[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1169 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
117th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 1169
To address issues involving the People's Republic of China.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
April 15, 2021
Mr. Menendez (for himself and Mr. Risch) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To address issues involving the People's Republic of China.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Strategic
Competition Act of 2021''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Definitions.
Sec. 4. Statement of policy.
Sec. 5. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 6. Rules of construction.
TITLE I--INVESTING IN A COMPETITIVE FUTURE
Subtitle A--Science and Technology
Sec. 101. Authorization to assist United States companies with global
supply chain diversification and
management.
Subtitle B--Global Infrastructure Development
Sec. 111. Appropriate committees of Congress defined.
Sec. 112. Sense of Congress on international quality infrastructure
investment standards.
Sec. 113. United States support for infrastructure.
Sec. 114. Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network.
Sec. 115. Strategy for advanced and reliable energy infrastructure.
Sec. 116. Report on China's investments in foreign energy development.
Subtitle C--Digital Technology and Connectivity
Sec. 121. Sense of Congress on digital technology issues.
Sec. 122. Digital connectivity and cybersecurity partnership.
Subtitle D--Countering Chinese Communist Party Influence
Sec. 131. Short title.
Sec. 132. Authorization.
Sec. 133. Findings on Chinese information warfare and malign influence
operations.
Sec. 134. Authorization of appropriations for the Fulbright-Hays
Program.
Sec. 135. Sense of Congress condemning anti-Asian racism and
discrimination.
Sec. 136. Supporting independent media and countering disinformation.
Sec. 137. Global engagement center.
Sec. 138. Review by Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States of certain foreign gifts to and
contracts with institutions of higher
education.
TITLE II--INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS
Subtitle A--Strategic and Diplomatic Matters
Sec. 201. Appropriate congressional committees defined.
Sec. 202. United States commitment and support for allies and partners
in the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 203. Sense of Congress on cooperation with the Quad.
Sec. 204. Statement of policy on cooperation with ASEAN.
Sec. 205. Sense of Congress on enhancing United States-ASEAN
cooperation on technology issues with
respect to the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 206. Report on Chinese influence in international organizations.
Sec. 207. Regulatory exchanges with allies and partners.
Sec. 208. Technology partnership office at the Department of State.
Sec. 209. United States representation in standards-setting bodies.
Sec. 210. Sense of Congress on centrality of sanctions and other
restrictions to strategic competition with
China.
Sec. 211. Sense of Congress on negotiations with G7 countries on the
People's Republic of China.
Sec. 212. Enhancing the United States-Taiwan partnership.
Sec. 213. Treatment of Taiwan government.
Sec. 214. Report on origins of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Sec. 215. Enhancement of diplomatic support and economic engagement
with Pacific island countries.
Sec. 216. Increasing Department of State personnel and resources
devoted to the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 217. Advancing United States leadership in the United Nations
System.
Subtitle B--International Security Matters
Sec. 221. Definitions.
Sec. 222. Findings.
Sec. 223. Sense of Congress regarding bolstering security partnerships
in the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 224. Statement of policy.
Sec. 225. Foreign military financing in the Indo-Pacific and
authorization of appropriations for
Southeast Asia maritime security programs
and diplomatic outreach activities.
Sec. 226. Foreign military financing compact pilot program in the Indo-
Pacific.
Sec. 227. Additional funding for international military education and
training in the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 228. Prioritizing excess defense article transfers for the Indo-
Pacific.
Sec. 229. Prioritizing excess naval vessel transfers for the Indo-
Pacific.
Sec. 230. Statement of policy on maritime freedom of operations in
international waterways and airspace of the
Indo-Pacific and on artificial land
features in the South China Sea.
Sec. 231. Report on capability development of Indo-Pacific allies and
partners.
Sec. 232. Report on national technology and industrial base.
Sec. 233. Report on diplomatic outreach with respect to Chinese
military installations overseas.
Sec. 234. Statement of policy regarding universal implementation of
United Nations sanctions on North Korea.
Sec. 235. Limitation on assistance to countries hosting Chinese
military installations.
Subtitle C--Regional Strategies To Counter the People's Republic of
China
Sec. 241. Statement of policy on cooperation with allies and partners
around the world with respect to the
People's Republic of China.
Part I--Western Hemisphere
Sec. 245. Sense of Congress regarding United States-Canada relations.
Sec. 246. Sense of Congress regarding the Government of China's
arbitrary imprisonment of Canadian
citizens.
Sec. 247. Strategy to enhance cooperation with Canada.
Sec. 248. Strategy to strengthen economic competitiveness, governance,
human rights, and the rule of law in Latin
America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 249. Engagement in regional and international organizations in
Latin America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 250. Addressing China's sovereign lending practices in Latin
America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 251. Defense cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 252. Engagement with civil society in Latin America and the
Caribbean regarding accountability, human
rights, and the risks of pervasive
surveillance technologies.
Part II--Transatlantic Alliance
Sec. 255. Sense of Congress on the Transatlantic Alliance.
Sec. 256. Strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation with respect to
the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 257. Enhancing transatlantic cooperation on promoting private
sector finance.
Sec. 258. Report and briefing on cooperation between China and Iran and
between China and Russia.
Part III--South and Central Asia
Sec. 261. Sense of Congress on South and Central Asia.
Sec. 262. Strategy to enhance cooperation with South and Central Asia.
Part IV--Africa
Sec. 271. Assessment of political, economic, and security activity of
the People's Republic of China in Africa.
Sec. 272. Increasing the competitiveness of the United States in
Africa.
Sec. 273. Digital security cooperation with respect to Africa.
Sec. 274. Increasing personnel in United States embassies in sub-
Saharan Africa focused on the People's
Republic of China.
Sec. 275. Support for Young African Leaders Initiative.
Sec. 276. Africa broadcasting networks.
Part V--Middle East and North Africa
Sec. 281. Strategy to counter Chinese influence in, and access to, the
Middle East and North Africa.
Sec. 282. Sense of Congress on Middle East and North Africa engagement.
Part VI--Arctic Region
Sec. 285. Arctic diplomacy.
Part VII--Oceania
Sec. 291. Statement of policy on United States engagement in Oceania.
Sec. 292. Oceania strategic roadmap.
TITLE III--INVESTING IN OUR VALUES
Sec. 301. Authorization of appropriations for promotion of democracy in
Hong Kong.
Sec. 302. Imposition of sanctions relating to forced labor in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
Sec. 303. Imposition of sanctions with respect to systematic rape,
coercive abortion, forced sterilization, or
involuntary contraceptive implantation in
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
TITLE IV--INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT
Sec. 401. Findings and sense of Congress regarding the PRC's industrial
policy.
Sec. 402. Intellectual property violators list.
Sec. 403. Government of the People's Republic of China subsidies list.
Sec. 404. Countering foreign corrupt practices.
Sec. 405. Debt relief for countries eligible for assistance from the
International Development Association.
Sec. 406. Report on manner and extent to which the Government of China
exploits Hong Kong to circumvent United
States laws and protections.
Sec. 407. Annual review on the presence of Chinese companies in United
States capital markets.
TITLE V--ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY
Sec. 501. Findings on strategic security and arms control.
Sec. 502. Cooperation on a strategic nuclear dialogue.
Sec. 503. Report on United States efforts to engage the People's
Republic of China on nuclear issues and
ballistic missile issues.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The People's Republic of China (PRC) is leveraging its
political, diplomatic, economic, military, technological, and
ideological power to become a strategic, near-peer, global
competitor of the United States. The policies increasingly
pursued by the PRC in these domains are contrary to the
interests and values of the United States, its partners, and
much of the rest of the world.
(2) The current policies being pursued by the PRC--
(A) threaten the future character of the
international order and are shaping the rules, norms,
and institutions that govern relations among states;
(B) will put at risk the ability of the United
States to secure its national interests; and
(C) will put at risk the future peace, prosperity,
and freedom of the international community in the
coming decades.
(3) After normalizing diplomatic relations with the PRC in
1979, the United States actively worked to advance the PRC's
economic and social development to ensure that it participated
in, and benefitted from, the free and open international order.
The United States pursued these goals and contributed to the
welfare of the Chinese people by--
(A) increasing the PRC's trade relations and access
to global capital markets;
(B) promoting the PRC's accession to the World
Trade Organization;
(C) providing development finance and technical
assistance;
(D) promoting research collaboration;
(E) educating the PRC's top students;
(F) permitting transfers of cutting-edge
technologies and scientific knowledge; and
(G) providing intelligence and military assistance.
(4) It is now clear that the PRC has chosen to pursue
state-led, mercantilist economic policies, an increasingly
authoritarian governance model at home through increased
restrictions on personal freedoms, and an aggressive and
assertive foreign policy. These policies frequently and
deliberately undermine United States interests and are contrary
to core United States values and the values of other nations,
both in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In response to this
strategic decision of the CCP, the United States has been
compelled to reexamine and revise its strategy towards the PRC.
(5) The General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party
and the President of the People's Republic of China, Xi
Jinping, has elevated the ``Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese
Nation'' as central to the domestic and foreign policy of the
PRC. His program demands--
(A) strong, centralized CCP leadership;
(B) concentration of military power;
(C) a strong role for the CCP in the state and the
economy;
(D) an aggressive foreign policy seeking control
over broadly asserted territorial claims; and
(E) the denial of any universal values and
individual rights that are deemed to threaten the CCP.
(6) The PRC views its Leninist model of governance,
``socialism with Chinese characteristics'', as superior to, and
at odds with, the constitutional models of the United States
and other democracies. This approach to governance is lauded by
the CCP as essential to securing the PRC's status as a global
leader, and to shaping the future of the world. In a 2013
speech, President Xi said, ``We firmly believe that as
socialism with Chinese characteristics develops further . . .
it is . . . inevitable that the superiority of our socialist
system will be increasingly apparent . . . [and] our country's
road of development will have increasingly greater influence on
the world.''.
(7) The PRC's objectives are to first establish regional
hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and then to use that dominant
position to propel the PRC to become the ``leading world
power,'' shaping an international order that is conducive to
the CCP's interests. Achieving these objectives requires
turning the PRC into a wealthy nation under strict CCP rule by
using a strong military and advanced technological capability
to pursue the PRC's objectives, regardless of other countries'
interests.
(8) The PRC is reshaping the current international order,
which is built upon the rule of law and free and open ideals
and principles, by conducting global information and influence
operations, seeking to redefine international laws and norms to
align with the objectives of the CCP, rejecting the legitimacy
of internationally recognized human rights, and seeking to co-
opt the leadership and agenda of multinational organizations
for the benefit of the PRC and other authoritarian regimes at
the expense of the interests of the United States and the
international community. In December 2018, President Xi
suggested that the CCP views its ``historic mission'' as not
only to govern China, but also to profoundly influence global
governance to benefit the CCP.
(9) The PRC is encouraging other countries to follow its
model of ``socialism with Chinese characteristics''. During the
19th Party Congress in 2017, President Xi said that the PRC
could serve as a model of development for other countries by
utilizing ``Chinese wisdom'' and a ``Chinese approach to
solving problems''.
(10) The PRC is promoting its governance model and
attempting to weaken other models of governance by--
(A) undermining democratic institutions;
(B) subverting financial institutions;
(C) coercing businesses to accommodate the policies
of the PRC; and
(D) using disinformation to disguise the nature of
the actions described in subparagraphs (A) through (C).
(11) The PRC is close to its goal of becoming the global
leader in science and technology. In May 2018, President Xi
said that for the PRC to reach ``prosperity and rejuvenation'',
it needs to ``endeavor to be a major world center for science
and innovation''. The PRC has invested the equivalent of
billions of dollars into education and research and development
and established joint scientific research centers and science
universities.
(12) The PRC's drive to become a ``manufacturing and
technological superpower'' and to promote ``innovation with
Chinese characteristics'' is coming at the expense of human
rights and longstanding international rules and norms with
respect to economic competition, and presents a challenge to
United States national security and the security of allies and
like-minded countries. In particular, the PRC advances its
illiberal political and social policies through mass
surveillance, social credit systems, and a significant role of
the state in internet governance. Through these means, the PRC
increases direct and indirect government control over its
citizens' everyday lives. Its national strategy of ``civil-
military fusion'' mandates that civil and commercial research,
which increasingly drives global innovation, is leveraged to
develop new military capabilities.
(13) The PRC is using legal and illegal means to achieve
its objective of becoming a manufacturing and technological
superpower. The PRC uses state-directed industrial policies in
anticompetitive ways to ensure the dominance of PRC companies.
The CCP engages in and encourages actions that actively
undermine a free and open international market, such as
intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers,
regulatory and financial subsidies, and mandatory CCP access to
proprietary data as part of business and commercial agreements
between Chinese and foreign companies.
(14) The policies referred to in paragraph (13) are
designed to freeze United States and other foreign firms out of
the PRC market, while eroding competition in other important
markets. The heavy subsidization of Chinese companies includes
potential violation of its World Trade Organization
commitments. In May 2018, President Xi said that the PRC aims
to keep the ``initiatives of innovation and development
security . . . in [China's] own hands''.
(15) The PRC is advancing its global objectives through a
variety of avenues, including its signature initiative, the
Belt and Road Initiative (referred to in this section as
``BRI''), which is enshrined in the Chinese Constitution and
includes the Digital Silk Road and Health Silk Road. The PRC
describes BRI as a straightforward and wholly beneficial plan
for all countries. Eventually, it seeks to advance an economic
system with the PRC at its center, making it the most concrete
geographical representation of the PRC's global ambitions. BRI
increases the economic influence of state-owned Chinese firms
in global markets, enhances the PRC's political leverage with
government leaders around the world, and provides greater
access to strategic nodes such as ports and railways. Through
BRI, the PRC seeks political deference through economic
dependence.
(16) The PRC is executing a plan to establish regional
hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and displace the United States
from the region. As a Pacific power, the United States has
built and supported enduring alliances and economic
partnerships that secure peace and prosperity and promote the
rule of law and political pluralism in a free and open Indo-
Pacific. In contrast, the PRC uses economic and military
coercion in the region to secure its own interests.
(17) The PRC's military strategy seeks to keep the United
States military from operating in the Western Pacific and
erodes United States security guarantees.
(18) The PRC is aggressively pursuing exclusive control of
critical land routes, sea lanes, and air space in the Indo-
Pacific in the hopes of eventually exercising greater influence
beyond the region. This includes lanes crucial to commercial
activity, energy exploration, transport, and the exercise of
security operations in areas permitted under international law.
(19) The PRC seeks so-called ``reunification'' with Taiwan
through whatever means may ultimately be required. The CCP's
insistence that so-called ``reunification'' is Taiwan's only
option makes this goal inherently coercive. In January 2019,
President Xi stated that the PRC ``make[s] no promise to
renounce the use of force and reserve[s] the option of taking
all necessary means''. Taiwan's embodiment of democratic values
and economic liberalism challenges President Xi's goal of
achieving national rejuvenation. The PRC plans to exploit
Taiwan's dominant strategic position in the First Island Chain
and to project power into the Second Island Chain and beyond.
(20) In the South China Sea, the PRC has executed an
illegal island-building campaign that threatens freedom of
navigation and the free-flow of commerce, damages the
environment, bolsters the PLA power projection capabilities,
and coerces and intimidates other regional claimants in an
effort to advance its unlawful claims and control the waters
around neighboring countries. Despite President Xi's September
2015 speech, in which he said the PRC was not militarizing the
South China Sea, during the 2017 19th Party Congress, President
Xi announced that ``construction on islands and reefs in the
South China Sea have seen steady progress''.
(21) The PRC is rapidly modernizing the PLA to attain a
level of capacity and capability superior to the United States
in terms of equipment and conduct of modern military operations
by shifting its military doctrine from having a force
``adequate [for] China's defensive needs'' to having a force
``commensurate with China's international status''. Ultimately,
this transformation could enable China to impose its will in
the Indo-Pacific region through the threat of military force.
In 2017, President Xi established the following developmental
benchmarks for the advancement of the PLA:
(A) A mechanized force with increased informatized
and strategic capabilities by 2020.
(B) The complete modernization of China's national
defense by 2035.
(C) The full transformation of the PLA into a
world-class force by 2050.
(22) The PRC's strategy and supporting policies described
in this section undermine United States interests, such as--
(A) upholding a free and open international order;
(B) maintaining the integrity of international
institutions with liberal norms and values;
(C) preserving a favorable balance of power in the
Indo-Pacific;
(D) ensuring the defense of its allies;
(E) preserving open sea and air lanes;
(F) fostering the free flow of commerce through
open and transparent markets; and
(G) promoting individual freedom and human rights.
(23) The global COVID-19 pandemic has intensified and
accelerated these trends in the PRC's behavior and therefore
increased the need for United States global leadership and a
competitive posture. The PRC has capitalized on the world's
focus on the COVID-19 pandemic by--
(A) moving rapidly to undermine Hong Kong's
autonomy, including imposing a so-called ``national
security law'' on Hong Kong;
(B) aggressively imposing its will in the East and
South China Seas;
(C) contributing to increased tensions with India;
and
(D) engaging in a widespread and government-
directed disinformation campaign to obscure the PRC
Government's efforts to cover up the seriousness of
COVID-19, sow confusion about the origination of the
outbreak, and discredit the United States, its allies,
and global health efforts.
(24) In response to the PRC's strategy and policies, the
United States must adopt a policy of strategic competition with
the PRC to protect and promote our vital interests and values.
(25) The United States policy of strategic competition with
respect to the People's Republic of China is part of a broader
strategic approach to the Indo-Pacific and the world which
centers with United States allies and partners to advance
shared values and interests and to preserve and enhance a free,
open, democratic, inclusive, rules-based, stable, and diverse
region.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives.
(2) CCP.--The term ``CCP'' means the Chinese Communist
Party.
(3) Indo-pacific region.--The terms ``Indo-Pacific'' and
``Indo-Pacific region'' mean the 36 countries and the
surrounding waterways that are under the area of responsibility
of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. These countries are:
Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, China,
Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Laos, Malaysia,
Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Nauru, Nepal,
New Zealand, North Korea, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines,
Republic of Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri
Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu,
and Vietnam.
(4) People's liberation army; pla.--The terms ``People's
Liberation Army'' and ``PLA'' mean the armed forces of the
People's Republic of China.
(5) PRC; china.--The terms ``PRC'' and ``China'' mean the
People's Republic of China.
SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
(a) Objectives.--It is the policy of the United States, in pursuing
strategic competition with the PRC, to pursue the following objectives:
(1) The United States global leadership role is sustained
and its political system and major foundations of national
power are postured for long-term political, economic,
technological, and military competition with the PRC.
(2) The balance of power in the Indo-Pacific remains
favorable to the United States and its allies. The United
States and its allies maintain unfettered access to the region,
including through freedom of navigation and the free flow of
commerce, consistent with international law and practice, and
the PRC neither dominates the region nor coerces its neighbors.
(3) The allies and partners of the United States--
(A) maintain confidence in United States leadership
and its commitment to the Indo-Pacific region;
(B) can withstand and combat subversion and undue
influence by the PRC; and
(C) align themselves with the United States in
setting global rules, norms, and standards that benefit
the international community.
(4) The combined weight of the United States and its allies
and partners is strong enough to demonstrate to the PRC that
the risks of attempts to dominate other states outweigh the
potential benefits.
(5) The United States leads the free and open international
order, which is comprised of resilient states and institutions
that uphold and defend principles, including sovereignty, rule
of law, individual freedom, and human rights. The international
order is strengthened to defeat attempts at destabilization by
illiberal and authoritarian actors.
(6) The key rules, norms, and standards of international
engagement in the 21st century are maintained, including the--
(A) protection of human rights, commercial
engagement and investment, and technology; and
(B) that such rules, norms, and standards are in
alignment with the values and interests of the United
States, its allies and partners, and the free world.
(7) Assure that the CCP does not--
(A) subvert open and democratic societies;
(B) distort global markets;
(C) manipulate the international trade system;
(D) coerce other nations via economic and military
means; or
(E) use its technological advantages to undermine
individual freedoms or other states' national security
interests.
(8) The United States deters military confrontation with
the PRC and both nations work to reduce the risk of conflict.
