working Group, shall
develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a United
States National and International Strategy to prevent and respond to
the effects of climate change on women.
(b) Contents.--The strategy submitted under subsection (a) shall
include--
(1) recognizing the disparate impacts of climate change on
women and the efforts of women globally to address climate
change;
(2) taking effective action--
(A) to prevent and respond to climate change and
mitigate the effects of climate change on women around
the world; and
(B) to promote gender equality, economic growth,
public health, racial justice, principled humanitarian
access, and human rights;
(3) implementing the United Nations Sustainable Development
Goals listed in subsection (f) through and beyond 2030 to
prevent and respond to the effects of climate change on women
globally;
(4) implementing balanced gender participation to avoid
reinforcing binary roles, especially among individuals from the
communities most impacted, in climate change adaptation and
mitigation efforts, including in governance and diplomatic
positions within the United States Government;
(5) working at the local, national, and international
levels, including with individuals, families, and communities,
to prevent and respond to the effects of climate change on
women;
(6) systematically integrating and coordinating efforts to
prevent and respond to the effects of climate change on women
internationally into United States foreign policy and foreign
assistance programs;
(7) investing in research on climate change through
appropriate Federal departments or agencies and funding of
university and independent research groups on the various
causes and effects of climate change;
(8) developing and implementing gender-sensitive frameworks
in policies to address climate change that account for the
specific impacts of climate change on women;
(9) developing policies to support women who are
particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change to
prepare for, build their resilience to, and adapt to such
impacts, including a commitment to increase education and
training opportunities for women to develop local resilience
plans to address the effects of climate change;
(10) developing and investing in programs, in coordination
with the diplomatic missions of other countries, that--
(A) educate and empower women and girls in the
United States and around the world;
(B) gather information on how climate change is
affecting their lives; and
(C) provide guidance on the needs of their families
and communities in the face of climate change;
(11) consulting with representatives of civil society,
including nongovernmental organizations, community and faith-
based organizations, multilateral organizations, local and
international civil society groups, and local climate change
organizations and their beneficiaries, that have demonstrated
experience in preventing and responding to the effects of
climate change on women;
(12) supporting and building local capacity in developing
countries, including in governments at all levels and in
nongovernmental organizations (especially women-led
organizations), to prevent and respond to the effects of
climate change on women;
(13) developing programs to empower women in communities to
meaningfully engage in the planning, design, implementation,
and evaluation of strategies to address climate change while
taking into account their roles and resources;
(14) including women in economic development planning,
policies, and practices that directly improve conditions that
result from climate change;
(15) integrating gender analysis in all policies and
programs in the United States that are globally related to
climate change; and
(16) ensuring that such policies and programs support women
globally to prepare for, build resilience for, and adapt to,
climate change.
(c) Updates.--The Ambassador-at-Large, or the Special Coordinator,
shall--
(1) consult with the Working Group to collect information
and feedback; and
(2) update the strategy and programs to prevent and respond
to the effects of climate change on women globally, as the
Ambassador-at-Large, or the Special Coordinator, considers
appropriate.
(d) Implementation Plan and Budget Required.--Not later than 60
days after the submission of the strategy under subsection (a), the
Senior Coordinator shall submit an implementation plan and budget for
the strategy to the appropriate congressional committees.
(e) Assistance and Consultation.--The Senior Coordinator shall
assist and provide consultation to the Secretary of State in preventing
and responding to the effects of climate change on women globally.
(f) United Nations Sustainable Development Goals Through and Beyond
2030.--The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals listed in this
subsection are--
(1) ending poverty in all its forms everywhere;
(2) ending hunger, achieving food security and improved
nutrition, and promoting sustainable agriculture;
(3) ensuring healthy lives and promoting well-being for all
and at all ages;
(4) ensuring inclusive, equitable, and quality education
and promoting lifelong learning opportunities for all;
(5) achieving gender equality and empowering all women and
girls;
(6) ensuring the availability and sustainable management of
water and sanitation for all;
(7) ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable,
and modern energy for all;
(8) promoting sustained, inclusive, and sustainable
economic growth, full and productive employment, and decent
work for all;
(9) building resilient infrastructure, promoting inclusive
and sustainable industrialization, and fostering innovation;
(10) reducing inequality within and among countries;
(11) making cities and human settlements inclusive, safe,
resilient, and sustainable;
(12) ensuring sustainable consumption and production
patterns;
(13) taking urgent action to combat climate change and its
impacts;
(14) conserving and sustainably using the oceans, seas, and
marine resources for sustainable development;
(15) protecting, restoring, and promoting sustainable use
of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably managing forests,
combating desertification, and halting and reversing land
degradation and biodiversity loss;
(16) promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for
sustainable development, providing access to justice for all,
and building effective, accountable and inclusive institutions
at all levels; and
(17) strengthening the means of policy implementation and
revitalizing the global partnership for sustainable
development.
SEC. 607. CLIMATE CHANGE WITHIN THE OFFICE OF GLOBAL WOMEN'S ISSUES.
(a) Establishment.--The Ambassador-at-Large for the Office of
Global Women's Issues of the Department of State shall chair the
Federal Interagency Working Group on Women and Climate Change.
(b) Functions.--The Ambassador-at-Large shall--
(1) direct the activities, policies, programs, and funding
of the Department of State relating to the effects of climate
change on women, including with respect to efforts to prevent
and respond to those effects;
(2) coordinate closely with the Climate Security
Coordinator appointed pursuant to section 1(g) of the State
Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, as added by section
102, regarding matters related to climate change's effects on
women and related security and diplomatic matters and
engagements;
(3) advise the Secretary of State, the relevant heads of
other Federal departments and independent agencies, and other
entities within the Executive Office of the President,
regarding the establishment of--
(A) policies, goals, objectives, and priorities for
addressing and combating the effects of climate change
on women; and
(B) mechanisms to improve the effectiveness,
coordination, impact, and outcomes of programs relating
to addressing and combating the effects of climate
change on women, in coordination with experts in the
field, nongovernmental organizations, and foreign
governments; and
(4) identify and assist in the resolution of any disputes
that arise between Federal agencies relating to policies and
programs to address and combat the effects of climate change on
women or other matters within the responsibility of the Office
of Global Women's Issues.
(c) Special Coordinator.--The Ambassador-at-Large may appoint a
senior coordinator as the designee responsible for carrying out the
functions described in subsection (b).
(d) Briefing and Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Ambassador-at-
Large shall--
(1) brief the appropriate congressional committees
regarding--
(A) the effects of climate change on women; and
(B) the prevention and response strategies,
programming, and associated outcomes with respect to
climate change; and
(2) submit an assessment of the human and financial
resources necessary to carry out this title to the appropriate
congressional committees.
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