[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1169 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>






117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1169

      To address issues involving the People's Republic of China.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 15, 2021

Mr. Menendez (for himself and Mr. Risch) introduced the following bill; 
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
      To address issues involving the People's Republic of China.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Strategic 
Competition Act of 2021''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Definitions.
Sec. 4. Statement of policy.
Sec. 5. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 6. Rules of construction.
               TITLE I--INVESTING IN A COMPETITIVE FUTURE

                   Subtitle A--Science and Technology

Sec. 101. Authorization to assist United States companies with global 
                            supply chain diversification and 
                            management.
             Subtitle B--Global Infrastructure Development

Sec. 111. Appropriate committees of Congress defined.
Sec. 112. Sense of Congress on international quality infrastructure 
                            investment standards.
Sec. 113. United States support for infrastructure.
Sec. 114. Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network.
Sec. 115. Strategy for advanced and reliable energy infrastructure.
Sec. 116. Report on China's investments in foreign energy development.
            Subtitle C--Digital Technology and Connectivity

Sec. 121. Sense of Congress on digital technology issues.
Sec. 122. Digital connectivity and cybersecurity partnership.
        Subtitle D--Countering Chinese Communist Party Influence

Sec. 131. Short title.
Sec. 132. Authorization.
Sec. 133. Findings on Chinese information warfare and malign influence 
                            operations.
Sec. 134. Authorization of appropriations for the Fulbright-Hays 
                            Program.
Sec. 135. Sense of Congress condemning anti-Asian racism and 
                            discrimination.
Sec. 136. Supporting independent media and countering disinformation.
Sec. 137. Global engagement center.
Sec. 138. Review by Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
                            States of certain foreign gifts to and 
                            contracts with institutions of higher 
                            education.
           TITLE II--INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS

              Subtitle A--Strategic and Diplomatic Matters

Sec. 201. Appropriate congressional committees defined.
Sec. 202. United States commitment and support for allies and partners 
                            in the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 203. Sense of Congress on cooperation with the Quad.
Sec. 204. Statement of policy on cooperation with ASEAN.
Sec. 205. Sense of Congress on enhancing United States-ASEAN 
                            cooperation on technology issues with 
                            respect to the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 206. Report on Chinese influence in international organizations.
Sec. 207. Regulatory exchanges with allies and partners.
Sec. 208. Technology partnership office at the Department of State.
Sec. 209. United States representation in standards-setting bodies.
Sec. 210. Sense of Congress on centrality of sanctions and other 
                            restrictions to strategic competition with 
                            China.
Sec. 211. Sense of Congress on negotiations with G7 countries on the 
                            People's Republic of China.
Sec. 212. Enhancing the United States-Taiwan partnership.
Sec. 213. Treatment of Taiwan government.
Sec. 214. Report on origins of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Sec. 215. Enhancement of diplomatic support and economic engagement 
                            with Pacific island countries.
Sec. 216. Increasing Department of State personnel and resources 
                            devoted to the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 217. Advancing United States leadership in the United Nations 
                            System.
               Subtitle B--International Security Matters

Sec. 221. Definitions.
Sec. 222. Findings.
Sec. 223. Sense of Congress regarding bolstering security partnerships 
                            in the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 224. Statement of policy.
Sec. 225. Foreign military financing in the Indo-Pacific and 
                            authorization of appropriations for 
                            Southeast Asia maritime security programs 
                            and diplomatic outreach activities.
Sec. 226. Foreign military financing compact pilot program in the Indo-
                            Pacific.
Sec. 227. Additional funding for international military education and 
                            training in the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 228. Prioritizing excess defense article transfers for the Indo-
                            Pacific.
Sec. 229. Prioritizing excess naval vessel transfers for the Indo-
                            Pacific.
Sec. 230. Statement of policy on maritime freedom of operations in 
                            international waterways and airspace of the 
                            Indo-Pacific and on artificial land 
                            features in the South China Sea.
Sec. 231. Report on capability development of Indo-Pacific allies and 
                            partners.
Sec. 232. Report on national technology and industrial base.
Sec. 233. Report on diplomatic outreach with respect to Chinese 
                            military installations overseas.
Sec. 234. Statement of policy regarding universal implementation of 
                            United Nations sanctions on North Korea.
Sec. 235. Limitation on assistance to countries hosting Chinese 
                            military installations.
  Subtitle C--Regional Strategies To Counter the People's Republic of 
                                 China

Sec. 241. Statement of policy on cooperation with allies and partners 
                            around the world with respect to the 
                            People's Republic of China.
                       Part I--Western Hemisphere

Sec. 245. Sense of Congress regarding United States-Canada relations.
Sec. 246. Sense of Congress regarding the Government of China's 
                            arbitrary imprisonment of Canadian 
                            citizens.
Sec. 247. Strategy to enhance cooperation with Canada.
Sec. 248. Strategy to strengthen economic competitiveness, governance, 
                            human rights, and the rule of law in Latin 
                            America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 249. Engagement in regional and international organizations in 
                            Latin America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 250. Addressing China's sovereign lending practices in Latin 
                            America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 251. Defense cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 252. Engagement with civil society in Latin America and the 
                            Caribbean regarding accountability, human 
                            rights, and the risks of pervasive 
                            surveillance technologies.
                    Part II--Transatlantic Alliance

Sec. 255. Sense of Congress on the Transatlantic Alliance.
Sec. 256. Strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation with respect to 
                            the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 257. Enhancing transatlantic cooperation on promoting private 
                            sector finance.
Sec. 258. Report and briefing on cooperation between China and Iran and 
                            between China and Russia.
                    Part III--South and Central Asia

Sec. 261. Sense of Congress on South and Central Asia.
Sec. 262. Strategy to enhance cooperation with South and Central Asia.
                            Part IV--Africa

Sec. 271. Assessment of political, economic, and security activity of 
                            the People's Republic of China in Africa.
Sec. 272. Increasing the competitiveness of the United States in 
                            Africa.
Sec. 273. Digital security cooperation with respect to Africa.
Sec. 274. Increasing personnel in United States embassies in sub-
                            Saharan Africa focused on the People's 
                            Republic of China.
Sec. 275. Support for Young African Leaders Initiative.
Sec. 276. Africa broadcasting networks.
                  Part V--Middle East and North Africa

Sec. 281. Strategy to counter Chinese influence in, and access to, the 
                            Middle East and North Africa.
Sec. 282. Sense of Congress on Middle East and North Africa engagement.
                         Part VI--Arctic Region

Sec. 285. Arctic diplomacy.
                           Part VII--Oceania

Sec. 291. Statement of policy on United States engagement in Oceania.
Sec. 292. Oceania strategic roadmap.
                   TITLE III--INVESTING IN OUR VALUES

Sec. 301. Authorization of appropriations for promotion of democracy in 
                            Hong Kong.
Sec. 302. Imposition of sanctions relating to forced labor in the 
                            Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
Sec. 303. Imposition of sanctions with respect to systematic rape, 
                            coercive abortion, forced sterilization, or 
                            involuntary contraceptive implantation in 
                            the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
             TITLE IV--INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT

Sec. 401. Findings and sense of Congress regarding the PRC's industrial 
                            policy.
Sec. 402. Intellectual property violators list.
Sec. 403. Government of the People's Republic of China subsidies list.
Sec. 404. Countering foreign corrupt practices.
Sec. 405. Debt relief for countries eligible for assistance from the 
                            International Development Association.
Sec. 406. Report on manner and extent to which the Government of China 
                            exploits Hong Kong to circumvent United 
                            States laws and protections.
Sec. 407. Annual review on the presence of Chinese companies in United 
                            States capital markets.
                  TITLE V--ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY

Sec. 501. Findings on strategic security and arms control.
Sec. 502. Cooperation on a strategic nuclear dialogue.
Sec. 503. Report on United States efforts to engage the People's 
                            Republic of China on nuclear issues and 
                            ballistic missile issues.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The People's Republic of China (PRC) is leveraging its 
        political, diplomatic, economic, military, technological, and 
        ideological power to become a strategic, near-peer, global 
        competitor of the United States. The policies increasingly 
        pursued by the PRC in these domains are contrary to the 
        interests and values of the United States, its partners, and 
        much of the rest of the world.
            (2) The current policies being pursued by the PRC--
                    (A) threaten the future character of the 
                international order and are shaping the rules, norms, 
                and institutions that govern relations among states;
                    (B) will put at risk the ability of the United 
                States to secure its national interests; and
                    (C) will put at risk the future peace, prosperity, 
                and freedom of the international community in the 
                coming decades.
            (3) After normalizing diplomatic relations with the PRC in 
        1979, the United States actively worked to advance the PRC's 
        economic and social development to ensure that it participated 
        in, and benefitted from, the free and open international order. 
        The United States pursued these goals and contributed to the 
        welfare of the Chinese people by--
                    (A) increasing the PRC's trade relations and access 
                to global capital markets;
                    (B) promoting the PRC's accession to the World 
                Trade Organization;
                    (C) providing development finance and technical 
                assistance;
                    (D) promoting research collaboration;
                    (E) educating the PRC's top students;
                    (F) permitting transfers of cutting-edge 
                technologies and scientific knowledge; and
                    (G) providing intelligence and military assistance.
            (4) It is now clear that the PRC has chosen to pursue 
        state-led, mercantilist economic policies, an increasingly 
        authoritarian governance model at home through increased 
        restrictions on personal freedoms, and an aggressive and 
        assertive foreign policy. These policies frequently and 
        deliberately undermine United States interests and are contrary 
        to core United States values and the values of other nations, 
        both in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In response to this 
        strategic decision of the CCP, the United States has been 
        compelled to reexamine and revise its strategy towards the PRC.
            (5) The General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party 
        and the President of the People's Republic of China, Xi 
        Jinping, has elevated the ``Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese 
        Nation'' as central to the domestic and foreign policy of the 
        PRC. His program demands--
                    (A) strong, centralized CCP leadership;
                    (B) concentration of military power;
                    (C) a strong role for the CCP in the state and the 
                economy;
                    (D) an aggressive foreign policy seeking control 
                over broadly asserted territorial claims; and
                    (E) the denial of any universal values and 
                individual rights that are deemed to threaten the CCP.
            (6) The PRC views its Leninist model of governance, 
        ``socialism with Chinese characteristics'', as superior to, and 
        at odds with, the constitutional models of the United States 
        and other democracies. This approach to governance is lauded by 
        the CCP as essential to securing the PRC's status as a global 
        leader, and to shaping the future of the world. In a 2013 
        speech, President Xi said, ``We firmly believe that as 
        socialism with Chinese characteristics develops further . . . 
        it is . . . inevitable that the superiority of our socialist 
        system will be increasingly apparent . . . [and] our country's 
        road of development will have increasingly greater influence on 
        the world.''.
            (7) The PRC's objectives are to first establish regional 
        hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and then to use that dominant 
        position to propel the PRC to become the ``leading world 
        power,'' shaping an international order that is conducive to 
        the CCP's interests. Achieving these objectives requires 
        turning the PRC into a wealthy nation under strict CCP rule by 
        using a strong military and advanced technological capability 
        to pursue the PRC's objectives, regardless of other countries' 
        interests.
            (8) The PRC is reshaping the current international order, 
        which is built upon the rule of law and free and open ideals 
        and principles, by conducting global information and influence 
        operations, seeking to redefine international laws and norms to 
        align with the objectives of the CCP, rejecting the legitimacy 
        of internationally recognized human rights, and seeking to co-
        opt the leadership and agenda of multinational organizations 
        for the benefit of the PRC and other authoritarian regimes at 
        the expense of the interests of the United States and the 
        international community. In December 2018, President Xi 
        suggested that the CCP views its ``historic mission'' as not 
        only to govern China, but also to profoundly influence global 
        governance to benefit the CCP.
            (9) The PRC is encouraging other countries to follow its 
        model of ``socialism with Chinese characteristics''. During the 
        19th Party Congress in 2017, President Xi said that the PRC 
        could serve as a model of development for other countries by 
        utilizing ``Chinese wisdom'' and a ``Chinese approach to 
        solving problems''.
            (10) The PRC is promoting its governance model and 
        attempting to weaken other models of governance by--
                    (A) undermining democratic institutions;
                    (B) subverting financial institutions;
                    (C) coercing businesses to accommodate the policies 
                of the PRC; and
                    (D) using disinformation to disguise the nature of 
                the actions described in subparagraphs (A) through (C).
            (11) The PRC is close to its goal of becoming the global 
        leader in science and technology. In May 2018, President Xi 
        said that for the PRC to reach ``prosperity and rejuvenation'', 
        it needs to ``endeavor to be a major world center for science 
        and innovation''. The PRC has invested the equivalent of 
        billions of dollars into education and research and development 
        and established joint scientific research centers and science 
        universities.
            (12) The PRC's drive to become a ``manufacturing and 
        technological superpower'' and to promote ``innovation with 
        Chinese characteristics'' is coming at the expense of human 
        rights and longstanding international rules and norms with 
        respect to economic competition, and presents a challenge to 
        United States national security and the security of allies and 
        like-minded countries. In particular, the PRC advances its 
        illiberal political and social policies through mass 
        surveillance, social credit systems, and a significant role of 
        the state in internet governance. Through these means, the PRC 
        increases direct and indirect government control over its 
        citizens' everyday lives. Its national strategy of ``civil-
        military fusion'' mandates that civil and commercial research, 
        which increasingly drives global innovation, is leveraged to 
        develop new military capabilities.
            (13) The PRC is using legal and illegal means to achieve 
        its objective of becoming a manufacturing and technological 
        superpower. The PRC uses state-directed industrial policies in 
        anticompetitive ways to ensure the dominance of PRC companies. 
        The CCP engages in and encourages actions that actively 
        undermine a free and open international market, such as 
        intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers, 
        regulatory and financial subsidies, and mandatory CCP access to 
        proprietary data as part of business and commercial agreements 
        between Chinese and foreign companies.
            (14) The policies referred to in paragraph (13) are 
        designed to freeze United States and other foreign firms out of 
        the PRC market, while eroding competition in other important 
        markets. The heavy subsidization of Chinese companies includes 
        potential violation of its World Trade Organization 
        commitments. In May 2018, President Xi said that the PRC aims 
        to keep the ``initiatives of innovation and development 
        security . . . in [China's] own hands''.
            (15) The PRC is advancing its global objectives through a 
        variety of avenues, including its signature initiative, the 
        Belt and Road Initiative (referred to in this section as 
        ``BRI''), which is enshrined in the Chinese Constitution and 
        includes the Digital Silk Road and Health Silk Road. The PRC 
        describes BRI as a straightforward and wholly beneficial plan 
        for all countries. Eventually, it seeks to advance an economic 
        system with the PRC at its center, making it the most concrete 
        geographical representation of the PRC's global ambitions. BRI 
        increases the economic influence of state-owned Chinese firms 
        in global markets, enhances the PRC's political leverage with 
        government leaders around the world, and provides greater 
        access to strategic nodes such as ports and railways. Through 
        BRI, the PRC seeks political deference through economic 
        dependence.
            (16) The PRC is executing a plan to establish regional 
        hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and displace the United States 
        from the region. As a Pacific power, the United States has 
        built and supported enduring alliances and economic 
        partnerships that secure peace and prosperity and promote the 
        rule of law and political pluralism in a free and open Indo-
        Pacific. In contrast, the PRC uses economic and military 
        coercion in the region to secure its own interests.
            (17) The PRC's military strategy seeks to keep the United 
        States military from operating in the Western Pacific and 
        erodes United States security guarantees.
            (18) The PRC is aggressively pursuing exclusive control of 
        critical land routes, sea lanes, and air space in the Indo-
        Pacific in the hopes of eventually exercising greater influence 
        beyond the region. This includes lanes crucial to commercial 
        activity, energy exploration, transport, and the exercise of 
        security operations in areas permitted under international law.
            (19) The PRC seeks so-called ``reunification'' with Taiwan 
        through whatever means may ultimately be required. The CCP's 
        insistence that so-called ``reunification'' is Taiwan's only 
        option makes this goal inherently coercive. In January 2019, 
        President Xi stated that the PRC ``make[s] no promise to 
        renounce the use of force and reserve[s] the option of taking 
        all necessary means''. Taiwan's embodiment of democratic values 
        and economic liberalism challenges President Xi's goal of 
        achieving national rejuvenation. The PRC plans to exploit 
        Taiwan's dominant strategic position in the First Island Chain 
        and to project power into the Second Island Chain and beyond.
            (20) In the South China Sea, the PRC has executed an 
        illegal island-building campaign that threatens freedom of 
        navigation and the free-flow of commerce, damages the 
        environment, bolsters the PLA power projection capabilities, 
        and coerces and intimidates other regional claimants in an 
        effort to advance its unlawful claims and control the waters 
        around neighboring countries. Despite President Xi's September 
        2015 speech, in which he said the PRC was not militarizing the 
        South China Sea, during the 2017 19th Party Congress, President 
        Xi announced that ``construction on islands and reefs in the 
        South China Sea have seen steady progress''.
            (21) The PRC is rapidly modernizing the PLA to attain a 
        level of capacity and capability superior to the United States 
        in terms of equipment and conduct of modern military operations 
        by shifting its military doctrine from having a force 
        ``adequate [for] China's defensive needs'' to having a force 
        ``commensurate with China's international status''. Ultimately, 
        this transformation could enable China to impose its will in 
        the Indo-Pacific region through the threat of military force. 
        In 2017, President Xi established the following developmental 
        benchmarks for the advancement of the PLA:
                    (A) A mechanized force with increased informatized 
                and strategic capabilities by 2020.
                    (B) The complete modernization of China's national 
                defense by 2035.
                    (C) The full transformation of the PLA into a 
                world-class force by 2050.
            (22) The PRC's strategy and supporting policies described 
        in this section undermine United States interests, such as--
                    (A) upholding a free and open international order;
                    (B) maintaining the integrity of international 
                institutions with liberal norms and values;
                    (C) preserving a favorable balance of power in the 
                Indo-Pacific;
                    (D) ensuring the defense of its allies;
                    (E) preserving open sea and air lanes;
                    (F) fostering the free flow of commerce through 
                open and transparent markets; and
                    (G) promoting individual freedom and human rights.
            (23) The global COVID-19 pandemic has intensified and 
        accelerated these trends in the PRC's behavior and therefore 
        increased the need for United States global leadership and a 
        competitive posture. The PRC has capitalized on the world's 
        focus on the COVID-19 pandemic by--
                    (A) moving rapidly to undermine Hong Kong's 
                autonomy, including imposing a so-called ``national 
                security law'' on Hong Kong;
                    (B) aggressively imposing its will in the East and 
                South China Seas;
                    (C) contributing to increased tensions with India; 
                and
                    (D) engaging in a widespread and government-
                directed disinformation campaign to obscure the PRC 
                Government's efforts to cover up the seriousness of 
                COVID-19, sow confusion about the origination of the 
                outbreak, and discredit the United States, its allies, 
                and global health efforts.
            (24) In response to the PRC's strategy and policies, the 
        United States must adopt a policy of strategic competition with 
        the PRC to protect and promote our vital interests and values.
            (25) The United States policy of strategic competition with 
        respect to the People's Republic of China is part of a broader 
        strategic approach to the Indo-Pacific and the world which 
        centers with United States allies and partners to advance 
        shared values and interests and to preserve and enhance a free, 
        open, democratic, inclusive, rules-based, stable, and diverse 
        region.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives.
            (2) CCP.--The term ``CCP'' means the Chinese Communist 
        Party.
            (3) Indo-pacific region.--The terms ``Indo-Pacific'' and 
        ``Indo-Pacific region'' mean the 36 countries and the 
        surrounding waterways that are under the area of responsibility 
        of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. These countries are: 
        Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, China, 
        Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Laos, Malaysia, 
        Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Nauru, Nepal, 
        New Zealand, North Korea, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, 
        Republic of Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri 
        Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, 
        and Vietnam.
            (4) People's liberation army; pla.--The terms ``People's 
        Liberation Army'' and ``PLA'' mean the armed forces of the 
        People's Republic of China.
            (5) PRC; china.--The terms ``PRC'' and ``China'' mean the 
        People's Republic of China.

SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    (a) Objectives.--It is the policy of the United States, in pursuing 
strategic competition with the PRC, to pursue the following objectives:
            (1) The United States global leadership role is sustained 
        and its political system and major foundations of national 
        power are postured for long-term political, economic, 
        technological, and military competition with the PRC.
            (2) The balance of power in the Indo-Pacific remains 
        favorable to the United States and its allies. The United 
        States and its allies maintain unfettered access to the region, 
        including through freedom of navigation and the free flow of 
        commerce, consistent with international law and practice, and 
        the PRC neither dominates the region nor coerces its neighbors.
            (3) The allies and partners of the United States--
                    (A) maintain confidence in United States leadership 
                and its commitment to the Indo-Pacific region;
                    (B) can withstand and combat subversion and undue 
                influence by the PRC; and
                    (C) align themselves with the United States in 
                setting global rules, norms, and standards that benefit 
                the international community.
            (4) The combined weight of the United States and its allies 
        and partners is strong enough to demonstrate to the PRC that 
        the risks of attempts to dominate other states outweigh the 
        potential benefits.
            (5) The United States leads the free and open international 
        order, which is comprised of resilient states and institutions 
        that uphold and defend principles, including sovereignty, rule 
        of law, individual freedom, and human rights. The international 
        order is strengthened to defeat attempts at destabilization by 
        illiberal and authoritarian actors.
            (6) The key rules, norms, and standards of international 
        engagement in the 21st century are maintained, including the--
                    (A) protection of human rights, commercial 
                engagement and investment, and technology; and
                    (B) that such rules, norms, and standards are in 
                alignment with the values and interests of the United 
                States, its allies and partners, and the free world.
            (7) Assure that the CCP does not--
                    (A) subvert open and democratic societies;
                    (B) distort global markets;
                    (C) manipulate the international trade system;
                    (D) coerce other nations via economic and military 
                means; or
                    (E) use its technological advantages to undermine 
                individual freedoms or other states' national security 
                interests.
            (8) The United States deters military confrontation with 
        the PRC and both nations work to reduce the risk of conflict.
    (b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States, in pursuit of 
the objectives set forth in subsection (a)--
            (1) to strengthen the United States domestic foundation by 
        reinvesting in market-based economic growth, education, 
        scientific and technological innovation, democratic 
        institutions, and other areas that improve the United States 
        ability to pursue its vital economic, foreign policy, and 
        national security interests;
            (2) to pursue a strategy of strategic competition with the 
        PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic, development, 
        military, informational, and technological realms that 
        maximizes United States strengths and increases the costs for 
        the PRC of harming United States interests and values of those 
        of United States allies and partners;
            (3) to lead a free, open, and secure international system 
        characterized by freedom from coercion, rule of law, open 
        markets and the free flow of commerce, and a shared commitment 
        to security and peaceful resolution of disputes, human rights, 
        and good and transparent governance;
            (4) to strengthen and deepen United States alliances and 
        partnerships, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific and Europe, by 
        pursuing greater bilateral and multilateral cooperative 
        initiatives that advance shared interests and values and 
        bolster partner countries' confidence that the United States is 
        and will remain a strong, committed, and constant partner;
            (5) to encourage and aid United States allies and partners 
        in boosting their own capabilities and resiliency to pursue, 
        defend, and protect shared interests and values, free from 
        coercion and external pressure;
            (6) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and healthy 
        competition in United States-China economic relations by--
                    (A) advancing policies that harden the United 
                States economy against unfair and illegal commercial or 
                trading practices and the coercion of United States 
                businesses; and
                    (B) tightening United States laws and regulations 
                as necessary to prevent the PRC's attempts to harm 
                United States economic competitiveness;
            (7) to demonstrate the value of private sector-led growth 
        in emerging markets around the world, including through the use 
        of United States Government tools that--
                    (A) support greater private sector investment and 
                advance capacity-building initiatives that are grounded 
                in the rule of law;
                    (B) promote open markets;
                    (C) establish clear policy and regulatory 
                frameworks;
                    (D) improve the management of key economic sectors;
                    (E) combat corruption; and
                    (F) foster and support greater collaboration with 
                and among partner countries and the United States 
                private sector to develop secure and sustainable 
                infrastructure;
            (8) to lead in the advancement of international rules and 
        norms that foster free and reciprocal trade and open and 
        integrated markets;
            (9) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy in support of 
        United States companies and businesses in partner countries 
        that seek fair competition;
            (10) to ensure that the United States leads in the 
        innovation of critical and emerging technologies, such as next-
        generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence, quantum 
        computing, semiconductors, and biotechnology, by--
                    (A) providing necessary investment and concrete 
                incentives for the private sector to accelerate 
                development of such technologies;
                    (B) modernizing and harmonizing with allies and 
                partners export controls and investment screening 
                regimes and associated policies and regulations;
                    (C) enhancing United States leadership in technical 
                standards-setting bodies and avenues for developing 
                norms regarding the use of emerging critical 
                technologies;
                    (D) reducing United States barriers and increasing 
                incentives for collaboration with allies and partners 
                on the research and codevelopment of critical 
                technologies;
                    (E) collaborating with allies and partners to 
                protect critical technologies by--
                            (i) crafting multilateral export control 
                        measures;
                            (ii) building capacity for defense 
                        technology security;
                            (iii) safeguarding chokepoints in the 
                        supply chains; and
                            (iv) ensuring diversification; and
                    (F) designing major defense capabilities for export 
                to allies and partners;
            (11) to enable the people of the United States, including 
        the private sector, civil society, universities and other 
        academic institutions, State and local legislators, and other 
        relevant actors to identify and remain vigilant to the risks 
        posed by undue influence of the CCP in the United States;
            (12) to implement measures to mitigate the risks referred 
        to in paragraph (11), while still preserving opportunities for 
        economic engagement, academic research, and cooperation in 
        other areas where the United States and the PRC share 
        interests;
            (13) to collaborate with advanced democracies and other 
        willing partners to promote ideals and principles that--
                    (A) advance a free and open international order;
                    (B) strengthen democratic institutions;
                    (C) protect and promote human rights; and
                    (D) uphold a free press and fact-based reporting;
            (14) to demonstrate effective leadership at the United 
        Nations, its associated agencies, and other multilateral 
        organizations and defend the integrity of these organizations 
        against co-optation by illiberal and authoritarian nations;
            (15) to prioritize the defense of fundamental freedoms and 
        human rights in the United States relationship with the PRC;
            (16) to cooperate with allies, partners, and multilateral 
        organizations, leveraging their significant and growing 
        capabilities to build a network of like-minded states that 
        sustains and strengthens a free and open order and addresses 
        regional and global challenges to hold the Government of the 
        PRC accountable for--
                    (A) violations and abuses of human rights;
                    (B) restrictions on religious practices; and,
                    (C) undermining and abrogating treaties, other 
                international agreements, and other international norms 
                related to human rights;
            (17) to expose the PRC's use of corruption, repression, 
        coercion, and other malign behavior to attain unfair economic 
        advantage and deference of other nations to its political and 
        strategic objectives;
            (18) to maintain United States access to the Western 
        Pacific, including by--
                    (A) increasing United States forward-deployed 
                forces in the Indo-Pacific region;
                    (B) modernizing the United States military through 
                investments in existing and new platforms, emerging 
                technologies, critical in-theater force structure and 
                enabling capabilities, joint operational concepts, and 
                a diverse, operationally resilient and politically 
                sustainable posture; and
                    (C) operating and conducting exercises with allies 
                and partners--
                            (i) to mitigate the PLA's ability to 
                        project power and establish contested zones 
                        within the First and Second Island Chains;
                            (ii) to diminish the ability of the PLA to 
                        coerce its neighbors;
                            (iii) to maintain open sea and air lanes, 
                        particularly in the Taiwan Strait, the East 
                        China Sea, and the South China Sea; and
                            (iv) to project power from the United 
                        States and its allies and partners to 
                        demonstrate the ability to conduct contested 
                        logistics;
            (19) to deter the PRC from--
                    (A) coercing Indo-Pacific nations, including by 
                developing more combat-credible forces that are 
                integrated with allies and partners in contact, blunt, 
                and surge layers and able to defeat any PRC theory of 
                victory in the First or Second Island Chains of the 
                Western Pacific and beyond, as called for in the 2018 
                National Defense Strategy;
                    (B) using gray-zone tactics below the level of 
                armed conflict; or
                    (C) initiating armed conflict;
            (20) to strengthen United States-PRC military-to-military 
        communication and improve de-escalation procedures to 
        deconflict operations and reduce the risk of unwanted conflict, 
        including through high-level visits and recurrent exchanges 
        between civilian and military officials and other measures, in 
        alignment with United States interests; and
            (21) to cooperate with the PRC if interests align, 
        including through bilateral or multilateral means and at the 
        United Nations, as appropriate.

SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that the execution of the policy 
described in section 4(b) requires the following actions:
            (1) Strategic competition with the PRC will require the 
        United States--
                    (A) to marshal sustained political will to protect 
                its vital interests, promote its values, and advance 
                its economic and national security objectives for 
                decades to come; and
                    (B) to achieve this sustained political will, 
                persuade the American people and United States allies 
                and partners of--
                            (i) the challenges posed by the PRC; and
                            (ii) the need for long-term competition to 
                        defend shared interests and values.
            (2) The United States must coordinate closely with allies 
        and partners to compete effectively with the PRC, including to 
        encourage allies and partners to assume, as appropriate, 
        greater roles in balancing and checking the aggressive and 
        assertive behavior of the PRC.
            (3) The President of the United States must lead and direct 
        the entire executive branch to make the People's Republic of 
        China as the greatest geopolitical and geoeconomic challenge 
        for United States foreign policy, increasing the prioritization 
        of strategic competition with the PRC and broader United States 
        interests in the Indo-Pacific region in the conduct of foreign 
        policy and assuring the allocation of appropriate resources 
        adequate to the challenge.
            (4) The head of every Federal department and agency should 
        designate a senior official at the level of Under Secretary or 
        above to coordinate the department's or agency's policies with 
        respect to strategic competition with the PRC.
            (5) The ability of the United States to execute a strategy 
        of strategic competition with the PRC will be undermined if our 
        attention is repeatedly diverted to challenges that are not 
        vital to United States economic and national security 
        interests.
            (6) In the coming decades, the United States must prevent 
        the PRC from--
                    (A) establishing regional hegemony in the Indo-
                Pacific; and
                    (B) using that position to advance its assertive 
                political, economic, and foreign policy goals around 
                the world.
            (7) The United States must ensure that the Federal budget 
        is properly aligned with the strategic imperative to compete 
        with the PRC by--
                    (A) ensuring sufficient levels of funding to 
                resource all instruments of United States national 
                power; and
                    (B) coherently prioritizing how such funds are 
                used.
            (8) Sustained prioritization of the challenge posed by the 
        PRC requires--
                    (A) bipartisan cooperation within Congress; and
                    (B) frequent, sustained, and meaningful 
                collaboration and consultation between the executive 
                branch and Congress.
            (9) The United States must ensure close integration among 
        economic and foreign policymakers, the private sector, civil 
        society, universities and academic institutions, and other 
        relevant actors in free and open societies affected by the 
        challenges posed by the PRC to enable such actors--
                    (A) to collaborate to advance common interests; and
                    (B) to identify appropriate policies--
                            (i) to strengthen the United States and its 
                        allies;
                            (ii) to promote a compelling vision of a 
                        free and open order; and
                            (iii) to push back against detrimental 
                        policies pursued by the CCP.
            (10) The United States must ensure that all Federal 
        departments and agencies are organized to reflect the fact that 
        strategic competition with the PRC is the United States top 
        foreign policy priority, including through the assigned 
        missions and location of United States Government personnel, 
        by--
                    (A) dedicating more personnel in the Indo-Pacific 
                region, at posts around the world, and in Washington 
                DC, with priorities directly relevant to advancing 
                competition with the People's Republic of China;
                    (B) placing greater numbers of foreign service 
                officers, international development professionals, 
                members of the foreign commercial service, intelligence 
                professionals, and other United States Government 
                personnel in the Indo-Pacific region; and
                    (C) ensuring that this workforce, both civilian and 
                military, has the training in language, technical 
                skills, and other competencies required to advance a 
                successful competitive strategy with the PRC.
            (11) The United States must place renewed emphasis on 
        strengthening the nonmilitary instruments of national power, 
        including diplomacy, information, technology, economics, 
        foreign assistance and development finance, commerce, 
        intelligence, and law enforcement, which are crucial for 
        addressing the unique economic, political, and ideological 
        challenges posed by the PRC.
            (12) The United States must sustain resourcing for a 
        Pacific Deterrence Initiative, which shall be aligned with the 
        overarching political and diplomatic objectives articulated in 
        the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (Public Law 115-409), and 
        must prioritize the military investments necessary to achieve 
        United States political objectives in the Indo-Pacific, 
        including--
                    (A) promoting regional security in the Indo-
                Pacific;
                    (B) reassuring allies and partners while protecting 
                them from coercion; and
                    (C) deterring conflict with the PRC.
            (13) Competition with the PRC requires the United States 
        skillful adaptation to the information environment of the 21st 
        century. United States public diplomacy and messaging efforts 
        must effectively--
                    (A) promote the value of partnership with the 
                United States;
                    (B) highlight the risks and costs of enmeshment 
                with the PRC; and
                    (C) counter CCP propaganda and disinformation.

SEC. 6. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.

    (a) Applicability of Existing Restrictions on Assistance to Foreign 
Security Forces.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed to diminish, 
supplant, supersede, or otherwise restrict or prevent responsibilities 
of the United States Government under section 620M of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) or section 362 of title 10, 
United States Code.
    (b) No Authorization for the Use of Military Force.--Nothing in 
this Act may be construed as authorizing the use of military force.

               TITLE I--INVESTING IN A COMPETITIVE FUTURE

                   Subtitle A--Science and Technology

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST UNITED STATES COMPANIES WITH GLOBAL 
              SUPPLY CHAIN DIVERSIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT.

    (a) Authorization To Contract Services.--The Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, is authorized to establish 
a program to facilitate the contracting by United States embassies for 
the professional services of qualified experts, on a reimbursable fee 
for service basis, to assist interested United States persons and 
business entities with supply chain management issues related to the 
PRC, including--
            (1) exiting from the PRC market or relocating certain 
        production facilities to locations outside the PRC;
            (2) diversifying sources of inputs, and other efforts to 
        diversify supply chains to locations outside of the PRC;
            (3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other challenges in 
        the course of the activities described in paragraphs (1) and 
        (2); and
            (4) identifying alternative markets for production or 
        sourcing outside of the PRC, including through providing market 
        intelligence, facilitating contact with reliable local partners 
        as appropriate, and other services.
    (b) Chief of Mission Oversight.--The persons hired to perform the 
services described in subsection (a) shall--
            (1) be under the authority of the United States Chief of 
        Mission in the country in which they are hired, in accordance 
        with existing United States laws;
            (2) coordinate with Department of State and Department of 
        Commerce officers; and
            (3) coordinate with United States missions and relevant 
        local partners in other countries as needed to carry out the 
        services described in subsection (a).
    (c) Prioritization of Micro-, Small-, and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises.--The services described in subsection (a) shall be 
prioritized to assisting micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $15,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2027 for 
the purposes of carrying out this section.
    (e) Prohibition on Access to Assistance by Foreign Adversaries.--
None of the funds appropriated pursuant to this section may be provided 
to an entity--
            (1) under the foreign ownership, control, or influence of 
        the Government of China or the Chinese Communist Party, or 
        other foreign adversary; or
            (2) determined to have beneficial ownership from foreign 
        individuals subject to the jurisdiction, direction, or 
        influence of foreign adversaries.
    (f) Definitions.--The terms ``foreign ownership, control, or 
influence'' and ``FOCI'' have the meanings given those terms in the 
National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (DOD 5220.22-M), 
or a successor document.

             Subtitle B--Global Infrastructure Development

SEC. 111. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.

    In this subtitle, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 112. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL QUALITY INFRASTRUCTURE 
              INVESTMENT STANDARDS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should initiate collaboration among governments, the private 
sector, and civil society to encourage the adoption of the standards 
for quality global infrastructure development advanced by the G20 at 
Osaka in 2018, including with respect to the following issues:
            (1) Respect for the sovereignty of countries in which 
        infrastructure investments are made.
            (2) Anti-corruption.
            (3) Rule of law.
            (4) Human rights and labor rights.
            (5) Fiscal and debt sustainability.
            (6) Social and governance safeguards.
            (7) Transparency.
            (8) Environmental and energy standards.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should launch a series of fora around the world showcasing the 
commitment of the United States and partners of the United States to 
high-quality development cooperation, including with respect to the 
issues as described in subsection (a).

SEC. 113. UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR INFRASTRUCTURE.

    (a) Findings.--The Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee 
(GICC) was established to coordinate the efforts of the Department of 
State, the Department of Commerce, the Department of the Treasury, the 
Department of Energy, the Department of Transportation, the United 
States Agency for International Development, the United States Trade 
and Development Agency, the Development Finance Corporation, the 
Export-Import Bank of the United States, and other agencies to catalyze 
private sector investments around the world and the deployment of 
United States Government technical assistance and development finance 
tools, including project preparation services and commercial advocacy.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the world's infrastructure needs, including in the 
        transport, energy, and digital sectors, are vast and growing;
            (2) total or partial acquisition of, or a significant 
        financial stake or physical presence in, certain types of 
        infrastructure, including ports, energy grids, 5G 
        telecommunications networks, and undersea cables, can provide 
        an advantage to countries that do not share the interests and 
        values of the United States and its allies and partners, and 
        could therefore be deleterious to the interests and values of 
        the United States and its allies and partners;
            (3) the United States must continue to prioritize support 
        for infrastructure projects that are physically secure, 
        financially viable, economically sustainable, and socially 
        responsible;
            (4) achieving the objective outlined in paragraph (3) 
        requires the coordination of all United States Government 
        economic tools across the interagency, so that such tools are 
        deployed way to maximize United States interests and that of 
        its allies and partners;
            (5) the GICC represents an important and concrete step 
        toward better communication and coordination across the United 
        States Government of economic tools relevant to supporting 
        infrastructure that is physically secure, financially viable, 
        economically sustainable, and socially responsible, and should 
        be continued; and
            (6) the executive branch and Congress should have 
        consistent consultations on United States support for strategic 
        infrastructure projects, including how the Congress can support 
        such initiatives in the future.
    (c) Reporting Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, and semi-annually thereafter, the 
Secretary of State, in coordination with other Federal agencies that 
participate in the GICC, and, as appropriate, the Director of National 
Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a 
report that identifies--
            (1) current and pending or future infrastructure projects, 
        particularly in the transport, energy, and digital sectors, 
        that the United States is supporting or will support through 
        financing, foreign assistance, technical assistance, or other 
        means;
            (2) a detailed explanation of the United States and partner 
        country interests served by the United States providing support 
        to such projects; and
            (3) a detailed description of any support provided by other 
        United States allies and partners to such projects.
    (d) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 114. INFRASTRUCTURE TRANSACTION AND ASSISTANCE NETWORK.

    (a) Authority.--The Secretary of State is authorized to establish a 
program, to be known as the ``Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance 
Network'', under which the Secretary of State, in consultation with 
other relevant Federal agencies, including those represented on the 
Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee, may advance the 
development of sustainable, transparent, and high-quality 
infrastructure, in the Indo-Pacific region by--
            (1) strengthening capacity-building programs to improve 
        project evaluation processes, regulatory and procurement 
        environments, and project preparation capacity of countries 
        that are partners of the United States in such development;
            (2) providing transaction advisory services and project 
        preparation assistance to support sustainable infrastructure; 
        and
            (3) coordinating the provision of United States assistance 
        for the development of infrastructure, including infrastructure 
        that utilizes United States-manufactured goods and services, 
        and catalyzing investment led by the private sector.
    (b) Transaction Advisory Fund.--As part of the ``Infrastructure 
Transaction and Assistance Network'' described under subsection (a), 
the Secretary of State is authorized to provide support, including 
through flexible financing mechanisms such as the Transaction Advisory 
Fund, for advisory services to help boost the capacity of partner 
countries to evaluate contracts and assess the financial and 
environmental impacts of potential infrastructure projects, including 
through providing services such as--
            (1) legal services;
            (2) pre-feasibility studies;
            (3) debt sustainability analyses;
            (4) bid or proposal evaluation; and
            (5) other services relevant to advancing the development of 
        sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastructure.
    (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $75,000,000 to the Infrastructure Transaction and 
Assistance Network, of which $20,000,000 is to be provided for the 
Transaction Advisory Fund.

SEC. 115. STRATEGY FOR ADVANCED AND RELIABLE ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE.

    (a) In General.--The President shall direct a comprehensive, multi-
year, whole of government effort, in consultation with the private 
sector, to counter predatory lending and financing by the Government of 
China, including support to companies incorporated in the PRC that 
engage in such activities, in the energy sectors of developing 
countries.
    (b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to--
            (1) regularly evaluate current and forecasted energy needs 
        and capacities of developing countries and analyze the presence 
        and involvement of PRC state-owned industries and other 
        companies incorporated in the PRC, Chinese nationals providing 
        labor, and financing of energy projects, including direct 
        financing by the Government of China, PRC financial 
        institutions, or direct state support to state-owned 
        enterprises and other companies incorporated in the PRC;
            (2) pursue strategic support and investment opportunities, 
        and diplomatic engagement on power sector reforms, to expand 
        the development and deployment of advanced energy technologies 
        in developing countries;
            (3) offer financing, loan guarantees, grants, and other 
        financial products on terms that advance domestic economic and 
        local employment opportunities, utilize advanced energy 
        technologies, encourage private sector growth, and when 
        appropriate United States equity and sovereign lending products 
        as alternative to the predatory lending tools offered by 
        Chinese international finance institutions;
            (4) pursue partnerships with likeminded international 
        financing and multilateral institutions to leverage investment 
        in advanced energy technologies in developing countries; and
            (5) pursue bilateral partnerships focused on the 
        cooperative development of advanced energy technologies with 
        countries of strategic significance, particularly in the Indo-
        Pacific region, to address the effects of energy engagement by 
        the PRC through predatory lending or other actions that 
        negatively impact other countries.
    (c) Advanced Energy Technologies Exports.--Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter 
for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary 
of Energy, shall establish a United States Government strategy to 
increase United States exports of advanced energy technologies to--
            (1) improve energy security in allied and developing 
        countries;
            (2) create open, efficient, rule-based, and transparent 
        energy markets;
            (3) improve free, fair, and reciprocal energy trading 
        relationships; and
            (4) expand access to affordable, reliable energy.

SEC. 116. REPORT ON CHINA'S INVESTMENTS IN FOREIGN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT.

    (a) In General.--No later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for five years, the 
Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary for Energy 
Resources, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
report that--
            (1) identifies priority countries for deepening United 
        States engagement on energy matters, in accordance with the 
        economic and national security interests of the United States 
        and where deeper energy partnerships are most achievable;
            (2) describes the involvement of the PRC government and 
        companies incorporated in the PRC in the development, 
        operation, financing, or ownership of energy generation 
        facilities, transmission infrastructure or energy resources in 
        the countries identified in paragraph (1);
            (3) evaluates strategic or security concerns and 
        implications for United States national interests and the 
        interests of the countries identified in paragraph (1), with 
        respect to the PRC's involvement and influence in developing 
        country energy production or transmission; and
            (4) outlines current and planned efforts by the United 
        States to partner with the countries identified in paragraph 
        (1) on energy matters that support shared interests between the 
        United States and such countries.
    (b) Transmittal.--The assessment required in subsection (a) shall 
be published on the United States Agency for International 
Development's website and transmitted to the appropriate committees of 
Congress, the Secretary of State, and the Chief Executive Officer of 
the United States International Development Finance Corporation.

            Subtitle C--Digital Technology and Connectivity

SEC. 121. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY ISSUES.

    (a) Statement of Policy on Leadership in International Standards 
Setting.--It is the sense of Congress that the United States must lead 
in international standard-setting bodies that set the governance norms 
and rules for critical digitally enabled technologies in order to 
ensure that these technologies operate within a free, secure, 
interoperable, and stable digital domain.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States, along with allies and partners, should lead an international 
effort that utilizes all of the economic and diplomatic tools at its 
disposal to combat the expanding use of information and communications 
technology products and services to surveil, repress, and manipulate 
populations (also known as ``digital authoritarianism'').
    (c) Negotiations for Digital Trade Agreement.--It is the sense of 
Congress that the United States Trade Representative should negotiate 
bilateral and plurilateral agreements relating to digital goods with 
the European Union, Japan, Taiwan, the member countries of the Five 
Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance, and other nations, as appropriate.
    (d) Freedom of Information in the Digital Age.--It is the sense of 
Congress that the United States should lead a global effort to ensure 
that freedom of information, including the ability to safely consume or 
publish information without fear of undue reprisals, is maintained as 
the digital domain becomes an increasingly integral mechanism for 
communication.
    (e) Efforts to Ensure Technological Development Does Not Threaten 
Democratic Governance or Human Rights.--It is the sense of Congress 
that the United States should lead a global effort to develop and adopt 
a set of common principles and standards for critical technologies to 
ensure that the such technologies cannot be abused by malign actors, 
whether they are governments or other entities, and that they do not 
threaten democratic governance or human rights.
    (f) Formation of Digital Technology Trade Alliance.--It is the 
sense of Congress that the United States should examine opportunities 
for diplomatic negotiations regarding the formation of mutually 
beneficial alliances relating to digitally enabled technologies and 
services.

SEC. 122. DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY PARTNERSHIP.

    (a) Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership.--The 
Secretary of State is authorized to establish a program, to be known as 
the ``Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership'' to help 
foreign countries--
            (1) expand and increase secure Internet access and digital 
        infrastructure in emerging markets;
            (2) protect technological assets, including data;
            (3) adopt policies and regulatory positions that foster and 
        encourage open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet, 
        the free flow of data, multi-stakeholder models of internet 
        governance, and pro-competitive and security information 
        communications technology policies and regulations;
            (4) promote exports of United States information and 
        communications technology (ICT) goods and services and increase 
        United States company market share in target markets;
            (5) promote the diversification of ICT goods and supply 
        chain services to be less reliant on Chinese imports; and
            (6) build cybersecurity capacity, expand interoperability, 
        and promote best practices for a national approach to 
        cybersecurity.
    (b) Implementation Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
appropriate committees of Congress an implementation plan for the 
coming year to advance the goals identified in subsection (a).
    (c) Consultation.--In developing the strategy required by 
subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall consult with--
            (1) leaders of the United States industry;
            (2) other relevant technology experts, including the Open 
        Technology Fund;
            (3) representatives from relevant United States Government 
        agencies; and
            (4) representatives from like-minded allies and partners.
    (d) Semiannual Briefing Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for five 
years, the Secretary of State shall provide to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives a briefing on the implementation of the plan 
required by subsection (b).
    (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $100,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026.

        Subtitle D--Countering Chinese Communist Party Influence

SEC. 131. SHORT TITLE.

    This subtitle may be cited as the ``Countering Chinese Communist 
Party Malign Influence Act''.

SEC. 132. AUTHORIZATION.

    (a) Countering Chinese Influence Fund.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $300,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 
for the Countering Chinese Influence Fund to counter the malign 
influence of the Chinese Communist Party globally. Amounts appropriated 
pursuant to this authorization are authorized to remain available until 
expended and shall supplement, not supplant, amounts otherwise 
authorized to be appropriated to counter such influence.
    (b) Consultation Required.--The obligation of funds appropriated or 
otherwise made available to counter the malign influence of the Chinese 
Communist Party globally, including pursuant to the authorization under 
subsection (a), shall be subject to prior consultation with, and 
consistent with section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
U.S.C. 2394-1), the regular notification procedures of--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
    (c) Policy Guidance, Coordination, and Approval.--
            (1) Coordinator.--The Secretary of State shall designate an 
        existing senior official of the Department at the rank of 
        Assistant Secretary or above to provide policy guidance, 
        coordination, and approval for the obligation of funds 
        authorized pursuant to subsection (a).
            (2) Duties.--The senior official designated pursuant to 
        paragraph (1) shall be responsible for--
                    (A) on an annual basis, the identification of 
                specific strategic priorities for using the funds 
                authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a), such 
                as geographic areas of focus or functional categories 
                of programming that funds are to be concentrated 
                within, consistent with the national interests of the 
                United States and the purposes of this Act;
                    (B) the coordination and approval of all 
                programming conducted using the funds authorized to be 
                appropriated by subsection (a), based on a 
                determination that such programming directly counters 
                the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party, 
                including specific activities or policies advanced by 
                the Chinese Communist Party, pursuant to the strategic 
                objectives of the United States, as established in the 
                2017 National Security Strategy, the 2018 National 
                Defense Strategy, and other relevant national and 
                regional strategies as appropriate;
                    (C) ensuring that all programming approved bears a 
                sufficiently direct nexus to such acts by the Chinese 
                Communist Party described in subsection (d) and adheres 
                to the requirements outlined in subsection (e); and
                    (D) conducting oversight, monitoring, and 
                evaluation of the effectiveness of all programming 
                conducted using the funds authorized to be appropriated 
                by subsection (a) to ensure that it advances United 
                States interests and degrades the ability of the 
                Chinese Communist Party, to advance activities that 
                align with subsection (d) of this section.
            (3) Interagency coordination.--The senior official 
        designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall, in coordinating and 
        approving programming pursuant to paragraph (2), seek to--
                    (A) conduct appropriate interagency consultation; 
                and
                    (B) ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, that 
                all approved programming functions in concert with 
                other Federal activities to counter the malign 
                influence and activities of the Chinese Communist 
                Party.
            (4) Assistant coordinator.--The Administrator of the United 
        States Agency for International Development shall designate a 
        senior official at the rank of Assistant Administrator or above 
        to assist and consult the senior official designated pursuant 
        to paragraph (1).
    (d) Malign Influence.--In this section, the term ``malign 
influence'' with respect to the Chinese Communist Party should be 
construed to include acts conducted by the Chinese Communist Party or 
entities acting on its behalf that--
            (1) undermine a free and open international order;
            (2) advance an alternative, repressive international order 
        that bolsters the Chinese Communist Party's hegemonic ambitions 
        and is characterized by coercion and dependency;
            (3) undermine the national security or sovereignty of the 
        United States or other countries; or
            (4) undermine the economic security of the United States or 
        other countries, including by promoting corruption.
    (e) Countering Malign Influence.--In this section countering malign 
influence through the use of funds authorized to be appropriated by 
subsection (a) shall include efforts to--
            (1) promote transparency and accountability, and reduce 
        corruption, including in governance structures targeted by the 
        malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party;
            (2) support civil society and independent media to raise 
        awareness of and increase transparency regarding the negative 
        impact of activities related to the Belt and Road Initiative;
            (3) counter transnational criminal networks that benefit, 
        or benefit from, the malign influence of the Chinese Communist 
        Party;
            (4) encourage economic development structures that help 
        protect against predatory lending schemes, including support 
        for market-based alternatives in key economic sectors, such as 
        digital economy, energy, and infrastructure;
            (5) counter activities that provide undue influence to the 
        security forces of the People's Republic of China;
            (6) expose misinformation and disinformation of the Chinese 
        Communist Party's propaganda, including through programs 
        carried out by the Global Engagement Center; and
            (7) counter efforts by the Chinese Communist Party to 
        legitimize or promote authoritarian ideology and governance 
        models.

SEC. 133. FINDINGS ON CHINESE INFORMATION WARFARE AND MALIGN INFLUENCE 
              OPERATIONS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) In the report to Congress required under section 
        1261(b) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization 
        Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232), the President 
        laid out a broad range of malign activities conducted by the 
        Government of China and its agents and entities, including--
                    (A) propaganda and disinformation, in which 
                ``Beijing communicates its narrative through state-run 
                television, print, radio, and online organizations 
                whose presence is proliferating in the United States 
                and around the world'';
                    (B) malign political influence operations, in which 
                ``front organizations and agents which target 
                businesses, universities, think tanks, scholars, 
                journalists, and local state and Federal officials in 
                the United States and around the world, attempting to 
                influence discourse''; and
                    (C) malign financial influence operations, 
                characterized as ``misappropriation of technology and 
                intellectual property, failure to appropriately 
                disclose relationships with foreign government 
                sponsored entities, breaches of contract and 
                confidentiality, and manipulation of processes for fair 
                and merit-based allocation of Federal research and 
                development funding''.
            (2) Chinese information warfare and malign influence 
        operations are ongoing. In January 2019, the Director of 
        National Intelligence, Dan Coats, stated, ``China will continue 
        to use legal, political, and economic levers--such as the lure 
        of Chinese markets--to shape the information environment. It is 
        also capable of using cyber attacks against systems in the 
        United States to censor or suppress viewpoints it deems 
        politically sensitive.''.
            (3) In February 2020, the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation, Christopher Wray, testified to the Committee on 
        the Judiciary of the House of Representatives that the People's 
        Republic of China has ``very active [malign] foreign influence 
        efforts in this country,'' with the goal of ``trying to shift 
        our policy and our public opinion to be more pro-China on a 
        variety of issues''.
            (4) The People's Republic of China's information warfare 
        and malign influence operations continue to adopt new tactics 
        and evolve in sophistication. In May 2020, the Special Envoy 
        and Coordinator of the Global Engagement Center (GEC), Lea 
        Gabrielle, stated that there was a convergence of Russian and 
        Chinese narratives surrounding COVID-19 and that the GEC had 
        ``uncovered a new network of inauthentic Twitter accounts'' 
        that it assessed was ``created with the intent to amplify 
        Chinese propaganda and disinformation''. In June 2020, Google 
        reported that Chinese hackers attempted to access email 
        accounts of the campaign staff of a presidential candidate.
            (5) Chinese information warfare and malign influence 
        operations are a threat to the national security, democracy and 
        the economic systems of the United States, its allies and 
        partners. In October 2018, Vice President Mike Pence warned 
        that ``Beijing is employing a whole-of-government approach, 
        using political, economic, and military tools, as well as 
        propaganda, to advance its influence and benefit its interests 
        in the United States.''.
            (6) In February 2018, the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation, Christopher Wray, testified to the Select 
        Committee on Intelligence of the Senate that the People's 
        Republic of China is taking advantage of and exploiting the 
        open research and development environments of United States 
        institutions of higher education to utilize ``professors, 
        scientists and students'' as ``nontraditional collectors'' of 
        information.
    (b) Presidential Duties.--The President shall--
            (1) protect our democratic institutions and processes from 
        malign influence from the People's Republic of China and other 
        foreign adversaries; and
            (2) consistent with the policy specified in paragraph (1), 
        direct the heads of the appropriate Federal departments and 
        agencies to implement Acts of Congress to counter and deter 
        Chinese and other foreign information warfare and malign 
        influence operations without delay, including--
                    (A) section 1043 of the John S. McCain National 
                Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public 
                Law 115-232), which authorizes a coordinator position 
                within the National Security Council for countering 
                malign foreign influence operations and campaigns;
                    (B) section 228 of the National Defense 
                Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116-
                92), which authorizes additional research of foreign 
                malign influence operations on social media platforms;
                    (C) section 847 of such Act, which requires the 
                Secretary of Defense to modify contracting regulations 
                regarding vetting for foreign ownership, control and 
                influence in order to mitigate risks from malign 
                foreign influence;
                    (D) section 1239 of such Act, which requires an 
                update of the comprehensive strategy to counter the 
                threat of malign influence to include the People's 
                Republic of China;
                    (E) section 5323 of such Act, which authorizes the 
                Director of National Intelligence to facilitate the 
                establishment of Social Media Data and Threat Analysis 
                Center to detect and study information warfare and 
                malign influence operations across social media 
                platforms; and
                    (F) section 119C of the National Security Act of 
                1947 (50 U.S.C. 3059), which authorizes the 
                establishment of a Foreign Malign Influence Response 
                Center inside the Office of the Director of National 
                Intelligence.

SEC. 134. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE FULBRIGHT-HAYS 
              PROGRAM.

    There are authorized to be appropriated, for the 6-year period 
beginning on September 30, 2021, $105,500,000, which shall be expended 
to promote education, training, research, and foreign language skills 
through the Fulbright-Hays Program, in accordance with section 102(b) 
of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2452(b)).

SEC. 135. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING ANTI-ASIAN RACISM AND 
              DISCRIMINATION.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, crimes and 
        discrimination against Asians and those of Asian descent have 
        risen dramatically worldwide. In May 2020, United Nations 
        Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said ``the pandemic 
        continues to unleash a tsunami of hate and xenophobia, 
        scapegoating and scare-mongering'' and urged governments to 
        ``act now to strengthen the immunity of our societies against 
        the virus of hate''.
            (2) Asian American and Pacific Island (AAPI) workers make 
        up a large portion of the essential workers on the frontlines 
        of the COVID-19 pandemic, making up 8.5 percent of all 
        essential healthcare workers in the United States. AAPI workers 
        also make up a large share--between 6 percent and 12 percent 
        based on sector--of the biomedical field.
            (3) The United States Census notes that Americans of Asian 
        descent alone made up nearly 5.9 percent of the United States 
        population in 2019, and that Asian Americans are the fastest-
        growing racial group in the United States, projected to 
        represent 14 percent of the United States population by 2065.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the reprehensible attacks on people of Asian descent 
        and concerning increase in anti-Asian sentiment and racism in 
        the United States and around the world have no place in a 
        peaceful, civilized, and tolerant world;
            (2) the United States is a diverse nation with a proud 
        tradition of immigration, and the strength and vibrancy of the 
        United States is enhanced by the diverse ethnic backgrounds and 
        tolerance of its citizens, including Asian Americans and 
        Pacific Islanders;
            (3) the United States Government should encourage other 
        foreign governments to use the official and scientific names 
        for the COVID-19 pandemic, as recommended by the World Health 
        Organization and the Centers for Disease Control and 
        Prevention; and
            (4) the United States Government and other governments 
        around the world must actively oppose racism and intolerance, 
        and use available and appropriate tools to combat the spread of 
        anti-Asian racism and discrimination.