(b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States, in pursuit of
the objectives set forth in subsection (a)--
(1) to strengthen the United States domestic foundation by
reinvesting in market-based economic growth, education,
scientific and technological innovation, democratic
institutions, and other areas that improve the United States
ability to pursue its vital economic, foreign policy, and
national security interests;
(2) to pursue a strategy of strategic competition with the
PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic, development,
military, informational, and technological realms that
maximizes United States strengths and increases the costs for
the PRC of harming United States interests and values of those
of United States allies and partners;
(3) to lead a free, open, and secure international system
characterized by freedom from coercion, rule of law, open
markets and the free flow of commerce, and a shared commitment
to security and peaceful resolution of disputes, human rights,
and good and transparent governance;
(4) to strengthen and deepen United States alliances and
partnerships, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific and Europe, by
pursuing greater bilateral and multilateral cooperative
initiatives that advance shared interests and values and
bolster partner countries' confidence that the United States is
and will remain a strong, committed, and constant partner;
(5) to encourage and aid United States allies and partners
in boosting their own capabilities and resiliency to pursue,
defend, and protect shared interests and values, free from
coercion and external pressure;
(6) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and healthy
competition in United States-China economic relations by--
(A) advancing policies that harden the United
States economy against unfair and illegal commercial or
trading practices and the coercion of United States
businesses; and
(B) tightening United States laws and regulations
as necessary to prevent the PRC's attempts to harm
United States economic competitiveness;
(7) to demonstrate the value of private sector-led growth
in emerging markets around the world, including through the use
of United States Government tools that--
(A) support greater private sector investment and
advance capacity-building initiatives that are grounded
in the rule of law;
(B) promote open markets;
(C) establish clear policy and regulatory
frameworks;
(D) improve the management of key economic sectors;
(E) combat corruption; and
(F) foster and support greater collaboration with
and among partner countries and the United States
private sector to develop secure and sustainable
infrastructure;
(8) to lead in the advancement of international rules and
norms that foster free and reciprocal trade and open and
integrated markets;
(9) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy in support of
United States companies and businesses in partner countries
that seek fair competition;
(10) to ensure that the United States leads in the
innovation of critical and emerging technologies, such as next-
generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence, quantum
computing, semiconductors, and biotechnology, by--
(A) providing necessary investment and concrete
incentives for the private sector to accelerate
development of such technologies;
(B) modernizing and harmonizing with allies and
partners export controls and investment screening
regimes and associated policies and regulations;
(C) enhancing United States leadership in technical
standards-setting bodies and avenues for developing
norms regarding the use of emerging critical
technologies;
(D) reducing United States barriers and increasing
incentives for collaboration with allies and partners
on the research and codevelopment of critical
technologies;
(E) collaborating with allies and partners to
protect critical technologies by--
(i) crafting multilateral export control
measures;
(ii) building capacity for defense
technology security;
(iii) safeguarding chokepoints in the
supply chains; and
(iv) ensuring diversification; and
(F) designing major defense capabilities for export
to allies and partners;
(11) to enable the people of the United States, including
the private sector, civil society, universities and other
academic institutions, State and local legislators, and other
relevant actors to identify and remain vigilant to the risks
posed by undue influence of the CCP in the United States;
(12) to implement measures to mitigate the risks referred
to in paragraph (11), while still preserving opportunities for
economic engagement, academic research, and cooperation in
other areas where the United States and the PRC share
interests;
(13) to collaborate with advanced democracies and other
willing partners to promote ideals and principles that--
(A) advance a free and open international order;
(B) strengthen democratic institutions;
(C) protect and promote human rights; and
(D) uphold a free press and fact-based reporting;
(14) to demonstrate effective leadership at the United
Nations, its associated agencies, and other multilateral
organizations and defend the integrity of these organizations
against co-optation by illiberal and authoritarian nations;
(15) to prioritize the defense of fundamental freedoms and
human rights in the United States relationship with the PRC;
(16) to cooperate with allies, partners, and multilateral
organizations, leveraging their significant and growing
capabilities to build a network of like-minded states that
sustains and strengthens a free and open order and addresses
regional and global challenges to hold the Government of the
PRC accountable for--
(A) violations and abuses of human rights;
(B) restrictions on religious practices; and,
(C) undermining and abrogating treaties, other
international agreements, and other international norms
related to human rights;
(17) to expose the PRC's use of corruption, repression,
coercion, and other malign behavior to attain unfair economic
advantage and deference of other nations to its political and
strategic objectives;
(18) to maintain United States access to the Western
Pacific, including by--
(A) increasing United States forward-deployed
forces in the Indo-Pacific region;
(B) modernizing the United States military through
investments in existing and new platforms, emerging
technologies, critical in-theater force structure and
enabling capabilities, joint operational concepts, and
a diverse, operationally resilient and politically
sustainable posture; and
(C) operating and conducting exercises with allies
and partners--
(i) to mitigate the PLA's ability to
project power and establish contested zones
within the First and Second Island Chains;
(ii) to diminish the ability of the PLA to
coerce its neighbors;
(iii) to maintain open sea and air lanes,
particularly in the Taiwan Strait, the East
China Sea, and the South China Sea; and
(iv) to project power from the United
States and its allies and partners to
demonstrate the ability to conduct contested
logistics;
(19) to deter the PRC from--
(A) coercing Indo-Pacific nations, including by
developing more combat-credible forces that are
integrated with allies and partners in contact, blunt,
and surge layers and able to defeat any PRC theory of
victory in the First or Second Island Chains of the
Western Pacific and beyond, as called for in the 2018
National Defense Strategy;
(B) using gray-zone tactics below the level of
armed conflict; or
(C) initiating armed conflict;
(20) to strengthen United States-PRC military-to-military
communication and improve de-escalation procedures to
deconflict operations and reduce the risk of unwanted conflict,
including through high-level visits and recurrent exchanges
between civilian and military officials and other measures, in
alignment with United States interests; and
(21) to cooperate with the PRC if interests align,
including through bilateral or multilateral means and at the
United Nations, as appropriate.
SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that the execution of the policy
described in section 4(b) requires the following actions:
(1) Strategic competition with the PRC will require the
United States--
(A) to marshal sustained political will to protect
its vital interests, promote its values, and advance
its economic and national security objectives for
decades to come; and
(B) to achieve this sustained political will,
persuade the American people and United States allies
and partners of--
(i) the challenges posed by the PRC; and
(ii) the need for long-term competition to
defend shared interests and values.
(2) The United States must coordinate closely with allies
and partners to compete effectively with the PRC, including to
encourage allies and partners to assume, as appropriate,
greater roles in balancing and checking the aggressive and
assertive behavior of the PRC.
(3) The President of the United States must lead and direct
the entire executive branch to make the People's Republic of
China as the greatest geopolitical and geoeconomic challenge
for United States foreign policy, increasing the prioritization
of strategic competition with the PRC and broader United States
interests in the Indo-Pacific region in the conduct of foreign
policy and assuring the allocation of appropriate resources
adequate to the challenge.
(4) The head of every Federal department and agency should
designate a senior official at the level of Under Secretary or
above to coordinate the department's or agency's policies with
respect to strategic competition with the PRC.
(5) The ability of the United States to execute a strategy
of strategic competition with the PRC will be undermined if our
attention is repeatedly diverted to challenges that are not
vital to United States economic and national security
interests.
(6) In the coming decades, the United States must prevent
the PRC from--
(A) establishing regional hegemony in the Indo-
Pacific; and
(B) using that position to advance its assertive
political, economic, and foreign policy goals around
the world.
(7) The United States must ensure that the Federal budget
is properly aligned with the strategic imperative to compete
with the PRC by--
(A) ensuring sufficient levels of funding to
resource all instruments of United States national
power; and
(B) coherently prioritizing how such funds are
used.
(8) Sustained prioritization of the challenge posed by the
PRC requires--
(A) bipartisan cooperation within Congress; and
(B) frequent, sustained, and meaningful
collaboration and consultation between the executive
branch and Congress.
(9) The United States must ensure close integration among
economic and foreign policymakers, the private sector, civil
society, universities and academic institutions, and other
relevant actors in free and open societies affected by the
challenges posed by the PRC to enable such actors--
(A) to collaborate to advance common interests; and
(B) to identify appropriate policies--
(i) to strengthen the United States and its
allies;
(ii) to promote a compelling vision of a
free and open order; and
(iii) to push back against detrimental
policies pursued by the CCP.
(10) The United States must ensure that all Federal
departments and agencies are organized to reflect the fact that
strategic competition with the PRC is the United States top
foreign policy priority, including through the assigned
missions and location of United States Government personnel,
by--
(A) dedicating more personnel in the Indo-Pacific
region, at posts around the world, and in Washington
DC, with priorities directly relevant to advancing
competition with the People's Republic of China;
(B) placing greater numbers of foreign service
officers, international development professionals,
members of the foreign commercial service, intelligence
professionals, and other United States Government
personnel in the Indo-Pacific region; and
(C) ensuring that this workforce, both civilian and
military, has the training in language, technical
skills, and other competencies required to advance a
successful competitive strategy with the PRC.
(11) The United States must place renewed emphasis on
strengthening the nonmilitary instruments of national power,
including diplomacy, information, technology, economics,
foreign assistance and development finance, commerce,
intelligence, and law enforcement, which are crucial for
addressing the unique economic, political, and ideological
challenges posed by the PRC.
(12) The United States must sustain resourcing for a
Pacific Deterrence Initiative, which shall be aligned with the
overarching political and diplomatic objectives articulated in
the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (Public Law 115-409), and
must prioritize the military investments necessary to achieve
United States political objectives in the Indo-Pacific,
including--
(A) promoting regional security in the Indo-
Pacific;
(B) reassuring allies and partners while protecting
them from coercion; and
(C) deterring conflict with the PRC.
(13) Competition with the PRC requires the United States
skillful adaptation to the information environment of the 21st
century. United States public diplomacy and messaging efforts
must effectively--
(A) promote the value of partnership with the
United States;
(B) highlight the risks and costs of enmeshment
with the PRC; and
(C) counter CCP propaganda and disinformation.
SEC. 6. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.
(a) Applicability of Existing Restrictions on Assistance to Foreign
Security Forces.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed to diminish,
supplant, supersede, or otherwise restrict or prevent responsibilities
of the United States Government under section 620M of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) or section 362 of title 10,
United States Code.
(b) No Authorization for the Use of Military Force.--Nothing in
this Act may be construed as authorizing the use of military force.
TITLE I--INVESTING IN A COMPETITIVE FUTURE
Subtitle A--Science and Technology
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST UNITED STATES COMPANIES WITH GLOBAL
SUPPLY CHAIN DIVERSIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT.
(a) Authorization To Contract Services.--The Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, is authorized to establish
a program to facilitate the contracting by United States embassies for
the professional services of qualified experts, on a reimbursable fee
for service basis, to assist interested United States persons and
business entities with supply chain management issues related to the
PRC, including--
(1) exiting from the PRC market or relocating certain
production facilities to locations outside the PRC;
(2) diversifying sources of inputs, and other efforts to
diversify supply chains to locations outside of the PRC;
(3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other challenges in
the course of the activities described in paragraphs (1) and
(2); and
(4) identifying alternative markets for production or
sourcing outside of the PRC, including through providing market
intelligence, facilitating contact with reliable local partners
as appropriate, and other services.
(b) Chief of Mission Oversight.--The persons hired to perform the
services described in subsection (a) shall--
(1) be under the authority of the United States Chief of
Mission in the country in which they are hired, in accordance
with existing United States laws;
(2) coordinate with Department of State and Department of
Commerce officers; and
(3) coordinate with United States missions and relevant
local partners in other countries as needed to carry out the
services described in subsection (a).
(c) Prioritization of Micro-, Small-, and Medium-Sized
Enterprises.--The services described in subsection (a) shall be
prioritized to assisting micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $15,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2027 for
the purposes of carrying out this section.
(e) Prohibition on Access to Assistance by Foreign Adversaries.--
None of the funds appropriated pursuant to this section may be provided
to an entity--
(1) under the foreign ownership, control, or influence of
the Government of China or the Chinese Communist Party, or
other foreign adversary; or
(2) determined to have beneficial ownership from foreign
individuals subject to the jurisdiction, direction, or
influence of foreign adversaries.
(f) Definitions.--The terms ``foreign ownership, control, or
influence'' and ``FOCI'' have the meanings given those terms in the
National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (DOD 5220.22-M),
or a successor document.
Subtitle B--Global Infrastructure Development
SEC. 111. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.
In this subtitle, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 112. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL QUALITY INFRASTRUCTURE
INVESTMENT STANDARDS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should initiate collaboration among governments, the private
sector, and civil society to encourage the adoption of the standards
for quality global infrastructure development advanced by the G20 at
Osaka in 2018, including with respect to the following issues:
(1) Respect for the sovereignty of countries in which
infrastructure investments are made.
(2) Anti-corruption.
(3) Rule of law.
(4) Human rights and labor rights.
(5) Fiscal and debt sustainability.
(6) Social and governance safeguards.
(7) Transparency.
(8) Environmental and energy standards.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should launch a series of fora around the world showcasing the
commitment of the United States and partners of the United States to
high-quality development cooperation, including with respect to the
issues as described in subsection (a).
SEC. 113. UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR INFRASTRUCTURE.
(a) Findings.--The Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee
(GICC) was established to coordinate the efforts of the Department of
State, the Department of Commerce, the Department of the Treasury, the
Department of Energy, the Department of Transportation, the United
States Agency for International Development, the United States Trade
and Development Agency, the Development Finance Corporation, the
Export-Import Bank of the United States, and other agencies to catalyze
private sector investments around the world and the deployment of
United States Government technical assistance and development finance
tools, including project preparation services and commercial advocacy.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the world's infrastructure needs, including in the
transport, energy, and digital sectors, are vast and growing;
(2) total or partial acquisition of, or a significant
financial stake or physical presence in, certain types of
infrastructure, including ports, energy grids, 5G
telecommunications networks, and undersea cables, can provide
an advantage to countries that do not share the interests and
values of the United States and its allies and partners, and
could therefore be deleterious to the interests and values of
the United States and its allies and partners;
(3) the United States must continue to prioritize support
for infrastructure projects that are physically secure,
financially viable, economically sustainable, and socially
responsible;
(4) achieving the objective outlined in paragraph (3)
requires the coordination of all United States Government
economic tools across the interagency, so that such tools are
deployed way to maximize United States interests and that of
its allies and partners;
(5) the GICC represents an important and concrete step
toward better communication and coordination across the United
States Government of economic tools relevant to supporting
infrastructure that is physically secure, financially viable,
economically sustainable, and socially responsible, and should
be continued; and
(6) the executive branch and Congress should have
consistent consultations on United States support for strategic
infrastructure projects, including how the Congress can support
such initiatives in the future.
(c) Reporting Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, and semi-annually thereafter, the
Secretary of State, in coordination with other Federal agencies that
participate in the GICC, and, as appropriate, the Director of National
Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a
report that identifies--
(1) current and pending or future infrastructure projects,
particularly in the transport, energy, and digital sectors,
that the United States is supporting or will support through
financing, foreign assistance, technical assistance, or other
means;
(2) a detailed explanation of the United States and partner
country interests served by the United States providing support
to such projects; and
(3) a detailed description of any support provided by other
United States allies and partners to such projects.
(d) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 114. INFRASTRUCTURE TRANSACTION AND ASSISTANCE NETWORK.
(a) Authority.--The Secretary of State is authorized to establish a
program, to be known as the ``Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance
Network'', under which the Secretary of State, in consultation with
other relevant Federal agencies, including those represented on the
Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee, may advance the
development of sustainable, transparent, and high-quality
infrastructure, in the Indo-Pacific region by--
(1) strengthening capacity-building programs to improve
project evaluation processes, regulatory and procurement
environments, and project preparation capacity of countries
that are partners of the United States in such development;
(2) providing transaction advisory services and project
preparation assistance to support sustainable infrastructure;
and
(3) coordinating the provision of United States assistance
for the development of infrastructure, including infrastructure
that utilizes United States-manufactured goods and services,
and catalyzing investment led by the private sector.
(b) Transaction Advisory Fund.--As part of the ``Infrastructure
Transaction and Assistance Network'' described under subsection (a),
the Secretary of State is authorized to provide support, including
through flexible financing mechanisms such as the Transaction Advisory
Fund, for advisory services to help boost the capacity of partner
countries to evaluate contracts and assess the financial and
environmental impacts of potential infrastructure projects, including
through providing services such as--
(1) legal services;
(2) pre-feasibility studies;
(3) debt sustainability analyses;
(4) bid or proposal evaluation; and
(5) other services relevant to advancing the development of
sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastructure.
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $75,000,000 to the Infrastructure Transaction and
Assistance Network, of which $20,000,000 is to be provided for the
Transaction Advisory Fund.
SEC. 115. STRATEGY FOR ADVANCED AND RELIABLE ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE.
(a) In General.--The President shall direct a comprehensive, multi-
year, whole of government effort, in consultation with the private
sector, to counter predatory lending and financing by the Government of
China, including support to companies incorporated in the PRC that
engage in such activities, in the energy sectors of developing
countries.
(b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to--
(1) regularly evaluate current and forecasted energy needs
and capacities of developing countries and analyze the presence
and involvement of PRC state-owned industries and other
companies incorporated in the PRC, Chinese nationals providing
labor, and financing of energy projects, including direct
financing by the Government of China, PRC financial
institutions, or direct state support to state-owned
enterprises and other companies incorporated in the PRC;
(2) pursue strategic support and investment opportunities,
and diplomatic engagement on power sector reforms, to expand
the development and deployment of advanced energy technologies
in developing countries;
(3) offer financing, loan guarantees, grants, and other
financial products on terms that advance domestic economic and
local employment opportunities, utilize advanced energy
technologies, encourage private sector growth, and when
appropriate United States equity and sovereign lending products
as alternative to the predatory lending tools offered by
Chinese international finance institutions;
(4) pursue partnerships with likeminded international
financing and multilateral institutions to leverage investment
in advanced energy technologies in developing countries; and
(5) pursue bilateral partnerships focused on the
cooperative development of advanced energy technologies with
countries of strategic significance, particularly in the Indo-
Pacific region, to address the effects of energy engagement by
the PRC through predatory lending or other actions that
negatively impact other countries.
(c) Advanced Energy Technologies Exports.--Not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter
for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary
of Energy, shall establish a United States Government strategy to
increase United States exports of advanced energy technologies to--
(1) improve energy security in allied and developing
countries;
(2) create open, efficient, rule-based, and transparent
energy markets;
(3) improve free, fair, and reciprocal energy trading
relationships; and
(4) expand access to affordable, reliable energy.
SEC. 116. REPORT ON CHINA'S INVESTMENTS IN FOREIGN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT.
(a) In General.--No later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for five years, the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary for Energy
Resources, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report that--
(1) identifies priority countries for deepening United
States engagement on energy matters, in accordance with the
economic and national security interests of the United States
and where deeper energy partnerships are most achievable;
(2) describes the involvement of the PRC government and
companies incorporated in the PRC in the development,
operation, financing, or ownership of energy generation
facilities, transmission infrastructure or energy resources in
the countries identified in paragraph (1);
(3) evaluates strategic or security concerns and
implications for United States national interests and the
interests of the countries identified in paragraph (1), with
respect to the PRC's involvement and influence in developing
country energy production or transmission; and
(4) outlines current and planned efforts by the United
States to partner with the countries identified in paragraph
(1) on energy matters that support shared interests between the
United States and such countries.
(b) Transmittal.--The assessment required in subsection (a) shall
be published on the United States Agency for International
Development's website and transmitted to the appropriate committees of
Congress, the Secretary of State, and the Chief Executive Officer of
the United States International Development Finance Corporation.
Subtitle C--Digital Technology and Connectivity
SEC. 121. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY ISSUES.
(a) Statement of Policy on Leadership in International Standards
Setting.--It is the sense of Congress that the United States must lead
in international standard-setting bodies that set the governance norms
and rules for critical digitally enabled technologies in order to
ensure that these technologies operate within a free, secure,
interoperable, and stable digital domain.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States, along with allies and partners, should lead an international
effort that utilizes all of the economic and diplomatic tools at its
disposal to combat the expanding use of information and communications
technology products and services to surveil, repress, and manipulate
populations (also known as ``digital authoritarianism'').
(c) Negotiations for Digital Trade Agreement.--It is the sense of
Congress that the United States Trade Representative should negotiate
bilateral and plurilateral agreements relating to digital goods with
the European Union, Japan, Taiwan, the member countries of the Five
Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance, and other nations, as appropriate.
(d) Freedom of Information in the Digital Age.--It is the sense of
Congress that the United States should lead a global effort to ensure
that freedom of information, including the ability to safely consume or
publish information without fear of undue reprisals, is maintained as
the digital domain becomes an increasingly integral mechanism for
communication.
(e) Efforts to Ensure Technological Development Does Not Threaten
Democratic Governance or Human Rights.--It is the sense of Congress
that the United States should lead a global effort to develop and adopt
a set of common principles and standards for critical technologies to
ensure that the such technologies cannot be abused by malign actors,
whether they are governments or other entities, and that they do not
threaten democratic governance or human rights.
(f) Formation of Digital Technology Trade Alliance.--It is the
sense of Congress that the United States should examine opportunities
for diplomatic negotiations regarding the formation of mutually
beneficial alliances relating to digitally enabled technologies and
services.
SEC. 122. DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY PARTNERSHIP.
(a) Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership.--The
Secretary of State is authorized to establish a program, to be known as
the ``Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership'' to help
foreign countries--
(1) expand and increase secure Internet access and digital
infrastructure in emerging markets;
(2) protect technological assets, including data;
(3) adopt policies and regulatory positions that foster and
encourage open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet,
the free flow of data, multi-stakeholder models of internet
governance, and pro-competitive and security information
communications technology policies and regulations;
(4) promote exports of United States information and
communications technology (ICT) goods and services and increase
United States company market share in target markets;
(5) promote the diversification of ICT goods and supply
chain services to be less reliant on Chinese imports; and
(6) build cybersecurity capacity, expand interoperability,
and promote best practices for a national approach to
cybersecurity.
(b) Implementation Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress an implementation plan for the
coming year to advance the goals identified in subsection (a).
(c) Consultation.--In developing the strategy required by
subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall consult with--
(1) leaders of the United States industry;
(2) other relevant technology experts, including the Open
Technology Fund;
(3) representatives from relevant United States Government
agencies; and
(4) representatives from like-minded allies and partners.
(d) Semiannual Briefing Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for five
years, the Secretary of State shall provide to the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives a briefing on the implementation of the plan
required by subsection (b).
(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $100,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026.
Subtitle D--Countering Chinese Communist Party Influence
SEC. 131. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the ``Countering Chinese Communist
Party Malign Influence Act''.
SEC. 132. AUTHORIZATION.
(a) Countering Chinese Influence Fund.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $300,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026
for the Countering Chinese Influence Fund to counter the malign
influence of the Chinese Communist Party globally. Amounts appropriated
pursuant to this authorization are authorized to remain available until
expended and shall supplement, not supplant, amounts otherwise
authorized to be appropriated to counter such influence.
(b) Consultation Required.--The obligation of funds appropriated or
otherwise made available to counter the malign influence of the Chinese
Communist Party globally, including pursuant to the authorization under
subsection (a), shall be subject to prior consultation with, and
consistent with section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2394-1), the regular notification procedures of--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(c) Policy Guidance, Coordination, and Approval.--
(1) Coordinator.--The Secretary of State shall designate an
existing senior official of the Department at the rank of
Assistant Secretary or above to provide policy guidance,
coordination, and approval for the obligation of funds
authorized pursuant to subsection (a).
(2) Duties.--The senior official designated pursuant to
paragraph (1) shall be responsible for--
(A) on an annual basis, the identification of
specific strategic priorities for using the funds
authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a), such
as geographic areas of focus or functional categories
of programming that funds are to be concentrated
within, consistent with the national interests of the
United States and the purposes of this Act;
(B) the coordination and approval of all
programming conducted using the funds authorized to be
appropriated by subsection (a), based on a
determination that such programming directly counters
the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party,
including specific activities or policies advanced by
the Chinese Communist Party, pursuant to the strategic
objectives of the United States, as established in the
2017 National Security Strategy, the 2018 National
Defense Strategy, and other relevant national and
regional strategies as appropriate;
(C) ensuring that all programming approved bears a
sufficiently direct nexus to such acts by the Chinese
Communist Party described in subsection (d) and adheres
to the requirements outlined in subsection (e); and
(D) conducting oversight, monitoring, and
evaluation of the effectiveness of all programming
conducted using the funds authorized to be appropriated
by subsection (a) to ensure that it advances United
States interests and degrades the ability of the
Chinese Communist Party, to advance activities that
align with subsection (d) of this section.
(3) Interagency coordination.--The senior official
designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall, in coordinating and
approving programming pursuant to paragraph (2), seek to--
(A) conduct appropriate interagency consultation;
and
(B) ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, that
all approved programming functions in concert with
other Federal activities to counter the malign
influence and activities of the Chinese Communist
Party.
(4) Assistant coordinator.--The Administrator of the United
States Agency for International Development shall designate a
senior official at the rank of Assistant Administrator or above
to assist and consult the senior official designated pursuant
to paragraph (1).
(d) Malign Influence.--In this section, the term ``malign
influence'' with respect to the Chinese Communist Party should be
construed to include acts conducted by the Chinese Communist Party or
entities acting on its behalf that--
(1) undermine a free and open international order;
(2) advance an alternative, repressive international order
that bolsters the Chinese Communist Party's hegemonic ambitions
and is characterized by coercion and dependency;
(3) undermine the national security or sovereignty of the
United States or other countries; or
(4) undermine the economic security of the United States or
other countries, including by promoting corruption.
(e) Countering Malign Influence.--In this section countering malign
influence through the use of funds authorized to be appropriated by
subsection (a) shall include efforts to--
(1) promote transparency and accountability, and reduce
corruption, including in governance structures targeted by the
malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party;
(2) support civil society and independent media to raise
awareness of and increase transparency regarding the negative
impact of activities related to the Belt and Road Initiative;
(3) counter transnational criminal networks that benefit,
or benefit from, the malign influence of the Chinese Communist
Party;
(4) encourage economic development structures that help
protect against predatory lending schemes, including support
for market-based alternatives in key economic sectors, such as
digital economy, energy, and infrastructure;
(5) counter activities that provide undue influence to the
security forces of the People's Republic of China;
(6) expose misinformation and disinformation of the Chinese
Communist Party's propaganda, including through programs
carried out by the Global Engagement Center; and
(7) counter efforts by the Chinese Communist Party to
legitimize or promote authoritarian ideology and governance
models.
SEC. 133. FINDINGS ON CHINESE INFORMATION WARFARE AND MALIGN INFLUENCE
OPERATIONS.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) In the report to Congress required under section
1261(b) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232), the President
laid out a broad range of malign activities conducted by the
Government of China and its agents and entities, including--
(A) propaganda and disinformation, in which
``Beijing communicates its narrative through state-run
television, print, radio, and online organizations
whose presence is proliferating in the United States
and around the world'';
(B) malign political influence operations, in which
``front organizations and agents which target
businesses, universities, think tanks, scholars,
journalists, and local state and Federal officials in
the United States and around the world, attempting to
influence discourse''; and
(C) malign financial influence operations,
characterized as ``misappropriation of technology and
intellectual property, failure to appropriately
disclose relationships with foreign government
sponsored entities, breaches of contract and
confidentiality, and manipulation of processes for fair
and merit-based allocation of Federal research and
development funding''.
(2) Chinese information warfare and malign influence
operations are ongoing. In January 2019, the Director of
National Intelligence, Dan Coats, stated, ``China will continue
to use legal, political, and economic levers--such as the lure
of Chinese markets--to shape the information environment. It is
also capable of using cyber attacks against systems in the
United States to censor or suppress viewpoints it deems
politically sensitive.''.
(3) In February 2020, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Christopher Wray, testified to the Committee on
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives that the People's
Republic of China has ``very active [malign] foreign influence
efforts in this country,'' with the goal of ``trying to shift
our policy and our public opinion to be more pro-China on a
variety of issues''.
(4) The People's Republic of China's information warfare
and malign influence operations continue to adopt new tactics
and evolve in sophistication. In May 2020, the Special Envoy
and Coordinator of the Global Engagement Center (GEC), Lea
Gabrielle, stated that there was a convergence of Russian and
Chinese narratives surrounding COVID-19 and that the GEC had
``uncovered a new network of inauthentic Twitter accounts''
that it assessed was ``created with the intent to amplify
Chinese propaganda and disinformation''. In June 2020, Google
reported that Chinese hackers attempted to access email
accounts of the campaign staff of a presidential candidate.
(5) Chinese information warfare and malign influence
operations are a threat to the national security, democracy and
the economic systems of the United States, its allies and
partners. In October 2018, Vice President Mike Pence warned
that ``Beijing is employing a whole-of-government approach,
using political, economic, and military tools, as well as
propaganda, to advance its influence and benefit its interests
in the United States.''.
(6) In February 2018, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Christopher Wray, testified to the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate that the People's
Republic of China is taking advantage of and exploiting the
open research and development environments of United States
institutions of higher education to utilize ``professors,
scientists and students'' as ``nontraditional collectors'' of
information.
(b) Presidential Duties.--The President shall--
(1) protect our democratic institutions and processes from
malign influence from the People's Republic of China and other
foreign adversaries; and
(2) consistent with the policy specified in paragraph (1),
direct the heads of the appropriate Federal departments and
agencies to implement Acts of Congress to counter and deter
Chinese and other foreign information warfare and malign
influence operations without delay, including--
(A) section 1043 of the John S. McCain National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public
Law 115-232), which authorizes a coordinator position
within the National Security Council for countering
malign foreign influence operations and campaigns;
(B) section 228 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116-
92), which authorizes additional research of foreign
malign influence operations on social media platforms;
(C) section 847 of such Act, which requires the
Secretary of Defense to modify contracting regulations
regarding vetting for foreign ownership, control and
influence in order to mitigate risks from malign
foreign influence;
(D) section 1239 of such Act, which requires an
update of the comprehensive strategy to counter the
threat of malign influence to include the People's
Republic of China;
(E) section 5323 of such Act, which authorizes the
Director of National Intelligence to facilitate the
establishment of Social Media Data and Threat Analysis
Center to detect and study information warfare and
malign influence operations across social media
platforms; and
(F) section 119C of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3059), which authorizes the
establishment of a Foreign Malign Influence Response
Center inside the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
SEC. 134. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE FULBRIGHT-HAYS
PROGRAM.
There are authorized to be appropriated, for the 6-year period
beginning on September 30, 2021, $105,500,000, which shall be expended
to promote education, training, research, and foreign language skills
through the Fulbright-Hays Program, in accordance with section 102(b)
of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2452(b)).
SEC. 135. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING ANTI-ASIAN RACISM AND
DISCRIMINATION.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, crimes and
discrimination against Asians and those of Asian descent have
risen dramatically worldwide. In May 2020, United Nations
Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said ``the pandemic
continues to unleash a tsunami of hate and xenophobia,
scapegoating and scare-mongering'' and urged governments to
``act now to strengthen the immunity of our societies against
the virus of hate''.
(2) Asian American and Pacific Island (AAPI) workers make
up a large portion of the essential workers on the frontlines
of the COVID-19 pandemic, making up 8.5 percent of all
essential healthcare workers in the United States. AAPI workers
also make up a large share--between 6 percent and 12 percent
based on sector--of the biomedical field.
(3) The United States Census notes that Americans of Asian
descent alone made up nearly 5.9 percent of the United States
population in 2019, and that Asian Americans are the fastest-
growing racial group in the United States, projected to
represent 14 percent of the United States population by 2065.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the reprehensible attacks on people of Asian descent
and concerning increase in anti-Asian sentiment and racism in
the United States and around the world have no place in a
peaceful, civilized, and tolerant world;
(2) the United States is a diverse nation with a proud
tradition of immigration, and the strength and vibrancy of the
United States is enhanced by the diverse ethnic backgrounds and
tolerance of its citizens, including Asian Americans and
Pacific Islanders;
(3) the United States Government should encourage other
foreign governments to use the official and scientific names
for the COVID-19 pandemic, as recommended by the World Health
Organization and the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention; and
(4) the United States Government and other governments
around the world must actively oppose racism and intolerance,
and use available and appropriate tools to combat the spread of
anti-Asian racism and discrimination.
SEC. 136. SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND COUNTERING DISINFORMATION.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) China is increasing its spending on public diplomacy
including influence campaigns, advertising, and investments
into state-sponsored media publications outside of China. These
include, for example, more than $10,000,000,000 in foreign
direct investment in communications infrastructure, platforms,
and properties, as well as bringing journalists to China for
training programs.
(2) The PRC, through the Voice of China, the United Front
Work Department, and UFWD's many affiliates and proxies, has
obtained unfettered access to radio, television, and digital
dissemination platforms in numerous languages targeted at
citizens in other regions where China has an interest in
promoting public sentiment in support of the Chinese Communist
Party and expanding the reach of its misleading narratives and
propaganda.
(3) Even in Western countries, China spends extensively on
influence operations, such as a $500,000,000 advertising
campaign to attract cable viewers in Australia and a more than
$20,000,000 campaign to influence United States public opinion
via the China Daily newspaper supplement.
(b) The United States Agency for Global Media.--The United States
Agency for Global Media (USAGM) and affiliate Federal and non-Federal
entities shall undertake the following actions to support independent
journalism, countering disinformation, and breaking the firewall and
combatting surveillance in countries where the Chinese Communist Party
and other malign actors are promoting disinformation, propaganda, and
manipulated media markets:
(1) Radio Free Asia shall expand domestic coverage and
digital programming for all RFA China services and other
affiliate language broadcasting services.
(2) USAGM shall increase funding for Radio Free Asia's
Mandarin, Tibetan, Uyghur, and Cantonese language services.
(3) Voice of America shall establish a real-time
disinformation tracking tool similar to Polygraph for Russian
language propaganda and misinformation.
(4) USAGM shall expand existing training and partnership
programs that promote journalistic standards, investigative
reporting, cybersecurity, and digital analytics to help expose
and counter false CCP narratives.
(5) The Open Technology Fund shall continue and expand work
to support tools and technology to circumvent censorship and
surveillance by the CCP, both inside China as well as abroad
where China has exported censorship technology, and increase
secure peer to peer connectivity and privacy tools.
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for the United
States Agency for Global Media, $100,000,000 for ongoing and new
programs to support local media, build independent media, combat
Chinese disinformation inside and outside of China, invest in
technology to subvert censorship, and monitor and evaluate these
programs.
(d) Support for Local Media.--The Secretary of State, acting
through the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor and in coordination with the Administrator of the United
States Agency for International Development, shall support and train
journalists on investigative techniques necessary to ensure public
accountability related to the Belt and Road Initiative, the PRC's
surveillance and digital export of technology, and other influence
operations abroad direct or directly supported by the Communist Party
or the Chinese government.
(e) Internet Freedom Programs.--The Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor shall continue to support internet freedom programs.
(f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026, $170,000,000
for ongoing and new programs in support of press freedom, training, and
protection of journalists.
SEC. 137. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER.
(a) Finding.--Congress established the Global Engagement Center to
``direct, lead, and coordinate efforts'' of the Federal Government to
``recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and non-
state propaganda and disinformation globally''.
(b) Extension.--Section 1287(j) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended
by striking ``the date that is 8 years after the date of the enactment
of this Act'' and inserting ``December 31, 2027''.
(c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the Global
Engagement Center should expand its coordinating capacity through the
exchange of liaison officers with Federal departments and agencies that
manage aspects of identifying and countering foreign disinformation,
including the National Counterterrorism Center at the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence and from combatant commands.
(d) Hiring Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the Secretary of State, during the five year period beginning on the
date of the enactment of this Act and solely to carry out functions of
the Global Engagement Center, may--
(1) appoint employees without regard to the provisions of
title 5, United States Code, regarding appointments in the
competitive service; and
(2) fix the basic compensation of such employees without
regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such
title regarding classification and General Schedule pay rates.
SEC. 138. REVIEW BY COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES OF CERTAIN FOREIGN GIFTS TO AND CONTRACTS WITH
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION.
(a) Amendments to Defense Production Act of 1950.--
(1) Definition of covered transaction.--Subsection (a)(4)
of section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C.
4565) is amended--
(A) in subparagraph (A)--
(i) in clause (i), by striking ``; and''
and inserting a semicolon;
(ii) in clause (ii), by striking the period
at the end and inserting ``; and''; and
(iii) by adding at the end the following:
``(iii) any transaction described in
subparagraph (B)(vi) proposed or pending after
the date of the enactment of the Strategic
Competition Act of 2021.'';
(B) in subparagraph (B), by adding at the end the
following:
``(vi) Any gift to an institution of higher
education from a foreign person, or the entry
into a contract by such an institution with a
foreign person, if--
``(I)(aa) the value of the gift or
contract equals or exceeds $1,000,000;
or
``(bb) the institution receives,
directly or indirectly, more than one
gift from or enters into more than one
contract, directly or indirectly, with
the same foreign person for the same
purpose the aggregate value of which,
during the period of 2 consecutive
calendar years, equals or exceeds
$1,000,000; and
``(II) the gift or contract--
``(aa) relates to research,
development, or production of
critical technologies and
provides the foreign person
potential access to any
material nonpublic technical
information (as defined in
subparagraph (D)(ii)) in the
possession of the institution;
or
``(bb) is a restricted or
conditional gift or contract
(as defined in section 117(h)
of the Higher Education Act of
1965 (20 U.S.C. 2011f(h))) that
establishes control.''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
``(G) Foreign gifts to and contracts with
institutions of higher education.--For purposes of
subparagraph (B)(vi):
``(i) Contract.--The term `contract' means
any agreement for the acquisition by purchase,
lease, or barter of property or services by a
foreign person, for the direct benefit or use
of either of the parties.
``(ii) Gift.--The term `gift' means any
gift of money or property.
``(iii) Institution of higher education.--
The term `institution of higher education'
means any institution, public or private, or,
if a multicampus institution, any single campus
of such institution, in any State--
``(I) that is legally authorized
within such State to provide a program
of education beyond secondary school;
``(II) that provides a program for
which the institution awards a
bachelor's degree (or provides not less
than a 2-year program which is
acceptable for full credit toward such
a degree) or a more advanced degree;
``(III) that is accredited by a
nationally recognized accrediting
agency or association; and
``(IV) to which the Federal
Government extends Federal financial
assistance (directly or indirectly
through another entity or person), or
that receives support from the
extension of Federal financial
assistance to any of the institution's
subunits.''.
(2) Mandatory declarations.--Subsection
(b)(1)(C)(v)(IV)(aa) of such section is amended by adding at
the end the following: ``Such regulations shall require a
declaration under this subclause with respect to a covered
transaction described in subsection (a)(4)(B)(vi)(II)(aa).''.
(3) Factors to be considered.--Subsection (f) of such
section is amended--
(A) in paragraph (10), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a semicolon;
(B) by redesignating paragraph (11) as paragraph
(12); and
(C) by inserting after paragraph (10) the
following:
``(11) as appropriate, and particularly with respect to
covered transactions described in subsection (a)(4)(B)(vi), the
importance of academic freedom at institutions of higher
education in the United States; and''.
(4) Membership of cfius.--Subsection (k)(2) of such section
is amended--
(A) by redesignating subparagraphs (H), (I), and
(J) as subparagraphs (I), (J), and (K), respectively;
and
(B) by inserting after subparagraph (G) the
following:
``(G) In the case of a covered transaction
involving an institution of higher education (as
defined in subsection (a)(4)(G)), the Secretary of
Education.''.
(5) Contents of annual report relating to critical
technologies.--Subsection (m)(3) of such section is amended--
(A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a semicolon;
(B) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period at
the end and inserting a semicolon; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
``(D) an evaluation of whether there are foreign
malign influence or espionage activities directed or
directly assisted by foreign governments against
institutions of higher education (as defined in
subsection (a)(4)(G)) aimed at obtaining research and
development methods or secrets related to critical
technologies; and
``(E) an evaluation of, and recommendation for any
changes to, reviews conducted under this section that
relate to institutions of higher education, based on an
analysis of disclosure reports submitted to the
chairperson under section 117(a) of the Higher
Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1011f(a)).''.
(b) Inclusion of CFIUS in Reporting on Foreign Gifts Under Higher
Education Act of 1965.--Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965
(20 U.S.C. 1011f) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by inserting after ``the Secretary''
the following: ``and the Secretary of the Treasury (in the
capacity of the Secretary as the chairperson of the Committee
on Foreign Investment in the United States under section
721(k)(3) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C.
4565(k)(3)))''; and
(2) in subsection (d)--
(A) in paragraph (1)--
(i) by striking ``with the Secretary'' and
inserting ``with the Secretary and the
Secretary of the Treasury''; and
(ii) by striking ``to the Secretary'' and
inserting ``to each such Secretary''; and
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``with the
Secretary'' and inserting ``with the Secretary and the
Secretary of the Treasury''.
(c) Effective Date; Applicability.--The amendments made by
subsection (a) shall--
(1) take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act,
subject to the requirements of subsections (d) and (e); and
(2) apply with respect to any covered transaction the
review or investigation of which is initiated under section 721
of the Defense Production Act of 1950 on or after that date.
(d) Regulations.--
(1) In general.--The Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States, which shall include the Secretary of Education
for purposes of this subsection, shall prescribe regulations as
necessary and appropriate to implement the amendments made by
subsection (a).
(2) Elements.--The regulations prescribed under paragraph
(1) shall include--
(A) regulations accounting for the burden on
institutions of higher education likely to result from
compliance with the amendments made by subsection (a),
structuring penalties and filing fees to reduce such
burdens, and implementing any procedures necessary to
protect academic freedom; and
(B) guidance with respect to the meaning of
``control'', as defined in section 721(a) of the
Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565(a)), as
that term applies to covered transactions described in
clause (vi) of paragraph (4)(B) of that section, as
added by subsection (a)(1).
(3) Issuance of final rule.--The Committee shall issue a
final rule to carry out the amendments made by subsection (a)
after assessing the findings of the pilot program required by
subsection (e).
(e) Pilot Program.--
(1) In general.--Beginning on the date that is 30 days
after the publication in the Federal Register of the matter
required by paragraph (2) and ending on the date that is 570
days thereafter, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States shall conduct a pilot program to assess methods
for implementing the review of covered transactions described
in clause (vi) of section 721(a)(4)(B) of the Defense
Production Act of 1950, as added by subsection (a)(1).
(2) Proposed determination.--Not later than 270 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Committee shall, in
consultation with the Secretary of Education, publish in the
Federal Register--
(A) a proposed determination of the scope of and
procedures for the pilot program required by paragraph
(1);
(B) an assessment of the burden on institutions of
higher education likely to result from compliance with
the pilot program;
(C) recommendations for addressing any such
burdens, including structuring penalties and filing
fees to reduce such burdens; and
(D) any procedures necessary to ensure that the
pilot program does not infringe upon academic freedom.
TITLE II--INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS
Subtitle A--Strategic and Diplomatic Matters
SEC. 201. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.
In this subtitle, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 202. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT FOR ALLIES AND PARTNERS
IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific
provide a unique strategic advantage to the United States and
are among the Nation's most precious assets, enabling the
United States to advance its vital national interests, defend
its territory, expand its economy through international trade
and commerce, establish enduring cooperation among like-minded
countries, prevent the domination of the Indo-Pacific and its
surrounding maritime and air lanes by a hostile power or
powers, and deter potential aggressors;
(2) the Governments of the United States, Japan, the
Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and Thailand are
critical allies in advancing a free and open order in the Indo-
Pacific region and tackling challenges with unity purpose, and
have collaborated to advance specific efforts of shared
interest in areas such as defense and security, economic
prosperity, infrastructure connectivity, and fundamental
freedoms;
(3) the United States greatly values other partnerships in
the Indo-Pacific region, including with India, Singapore,
Indonesia, Taiwan, New Zealand, and Vietnam as well as regional
architecture such as the Quad, the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Community
(APEC), which are essential to further shared interests;
(4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific demands
consistent United States and allied commitment to strengthening
and advancing our alliances so that they are postured to meet
these challenges, and will require sustained political will,
concrete partnerships, economic, commercial, and technological
cooperation, consistent and tangible commitments, high-level
and extensive consultations on matters of mutual interest,
mutual and shared cooperation in the acquisition of key
capabilities important to allied defenses, and unified mutual
support in the face of political, economic, or military
coercion;
(5) fissures in the United States alliance relationships
and partnerships benefit United States adversaries and weaken
collective ability to advance shared interests; and
(6) the United States will work with allies to prioritize
promoting human rights throughout the region.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United
States--
(1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and security
cooperation between and among the United States, Japan, the
Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia,
including through diplomatic engagement, regional development,
energy security and development, scientific and health
partnerships, educational and cultural exchanges, missile
defense, intelligence-sharing, space, cyber, and other
diplomatic and defense-related initiatives;
(2) to uphold our multilateral and bilateral treaty
obligations, including--
(A) defending Japan, including all areas under the
administration of Japan, under article V of the Treaty
of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United
States of America and Japan;
(B) defending the Republic of Korea under article
III of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United
States and the Republic of Korea;
(C) defending the Philippines under article IV of
the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and
the Republic of the Philippines;
(D) defending Thailand under the 1954 Manila Pact
and the Thanat-Rusk communique of 1962; and
(E) defending Australia under article IV of the
Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty;
(3) to strengthen and deepen our bilateral and regional
partnerships, including with India, Taiwan, ASEAN, and New
Zealand;
(4) to cooperate with Japan, the Republic of Korea, the
Philippines, Thailand, and Australia to promote human rights
bilaterally and through regional and multilateral fora and
pacts; and
(5) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, economic, and
security cooperation with regional partners, such as Taiwan,
Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and India.