SEC. 136. SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND COUNTERING DISINFORMATION.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) China is increasing its spending on public diplomacy 
        including influence campaigns, advertising, and investments 
        into state-sponsored media publications outside of China. These 
        include, for example, more than $10,000,000,000 in foreign 
        direct investment in communications infrastructure, platforms, 
        and properties, as well as bringing journalists to China for 
        training programs.
            (2) The PRC, through the Voice of China, the United Front 
        Work Department, and UFWD's many affiliates and proxies, has 
        obtained unfettered access to radio, television, and digital 
        dissemination platforms in numerous languages targeted at 
        citizens in other regions where China has an interest in 
        promoting public sentiment in support of the Chinese Communist 
        Party and expanding the reach of its misleading narratives and 
        propaganda.
            (3) Even in Western countries, China spends extensively on 
        influence operations, such as a $500,000,000 advertising 
        campaign to attract cable viewers in Australia and a more than 
        $20,000,000 campaign to influence United States public opinion 
        via the China Daily newspaper supplement.
    (b) The United States Agency for Global Media.--The United States 
Agency for Global Media (USAGM) and affiliate Federal and non-Federal 
entities shall undertake the following actions to support independent 
journalism, countering disinformation, and breaking the firewall and 
combatting surveillance in countries where the Chinese Communist Party 
and other malign actors are promoting disinformation, propaganda, and 
manipulated media markets:
            (1) Radio Free Asia shall expand domestic coverage and 
        digital programming for all RFA China services and other 
        affiliate language broadcasting services.
            (2) USAGM shall increase funding for Radio Free Asia's 
        Mandarin, Tibetan, Uyghur, and Cantonese language services.
            (3) Voice of America shall establish a real-time 
        disinformation tracking tool similar to Polygraph for Russian 
        language propaganda and misinformation.
            (4) USAGM shall expand existing training and partnership 
        programs that promote journalistic standards, investigative 
        reporting, cybersecurity, and digital analytics to help expose 
        and counter false CCP narratives.
            (5) The Open Technology Fund shall continue and expand work 
        to support tools and technology to circumvent censorship and 
        surveillance by the CCP, both inside China as well as abroad 
        where China has exported censorship technology, and increase 
        secure peer to peer connectivity and privacy tools.
    (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for the United 
States Agency for Global Media, $100,000,000 for ongoing and new 
programs to support local media, build independent media, combat 
Chinese disinformation inside and outside of China, invest in 
technology to subvert censorship, and monitor and evaluate these 
programs.
    (d) Support for Local Media.--The Secretary of State, acting 
through the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, 
and Labor and in coordination with the Administrator of the United 
States Agency for International Development, shall support and train 
journalists on investigative techniques necessary to ensure public 
accountability related to the Belt and Road Initiative, the PRC's 
surveillance and digital export of technology, and other influence 
operations abroad direct or directly supported by the Communist Party 
or the Chinese government.
    (e) Internet Freedom Programs.--The Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor shall continue to support internet freedom programs.
    (f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026, $170,000,000 
for ongoing and new programs in support of press freedom, training, and 
protection of journalists.

SEC. 137. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER.

    (a) Finding.--Congress established the Global Engagement Center to 
``direct, lead, and coordinate efforts'' of the Federal Government to 
``recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and non-
state propaganda and disinformation globally''.
    (b) Extension.--Section 1287(j) of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended 
by striking ``the date that is 8 years after the date of the enactment 
of this Act'' and inserting ``December 31, 2027''.
    (c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the Global 
Engagement Center should expand its coordinating capacity through the 
exchange of liaison officers with Federal departments and agencies that 
manage aspects of identifying and countering foreign disinformation, 
including the National Counterterrorism Center at the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence and from combatant commands.
    (d) Hiring Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
the Secretary of State, during the five year period beginning on the 
date of the enactment of this Act and solely to carry out functions of 
the Global Engagement Center, may--
            (1) appoint employees without regard to the provisions of 
        title 5, United States Code, regarding appointments in the 
        competitive service; and
            (2) fix the basic compensation of such employees without 
        regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such 
        title regarding classification and General Schedule pay rates.

SEC. 138. REVIEW BY COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED 
              STATES OF CERTAIN FOREIGN GIFTS TO AND CONTRACTS WITH 
              INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION.

    (a) Amendments to Defense Production Act of 1950.--
            (1) Definition of covered transaction.--Subsection (a)(4) 
        of section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 
        4565) is amended--
                    (A) in subparagraph (A)--
                            (i) in clause (i), by striking ``; and'' 
                        and inserting a semicolon;
                            (ii) in clause (ii), by striking the period 
                        at the end and inserting ``; and''; and
                            (iii) by adding at the end the following:
                            ``(iii) any transaction described in 
                        subparagraph (B)(vi) proposed or pending after 
                        the date of the enactment of the Strategic 
                        Competition Act of 2021.'';
                    (B) in subparagraph (B), by adding at the end the 
                following:
                            ``(vi) Any gift to an institution of higher 
                        education from a foreign person, or the entry 
                        into a contract by such an institution with a 
                        foreign person, if--
                                    ``(I)(aa) the value of the gift or 
                                contract equals or exceeds $1,000,000; 
                                or
                                    ``(bb) the institution receives, 
                                directly or indirectly, more than one 
                                gift from or enters into more than one 
                                contract, directly or indirectly, with 
                                the same foreign person for the same 
                                purpose the aggregate value of which, 
                                during the period of 2 consecutive 
                                calendar years, equals or exceeds 
                                $1,000,000; and
                                    ``(II) the gift or contract--
                                            ``(aa) relates to research, 
                                        development, or production of 
                                        critical technologies and 
                                        provides the foreign person 
                                        potential access to any 
                                        material nonpublic technical 
                                        information (as defined in 
                                        subparagraph (D)(ii)) in the 
                                        possession of the institution; 
                                        or
                                            ``(bb) is a restricted or 
                                        conditional gift or contract 
                                        (as defined in section 117(h) 
                                        of the Higher Education Act of 
                                        1965 (20 U.S.C. 2011f(h))) that 
                                        establishes control.''; and
                    (C) by adding at the end the following:
                    ``(G) Foreign gifts to and contracts with 
                institutions of higher education.--For purposes of 
                subparagraph (B)(vi):
                            ``(i) Contract.--The term `contract' means 
                        any agreement for the acquisition by purchase, 
                        lease, or barter of property or services by a 
                        foreign person, for the direct benefit or use 
                        of either of the parties.
                            ``(ii) Gift.--The term `gift' means any 
                        gift of money or property.
                            ``(iii) Institution of higher education.--
                        The term `institution of higher education' 
                        means any institution, public or private, or, 
                        if a multicampus institution, any single campus 
                        of such institution, in any State--
                                    ``(I) that is legally authorized 
                                within such State to provide a program 
                                of education beyond secondary school;
                                    ``(II) that provides a program for 
                                which the institution awards a 
                                bachelor's degree (or provides not less 
                                than a 2-year program which is 
                                acceptable for full credit toward such 
                                a degree) or a more advanced degree;
                                    ``(III) that is accredited by a 
                                nationally recognized accrediting 
                                agency or association; and
                                    ``(IV) to which the Federal 
                                Government extends Federal financial 
                                assistance (directly or indirectly 
                                through another entity or person), or 
                                that receives support from the 
                                extension of Federal financial 
                                assistance to any of the institution's 
                                subunits.''.
            (2) Mandatory declarations.--Subsection 
        (b)(1)(C)(v)(IV)(aa) of such section is amended by adding at 
        the end the following: ``Such regulations shall require a 
        declaration under this subclause with respect to a covered 
        transaction described in subsection (a)(4)(B)(vi)(II)(aa).''.
            (3) Factors to be considered.--Subsection (f) of such 
        section is amended--
                    (A) in paragraph (10), by striking ``; and'' and 
                inserting a semicolon;
                    (B) by redesignating paragraph (11) as paragraph 
                (12); and
                    (C) by inserting after paragraph (10) the 
                following:
            ``(11) as appropriate, and particularly with respect to 
        covered transactions described in subsection (a)(4)(B)(vi), the 
        importance of academic freedom at institutions of higher 
        education in the United States; and''.
            (4) Membership of cfius.--Subsection (k)(2) of such section 
        is amended--
                    (A) by redesignating subparagraphs (H), (I), and 
                (J) as subparagraphs (I), (J), and (K), respectively; 
                and
                    (B) by inserting after subparagraph (G) the 
                following:
                    ``(G) In the case of a covered transaction 
                involving an institution of higher education (as 
                defined in subsection (a)(4)(G)), the Secretary of 
                Education.''.
            (5) Contents of annual report relating to critical 
        technologies.--Subsection (m)(3) of such section is amended--
                    (A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``; and'' and 
                inserting a semicolon;
                    (B) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period at 
                the end and inserting a semicolon; and
                    (C) by adding at the end the following:
                    ``(D) an evaluation of whether there are foreign 
                malign influence or espionage activities directed or 
                directly assisted by foreign governments against 
                institutions of higher education (as defined in 
                subsection (a)(4)(G)) aimed at obtaining research and 
                development methods or secrets related to critical 
                technologies; and
                    ``(E) an evaluation of, and recommendation for any 
                changes to, reviews conducted under this section that 
                relate to institutions of higher education, based on an 
                analysis of disclosure reports submitted to the 
                chairperson under section 117(a) of the Higher 
                Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1011f(a)).''.
    (b) Inclusion of CFIUS in Reporting on Foreign Gifts Under Higher 
Education Act of 1965.--Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 
(20 U.S.C. 1011f) is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a), by inserting after ``the Secretary'' 
        the following: ``and the Secretary of the Treasury (in the 
        capacity of the Secretary as the chairperson of the Committee 
        on Foreign Investment in the United States under section 
        721(k)(3) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 
        4565(k)(3)))''; and
            (2) in subsection (d)--
                    (A) in paragraph (1)--
                            (i) by striking ``with the Secretary'' and 
                        inserting ``with the Secretary and the 
                        Secretary of the Treasury''; and
                            (ii) by striking ``to the Secretary'' and 
                        inserting ``to each such Secretary''; and
                    (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``with the 
                Secretary'' and inserting ``with the Secretary and the 
                Secretary of the Treasury''.
    (c) Effective Date; Applicability.--The amendments made by 
subsection (a) shall--
            (1) take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, 
        subject to the requirements of subsections (d) and (e); and
            (2) apply with respect to any covered transaction the 
        review or investigation of which is initiated under section 721 
        of the Defense Production Act of 1950 on or after that date.
    (d) Regulations.--
            (1) In general.--The Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
        United States, which shall include the Secretary of Education 
        for purposes of this subsection, shall prescribe regulations as 
        necessary and appropriate to implement the amendments made by 
        subsection (a).
            (2) Elements.--The regulations prescribed under paragraph 
        (1) shall include--
                    (A) regulations accounting for the burden on 
                institutions of higher education likely to result from 
                compliance with the amendments made by subsection (a), 
                structuring penalties and filing fees to reduce such 
                burdens, and implementing any procedures necessary to 
                protect academic freedom; and
                    (B) guidance with respect to the meaning of 
                ``control'', as defined in section 721(a) of the 
                Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565(a)), as 
                that term applies to covered transactions described in 
                clause (vi) of paragraph (4)(B) of that section, as 
                added by subsection (a)(1).
            (3) Issuance of final rule.--The Committee shall issue a 
        final rule to carry out the amendments made by subsection (a) 
        after assessing the findings of the pilot program required by 
        subsection (e).
    (e) Pilot Program.--
            (1) In general.--Beginning on the date that is 30 days 
        after the publication in the Federal Register of the matter 
        required by paragraph (2) and ending on the date that is 570 
        days thereafter, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
        United States shall conduct a pilot program to assess methods 
        for implementing the review of covered transactions described 
        in clause (vi) of section 721(a)(4)(B) of the Defense 
        Production Act of 1950, as added by subsection (a)(1).
            (2) Proposed determination.--Not later than 270 days after 
        the date of the enactment of this Act, the Committee shall, in 
        consultation with the Secretary of Education, publish in the 
        Federal Register--
                    (A) a proposed determination of the scope of and 
                procedures for the pilot program required by paragraph 
                (1);
                    (B) an assessment of the burden on institutions of 
                higher education likely to result from compliance with 
                the pilot program;
                    (C) recommendations for addressing any such 
                burdens, including structuring penalties and filing 
                fees to reduce such burdens; and
                    (D) any procedures necessary to ensure that the 
                pilot program does not infringe upon academic freedom.

           TITLE II--INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS

              Subtitle A--Strategic and Diplomatic Matters

SEC. 201. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.

    In this subtitle, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 202. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT FOR ALLIES AND PARTNERS 
              IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific 
        provide a unique strategic advantage to the United States and 
        are among the Nation's most precious assets, enabling the 
        United States to advance its vital national interests, defend 
        its territory, expand its economy through international trade 
        and commerce, establish enduring cooperation among like-minded 
        countries, prevent the domination of the Indo-Pacific and its 
        surrounding maritime and air lanes by a hostile power or 
        powers, and deter potential aggressors;
            (2) the Governments of the United States, Japan, the 
        Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and Thailand are 
        critical allies in advancing a free and open order in the Indo-
        Pacific region and tackling challenges with unity purpose, and 
        have collaborated to advance specific efforts of shared 
        interest in areas such as defense and security, economic 
        prosperity, infrastructure connectivity, and fundamental 
        freedoms;
            (3) the United States greatly values other partnerships in 
        the Indo-Pacific region, including with India, Singapore, 
        Indonesia, Taiwan, New Zealand, and Vietnam as well as regional 
        architecture such as the Quad, the Association of Southeast 
        Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Community 
        (APEC), which are essential to further shared interests;
            (4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific demands 
        consistent United States and allied commitment to strengthening 
        and advancing our alliances so that they are postured to meet 
        these challenges, and will require sustained political will, 
        concrete partnerships, economic, commercial, and technological 
        cooperation, consistent and tangible commitments, high-level 
        and extensive consultations on matters of mutual interest, 
        mutual and shared cooperation in the acquisition of key 
        capabilities important to allied defenses, and unified mutual 
        support in the face of political, economic, or military 
        coercion;
            (5) fissures in the United States alliance relationships 
        and partnerships benefit United States adversaries and weaken 
        collective ability to advance shared interests; and
            (6) the United States will work with allies to prioritize 
        promoting human rights throughout the region.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States--
            (1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and security 
        cooperation between and among the United States, Japan, the 
        Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia, 
        including through diplomatic engagement, regional development, 
        energy security and development, scientific and health 
        partnerships, educational and cultural exchanges, missile 
        defense, intelligence-sharing, space, cyber, and other 
        diplomatic and defense-related initiatives;
            (2) to uphold our multilateral and bilateral treaty 
        obligations, including--
                    (A) defending Japan, including all areas under the 
                administration of Japan, under article V of the Treaty 
                of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United 
                States of America and Japan;
                    (B) defending the Republic of Korea under article 
                III of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United 
                States and the Republic of Korea;
                    (C) defending the Philippines under article IV of 
                the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and 
                the Republic of the Philippines;
                    (D) defending Thailand under the 1954 Manila Pact 
                and the Thanat-Rusk communique of 1962; and
                    (E) defending Australia under article IV of the 
                Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty;
            (3) to strengthen and deepen our bilateral and regional 
        partnerships, including with India, Taiwan, ASEAN, and New 
        Zealand;
            (4) to cooperate with Japan, the Republic of Korea, the 
        Philippines, Thailand, and Australia to promote human rights 
        bilaterally and through regional and multilateral fora and 
        pacts; and
            (5) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, economic, and 
        security cooperation with regional partners, such as Taiwan, 
        Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and India.

SEC. 203. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COOPERATION WITH THE QUAD.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States should reaffirm our commitment to 
        quadrilateral cooperation among Australia, India, Japan, and 
        the United States (the ``Quad'') to enhance and implement a 
        shared vision to meet shared regional challenges and to promote 
        a free, open, inclusive, resilient, and healthy Indo-Pacific 
        that is characterized by democracy, rule-of-law, and market-
        driven economic growth and is free from undue influence and 
        coercion;
            (2) the United States should seek to expand sustained 
        dialogue and cooperation through the Quad with a range of 
        partners to support the rule of law, freedom of navigation and 
        overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, 
        and territorial integrity, and to uphold peace and prosperity 
        and strengthen democratic resilience;
            (3) the United States should seek to expand avenues of 
        cooperation with the Quad, including more regular military-to-
        military dialogues, joint exercises, and coordinated policies 
        related to shared interests such as protecting cyberspace and 
        advancing maritime security; and
            (4) the recent pledge from the first-ever Quad leaders 
        meeting on March 12, 2021, to respond to the economic and 
        health impacts of COVID-19, including expanding safe, 
        affordable, and effective vaccine production and equitable 
        access, and to address shared challenges, including in 
        cyberspace, critical technologies, counterterrorism, quality 
        infrastructure investment, and humanitarian assistance and 
        disaster relief, as well as maritime domains, further advances 
        the important cooperation among Quad nations that is so 
        critical to the Indo-Pacific region.

SEC. 204. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH ASEAN.

    It is the policy of the United States to--
            (1) stand with the nations of Association of Southeast 
        Asian Nations (ASEAN) as they respond to COVID-19 and support 
        greater cooperation in building capacity to prepare for and 
        respond to pandemics and other public health challenges;
            (2) support high-level United States participation in the 
        annual ASEAN Summit held each November;
            (3) reaffirm the importance of United States-ASEAN economic 
        engagement, including the elimination of barriers to cross-
        border commerce, and support the ASEAN Economic Community's 
        (AEC) goals, including strong, inclusive, and sustainable long-
        term economic growth and cooperation with the United States 
        that focuses on innovation and capacity-building efforts in 
        technology, education, disaster management, food security, 
        human rights, and trade facilitation, particularly for ASEAN's 
        poorest countries;
            (4) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster greater 
        integration and unity within the ASEAN community, as well as to 
        foster greater integration and unity with non-ASEAN economic, 
        political, and security partners, including Japan, the Republic 
        of Korea, Australia, the European Union, Taiwan, and India;
            (5) recognize the value of strategic economic initiatives 
        like United States-ASEAN Connect, which demonstrates a 
        commitment to ASEAN and the AEC and builds upon economic 
        relationships in the region;
            (6) support ASEAN nations in addressing maritime and 
        territorial disputes in a constructive manner and in pursuing 
        claims through peaceful, diplomatic, and, as necessary, 
        legitimate regional and international arbitration mechanisms, 
        consistent with international law, including through the 
        adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea that 
        represents the interests of all parties and promotes peace and 
        stability in the region;
            (7) urge all parties involved in the maritime and 
        territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific region, including the 
        Government of China--
                    (A) to cease any current activities, and avoid 
                undertaking any actions in the future, that undermine 
                stability, or complicate or escalate disputes through 
                the use of coercion, intimidation, or military force;
                    (B) to demilitarize islands, reefs, shoals, and 
                other features, and refrain from new efforts to 
                militarize, including the construction of new garrisons 
                and facilities and the relocation of additional 
                military personnel, material, or equipment;
                    (C) to oppose actions by any country that prevent 
                other countries from exercising their sovereign rights 
                to the resources in their exclusive economic zones and 
                continental shelves by enforcing claims to those areas 
                in the South China Sea that lack support in 
                international law; and
                    (D) to oppose unilateral declarations of 
                administrative and military districts in contested 
                areas in the South China Sea;
            (8) urge parties to refrain from unilateral actions that 
        cause permanent physical damage to the marine environment and 
        support the efforts of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
        Administration and ASEAN to implement guidelines to address the 
        illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the region;
            (9) urge ASEAN member states to develop a common approach 
        to reaffirm the decision of the Permanent Court of 
        Arbitration's 2016 ruling in favor of the Republic of the 
        Philippines in the case against the People's Republic of 
        China's excessive maritime claims;
            (10) reaffirm the commitment of the United States to 
        continue joint efforts with ASEAN to halt human smuggling and 
        trafficking in persons and urge ASEAN to create and strengthen 
        regional mechanisms to provide assistance and support to 
        refugees and migrants;
            (11) support the Lower Mekong Initiative;
            (12) support newly created initiatives with ASEAN 
        countries, including the Mekong-United States partnership, the 
        United States-ASEAN Smart Cities Partnership, the ASEAN Policy 
        Implementation Project, the United States-ASEAN Innovation 
        Circle, and the United States-ASEAN Health Futures;
            (13) encourage the President to communicate to ASEAN 
        leaders the importance of promoting the rule of law and open 
        and transparent government, strengthening civil society, and 
        protecting human rights, including releasing political 
        prisoners, ceasing politically motivated prosecutions and 
        arbitrary killings, and safeguarding freedom of the press, 
        freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom of speech 
        and expression;
            (14) support efforts by organizations in ASEAN that address 
        corruption in the public and private sectors, enhance anti-
        bribery compliance, enforce bribery criminalization in the 
        private sector, and build beneficial ownership transparency 
        through the ASEAN-USAID PROSPECT project partnered with the 
        South East Asia Parties Against Corruption (SEA-PAC);
            (15) support the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative 
        as an example of a people-to-people partnership that provides 
        skills, networks, and leadership training to a new generation 
        that will create and fill jobs, foster cross-border cooperation 
        and partnerships, and rise to solve the regional and global 
        challenges of the future;
            (16) support creating initiatives similar to the Young 
        Southeast Asian Leaders for other parts of the Indo-Pacific to 
        foster people-to-people partnerships with an emphasis on civil 
        society leaders;
            (17) acknowledge those ASEAN governments that have fully 
        upheld and implemented all United Nations Security Council 
        resolutions and international agreements with respect to the 
        Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear and ballistic 
        missile programs and encourage all other ASEAN governments to 
        do the same; and
            (18) allocate appropriate resources across the United 
        States Government to articulate and implement an Indo-Pacific 
        strategy that respects and supports ASEAN centrality and 
        supports ASEAN as a source of well-functioning and problem-
        solving regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific community.

SEC. 205. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ENHANCING UNITED STATES-ASEAN 
              COOPERATION ON TECHNOLOGY ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO THE 
              PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States and ASEAN should complete a joint 
        analysis on risks of overreliance on Chinese equipment critical 
        to strategic technologies and critical infrastructure;
            (2) the United States and ASEAN should share information 
        about and collaborate on screening Chinese investments in 
        strategic technology and critical infrastructure;
            (3) the United States and ASEAN should work together on 
        appropriate import restriction regimes regarding Chinese 
        exports of surveillance technologies;
            (4) the United States should urge ASEAN to adopt its March 
        2019 proposed sanctions regime targeting cyber attacks;
            (5) the United States should urge ASEAN to commit to the 
        September 2019 principles signed by 28 countries regarding 
        ``Advancing Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace'', a set 
        of commitments that support the ``rules-based international 
        order, affirm the applicability of international law to state-
        on-state behavior, adherence to voluntary norms of responsible 
        state behavior in peacetime, and the development and 
        implementation of practical confidence building measures to 
        help reduce the risk of conflict stemming from cyber 
        incidents''; and
            (6) the United States and ASEAN should explore how Chinese 
        investments in critical technology, including artificial 
        intelligence, will impact Indo-Pacific security over the coming 
        decades.

SEC. 206. REPORT ON CHINESE INFLUENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

    (a) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report on 
the expanded influence of the Government of the People's Republic of 
China and the Chinese Communist Party in international organizations.
    (b) Contents.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include 
analysis of the following:
            (1) The influence of the PRC and Chinese Communist Party in 
        international organizations and how that influence has expanded 
        over the last 10 years, including--
                    (A) tracking countries' voting patterns that align 
                with Chinese government voting patterns;
                    (B) the number of PRC nationals in leadership 
                positions at the D-1 level or higher;
                    (C) changes in PRC voluntary and mandatory funding 
                by organization;
                    (D) adoption of Chinese Communist Party phrases and 
                initiatives in international organization language and 
                programming;
                    (E) efforts by the PRC to secure legitimacy for its 
                own foreign policy initiatives, including the Belt and 
                Road Initiative;
                    (F) the number of Junior Professional Officers that 
                the Government of China has funded by organization;
                    (G) tactics used by the Government of China or the 
                CCP to manipulate secret or otherwise non-public voting 
                measures, voting bodies, or votes;
                    (H) the extent to which technology companies 
                incorporated in the PRC, or which have PRC or CCP 
                ownership interests, provide equipment and services to 
                international organizations; and
                    (I) efforts by China's United Nations Mission to 
                generate criticism of the United States in the United 
                Nations, including any efforts to highlight delayed 
                United States payments or to misrepresent total United 
                States voluntary and assessed financial contributions 
                to the United Nations and its specialized agencies and 
                programs.
            (2) The purpose and ultimate goals of the expanded 
        influence of the PRC and the Chinese Communist Party in 
        international organizations, including an analysis of PRC 
        Government- and Chinese Communist Party strategic documents and 
        rhetoric.
            (3) The tactics and means employed by the PRC and the 
        Chinese Communist Party to achieve expanded influence in 
        international organizations, including--
                    (A) incentive programs for PRC nationals to join 
                and run for leadership positions in international 
                organizations;
                    (B) coercive economic and other practices against 
                other members in the organization; and
                    (C) economic or other incentives provided to 
                international organizations, including donations of 
                technologies or goods.
            (4) The successes and failures of PRC and CCP influence 
        efforts in international organizations.
    (c) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
    (d) Definition.--In this section, the term ``international 
organizations'' means the following:
            (1) The African Development Bank.
            (2) The Asian Development Bank.
            (3) The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation.
            (4) The Bank of International Settlements.
            (5) The Caribbean Development Bank.
            (6) The Food and Agriculture Organization.
            (7) The International Atomic Energy Agency.
            (8) The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
        Development.
            (9) The International Bureau of Weights and Measures.
            (10) The International Chamber of Commerce.
            (11) The International Civil Aviation Organization.
            (12) The International Criminal Police Organization.
            (13) The International Finance Corporation.
            (14) The International Fund for Agricultural Development.
            (15) The International Hydrographic Organization.
            (16) The International Labor Organization.
            (17) The International Maritime Organization.
            (18) The International Monetary Fund.
            (19) The International Olympic Committee.
            (20) The International Organization for Migration.
            (21) The International Organization for Standardization.
            (22) The International Renewable Energy Agency.
            (23) The International Telecommunications Union.
            (24) The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
        Development.
            (25) The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
        Weapons.
            (26) The United Nations.
            (27) The United Nations Conference on Trade and 
        Development.
            (28) The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
        Cultural Organization.
            (29) The United Nations Industrial Development 
        Organization.
            (30) The United Nations Institute for Training and 
        Research.
            (31) The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.
            (32) The Universal Postal Union.
            (33) The World Customs Organization.
            (34) The World Health Organization.
            (35) The World Intellectual Property Organization.
            (36) The World Meteorological Organization.
            (37) The World Organization for Animal Health.
            (38) The World Tourism Organization.
            (39) The World Trade Organization.
            (40) The World Bank Group.

SEC. 207. REGULATORY EXCHANGES WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
heads of other participating executive branch agencies, shall establish 
and develop a program to facilitate and encourage regular dialogues 
between United States Government regulatory and technical agencies and 
their counterpart organizations in allied and partner countries, both 
bilaterally and in relevant multilateral institutions and 
organizations--
            (1) to promote best practices in regulatory formation and 
        implementation;
            (2) to collaborate to achieve optimal regulatory outcomes 
        based on scientific, technical, and other relevant principles;
            (3) to seek better harmonization and alignment of 
        regulations and regulatory practices;
            (4) to build consensus around industry and technical 
        standards in emerging sectors that will drive future global 
        economic growth and commerce; and
            (5) to promote United States standards regarding 
        environmental, labor, and other relevant protections in 
        regulatory formation and implementation, in keeping with the 
        values of free and open societies, including the rule of law.
    (b) Prioritization of Activities.--In facilitating expert exchanges 
under subsection (a), the Secretary shall prioritize--
            (1) bilateral coordination and collaboration with countries 
        where greater regulatory coherence, harmonization of standards, 
        or communication and dialogue between technical agencies is 
        achievable and best advances the economic and national security 
        interests of the United States;
            (2) multilateral coordination and coordination where 
        greater regulatory coherence, harmonization of standards, or 
        dialogue on other relevant regulatory matters is achievable and 
        best advances the economic and national security interests of 
        the United States, including with--
                    (A) the European Union;
                    (B) the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation;
                    (C) the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
                (ASEAN);
                    (D) the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
                Development (OECD); and
                    (E) multilateral development banks; and
            (3) regulatory practices and standards setting bodies 
        focused on key economic sectors and emerging technologies.
    (c) Participation by Non-Governmental Entities.--With regard to the 
program described in subsection (a), the Secretary may facilitate, 
including through the use of amounts appropriated pursuant to 
subsection (e), the participation of private sector representatives, 
and other relevant organizations and individuals with relevant 
expertise, as appropriate and to the extent that such participation 
advances the goals of such program.
    (d) Delegation of Authority by the Secretary.--The Secretary of 
State is authorized to delegate the responsibilities described in this 
section to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, 
and the Environment.
    (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--
            (1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated 
        $2,500,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry 
        out this section.
            (2) Use of funds.--The Secretary may obligate amounts 
        appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) in a manner that--
                    (A) facilities participation by representatives 
                from technical agencies within the United States 
                Government and their counterparts; and
                    (B) complies with applicable procedural 
                requirements under the State Department Basic 
                Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a et seq.) and 
                the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et 
                seq.).