SEC. 203. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COOPERATION WITH THE QUAD.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States should reaffirm our commitment to
quadrilateral cooperation among Australia, India, Japan, and
the United States (the ``Quad'') to enhance and implement a
shared vision to meet shared regional challenges and to promote
a free, open, inclusive, resilient, and healthy Indo-Pacific
that is characterized by democracy, rule-of-law, and market-
driven economic growth and is free from undue influence and
coercion;
(2) the United States should seek to expand sustained
dialogue and cooperation through the Quad with a range of
partners to support the rule of law, freedom of navigation and
overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values,
and territorial integrity, and to uphold peace and prosperity
and strengthen democratic resilience;
(3) the United States should seek to expand avenues of
cooperation with the Quad, including more regular military-to-
military dialogues, joint exercises, and coordinated policies
related to shared interests such as protecting cyberspace and
advancing maritime security; and
(4) the recent pledge from the first-ever Quad leaders
meeting on March 12, 2021, to respond to the economic and
health impacts of COVID-19, including expanding safe,
affordable, and effective vaccine production and equitable
access, and to address shared challenges, including in
cyberspace, critical technologies, counterterrorism, quality
infrastructure investment, and humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief, as well as maritime domains, further advances
the important cooperation among Quad nations that is so
critical to the Indo-Pacific region.
SEC. 204. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH ASEAN.
It is the policy of the United States to--
(1) stand with the nations of Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) as they respond to COVID-19 and support
greater cooperation in building capacity to prepare for and
respond to pandemics and other public health challenges;
(2) support high-level United States participation in the
annual ASEAN Summit held each November;
(3) reaffirm the importance of United States-ASEAN economic
engagement, including the elimination of barriers to cross-
border commerce, and support the ASEAN Economic Community's
(AEC) goals, including strong, inclusive, and sustainable long-
term economic growth and cooperation with the United States
that focuses on innovation and capacity-building efforts in
technology, education, disaster management, food security,
human rights, and trade facilitation, particularly for ASEAN's
poorest countries;
(4) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster greater
integration and unity within the ASEAN community, as well as to
foster greater integration and unity with non-ASEAN economic,
political, and security partners, including Japan, the Republic
of Korea, Australia, the European Union, Taiwan, and India;
(5) recognize the value of strategic economic initiatives
like United States-ASEAN Connect, which demonstrates a
commitment to ASEAN and the AEC and builds upon economic
relationships in the region;
(6) support ASEAN nations in addressing maritime and
territorial disputes in a constructive manner and in pursuing
claims through peaceful, diplomatic, and, as necessary,
legitimate regional and international arbitration mechanisms,
consistent with international law, including through the
adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea that
represents the interests of all parties and promotes peace and
stability in the region;
(7) urge all parties involved in the maritime and
territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific region, including the
Government of China--
(A) to cease any current activities, and avoid
undertaking any actions in the future, that undermine
stability, or complicate or escalate disputes through
the use of coercion, intimidation, or military force;
(B) to demilitarize islands, reefs, shoals, and
other features, and refrain from new efforts to
militarize, including the construction of new garrisons
and facilities and the relocation of additional
military personnel, material, or equipment;
(C) to oppose actions by any country that prevent
other countries from exercising their sovereign rights
to the resources in their exclusive economic zones and
continental shelves by enforcing claims to those areas
in the South China Sea that lack support in
international law; and
(D) to oppose unilateral declarations of
administrative and military districts in contested
areas in the South China Sea;
(8) urge parties to refrain from unilateral actions that
cause permanent physical damage to the marine environment and
support the efforts of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration and ASEAN to implement guidelines to address the
illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the region;
(9) urge ASEAN member states to develop a common approach
to reaffirm the decision of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration's 2016 ruling in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines in the case against the People's Republic of
China's excessive maritime claims;
(10) reaffirm the commitment of the United States to
continue joint efforts with ASEAN to halt human smuggling and
trafficking in persons and urge ASEAN to create and strengthen
regional mechanisms to provide assistance and support to
refugees and migrants;
(11) support the Lower Mekong Initiative;
(12) support newly created initiatives with ASEAN
countries, including the Mekong-United States partnership, the
United States-ASEAN Smart Cities Partnership, the ASEAN Policy
Implementation Project, the United States-ASEAN Innovation
Circle, and the United States-ASEAN Health Futures;
(13) encourage the President to communicate to ASEAN
leaders the importance of promoting the rule of law and open
and transparent government, strengthening civil society, and
protecting human rights, including releasing political
prisoners, ceasing politically motivated prosecutions and
arbitrary killings, and safeguarding freedom of the press,
freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom of speech
and expression;
(14) support efforts by organizations in ASEAN that address
corruption in the public and private sectors, enhance anti-
bribery compliance, enforce bribery criminalization in the
private sector, and build beneficial ownership transparency
through the ASEAN-USAID PROSPECT project partnered with the
South East Asia Parties Against Corruption (SEA-PAC);
(15) support the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative
as an example of a people-to-people partnership that provides
skills, networks, and leadership training to a new generation
that will create and fill jobs, foster cross-border cooperation
and partnerships, and rise to solve the regional and global
challenges of the future;
(16) support creating initiatives similar to the Young
Southeast Asian Leaders for other parts of the Indo-Pacific to
foster people-to-people partnerships with an emphasis on civil
society leaders;
(17) acknowledge those ASEAN governments that have fully
upheld and implemented all United Nations Security Council
resolutions and international agreements with respect to the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear and ballistic
missile programs and encourage all other ASEAN governments to
do the same; and
(18) allocate appropriate resources across the United
States Government to articulate and implement an Indo-Pacific
strategy that respects and supports ASEAN centrality and
supports ASEAN as a source of well-functioning and problem-
solving regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific community.
SEC. 205. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ENHANCING UNITED STATES-ASEAN
COOPERATION ON TECHNOLOGY ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States and ASEAN should complete a joint
analysis on risks of overreliance on Chinese equipment critical
to strategic technologies and critical infrastructure;
(2) the United States and ASEAN should share information
about and collaborate on screening Chinese investments in
strategic technology and critical infrastructure;
(3) the United States and ASEAN should work together on
appropriate import restriction regimes regarding Chinese
exports of surveillance technologies;
(4) the United States should urge ASEAN to adopt its March
2019 proposed sanctions regime targeting cyber attacks;
(5) the United States should urge ASEAN to commit to the
September 2019 principles signed by 28 countries regarding
``Advancing Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace'', a set
of commitments that support the ``rules-based international
order, affirm the applicability of international law to state-
on-state behavior, adherence to voluntary norms of responsible
state behavior in peacetime, and the development and
implementation of practical confidence building measures to
help reduce the risk of conflict stemming from cyber
incidents''; and
(6) the United States and ASEAN should explore how Chinese
investments in critical technology, including artificial
intelligence, will impact Indo-Pacific security over the coming
decades.
SEC. 206. REPORT ON CHINESE INFLUENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.
(a) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the Committee on
Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report on
the expanded influence of the Government of the People's Republic of
China and the Chinese Communist Party in international organizations.
(b) Contents.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include
analysis of the following:
(1) The influence of the PRC and Chinese Communist Party in
international organizations and how that influence has expanded
over the last 10 years, including--
(A) tracking countries' voting patterns that align
with Chinese government voting patterns;
(B) the number of PRC nationals in leadership
positions at the D-1 level or higher;
(C) changes in PRC voluntary and mandatory funding
by organization;
(D) adoption of Chinese Communist Party phrases and
initiatives in international organization language and
programming;
(E) efforts by the PRC to secure legitimacy for its
own foreign policy initiatives, including the Belt and
Road Initiative;
(F) the number of Junior Professional Officers that
the Government of China has funded by organization;
(G) tactics used by the Government of China or the
CCP to manipulate secret or otherwise non-public voting
measures, voting bodies, or votes;
(H) the extent to which technology companies
incorporated in the PRC, or which have PRC or CCP
ownership interests, provide equipment and services to
international organizations; and
(I) efforts by China's United Nations Mission to
generate criticism of the United States in the United
Nations, including any efforts to highlight delayed
United States payments or to misrepresent total United
States voluntary and assessed financial contributions
to the United Nations and its specialized agencies and
programs.
(2) The purpose and ultimate goals of the expanded
influence of the PRC and the Chinese Communist Party in
international organizations, including an analysis of PRC
Government- and Chinese Communist Party strategic documents and
rhetoric.
(3) The tactics and means employed by the PRC and the
Chinese Communist Party to achieve expanded influence in
international organizations, including--
(A) incentive programs for PRC nationals to join
and run for leadership positions in international
organizations;
(B) coercive economic and other practices against
other members in the organization; and
(C) economic or other incentives provided to
international organizations, including donations of
technologies or goods.
(4) The successes and failures of PRC and CCP influence
efforts in international organizations.
(c) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(d) Definition.--In this section, the term ``international
organizations'' means the following:
(1) The African Development Bank.
(2) The Asian Development Bank.
(3) The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation.
(4) The Bank of International Settlements.
(5) The Caribbean Development Bank.
(6) The Food and Agriculture Organization.
(7) The International Atomic Energy Agency.
(8) The International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development.
(9) The International Bureau of Weights and Measures.
(10) The International Chamber of Commerce.
(11) The International Civil Aviation Organization.
(12) The International Criminal Police Organization.
(13) The International Finance Corporation.
(14) The International Fund for Agricultural Development.
(15) The International Hydrographic Organization.
(16) The International Labor Organization.
(17) The International Maritime Organization.
(18) The International Monetary Fund.
(19) The International Olympic Committee.
(20) The International Organization for Migration.
(21) The International Organization for Standardization.
(22) The International Renewable Energy Agency.
(23) The International Telecommunications Union.
(24) The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development.
(25) The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons.
(26) The United Nations.
(27) The United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development.
(28) The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization.
(29) The United Nations Industrial Development
Organization.
(30) The United Nations Institute for Training and
Research.
(31) The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.
(32) The Universal Postal Union.
(33) The World Customs Organization.
(34) The World Health Organization.
(35) The World Intellectual Property Organization.
(36) The World Meteorological Organization.
(37) The World Organization for Animal Health.
(38) The World Tourism Organization.
(39) The World Trade Organization.
(40) The World Bank Group.
SEC. 207. REGULATORY EXCHANGES WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the
heads of other participating executive branch agencies, shall establish
and develop a program to facilitate and encourage regular dialogues
between United States Government regulatory and technical agencies and
their counterpart organizations in allied and partner countries, both
bilaterally and in relevant multilateral institutions and
organizations--
(1) to promote best practices in regulatory formation and
implementation;
(2) to collaborate to achieve optimal regulatory outcomes
based on scientific, technical, and other relevant principles;
(3) to seek better harmonization and alignment of
regulations and regulatory practices;
(4) to build consensus around industry and technical
standards in emerging sectors that will drive future global
economic growth and commerce; and
(5) to promote United States standards regarding
environmental, labor, and other relevant protections in
regulatory formation and implementation, in keeping with the
values of free and open societies, including the rule of law.
(b) Prioritization of Activities.--In facilitating expert exchanges
under subsection (a), the Secretary shall prioritize--
(1) bilateral coordination and collaboration with countries
where greater regulatory coherence, harmonization of standards,
or communication and dialogue between technical agencies is
achievable and best advances the economic and national security
interests of the United States;
(2) multilateral coordination and coordination where
greater regulatory coherence, harmonization of standards, or
dialogue on other relevant regulatory matters is achievable and
best advances the economic and national security interests of
the United States, including with--
(A) the European Union;
(B) the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation;
(C) the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN);
(D) the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD); and
(E) multilateral development banks; and
(3) regulatory practices and standards setting bodies
focused on key economic sectors and emerging technologies.
(c) Participation by Non-Governmental Entities.--With regard to the
program described in subsection (a), the Secretary may facilitate,
including through the use of amounts appropriated pursuant to
subsection (e), the participation of private sector representatives,
and other relevant organizations and individuals with relevant
expertise, as appropriate and to the extent that such participation
advances the goals of such program.
(d) Delegation of Authority by the Secretary.--The Secretary of
State is authorized to delegate the responsibilities described in this
section to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy,
and the Environment.
(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated
$2,500,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry
out this section.
(2) Use of funds.--The Secretary may obligate amounts
appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) in a manner that--
(A) facilities participation by representatives
from technical agencies within the United States
Government and their counterparts; and
(B) complies with applicable procedural
requirements under the State Department Basic
Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a et seq.) and
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et
seq.).
SEC. 208. TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP OFFICE AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United
States to lead new technology policy partnerships focused on the shared
interests of the world's technology-leading democracies.
(b) Establishment.--The Secretary of State shall establish an
interagency-staffed Technology Partnership Office (referred to in this
section as the ``Office''), which shall be housed in the Department of
State.
(c) Leadership.--
(1) Ambassador-at-large.--The Office shall be headed by an
Ambassador-at-Large for Technology, who shall--
(A) be appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate;
(B) have the rank and status of ambassador; and
(C) report to the Secretary of State, unless
otherwise directed.
(2) Office liaisons.--The Secretary of Commerce and the
Secretary of Treasury shall each appoint, from within their
respective departments at the level of GS-14 or higher,
liaisons between the Office and the Department of Commerce or
the Department of the Treasury, as applicable, to perform the
following duties:
(A) Collaborate with the Department of State on
relevant technology initiatives and partnerships.
(B) Provide technical and other relevant expertise
to the Office, as appropriate.
(d) Membership.--In addition to the liaisons referred to in
subsection (c), the Office shall include a representative or expert
detailee from key Federal agencies, as determined by the Ambassador-at-
Large for Technology.
(e) Purposes.--The purposes of the Office shall include
responsibilities such as--
(1) creating, overseeing, and carrying out technology
partnerships with countries and relevant political and economic
unions that are committed to--
(A) the rule of law, freedom of speech, and respect
for an promotion of human rights;
(B) the safe and responsible development and use of
new and emerging technologies and the establishment of
related norms and standards;
(C) a secure internet architecture governed by a
multi-stakeholder model instead of centralized
government control;
(D) robust international cooperation to promote an
open internet and interoperable technological products
and services that are necessary to freedom, innovation,
transparency, and privacy; and
(E) multilateral coordination, including through
diplomatic initiatives, information sharing, and other
activities, to defend the principles described in
subparagraphs (A) through (C) against efforts by state
and non-state actors to undermine them;
(2) harmonizing technology governance regimes with
partners, coordinating on basic and pre-competitive research
and development initiatives, and collaborating to pursue such
opportunities in key technologies, including--
(A) artificial intelligence and machine learning;
(B) 5G telecommunications and other advanced
wireless networking technologies;
(C) semiconductor manufacturing;
(D) biotechnology;
(E) quantum computing;
(F) surveillance technologies, including facial
recognition technologies and censorship software; and
(G) fiber optic cables;
(3) coordinating with such countries regarding shared
technology strategies, including technology controls and
standards, as well as strategies with respect to the
development and acquisition of key technologies to provide
alternatives for those countries utilizing systems supported by
authoritarian regimes;
(4) supporting and expanding adherence to international
treaties and frameworks governing the responsible use of new
and emerging technologies;
(5) coordinating the adoption of shared data privacy, data
sharing, and data archiving standards among the United States
and partner countries and relevant economic and political
unions, including complementary data protection regulations;
(6) coordinating with other technology partners on export
control policies, including as appropriate through the
Wassenaar Arrangement On Export Controls for Conventional Arms
and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, done at The Hague December
1995, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, and the
Missile Technology Control Regime; supply chain security; and
investment in or licensing of critical infrastructure and dual-
use technologies;
(7) coordinating with members of technology partnerships on
other policies for the use and control of emerging and
foundational technologies through appropriate restrictions,
investment screening, and appropriate measures with respect to
technology transfers;
(8) coordinating policies, in coordination with the
Department of Commerce, around the resiliency of supply chains
in critical technology areas and explore possible
diversification of supply chain components to countries
involved in technology partnerships with the United States,
while also maintaining transparency surrounding subsidies and
product origins;
(9) sharing information regarding the technology transfer
threat posed by authoritarian governments and the ways in which
autocratic regimes are utilizing technology to erode individual
freedoms and other foundations of open, democratic societies;
(10) administering the establishment of--
(A) the common funding mechanism for development
and adoption of measurably secure semiconductors and
measurably secure semiconductors supply chains created
in and in accordance with the requirements of section
9905 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public
Law 116-283); and
(B) the multilateral telecommunications security
fund created in and in accordance with the requirements
of section 9202 of such Act; and
(11) collaborating with private companies, trade
associations, and think tanks to realize the purposes of
paragraphs (1) through (10).
(f) Special Hiring Authorities.--The Secretary of State may--
(1) appoint employees without regard to the provisions of
title 5, United States Code, regarding appointments in the
competitive service; and
(2) fix the basic compensation of such employees without
regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such
title regarding classification and General Schedule pay rates.
(g) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the next three
years, the Secretary of State shall submit an unclassified report to
the appropriate congressional committees, with a classified index, if
necessary, about the activities of the Office, including any
cooperative initiatives and partnerships pursued with United States
allies and partners, and the results of those activities, initiatives,
and partnerships.
(h) Sense of Congress on Establishing International Technology
Partnership.--It is the sense of Congress that the Ambassador-at-Large
for Technology should seek to establish an International Technology
Partnership for the purposes described in this section with foreign
countries that have--
(1) democratic national government and a strong commitment
to democratic values, including an adherence to the rule of
law, freedom of speech, and respect for and promotion of human
rights;
(2) an economy with advanced technology sectors; and
(3) a demonstrated record of trust or an expressed interest
in international cooperation and coordination with the United
States on important defense and intelligence issues.
SEC. 209. UNITED STATES REPRESENTATION IN STANDARDS-SETTING BODIES.
(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Promoting
United States International Leadership in 5G Act of 2021''.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States and its allies and partners should
maintain participation and leadership at international
standards-setting bodies for 5th and future generation mobile
telecommunications systems and infrastructure;
(2) the United States should work with its allies and
partners to encourage and facilitate the development of secure
supply chains and networks for 5th and future generation mobile
telecommunications systems and infrastructure; and
(3) the maintenance of a high standard of security in
telecommunications and cyberspace between the United States and
its allies and partners is a national security interest of the
United States.
(c) Enhancing Representation and Leadership of United States at
International Standards-setting Bodies.--
(1) In general.--The President shall--
(A) establish an interagency working group to
provide assistance and technical expertise to enhance
the representation and leadership of the United States
at international bodies that set standards for
equipment, systems, software, and virtually defined
networks that support 5th and future generation mobile
telecommunications systems and infrastructure, such as
the International Telecommunication Union and the 3rd
Generation Partnership Project; and
(B) work with allies, partners, and the private
sector to increase productive engagement.
(2) Interagency working group.--The interagency working
group described in paragraph (1)--
(A) shall be chaired by the Secretary of State or a
designee of the Secretary of State; and
(B) shall consist of the head (or designee) of each
Federal department or agency the President determines
appropriate.
(3) Briefings.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and subsequently
thereafter as provided under subparagraph (B), the
interagency working group described in paragraph (1)
shall provide a strategy to the appropriate
congressional committees that addresses--
(i) promotion of United States leadership
at international standards-setting bodies for
equipment, systems, software, and virtually
defined networks relevant to 5th and future
generation mobile telecommunications systems
and infrastructure, taking into account the
different processes followed by the various
international standard-setting bodies;
(ii) diplomatic engagement with allies and
partners to share security risk information and
findings pertaining to equipment that supports
or is used in 5th and future generation mobile
telecommunications systems and infrastructure
and cooperation on mitigating such risks;
(iii) China's presence and activities at
international standards-setting bodies relevant
to 5th and future generation mobile
telecommunications systems and infrastructure,
including information on the differences in the
scope and scale of China's engagement at such
bodies compared to engagement by the United
States or its allies and partners and the
security risks raised by Chinese proposals in
such standards-setting bodies; and
(iv) engagement with private sector
communications and information service
providers, equipment developers, academia,
Federally funded research and development
centers, and other private-sector stakeholders
to propose and develop secure standards for
equipment, systems, software, and virtually
defined networks that support 5th and future
generation mobile telecommunications systems
and infrastructure.
(B) Subsequent briefings.--Upon receiving a request
from the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives, or as determined appropriate by the
chair of the interagency working group established
pursuant to paragraph (1), the interagency working
group shall provide the requesting committee an updated
briefing that covers the matters described in clauses
(i) through (iv) of subparagraph (A).
SEC. 210. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CENTRALITY OF SANCTIONS AND OTHER
RESTRICTIONS TO STRATEGIC COMPETITION WITH CHINA.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Sanctions and other restrictions, when used as part of
a coordinated and comprehensive strategy, are a powerful tool
to advance United States foreign policy and national security
interests.
(2) Congress has authorized and mandated broad range of
sanctions and other restrictions to address malign behavior and
incentivize behavior change by individuals and entities in the
PRC.
(3) The sanctions and other restrictions authorized and
mandated by Congress address a range of malign PRC behavior,
including--
(A) intellectual property theft;
(B) cyber-related economic espionage;
(C) repression of ethnic minorities;
(D) other human rights abuses;
(E) abuses of the international trading system;
(F) illicit assistance to and trade with the
Government of North Korea; and
(G) drug trafficking, including trafficking in
fentanyl and other opioids;
(4) The sanctions and other restrictions described in this
section include the following:
(A) The Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public
Law 114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note).
(B) Section 1637 of the Carl Levin and Howard P.
``Buck'' McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2015 (50 U.S.C. 1708).
(C) The Fentanyl Sanctions Act (21 U.S.C. 2301 et
seq.).
(D) The Hong Kong Autonomy Act (Public Law 116-149;
22 U.S.C. 5701 note).
(E) Section 7 of the Hong Kong Human Rights and
Democracy Act of 2019 (Public Law 116-76; 22 U.S.C.
5701 note).
(F) Section 6 of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act
of 2020 (Public Law 116-145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note).
(G) The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50
U.S.C. 4801 et seq.).
(H) Export control measures required to be
maintained with respect to entities in the
telecommunications sector of the People's Republic of
China, including under section 1260I of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public
Law 116-92).
(I) Section 311 of the Countering America's
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2018 (Public Law
115-44; 131 Stat. 942).
(5) Full implementation of the authorities described in
paragraph (4) is required under the respective laws described
therein and pursuant to the Take Care Clause of the
Constitution (article II, section 3).
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the executive branch has not fully implemented the
sanctions and other restrictions described in subsection (a)(4)
despite the statutory and constitutional requirements to do so;
and
(2) the President's full implementation and execution of
the those authorities is a necessary and essential component to
the success of the United States in the strategic competition
with China.
SEC. 211. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH G7 COUNTRIES ON THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) In General.--It is the sense of Congress that the President,
acting through the Secretary of State, should initiate an agenda with
G7 countries on matters relevant to economic and democratic freedoms,
including the following:
(1) Trade and investment issues and enforcement.
(2) Building support for international infrastructure
standards, including those agreed to at the G20 summit in Osaka
in 2018.
(3) The erosion of democracy and human rights.
(4) The security of 5G telecommunications.
(5) Anti-competitive behavior, such as intellectual
property theft, massive subsidization of companies, and other
policies and practices.
(6) Predatory international sovereign lending that is
inconsistent with OECD and Paris Club principles.
(7) International influence campaigns.
(8) Environmental standards.
(9) Coordination with like-minded regional partners that
are not in the G7.
SEC. 212. ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES-TAIWAN PARTNERSHIP.
It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the United
States Indo-Pacific strategy;
(2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its democracy as
key elements for the continued peace and stability of the
greater Indo-Pacific region, and a vital national security
interest of the United States;
(3) to reinforce its commitments to Taiwan under the Taiwan
Relations Act (Public Law 96-8) and the ``Six Assurances'' and
in accordance with the United States ``One China'' policy;
(4) to support Taiwan's implementation of its asymmetric
defense strategy, including the priorities identified in
Taiwan's Overall Defense Concept;
(5) to urge Taiwan to increase its defense spending in
order to fully resource its defense strategy;
(6) to conduct regular transfers of defense articles to
Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan's self-defense capabilities,
particularly its efforts to develop and integrate asymmetric
capabilities, including anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor,
air defense, undersea warfare, advanced command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance, and resilient command and control capabilities,
into its military forces;
(7) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan's meaningful
participation in the United Nations, the World Health Assembly,
the International Civil Aviation Organization, the
International Criminal Police Organization, and other
international bodies as appropriate; and
(8) to promote meaningful cooperation among the United
States, Taiwan, and other like-minded partners.
SEC. 213. TREATMENT OF TAIWAN GOVERNMENT.
(a) In General.--The Department of State and other United States
Government agencies shall engage with the democratically elected
government of Taiwan on the same basis, and using the same nomenclature
and protocol, as the United States Government engages with other
foreign governments. Notwithstanding the continued supporting role of
the American Institute in Taiwan in carrying out United States foreign
policy and protecting United States interests in Taiwan, the United
States Government shall not place any restrictions on the ability of
officials of the Department of State and other United States Government
agencies to interact directly and routinely with counterparts in the
Taiwan government.
(b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this paragraph shall be
construed as entailing restoration of diplomatic relations with the
Republic of China (Taiwan) or altering the United States Government's
position on Taiwan's international status.
SEC. 214. REPORT ON ORIGINS OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) it is critical to understand the origins of the COVID-
19 pandemic so the United States can better prepare, prevent,
and respond to pandemic health threats in the future;
(2) given the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on all
Americans, the American people deserve to know what information
the United States Government possesses about the origins of
COVID-19, as appropriate;
(3) Congress shares the concerns expressed by the United
States Government and 13 other foreign governments that the
international team of experts dispatched to the People's
Republic of China by the World Health Organization (WHO) to
study the origins of the SARS-CoV-2 virus was ``significantly
delayed and lacked access to complete, original data and
samples'';
(4) the March 30, 2021, statement by the Director-General
of the WHO, Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, further affirms
that the investigative team had encountered ``difficulties'' in
accessing necessary raw data, that ``we have not yet found the
source of the virus,'' and that ``all hypotheses remain on the
table''; and
(5) it is critical for independent experts to have full
access to all pertinent human, animal, and environmental data,
live virus samples, research, and personnel involved in the
early stages of the outbreak relevant to determining how this
pandemic emerged.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the
Secretary of Energy, and other relevant executive departments, shall
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report consisting
of--
(1) an assessment of the most likely source or origin of
the SARS-CoV-2 virus, including a detailed review of all
information the United States possesses that it has identified
as potentially relevant to the source or origin of the SARS-
CoV-2 virus, including zoonotic transmission and spillover, the
Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), or other sources of origin,
transmission, or spillover, based on the information the United
States Government has to date;
(2) an identification of the leading credible theories of
the etiology of the SARS-CoV-2 virus by the United States
Government, the steps the United States has taken to validate
those theories, and any variance in assessment or dissent among
or between United States intelligence agencies, executive
agencies, and executive offices of the most likely source or
origin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, and the basis for such variance
or dissent;
(3) a description of all steps the United States Government
has taken to identify and investigate the source of the SARS-
CoV-2 virus, including a timeline of such efforts;
(4) a detailed description of the data to which the United
States and the WHO have requested and have access to in order
to determine the origin of the source of the SARS-CoV-2 virus;
(5) an account of efforts by the PRC to cooperate with,
impede, or obstruct any inquiry or investigation to determine
the source and transmission of SARS-CoV-2 virus, including into
a possible lab leak, or to create or spread misinformation or
disinformation regarding the source and transmission of SARS-
CoV-2 virus by the PRC or CCP, including by national and local
governmental and health entities;
(6) a detailed account of information known to the United
States Government regarding the WIV and associated facilities,
including research activities on coronaviruses and gain-of-
function research, any reported illnesses of persons associated
with the laboratory with symptoms consistent with COVID-19 and
the ultimate diagnosis, and a timeline of research relevant to
coronaviruses;
(7) a list of any known obligations on the PRC that require
disclosure and cooperation in the event of a viral outbreak
like SARS-CoV-2; and
(8) an overview of United States engagement with the PRC
with respect to coronaviruses that includes--
(A) a detailed accounting of United States
engagement with the WIV and similar labs in the PRC
specific to coronaviruses, including a detailed
accounting United States Government-sponsored research
and funding and diplomatic engagements such as ``track
1.5'' and ``track 2'' engagements; and
(B) an assessment of any additional scrutiny of
United States Government funding to support gain-of-
function research in the PRC after the moratorium on
such funding was lifted in 2017, and whether United
States Government funding was used to support gain-of-
function research in China, during the moratorium on
gain-of-function research (2014-2017).
(c) Form.--The report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted
in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.
(d) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
of the Senate;
(4) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives;
(6) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives;
(7) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of
Representatives; and
(8) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives.
SEC. 215. ENHANCEMENT OF DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT AND ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT
WITH PACIFIC ISLAND COUNTRIES.
(a) Authority.--The Secretary of State and Secretary of Commerce
are authorized to hire Locally Employed Staff in Pacific island
countries for the purpose of providing increased diplomatic support and
promoting increased economic and commercial engagement between the
United States and Pacific Island countries.
(b) Availability of Funds.--
(1) In general.--Of the amounts authorized to be
appropriated to the Department of State and the Department of
Commerce for fiscal year 2022, not more than $10,000,000 ,
respectively, shall be available to carry out the purposes of
this section.
(2) Termination.--The availability of funds in paragraph
(1) shall expire on December 31, 2026.
(c) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State
and the Secretary of Commerce shall provide to the appropriate
committees of Congress a report on the activities of the Department of
State and Department of Commerce Locally Employed Staff in Pacific
island countries, which shall include--
(1) a detailed description of the additional diplomatic,
economic, and commercial engagement and activities in the
Pacific island countries provided by Locally Employed Staff;
and
(2) an assessment of the impact of the activities with
respect to the diplomatic, economic, and security interests of
the United States.
(d) Exception for American Samoa.--The Secretary of State may, as
appropriate, treat the territory of American Samoa as a foreign country
for purposes of carrying out this section.
(e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources, and the Committee on Appropriations of
the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Natural Resources, and
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
SEC. 216. INCREASING DEPARTMENT OF STATE PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES
DEVOTED TO THE INDO-PACIFIC.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) In fiscal year 2020, the Department of State allocated
$1,500,000,000 to the Indo-Pacific region in bilateral and
regional foreign assistance (FA) resources and $798,000,000 in
the fiscal year 2020 diplomatic engagement (DE) budget. These
amounts represent only 5 percent of the DE budget and only 4
percent of the total Department of State-USAID budget.
(2) Over the last 5 years the DE budget and personnel
levels in the Indo-Pacific averaged only 5 percent of the
total, while FA resources averaged only 4 percent of the total.
(3) In 2020, the Department of State began a process to
realign certain positions at posts to ensure that its personnel
footprint matches the demands of great-power competition,
including in the Indo-Pacific.
(b) Statement of Policy.--
(1) It shall be the policy of the United States to ensure
Department of State funding levels and personnel footprint in
the Indo-Pacific reflect the region's high degree of importance
and significance to United States political, economic, and
security interests.
(2) It shall be the policy of the United States to increase
DE and FA funding and the quantity of personnel dedicated to
the Indo-Pacific region respective to the Department of State's
total budget.
(3) It shall be the policy of the United States to increase
the number of Defense attaches in the Indo-Pacific region
number of to assure coverage of all appropriate Posts.
(c) Action Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide to the
appropriate committees of Congress an action plan with the following
elements:
(1) Identification of requirements and the personnel
budgetary resources needed to meet them, assuming an
unconstrained resource environment.
(2) A plan to increase the portion of the Department's
budget dedicated to the Indo-Pacific in terms of DE and FA
focused on development, economic, and security assistance.
(3) A plan to increase the number of positions at posts in
the Indo-Pacific region and bureaus with responsibility for the
Indo-Pacific region, including a description of increases at
each post or bureau, a breakdown of increases by cone, and a
description of what each new officer will do to advance United
States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.
(4) Defined concrete and annual benchmarks that the
Department will meet in implementing the action plan.
(5) A description of any barriers to implementing the
action plan.
(d) Updates to Report and Briefing.--Every 90 days after the
submission of the action plan described in subsection (c), the
Secretary shall submit an update and brief the appropriate committees
of Congress on the implementation of such action plan, with supporting
data and including a detailed assessment of benchmarks reached.
(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $2,000,000,000 in bilateral and regional foreign
assistance resources to the Indo-Pacific region and $1,250,000,000 in
diplomatic engagement resources to the Indo-Pacific region.
(f) Secretary of State Certification.--Not later than two years
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
shall certify whether or not the benchmarks described in the action
plan in subsection (c) have been met. This certification is non-
delegable.
(g) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 217. ADVANCING UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS
SYSTEM.
(a) Establishment.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall establish,
within the Bureau of International Organization Affairs of the
Department of State, a Special Representative for Advancing
United States Leadership in the United Nations (referred to in
this section as the ``Special Representative''). The Special
Representative shall serve concurrently as a Deputy Assistant
Secretary in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs
of the Department of State. The Special Representative shall
report directly to the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of
International Organization Affairs, in coordination and
consultation with the Representative of the United States to
the United Nations.
(b) Responsibilities.--The Special Representative shall assume
responsibility for--
(1) promoting United States leadership and participation in
the United Nations system, with a focus on issue areas where
authoritarian nations are exercising increased influence in and
determining the agenda of the United Nations system;
(2) highlighting how investments in the United Nations
advance United States interests and enable stronger coalitions
to hold authoritarian regimes to account;
(3) ensuring United States emphasis on the need for United
Nations employees to uphold the principals of impartiality
enshrined in the United Nations charter, rules, and
regulations;
(4) monitoring and developing and implementing plans to
counter undue influence, especially by authoritarian nations,
within the United Nations system;
(5) assessing how United States decisions to withdraw from
United Nations bodies impacts United States influence at the
United Nations and multilateral global initiatives;
(6) promoting participation and inclusion of Taiwan in the
United Nations system;
(7) monitoring the pipeline of United Nations jobs and
identifying qualified Americans and other qualified nationals
to promote for these positions;
(8) tracking leadership changes in United Nations
secretariat, funds, programs and agencies, and developing
strategies to ensure that coalitions of like-minded states are
assembled to ensure leadership races are not won by countries
that do not share United States interests; and
(9) advancing other priorities deemed relevant by the
Secretary of State to ensuring the integrity of the United
Nations system.
(c) Support.--The Secretary of State shall make any necessary
adjustments to the current structure of the Bureau of International
Organization Affairs, including the respective roles and
responsibilities of offices in that Bureau, to ensure appropriate
support for the mission and work of the Special Representative.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated not less than $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 and for each
subsequent fiscal year to carry out the responsibilities under
subsection (b).
Subtitle B--International Security Matters
SEC. 221. DEFINITIONS.
In this subtitle:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Select
Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) Company.--The term ``company'' means any corporation,
company, limited liability company, limited partnership,
business trust, business association, or other similar entity.
(3) Other security forces.--The term ``other security
forces''--
(A) includes national security forces that conduct
maritime security; and
(B) does not include self-described militias or
paramilitary organizations.
SEC. 222. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The People's Republic of China aims to use its growing
military might in concert with other instruments of its
national power to displace the United States in the Indo-
Pacific and establish hegemony over the region.
(2) The military balance of power in the Indo-Pacific
region is growing increasingly unfavorable to the United States
because--
(A) the PRC is rapidly modernizing and expanding
the capabilities of the PLA to project power and create
contested areas across the entire Indo-Pacific region;
(B) PLA modernization has largely focused on areas
where it possesses operational advantages and can
exploit weaknesses in the United States suite of
capabilities; and
(C) current United States force structure and
presence do not sufficiently counter threats in the
Indo-Pacific, as United States allies, bases, and
forces at sea in the Indo-Pacific region are
concentrated in large bases that are highly vulnerable
to the PRC's strike capabilities.
(3) This shift in the regional military balance and erosion
of conventional deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region--
(A) presents a substantial and imminent risk to the
security of the United States; and
(B) left unchecked, could embolden the PRC to take
actions, including the use of military force, to change
the status quo before the United States can mount an
effective response.
(4) The PRC sees an opportunity to diminish confidence
among United States allies and partners in the strength of
United States commitments, even to the extent that these
nations feel compelled to bandwagon with the PRC to protect
their interests. The PRC is closely monitoring the United
States reaction to PRC pressure and coercion of United States
allies, searching for indicators of United States resolve.
(5) Achieving so-called ``reunification'' of Taiwan to
mainland China is a key step for the PRC to achieve its
regional hegemonic ambitions. The PRC has increased the
frequency and scope of its exercises and operations targeting
Taiwan, such as amphibious assault and live-fire exercises in
the Taiwan Strait, PLA Air Force flights that encircle Taiwan,
and flights across the unofficial median line in the Taiwan
Strait. The Government of the PRC's full submission of Hong
Kong potentially accelerates the timeline of a Taiwan scenario,
and makes the defense of Taiwan an even more urgent priority.
(6) The defense of Taiwan is critical to--
(A) defending the people of Taiwan;
(B) limiting the PLA's ability to project power
beyond the First Island Chain, including to United
States territory, such as Guam and Hawaii;
(C) defending the territorial integrity of Japan;
(D) preventing the PLA from diverting military
planning, resources, and personnel to broader military
ambitions; and
(E) retaining the United States credibility as a
defender of the democratic values and free-market
principles embodied by Taiwan's people and government;
(7) The PRC capitalized on the world's attention to COVID-
19 to advance its military objectives in the South China Sea,
intensifying and accelerating trends already underway. The PRC
has sent militarized survey vessels into the Malaysian
Exclusive Economic Zone, announced the establishment of an
administrative district in the Spratly and Paracel Islands
under the Chinese local government of Sansha, aimed a fire
control radar at a Philippine navy ship, encroached on
Indonesia's fishing grounds, sunk a Vietnamese fishing boat,
announced new ``research stations'' on Fiery Cross Reef and
Subi Reef, landed special military aircraft on Fiery Cross Reef
to routinize such deployments, and sent a flotilla of over 200
militia vessels to Whitsun Reef, a feature within the exclusive
economic zone of the Philippines.
(8) On July 13, 2020, the Department of State clarified
United States policy on the South China Sea and stated that
``Beijing's claims to offshore resources across most of the
South China Sea are completely unlawful''.
(9) These actions in the South China Sea enable the PLA to
exert influence and project power deeper into Oceania and the
Indian Ocean. As Admiral Phil Davidson, Commander of Indo-
Pacific Command, testified in 2019, ``In short, China is now
capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios
short of war with the United States.''.
(10) The PLA also continues to advance its claims in the
East China Sea, including through a high number of surface
combatant patrols and frequent entry into the territorial
waters of the Senkaku Islands, over which the United States
recognizes Japan's administrative control. In April 2014,
President Barack Obama stated, ``Our commitment to Japan's
security is absolute and article five [of the U.S.-Japan
security treaty] covers all territory under Japan's
administration, including the Senkaku islands.''.
(11) On March 1, 2019, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo
stated, ``As the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any
armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels
in the South China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations
under Article 4 of our Mutual Defense Treaty.''.
(12) The PLA is modernizing and gaining critical capability
in every branch and every domain, including--
(A) positioning the PLA Navy to become a great
maritime power or ``blue-water'' navy that can
completely control all activity within the First Island
Chain and project power beyond it with a fleet of 425
battle force ships by 2030;
(B) increasing the size and range of its strike
capabilities, including approximately 1,900 ground-
launched short- and intermediate-range missiles capable
of targeting United States allies and partners in the
First and Second Island chains, United States bases in
the Indo-Pacific, and United States forces at sea;
(C) boosting capabilities for air warfare,
including with Russian-origin Su-35 fighters and S-400
air defense systems, new J-20 5th generation stealth
fighters, advanced H-6 bomber variants, a long-range
stealth bomber, and Y-20 heavy lift aircraft; and
(D) making critical investments in new domains of
warfare, such as cyber warfare, electronic warfare, and
space warfare.
(13) The PRC is pursuing this modernization through all
means at its disposal, including its Military-Civil Fusion
initiative, which enlists the whole of PRC society in
developing and acquiring technology with military applications
to pursue technological advantage over the United States in
artificial intelligence, hypersonic glide vehicles, directed
energy weapons, electromagnetic railguns, counter-space
weapons, and other emerging capabilities.
(14) The United States lead in the development of science
and technology relevant to defense is eroding in the face of
competition from the PRC. United States research and
development spending on defense capabilities has declined
sharply as a share of global research and development. The
commercial sector's leading role in innovation presents certain
unique challenges to the Department of Defense's reliance on
technology for battlefield advantage.
(15) The PRC has vastly increased domestic research and
development expenditures, supported the growth of new cutting-
edge industries and tapped into a large workforce to invest in
fostering science and engineering talent.
(16) The PRC is increasing exports of defense and security
capabilities to build its defense technology and industrial
base and improve its own military capabilities, as well as its
influence with countries that purchase and become dependent on
its military systems.
SEC. 223. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING BOLSTERING SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS
IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.
It is the Sense of Congress that steps to bolster United States
security partnership in the Indo-Pacific must include--
(1) supporting Japan in its development of long-range
precision fires, munitions, air and missile defense capacity,
interoperability across all domains, maritime security, and
intelligence, and surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities;
(2) launching a United States-Japan national security
innovation fund to solicit and support private sector
cooperation for new technologies that could benefit the United
States and Japan's mutual security objectives;
(3) promoting a deeper defense relationship between Japan
and Australia, including supporting reciprocal access
agreements and trilateral United States-Japan-Australia
intelligence sharing;
(4) encouraging and facilitating Taiwan's accelerated
acquisition of asymmetric defense capabilities, which are
crucial to defending the islands of Taiwan from invasion,
including long-range precision fires, munitions, anti-ship
missiles, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, undersea
warfare, advanced command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), and
resilient command and control capabilities, and increasing the
conduct of relevant and practical training and exercises with
Taiwan's defense forces; and
(5) prioritizing building the capacity of United States
allies and partners to protect defense technology.