SEC. 208. TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP OFFICE AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States to lead new technology policy partnerships focused on the shared 
interests of the world's technology-leading democracies.
    (b) Establishment.--The Secretary of State shall establish an 
interagency-staffed Technology Partnership Office (referred to in this 
section as the ``Office''), which shall be housed in the Department of 
State.
    (c) Leadership.--
            (1) Ambassador-at-large.--The Office shall be headed by an 
        Ambassador-at-Large for Technology, who shall--
                    (A) be appointed by the President, by and with the 
                advice and consent of the Senate;
                    (B) have the rank and status of ambassador; and
                    (C) report to the Secretary of State, unless 
                otherwise directed.
            (2) Office liaisons.--The Secretary of Commerce and the 
        Secretary of Treasury shall each appoint, from within their 
        respective departments at the level of GS-14 or higher, 
        liaisons between the Office and the Department of Commerce or 
        the Department of the Treasury, as applicable, to perform the 
        following duties:
                    (A) Collaborate with the Department of State on 
                relevant technology initiatives and partnerships.
                    (B) Provide technical and other relevant expertise 
                to the Office, as appropriate.
    (d) Membership.--In addition to the liaisons referred to in 
subsection (c), the Office shall include a representative or expert 
detailee from key Federal agencies, as determined by the Ambassador-at-
Large for Technology.
    (e) Purposes.--The purposes of the Office shall include 
responsibilities such as--
            (1) creating, overseeing, and carrying out technology 
        partnerships with countries and relevant political and economic 
        unions that are committed to--
                    (A) the rule of law, freedom of speech, and respect 
                for an promotion of human rights;
                    (B) the safe and responsible development and use of 
                new and emerging technologies and the establishment of 
                related norms and standards;
                    (C) a secure internet architecture governed by a 
                multi-stakeholder model instead of centralized 
                government control;
                    (D) robust international cooperation to promote an 
                open internet and interoperable technological products 
                and services that are necessary to freedom, innovation, 
                transparency, and privacy; and
                    (E) multilateral coordination, including through 
                diplomatic initiatives, information sharing, and other 
                activities, to defend the principles described in 
                subparagraphs (A) through (C) against efforts by state 
                and non-state actors to undermine them;
            (2) harmonizing technology governance regimes with 
        partners, coordinating on basic and pre-competitive research 
        and development initiatives, and collaborating to pursue such 
        opportunities in key technologies, including--
                    (A) artificial intelligence and machine learning;
                    (B) 5G telecommunications and other advanced 
                wireless networking technologies;
                    (C) semiconductor manufacturing;
                    (D) biotechnology;
                    (E) quantum computing;
                    (F) surveillance technologies, including facial 
                recognition technologies and censorship software; and
                    (G) fiber optic cables;
            (3) coordinating with such countries regarding shared 
        technology strategies, including technology controls and 
        standards, as well as strategies with respect to the 
        development and acquisition of key technologies to provide 
        alternatives for those countries utilizing systems supported by 
        authoritarian regimes;
            (4) supporting and expanding adherence to international 
        treaties and frameworks governing the responsible use of new 
        and emerging technologies;
            (5) coordinating the adoption of shared data privacy, data 
        sharing, and data archiving standards among the United States 
        and partner countries and relevant economic and political 
        unions, including complementary data protection regulations;
            (6) coordinating with other technology partners on export 
        control policies, including as appropriate through the 
        Wassenaar Arrangement On Export Controls for Conventional Arms 
        and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, done at The Hague December 
        1995, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, and the 
        Missile Technology Control Regime; supply chain security; and 
        investment in or licensing of critical infrastructure and dual-
        use technologies;
            (7) coordinating with members of technology partnerships on 
        other policies for the use and control of emerging and 
        foundational technologies through appropriate restrictions, 
        investment screening, and appropriate measures with respect to 
        technology transfers;
            (8) coordinating policies, in coordination with the 
        Department of Commerce, around the resiliency of supply chains 
        in critical technology areas and explore possible 
        diversification of supply chain components to countries 
        involved in technology partnerships with the United States, 
        while also maintaining transparency surrounding subsidies and 
        product origins;
            (9) sharing information regarding the technology transfer 
        threat posed by authoritarian governments and the ways in which 
        autocratic regimes are utilizing technology to erode individual 
        freedoms and other foundations of open, democratic societies;
            (10) administering the establishment of--
                    (A) the common funding mechanism for development 
                and adoption of measurably secure semiconductors and 
                measurably secure semiconductors supply chains created 
                in and in accordance with the requirements of section 
                9905 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National 
                Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public 
                Law 116-283); and
                    (B) the multilateral telecommunications security 
                fund created in and in accordance with the requirements 
                of section 9202 of such Act; and
            (11) collaborating with private companies, trade 
        associations, and think tanks to realize the purposes of 
        paragraphs (1) through (10).
    (f) Special Hiring Authorities.--The Secretary of State may--
            (1) appoint employees without regard to the provisions of 
        title 5, United States Code, regarding appointments in the 
        competitive service; and
            (2) fix the basic compensation of such employees without 
        regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such 
        title regarding classification and General Schedule pay rates.
    (g) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the next three 
years, the Secretary of State shall submit an unclassified report to 
the appropriate congressional committees, with a classified index, if 
necessary, about the activities of the Office, including any 
cooperative initiatives and partnerships pursued with United States 
allies and partners, and the results of those activities, initiatives, 
and partnerships.
    (h) Sense of Congress on Establishing International Technology 
Partnership.--It is the sense of Congress that the Ambassador-at-Large 
for Technology should seek to establish an International Technology 
Partnership for the purposes described in this section with foreign 
countries that have--
            (1) democratic national government and a strong commitment 
        to democratic values, including an adherence to the rule of 
        law, freedom of speech, and respect for and promotion of human 
        rights;
            (2) an economy with advanced technology sectors; and
            (3) a demonstrated record of trust or an expressed interest 
        in international cooperation and coordination with the United 
        States on important defense and intelligence issues.

SEC. 209. UNITED STATES REPRESENTATION IN STANDARDS-SETTING BODIES.

    (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Promoting 
United States International Leadership in 5G Act of 2021''.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States and its allies and partners should 
        maintain participation and leadership at international 
        standards-setting bodies for 5th and future generation mobile 
        telecommunications systems and infrastructure;
            (2) the United States should work with its allies and 
        partners to encourage and facilitate the development of secure 
        supply chains and networks for 5th and future generation mobile 
        telecommunications systems and infrastructure; and
            (3) the maintenance of a high standard of security in 
        telecommunications and cyberspace between the United States and 
        its allies and partners is a national security interest of the 
        United States.
    (c) Enhancing Representation and Leadership of United States at 
International Standards-setting Bodies.--
            (1) In general.--The President shall--
                    (A) establish an interagency working group to 
                provide assistance and technical expertise to enhance 
                the representation and leadership of the United States 
                at international bodies that set standards for 
                equipment, systems, software, and virtually defined 
                networks that support 5th and future generation mobile 
                telecommunications systems and infrastructure, such as 
                the International Telecommunication Union and the 3rd 
                Generation Partnership Project; and
                    (B) work with allies, partners, and the private 
                sector to increase productive engagement.
            (2) Interagency working group.--The interagency working 
        group described in paragraph (1)--
                    (A) shall be chaired by the Secretary of State or a 
                designee of the Secretary of State; and
                    (B) shall consist of the head (or designee) of each 
                Federal department or agency the President determines 
                appropriate.
            (3) Briefings.--
                    (A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the 
                date of the enactment of this Act, and subsequently 
                thereafter as provided under subparagraph (B), the 
                interagency working group described in paragraph (1) 
                shall provide a strategy to the appropriate 
                congressional committees that addresses--
                            (i) promotion of United States leadership 
                        at international standards-setting bodies for 
                        equipment, systems, software, and virtually 
                        defined networks relevant to 5th and future 
                        generation mobile telecommunications systems 
                        and infrastructure, taking into account the 
                        different processes followed by the various 
                        international standard-setting bodies;
                            (ii) diplomatic engagement with allies and 
                        partners to share security risk information and 
                        findings pertaining to equipment that supports 
                        or is used in 5th and future generation mobile 
                        telecommunications systems and infrastructure 
                        and cooperation on mitigating such risks;
                            (iii) China's presence and activities at 
                        international standards-setting bodies relevant 
                        to 5th and future generation mobile 
                        telecommunications systems and infrastructure, 
                        including information on the differences in the 
                        scope and scale of China's engagement at such 
                        bodies compared to engagement by the United 
                        States or its allies and partners and the 
                        security risks raised by Chinese proposals in 
                        such standards-setting bodies; and
                            (iv) engagement with private sector 
                        communications and information service 
                        providers, equipment developers, academia, 
                        Federally funded research and development 
                        centers, and other private-sector stakeholders 
                        to propose and develop secure standards for 
                        equipment, systems, software, and virtually 
                        defined networks that support 5th and future 
                        generation mobile telecommunications systems 
                        and infrastructure.
                    (B) Subsequent briefings.--Upon receiving a request 
                from the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 
                and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
                Representatives, or as determined appropriate by the 
                chair of the interagency working group established 
                pursuant to paragraph (1), the interagency working 
                group shall provide the requesting committee an updated 
                briefing that covers the matters described in clauses 
                (i) through (iv) of subparagraph (A).

SEC. 210. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CENTRALITY OF SANCTIONS AND OTHER 
              RESTRICTIONS TO STRATEGIC COMPETITION WITH CHINA.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Sanctions and other restrictions, when used as part of 
        a coordinated and comprehensive strategy, are a powerful tool 
        to advance United States foreign policy and national security 
        interests.
            (2) Congress has authorized and mandated broad range of 
        sanctions and other restrictions to address malign behavior and 
        incentivize behavior change by individuals and entities in the 
        PRC.
            (3) The sanctions and other restrictions authorized and 
        mandated by Congress address a range of malign PRC behavior, 
        including--
                    (A) intellectual property theft;
                    (B) cyber-related economic espionage;
                    (C) repression of ethnic minorities;
                    (D) other human rights abuses;
                    (E) abuses of the international trading system;
                    (F) illicit assistance to and trade with the 
                Government of North Korea; and
                    (G) drug trafficking, including trafficking in 
                fentanyl and other opioids;
            (4) The sanctions and other restrictions described in this 
        section include the following:
                    (A) The Global Magnitsky Human Rights 
                Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public 
                Law 114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note).
                    (B) Section 1637 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. 
                ``Buck'' McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for 
                Fiscal Year 2015 (50 U.S.C. 1708).
                    (C) The Fentanyl Sanctions Act (21 U.S.C. 2301 et 
                seq.).
                    (D) The Hong Kong Autonomy Act (Public Law 116-149; 
                22 U.S.C. 5701 note).
                    (E) Section 7 of the Hong Kong Human Rights and 
                Democracy Act of 2019 (Public Law 116-76; 22 U.S.C. 
                5701 note).
                    (F) Section 6 of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act 
                of 2020 (Public Law 116-145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note).
                    (G) The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 
                U.S.C. 4801 et seq.).
                    (H) Export control measures required to be 
                maintained with respect to entities in the 
                telecommunications sector of the People's Republic of 
                China, including under section 1260I of the National 
                Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public 
                Law 116-92).
                    (I) Section 311 of the Countering America's 
                Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2018 (Public Law 
                115-44; 131 Stat. 942).
            (5) Full implementation of the authorities described in 
        paragraph (4) is required under the respective laws described 
        therein and pursuant to the Take Care Clause of the 
        Constitution (article II, section 3).
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the executive branch has not fully implemented the 
        sanctions and other restrictions described in subsection (a)(4) 
        despite the statutory and constitutional requirements to do so; 
        and
            (2) the President's full implementation and execution of 
        the those authorities is a necessary and essential component to 
        the success of the United States in the strategic competition 
        with China.

SEC. 211. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH G7 COUNTRIES ON THE 
              PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) In General.--It is the sense of Congress that the President, 
acting through the Secretary of State, should initiate an agenda with 
G7 countries on matters relevant to economic and democratic freedoms, 
including the following:
            (1) Trade and investment issues and enforcement.
            (2) Building support for international infrastructure 
        standards, including those agreed to at the G20 summit in Osaka 
        in 2018.
            (3) The erosion of democracy and human rights.
            (4) The security of 5G telecommunications.
            (5) Anti-competitive behavior, such as intellectual 
        property theft, massive subsidization of companies, and other 
        policies and practices.
            (6) Predatory international sovereign lending that is 
        inconsistent with OECD and Paris Club principles.
            (7) International influence campaigns.
            (8) Environmental standards.
            (9) Coordination with like-minded regional partners that 
        are not in the G7.

SEC. 212. ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES-TAIWAN PARTNERSHIP.

    It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the United 
        States Indo-Pacific strategy;
            (2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its democracy as 
        key elements for the continued peace and stability of the 
        greater Indo-Pacific region, and a vital national security 
        interest of the United States;
            (3) to reinforce its commitments to Taiwan under the Taiwan 
        Relations Act (Public Law 96-8) and the ``Six Assurances'' and 
        in accordance with the United States ``One China'' policy;
            (4) to support Taiwan's implementation of its asymmetric 
        defense strategy, including the priorities identified in 
        Taiwan's Overall Defense Concept;
            (5) to urge Taiwan to increase its defense spending in 
        order to fully resource its defense strategy;
            (6) to conduct regular transfers of defense articles to 
        Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan's self-defense capabilities, 
        particularly its efforts to develop and integrate asymmetric 
        capabilities, including anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, 
        air defense, undersea warfare, advanced command, control, 
        communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 
        reconnaissance, and resilient command and control capabilities, 
        into its military forces;
            (7) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan's meaningful 
        participation in the United Nations, the World Health Assembly, 
        the International Civil Aviation Organization, the 
        International Criminal Police Organization, and other 
        international bodies as appropriate; and
            (8) to promote meaningful cooperation among the United 
        States, Taiwan, and other like-minded partners.

SEC. 213. TREATMENT OF TAIWAN GOVERNMENT.

    (a) In General.--The Department of State and other United States 
Government agencies shall engage with the democratically elected 
government of Taiwan on the same basis, and using the same nomenclature 
and protocol, as the United States Government engages with other 
foreign governments. Notwithstanding the continued supporting role of 
the American Institute in Taiwan in carrying out United States foreign 
policy and protecting United States interests in Taiwan, the United 
States Government shall not place any restrictions on the ability of 
officials of the Department of State and other United States Government 
agencies to interact directly and routinely with counterparts in the 
Taiwan government.
    (b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this paragraph shall be 
construed as entailing restoration of diplomatic relations with the 
Republic of China (Taiwan) or altering the United States Government's 
position on Taiwan's international status.

SEC. 214. REPORT ON ORIGINS OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) it is critical to understand the origins of the COVID-
        19 pandemic so the United States can better prepare, prevent, 
        and respond to pandemic health threats in the future;
            (2) given the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on all 
        Americans, the American people deserve to know what information 
        the United States Government possesses about the origins of 
        COVID-19, as appropriate;
            (3) Congress shares the concerns expressed by the United 
        States Government and 13 other foreign governments that the 
        international team of experts dispatched to the People's 
        Republic of China by the World Health Organization (WHO) to 
        study the origins of the SARS-CoV-2 virus was ``significantly 
        delayed and lacked access to complete, original data and 
        samples'';
            (4) the March 30, 2021, statement by the Director-General 
        of the WHO, Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, further affirms 
        that the investigative team had encountered ``difficulties'' in 
        accessing necessary raw data, that ``we have not yet found the 
        source of the virus,'' and that ``all hypotheses remain on the 
        table''; and
            (5) it is critical for independent experts to have full 
        access to all pertinent human, animal, and environmental data, 
        live virus samples, research, and personnel involved in the 
        early stages of the outbreak relevant to determining how this 
        pandemic emerged.
    (b) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after enactment of 
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with 
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the 
Secretary of Energy, and other relevant executive departments, shall 
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report consisting 
of--
            (1) an assessment of the most likely source or origin of 
        the SARS-CoV-2 virus, including a detailed review of all 
        information the United States possesses that it has identified 
        as potentially relevant to the source or origin of the SARS-
        CoV-2 virus, including zoonotic transmission and spillover, the 
        Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), or other sources of origin, 
        transmission, or spillover, based on the information the United 
        States Government has to date;
            (2) an identification of the leading credible theories of 
        the etiology of the SARS-CoV-2 virus by the United States 
        Government, the steps the United States has taken to validate 
        those theories, and any variance in assessment or dissent among 
        or between United States intelligence agencies, executive 
        agencies, and executive offices of the most likely source or 
        origin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, and the basis for such variance 
        or dissent;
            (3) a description of all steps the United States Government 
        has taken to identify and investigate the source of the SARS-
        CoV-2 virus, including a timeline of such efforts;
            (4) a detailed description of the data to which the United 
        States and the WHO have requested and have access to in order 
        to determine the origin of the source of the SARS-CoV-2 virus;
            (5) an account of efforts by the PRC to cooperate with, 
        impede, or obstruct any inquiry or investigation to determine 
        the source and transmission of SARS-CoV-2 virus, including into 
        a possible lab leak, or to create or spread misinformation or 
        disinformation regarding the source and transmission of SARS-
        CoV-2 virus by the PRC or CCP, including by national and local 
        governmental and health entities;
            (6) a detailed account of information known to the United 
        States Government regarding the WIV and associated facilities, 
        including research activities on coronaviruses and gain-of-
        function research, any reported illnesses of persons associated 
        with the laboratory with symptoms consistent with COVID-19 and 
        the ultimate diagnosis, and a timeline of research relevant to 
        coronaviruses;
            (7) a list of any known obligations on the PRC that require 
        disclosure and cooperation in the event of a viral outbreak 
        like SARS-CoV-2; and
            (8) an overview of United States engagement with the PRC 
        with respect to coronaviruses that includes--
                    (A) a detailed accounting of United States 
                engagement with the WIV and similar labs in the PRC 
                specific to coronaviruses, including a detailed 
                accounting United States Government-sponsored research 
                and funding and diplomatic engagements such as ``track 
                1.5'' and ``track 2'' engagements; and
                    (B) an assessment of any additional scrutiny of 
                United States Government funding to support gain-of-
                function research in the PRC after the moratorium on 
                such funding was lifted in 2017, and whether United 
                States Government funding was used to support gain-of-
                function research in China, during the moratorium on 
                gain-of-function research (2014-2017).
    (c) Form.--The report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted 
in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.
    (d) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
            (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
            (3) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 
        of the Senate;
            (4) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
            (5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives;
            (6) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        House of Representatives;
            (7) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of 
        Representatives; and
            (8) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
        Representatives.

SEC. 215. ENHANCEMENT OF DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT AND ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT 
              WITH PACIFIC ISLAND COUNTRIES.

    (a) Authority.--The Secretary of State and Secretary of Commerce 
are authorized to hire Locally Employed Staff in Pacific island 
countries for the purpose of providing increased diplomatic support and 
promoting increased economic and commercial engagement between the 
United States and Pacific Island countries.
    (b) Availability of Funds.--
            (1) In general.--Of the amounts authorized to be 
        appropriated to the Department of State and the Department of 
        Commerce for fiscal year 2022, not more than $10,000,000 , 
        respectively, shall be available to carry out the purposes of 
        this section.
            (2) Termination.--The availability of funds in paragraph 
        (1) shall expire on December 31, 2026.
    (c) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State 
and the Secretary of Commerce shall provide to the appropriate 
committees of Congress a report on the activities of the Department of 
State and Department of Commerce Locally Employed Staff in Pacific 
island countries, which shall include--
            (1) a detailed description of the additional diplomatic, 
        economic, and commercial engagement and activities in the 
        Pacific island countries provided by Locally Employed Staff; 
        and
            (2) an assessment of the impact of the activities with 
        respect to the diplomatic, economic, and security interests of 
        the United States.
    (d) Exception for American Samoa.--The Secretary of State may, as 
appropriate, treat the territory of American Samoa as a foreign country 
for purposes of carrying out this section.
    (e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Energy 
        and Natural Resources, and the Committee on Appropriations of 
        the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Natural Resources, and 
        the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
        Representatives.

SEC. 216. INCREASING DEPARTMENT OF STATE PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES 
              DEVOTED TO THE INDO-PACIFIC.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) In fiscal year 2020, the Department of State allocated 
        $1,500,000,000 to the Indo-Pacific region in bilateral and 
        regional foreign assistance (FA) resources and $798,000,000 in 
        the fiscal year 2020 diplomatic engagement (DE) budget. These 
        amounts represent only 5 percent of the DE budget and only 4 
        percent of the total Department of State-USAID budget.
            (2) Over the last 5 years the DE budget and personnel 
        levels in the Indo-Pacific averaged only 5 percent of the 
        total, while FA resources averaged only 4 percent of the total.
            (3) In 2020, the Department of State began a process to 
        realign certain positions at posts to ensure that its personnel 
        footprint matches the demands of great-power competition, 
        including in the Indo-Pacific.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--
            (1) It shall be the policy of the United States to ensure 
        Department of State funding levels and personnel footprint in 
        the Indo-Pacific reflect the region's high degree of importance 
        and significance to United States political, economic, and 
        security interests.
            (2) It shall be the policy of the United States to increase 
        DE and FA funding and the quantity of personnel dedicated to 
        the Indo-Pacific region respective to the Department of State's 
        total budget.
            (3) It shall be the policy of the United States to increase 
        the number of Defense attaches in the Indo-Pacific region 
        number of to assure coverage of all appropriate Posts.
    (c) Action Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide to the 
appropriate committees of Congress an action plan with the following 
elements:
            (1) Identification of requirements and the personnel 
        budgetary resources needed to meet them, assuming an 
        unconstrained resource environment.
            (2) A plan to increase the portion of the Department's 
        budget dedicated to the Indo-Pacific in terms of DE and FA 
        focused on development, economic, and security assistance.
            (3) A plan to increase the number of positions at posts in 
        the Indo-Pacific region and bureaus with responsibility for the 
        Indo-Pacific region, including a description of increases at 
        each post or bureau, a breakdown of increases by cone, and a 
        description of what each new officer will do to advance United 
        States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.
            (4) Defined concrete and annual benchmarks that the 
        Department will meet in implementing the action plan.
            (5) A description of any barriers to implementing the 
        action plan.
    (d) Updates to Report and Briefing.--Every 90 days after the 
submission of the action plan described in subsection (c), the 
Secretary shall submit an update and brief the appropriate committees 
of Congress on the implementation of such action plan, with supporting 
data and including a detailed assessment of benchmarks reached.
    (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $2,000,000,000 in bilateral and regional foreign 
assistance resources to the Indo-Pacific region and $1,250,000,000 in 
diplomatic engagement resources to the Indo-Pacific region.
    (f) Secretary of State Certification.--Not later than two years 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 
shall certify whether or not the benchmarks described in the action 
plan in subsection (c) have been met. This certification is non-
delegable.
    (g) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 217. ADVANCING UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS 
              SYSTEM.

    (a) Establishment.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall establish, 
        within the Bureau of International Organization Affairs of the 
        Department of State, a Special Representative for Advancing 
        United States Leadership in the United Nations (referred to in 
        this section as the ``Special Representative''). The Special 
        Representative shall serve concurrently as a Deputy Assistant 
        Secretary in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs 
        of the Department of State. The Special Representative shall 
        report directly to the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of 
        International Organization Affairs, in coordination and 
        consultation with the Representative of the United States to 
        the United Nations.
    (b) Responsibilities.--The Special Representative shall assume 
responsibility for--
            (1) promoting United States leadership and participation in 
        the United Nations system, with a focus on issue areas where 
        authoritarian nations are exercising increased influence in and 
        determining the agenda of the United Nations system;
            (2) highlighting how investments in the United Nations 
        advance United States interests and enable stronger coalitions 
        to hold authoritarian regimes to account;
            (3) ensuring United States emphasis on the need for United 
        Nations employees to uphold the principals of impartiality 
        enshrined in the United Nations charter, rules, and 
        regulations;
            (4) monitoring and developing and implementing plans to 
        counter undue influence, especially by authoritarian nations, 
        within the United Nations system;
            (5) assessing how United States decisions to withdraw from 
        United Nations bodies impacts United States influence at the 
        United Nations and multilateral global initiatives;
            (6) promoting participation and inclusion of Taiwan in the 
        United Nations system;
            (7) monitoring the pipeline of United Nations jobs and 
        identifying qualified Americans and other qualified nationals 
        to promote for these positions;
            (8) tracking leadership changes in United Nations 
        secretariat, funds, programs and agencies, and developing 
        strategies to ensure that coalitions of like-minded states are 
        assembled to ensure leadership races are not won by countries 
        that do not share United States interests; and
            (9) advancing other priorities deemed relevant by the 
        Secretary of State to ensuring the integrity of the United 
        Nations system.
    (c) Support.--The Secretary of State shall make any necessary 
adjustments to the current structure of the Bureau of International 
Organization Affairs, including the respective roles and 
responsibilities of offices in that Bureau, to ensure appropriate 
support for the mission and work of the Special Representative.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated not less than $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 and for each 
subsequent fiscal year to carry out the responsibilities under 
subsection (b).

               Subtitle B--International Security Matters

SEC. 221. DEFINITIONS.

    In this subtitle:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Select 
                Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on 
                Appropriations of the Senate; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Permanent 
                Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on 
                Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
            (2) Company.--The term ``company'' means any corporation, 
        company, limited liability company, limited partnership, 
        business trust, business association, or other similar entity.
            (3) Other security forces.--The term ``other security 
        forces''--
                    (A) includes national security forces that conduct 
                maritime security; and
                    (B) does not include self-described militias or 
                paramilitary organizations.

SEC. 222. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The People's Republic of China aims to use its growing 
        military might in concert with other instruments of its 
        national power to displace the United States in the Indo-
        Pacific and establish hegemony over the region.
            (2) The military balance of power in the Indo-Pacific 
        region is growing increasingly unfavorable to the United States 
        because--
                    (A) the PRC is rapidly modernizing and expanding 
                the capabilities of the PLA to project power and create 
                contested areas across the entire Indo-Pacific region;
                    (B) PLA modernization has largely focused on areas 
                where it possesses operational advantages and can 
                exploit weaknesses in the United States suite of 
                capabilities; and
                    (C) current United States force structure and 
                presence do not sufficiently counter threats in the 
                Indo-Pacific, as United States allies, bases, and 
                forces at sea in the Indo-Pacific region are 
                concentrated in large bases that are highly vulnerable 
                to the PRC's strike capabilities.
            (3) This shift in the regional military balance and erosion 
        of conventional deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region--
                    (A) presents a substantial and imminent risk to the 
                security of the United States; and
                    (B) left unchecked, could embolden the PRC to take 
                actions, including the use of military force, to change 
                the status quo before the United States can mount an 
                effective response.
            (4) The PRC sees an opportunity to diminish confidence 
        among United States allies and partners in the strength of 
        United States commitments, even to the extent that these 
        nations feel compelled to bandwagon with the PRC to protect 
        their interests. The PRC is closely monitoring the United 
        States reaction to PRC pressure and coercion of United States 
        allies, searching for indicators of United States resolve.
            (5) Achieving so-called ``reunification'' of Taiwan to 
        mainland China is a key step for the PRC to achieve its 
        regional hegemonic ambitions. The PRC has increased the 
        frequency and scope of its exercises and operations targeting 
        Taiwan, such as amphibious assault and live-fire exercises in 
        the Taiwan Strait, PLA Air Force flights that encircle Taiwan, 
        and flights across the unofficial median line in the Taiwan 
        Strait. The Government of the PRC's full submission of Hong 
        Kong potentially accelerates the timeline of a Taiwan scenario, 
        and makes the defense of Taiwan an even more urgent priority.
            (6) The defense of Taiwan is critical to--
                    (A) defending the people of Taiwan;
                    (B) limiting the PLA's ability to project power 
                beyond the First Island Chain, including to United 
                States territory, such as Guam and Hawaii;
                    (C) defending the territorial integrity of Japan;
                    (D) preventing the PLA from diverting military 
                planning, resources, and personnel to broader military 
                ambitions; and
                    (E) retaining the United States credibility as a 
                defender of the democratic values and free-market 
                principles embodied by Taiwan's people and government;
            (7) The PRC capitalized on the world's attention to COVID-
        19 to advance its military objectives in the South China Sea, 
        intensifying and accelerating trends already underway. The PRC 
        has sent militarized survey vessels into the Malaysian 
        Exclusive Economic Zone, announced the establishment of an 
        administrative district in the Spratly and Paracel Islands 
        under the Chinese local government of Sansha, aimed a fire 
        control radar at a Philippine navy ship, encroached on 
        Indonesia's fishing grounds, sunk a Vietnamese fishing boat, 
        announced new ``research stations'' on Fiery Cross Reef and 
        Subi Reef, landed special military aircraft on Fiery Cross Reef 
        to routinize such deployments, and sent a flotilla of over 200 
        militia vessels to Whitsun Reef, a feature within the exclusive 
        economic zone of the Philippines.
            (8) On July 13, 2020, the Department of State clarified 
        United States policy on the South China Sea and stated that 
        ``Beijing's claims to offshore resources across most of the 
        South China Sea are completely unlawful''.
            (9) These actions in the South China Sea enable the PLA to 
        exert influence and project power deeper into Oceania and the 
        Indian Ocean. As Admiral Phil Davidson, Commander of Indo-
        Pacific Command, testified in 2019, ``In short, China is now 
        capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios 
        short of war with the United States.''.
            (10) The PLA also continues to advance its claims in the 
        East China Sea, including through a high number of surface 
        combatant patrols and frequent entry into the territorial 
        waters of the Senkaku Islands, over which the United States 
        recognizes Japan's administrative control. In April 2014, 
        President Barack Obama stated, ``Our commitment to Japan's 
        security is absolute and article five [of the U.S.-Japan 
        security treaty] covers all territory under Japan's 
        administration, including the Senkaku islands.''.
            (11) On March 1, 2019, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo 
        stated, ``As the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any 
        armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels 
        in the South China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations 
        under Article 4 of our Mutual Defense Treaty.''.
            (12) The PLA is modernizing and gaining critical capability 
        in every branch and every domain, including--
                    (A) positioning the PLA Navy to become a great 
                maritime power or ``blue-water'' navy that can 
                completely control all activity within the First Island 
                Chain and project power beyond it with a fleet of 425 
                battle force ships by 2030;
                    (B) increasing the size and range of its strike 
                capabilities, including approximately 1,900 ground-
                launched short- and intermediate-range missiles capable 
                of targeting United States allies and partners in the 
                First and Second Island chains, United States bases in 
                the Indo-Pacific, and United States forces at sea;
                    (C) boosting capabilities for air warfare, 
                including with Russian-origin Su-35 fighters and S-400 
                air defense systems, new J-20 5th generation stealth 
                fighters, advanced H-6 bomber variants, a long-range 
                stealth bomber, and Y-20 heavy lift aircraft; and
                    (D) making critical investments in new domains of 
                warfare, such as cyber warfare, electronic warfare, and 
                space warfare.
            (13) The PRC is pursuing this modernization through all 
        means at its disposal, including its Military-Civil Fusion 
        initiative, which enlists the whole of PRC society in 
        developing and acquiring technology with military applications 
        to pursue technological advantage over the United States in 
        artificial intelligence, hypersonic glide vehicles, directed 
        energy weapons, electromagnetic railguns, counter-space 
        weapons, and other emerging capabilities.
            (14) The United States lead in the development of science 
        and technology relevant to defense is eroding in the face of 
        competition from the PRC. United States research and 
        development spending on defense capabilities has declined 
        sharply as a share of global research and development. The 
        commercial sector's leading role in innovation presents certain 
        unique challenges to the Department of Defense's reliance on 
        technology for battlefield advantage.
            (15) The PRC has vastly increased domestic research and 
        development expenditures, supported the growth of new cutting-
        edge industries and tapped into a large workforce to invest in 
        fostering science and engineering talent.
            (16) The PRC is increasing exports of defense and security 
        capabilities to build its defense technology and industrial 
        base and improve its own military capabilities, as well as its 
        influence with countries that purchase and become dependent on 
        its military systems.