SEC. 224. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It shall be the policy of the United States to--
(1) prioritize the Indo-Pacific region in United States
foreign policy, and prioritize resources for achieving United
States political and military objectives in the region;
(2) exercise freedom of operations in the international
waters and airspace in the Indo-Pacific maritime domains, which
are critical to the prosperity, stability, and security of the
Indo-Pacific region;
(3) maintain forward-deployed forces in the Indo-Pacific
region, including a rotational bomber presence, integrated
missile defense capabilities, long-range precision fires,
undersea warfare capabilities, and diversified and resilient
basing and rotational presence, including support for pre-
positioning strategies;
(4) strengthen and deepen the alliances and partnerships of
the United States to build capacity and capabilities, increase
multilateral partnerships, modernize communications
architecture, address anti-access and area denial challenges,
and increase joint exercises and security cooperation efforts;
(5) reaffirm the commitment and support of the United
States for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region,
including longstanding United States policy regarding--
(A) Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
and Security between the United States and Japan,
signed at Washington January 19, 1960;
(B) Article III of the Mutual Defense Treaty
between the United States and the Republic of Korea,
signed at Washington October 1, 1953;
(C) Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty between
the United States and the Republic of the Philippines,
signed at Washington August 30, 1951, including that,
as the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any
armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft or public
vessels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual
defense obligations under Article IV of our mutual
defense treaty;
(D) Article IV of the Australia, New Zealand,
United States Security Treaty, done at San Francisco
September 1, 1951; and
(E) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty,
done at Manila September 8, 1954, together with the
Thanat-Rusk Communique of 1962; and
(6) collaborate with United States treaty allies in the
Indo-Pacific to foster greater multilateral security and
defense cooperation with other regional partners;
(7) ensure the continuity of operations by the United
States Armed Forces in the Indo-Pacific region, including, as
appropriate, in cooperation with partners and allies, in order
to reaffirm the principle of freedom of operations in
international waters and airspace in accordance with
established principles and practices of international law;
(8) sustain the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22
U.S.C. 3301 et seq.);
(9) sustain the``Six Assurances'' provided by the United
States to Taiwan in July 1982 as the foundations for United
States-Taiwan relations, and to deepen, to the fullest extent
possible, the extensive, close, and friendly relations of the
United States and Taiwan, including cooperation to support the
development of capable, ready, and modern forces necessary for
the defense of Taiwan;
(10) enhance security partnerships with India, across
Southeast Asia, and with other nations of the Indo-Pacific;
(11) deter acts of aggression or coercion by the PRC
against United States and allies' interests, especially along
the First Island Chain and in the Western Pacific, by showing
PRC leaders that the United States can and is willing to deny
them the ability to achieve their objectives, including by--
(A) consistently demonstrating the political will
of the United States to deepening existing treaty
alliances and growing new partnerships as a durable,
asymmetric, and unmatched strategic advantage to the
PRC's growing military capabilities and reach;
(B) maintaining a system of forward-deployed bases
in the Indo-Pacific region as the most visible sign of
United States resolve and commitment to the region, and
as platforms to ensure United States operational
readiness and advance interoperability with allies and
partners;
(C) adopting a more dispersed force posture
throughout the region, particularly the Western
Pacific, and pursuing maximum access for United States
mobile and relocatable launchers for long-range cruise,
ballistic, and hypersonic weapons throughout the Indo-
Pacific region;
(D) fielding long-range, precision-strike networks
to United States and allied forces, including ground-
launched cruise missiles, undersea and naval
capabilities, and integrated air and missile defense in
the First Island Chain and the Second Island Chain, in
order to deter and prevent PRC coercion and aggression,
and to maximize the United States ability to operate;
(E) strengthening extended deterrence to ensure
that escalation against key United States interests
would be costly, risky, and self-defeating; and
(F) collaborating with allies and partners to
accelerate their roles in more equitably sharing the
burdens of mutual defense, including through the
acquisition and fielding of advanced capabilities and
training that will better enable them to repel PRC
aggression or coercion; and
(12) maintain the capacity of the United States to impose
prohibitive diplomatic, economic, financial, reputational, and
military costs on the PRC for acts of coercion or aggression,
including to defend itself and its allies regardless of the
point of origin of attacks against them.
SEC. 225. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING IN THE INDO-PACIFIC AND
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA
MARITIME SECURITY PROGRAMS AND DIPLOMATIC OUTREACH
ACTIVITIES.
(a) Foreign Military Financing Funding.--In addition to any amount
appropriated pursuant to section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22
U.S.C. 2763) (relating to foreign military financing assistance), there
is authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 2022 through
fiscal year 2026 for activities in the Indo-Pacific region in
accordance with this section--
(1) $110,000,000 for fiscal year 2022;
(2) $125,000,000 for fiscal year 2023;
(3) $130,000,000 for fiscal year 2024;
(4) $140,000,000 for fiscal year 2025; and
(5) $150,000,000 for fiscal year 2026.
(b) Southeast Maritime Law Enforcement Initiative.--There is
authorized to be appropriated $10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022
through 2026 for the Department of State for International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) for the support of the Southeast
Asia Maritime Law Enforcement Initiative.
(c) Diplomatic Outreach Activities.--There is authorized to be
appropriated to the Department of State, $1,000,000 for each of fiscal
years 2022 through 2026, which shall be used--
(1) to conduct, in coordination with the Department of
Defense, outreach activities, including conferences and
symposia, to familiarize partner countries, particularly in the
Indo-Pacific region, with the United States interpretation of
international law relating to freedom of the seas; and
(2) to work with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific
region to better align respective interpretations of
international law relating to freedom of the seas, including on
the matters of operations by military ships in exclusive
economic zones, innocent passage through territorial seas, and
transits through international straits.
(d) Program Authorization and Purpose.--Using amounts appropriate
pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary of State, in coordination
with the Secretary of Defense, is authorized to provide assistance, for
the purpose of increasing maritime security and domain awareness for
countries in the Indo-Pacific region--
(1) to provide assistance to national military or other
security forces of such countries that have maritime security
missions among their functional responsibilities;
(2) to provide training to ministry, agency, and
headquarters level organizations for such forces; and
(3) to provide assistance to and training to other relevant
foreign affairs, maritime, or security-related ministries,
agencies, departments, or offices that manage and oversee
maritime activities and policy that the Secretary of State may
so designate.
(e) Designation of Assistance.--Assistance provided by the
Secretary of State under this section shall be known as the ``Indo-
Pacific Maritime Security Initiative'' (in this section referred to as
the ``Initiative'').
(f) Program Objectives.--Assistance provided through the Initiative
may be used to accomplish the following objectives:
(1) Retaining unhindered access to and use of international
waterways in the Indo-Pacific region that are critical to
ensuring the security and free flow of commerce and achieving
United States national security objectives.
(2) Improving maritime domain awareness in the Indo-Pacific
region.
(3) Countering piracy in the Indo-Pacific region.
(4) Disrupting illicit maritime trafficking activities and
other forms of maritime trafficking activity in the Indo-
Pacific that directly benefit organizations that have been
determined to be a security threat to the United States.
(5) Enhancing the maritime capabilities of a country or
regional organization to respond to emerging threats to
maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region.
(6) Strengthening United States alliances and partnerships
in Southeast Asia and other parts of the Indo-Pacific region.
(g) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount appropriated pursuant to
subsection(a) and section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22
U.S.C. 2763) (relating to foreign military financing
assistance), there is authorized to be appropriated to the
Department of State for the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security
Initiative and other related regional programs exactly--
(A) $70,000,000 for fiscal year 2022;
(B) $80,000,000 for fiscal year 2023;
(C) $90,000,000 for fiscal year 2024;
(D) $100,000,000 for fiscal year 2025; and
(E) $110,000,000 for fiscal year 2026.
(2) Rule of construction.--The ``Indo-Pacific Maritime
Security Initiative'' and funds authorized for the Initiative
shall include existing regional programs related to maritime
security, including the Southeast Asia Maritime Security
Initiative.
(h) Eligibility and Priorities for Assistance.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall use the
following considerations when selecting which countries in the
Indo-Pacific region should receive assistance pursuant to the
Initiative:
(A) Assistance may be provided to a country in the
Indo-Pacific region to enhance the capabilities of that
country according to the objectives outlined in (f), or
of a regional organization that includes that country,
to conduct--
(i) maritime intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance;
(ii) littoral and port security;
(iii) Coast Guard operations;
(iv) command and control; and
(v) management and oversight of maritime
activities.
(B) Priority shall be placed on assistance to
enhance the maritime security capabilities of the
military or security forces of countries in the Indo-
Pacific region that have maritime missions and the
government agencies responsible for such forces.
(2) Types of assistance and training.--
(A) Authorized elements of assistance.--Assistance
provided under paragraph (1)(A) may include the
provision of equipment, training, and small-scale
military construction.
(B) Required elements of assistance and training.--
Assistance and training provided under subparagraph (A)
shall include elements that promote--
(i) the observance of and respect for human
rights; and
(ii) respect for legitimate civilian
authority within the country to which the
assistance is provided.
(i) Joint Task Force.--The Department of Defense shall establish a
joint, interagency task force to assess, respond to, and coordinate
with allies and partners in response to the use of grey zone tactics by
state and non-state actors in the Indo-Pacific maritime domain,
including--
(1) conducting domain awareness operations, intelligence
fusion, and multi-sensor correlation to detect, monitor, and
hand off suspected grey zone activities;
(2) promoting security, cooperation, and capacity building;
and
(3) coordinating country team and partner nation
initiatives in order to counter the use of grey zone tactics by
adversaries.
(j) Annual Report.--The Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Defense shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress
each year a report on the status of the provision of equipment,
training, supplies, or other services provided pursuant to the
Initiative during the preceding 12 months.
(k) Notice to Congress on Assistance and Training.--Not later than
15 days before exercising the authority under subsection (a) with
respect to a recipient foreign country, the Secretary of State shall
submit a notification in writing to the appropriate committees of
Congress.
SEC. 226. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING COMPACT PILOT PROGRAM IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $20,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 and 2023 for the
creation of a pilot program for foreign military financing compacts.
(b) Assistance.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State is authorized to
create a pilot program, for a duration of two years, with an
assessment for any additional or permanent programming, to
provide assistance under this section for each country that
enters into an FMF Challenge Compact with the United States
pursuant to subsection (d) to support policies and programs
that advance the progress of the country in achieving lasting
security and civilian-military governance through respect for
human rights, good governance (including transparency and free
and fair elections), and cooperation with United States and
international counter-terrorism, anti-trafficking, and counter-
crime efforts and programs.
(2) Form of assistance.--Assistance under this subsection
may be provided in the form of grants, cooperative agreements,
contracts, or no-interest loans to the government of an
eligible country described in subsection (c).
(c) Eligible Countries.--
(1) In general.--A country shall be a candidate country for
purposes of eligibility for assistance for fiscal year 2022 and
2023 if--
(A) the country is classified as a lower middle
income country in the then most recent edition of the
World Development Report for Reconstruction and
Development published by the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development and has an income
greater than the historical ceiling for International
Development Association eligibility for the fiscal year
involved; and
(B) the Secretary of State determines that the
country is committed to seeking just and democratic
governance, including with a demonstrated commitment
to--
(i) the promotion of political pluralism,
equality, and the rule of law;
(ii) respect for human and civil rights;
(iii) protection of private property
rights;
(iv) transparency and accountability of
government;
(v) anti-corruption; and
(vi) the institution of effective civilian
control, professionalization, respect for human
rights by, and accountability of the armed
forces.
(2) Identification of eligible countries.--Not later than
90 days prior to the date on which the Secretary of State
determines eligible countries for an FMF Challenge Compact, the
Secretary--
(A) shall prepare and submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report that contains a list
of all eligible countries identified that have met the
requirements under paragraph (1) for the fiscal year;
and
(B) shall consult with the appropriate
congressional committees on the extent to which such
countries meet the criteria described in paragraph (1).
(d) FMF Challenge Compact.--
(1) Compact.--The Secretary of State may provide assistance
for an eligible country only if the country enters into an
agreement with the United States, to be known as an ``FMF
Challenge Compact'' (in this subsection referred to as
a``Compact'') that establishes a multi-year plan for achieving
shared security objectives in furtherance of the purposes of
this title.
(2) Elements.--The elements of the Compact shall be those
listed in subsection (c)(1)(B) for determining eligibility, and
be designed to significantly advance the performance of those
commitments during the period of the Compact.
(3) In general.--The Compact should take into account the
national strategy of the eligible country and shall include--
(A) the specific objectives that the country and
the United States expect to achieve during the term of
the Compact, including both how the foreign military
financing under the Compact will advance shared
security interests and advance partner capacity
building efforts as well as to advance national efforts
towards just and democratic governance;
(B) the responsibilities of the country and the
United States in the achievement of such objectives;
(C) regular benchmarks to measure, where
appropriate, progress toward achieving such objectives;
and
(D) the strategy of the eligible country to sustain
progress made toward achieving such objectives after
expiration of the Compact.
(e) Congressional Consultation Prior to Compact Negotiations.--Not
later than 15 days before commencing negotiations of a Compact with an
eligible country, the Secretary of State shall consult with the
appropriate congressional committees with respect to the proposed
Compact negotiation and shall identify the objectives and mechanisms to
be used for the negotiation of the Compact.
(f) Assessment of Pilot Program and Recommendations.--Not later
than 90 days after the conclusion of the pilot program, the Secretary
of State shall provide a report to the appropriate congressional
committees with respect to the pilot program, including an assessment
of the success and utility of the pilot program established under this
subsection in meeting United States objectives and a recommendation
with respect to whether to continue on a pilot or permanent basis a
further foreign military financing compact program.
SEC. 227. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND
TRAINING IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.
There is authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years
2022 through fiscal year 2026 for the Department of State, out of
amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for assistance under
chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2347 et seq.) (relating to international military education and
training (IMET) assistance), $45,000,000 for activities in the Indo-
Pacific region in accordance with this Act.
SEC. 228. PRIORITIZING EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLE TRANSFERS FOR THE INDO-
PACIFIC.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States Government should prioritize the review of excess defense
article transfers to Indo-Pacific partners.
(b) Five-Year Plan.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall develop a five-year plan to
prioritize excess defense article transfers to the Indo-Pacific and
provide a report describing such plan to the appropriate congressional
committees.
(c) Transfer Authority.--Section 516(c)(2) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)) is amended by inserting
``, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia'' after ``and to the
Philippines''.
(d) Required Coordination.--The United States Government shall
coordinate and align excess defense article transfers with capacity
building efforts of regional allies and partners.
SEC. 229. PRIORITIZING EXCESS NAVAL VESSEL TRANSFERS FOR THE INDO-
PACIFIC.
(a) Authority.--The President is authorized to transfer to a
government of a country listed pursuant to the amendment made under
section 228(c) two OLIVER HAZARD PERRY class guided missile frigates on
a grant basis under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(22 U.S.C. 2321j).
(b) Grants Not Counted in Annual Total of Transferred Excess
Defense Articles.--The value of a vessel transferred to another country
on a grant basis pursuant to authority provided by this section shall
not be counted against the aggregate value of excess defense articles
transferred in any fiscal year under section 516 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j).
(c) Costs of Transfers.--Any expense incurred by the United States
in connection with a transfer authorized by this section shall be
charged to the recipient notwithstanding section 516(e) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(e)).
(d) Repair and Refurbishment in United States Shipyards.--To the
maximum extent practicable, the President shall require, as a condition
of the transfer of a vessel under this subsection, that the recipient
to which the vessel is transferred have such repair or refurbishment of
the vessel as is needed, before the vessel joins the naval forces of
that recipient, performed at a shipyard located in the United States.
(e) Expiration of Authority.--The authority to transfer a vessel
under this section shall expire at the end of the 3-year period
beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 230. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON MARITIME FREEDOM OF OPERATIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS AND AIRSPACE OF THE INDO-PACIFIC
AND ON ARTIFICIAL LAND FEATURES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA.
(a) Sense of Congress.--Congress--
(1) condemns coercive and threatening actions or the use of
force to impede freedom of operations in international airspace
by military or civilian aircraft, to alter the status quo, or
to destabilize the Indo-Pacific region;
(2) urges the Government of China to refrain from
implementing the declared East China Sea Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in the South China Sea,
which is contrary to freedom of overflight in international
airspace, and to refrain from taking similar provocative
actions elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific region;
(3) reaffirms that the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal's decision is
final and legally binding on both parties and that the People's
Republic of China's claims to offshore resources across most of
the South China Sea are unlawful; and
(4) condemns the People's Republic of China for failing to
abide by the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal's ruling, despite Chinese
obligations as a state party to the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United
States to--
(1) reaffirm its commitment and support for allies and
partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including longstanding
United States policy regarding Article V of the United States-
Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty and reaffirm its position
that Article V of the United States-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty
applies to the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands;
(2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights, freedoms, and
lawful use of the sea, or the airspace above it, that belong to
all nations, and oppose the militarization of new and reclaimed
land features in the South China Sea;
(3) continue certain policies with respect to the PRC
claims in the South China Sea, namely--
(A) that PRC claims in the South China Sea,
including to offshore resources across most of the
South China Sea, are unlawful;
(B) that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a maritime
claim vis-a-vis the Philippines in areas that the
Tribunal found to be in the Philippines' Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) or on its continental shelf;
(C) to reject any PRC claim to waters beyond a 12
nautical mile territorial sea derived from islands its
claims in the Spratly Islands; and
(D) that the PRC has no lawful territorial or
maritime claim to James Shoal;
(4) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in
destabilizing activities, including illegal occupation or
efforts to unlawfully assert administration over disputed
claims;
(5) ensure that disputes are managed without intimidation,
coercion, or force;
(6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust claims in
accordance with international law;
(7) uphold the principle that territorial and maritime
claims, including territorial waters or territorial seas, must
be derived from land features and otherwise comport with
international law;
(8) oppose the imposition of new fishing regulations
covering disputed areas in the South China Sea, regulations
which have raised tensions in the region;
(9) support an effective Code of Conduct, if that Code of
Conduct reflects the interests of Southeast Asian claimant
states and does not serve as a vehicle for the People's
Republic of China to advance its unlawful maritime claims;
(10) reaffirm that an existing body of international rules
and guidelines, including the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972
(COLREGs), is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation
between the United States Armed Forces and the forces of other
countries, including the People's Republic of China;
(11) support the development of regional institutions and
bodies, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense
Minister's Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the expanded
ASEAN Maritime Forum, to build practical cooperation in the
region and reinforce the role of international law;
(12) encourage the deepening of partnerships with other
countries in the region for maritime domain awareness and
capacity building, as well as efforts by the United States
Government to explore the development of appropriate
multilateral mechanisms for a ``common operating picture'' in
the South China Sea among Southeast Asian countries that would
serve to help countries avoid destabilizing behavior and deter
risky and dangerous activities;
(13) oppose actions by any country to prevent any other
country from exercising its sovereign rights to the resources
of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf by
making claims to those areas in the South China Sea that have
no support in international law; and
(14) assure the continuity of operations by the United
States in the Indo-Pacific region, including, when appropriate,
in cooperation with partners and allies, to reaffirm the
principle of freedom of operations in international waters and
airspace in accordance with established principles and
practices of international law.
SEC. 231. REPORT ON CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT OF INDO-PACIFIC ALLIES AND
PARTNERS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Secretary of State should expand and strengthen
existing measures under the United States Conventional Arms
Transfer Policy to provide capabilities to allies and partners
consistent with agreed-on division of responsibility for
alliance roles, missions and capabilities, prioritizing allies
and partners in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with
United States strategic imperatives;
(2) the United States should design for export to Indo-
Pacific allies and partners capabilities critical to
maintaining a favorable military balance in the region,
including long-range precision fires, air and missile defense
systems, anti-ship cruise missiles, land attack cruise
missiles, conventional hypersonic systems, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, and command and
control systems;
(3) the United States should pursue, to the maximum extent
possible, anticipatory technology security and foreign
disclosure policy on the systems described in paragraph (2);
and
(4) the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Secretary of Defense, should--
(A) urge allies and partners to invest in
sufficient quantities of munitions to meet contingency
requirements and avoid the need for accessing United
States stocks in wartime; and
(B) cooperate with allies to deliver such
munitions, or when necessary, to increase allies'
capacity to produce such munitions.
(b) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives; and
(4) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives.
(c) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit a
report to the appropriate committees of Congress that describes
United States priorities for building more capable security
partners in the Indo-Pacific region.
(2) Matters to be included.--The report required under
paragraph (1) shall--
(A) provide a priority list of defense and military
capabilities that Indo-Pacific allies and partners must
possess for the United States to be able to achieve its
military objectives in the Indo-Pacific region;
(B) identify, from the list referred to in
subparagraph (A), the capabilities that are best
provided, or can only be provided, by the United
States;
(C) identify--
(i) actions required to prioritize United
States Government resources and personnel to
expedite fielding the capabilities identified
in subparagraph (B); and
(ii) steps needed to fully account for and
a plan to integrate all means of United States
foreign military sales, direct commercial
sales, security assistance, and all applicable
authorities of the Department of State and the
Department of Defense;
(D) assess the requirements for United States
security assistance, including International Military
Education and Training, in the Indo-Pacific region, as
a part of the means to deliver critical partner
capability requirements identified in subparagraph (B);
(E) assess the resources necessary to meet the
requirements for United States security assistance, and
identify resource gaps;
(F) assess the major obstacles to fulfilling
requirements for United States security assistance in
the Indo-Pacific region, including resources and
personnel limits, foreign legislative and policy
barriers, and factors related to specific partner
countries;
(G) identify limitations on the United States
ability to provide such capabilities, including those
identified under subparagraph (B), because of existing
United States treaty obligations, United States
policies, or other regulations;
(H) recommend improvements to the process for
developing requirements for partners capabilities; and
(I) identify required jointly agreed
recommendations for infrastructure and posture, based
on any ongoing mutual dialogues.
(3) Form.--The report required under this subsection shall
be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 232. REPORT ON NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL BASE.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) a more streamlined, shared, and coordinated approach,
which leverages economies of scale with major allies, is
necessary for the United States to retain its lead in defense
technology;
(2) allowing for the export, re-export, or transfer of
defense-related technologies and services to members of the
national technology and industrial base (as defined in section
2500 of title 10, United States Code) would advance United
States security interests by helping to leverage the defense-
related technologies and skilled workforces of trusted allies
to reduce the dependence on other countries, including
countries that pose challenges to United States interests
around the world, for defense-related innovation and
investment; and
(3) it is in the interest of the United States to continue
to increase cooperation with Australia, Canada, and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to protect
critical defense-related technology and services and leverage
the investments of like-minded, major ally nations in order to
maximize the strategic edge afforded by defense technology
innovation.
(b) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit
a report to the appropriate congressional committees that--
(A) describes the Department of State's efforts to
facilitate access among the national technology and
industrial base to defense articles and services
subject to the United States Munitions List under
section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22
U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)); and
(B) identifies foreign legal, regulatory, foreign
policy, or other challenges or considerations that
prevent or frustrate these efforts, to include any gaps
in the respective export control regimes implemented by
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
Australia, or Canada.
(2) Form.--This report required under paragraph (1) shall
be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 233. REPORT ON DIPLOMATIC OUTREACH WITH RESPECT TO CHINESE
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS OVERSEAS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Secretary of Defense, shall submit a report to the appropriate
congressional committees regarding United States diplomatic engagement
with other nations that host or are considering hosting any military
installation of the Government of the People's Republic of China.
(b) Matters To Be Included.--The report required under subsection
(a) shall include--
(1) a list of countries that currently host or are
considering hosting any military installation of the Government
of the People's Republic of China;
(2) a detailed description of United States diplomatic and
related efforts to countries that are considering hosting a
military installation of the Government of the People's
Republic of China, and the results of such efforts;
(3) an assessment on the adverse impact on United States
interests of the Government of the People's Republic of China
successfully establishing a military installation at any of the
locations it is currently considering;
(4) a description and list of any commercial ports outside
of the People's Republic of China that the United States
Government assesses could be used by the Government of the
People's Republic of China for military purposes, and any
diplomatic efforts with the governments of the countries where
such ports are located;
(5) the impact of the military installations of the
Government of the People's Republic of China on United States
interests; and
(6) lessons learned from the diplomatic experience of
addressing the PRC's first overseas base in Djibouti.
(c) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
be classified, but may include a unclassified summary.
SEC. 234. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING UNIVERSAL IMPLEMENTATION OF
UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA.
It is the policy of the United States to sustain maximum economic
pressure on the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(referred to in this section as the ``DPRK'') until the regime
undertakes complete, verifiable, and irreversible actions toward
denuclearization, including by--
(1) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to implement
and enforce existing United Nations sanctions with regard to
the DPRK;
(2) pressing all nations, including the PRC, and in
accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions, to
end the practice of hosting DPRK citizens as guest workers,
recognizing that such workers are demonstrated to constitute an
illicit source of revenue for the DPRK regime and its nuclear
ambitions;
(3) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to pursue
rigorous interdiction of shipments to and from the DPRK,
including ship-to-ship transfers, consistent with United
Nations Security Council resolutions;
(4) pressing the PRC and PRC entities--
(A) to cease business activities with United
Nations-designated entities and their affiliates in the
DPRK; and
(B) to expel from the PRC individuals who enable
the DPRK to acquire materials for its nuclear and
ballistic missile programs; and
(5) enforcing United Nations Security Council resolutions
with respect to the DPRK and United States sanctions, including
those pursuant to the North Korea Sanctions and Policy
Enhancement Act of 2016 (Public Law 114-122), the Countering
America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Public Law 115-
44), the Otto Warmbier North Korea Nuclear Sanctions and
Enforcement Act of 2019 (title LXXI of division F of Public Law
116-92), and relevant United States executive orders.
SEC. 235. LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES HOSTING CHINESE
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) although it casts the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as
a development initiative, the People's Republic of China is
also utilizing the BRI to advance its own security interests,
including to expand its power projection capabilities and
facilitate greater access for the People's Liberation Army
through overseas military installations; and
(2) the expansion of the People's Liberation Army globally
through overseas military installations will undermine the
medium- and long-term security of the United States and the
security and development of strategic partners in critical
regions around the world, which is at odds with United States
goals to promote peace, prosperity, and self-reliance among
partner nations, including through the Millennium Challenge
Corporation.
(b) Limitation on Assistance.--Except as provided in subsection
(c), for fiscal years 2022 through 2031, the government of a country
that is hosting on its territory a military installation of the
Government of the People's Republic of China or facilitates the
expansion of the presence of the People's Liberation Army for purposes
other than participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations or
for temporary humanitarian, medical, and disaster relief operations in
such country shall not be eligible for assistance under sections 609 or
616 of the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7708, 7715).
(c) National Interest Waiver.--The President may, on a case by case
basis, waive the limitation in subsection (b) if the President submits
to the appropriate congressional committees--
(1) a written determination that the waiver is important to
the national interests of the United States; and
(2) a detailed explanation of how the waiver is important
to those interests.
Subtitle C--Regional Strategies To Counter the People's Republic of
China
SEC. 241. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS
AROUND THE WORLD WITH RESPECT TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA.
It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to strengthen alliances and partnerships Europe and
with like-minded countries around the globe to effectively
compete with the People's Republic of China; and
(2) to work in collaboration with such allies and
partners--
(A) to address significant diplomatic, economic,
and military challenges posed by the People's Republic
of China;
(B) to deter the People's Republic of China from
pursuing military aggression;
(C) to promote the peaceful resolution of
territorial disputes in accordance with international
law;
(D) to promote private sector-led long-term
economic development while countering efforts by the
Government of the People's Republic of China to
leverage predatory economic practices as a means of
political and economic coercion in the Indo-Pacific
region and beyond;
(E) to promote the values of democracy and human
rights, including through efforts to end the repression
by the Chinese Communist Party of political dissidents
and Uyghurs and other ethnic Muslim minorities, Tibetan
Buddhists, Christians, and other minorities;
(F) to respond to the crackdown by the Chinese
Communist Party, in contravention of the commitments
made under the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984
and the Basic Law of Hong Kong, on the legitimate
aspirations of the people of Hong Kong; and
(G) to counter the Chinese Communist Party efforts
to spread disinformation in the People's Republic of
China and beyond with respect to the response of the
Chinese Communist Party to COVID-19.
PART I--WESTERN HEMISPHERE
SEC. 245. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES-CANADA RELATIONS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States and Canada have a unique relationship
based on shared geography, extensive personal connections, deep
economic ties, mutual defense commitments, and a shared vision
to uphold democracy, human rights, and the rules based
international order established after World War II;
(2) the United States and Canada can better address China's
economic, political, and security influence through closer
cooperation on counternarcotics, environmental stewardship,
transparent practices in public procurement and infrastructure
planning, the Arctic, energy and connectivity issues, trade and
commercial relations, bilateral legal matters, and support for
democracy, good governance, and human rights;
(3) amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States and
Canada should maintain joint initiatives to address border
management, commercial and trade relations, a shared approach
with respect to the People's Republic of China, and
transnational challenges, including pandemics and climate
change;
(4) the United States and Canada should enhance cooperation
to counter Chinese disinformation, influence operations,
economic espionage, and propaganda efforts;
(5) the People's Republic of China's infrastructure
investments, particularly in 5G telecommunications technology,
extraction of natural resources, and port infrastructure, pose
national security risks for the United States and Canada;
(6) the United States should share, as appropriate,
intelligence gathered regarding--
(A) Huawei's 5G capabilities; and
(B) the Chinese Government's intentions with
respect to 5G expansion;
(7) the United States and Canada should continue to advance
collaborative initiatives to implement the January 9, 2020,
United States-Canada Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals
Development Collaboration; and
(8) the United States and Canada must prioritize
cooperation on continental defense and in the Arctic, including
by modernizing the North American Aerospace Defense Command
(NORAD) to effectively defend the Northern Hemisphere against
the range of threats by peer competitors, including long range
missiles and high-precision weapons.
SEC. 246. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA'S
ARBITRARY IMPRISONMENT OF CANADIAN CITIZENS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Government of the People's Republic of China's
apparent arbitrary detention and abusive treatment of Canadian
nationals Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig in apparent
retaliation for the Government of Canada's arrest of Meng
Wanzhou is deeply concerning;
(2) the Government of Canada has shown international
leadership by--
(A) upholding the rule of law and complying with
its international legal obligations, including those
pursuant to the Extradition Treaty Between the United
States of America and Canada, signed at Washington
December 3, 1971; and
(B) launching the Declaration Against Arbitrary
Detention in State-to-State Relations, which has been
endorsed by 57 countries and the European Union and
reaffirms well-established prohibitions under
international human rights conventions against the
arbitrary detention of foreign nationals to be used as
leverage in state-to-state relations; and
(3) the United States continues to join the Government of
Canada in calling for the immediate release of Michael Spavor
and Michael Kovrig and for due process for Canadian national
Robert Schellenberg.
SEC. 247. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH CANADA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a strategy to the
Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of
the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Armed Services of the House of Representatives that describes how the
United States will enhance cooperation with the Government of Canada in
managing relations with the Government of China.
(b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall--
(1) identify key policy points of convergence and
divergence between the United States and Canada in managing
relations with the People's Republic of China in the areas of
technology, trade, economic practices, cyber security, secure
supply chains and critical minerals, and illicit narcotics;
(2) include the development coordination efforts with
Canadian counterparts to enhance the cooperation between the
United States and Canada with respect to--
(A) managing economic relations with the People's
Republic of China;
(B) democracy and human rights in the People's
Republic of China;
(C) technology issues involving the People's
Republic of China;
(D) defense issues involving the People's Republic
of China; and
(E) international law enforcement and transnational
organized crime issues.
(3) detail diplomatic efforts and future plans to work with
Canada to counter Chinese projection of an authoritarian
governing model around the world;
(4) detail diplomatic, defense, and intelligence
cooperation to date and future plans to support Canadian
efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to Huawei's 5G
technology;
(5) detail diplomatic and defense collaboration--
(A) to advance joint United States-Canadian
priorities for responsible stewardship in the Arctic
Region; and
(B) to counter Chinese efforts to project
political, economic, and military influence into the
Arctic Region; and
(6) detail diplomatic efforts to work with Canada to track
and counter Chinese attempts to exert influence across the
multilateral system, including at the World Health
Organization.
(c) Form.--The strategy required under this section shall be
submitted in an unclassified form that can be made available to the
public, but may include a classified annex, if necessary.
(d) Consultation.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than every 180 days
thereafter, the Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate
congressional committees regarding the development and implementation
of the strategy required under this section.
SEC. 248. STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS, GOVERNANCE,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney
General, the United States Trade Representative, and the Chief
Executive Officer of the United States International Development
Finance Corporation, shall submit a multi-year strategy for increasing
United States economic competitiveness and promoting good governance,
human rights, and the rule of law in Latin American and Caribbean
countries, particularly in the areas of investment, equitable and
sustainable development, commercial relations, anti-corruption
activities, and infrastructure projects, to--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Committee on Finance of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(4) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives;
(6) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives;
(7) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives; and
(8) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(b) Additional Elements.--The strategy required under subsection
(a) shall include a plan of action, including benchmarks to achieve
measurable progress, to--
(1) enhance the technical capacity of countries in the
region to advance the sustainable development of equitable
economies;
(2) reduce trade and non-tariff barriers between the
countries of the Americas;
(3) facilitate a more open, transparent, and competitive
environment for United States businesses in the region;
(4) establish frameworks or mechanisms to review long term
financial sustainability and security implications of foreign
investments in strategic sectors or services, including
transportation, communications, natural resources, and energy;
(5) establish competitive and transparent infrastructure
project selection and procurement processes that promote
transparency, open competition, financial sustainability,
adherence to robust global standards, and the employment of the
local workforce;
(6) strengthen legal structures critical to robust
democratic governance, fair competition, combat corruption, and
end impunity;
(7) identify and mitigate obstacles to private sector-led
economic growth in Latin America and the Caribbean; and
(8) maintain transparent and affordable access to the
internet and digital infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere.
(c) Reporting Requirement.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of
State, after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade
Representative, and the leadership of the United States International
Development Finance Corporation, shall brief the congressional
committees listed in subsection (a) regarding the implementation of
this part, including examples of successes and challenges.
SEC. 249. ENGAGEMENT IN REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.
(a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives;
(5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives; and
(6) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(b) Reporting Requirement.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, working
through the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and
Research, and in coordination with the Director of National
Intelligence and the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of
Congress that assesses the nature, intent, and impact to United
States strategic interests of Chinese diplomatic activity aimed
at influencing the decisions, procedures, and programs of
multilateral organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean,
including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund,
Organization of American States, and the Inter-American
Development Bank.
(2) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form and shall include classified
annexes.
SEC. 250. ADDRESSING CHINA'S SOVEREIGN LENDING PRACTICES IN LATIN
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) since 2005, the Government of China has expanded
sovereign lending to governments in Latin America and the
Caribbean with loans that are repaid or collateralized with
natural resources or commodities;
(2) several countries in Latin American and the Caribbean
that have received a significant amount of sovereign lending
from the Government of China face challenges in repaying such
loans;
(3) the Government of China's predatory economic practices
and sovereign lending practices in Latin America and the
Caribbean negatively influence United States national interests
in the Western Hemisphere;
(4) the Inter-American Development Bank, the premier
multilateral development bank dedicated to the Western
Hemisphere, should play a significant role supporting the
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean in achieving
sustainable and serviceable debt structures; and
(5) a tenth general capital increase for the Inter-American
Development Bank would strengthen the Bank's ability to help
the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean achieve
sustainable and serviceable debt structures.
(b) Support for a General Capital Increase.--The President shall
take steps to support a tenth general capital increase for the Inter-
American Development Bank, including advancing diplomatic engagement to
build support among member countries of the Bank for a tenth general
capital increase for the Bank
(c) Tenth Capital Increase.--The Inter-American Development Bank
Act (22 U.S.C. 283 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``SEC. 42. TENTH CAPITAL INCREASE.
``(a) Vote Authorized.--The United States Governor of the Bank is
authorized to vote in favor of a resolution to increase the capital
stock of the Bank by $80,000,000,000 over a period not to exceed 5
years.
``(b) Subscription Authorized.--
``(1) In general.--The United States Governor of the Bank
may subscribe on behalf of the United States to 1,990,714
additional shares of the capital stock of the Bank.
``(2) Limitation.--Any subscription by the United States to
the capital stock of the Bank shall be effective only to such
extent and in such amounts as are provided in advance in
appropriations Acts.
``(c) Limitations on Authorization of Appropriations.--
``(1) In general.--In order to pay for the increase in the
United States subscription to the Bank under subsection (b),
there is authorized to be appropriated $24,014,857,191 for
payment by the Secretary of the Treasury.
``(2) Allocation of funds.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated under paragraph (1)--
``(A) $600,371,430 shall be for paid in shares of
the Bank; and
``(B) $23,414,485,761 shall be for callable shares
of the Bank.''.
(d) Addressing China's Sovereign Lending in the Americas.--The
Secretary of the Treasury and the United States Executive Director to
the Inter-American Development Bank shall use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States--
(1) to advance efforts by the Bank to help countries
restructure debt resulting from sovereign lending by the
Government of China in order to achieve sustainable and
serviceable debt structures; and
(2) to establish appropriate safeguards and transparency
and conditionality measures to protect debt-vulnerable member
countries of the Inter-American Development Bank that borrow
from the Bank for the purposes of restructuring Chinese
bilateral debt held by such countries and preventing such
countries from incurring subsequent Chinese bilateral debt.
(e) Briefings.--
(1) Implementation.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the
President shall provide to the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the
House of Representatives a briefing detailing efforts to carry
out subsection (b) and (d) and the amendment made by subsection
(c).
(2) Progress in achieving sustainable and serviceable debt
structures.--Not later than 180 days after the successful
completion of a tenth general capital increase for the Inter-
American Development Bank, and every 180 days thereafter for a
period of 3 years, the President shall provide to the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
Financial Services of the House of Representatives a briefing
on efforts by the Bank to support countries in Latin American
and the Caribbean in their efforts to achieve sustainable and
serviceable debt structures.
SEC. 251. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.
(a) In General.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the
Department of State $12,000,000 for the International Military
Education and Training Program for Latin America and the Caribbean for
each of fiscal years 2021 through 2026.
(b) Modernization.--The Secretary of State shall take steps to
modernize and strengthen the programs receiving funding under
subsection (a) to ensure that such programs are vigorous, substantive,
and the preeminent choice for international military education and
training for Latin American and Caribbean partners.
(c) Required Elements.--The programs referred to in subsection (a)
shall--
(1) provide training and capacity-building opportunities to
Latin American and Caribbean security services;
(2) provide practical skills and frameworks for--
(A) improving the functioning and organization of
security services in Latin America and the Caribbean;
(B) creating a better understanding of the United
States and its values; and
(C) using technology for maximum efficiency and
organization; and
(3) promote and ensure that security services in Latin
America and the Caribbean respect civilian authority and
operate in compliance with international norms, standards, and
rules of engagement, including a respect for human rights.
(d) Limitation.--Security assistance under this section is subject
to limitations as enshrined in the requirements of section 620M of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d).
SEC. 252. ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE
CARIBBEAN REGARDING ACCOUNTABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE
RISKS OF PERVASIVE SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Government of China is exporting its model for
internal security and state control of society through advanced
technology and artificial intelligence; and
(2) the inclusion of communication networks and
communications supply chains with equipment and services from
companies with close ties to or susceptible to pressure from
governments or security services without reliable legal checks
on governmental powers can lead to breaches of citizens'
private information, increased censorship, violations of human
rights, and harassment of political opponents.
(b) Diplomatic Engagement.--The Secretary of State shall conduct
diplomatic engagement with governments and civil society organizations
in Latin America and the Caribbean to--
(1) help identify and mitigate the risks to civil liberties
posed by technologies and services described in subsection (a);
and
(2) offer recommendations on ways to mitigate such risks.
(c) Internet Freedom Programs.--The Chief Executive Officer of the
United States Agency for Global Media, working through the Open
Technology Fund, and the Secretary of State, working through the Bureau
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor's Internet Freedom and Business
and Human Rights Section, shall expand and prioritize efforts to
provide anti-censorship technology and services to journalists in Latin
America and the Caribbean, in order to enhance their ability to safely
access or share digital news and information.
(d) Support for Civil Society.--The Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor and the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development, shall work through nongovernmental
organizations to--
(1) support and promote programs that support internet
freedom and the free flow of information online in Latin
America and the Caribbean;
(2) protect open, interoperable, secure, and reliable
access to internet in Latin America and the Caribbean;
(3) provide integrated support to civil society for
technology, digital safety, policy and advocacy, and applied
research programs in Latin America and the Caribbean;
(4) train journalists and civil society leaders in Latin
America and the Caribbean on investigative techniques necessary
to ensure public accountability and prevent government
overreach in the digital sphere;
(5) assist independent media outlets and journalists in
Latin America and the Caribbean to build their own capacity and
develop high-impact, in-depth news reports covering governance
and human rights topics;
(6) provide training for journalists and civil society
leaders on investigative techniques necessary to improve
transparency and accountability in government and the private
sector;
(7) provide training on investigative reporting of
incidents of corruption and unfair trade, business and
commercial practices related to China, including the role of
the Government of China in such practices;
(8) assist nongovernmental organizations to strengthen
their capacity to monitor the activities described in paragraph
(7); and
(9) identify local resources to support the preponderance
of activities that would be carried out under this subsection.
(e) Briefing Requirement.--Not more than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary
of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development, and the Chief Executive Officer of the
United States Agency for Global Media shall provide a briefing
regarding the efforts described in subsections (c), (d), and (e) to--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives; and
(4) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
PART II--TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE
SEC. 255. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States, the European Union, and countries of
Europe are close partners, sharing values grounded in
democracy, human rights, transparency, and the rules-based
international order established after World War II;
(2) without a common approach by the United States,
European Union, and countries of Europe on connectivity, trade,
transnational problems, and support for democracy and human
rights, the People's Republic of China will continue to
increase its economic, political and security leverage in
Europe;
(3) the People's Republic of China's deployment of
assistance to European countries following the COVID-19
outbreak showcased a coercive approach to aid, but it also
highlighted Europe's deep economic ties to China;
(4) as European states seek to recover from the economic
toll of the COVID-19 outbreak, the United States must stand in
partnership with Europe to support our collective economic
recovery and reinforce our collective national security and
defend these shared values;
(5) the United States, European Union, and other European
countries should coordinate on joint strategies to diversify
reliance on supply chains away from the People's Republic of
China, especially in the medical and pharmaceutical sectors;
(6) the United States, European Union, United Kingdom, and
the countries of Europe should leverage their respective
economic innovation capabilities to support the global economic
recovery from the COVID-19 recession and draw a contrast with
the centralized economy of the People's Republic of China;
(7) the United States and European Union should accelerate
efforts to de-escalate their trade disputes, including
negotiating a United States-European Union trade agreement that
benefits workers and the broader economy in both the United
States and European Union;
(8) the United States, European Union, and Japan should
continue trilateral efforts to address economic challenges
posed by the People's Republic of China;
(9) the United States, European Union, and countries of
Europe should enhance cooperation to counter Chinese
disinformation, influence operations, and propaganda efforts;
(10) the United States and European nations share serious
concerns with the repressions being supported and executed by
the Government of China, and should continue implementing
measures to address the Government of China's specific abuses
in Tibet, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang, and should build joint
mechanisms and programs to prevent the export of China's
authoritarian governance model to countries around the world;
(11) the United States and European nations should remain
united in their shared values against attempts by the
Government of China at the United Nations and other
multilateral organizations to promote efforts that erode the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, like the ``community of
a shared future for mankind'' and ``democratization of
international relations'';
(12) the People's Republic of China's infrastructure
investments around the world, particularly in 5G
telecommunications technology and port infrastructure, could
threaten democracy across Europe and the national security of
key countries;
(13) as appropriate, the United States should share
intelligence with European allies and partners on Huawei's 5G
capabilities and the intentions of the Government of China with
respect to 5G expansion in Europe;
(14) the European Union's Investment Screening Regulation,
which came into force in October 2020, is a welcome
development, and member states should closely scrutinize
Chinese investments in their countries through their own
national investment screening measures;
(15) the President should actively engage the European
Union on the implementation of the Export Control Reform Act
regulations and work to align the law's regulations with
European Union priorities;
(16) the President should strongly advocate for the listing
of more items and technologies to restrict dual use exports
controlled at the National Security and above level to the
People's Republic of China under the Wassenaar Arrangement;
(17) the United States should explore the value of
establishing a body akin to the Coordinating Committee for
Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) that would specifically
coordinate the export of United States and European Union
sensitive technologies to the People's Republic of China; and
(18) the United States should work with counterparts in
Europe to--
(A) evaluate United States and European
overreliance on Chinese goods, including in the medical
and pharmaceutical sectors, and develop joint
strategies to diversify supply chains;
(B) counter Chinese efforts to use COVID-19-related
assistance as a coercive tool to pressure developing
countries by offering relevant United States and
European expertise and assistance; and
(C) leverage the United States and European private
sectors to advance the post-COVID-19 economic recovery.