SEC. 223. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING BOLSTERING SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS 
              IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.

    It is the Sense of Congress that steps to bolster United States 
security partnership in the Indo-Pacific must include--
            (1) supporting Japan in its development of long-range 
        precision fires, munitions, air and missile defense capacity, 
        interoperability across all domains, maritime security, and 
        intelligence, and surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities;
            (2) launching a United States-Japan national security 
        innovation fund to solicit and support private sector 
        cooperation for new technologies that could benefit the United 
        States and Japan's mutual security objectives;
            (3) promoting a deeper defense relationship between Japan 
        and Australia, including supporting reciprocal access 
        agreements and trilateral United States-Japan-Australia 
        intelligence sharing;
            (4) encouraging and facilitating Taiwan's accelerated 
        acquisition of asymmetric defense capabilities, which are 
        crucial to defending the islands of Taiwan from invasion, 
        including long-range precision fires, munitions, anti-ship 
        missiles, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, undersea 
        warfare, advanced command, control, communications, computers, 
        intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), and 
        resilient command and control capabilities, and increasing the 
        conduct of relevant and practical training and exercises with 
        Taiwan's defense forces; and
            (5) prioritizing building the capacity of United States 
        allies and partners to protect defense technology.

SEC. 224. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It shall be the policy of the United States to--
            (1) prioritize the Indo-Pacific region in United States 
        foreign policy, and prioritize resources for achieving United 
        States political and military objectives in the region;
            (2) exercise freedom of operations in the international 
        waters and airspace in the Indo-Pacific maritime domains, which 
        are critical to the prosperity, stability, and security of the 
        Indo-Pacific region;
            (3) maintain forward-deployed forces in the Indo-Pacific 
        region, including a rotational bomber presence, integrated 
        missile defense capabilities, long-range precision fires, 
        undersea warfare capabilities, and diversified and resilient 
        basing and rotational presence, including support for pre-
        positioning strategies;
            (4) strengthen and deepen the alliances and partnerships of 
        the United States to build capacity and capabilities, increase 
        multilateral partnerships, modernize communications 
        architecture, address anti-access and area denial challenges, 
        and increase joint exercises and security cooperation efforts;
            (5) reaffirm the commitment and support of the United 
        States for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, 
        including longstanding United States policy regarding--
                    (A) Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation 
                and Security between the United States and Japan, 
                signed at Washington January 19, 1960;
                    (B) Article III of the Mutual Defense Treaty 
                between the United States and the Republic of Korea, 
                signed at Washington October 1, 1953;
                    (C) Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty between 
                the United States and the Republic of the Philippines, 
                signed at Washington August 30, 1951, including that, 
                as the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any 
                armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft or public 
                vessels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual 
                defense obligations under Article IV of our mutual 
                defense treaty;
                    (D) Article IV of the Australia, New Zealand, 
                United States Security Treaty, done at San Francisco 
                September 1, 1951; and
                    (E) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, 
                done at Manila September 8, 1954, together with the 
                Thanat-Rusk Communique of 1962; and
            (6) collaborate with United States treaty allies in the 
        Indo-Pacific to foster greater multilateral security and 
        defense cooperation with other regional partners;
            (7) ensure the continuity of operations by the United 
        States Armed Forces in the Indo-Pacific region, including, as 
        appropriate, in cooperation with partners and allies, in order 
        to reaffirm the principle of freedom of operations in 
        international waters and airspace in accordance with 
        established principles and practices of international law;
            (8) sustain the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 
        U.S.C. 3301 et seq.);
            (9) sustain the``Six Assurances'' provided by the United 
        States to Taiwan in July 1982 as the foundations for United 
        States-Taiwan relations, and to deepen, to the fullest extent 
        possible, the extensive, close, and friendly relations of the 
        United States and Taiwan, including cooperation to support the 
        development of capable, ready, and modern forces necessary for 
        the defense of Taiwan;
            (10) enhance security partnerships with India, across 
        Southeast Asia, and with other nations of the Indo-Pacific;
            (11) deter acts of aggression or coercion by the PRC 
        against United States and allies' interests, especially along 
        the First Island Chain and in the Western Pacific, by showing 
        PRC leaders that the United States can and is willing to deny 
        them the ability to achieve their objectives, including by--
                    (A) consistently demonstrating the political will 
                of the United States to deepening existing treaty 
                alliances and growing new partnerships as a durable, 
                asymmetric, and unmatched strategic advantage to the 
                PRC's growing military capabilities and reach;
                    (B) maintaining a system of forward-deployed bases 
                in the Indo-Pacific region as the most visible sign of 
                United States resolve and commitment to the region, and 
                as platforms to ensure United States operational 
                readiness and advance interoperability with allies and 
                partners;
                    (C) adopting a more dispersed force posture 
                throughout the region, particularly the Western 
                Pacific, and pursuing maximum access for United States 
                mobile and relocatable launchers for long-range cruise, 
                ballistic, and hypersonic weapons throughout the Indo-
                Pacific region;
                    (D) fielding long-range, precision-strike networks 
                to United States and allied forces, including ground-
                launched cruise missiles, undersea and naval 
                capabilities, and integrated air and missile defense in 
                the First Island Chain and the Second Island Chain, in 
                order to deter and prevent PRC coercion and aggression, 
                and to maximize the United States ability to operate;
                    (E) strengthening extended deterrence to ensure 
                that escalation against key United States interests 
                would be costly, risky, and self-defeating; and
                    (F) collaborating with allies and partners to 
                accelerate their roles in more equitably sharing the 
                burdens of mutual defense, including through the 
                acquisition and fielding of advanced capabilities and 
                training that will better enable them to repel PRC 
                aggression or coercion; and
            (12) maintain the capacity of the United States to impose 
        prohibitive diplomatic, economic, financial, reputational, and 
        military costs on the PRC for acts of coercion or aggression, 
        including to defend itself and its allies regardless of the 
        point of origin of attacks against them.

SEC. 225. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING IN THE INDO-PACIFIC AND 
              AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA 
              MARITIME SECURITY PROGRAMS AND DIPLOMATIC OUTREACH 
              ACTIVITIES.

    (a) Foreign Military Financing Funding.--In addition to any amount 
appropriated pursuant to section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
U.S.C. 2763) (relating to foreign military financing assistance), there 
is authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 2022 through 
fiscal year 2026 for activities in the Indo-Pacific region in 
accordance with this section--
            (1) $110,000,000 for fiscal year 2022;
            (2) $125,000,000 for fiscal year 2023;
            (3) $130,000,000 for fiscal year 2024;
            (4) $140,000,000 for fiscal year 2025; and
            (5) $150,000,000 for fiscal year 2026.
    (b) Southeast Maritime Law Enforcement Initiative.--There is 
authorized to be appropriated $10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 
through 2026 for the Department of State for International Narcotics 
Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) for the support of the Southeast 
Asia Maritime Law Enforcement Initiative.
    (c) Diplomatic Outreach Activities.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated to the Department of State, $1,000,000 for each of fiscal 
years 2022 through 2026, which shall be used--
            (1) to conduct, in coordination with the Department of 
        Defense, outreach activities, including conferences and 
        symposia, to familiarize partner countries, particularly in the 
        Indo-Pacific region, with the United States interpretation of 
        international law relating to freedom of the seas; and
            (2) to work with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific 
        region to better align respective interpretations of 
        international law relating to freedom of the seas, including on 
        the matters of operations by military ships in exclusive 
        economic zones, innocent passage through territorial seas, and 
        transits through international straits.
    (d) Program Authorization and Purpose.--Using amounts appropriate 
pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary of State, in coordination 
with the Secretary of Defense, is authorized to provide assistance, for 
the purpose of increasing maritime security and domain awareness for 
countries in the Indo-Pacific region--
            (1) to provide assistance to national military or other 
        security forces of such countries that have maritime security 
        missions among their functional responsibilities;
            (2) to provide training to ministry, agency, and 
        headquarters level organizations for such forces; and
            (3) to provide assistance to and training to other relevant 
        foreign affairs, maritime, or security-related ministries, 
        agencies, departments, or offices that manage and oversee 
        maritime activities and policy that the Secretary of State may 
        so designate.
    (e) Designation of Assistance.--Assistance provided by the 
Secretary of State under this section shall be known as the ``Indo-
Pacific Maritime Security Initiative'' (in this section referred to as 
the ``Initiative'').
    (f) Program Objectives.--Assistance provided through the Initiative 
may be used to accomplish the following objectives:
            (1) Retaining unhindered access to and use of international 
        waterways in the Indo-Pacific region that are critical to 
        ensuring the security and free flow of commerce and achieving 
        United States national security objectives.
            (2) Improving maritime domain awareness in the Indo-Pacific 
        region.
            (3) Countering piracy in the Indo-Pacific region.
            (4) Disrupting illicit maritime trafficking activities and 
        other forms of maritime trafficking activity in the Indo-
        Pacific that directly benefit organizations that have been 
        determined to be a security threat to the United States.
            (5) Enhancing the maritime capabilities of a country or 
        regional organization to respond to emerging threats to 
        maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region.
            (6) Strengthening United States alliances and partnerships 
        in Southeast Asia and other parts of the Indo-Pacific region.
    (g) Authorization of Appropriations.--
            (1) In general.--Of the amount appropriated pursuant to 
        subsection(a) and section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
        U.S.C. 2763) (relating to foreign military financing 
        assistance), there is authorized to be appropriated to the 
        Department of State for the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security 
        Initiative and other related regional programs exactly--
                    (A) $70,000,000 for fiscal year 2022;
                    (B) $80,000,000 for fiscal year 2023;
                    (C) $90,000,000 for fiscal year 2024;
                    (D) $100,000,000 for fiscal year 2025; and
                    (E) $110,000,000 for fiscal year 2026.
            (2) Rule of construction.--The ``Indo-Pacific Maritime 
        Security Initiative'' and funds authorized for the Initiative 
        shall include existing regional programs related to maritime 
        security, including the Southeast Asia Maritime Security 
        Initiative.
    (h) Eligibility and Priorities for Assistance.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall use the 
        following considerations when selecting which countries in the 
        Indo-Pacific region should receive assistance pursuant to the 
        Initiative:
                    (A) Assistance may be provided to a country in the 
                Indo-Pacific region to enhance the capabilities of that 
                country according to the objectives outlined in (f), or 
                of a regional organization that includes that country, 
                to conduct--
                            (i) maritime intelligence, surveillance, 
                        and reconnaissance;
                            (ii) littoral and port security;
                            (iii) Coast Guard operations;
                            (iv) command and control; and
                            (v) management and oversight of maritime 
                        activities.
                    (B) Priority shall be placed on assistance to 
                enhance the maritime security capabilities of the 
                military or security forces of countries in the Indo-
                Pacific region that have maritime missions and the 
                government agencies responsible for such forces.
            (2) Types of assistance and training.--
                    (A) Authorized elements of assistance.--Assistance 
                provided under paragraph (1)(A) may include the 
                provision of equipment, training, and small-scale 
                military construction.
                    (B) Required elements of assistance and training.--
                Assistance and training provided under subparagraph (A) 
                shall include elements that promote--
                            (i) the observance of and respect for human 
                        rights; and
                            (ii) respect for legitimate civilian 
                        authority within the country to which the 
                        assistance is provided.
    (i) Joint Task Force.--The Department of Defense shall establish a 
joint, interagency task force to assess, respond to, and coordinate 
with allies and partners in response to the use of grey zone tactics by 
state and non-state actors in the Indo-Pacific maritime domain, 
including--
            (1) conducting domain awareness operations, intelligence 
        fusion, and multi-sensor correlation to detect, monitor, and 
        hand off suspected grey zone activities;
            (2) promoting security, cooperation, and capacity building; 
        and
            (3) coordinating country team and partner nation 
        initiatives in order to counter the use of grey zone tactics by 
        adversaries.
    (j) Annual Report.--The Secretary of State and the Secretary of 
Defense shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress 
each year a report on the status of the provision of equipment, 
training, supplies, or other services provided pursuant to the 
Initiative during the preceding 12 months.
    (k) Notice to Congress on Assistance and Training.--Not later than 
15 days before exercising the authority under subsection (a) with 
respect to a recipient foreign country, the Secretary of State shall 
submit a notification in writing to the appropriate committees of 
Congress.

SEC. 226. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING COMPACT PILOT PROGRAM IN THE INDO-
              PACIFIC.

    (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $20,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 and 2023 for the 
creation of a pilot program for foreign military financing compacts.
    (b) Assistance.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State is authorized to 
        create a pilot program, for a duration of two years, with an 
        assessment for any additional or permanent programming, to 
        provide assistance under this section for each country that 
        enters into an FMF Challenge Compact with the United States 
        pursuant to subsection (d) to support policies and programs 
        that advance the progress of the country in achieving lasting 
        security and civilian-military governance through respect for 
        human rights, good governance (including transparency and free 
        and fair elections), and cooperation with United States and 
        international counter-terrorism, anti-trafficking, and counter-
        crime efforts and programs.
            (2) Form of assistance.--Assistance under this subsection 
        may be provided in the form of grants, cooperative agreements, 
        contracts, or no-interest loans to the government of an 
        eligible country described in subsection (c).
    (c) Eligible Countries.--
            (1) In general.--A country shall be a candidate country for 
        purposes of eligibility for assistance for fiscal year 2022 and 
        2023 if--
                    (A) the country is classified as a lower middle 
                income country in the then most recent edition of the 
                World Development Report for Reconstruction and 
                Development published by the International Bank for 
                Reconstruction and Development and has an income 
                greater than the historical ceiling for International 
                Development Association eligibility for the fiscal year 
                involved; and
                    (B) the Secretary of State determines that the 
                country is committed to seeking just and democratic 
                governance, including with a demonstrated commitment 
                to--
                            (i) the promotion of political pluralism, 
                        equality, and the rule of law;
                            (ii) respect for human and civil rights;
                            (iii) protection of private property 
                        rights;
                            (iv) transparency and accountability of 
                        government;
                            (v) anti-corruption; and
                            (vi) the institution of effective civilian 
                        control, professionalization, respect for human 
                        rights by, and accountability of the armed 
                        forces.
            (2) Identification of eligible countries.--Not later than 
        90 days prior to the date on which the Secretary of State 
        determines eligible countries for an FMF Challenge Compact, the 
        Secretary--
                    (A) shall prepare and submit to the appropriate 
                congressional committees a report that contains a list 
                of all eligible countries identified that have met the 
                requirements under paragraph (1) for the fiscal year; 
                and
                    (B) shall consult with the appropriate 
                congressional committees on the extent to which such 
                countries meet the criteria described in paragraph (1).
    (d) FMF Challenge Compact.--
            (1) Compact.--The Secretary of State may provide assistance 
        for an eligible country only if the country enters into an 
        agreement with the United States, to be known as an ``FMF 
        Challenge Compact'' (in this subsection referred to as 
        a``Compact'') that establishes a multi-year plan for achieving 
        shared security objectives in furtherance of the purposes of 
        this title.
            (2) Elements.--The elements of the Compact shall be those 
        listed in subsection (c)(1)(B) for determining eligibility, and 
        be designed to significantly advance the performance of those 
        commitments during the period of the Compact.
            (3) In general.--The Compact should take into account the 
        national strategy of the eligible country and shall include--
                    (A) the specific objectives that the country and 
                the United States expect to achieve during the term of 
                the Compact, including both how the foreign military 
                financing under the Compact will advance shared 
                security interests and advance partner capacity 
                building efforts as well as to advance national efforts 
                towards just and democratic governance;
                    (B) the responsibilities of the country and the 
                United States in the achievement of such objectives;
                    (C) regular benchmarks to measure, where 
                appropriate, progress toward achieving such objectives; 
                and
                    (D) the strategy of the eligible country to sustain 
                progress made toward achieving such objectives after 
                expiration of the Compact.
    (e) Congressional Consultation Prior to Compact Negotiations.--Not 
later than 15 days before commencing negotiations of a Compact with an 
eligible country, the Secretary of State shall consult with the 
appropriate congressional committees with respect to the proposed 
Compact negotiation and shall identify the objectives and mechanisms to 
be used for the negotiation of the Compact.
    (f) Assessment of Pilot Program and Recommendations.--Not later 
than 90 days after the conclusion of the pilot program, the Secretary 
of State shall provide a report to the appropriate congressional 
committees with respect to the pilot program, including an assessment 
of the success and utility of the pilot program established under this 
subsection in meeting United States objectives and a recommendation 
with respect to whether to continue on a pilot or permanent basis a 
further foreign military financing compact program.

SEC. 227. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND 
              TRAINING IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.

    There is authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 
2022 through fiscal year 2026 for the Department of State, out of 
amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for assistance under 
chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2347 et seq.) (relating to international military education and 
training (IMET) assistance), $45,000,000 for activities in the Indo-
Pacific region in accordance with this Act.

SEC. 228. PRIORITIZING EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLE TRANSFERS FOR THE INDO-
              PACIFIC.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States Government should prioritize the review of excess defense 
article transfers to Indo-Pacific partners.
    (b) Five-Year Plan.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall develop a five-year plan to 
prioritize excess defense article transfers to the Indo-Pacific and 
provide a report describing such plan to the appropriate congressional 
committees.
    (c) Transfer Authority.--Section 516(c)(2) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)) is amended by inserting 
``, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia'' after ``and to the 
Philippines''.
    (d) Required Coordination.--The United States Government shall 
coordinate and align excess defense article transfers with capacity 
building efforts of regional allies and partners.

SEC. 229. PRIORITIZING EXCESS NAVAL VESSEL TRANSFERS FOR THE INDO-
              PACIFIC.

    (a) Authority.--The President is authorized to transfer to a 
government of a country listed pursuant to the amendment made under 
section 228(c) two OLIVER HAZARD PERRY class guided missile frigates on 
a grant basis under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
(22 U.S.C. 2321j).
    (b) Grants Not Counted in Annual Total of Transferred Excess 
Defense Articles.--The value of a vessel transferred to another country 
on a grant basis pursuant to authority provided by this section shall 
not be counted against the aggregate value of excess defense articles 
transferred in any fiscal year under section 516 of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j).
    (c) Costs of Transfers.--Any expense incurred by the United States 
in connection with a transfer authorized by this section shall be 
charged to the recipient notwithstanding section 516(e) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(e)).
    (d) Repair and Refurbishment in United States Shipyards.--To the 
maximum extent practicable, the President shall require, as a condition 
of the transfer of a vessel under this subsection, that the recipient 
to which the vessel is transferred have such repair or refurbishment of 
the vessel as is needed, before the vessel joins the naval forces of 
that recipient, performed at a shipyard located in the United States.
    (e) Expiration of Authority.--The authority to transfer a vessel 
under this section shall expire at the end of the 3-year period 
beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 230. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON MARITIME FREEDOM OF OPERATIONS IN 
              INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS AND AIRSPACE OF THE INDO-PACIFIC 
              AND ON ARTIFICIAL LAND FEATURES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--Congress--
            (1) condemns coercive and threatening actions or the use of 
        force to impede freedom of operations in international airspace 
        by military or civilian aircraft, to alter the status quo, or 
        to destabilize the Indo-Pacific region;
            (2) urges the Government of China to refrain from 
        implementing the declared East China Sea Air Defense 
        Identification Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in the South China Sea, 
        which is contrary to freedom of overflight in international 
        airspace, and to refrain from taking similar provocative 
        actions elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific region;
            (3) reaffirms that the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal's decision is 
        final and legally binding on both parties and that the People's 
        Republic of China's claims to offshore resources across most of 
        the South China Sea are unlawful; and
            (4) condemns the People's Republic of China for failing to 
        abide by the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal's ruling, despite Chinese 
        obligations as a state party to the United Nations Convention 
        on the Law of the Sea.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States to--
            (1) reaffirm its commitment and support for allies and 
        partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including longstanding 
        United States policy regarding Article V of the United States-
        Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty and reaffirm its position 
        that Article V of the United States-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty 
        applies to the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands;
            (2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights, freedoms, and 
        lawful use of the sea, or the airspace above it, that belong to 
        all nations, and oppose the militarization of new and reclaimed 
        land features in the South China Sea;
            (3) continue certain policies with respect to the PRC 
        claims in the South China Sea, namely--
                    (A) that PRC claims in the South China Sea, 
                including to offshore resources across most of the 
                South China Sea, are unlawful;
                    (B) that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a maritime 
                claim vis-a-vis the Philippines in areas that the 
                Tribunal found to be in the Philippines' Exclusive 
                Economic Zone (EEZ) or on its continental shelf;
                    (C) to reject any PRC claim to waters beyond a 12 
                nautical mile territorial sea derived from islands its 
                claims in the Spratly Islands; and
                    (D) that the PRC has no lawful territorial or 
                maritime claim to James Shoal;
            (4) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in 
        destabilizing activities, including illegal occupation or 
        efforts to unlawfully assert administration over disputed 
        claims;
            (5) ensure that disputes are managed without intimidation, 
        coercion, or force;
            (6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust claims in 
        accordance with international law;
            (7) uphold the principle that territorial and maritime 
        claims, including territorial waters or territorial seas, must 
        be derived from land features and otherwise comport with 
        international law;
            (8) oppose the imposition of new fishing regulations 
        covering disputed areas in the South China Sea, regulations 
        which have raised tensions in the region;
            (9) support an effective Code of Conduct, if that Code of 
        Conduct reflects the interests of Southeast Asian claimant 
        states and does not serve as a vehicle for the People's 
        Republic of China to advance its unlawful maritime claims;
            (10) reaffirm that an existing body of international rules 
        and guidelines, including the International Regulations for 
        Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972 
        (COLREGs), is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation 
        between the United States Armed Forces and the forces of other 
        countries, including the People's Republic of China;
            (11) support the development of regional institutions and 
        bodies, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense 
        Minister's Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the expanded 
        ASEAN Maritime Forum, to build practical cooperation in the 
        region and reinforce the role of international law;
            (12) encourage the deepening of partnerships with other 
        countries in the region for maritime domain awareness and 
        capacity building, as well as efforts by the United States 
        Government to explore the development of appropriate 
        multilateral mechanisms for a ``common operating picture'' in 
        the South China Sea among Southeast Asian countries that would 
        serve to help countries avoid destabilizing behavior and deter 
        risky and dangerous activities;
            (13) oppose actions by any country to prevent any other 
        country from exercising its sovereign rights to the resources 
        of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf by 
        making claims to those areas in the South China Sea that have 
        no support in international law; and
            (14) assure the continuity of operations by the United 
        States in the Indo-Pacific region, including, when appropriate, 
        in cooperation with partners and allies, to reaffirm the 
        principle of freedom of operations in international waters and 
        airspace in accordance with established principles and 
        practices of international law.

SEC. 231. REPORT ON CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT OF INDO-PACIFIC ALLIES AND 
              PARTNERS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Secretary of State should expand and strengthen 
        existing measures under the United States Conventional Arms 
        Transfer Policy to provide capabilities to allies and partners 
        consistent with agreed-on division of responsibility for 
        alliance roles, missions and capabilities, prioritizing allies 
        and partners in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with 
        United States strategic imperatives;
            (2) the United States should design for export to Indo-
        Pacific allies and partners capabilities critical to 
        maintaining a favorable military balance in the region, 
        including long-range precision fires, air and missile defense 
        systems, anti-ship cruise missiles, land attack cruise 
        missiles, conventional hypersonic systems, intelligence, 
        surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, and command and 
        control systems;
            (3) the United States should pursue, to the maximum extent 
        possible, anticipatory technology security and foreign 
        disclosure policy on the systems described in paragraph (2); 
        and
            (4) the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
        Secretary of Defense, should--
                    (A) urge allies and partners to invest in 
                sufficient quantities of munitions to meet contingency 
                requirements and avoid the need for accessing United 
                States stocks in wartime; and
                    (B) cooperate with allies to deliver such 
                munitions, or when necessary, to increase allies' 
                capacity to produce such munitions.
    (b) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
            (2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
            (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives; and
            (4) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
        Representatives.
    (c) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit a 
        report to the appropriate committees of Congress that describes 
        United States priorities for building more capable security 
        partners in the Indo-Pacific region.
            (2) Matters to be included.--The report required under 
        paragraph (1) shall--
                    (A) provide a priority list of defense and military 
                capabilities that Indo-Pacific allies and partners must 
                possess for the United States to be able to achieve its 
                military objectives in the Indo-Pacific region;
                    (B) identify, from the list referred to in 
                subparagraph (A), the capabilities that are best 
                provided, or can only be provided, by the United 
                States;
                    (C) identify--
                            (i) actions required to prioritize United 
                        States Government resources and personnel to 
                        expedite fielding the capabilities identified 
                        in subparagraph (B); and
                            (ii) steps needed to fully account for and 
                        a plan to integrate all means of United States 
                        foreign military sales, direct commercial 
                        sales, security assistance, and all applicable 
                        authorities of the Department of State and the 
                        Department of Defense;
                    (D) assess the requirements for United States 
                security assistance, including International Military 
                Education and Training, in the Indo-Pacific region, as 
                a part of the means to deliver critical partner 
                capability requirements identified in subparagraph (B);
                    (E) assess the resources necessary to meet the 
                requirements for United States security assistance, and 
                identify resource gaps;
                    (F) assess the major obstacles to fulfilling 
                requirements for United States security assistance in 
                the Indo-Pacific region, including resources and 
                personnel limits, foreign legislative and policy 
                barriers, and factors related to specific partner 
                countries;
                    (G) identify limitations on the United States 
                ability to provide such capabilities, including those 
                identified under subparagraph (B), because of existing 
                United States treaty obligations, United States 
                policies, or other regulations;
                    (H) recommend improvements to the process for 
                developing requirements for partners capabilities; and
                    (I) identify required jointly agreed 
                recommendations for infrastructure and posture, based 
                on any ongoing mutual dialogues.
            (3) Form.--The report required under this subsection shall 
        be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 232. REPORT ON NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL BASE.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) a more streamlined, shared, and coordinated approach, 
        which leverages economies of scale with major allies, is 
        necessary for the United States to retain its lead in defense 
        technology;
            (2) allowing for the export, re-export, or transfer of 
        defense-related technologies and services to members of the 
        national technology and industrial base (as defined in section 
        2500 of title 10, United States Code) would advance United 
        States security interests by helping to leverage the defense-
        related technologies and skilled workforces of trusted allies 
        to reduce the dependence on other countries, including 
        countries that pose challenges to United States interests 
        around the world, for defense-related innovation and 
        investment; and
            (3) it is in the interest of the United States to continue 
        to increase cooperation with Australia, Canada, and the United 
        Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to protect 
        critical defense-related technology and services and leverage 
        the investments of like-minded, major ally nations in order to 
        maximize the strategic edge afforded by defense technology 
        innovation.
    (b) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit 
        a report to the appropriate congressional committees that--
                    (A) describes the Department of State's efforts to 
                facilitate access among the national technology and 
                industrial base to defense articles and services 
                subject to the United States Munitions List under 
                section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
                U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)); and
                    (B) identifies foreign legal, regulatory, foreign 
                policy, or other challenges or considerations that 
                prevent or frustrate these efforts, to include any gaps 
                in the respective export control regimes implemented by 
                United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
                Australia, or Canada.
            (2) Form.--This report required under paragraph (1) shall 
        be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 233. REPORT ON DIPLOMATIC OUTREACH WITH RESPECT TO CHINESE 
              MILITARY INSTALLATIONS OVERSEAS.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
Secretary of Defense, shall submit a report to the appropriate 
congressional committees regarding United States diplomatic engagement 
with other nations that host or are considering hosting any military 
installation of the Government of the People's Republic of China.
    (b) Matters To Be Included.--The report required under subsection 
(a) shall include--
            (1) a list of countries that currently host or are 
        considering hosting any military installation of the Government 
        of the People's Republic of China;
            (2) a detailed description of United States diplomatic and 
        related efforts to countries that are considering hosting a 
        military installation of the Government of the People's 
        Republic of China, and the results of such efforts;
            (3) an assessment on the adverse impact on United States 
        interests of the Government of the People's Republic of China 
        successfully establishing a military installation at any of the 
        locations it is currently considering;
            (4) a description and list of any commercial ports outside 
        of the People's Republic of China that the United States 
        Government assesses could be used by the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China for military purposes, and any 
        diplomatic efforts with the governments of the countries where 
        such ports are located;
            (5) the impact of the military installations of the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China on United States 
        interests; and
            (6) lessons learned from the diplomatic experience of 
        addressing the PRC's first overseas base in Djibouti.
    (c) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
be classified, but may include a unclassified summary.

SEC. 234. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING UNIVERSAL IMPLEMENTATION OF 
              UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA.

    It is the policy of the United States to sustain maximum economic 
pressure on the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(referred to in this section as the ``DPRK'') until the regime 
undertakes complete, verifiable, and irreversible actions toward 
denuclearization, including by--
            (1) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to implement 
        and enforce existing United Nations sanctions with regard to 
        the DPRK;
            (2) pressing all nations, including the PRC, and in 
        accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions, to 
        end the practice of hosting DPRK citizens as guest workers, 
        recognizing that such workers are demonstrated to constitute an 
        illicit source of revenue for the DPRK regime and its nuclear 
        ambitions;
            (3) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to pursue 
        rigorous interdiction of shipments to and from the DPRK, 
        including ship-to-ship transfers, consistent with United 
        Nations Security Council resolutions;
            (4) pressing the PRC and PRC entities--
                    (A) to cease business activities with United 
                Nations-designated entities and their affiliates in the 
                DPRK; and
                    (B) to expel from the PRC individuals who enable 
                the DPRK to acquire materials for its nuclear and 
                ballistic missile programs; and
            (5) enforcing United Nations Security Council resolutions 
        with respect to the DPRK and United States sanctions, including 
        those pursuant to the North Korea Sanctions and Policy 
        Enhancement Act of 2016 (Public Law 114-122), the Countering 
        America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Public Law 115-
        44), the Otto Warmbier North Korea Nuclear Sanctions and 
        Enforcement Act of 2019 (title LXXI of division F of Public Law 
        116-92), and relevant United States executive orders.

SEC. 235. LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES HOSTING CHINESE 
              MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) although it casts the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as 
        a development initiative, the People's Republic of China is 
        also utilizing the BRI to advance its own security interests, 
        including to expand its power projection capabilities and 
        facilitate greater access for the People's Liberation Army 
        through overseas military installations; and
            (2) the expansion of the People's Liberation Army globally 
        through overseas military installations will undermine the 
        medium- and long-term security of the United States and the 
        security and development of strategic partners in critical 
        regions around the world, which is at odds with United States 
        goals to promote peace, prosperity, and self-reliance among 
        partner nations, including through the Millennium Challenge 
        Corporation.
    (b) Limitation on Assistance.--Except as provided in subsection 
(c), for fiscal years 2022 through 2031, the government of a country 
that is hosting on its territory a military installation of the 
Government of the People's Republic of China or facilitates the 
expansion of the presence of the People's Liberation Army for purposes 
other than participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations or 
for temporary humanitarian, medical, and disaster relief operations in 
such country shall not be eligible for assistance under sections 609 or 
616 of the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7708, 7715).
    (c) National Interest Waiver.--The President may, on a case by case 
basis, waive the limitation in subsection (b) if the President submits 
to the appropriate congressional committees--
            (1) a written determination that the waiver is important to 
        the national interests of the United States; and
            (2) a detailed explanation of how the waiver is important 
        to those interests.

  Subtitle C--Regional Strategies To Counter the People's Republic of 
                                 China

SEC. 241. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS 
              AROUND THE WORLD WITH RESPECT TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
              CHINA.

    It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to strengthen alliances and partnerships Europe and 
        with like-minded countries around the globe to effectively 
        compete with the People's Republic of China; and
            (2) to work in collaboration with such allies and 
        partners--
                    (A) to address significant diplomatic, economic, 
                and military challenges posed by the People's Republic 
                of China;
                    (B) to deter the People's Republic of China from 
                pursuing military aggression;
                    (C) to promote the peaceful resolution of 
                territorial disputes in accordance with international 
                law;
                    (D) to promote private sector-led long-term 
                economic development while countering efforts by the 
                Government of the People's Republic of China to 
                leverage predatory economic practices as a means of 
                political and economic coercion in the Indo-Pacific 
                region and beyond;
                    (E) to promote the values of democracy and human 
                rights, including through efforts to end the repression 
                by the Chinese Communist Party of political dissidents 
                and Uyghurs and other ethnic Muslim minorities, Tibetan 
                Buddhists, Christians, and other minorities;
                    (F) to respond to the crackdown by the Chinese 
                Communist Party, in contravention of the commitments 
                made under the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 
                and the Basic Law of Hong Kong, on the legitimate 
                aspirations of the people of Hong Kong; and
                    (G) to counter the Chinese Communist Party efforts 
                to spread disinformation in the People's Republic of 
                China and beyond with respect to the response of the 
                Chinese Communist Party to COVID-19.

                       PART I--WESTERN HEMISPHERE

SEC. 245. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES-CANADA RELATIONS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States and Canada have a unique relationship 
        based on shared geography, extensive personal connections, deep 
        economic ties, mutual defense commitments, and a shared vision 
        to uphold democracy, human rights, and the rules based 
        international order established after World War II;
            (2) the United States and Canada can better address China's 
        economic, political, and security influence through closer 
        cooperation on counternarcotics, environmental stewardship, 
        transparent practices in public procurement and infrastructure 
        planning, the Arctic, energy and connectivity issues, trade and 
        commercial relations, bilateral legal matters, and support for 
        democracy, good governance, and human rights;
            (3) amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States and 
        Canada should maintain joint initiatives to address border 
        management, commercial and trade relations, a shared approach 
        with respect to the People's Republic of China, and 
        transnational challenges, including pandemics and climate 
        change;
            (4) the United States and Canada should enhance cooperation 
        to counter Chinese disinformation, influence operations, 
        economic espionage, and propaganda efforts;
            (5) the People's Republic of China's infrastructure 
        investments, particularly in 5G telecommunications technology, 
        extraction of natural resources, and port infrastructure, pose 
        national security risks for the United States and Canada;
            (6) the United States should share, as appropriate, 
        intelligence gathered regarding--
                    (A) Huawei's 5G capabilities; and
                    (B) the Chinese Government's intentions with 
                respect to 5G expansion;
            (7) the United States and Canada should continue to advance 
        collaborative initiatives to implement the January 9, 2020, 
        United States-Canada Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals 
        Development Collaboration; and
            (8) the United States and Canada must prioritize 
        cooperation on continental defense and in the Arctic, including 
        by modernizing the North American Aerospace Defense Command 
        (NORAD) to effectively defend the Northern Hemisphere against 
        the range of threats by peer competitors, including long range 
        missiles and high-precision weapons.

SEC. 246. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA'S 
              ARBITRARY IMPRISONMENT OF CANADIAN CITIZENS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Government of the People's Republic of China's 
        apparent arbitrary detention and abusive treatment of Canadian 
        nationals Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig in apparent 
        retaliation for the Government of Canada's arrest of Meng 
        Wanzhou is deeply concerning;
            (2) the Government of Canada has shown international 
        leadership by--
                    (A) upholding the rule of law and complying with 
                its international legal obligations, including those 
                pursuant to the Extradition Treaty Between the United 
                States of America and Canada, signed at Washington 
                December 3, 1971; and
                    (B) launching the Declaration Against Arbitrary 
                Detention in State-to-State Relations, which has been 
                endorsed by 57 countries and the European Union and 
                reaffirms well-established prohibitions under 
                international human rights conventions against the 
                arbitrary detention of foreign nationals to be used as 
                leverage in state-to-state relations; and
            (3) the United States continues to join the Government of 
        Canada in calling for the immediate release of Michael Spavor 
        and Michael Kovrig and for due process for Canadian national 
        Robert Schellenberg.

SEC. 247. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH CANADA.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a strategy to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of 
the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
Armed Services of the House of Representatives that describes how the 
United States will enhance cooperation with the Government of Canada in 
managing relations with the Government of China.
    (b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall--
            (1) identify key policy points of convergence and 
        divergence between the United States and Canada in managing 
        relations with the People's Republic of China in the areas of 
        technology, trade, economic practices, cyber security, secure 
        supply chains and critical minerals, and illicit narcotics;
            (2) include the development coordination efforts with 
        Canadian counterparts to enhance the cooperation between the 
        United States and Canada with respect to--
                    (A) managing economic relations with the People's 
                Republic of China;
                    (B) democracy and human rights in the People's 
                Republic of China;
                    (C) technology issues involving the People's 
                Republic of China;
                    (D) defense issues involving the People's Republic 
                of China; and
                    (E) international law enforcement and transnational 
                organized crime issues.
            (3) detail diplomatic efforts and future plans to work with 
        Canada to counter Chinese projection of an authoritarian 
        governing model around the world;
            (4) detail diplomatic, defense, and intelligence 
        cooperation to date and future plans to support Canadian 
        efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to Huawei's 5G 
        technology;
            (5) detail diplomatic and defense collaboration--
                    (A) to advance joint United States-Canadian 
                priorities for responsible stewardship in the Arctic 
                Region; and
                    (B) to counter Chinese efforts to project 
                political, economic, and military influence into the 
                Arctic Region; and
            (6) detail diplomatic efforts to work with Canada to track 
        and counter Chinese attempts to exert influence across the 
        multilateral system, including at the World Health 
        Organization.
    (c) Form.--The strategy required under this section shall be 
submitted in an unclassified form that can be made available to the 
public, but may include a classified annex, if necessary.
    (d) Consultation.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than every 180 days 
thereafter, the Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate 
congressional committees regarding the development and implementation 
of the strategy required under this section.

SEC. 248. STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS, GOVERNANCE, 
              HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA AND 
              THE CARIBBEAN.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney 
General, the United States Trade Representative, and the Chief 
Executive Officer of the United States International Development 
Finance Corporation, shall submit a multi-year strategy for increasing 
United States economic competitiveness and promoting good governance, 
human rights, and the rule of law in Latin American and Caribbean 
countries, particularly in the areas of investment, equitable and 
sustainable development, commercial relations, anti-corruption 
activities, and infrastructure projects, to--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
            (2) the Committee on Finance of the Senate;
            (3) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
            (4) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
            (5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives;
            (6) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
        Representatives;
            (7) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
        Representatives; and
            (8) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
        Representatives.
    (b) Additional Elements.--The strategy required under subsection 
(a) shall include a plan of action, including benchmarks to achieve 
measurable progress, to--
            (1) enhance the technical capacity of countries in the 
        region to advance the sustainable development of equitable 
        economies;
            (2) reduce trade and non-tariff barriers between the 
        countries of the Americas;
            (3) facilitate a more open, transparent, and competitive 
        environment for United States businesses in the region;
            (4) establish frameworks or mechanisms to review long term 
        financial sustainability and security implications of foreign 
        investments in strategic sectors or services, including 
        transportation, communications, natural resources, and energy;
            (5) establish competitive and transparent infrastructure 
        project selection and procurement processes that promote 
        transparency, open competition, financial sustainability, 
        adherence to robust global standards, and the employment of the 
        local workforce;
            (6) strengthen legal structures critical to robust 
        democratic governance, fair competition, combat corruption, and 
        end impunity;
            (7) identify and mitigate obstacles to private sector-led 
        economic growth in Latin America and the Caribbean; and
            (8) maintain transparent and affordable access to the 
        internet and digital infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere.
    (c) Reporting Requirement.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of 
State, after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the 
Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade 
Representative, and the leadership of the United States International 
Development Finance Corporation, shall brief the congressional 
committees listed in subsection (a) regarding the implementation of 
this part, including examples of successes and challenges.

SEC. 249. ENGAGEMENT IN REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN 
              LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
            (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
            (3) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
            (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives;
            (5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        House of Representatives; and
            (6) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
        Representatives.
    (b) Reporting Requirement.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, working 
        through the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and 
        Research, and in coordination with the Director of National 
        Intelligence and the Director of the Central Intelligence 
        Agency, shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of 
        Congress that assesses the nature, intent, and impact to United 
        States strategic interests of Chinese diplomatic activity aimed 
        at influencing the decisions, procedures, and programs of 
        multilateral organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
        including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, 
        Organization of American States, and the Inter-American 
        Development Bank.
            (2) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form and shall include classified 
        annexes.

SEC. 250. ADDRESSING CHINA'S SOVEREIGN LENDING PRACTICES IN LATIN 
              AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) since 2005, the Government of China has expanded 
        sovereign lending to governments in Latin America and the 
        Caribbean with loans that are repaid or collateralized with 
        natural resources or commodities;
            (2) several countries in Latin American and the Caribbean 
        that have received a significant amount of sovereign lending 
        from the Government of China face challenges in repaying such 
        loans;
            (3) the Government of China's predatory economic practices 
        and sovereign lending practices in Latin America and the 
        Caribbean negatively influence United States national interests 
        in the Western Hemisphere;
            (4) the Inter-American Development Bank, the premier 
        multilateral development bank dedicated to the Western 
        Hemisphere, should play a significant role supporting the 
        countries of Latin America and the Caribbean in achieving 
        sustainable and serviceable debt structures; and
            (5) a tenth general capital increase for the Inter-American 
        Development Bank would strengthen the Bank's ability to help 
        the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean achieve 
        sustainable and serviceable debt structures.
    (b) Support for a General Capital Increase.--The President shall 
take steps to support a tenth general capital increase for the Inter-
American Development Bank, including advancing diplomatic engagement to 
build support among member countries of the Bank for a tenth general 
capital increase for the Bank
    (c) Tenth Capital Increase.--The Inter-American Development Bank 
Act (22 U.S.C. 283 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the 
following:

``SEC. 42. TENTH CAPITAL INCREASE.

    ``(a) Vote Authorized.--The United States Governor of the Bank is 
authorized to vote in favor of a resolution to increase the capital 
stock of the Bank by $80,000,000,000 over a period not to exceed 5 
years.
    ``(b) Subscription Authorized.--
            ``(1) In general.--The United States Governor of the Bank 
        may subscribe on behalf of the United States to 1,990,714 
        additional shares of the capital stock of the Bank.
            ``(2) Limitation.--Any subscription by the United States to 
        the capital stock of the Bank shall be effective only to such 
        extent and in such amounts as are provided in advance in 
        appropriations Acts.
    ``(c) Limitations on Authorization of Appropriations.--
            ``(1) In general.--In order to pay for the increase in the 
        United States subscription to the Bank under subsection (b), 
        there is authorized to be appropriated $24,014,857,191 for 
        payment by the Secretary of the Treasury.
            ``(2) Allocation of funds.--Of the amount authorized to be 
        appropriated under paragraph (1)--
                    ``(A) $600,371,430 shall be for paid in shares of 
                the Bank; and
                    ``(B) $23,414,485,761 shall be for callable shares 
                of the Bank.''.
    (d) Addressing China's Sovereign Lending in the Americas.--The 
Secretary of the Treasury and the United States Executive Director to 
the Inter-American Development Bank shall use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States--
            (1) to advance efforts by the Bank to help countries 
        restructure debt resulting from sovereign lending by the 
        Government of China in order to achieve sustainable and 
        serviceable debt structures; and
            (2) to establish appropriate safeguards and transparency 
        and conditionality measures to protect debt-vulnerable member 
        countries of the Inter-American Development Bank that borrow 
        from the Bank for the purposes of restructuring Chinese 
        bilateral debt held by such countries and preventing such 
        countries from incurring subsequent Chinese bilateral debt.
    (e) Briefings.--
            (1) Implementation.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
        of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the 
        President shall provide to the Committee on Foreign Relations 
        of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the 
        House of Representatives a briefing detailing efforts to carry 
        out subsection (b) and (d) and the amendment made by subsection 
        (c).
            (2) Progress in achieving sustainable and serviceable debt 
        structures.--Not later than 180 days after the successful 
        completion of a tenth general capital increase for the Inter-
        American Development Bank, and every 180 days thereafter for a 
        period of 3 years, the President shall provide to the Committee 
        on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
        Financial Services of the House of Representatives a briefing 
        on efforts by the Bank to support countries in Latin American 
        and the Caribbean in their efforts to achieve sustainable and 
        serviceable debt structures.

SEC. 251. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

    (a) In General.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the 
Department of State $12,000,000 for the International Military 
Education and Training Program for Latin America and the Caribbean for 
each of fiscal years 2021 through 2026.
    (b) Modernization.--The Secretary of State shall take steps to 
modernize and strengthen the programs receiving funding under 
subsection (a) to ensure that such programs are vigorous, substantive, 
and the preeminent choice for international military education and 
training for Latin American and Caribbean partners.
    (c) Required Elements.--The programs referred to in subsection (a) 
shall--
            (1) provide training and capacity-building opportunities to 
        Latin American and Caribbean security services;
            (2) provide practical skills and frameworks for--
                    (A) improving the functioning and organization of 
                security services in Latin America and the Caribbean;
                    (B) creating a better understanding of the United 
                States and its values; and
                    (C) using technology for maximum efficiency and 
                organization; and
            (3) promote and ensure that security services in Latin 
        America and the Caribbean respect civilian authority and 
        operate in compliance with international norms, standards, and 
        rules of engagement, including a respect for human rights.
    (d) Limitation.--Security assistance under this section is subject 
to limitations as enshrined in the requirements of section 620M of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d).

SEC. 252. ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
              CARIBBEAN REGARDING ACCOUNTABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE 
              RISKS OF PERVASIVE SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Government of China is exporting its model for 
        internal security and state control of society through advanced 
        technology and artificial intelligence; and
            (2) the inclusion of communication networks and 
        communications supply chains with equipment and services from 
        companies with close ties to or susceptible to pressure from 
        governments or security services without reliable legal checks 
        on governmental powers can lead to breaches of citizens' 
        private information, increased censorship, violations of human 
        rights, and harassment of political opponents.
    (b) Diplomatic Engagement.--The Secretary of State shall conduct 
diplomatic engagement with governments and civil society organizations 
in Latin America and the Caribbean to--
            (1) help identify and mitigate the risks to civil liberties 
        posed by technologies and services described in subsection (a); 
        and
            (2) offer recommendations on ways to mitigate such risks.
    (c) Internet Freedom Programs.--The Chief Executive Officer of the 
United States Agency for Global Media, working through the Open 
Technology Fund, and the Secretary of State, working through the Bureau 
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor's Internet Freedom and Business 
and Human Rights Section, shall expand and prioritize efforts to 
provide anti-censorship technology and services to journalists in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, in order to enhance their ability to safely 
access or share digital news and information.
    (d) Support for Civil Society.--The Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor and the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
International Development, shall work through nongovernmental 
organizations to--
            (1) support and promote programs that support internet 
        freedom and the free flow of information online in Latin 
        America and the Caribbean;
            (2) protect open, interoperable, secure, and reliable 
        access to internet in Latin America and the Caribbean;
            (3) provide integrated support to civil society for 
        technology, digital safety, policy and advocacy, and applied 
        research programs in Latin America and the Caribbean;
            (4) train journalists and civil society leaders in Latin 
        America and the Caribbean on investigative techniques necessary 
        to ensure public accountability and prevent government 
        overreach in the digital sphere;
            (5) assist independent media outlets and journalists in 
        Latin America and the Caribbean to build their own capacity and 
        develop high-impact, in-depth news reports covering governance 
        and human rights topics;
            (6) provide training for journalists and civil society 
        leaders on investigative techniques necessary to improve 
        transparency and accountability in government and the private 
        sector;
            (7) provide training on investigative reporting of 
        incidents of corruption and unfair trade, business and 
        commercial practices related to China, including the role of 
        the Government of China in such practices;
            (8) assist nongovernmental organizations to strengthen 
        their capacity to monitor the activities described in paragraph 
        (7); and
            (9) identify local resources to support the preponderance 
        of activities that would be carried out under this subsection.
    (e) Briefing Requirement.--Not more than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary 
of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
International Development, and the Chief Executive Officer of the 
United States Agency for Global Media shall provide a briefing 
regarding the efforts described in subsections (c), (d), and (e) to--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
            (2) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
            (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives; and
            (4) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
        Representatives.

                    PART II--TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE

SEC. 255. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States, the European Union, and countries of 
        Europe are close partners, sharing values grounded in 
        democracy, human rights, transparency, and the rules-based 
        international order established after World War II;
            (2) without a common approach by the United States, 
        European Union, and countries of Europe on connectivity, trade, 
        transnational problems, and support for democracy and human 
        rights, the People's Republic of China will continue to 
        increase its economic, political and security leverage in 
        Europe;
            (3) the People's Republic of China's deployment of 
        assistance to European countries following the COVID-19 
        outbreak showcased a coercive approach to aid, but it also 
        highlighted Europe's deep economic ties to China;
            (4) as European states seek to recover from the economic 
        toll of the COVID-19 outbreak, the United States must stand in 
        partnership with Europe to support our collective economic 
        recovery and reinforce our collective national security and 
        defend these shared values;
            (5) the United States, European Union, and other European 
        countries should coordinate on joint strategies to diversify 
        reliance on supply chains away from the People's Republic of 
        China, especially in the medical and pharmaceutical sectors;
            (6) the United States, European Union, United Kingdom, and 
        the countries of Europe should leverage their respective 
        economic innovation capabilities to support the global economic 
        recovery from the COVID-19 recession and draw a contrast with 
        the centralized economy of the People's Republic of China;
            (7) the United States and European Union should accelerate 
        efforts to de-escalate their trade disputes, including 
        negotiating a United States-European Union trade agreement that 
        benefits workers and the broader economy in both the United 
        States and European Union;
            (8) the United States, European Union, and Japan should 
        continue trilateral efforts to address economic challenges 
        posed by the People's Republic of China;
            (9) the United States, European Union, and countries of 
        Europe should enhance cooperation to counter Chinese 
        disinformation, influence operations, and propaganda efforts;
            (10) the United States and European nations share serious 
        concerns with the repressions being supported and executed by 
        the Government of China, and should continue implementing 
        measures to address the Government of China's specific abuses 
        in Tibet, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang, and should build joint 
        mechanisms and programs to prevent the export of China's 
        authoritarian governance model to countries around the world;
            (11) the United States and European nations should remain 
        united in their shared values against attempts by the 
        Government of China at the United Nations and other 
        multilateral organizations to promote efforts that erode the 
        Universal Declaration of Human Rights, like the ``community of 
        a shared future for mankind'' and ``democratization of 
        international relations'';
            (12) the People's Republic of China's infrastructure 
        investments around the world, particularly in 5G 
        telecommunications technology and port infrastructure, could 
        threaten democracy across Europe and the national security of 
        key countries;
            (13) as appropriate, the United States should share 
        intelligence with European allies and partners on Huawei's 5G 
        capabilities and the intentions of the Government of China with 
        respect to 5G expansion in Europe;
            (14) the European Union's Investment Screening Regulation, 
        which came into force in October 2020, is a welcome 
        development, and member states should closely scrutinize 
        Chinese investments in their countries through their own 
        national investment screening measures;
            (15) the President should actively engage the European 
        Union on the implementation of the Export Control Reform Act 
        regulations and work to align the law's regulations with 
        European Union priorities;
            (16) the President should strongly advocate for the listing 
        of more items and technologies to restrict dual use exports 
        controlled at the National Security and above level to the 
        People's Republic of China under the Wassenaar Arrangement;
            (17) the United States should explore the value of 
        establishing a body akin to the Coordinating Committee for 
        Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) that would specifically 
        coordinate the export of United States and European Union 
        sensitive technologies to the People's Republic of China; and
            (18) the United States should work with counterparts in 
        Europe to--
                    (A) evaluate United States and European 
                overreliance on Chinese goods, including in the medical 
                and pharmaceutical sectors, and develop joint 
                strategies to diversify supply chains;
                    (B) counter Chinese efforts to use COVID-19-related 
                assistance as a coercive tool to pressure developing 
                countries by offering relevant United States and 
                European expertise and assistance; and
                    (C) leverage the United States and European private 
                sectors to advance the post-COVID-19 economic recovery.

SEC. 256. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION WITH RESPECT TO 
              THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall brief the Committee on 
Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of 
the House of Representatives on a strategy for how the United States 
will enhance cooperation with the European Union, NATO, and European 
partner countries on managing relations with the People's Republic of 
China.
    (b) Elements.--The briefing required by subsection (a) shall do the 
following:
            (1) Identify the senior Senate-confirmed Department of 
        State official that leads United States efforts to cooperate 
        with the European Union, NATO, and European partner countries 
        to advance a shared approach with respect to the People's 
        Republic of China.
            (2) Identify key policy points of convergence and 
        divergence between the United States and European partners with 
        respect to the People's Republic of China in the areas of 
        technology, trade, and economic practices.
            (3) Describe efforts to advance shared interests with 
        European counterparts on--
                    (A) economic challenges with the People's Republic 
                of China;
                    (B) democracy and human rights challenges with 
                respect to the People's Republic of China;
                    (C) technology issues with respect to the People's 
                Republic of China;
                    (D) defense issues with respect to the People's 
                Republic of China; and
                    (E) developing a comprehensive strategy to respond 
                to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) established by 
                the Government of the People's Republic of China.
            (4) Describe the coordination mechanisms among key regional 
        and functional bureaus within the Department of State and 
        Department of Defense tasked with engaging with European 
        partners on the People's Republic of China.
            (5) Detail diplomatic efforts made up to the date on which 
        the date of the briefing and future plans to work with European 
        partners to counter Chinese advancement of an authoritarian 
        governing model around the world.
            (6) Detail the diplomatic efforts made up to the date on 
        which the strategy is submitted and future plans to support 
        European efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to 
        Huawei's 5G technology.
            (7) Detail how United States public diplomacy tools, 
        including the Global Engagement Center of the Department of 
        State, will coordinate efforts with counterpart entities within 
        the European Union to counter Chinese propaganda.
            (8) Describe the staffing and budget resources the 
        Department of State dedicates to engagement between the United 
        States and the European Union on the People's Republic of China 
        and provide an assessment of out-year resource needs to execute 
        the strategy.
            (9) Detail diplomatic efforts to work with European 
        partners to track and counter Chinese attempts to exert 
        influence across multilateral fora, including at the World 
        Health Organization.
    (c) Form.--The briefing required by section (a) shall be 
classified.
    (d) Consultation.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of 
State shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees 
regarding the development and implementation of the strategy.

SEC. 257. ENHANCING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION ON PROMOTING PRIVATE 
              SECTOR FINANCE.

    (a) In General.--The President should work with transatlantic 
partners to build on the agreement among the Development Finance 
Corporation, FinDev Canada, and the European Development Finance 
Institutions (called the DFI Alliance) to enhance coordination on 
shared objectives to foster private sector-led development and provide 
market-based alternatives to state-directed financing in emerging 
markets, particularly as related to the People's Republic of China's 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), including by integrating efforts such 
as--
            (1) the European Union Strategy on Connecting Europe and 
        Asia;
            (2) the Three Seas Initiative and Three Seas Initiative 
        Fund;
            (3) the Blue Dot Network among the United States, Japan, 
        and Australia; and
            (4) a European Union-Japan initiative that has leveraged 
        $65,000,000,000 for infrastructure projects and emphasizes 
        transparency standards.
    (b) Cooperation at the United Nations.--The United States and 
Europe should coordinate efforts to address the Government of China's 
use of the United Nations to advance and legitimize BRI as a global 
good, including the proliferation of memoranda of understanding between 
the People's Republic of China and United Nations funds and programs on 
BRI implementation.
    (c) Standards.--The United States and the European Union should 
coordinate and develop a strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation 
with the OECD and the Paris Club on ensuring the highest possible 
standards for Belt and Road Initiative contracts and terms with 
developing countries.

SEC. 258. REPORT AND BRIEFING ON COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND IRAN AND 
              BETWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA.

    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on 
        Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the 
        Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the 
        Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the Committee on 
        Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance, 
        and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
            (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
        Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, 
        the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on 
        Financial Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the 
        Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
    (b) Report and Briefing Required.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
        Intelligence shall, in coordination with the Secretary of 
        State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the 
        Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and such 
        other heads of Federal agencies as the Director considers 
        appropriate, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a 
        report and brief the appropriate committees of Congress on 
        cooperation between China and Iran and between China and 
        Russia.
            (2) Contents.--The report submitted under paragraph (1) 
        shall include the following elements:
                    (A) An identification of major areas of diplomatic 
                energy, infrastructure, banking, financial, economic, 
                military, and space cooperation--
                            (i) between China and Iran; and
                            (ii) between China and Russia.
                    (B) An assessment of the effect of the Coronavirus 
                Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic on such cooperation.
            (3) Form.--The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall 
        be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex.
    (c) Sense of Congress on Sharing With Allies and Partners.--It is 
the sense of Congress that the Director of National Intelligence and 
the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies should 
share the findings of the report submitted under subsection (b) with 
important allies and partners of the United States, as appropriate.

                    PART III--SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA

SEC. 261. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States should continue to stand with friends 
        and partners in South and Central Asia as they contend with 
        efforts by the Government of China to interfere in their 
        respective political systems and encroach upon their sovereign 
        territory; and
            (2) the United States should reaffirm its commitment to the 
        Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership with India and 
        further deepen bilateral defense consultations and 
        collaboration with India commensurate with its status as a 
        major defense partner.

SEC. 262. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of 
the House of Representatives a strategy for how the United States will 
engage with the countries of South and Central Asia, including through 
the C5+1 mechanism, with respect to the People's Republic of China.
    (b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall 
include the following elements:
            (1) A detailed description of the security and economic 
        challenges that the People's Republic of China poses to the 
        countries of South and Central Asia, including border disputes 
        with South and Central Asian countries that border China, 
        Chinese investments in land and sea ports, transportation 
        infrastructure, and energy projects across the region.
            (2) A detailed description of United States efforts to 
        provide alternatives to Chinese investment in infrastructure 
        and other sectors in South and Central Asia.
            (3) A detailed description of bilateral and regional 
        efforts to work with countries in South Asia on strategies to 
        build resilience against Chinese efforts to interfere in their 
        political systems and economies.
            (4) A detailed description of United States diplomatic 
        efforts to work with the Government of Afghanistan on 
        addressing the challenges posed by Chinese investment in the 
        Afghan mineral sector.
            (5) A detailed description of United States diplomatic 
        efforts with the Government of Pakistan with respect to matters 
        relevant to the People's Republic of China, including 
        investments by the People's Republic of China in Pakistan 
        through the Belt and Road Initiative.
            (6) In close consultation with the Government of India, 
        identification of areas where the United States Government can 
        provide diplomatic and other support as appropriate for India's 
        efforts to address economic and security challenges posed by 
        the People's Republic of China in the region.
            (7) A description of the coordination mechanisms among key 
        regional and functional bureaus within the Department of State 
        and Department of Defense tasked with engaging with the 
        countries of South and Central Asia on issues relating to the 
        People's Republic of China.
            (8) A description of the efforts being made by Federal 
        departments agencies, including the Department of State, the 
        United States Agency for International Development, the 
        Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, and the 
        Office of the United States Trade Representative, to help the 
        nations of South and Central Asia develop trade and commerce 
        links that will help those nations diversify their trade away 
        from China.
    (c) Form.--The strategy required under section (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form that can be made available to the 
public, but may include a classified annex as necessary.
    (d) Consultation.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and not less than annually thereafter, the 
Secretary of State shall consult with the Committee on Foreign 
Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the 
Committee of Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
House of Representatives regarding the development and implementation 
of the strategy required under subsection (a).

                            PART IV--AFRICA

SEC. 271. ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY ACTIVITY OF 
              THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN AFRICA.

    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on 
        Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
    (b) Intelligence Assessment.--Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in 
coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, submit to the 
appropriate committees of Congress a report that assesses the nature 
and impact of Chinese political, economic, and security sector activity 
in Africa, and its impact on United States strategic interests, 
including--
            (1) the amount and impact of direct investment, loans, 
        development financing, oil-for-loans deals, and other 
        preferential trading arrangements;
            (2) the involvement of Chinese state-owned enterprises in 
        Africa;
            (3) the amount of African debt held by the People's 
        Republic of China;
            (4) the involvement of Chinese private security, technology 
        and media companies in Africa;
            (5) the scale and impact of Chinese arms sales to African 
        countries;
            (6) the methods, tools, and tactics used to facilitate 
        illegal and corrupt activity, including trade in counterfeit 
        and illicit goods, to include smuggled extractive resources and 
        wildlife products, from Africa to China;
            (7) the methods and techniques that China uses to exert 
        undue influence on African governments and facilitate corrupt 
        activity in Africa, and to influence African multilateral 
        organizations; and
            (8) an analysis of the soft power, cultural and educational 
        activities undertaken by the PRC and CCP to seek to expand 
        influence in Africa.

SEC. 272. INCREASING THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE UNITED STATES IN 
              AFRICA.

    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Appropriations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Appropriations, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the 
        House of Representatives.
    (b) Strategy Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in 
consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of 
Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade Representative, 
the Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development, and the leadership of the United States International 
Development Finance Corporation, submit to the appropriate committees 
of Congress a report setting forth a multi-year strategy for increasing 
United States economic competitiveness and promoting improvements in 
the investment climate in Africa, including through support for 
democratic institutions, the rule of law, including property rights, 
and for improved transparency, anti-corruption and governance.
    (c) Elements.--The strategy submitted pursuant to subsection (a) 
shall include--
            (1) a description and assessment of barriers to United 
        States investment in Africa for United States businesses, 
        including a clear identification of the different barriers 
        facing small-sized and medium-sized businesses, and an 
        assessment of whether existing programs effectively address 
        such barriers;
            (2) a description and assessment of barriers to African 
        diaspora investment in Africa, and recommendations to overcome 
        such barriers;
            (3) an identification of the economic sectors in the United 
        States that have a comparative advantage in Africa markets;
            (4) a determination of priority African countries for 
        promoting two-way trade and investment and an assessment of 
        additional foreign assistance needs, including democracy and 
        governance and rule of law support, to promote a conducive 
        operating environment in priority countries;
            (5) an identification of opportunities for strategic 
        cooperation with European allies on trade and investment in 
        Africa, and for establishing a dialogue on trade, security, 
        development, and environmental issues of mutual interest; and
            (6) a plan to regularly host a United States-Africa Leaders 
        Summit to promote two-way trade and investment, strategic 
        engagement, and security in Africa
    (d) Assessment of United States Government Human Resources 
Capacity.--The Comptroller General of the United States shall--
            (1) conduct a review of the number of Foreign Commercial 
        Service Officers and Department of State Economic Officers at 
        United States embassies in sub-Saharan Africa; and
            (2) develop an assessment of whether human resource 
        capacity in such embassies is adequate to meet the goals of the 
        various trade and economic programs and initiatives in Africa, 
        including the African Growth and Opportunity Act and Prosper 
        Africa.

SEC. 273. DIGITAL SECURITY COOPERATION WITH RESPECT TO AFRICA.

    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on 
        Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
    (b) Interagency Working Group To Counter Chinese Cyber Aggression 
in Africa.--
            (1) In general.--The President shall establish an 
        interagency Working Group, which shall include representatives 
        of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the 
        Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and such other 
        agencies of the United States Government as the President 
        considers appropriate, on means to counter Chinese cyber 
        aggression with respect to Africa.
            (2) Duties.--The Working Group established pursuant to this 
        subsection shall develop a set of recommendations for--
                    (A) bolstering the capacity of governments in 
                Africa to ensure the integrity of their data networks 
                and critical infrastructure where applicable;
                    (B) providing alternatives to Huawei;
                    (C) an action plan for United States embassies in 
                Africa to offer to provide assistance to host-country 
                governments with protecting their vital digital 
                networks and infrastructure from Chinese espionage, 
                including an assessment of staffing resources needed to 
                implement the action plan in embassies in Africa;
                    (D) utilizing interagency resources to counter 
                Chinese disinformation and propaganda in traditional 
                and digital media targeted to African audiences; and
                    (E) helping civil society in Africa counter digital 
                authoritarianism and identifying tools and assistance 
                to enhance and promote digital democracy.

SEC. 274. INCREASING PERSONNEL IN UNITED STATES EMBASSIES IN SUB-
              SAHARAN AFRICA FOCUSED ON THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    The Secretary of State may station on a permanent basis Department 
of State personnel at such United States embassies in sub-Saharan 
Africa as the Secretary considers appropriate focused on the 
activities, policies and investments of the People's Republic of China 
in Africa.

SEC. 275. SUPPORT FOR YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.

    (a) Finding.--Congress finds that youth in Africa can have a 
positive impact on efforts to foster economic growth, improve public 
sector transparency and governance, and counter extremism, and should 
be an area of focus for United States outreach on the continent.
    (b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States, in cooperation 
and collaboration with private sector companies, civic organizations, 
nongovernmental organizations, and national and regional public sector 
entities, to commit resources to enhancing the entrepreneurship and 
leadership skills of African youth with the objective of enhancing 
their ability to serve as leaders in the public and private sectors in 
order to help them spur growth and prosperity, strengthen democratic 
governance, and enhance peace and security in their respective 
countries of origin and across Africa.
    (c) Young African Leaders Initiative.--
            (1) In general.--There is hereby established the Young 
        African Leaders Initiative, to be carried out by the Secretary 
        of State.
            (2) Fellowships.--The Secretary is authorized to support 
        the participation in the Initiative established under this 
        paragraph, in the United States, of fellows from Africa each 
        year for such education and training in leadership and 
        professional development through the Department of State as the 
        Secretary of State considers appropriate. The Secretary shall 
        establish and publish criteria for eligibility for 
        participation as such a fellow, and for selection of fellows 
        among eligible applicants for a fellowship.
            (3) Reciprocal exchanges.--Under the Initiative, United 
        States citizens may engage in such reciprocal exchanges in 
        connection with and collaboration on projects with fellows 
        under paragraph (1) as the Secretary considers appropriate.
            (4) Regional centers and networks.--The Administrator of 
        the United States Agency for International Development shall 
        establish each of the following:
                    (A) Not fewer than four regional centers in Africa 
                to provide in-person and online training throughout the 
                year in business and entrepreneurship, civic 
                leadership, and public management.
                    (B) An online network that provides information and 
                online courses on, and connections with leaders in, the 
                private and public sectors in Africa.
    (d) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
Secretary of State should increase the number of fellows from Africa in 
the Young African Leaders Initiative above the number that participated 
in the Initiative in fiscal year 2020 .

SEC. 276. AFRICA BROADCASTING NETWORKS.

    Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the CEO of the United States Agency for Global Media shall submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the resources 
and timeline needed to establish within the Agency an organization 
whose mission shall be to promote democratic values and institutions in 
Africa by providing objective, accurate, and relevant news and 
information to the people of Africa, especially in countries where a 
free press is banned by the government or not fully established, about 
the region, the world, and the United States through uncensored news, 
responsible discussion, and open debate.

                  PART V--MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

SEC. 281. STRATEGY TO COUNTER CHINESE INFLUENCE IN, AND ACCESS TO, THE 
              MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the economic influence of the People's Republic of 
        China through its oil and gas imports from the Middle East, 
        infrastructure investments, technology transfer, and arms sales 
        provide influence and leverage that runs counter to United 
        States interests in the region;
            (2) the People's Republic of China seeks to erode United 
        States influence in the Middle East and North Africa through 
        the sale of Chinese arms, associated weapons technology, and 
        joint weapons research and development initiatives;
            (3) the People's Republic of China seeks to establish 
        military or dual use facilities in geographically strategic 
        locations in the Middle East and North Africa to further the 
        Chinese Communist Party's Belt and Road Initiative at the 
        expense of United States national security interests; and
            (4) the export of certain communications infrastructure 
        from the People's Republic of China degrades the security of 
        partner networks, exposes intellectual property to theft, 
        threatens the ability of the United States to conduct security 
        cooperation with compromised regional partners, and furthers 
        China's authoritarian surveillance model.
    (b) Strategy Required.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency 
        for International Development and the heads of other 
        appropriate Federal agencies, shall jointly develop and submit 
        to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy for 
        countering and limiting Chinese influence in, and access to, 
        the Middle East and North Africa.
            (2) Elements.--The strategy required under paragraph (1) 
        shall include--
                    (A) an assessment of China's intent with regards to 
                increased cooperation with Middle East and North 
                African countries and how these activities fit into 
                their broader global strategic objectives;
                    (B) an assessment of how governments across the 
                region are responding to Chinese efforts to increase 
                Chinese military presence in their countries;
                    (C) efforts to improve regional cooperation through 
                foreign military sales, financing, and efforts to build 
                partner capacity and increase interoperability with the 
                United States;
                    (D) an assessment of Chinese joint research and 
                development with the Middle East, North Africa, impacts 
                on United States' national security interests, and 
                recommended steps to mitigate Chinese influence;
                    (E) an assessment of arms sales and weapons 
                technology transfers from the People's Republic of 
                China to the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on 
                United States' national security interests, and 
                recommended steps to mitigate Chinese influence;
                    (F) an assessment of Chinese military sales to the 
                region including lethal and non lethal unmanned aerial 
                systems;
                    (G) an assessment of People's Republic of China 
                military basing and dual-use facility initiatives 
                across the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on 
                United States' national security interests, and 
                recommended steps to mitigate Chinese influence;
                    (H) efforts to improve regional security 
                cooperation with United States allies and partners with 
                a focus on--
                            (i) maritime security in the Arabian Gulf, 
                        the Red Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean;
                            (ii) integrated air and missile defense;
                            (iii) cyber security;
                            (iv) border security; and
                            (v) critical infrastructure security, to 
                        include energy security;
                    (I) increased support for government-to-government 
                engagement on critical infrastructure development 
                projects including ports and water infrastructure;
                    (J) efforts to encourage United States private 
                sector and public-private partnerships in healthcare 
                technology and foreign direct investment in non-energy 
                sectors;
                    (K) efforts to expand youth engagement and 
                professional education exchanges with key partner 
                countries;
                    (L) specific steps to counter increased Chinese 
                investment in telecommunications infrastructure and 
                diplomatic efforts to stress the political, economic, 
                and social benefits of a free and open internet;
                    (M) efforts to promote United States private sector 
                engagement in and public-private partnerships on 
                renewable energy development;
                    (N) the expansion of public-private partnership 
                efforts on water, desalination, and irrigation 
                projects; and
                    (O) efforts to warn United States partners in the 
                Middle East and North Africa of the risks associated 
                with Chinese telecommunications infrastructure and 
                provide alternative ``clean paths'' to Chinese 
                technology.

SEC. 282. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA ENGAGEMENT.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The United States and the international community have 
        long-term interests in the stability, security, and prosperity 
        of the people of the Middle East and North Africa.
            (2) In addition to and apart from military and security 
        efforts, the United States should harness a whole of government 
        approach, including bilateral and multilateral statecraft, 
        economic lines of effort, and public diplomacy to compete with 
        and counter Chinese Communist Party influence.
            (3) A clearly articulated positive narrative of United 
        States engagement, transparent governance structures, and 
        active civil society engagement help counter predatory foreign 
        investment and influence efforts.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States 
that the United States and the international community should, continue 
diplomatic and economic efforts throughout the Middle East and North 
Africa that support reform efforts to--
            (1) promote greater economic opportunity;
            (2) foster private sector development;
            (3) strengthen civil society; and
            (4) promote transparent and democratic governance and the 
        rule of law.

                         PART VI--ARCTIC REGION

SEC. 285. ARCTIC DIPLOMACY.

    (a) Sense of Congress on Arctic Security.--It is the sense of 
Congress that--
            (1) the rapidly changing Arctic environment--
                    (A) creates new national and regional security 
                challenges due to increased military activity in the 
                Arctic;
                    (B) heightens the risk of the Arctic emerging as a 
                major theater of conflict in ongoing strategic 
                competition;
                    (C) threatens maritime safety as Arctic littoral 
                nations have inadequate capacity to patrol the 
                increased vessel traffic in this remote region, which 
                is a result of diminished annual levels of sea ice;
                    (D) impacts public safety due to increased human 
                activity in the Arctic region where search and rescue 
                capacity remains very limited; and
                    (E) threatens the health of the Arctic's fragile 
                and pristine environment and the unique and highly 
                sensitive species found in the Arctic's marine and 
                terrestrial ecosystems; and
            (2) the United States should reduce the consequences 
        outlined in paragraph (1) by--
                    (A) carefully evaluating the wide variety and 
                dynamic set of security and safety risks unfolding in 
                the Arctic;
                    (B) developing policies and making preparations to 
                mitigate and respond to threats and risks in the 
                Arctic, including by continuing to work with allies and 
                partners in the Arctic region to deter potential 
                aggressive activities and build Arctic competencies;
                    (C) adequately funding the National Earth System 
                Prediction Capability to substantively improve weather, 
                ocean, and ice predictions on the time scales necessary 
                to ensure regional security and trans-Arctic shipping;
                    (D) investing in resources, including a 
                significantly expanded icebreaker fleet, to ensure that 
                the United States has adequate capacity to prevent and 
                respond to security threats in the Arctic region;
                    (E) pursuing diplomatic engagements with all 
                nations in the Arctic region for--
                            (i) maintaining peace and stability in the 
                        Arctic region; and
                            (ii) fostering cooperation on stewardship 
                        and safety initiatives in the Arctic region; 
                        and
                    (F) examining the possibility of reconvening the 
                Arctic Chiefs of Defense Forum.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to recognize only the nations enumerated in subsection 
        (c)(1) as Arctic nations, and to reject all other claims to 
        this status; and
            (2) that the militarization of the Arctic poses a serious 
        threat to Arctic peace and stability, and the interests of 
        United States allies and partners.
    (c) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Arctic nations.--The term ``Arctic nations'' means the 
        8 nations with territory or exclusive economic zones that 
        extend north of the 66.56083 parallel latitude north of the 
        equator, namely Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway, 
        Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Sweden, and Iceland.
            (2) Arctic region.--The term ``Arctic Region'' means the 
        geographic region north of the 66.56083 parallel latitude north 
        of the equator.
    (d) Designation.--The Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and 
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) shall 
designate a deputy assistant secretary serving within the Bureau of 
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs as 
``Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arctic Affairs'', who shall be 
responsible for OES affairs in the Arctic Region.
    (e) Duties.--The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arctic Affairs 
shall--
            (1) facilitate the development and coordination of United 
        States foreign policy in the Arctic Region relating to--
                    (A) strengthening institutions for cooperation 
                among the Arctic nations;
                    (B) enhancing scientific monitoring and research on 
                local, regional, and global environmental issues;
                    (C) protecting the Arctic environment and 
                conserving its biological resources;
                    (D) promoting responsible natural resource 
                management and economic development; and
                    (E) involving Arctic indigenous people in decisions 
                that affect them.
            (2) coordinate the diplomatic objectives with respect to 
        the activities described in paragraph (1), and, as appropriate, 
        represent the United States within multilateral fora that 
        address international cooperation and foreign policy matters in 
        the Arctic Region;
            (3) help inform, in coordination with the Bureau of 
        Economic and Business Affairs, transnational commerce and 
        commercial maritime transit in the Arctic Region;
            (4) coordinate the integration of scientific data on the 
        current and projected effects of emerging environmental changes 
        on the Arctic Region and ensure that such data is applied to 
        the development of security strategies for the Arctic Region;
            (5) make available the methods and approaches on the 
        integration of climate, data, and environmental science to 
        regional security planning programs in the Department of State 
        to better ensure that broader decision-making processes may 
        more adequately account for the effects of climate change;
            (6) assist with the development of, and facilitate the 
        implementation of, an Arctic Region Security Policy in 
        accordance with subsection (f);
            (7) use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States 
        to encourage other countries and international multilateral 
        organizations to support the principles of the Arctic Region 
        Security Policy implemented pursuant to subsection (f); and
            (8) perform such other duties and exercise such powers as 
        the Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International 
        Environmental and Scientific Affairs shall prescribe.
    (f) Rank and Status.--The Secretary of State may change the title 
of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arctic Affairs designated under 
subsection (c) to Special Representative or Special Envoy with the rank 
of Ambassador if--
            (1) the President nominates the person so designated to 
        that rank and status; and
            (2) the Senate confirms such person to such rank and 
        status.
    (g) Arctic Region Security Policy.--The Bureau of European and 
Eurasian Affairs shall be the lead bureau for developing and 
implementing the United States' Arctic Region Security Policy, in 
coordination with the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental 
and Scientific Affairs, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 
embassies, other regional bureaus, and relevant offices to advance 
United States national security interests, including through conflict 
prevention efforts, security assistance, humanitarian disaster response 
and prevention, and economic and other relevant assistance programs. 
The Arctic Region Security Policy shall assess, develop, budget for, 
and implement plans, policies, and actions--
            (1) to bolster the diplomatic presence of the United States 
        in Arctic nations, including through enhancements to diplomatic 
        missions and facilities, participation in regional and 
        bilateral dialogues related to Arctic security, and 
        coordination of United States initiatives and assistance 
        programs across agencies to protect the national security of 
        the United States and its allies and partners;
            (2) to enhance the resilience capacities of Arctic nations 
        to the effects of environmental change and increased civilian 
        and military activity from Arctic nations and other nations 
        that may result from increased accessibility of the Arctic 
        Region;
            (3) to assess specific added risks to the Arctic Region and 
        Arctic nations that--
                    (A) are vulnerable to the changing Arctic 
                environment; and
                    (B) are strategically significant to the United 
                States;
            (4) to coordinate the integration of environmental change 
        and national security risk and vulnerability assessments into 
        the decision making process on foreign assistance awards to 
        Arctic nations;
            (5) to advance principles of good governance by encouraging 
        and cooperating with Arctic nations on collaborative 
        approaches--
                    (A) to responsibly manage natural resources in the 
                Arctic Region;
                    (B) to share the burden of ensuring maritime safety 
                in the Arctic Region;
                    (C) to prevent the escalation of security tensions 
                by mitigating against the militarization of the Arctic 
                Region;
                    (D) to develop mutually agreed upon multilateral 
                policies among Arctic nations on the management of 
                maritime transit routes through the Arctic Region and 
                work cooperatively on the transit policies for access 
                to and transit in the Arctic Region by non-Arctic 
                nations; and
                    (E) to facilitate the development of Arctic Region 
                Security Action Plans to ensure stability and public 
                safety in disaster situations in a humane and 
                responsible fashion; and
            (6) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, survivability, 
        and resiliency of United States interests and nondefense assets 
        in the Arctic Region.

                           PART VII--OCEANIA

SEC. 291. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES ENGAGEMENT IN OCEANIA.

    It shall be the policy of the United States--
            (1) to elevate the countries of Oceania as a strategic 
        national security and economic priority of the United States 
        Government;
            (2) to promote civil society, the rule of law, and 
        democratic governance across Oceania as part of a free and open 
        Indo-Pacific region;
            (3) to broaden and deepen relationships with the Freely 
        Associated States of the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the 
        Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia 
        through robust defense, diplomatic, economic, and development 
        exchanges that promote the goals of individual states and the 
        entire region;
            (4) to work with the governments of Australia, New Zealand, 
        and Japan to advance shared alliance goals of the Oceania 
        region concerning health, environmental protection, disaster 
        resilience and preparedness, illegal, unreported and 
        unregulated fishing, maritime security, and economic 
        development;
            (5) to participate, wherever possible and appropriate, in 
        existing regional organizations and international structures to 
        promote the national security and economic goals of the United 
        States and countries of the Oceania region;
            (6) to invest in a whole-of-government United States 
        strategy that will enhance youth engagement and advance long-
        term growth and development throughout the region, especially 
        as it relates to protecting marine resources that are critical 
        to livelihoods and strengthening the resilience of the 
        countries of the Oceania region against current and future 
        threats resulting from extreme weather and severe changes in 
        the environment;
            (7) to deter and combat acts of malign foreign influence 
        and corruption aimed at undermining the political, 
        environmental, social, and economic stability of the people and 
        governments of the countries of Oceania;
            (8) to improve the local capacity of the countries of 
        Oceania to address public health challenges and improve global 
        health security;
            (9) to help the countries of Oceania access market-based 
        private sector investments that adhere to best practices 
        regarding transparency, debt sustainability, and environmental 
        and social safeguards as an alternative to state-directed 
        investments by authoritarian governments;
            (10) to ensure the people and communities of Oceania remain 
        safe from the risks of old and degrading munitions hazards and 
        other debris that threaten health and livelihoods; and
            (11) to work cooperatively with all governments in Oceania 
        to promote the dignified return of the remains of members of 
        the United States Armed Forces that are missing in action from 
        previous conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region.

SEC. 292. OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.

    (a) Oceania Strategic Roadmap.--Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees a strategic roadmap for 
strengthening United States engagement with the countries of Oceania, 
including an analysis of opportunities to cooperate with Australia, New 
Zealand, and Japan, to address shared concerns and promote shared goals 
in pursuit of security and resiliency in the countries of Oceania.
    (b) Elements.--The strategic roadmap required by subsection (a) 
shall include the following:
            (1) A description of United States regional goals and 
        concerns with respect to Oceania and increasing engagement with 
        the countries of Oceania.
            (2) An assessment, based on paragraph (1), of United States 
        regional goals and concerns that are shared by Australia, New 
        Zealand, and Japan, including a review of issues related to 
        anticorruption, maritime and other security issues, 
        environmental protection, fisheries management, economic growth 
        and development, and disaster resilience and preparedness.
            (3) A review of ongoing programs and initiatives by the 
        governments of the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and 
        Japan in pursuit of those shared regional goals and concerns, 
        including with respect to the issues described in paragraph 
        (1).
            (4) A review of ongoing programs and initiatives by 
        regional organizations and other related intergovernmental 
        structures aimed at addressing the issues described in 
        paragraph (1).
            (5) A plan for aligning United States programs and 
        resources in pursuit of those shared regional goals and 
        concerns, as appropriate.
            (6) Recommendations for additional United States 
        authorities, personnel, programs, or resources necessary to 
        execute the strategic roadmap.
            (7) Any other elements the Secretary considers appropriate.

                   TITLE III--INVESTING IN OUR VALUES

SEC. 301. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN 
              HONG KONG.

    (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 for the Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the Department of State to 
promote democracy in Hong Kong.
    (b) Administration.--The Secretary of State shall designate an 
office with the Department of State to administer and coordinate the 
provision of such funds described in subsection (a) within the 
Department of State and across the United States Government.

SEC. 302. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO FORCED LABOR IN THE 
              XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.

    (a) In General.--Section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy 
Act of 2020 (Public Law 116-145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended--
            (1) by redesignating subparagraphs (E) as subparagraph (F); 
        and
            (2) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the following:
                    ``(E) Serious human rights abuses in connection 
                with forced labor.''.
    (b) Effective Date; Applicability.--The amendment made by 
subsection (a)--
            (1) takes effect on the date of the enactment of this Act; 
        and
            (2) applies with respect to the first report required by 
        section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 
        submitted after such date of enactment.

SEC. 303. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SYSTEMATIC RAPE, 
              COERCIVE ABORTION, FORCED STERILIZATION, OR INVOLUNTARY 
              CONTRACEPTIVE IMPLANTATION IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR 
              AUTONOMOUS REGION.

    (a) In General.--Section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy 
Act of 2020 (Public Law 116-145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note), as amended by 
section 302, is further amended--
            (1) by redesignating subparagraphs (F) as subparagraph (G); 
        and
            (2) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the following:
                    ``(F) Systematic rape, coercive abortion, forced 
                sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive 
                implantation policies and practices.''.
    (b) Effective Date; Applicability.--The amendment made by 
subsection (a)--
            (1) takes effect on the date of the enactment of this Act; 
        and
            (2) applies with respect to the first report required by 
        section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 
        submitted after such date of enactment.

             TITLE IV--INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT

SEC. 401. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE PRC'S INDUSTRIAL 
              POLICY.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The People's Republic of China, at the direction of the 
        Chinese Communist Party, is advancing an ecosystem of 
        anticompetitive economic and industrial policies that--
                    (A) distort global markets;
                    (B) limit innovation;
                    (C) unfairly advantage PRC firms at the expense of 
                the United States and other foreign firms; and
                    (D) unfairly and harmfully prejudice consumer 
                choice.
            (2) Of the extensive and systemic economic and industrial 
        policies pursued by the PRC, the mass subsidization of Chinese 
        firms, intellectual property theft, and forced technology 
        transfer are among the most damaging to the global economy.
            (3) Through regulatory interventions and direct financial 
        subsidies, the CCP, for the purposes of advancing national 
        political and economic objectives, directs, coerces, and 
        influences in anti-competitive ways the commercial activities 
        of firms that are directed, financed, influenced, or otherwise 
        controlled by the state, including state-owned enterprises, and 
        ostensibly independent and private Chinese companies, such as 
        technology firms in strategic sectors.
            (4) The PRC Government, at the national and subnational 
        levels, grants special privileges or status to certain PRC 
        firms in key sectors designated as strategic, such as 
        telecommunications, oil, power, aviation, banking, and 
        semiconductors. Enterprises receive special state preferences 
        in the form of favorable loans, tax exemptions, and 
        preferential land access from the CCP.
            (5) The subsidization of PRC companies, as described in 
        paragraphs (3) and (4)--
                    (A) enables these companies to sell goods below 
                market prices, allowing them to outbid and crowd out 
                market-based competitors and thereby pursue global 
                dominance of key sectors;
                    (B) distorts the global market economy by 
                undermining longstanding and generally accepted market-
                based principles of fair competition, leading to 
                barriers to entry and forced exit from the market for 
                foreign or private firms, not only in the PRC, but in 
                markets around the world;
                    (C) creates government-sponsored or supported de 
                facto monopolies, cartels, and other anti-market 
                arrangements in key sectors, limiting or removing 
                opportunities for other firms; and
                    (D) leads to, as a result of the issues described 
                in paragraphs (A) through (C), declines in profits and 
                revenue needed by foreign and private firms for 
                research and development.
            (6) The CCP incentivizes and empowers Chinese actors to 
        steal critical technologies and trade secrets from private and 
        foreign competitors operating in the PRC and around the world, 
        particularly in areas that the CCP has identified as critical 
        to advancing PRC objectives. The PRC, as directed by the CCP, 
        also continues to implement anti-competitive regulations, 
        policies, and practices that coerce the handover of technology 
        and other propriety or sensitive data from foreign enterprises 
        to domestic firms in exchange for access to the PRC market.
            (7) Companies in the United States and in foreign countries 
        compete with state-subsidized PRC companies that enjoy the 
        protection and power of the state in third-country markets 
        around the world. The advantages granted to PRC firms, combined 
        with significant restrictions to accessing the PRC market 
        itself, severely hamper the ability of United States and 
        foreign firms to compete, innovate, and pursue the provision of 
        best value to customers. The result is an unbalanced playing 
        field. Such an unsustainable course, if not checked, will over 
        time lead to depressed competition around the world, reduced 
        opportunity, and harm to both producers and consumers.
            (8) As stated in the United States Trade Representative's 
        investigation of the PRC's trade practices under section 301 of 
        the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2411), conducted in March 
        2018, ``When U.S. companies are deprived of fair returns on 
        their investment in IP, they are unable to achieve the growth 
        necessary to reinvest in innovation. In this sense, China's 
        technology transfer regime directly burdens the innovation 
        ecosystem that is an engine of economic growth in the United 
        States and similarly-situated economies.''.
            (9) In addition to forced technology described in this 
        subsection, the United States Trade Representative's 
        investigation of the PRC under section 301 of the Trade Act of 
        1974 (19 U.S.C. 2411) also identified requirements that foreign 
        firms license products at less than market value, government-
        directed and government-subsidized acquisition of sensitive 
        technology for strategic purposes, and cyber theft as other key 
        PRC technology and industrial policies that are unreasonable 
        and discriminatory. These policies place at risk United States 
        intellectual property rights, innovation and technological 
        development, and jobs in dozens of industries.
            (10) Other elements of the PRC's ecosystem of industrial 
        policies that harm innovation and distort global markets 
        include--
                    (A) advancement of policies that encourage local 
                production over imports;
                    (B) continuation of policies that favor unique 
                technical standards in use by Chinese firms rather than 
                globally accepted standards, which often force foreign 
                firms to alter their products and manufacturing chains 
                to compete;
                    (C) requirements that foreign companies disclose 
                proprietary information to qualify for the adoption of 
                their standards for use in the PRC domestic market; and
                    (D) maintenance of closed procurement processes, 
                which limit participation by foreign firms, including 
                by setting terms that require such firms to use 
                domestic suppliers, transfer know-how to firms in the 
                PRC, and disclose proprietary information.
            (11) The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and associated 
        industry-specific efforts under this initiative, such as the 
        Digital Silk Road, are key vectors to advance the PRC's 
        mercantilist policies and practices globally. The resulting 
        challenges do not only affect United States firms. As the 
        European Chamber of Commerce reported in a January 2020 report, 
        the combination of concessional lending to Chinese state-owned 
        enterprises, nontransparent procurement and bidding processes, 
        closed digital standards, and other factors severely limit 
        European and other participation in BRI and make ``competition 
        [with Chinese companies] in third-country markets extremely 
        challenging''. This underscores a key objective of BRI, which 
        is to ensure the reliance of infrastructure, digital 
        technologies, and other important goods on PRC supply chains 
        and technical standards.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the challenges presented by a nonmarket economy like 
        the PRC's economy, which has captured such a large share of 
        global economic exchange, are in many ways unprecedented and 
        require sufficiently elevated and sustained long-term focus and 
        engagement;
            (2) in order to truly address the most detrimental aspects 
        of CCP-directed mercantilist economic strategy, the United 
        States must adopt policies that--
                    (A) expose the full scope and scale of intellectual 
                property theft and mass subsidization of Chinese firms, 
                and the resulting harm to the United States, foreign 
                markets, and the global economy;
                    (B) ensure that PRC companies face costs and 
                consequences for anticompetitive behavior;
                    (C) provide options for affected United States 
                persons to address and respond to unreasonable and 
                discriminatory CCP-directed industrial policies; and
                    (D) strengthen the protection of critical 
                technology and sensitive data, while still fostering an 
                environment that provides incentives for innovation and 
                competition;
            (3) the United States must work with its allies and 
        partners through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
        Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization, and other 
        venues and fora--
                    (A) to reinforce long-standing generally accepted 
                principles of fair competition and market behavior and 
                address the PRC's anticompetitive economic and 
                industrial policies that undermine decades of global 
                growth and innovation;
                    (B) to ensure that the PRC is not granted the same 
                treatment as that of a free-market economy until it 
                ceases the implementation of laws, regulations, 
                policies, and practices that provide unfair advantage 
                on PRC firms in furtherance of national objectives and 
                impose unreasonable, discriminatory, and illegal 
                burdens on market-based international commerce; and
                    (C) to align policies with respect to curbing 
                state-directed subsidization of the private sector, 
                such as advocating for global rules related to 
                transparency and adherence to notification 
                requirements, including through the efforts currently 
                being advanced by the United States, Japan, and the 
                European Union; and
            (4) the United States and its allies and partners must 
        collaborate to provide incentives to their respective companies 
        to cooperate in areas such as--
                    (A) advocating for protection of intellectual 
                property rights in markets around the world;
                    (B) fostering open technical standards; and
                    (C) increasing joint investments in overseas 
                markets.

SEC. 402. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VIOLATORS LIST.

    (a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than annually 
thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary 
of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and the Director 
of National Intelligence, shall create a list (referred to in this 
section as the ``intellectual property violators list''), which 
identifies all state-owned enterprises that have benefitted from--
            (1) a significant act or series of acts of intellectual 
        property theft that subjected a United States economic sector 
        or particular company incorporated in the United States to 
        harm; or
            (2) an act or government policy of involuntary or coerced 
        technology transfer of intellectual property ultimately owned 
        by a company incorporated in the United States.
    (b) Rules for Identification.--To determine whether there is a 
credible basis for determining that a company should be included on the 
intellectual property violators list, the Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade 
Representative, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall 
consider--
            (1) any finding by a United States court that the company 
        has violated relevant United States laws intended to protect 
        intellectual property rights; or
            (2) substantial and credible information received from any 
        entity described in subsection (c) or other interested persons.
    (c) Consultation.--In carrying out this section, the Secretary of 
State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the United 
States Trade Representative, and the Director of National Intelligence, 
may consult, as necessary and appropriate, with--
            (1) other Federal agencies, including independent agencies;
            (2) the private sector; and
            (3) civil society organizations with relevant expertise.
    (d) Report.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall publish, in 
        the Federal Register, an annual report that--
                    (A) lists the companies engaged in the activities 
                described in subsection (a)(1); and
                    (B) describes the circumstances surrounding actions 
                described in subsection (a)(2), including any role of 
                the Government of the PRC; and
                    (C) assesses, to the extent practicable, the 
                economic advantage derived by the companies engaged in 
                the activities described in subsection (a)(1).
            (2) Form.--The report published under paragraph (1) shall 
        be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.
    (e) Declassification and Release.--The Director of National 
Intelligence may authorize the declassification of information, as 
appropriate, to inform the contents of the report published pursuant to 
subsection (d).
    (f) Requirement To Protect Business-Confidential Information.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State and the heads of 
        all other Federal agencies involved in the production of the 
        intellectual property violators list shall protect from 
        disclosure any proprietary information submitted by a private 
        sector participant and marked as business-confidential 
        information, unless the party submitting the confidential 
        business information--
                    (A) had notice, at the time of submission, that 
                such information would be released by the Secretary; or
                    (B) subsequently consents to the release of such 
                information.
            (2) Nonconfidential version of report.--If confidential 
        business information is provided by a private sector 
        participant, a nonconfidential version of the report under 
        subsection (d) shall be published in the Federal Register that 
        summarizes or deletes, if necessary, the confidential business 
        information.
            (3) Treatment as trade secrets.--Proprietary information 
        submitted by a private party under this section--
                    (A) shall be considered to be trade secrets and 
                commercial or financial information (as defined under 
                section 552(b)(4) of title 5, United States Code); and
                    (B) shall be exempt from disclosure without the 
                express approval of the private party.

SEC. 403. GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA SUBSIDIES LIST.

    (a) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, 
in coordination with the United States Trade Representative and the 
Secretary of Commerce, shall publish an unclassified report in the 
Federal Register that identifies--
            (1) subsidies provided by the Government of the PRC to 
        enterprises in the PRC; and
            (2) discriminatory treatment favoring enterprises in the 
        PRC over foreign market participants.
    (b) Subsidies and Discriminatory Treatment Described.--In compiling 
the report under subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall 
consider--
            (1) regulatory and other policies enacted or promoted by 
        the Government of the PRC that--
                    (A) discriminate in favor of enterprises in the PRC 
                at the expense of foreign market participants;
                    (B) shield centrally administered, state-owned 
                enterprises from competition; or
                    (C) otherwise suppress market-based competition;
            (2) financial subsidies, including favorable lending terms, 
        from or promoted by the Government of the PRC or centrally 
        administered, state-owned enterprises that materially benefit 
        PRC enterprises over foreign market participants in 
        contravention of generally accepted market principles; and
            (3) any subsidy that meets the definition of subsidy under 
        article 1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
        Measures referred to in section 101(d)(12) of the Uruguay Round 
        Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(12)).''.
    (c) Consultation.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
Secretary of Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, may, 
as necessary and appropriate, consult with--
            (1) other Federal agencies, including independent agencies;
            (2) the private sector; and
            (3) civil society organizations with relevant expertise.

SEC. 404. COUNTERING FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
Attorney General, shall offer to provide technical assistance to 
establish legislative and regulatory frameworks to combat the bribery 
of foreign public officials consistent with the principles of the OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions to the governments of countries--
            (1) that are partners of the United States;
            (2) that have demonstrated a will to combat foreign corrupt 
        practices responsibly; and
            (3) for which technical assistance will have the greatest 
        opportunity to achieve measureable results.
    (b) Strategy Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a strategy 
for carrying out the activities described in subsections (a) to the 
appropriate congressional committees.
    (c) Coordination.--In formulating the strategy described in 
subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall coordinate with the 
Attorney General.
    (d) Semiannual Briefing Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after 
the date of enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter for 
five years, the Secretary of State shall provide a briefing regarding 
the activities described in subsection (a) and the strategy submitted 
under subsection (b) to the appropriate congressional committees.

SEC. 405. DEBT RELIEF FOR COUNTRIES ELIGIBLE FOR ASSISTANCE FROM THE 
              INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION.

    (a) Policy Statement.--It is the policy of the United States to 
coordinate with the international community to provide debt relief for 
debt that is held by countries eligible for assistance from the 
International Development Association that request forbearance to 
respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.
    (b) Debt Relief.--The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation 
with the Secretary of State, shall engage with international financial 
institutions and other bilateral official creditors to advance policy 
discussions on restructuring, rescheduling, or canceling the sovereign 
debt of countries eligible for assistance from the International 
Development Association, as necessary, to respond to the COVID-19 
pandemic.
    (c) Reporting Requirement.--Not later than 45 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter until the 
end of the COVID-19 pandemic, as determined by the World Health 
Organization, or until two years after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, whichever is earlier, the Secretary of the Treasury, in 
coordination with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the 
committees specified in subsection (d) a report that describes--
            (1) actions that have been taken to advance debt relief for 
        countries eligible for assistance from the International 
        Development Association that request forbearance to respond to 
        the COVID-19 pandemic in coordination with international 
        financial institutions, the Group of 7 (G7), the Group of 20 
        (G20), Paris Club members, and the Institute of International 
        Finance;
            (2) mechanisms that have been utilized and mechanisms that 
        are under consideration to provide the debt relief described in 
        paragraph (1);
            (3) any United States policy concerns regarding debt relief 
        to specific countries;
            (4) the balance and status of repayments on all loans from 
        the People's Republic of China to countries eligible for 
        assistance from the International Development Association, 
        including--
                    (A) loans provided as part of the Belt and Road 
                Initiative of the People's Republic of China;
                    (B) loans made by the Export-Import Bank of China;
                    (C) loans made by the China Development Bank; and
                    (D) loans made by the Asian Infrastructure 
                Investment Bank; and
            (5) the transparency measures established or proposed to 
        ensure that funds saved through the debt relief described in 
        paragraph (1) will be used for activities--
                    (A) that respond to the health, economic, and 
                social consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic; and
                    (B) that are consistent with the interests and 
                values of the United States.
    (d) Committees Specified.--The committees specified in this 
subsection are--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Appropriations, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
        Urban Affairs of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Appropriations, and the Committee on Financial Services of the 
        House of Representatives.

SEC. 406. REPORT ON MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA 
              EXPLOITS HONG KONG TO CIRCUMVENT UNITED STATES LAWS AND 
              PROTECTIONS.

    Title III of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (22 
U.S.C. 5731 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 303. REPORT ON MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF 
              CHINA EXPLOITS HONG KONG TO CIRCUMVENT UNITED STATES LAWS 
              AND PROTECTIONS.

    ``(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this section, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report on the manner and extent 
to which the Government of China uses the status of Hong Kong to 
circumvent the laws and protections of the United States.
    ``(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall 
include the following:
            ``(1) In consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the 
        Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National 
        Intelligence--
                    ``(A) an assessment of how the Government of China 
                uses Hong Kong to circumvent United States export 
                controls; and
                    ``(B) a list of all significant incidents in which 
                the Government of China used Hong Kong to circumvent 
                such controls during the reporting period.
            ``(2) In consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury 
        and the Secretary of Commerce--
                    ``(A) an assessment of how the Government of China 
                uses Hong Kong to circumvent duties on merchandise 
                exported to the United States from the People's 
                Republic of China; and
                    ``(B) a list of all significant incidents in which 
                the Government of China used Hong Kong to circumvent 
                such duties during the reporting period.
            ``(3) In consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, 
        the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of 
        National Intelligence--
                    ``(A) an assessment of how the Government of China 
                uses Hong Kong to circumvent sanctions imposed by the 
                United States or pursuant to multilateral regimes; and
                    ``(B) a list of all significant incidents in which 
                the Government of China used Hong Kong to circumvent 
                such sanctions during the reporting period.
            ``(4) In consultation with the Secretary of Homeland 
        Security and the Director of National Intelligence, an 
        assessment of how the Government of China uses formal or 
        informal means to extradite or coercively move individuals, 
        including United States persons, from Hong Kong to the People's 
        Republic of China.
            ``(5) In consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the 
        Director of National Intelligence, and the Director of Homeland 
        Security--
                    ``(A) an assessment of how the intelligence, 
                security, and law enforcement agencies of the 
                Government of China, including the Ministry of State 
                Security, the Ministry of Public Security, and the 
                People's Armed Police, use the Hong Kong Security 
                Bureau and other security agencies in Hong Kong to 
                conduct espionage on foreign nationals, including 
                United States persons, conduct influence operations, or 
                violate civil liberties guaranteed under the laws of 
                Hong Kong; and
                    ``(B) a list of all significant incidents of such 
                espionage, influence operations, or violations of civil 
                liberties during the reporting period.
    ``(c) Form of Report; Availability.--
            ``(1) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        index.
            ``(2) Availability.--The unclassified portion of the report 
        required by subsection (a) shall be posted on a publicly 
        available internet website of the Department of State.
    ``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
            ``(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        `appropriate congressional committees' means--
                    ``(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
                Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the 
                Committee on Finance, and the Select Committee on 
                Intelligence of the Senate; and
                    ``(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
                Committee on Financial Services, the Permanent Select 
                Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Ways 
                and Means of the House of Representatives.
            ``(2) Foreign national.--The term `foreign national' means 
        a person that is neither--
                    ``(A) an individual who is a citizen or national of 
                the People's Republic of China; or
                    ``(B) an entity organized under the laws of the 
                People's Republic of China or of a jurisdiction within 
                the People's Republic of China.
            ``(3) Reporting period.--The term `reporting period' means 
        the 5-year period preceding submission of the report required 
        by subsection (a).
            ``(4) United states person.--The term `United States 
        person' means--
                    ``(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully 
                admitted for permanent residence to the United States; 
                or
                    ``(B) an entity organized under the laws of the 
                United States or of any jurisdiction within the United 
                States, including a foreign branch of such an 
                entity.''.

SEC. 407. ANNUAL REVIEW ON THE PRESENCE OF CHINESE COMPANIES IN UNITED 
              STATES CAPITAL MARKETS.

    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In this section, the term 
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
            (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
            (3) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of 
        the Senate;
            (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives;
            (5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        House of Representatives; and
            (6) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of 
        Representatives.
    (b) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the 
        following 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with 
        the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of the 
        Treasury, shall submit an unclassified report to the 
        appropriate committees of Congress that describes the risks 
        posed to the United States by the presence in United States 
        capital markets of companies incorporated in the PRC.
            (2) Matters to be included.--The report required under 
        paragraph (1) shall--
                    (A) identify companies incorporated in the PRC 
                that--
                            (i) are listed or traded on one or several 
                        stock exchanges within the United States, 
                        including over-the-counter market and ``A 
                        Shares'' added to indexes and exchange-traded 
                        funds out of mainland exchanges in the PRC; and
                            (ii) based on the factors for consideration 
                        described in paragraph (3), have knowingly and 
                        materially contributed to--
                                    (I) activities that undermine 
                                United States national security;
                                    (II) serious abuses of 
                                internationally recognized human 
                                rights; or
                                    (III) a substantially increased 
                                financial risk exposure for United 
                                States-based investors;
                    (B) describe the activities of the companies 
                identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), and their 
                implications for the United States; and
                    (C) develop policy recommendations for the United 
                States Government, State governments, United States 
                financial institutions, United States equity and debt 
                exchanges, and other relevant stakeholders to address 
                the risks posed by the presence in United States 
                capital markets of the companies identified pursuant to 
                subparagraph (A).
            (3) Factors for consideration.--In completing the report 
        under paragraph (1), the President shall consider whether a 
        company identified pursuant to paragraph (2)(A)--
                    (A) has materially contributed to the development 
                or manufacture, or sold or facilitated procurement by 
                the PLA, of lethal military equipment or component 
                parts of such equipment;
                    (B) has contributed to the construction and 
                militarization of features in the South China Sea;
                    (C) has been sanctioned by the United States or has 
                been determined to have conducted business with 
                sanctioned entities;
                    (D) has engaged in an act or a series of acts of 
                intellectual property theft;
                    (E) has engaged in corporate or economic espionage;
                    (F) has contributed to the proliferation of nuclear 
                or missile technology in violation of United Nations 
                Security Council resolutions or United States 
                sanctions;
                    (G) has contributed to the repression of religious 
                and ethnic minorities within the PRC, including in 
                Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or Tibet Autonomous 
                Region;
                    (H) has contributed to the development of 
                technologies that enable censorship directed or 
                directly supported by the Government of the PRC;
                    (I) has failed to comply fully with Federal 
                securities laws (including required audits by the 
                Public Company Accounting Oversight Board) and 
                ``material risk'' disclosure requirements of the 
                Securities and Exchange Commission; or
                    (J) has contributed to other activities or behavior 
                determined to be relevant by the President.
    (c) Report Form.--The report required under subsection (b)(1) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
    (d) Publication.--The unclassified portion of the report under 
subsection (b)(1) shall be made accessible to the public online through 
relevant United States Government websites.

                  TITLE V--ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY

SEC. 501. FINDINGS ON STRATEGIC SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The United States and the PRC have a shared interest in 
        strategic security through enforceable arms control and non-
        proliferation agreements.
            (2) The United States has long pursued and continues to 
        seek effective, verifiable, and enforceable arms control and 
        non-proliferation agreements that support United States and 
        allied security by--
                    (A) controlling the spread of nuclear materials and 
                technology;
                    (B) placing limits on the production, stockpiling, 
                and deployment of nuclear weapons;
                    (C) decreasing misperception and miscalculation; 
                and
                    (D) avoiding destabilizing nuclear arms 
                competition.
            (3) In May 2019, Director of the Defense Intelligence 
        Agency Lieutenant General Robert Ashley stated, ``China is 
        likely to at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile in 
        the course of implementing the most rapid expansion and 
        diversification of its nuclear arsenal in China's history.''. 
        The PLA is building a full triad of modernized fixed and mobile 
        ground-based launchers and new capabilities for nuclear-armed 
        bombers and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
            (4) In June 2020, the Department of State raised concerns 
        in its annual ``Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, 
        Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments'' 
        report to Congress that the PRC is not complying with the 
        ``zero-yield'' nuclear testing ban and accused the PRC of 
        ``blocking the flow of data from the monitoring stations'' in 
        China.
            (5) The Department of Defense 2020 Report on Military and 
        Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 
        states that China ``intends to increase peacetime readiness of 
        its nuclear forces by moving to a launch on warning posture 
        with an expanded silo-based force''.
            (6) The Department of Defense report also states that, over 
        the next decade, China's nuclear stockpile--currently estimated 
        in the low 200s--is projected to least double in size as China 
        expands and modernizes its nuclear force.
            (7) The PRC is conducting research on its first potential 
        early warning radar, with technical cooperation from Russia. 
        This radar could indicate that the PRC is moving to a launch-on 
        warning posture.
            (8) The PRC plans to use its increasingly capable space, 
        cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities against United 
        States early warning systems and critical infrastructure in a 
        crisis scenario. This poses great risk to strategic security, 
        as it could lead to inadvertent escalation.
            (9) The PRC's nuclear expansion comes as a part of a 
        massive modernization of the PLA which, combined with the PLA's 
        aggressive actions, has increasingly destabilized the Indo-
        Pacific region.
            (10) The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), which was elevated in 
        2015 to become a separate branch within the PLA, has formed 11 
        new missile brigades since May 2017, some of which are capable 
        of both conventional and nuclear strikes. Unlike the United 
        States, which separates its conventional strike and nuclear 
        capabilities, the PLARF appears to not only co-locate 
        conventional and nuclear forces, including dual-use missiles 
        like the DF-26, but to task the same unit with both nuclear and 
        conventional missions. Such intermingling could lead to 
        inadvertent escalation in a crisis. The United States Defense 
        Intelligence Agency determined in March 2020 that the PLA 
        tested more ballistic missiles than the rest of the world 
        combined in 2019.
            (11) A January 2021 report from the Institute for Defense 
        Analysis found that many United States and international 
        observers viewed China's no first-use policy with skepticism, 
        especially in the wake of the expansion and modernization of 
        its nuclear capabilities.
            (12) The long-planned United States nuclear modernization 
        program will not increase the United States nuclear weapons 
        stockpile, predates China's conventional military and nuclear 
        expansion, and is not an arms race against China.
            (13) The United States extended nuclear deterrence--
                    (A) provides critical strategic security around the 
                world;
                    (B) is an essential element of United States 
                military alliances; and
                    (C) serves a vital non-proliferation function.
            (14) As a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
        of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 
        1, 1968, the PRC is obligated under Article Six of the treaty 
        to pursue arms control negotiations in good faith.
            (15) The United States has, on numerous occasions, called 
        on the PRC to participate in strategic arms control 
        negotiations, but the PRC has thus far declined.
            (16) The Governments of Poland, Slovenia, Denmark, Norway, 
        Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, the Netherlands, Romania, Austria, 
        and Albania, as well as the Deputy Secretary General of the 
        North Atlantic Treaty Organization, have all encouraged the PRC 
        to join arms control discussions.

SEC. 502. COOPERATION ON A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DIALOGUE.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to pursue, in coordination with United States allies, 
        arms control negotiations and sustained and regular engagement 
        with the PRC--
                    (A) to enhance understanding of each other's 
                respective nuclear policies, doctrine, and 
                capabilities;
                    (B) to improve transparency; and
                    (C) to help manage the risks of miscalculation and 
                misperception;
            (2) to formulate a strategy to engage the Government of 
        China on relevant bilateral issues that lays the groundwork for 
        bringing the People's Republic of China into an arms control 
        framework, including--
                    (A) fostering bilateral dialogue on arms control 
                leading to the convening of bilateral strategic 
                security talks;
                    (B) negotiating norms for outer space;
                    (C) developing pre-launch notification regimes 
                aimed at reducing nuclear miscalculation; and
                    (D) expanding lines of communication between both 
                governments for the purposes of reducing the risks of 
                conventional war and increasing transparency;
            (3) to pursue relevant capabilities in coordination with 
        our allies and partners to ensure the security of United States 
        and allied interests in the face of the PRC's military 
        modernization and expansion, including--
                    (A) ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles;
                    (B) integrated air and missile defense;
                    (C) hypersonic missiles;
                    (D) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
                    (E) space-based capabilities;
                    (F) cyber capabilities; and
                    (G) command, control, and communications;
            (4) to maintain sufficient force structure, posture, and 
        capabilities to provide extended nuclear deterrence to United 
        States allies and partners;
            (5) to maintain appropriate missile defense capabilities to 
        protect threats to the United States homeland and our forces 
        across the theater from rogue intercontinental ballistic 
        missiles from the Indo-Pacific region; and
            (6) to ensure that the United States declaratory policy 
        reflects the requirements of extended deterrence, to both 
        assure allies and to preserve its non-proliferation benefits.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) in the midst of growing competition between the United 
        States and the PRC, it is in the interest of both nations to 
        cooperate in reducing risks of conventional and nuclear 
        escalation;
            (2) a physical, cyber, electronic, or any other PLA attack 
        on United States early warning satellites, other portions of 
        the nuclear command and control enterprise, or critical 
        infrastructure poses a high risk to inadvertent but rapid 
        escalation;
            (3) the United States and its allies should promote 
        international norms on military operations in space, the 
        employment of cyber capabilities, and the military use of 
        artificial intelligence, as an element of risk reduction 
        regarding nuclear command and control; and
            (4) United States allies and partners should share the 
        burden of promoting and protecting such norms by voting against 
        the PRC's proposals regarding the weaponization of space, 
        highlighting unsafe behavior by the PRC that violates 
        international norms, such as in rendezvous and proximity 
        operations, and promoting responsible behavior in space and all 
        other domains.

SEC. 503. REPORT ON UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO ENGAGE THE PEOPLE'S 
              REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON NUCLEAR ISSUES AND BALLISTIC MISSILE 
              ISSUES.

    (a) Report on the Future of United States-China Arms Control.--Not 
later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and 
the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
Congress a report, and if necessary a separate classified annex, that 
examines the approaches and strategic effects of engaging the 
Government of China on arms control and risk reduction, including--
            (1) areas of potential dialogue between the Governments of 
        the United States and the People's Republic of China, including 
        on ballistic, hypersonic glide, and cruise missiles, 
        conventional forces, nuclear, space, and cyberspace issues, as 
        well as other new strategic domains, which could reduce the 
        likelihood of war, limit escalation if a conflict were to 
        occur, and constrain a destabilizing arms race in the Indo-
        Pacific;
            (2) how the United States Government can incentivize the 
        Government of China to engage in a constructive arms control 
        dialogue;
            (3) identifying strategic military capabilities of the 
        People's Republic of China that the United States Government is 
        most concerned about and how limiting these capabilities may 
        benefit United States and allied security interests;
            (4) mechanisms to avoid, manage, or control nuclear, 
        conventional, and unconventional military escalation between 
        the United States and the People's Republic of China; and
            (5) opportunities and methods to encourage transparency 
        from the People's Republic of China.
    (b) Report on Arms Control Talks With the Russian Federation and 
the People's Republic of China.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, shall submit 
to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that describes--
            (1) a concrete plan for arms control talks that includes 
        both the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation;
            (2) if a trilateral arms control dialogue does not arise, 
        what alternative plans the Department of State envisages for 
        ensuring the security of the United States and its allies 
        security from Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons;
            (3) effects on the credibility of United States extended 
        deterrence assurances to allies and partners if the United 
        States is faced with two nuclear-armed peer competitors and any 
        likely corresponding implications for regional security 
        architectures;
            (4) efforts at engaging the People's Republic of China to 
        join arms control talks, whether on a bilateral or multilateral 
        basis; and
            (5) the interest level of the Government of China in 
        joining arms control talks, whether on a bilateral or 
        multilateral basis.
    (c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Committee on Energy and Natural 
        Resources of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the 
        House of Representatives.
                                 <all>