SEC. 256. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION WITH RESPECT TO
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall brief the Committee on
Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of
the House of Representatives on a strategy for how the United States
will enhance cooperation with the European Union, NATO, and European
partner countries on managing relations with the People's Republic of
China.
(b) Elements.--The briefing required by subsection (a) shall do the
following:
(1) Identify the senior Senate-confirmed Department of
State official that leads United States efforts to cooperate
with the European Union, NATO, and European partner countries
to advance a shared approach with respect to the People's
Republic of China.
(2) Identify key policy points of convergence and
divergence between the United States and European partners with
respect to the People's Republic of China in the areas of
technology, trade, and economic practices.
(3) Describe efforts to advance shared interests with
European counterparts on--
(A) economic challenges with the People's Republic
of China;
(B) democracy and human rights challenges with
respect to the People's Republic of China;
(C) technology issues with respect to the People's
Republic of China;
(D) defense issues with respect to the People's
Republic of China; and
(E) developing a comprehensive strategy to respond
to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) established by
the Government of the People's Republic of China.
(4) Describe the coordination mechanisms among key regional
and functional bureaus within the Department of State and
Department of Defense tasked with engaging with European
partners on the People's Republic of China.
(5) Detail diplomatic efforts made up to the date on which
the date of the briefing and future plans to work with European
partners to counter Chinese advancement of an authoritarian
governing model around the world.
(6) Detail the diplomatic efforts made up to the date on
which the strategy is submitted and future plans to support
European efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to
Huawei's 5G technology.
(7) Detail how United States public diplomacy tools,
including the Global Engagement Center of the Department of
State, will coordinate efforts with counterpart entities within
the European Union to counter Chinese propaganda.
(8) Describe the staffing and budget resources the
Department of State dedicates to engagement between the United
States and the European Union on the People's Republic of China
and provide an assessment of out-year resource needs to execute
the strategy.
(9) Detail diplomatic efforts to work with European
partners to track and counter Chinese attempts to exert
influence across multilateral fora, including at the World
Health Organization.
(c) Form.--The briefing required by section (a) shall be
classified.
(d) Consultation.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of
State shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees
regarding the development and implementation of the strategy.
SEC. 257. ENHANCING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION ON PROMOTING PRIVATE
SECTOR FINANCE.
(a) In General.--The President should work with transatlantic
partners to build on the agreement among the Development Finance
Corporation, FinDev Canada, and the European Development Finance
Institutions (called the DFI Alliance) to enhance coordination on
shared objectives to foster private sector-led development and provide
market-based alternatives to state-directed financing in emerging
markets, particularly as related to the People's Republic of China's
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), including by integrating efforts such
as--
(1) the European Union Strategy on Connecting Europe and
Asia;
(2) the Three Seas Initiative and Three Seas Initiative
Fund;
(3) the Blue Dot Network among the United States, Japan,
and Australia; and
(4) a European Union-Japan initiative that has leveraged
$65,000,000,000 for infrastructure projects and emphasizes
transparency standards.
(b) Cooperation at the United Nations.--The United States and
Europe should coordinate efforts to address the Government of China's
use of the United Nations to advance and legitimize BRI as a global
good, including the proliferation of memoranda of understanding between
the People's Republic of China and United Nations funds and programs on
BRI implementation.
(c) Standards.--The United States and the European Union should
coordinate and develop a strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation
with the OECD and the Paris Club on ensuring the highest possible
standards for Belt and Road Initiative contracts and terms with
developing countries.
SEC. 258. REPORT AND BRIEFING ON COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND IRAN AND
BETWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA.
(a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance,
and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services,
the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on
Financial Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b) Report and Briefing Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall, in coordination with the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the
Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and such
other heads of Federal agencies as the Director considers
appropriate, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a
report and brief the appropriate committees of Congress on
cooperation between China and Iran and between China and
Russia.
(2) Contents.--The report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall include the following elements:
(A) An identification of major areas of diplomatic
energy, infrastructure, banking, financial, economic,
military, and space cooperation--
(i) between China and Iran; and
(ii) between China and Russia.
(B) An assessment of the effect of the Coronavirus
Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic on such cooperation.
(3) Form.--The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(c) Sense of Congress on Sharing With Allies and Partners.--It is
the sense of Congress that the Director of National Intelligence and
the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies should
share the findings of the report submitted under subsection (b) with
important allies and partners of the United States, as appropriate.
PART III--SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA
SEC. 261. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States should continue to stand with friends
and partners in South and Central Asia as they contend with
efforts by the Government of China to interfere in their
respective political systems and encroach upon their sovereign
territory; and
(2) the United States should reaffirm its commitment to the
Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership with India and
further deepen bilateral defense consultations and
collaboration with India commensurate with its status as a
major defense partner.
SEC. 262. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the Committee on
Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of
the House of Representatives a strategy for how the United States will
engage with the countries of South and Central Asia, including through
the C5+1 mechanism, with respect to the People's Republic of China.
(b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall
include the following elements:
(1) A detailed description of the security and economic
challenges that the People's Republic of China poses to the
countries of South and Central Asia, including border disputes
with South and Central Asian countries that border China,
Chinese investments in land and sea ports, transportation
infrastructure, and energy projects across the region.
(2) A detailed description of United States efforts to
provide alternatives to Chinese investment in infrastructure
and other sectors in South and Central Asia.
(3) A detailed description of bilateral and regional
efforts to work with countries in South Asia on strategies to
build resilience against Chinese efforts to interfere in their
political systems and economies.
(4) A detailed description of United States diplomatic
efforts to work with the Government of Afghanistan on
addressing the challenges posed by Chinese investment in the
Afghan mineral sector.
(5) A detailed description of United States diplomatic
efforts with the Government of Pakistan with respect to matters
relevant to the People's Republic of China, including
investments by the People's Republic of China in Pakistan
through the Belt and Road Initiative.
(6) In close consultation with the Government of India,
identification of areas where the United States Government can
provide diplomatic and other support as appropriate for India's
efforts to address economic and security challenges posed by
the People's Republic of China in the region.
(7) A description of the coordination mechanisms among key
regional and functional bureaus within the Department of State
and Department of Defense tasked with engaging with the
countries of South and Central Asia on issues relating to the
People's Republic of China.
(8) A description of the efforts being made by Federal
departments agencies, including the Department of State, the
United States Agency for International Development, the
Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, and the
Office of the United States Trade Representative, to help the
nations of South and Central Asia develop trade and commerce
links that will help those nations diversify their trade away
from China.
(c) Form.--The strategy required under section (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form that can be made available to the
public, but may include a classified annex as necessary.
(d) Consultation.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and not less than annually thereafter, the
Secretary of State shall consult with the Committee on Foreign
Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the
Committee of Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives regarding the development and implementation
of the strategy required under subsection (a).
PART IV--AFRICA
SEC. 271. ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY ACTIVITY OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN AFRICA.
(a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(b) Intelligence Assessment.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in
coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a report that assesses the nature
and impact of Chinese political, economic, and security sector activity
in Africa, and its impact on United States strategic interests,
including--
(1) the amount and impact of direct investment, loans,
development financing, oil-for-loans deals, and other
preferential trading arrangements;
(2) the involvement of Chinese state-owned enterprises in
Africa;
(3) the amount of African debt held by the People's
Republic of China;
(4) the involvement of Chinese private security, technology
and media companies in Africa;
(5) the scale and impact of Chinese arms sales to African
countries;
(6) the methods, tools, and tactics used to facilitate
illegal and corrupt activity, including trade in counterfeit
and illicit goods, to include smuggled extractive resources and
wildlife products, from Africa to China;
(7) the methods and techniques that China uses to exert
undue influence on African governments and facilitate corrupt
activity in Africa, and to influence African multilateral
organizations; and
(8) an analysis of the soft power, cultural and educational
activities undertaken by the PRC and CCP to seek to expand
influence in Africa.
SEC. 272. INCREASING THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE UNITED STATES IN
AFRICA.
(a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Appropriations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Appropriations, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the
House of Representatives.
(b) Strategy Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in
consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of
Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade Representative,
the Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, and the leadership of the United States International
Development Finance Corporation, submit to the appropriate committees
of Congress a report setting forth a multi-year strategy for increasing
United States economic competitiveness and promoting improvements in
the investment climate in Africa, including through support for
democratic institutions, the rule of law, including property rights,
and for improved transparency, anti-corruption and governance.
(c) Elements.--The strategy submitted pursuant to subsection (a)
shall include--
(1) a description and assessment of barriers to United
States investment in Africa for United States businesses,
including a clear identification of the different barriers
facing small-sized and medium-sized businesses, and an
assessment of whether existing programs effectively address
such barriers;
(2) a description and assessment of barriers to African
diaspora investment in Africa, and recommendations to overcome
such barriers;
(3) an identification of the economic sectors in the United
States that have a comparative advantage in Africa markets;
(4) a determination of priority African countries for
promoting two-way trade and investment and an assessment of
additional foreign assistance needs, including democracy and
governance and rule of law support, to promote a conducive
operating environment in priority countries;
(5) an identification of opportunities for strategic
cooperation with European allies on trade and investment in
Africa, and for establishing a dialogue on trade, security,
development, and environmental issues of mutual interest; and
(6) a plan to regularly host a United States-Africa Leaders
Summit to promote two-way trade and investment, strategic
engagement, and security in Africa
(d) Assessment of United States Government Human Resources
Capacity.--The Comptroller General of the United States shall--
(1) conduct a review of the number of Foreign Commercial
Service Officers and Department of State Economic Officers at
United States embassies in sub-Saharan Africa; and
(2) develop an assessment of whether human resource
capacity in such embassies is adequate to meet the goals of the
various trade and economic programs and initiatives in Africa,
including the African Growth and Opportunity Act and Prosper
Africa.
SEC. 273. DIGITAL SECURITY COOPERATION WITH RESPECT TO AFRICA.
(a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(b) Interagency Working Group To Counter Chinese Cyber Aggression
in Africa.--
(1) In general.--The President shall establish an
interagency Working Group, which shall include representatives
of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and such other
agencies of the United States Government as the President
considers appropriate, on means to counter Chinese cyber
aggression with respect to Africa.
(2) Duties.--The Working Group established pursuant to this
subsection shall develop a set of recommendations for--
(A) bolstering the capacity of governments in
Africa to ensure the integrity of their data networks
and critical infrastructure where applicable;
(B) providing alternatives to Huawei;
(C) an action plan for United States embassies in
Africa to offer to provide assistance to host-country
governments with protecting their vital digital
networks and infrastructure from Chinese espionage,
including an assessment of staffing resources needed to
implement the action plan in embassies in Africa;
(D) utilizing interagency resources to counter
Chinese disinformation and propaganda in traditional
and digital media targeted to African audiences; and
(E) helping civil society in Africa counter digital
authoritarianism and identifying tools and assistance
to enhance and promote digital democracy.
SEC. 274. INCREASING PERSONNEL IN UNITED STATES EMBASSIES IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA FOCUSED ON THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
The Secretary of State may station on a permanent basis Department
of State personnel at such United States embassies in sub-Saharan
Africa as the Secretary considers appropriate focused on the
activities, policies and investments of the People's Republic of China
in Africa.
SEC. 275. SUPPORT FOR YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.
(a) Finding.--Congress finds that youth in Africa can have a
positive impact on efforts to foster economic growth, improve public
sector transparency and governance, and counter extremism, and should
be an area of focus for United States outreach on the continent.
(b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States, in cooperation
and collaboration with private sector companies, civic organizations,
nongovernmental organizations, and national and regional public sector
entities, to commit resources to enhancing the entrepreneurship and
leadership skills of African youth with the objective of enhancing
their ability to serve as leaders in the public and private sectors in
order to help them spur growth and prosperity, strengthen democratic
governance, and enhance peace and security in their respective
countries of origin and across Africa.
(c) Young African Leaders Initiative.--
(1) In general.--There is hereby established the Young
African Leaders Initiative, to be carried out by the Secretary
of State.
(2) Fellowships.--The Secretary is authorized to support
the participation in the Initiative established under this
paragraph, in the United States, of fellows from Africa each
year for such education and training in leadership and
professional development through the Department of State as the
Secretary of State considers appropriate. The Secretary shall
establish and publish criteria for eligibility for
participation as such a fellow, and for selection of fellows
among eligible applicants for a fellowship.
(3) Reciprocal exchanges.--Under the Initiative, United
States citizens may engage in such reciprocal exchanges in
connection with and collaboration on projects with fellows
under paragraph (1) as the Secretary considers appropriate.
(4) Regional centers and networks.--The Administrator of
the United States Agency for International Development shall
establish each of the following:
(A) Not fewer than four regional centers in Africa
to provide in-person and online training throughout the
year in business and entrepreneurship, civic
leadership, and public management.
(B) An online network that provides information and
online courses on, and connections with leaders in, the
private and public sectors in Africa.
(d) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the
Secretary of State should increase the number of fellows from Africa in
the Young African Leaders Initiative above the number that participated
in the Initiative in fiscal year 2020 .
SEC. 276. AFRICA BROADCASTING NETWORKS.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the CEO of the United States Agency for Global Media shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the resources
and timeline needed to establish within the Agency an organization
whose mission shall be to promote democratic values and institutions in
Africa by providing objective, accurate, and relevant news and
information to the people of Africa, especially in countries where a
free press is banned by the government or not fully established, about
the region, the world, and the United States through uncensored news,
responsible discussion, and open debate.
PART V--MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
SEC. 281. STRATEGY TO COUNTER CHINESE INFLUENCE IN, AND ACCESS TO, THE
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the economic influence of the People's Republic of
China through its oil and gas imports from the Middle East,
infrastructure investments, technology transfer, and arms sales
provide influence and leverage that runs counter to United
States interests in the region;
(2) the People's Republic of China seeks to erode United
States influence in the Middle East and North Africa through
the sale of Chinese arms, associated weapons technology, and
joint weapons research and development initiatives;
(3) the People's Republic of China seeks to establish
military or dual use facilities in geographically strategic
locations in the Middle East and North Africa to further the
Chinese Communist Party's Belt and Road Initiative at the
expense of United States national security interests; and
(4) the export of certain communications infrastructure
from the People's Republic of China degrades the security of
partner networks, exposes intellectual property to theft,
threatens the ability of the United States to conduct security
cooperation with compromised regional partners, and furthers
China's authoritarian surveillance model.
(b) Strategy Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency
for International Development and the heads of other
appropriate Federal agencies, shall jointly develop and submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy for
countering and limiting Chinese influence in, and access to,
the Middle East and North Africa.
(2) Elements.--The strategy required under paragraph (1)
shall include--
(A) an assessment of China's intent with regards to
increased cooperation with Middle East and North
African countries and how these activities fit into
their broader global strategic objectives;
(B) an assessment of how governments across the
region are responding to Chinese efforts to increase
Chinese military presence in their countries;
(C) efforts to improve regional cooperation through
foreign military sales, financing, and efforts to build
partner capacity and increase interoperability with the
United States;
(D) an assessment of Chinese joint research and
development with the Middle East, North Africa, impacts
on United States' national security interests, and
recommended steps to mitigate Chinese influence;
(E) an assessment of arms sales and weapons
technology transfers from the People's Republic of
China to the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on
United States' national security interests, and
recommended steps to mitigate Chinese influence;
(F) an assessment of Chinese military sales to the
region including lethal and non lethal unmanned aerial
systems;
(G) an assessment of People's Republic of China
military basing and dual-use facility initiatives
across the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on
United States' national security interests, and
recommended steps to mitigate Chinese influence;
(H) efforts to improve regional security
cooperation with United States allies and partners with
a focus on--
(i) maritime security in the Arabian Gulf,
the Red Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean;
(ii) integrated air and missile defense;
(iii) cyber security;
(iv) border security; and
(v) critical infrastructure security, to
include energy security;
(I) increased support for government-to-government
engagement on critical infrastructure development
projects including ports and water infrastructure;
(J) efforts to encourage United States private
sector and public-private partnerships in healthcare
technology and foreign direct investment in non-energy
sectors;
(K) efforts to expand youth engagement and
professional education exchanges with key partner
countries;
(L) specific steps to counter increased Chinese
investment in telecommunications infrastructure and
diplomatic efforts to stress the political, economic,
and social benefits of a free and open internet;
(M) efforts to promote United States private sector
engagement in and public-private partnerships on
renewable energy development;
(N) the expansion of public-private partnership
efforts on water, desalination, and irrigation
projects; and
(O) efforts to warn United States partners in the
Middle East and North Africa of the risks associated
with Chinese telecommunications infrastructure and
provide alternative ``clean paths'' to Chinese
technology.
SEC. 282. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA ENGAGEMENT.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States and the international community have
long-term interests in the stability, security, and prosperity
of the people of the Middle East and North Africa.
(2) In addition to and apart from military and security
efforts, the United States should harness a whole of government
approach, including bilateral and multilateral statecraft,
economic lines of effort, and public diplomacy to compete with
and counter Chinese Communist Party influence.
(3) A clearly articulated positive narrative of United
States engagement, transparent governance structures, and
active civil society engagement help counter predatory foreign
investment and influence efforts.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States
that the United States and the international community should, continue
diplomatic and economic efforts throughout the Middle East and North
Africa that support reform efforts to--
(1) promote greater economic opportunity;
(2) foster private sector development;
(3) strengthen civil society; and
(4) promote transparent and democratic governance and the
rule of law.
PART VI--ARCTIC REGION
SEC. 285. ARCTIC DIPLOMACY.
(a) Sense of Congress on Arctic Security.--It is the sense of
Congress that--
(1) the rapidly changing Arctic environment--
(A) creates new national and regional security
challenges due to increased military activity in the
Arctic;
(B) heightens the risk of the Arctic emerging as a
major theater of conflict in ongoing strategic
competition;
(C) threatens maritime safety as Arctic littoral
nations have inadequate capacity to patrol the
increased vessel traffic in this remote region, which
is a result of diminished annual levels of sea ice;
(D) impacts public safety due to increased human
activity in the Arctic region where search and rescue
capacity remains very limited; and
(E) threatens the health of the Arctic's fragile
and pristine environment and the unique and highly
sensitive species found in the Arctic's marine and
terrestrial ecosystems; and
(2) the United States should reduce the consequences
outlined in paragraph (1) by--
(A) carefully evaluating the wide variety and
dynamic set of security and safety risks unfolding in
the Arctic;
(B) developing policies and making preparations to
mitigate and respond to threats and risks in the
Arctic, including by continuing to work with allies and
partners in the Arctic region to deter potential
aggressive activities and build Arctic competencies;
(C) adequately funding the National Earth System
Prediction Capability to substantively improve weather,
ocean, and ice predictions on the time scales necessary
to ensure regional security and trans-Arctic shipping;
(D) investing in resources, including a
significantly expanded icebreaker fleet, to ensure that
the United States has adequate capacity to prevent and
respond to security threats in the Arctic region;
(E) pursuing diplomatic engagements with all
nations in the Arctic region for--
(i) maintaining peace and stability in the
Arctic region; and
(ii) fostering cooperation on stewardship
and safety initiatives in the Arctic region;
and
(F) examining the possibility of reconvening the
Arctic Chiefs of Defense Forum.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to recognize only the nations enumerated in subsection
(c)(1) as Arctic nations, and to reject all other claims to
this status; and
(2) that the militarization of the Arctic poses a serious
threat to Arctic peace and stability, and the interests of
United States allies and partners.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Arctic nations.--The term ``Arctic nations'' means the
8 nations with territory or exclusive economic zones that
extend north of the 66.56083 parallel latitude north of the
equator, namely Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway,
Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Sweden, and Iceland.
(2) Arctic region.--The term ``Arctic Region'' means the
geographic region north of the 66.56083 parallel latitude north
of the equator.
(d) Designation.--The Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) shall
designate a deputy assistant secretary serving within the Bureau of
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs as
``Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arctic Affairs'', who shall be
responsible for OES affairs in the Arctic Region.
(e) Duties.--The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arctic Affairs
shall--
(1) facilitate the development and coordination of United
States foreign policy in the Arctic Region relating to--
(A) strengthening institutions for cooperation
among the Arctic nations;
(B) enhancing scientific monitoring and research on
local, regional, and global environmental issues;
(C) protecting the Arctic environment and
conserving its biological resources;
(D) promoting responsible natural resource
management and economic development; and
(E) involving Arctic indigenous people in decisions
that affect them.
(2) coordinate the diplomatic objectives with respect to
the activities described in paragraph (1), and, as appropriate,
represent the United States within multilateral fora that
address international cooperation and foreign policy matters in
the Arctic Region;
(3) help inform, in coordination with the Bureau of
Economic and Business Affairs, transnational commerce and
commercial maritime transit in the Arctic Region;
(4) coordinate the integration of scientific data on the
current and projected effects of emerging environmental changes
on the Arctic Region and ensure that such data is applied to
the development of security strategies for the Arctic Region;
(5) make available the methods and approaches on the
integration of climate, data, and environmental science to
regional security planning programs in the Department of State
to better ensure that broader decision-making processes may
more adequately account for the effects of climate change;
(6) assist with the development of, and facilitate the
implementation of, an Arctic Region Security Policy in
accordance with subsection (f);
(7) use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States
to encourage other countries and international multilateral
organizations to support the principles of the Arctic Region
Security Policy implemented pursuant to subsection (f); and
(8) perform such other duties and exercise such powers as
the Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs shall prescribe.
(f) Rank and Status.--The Secretary of State may change the title
of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arctic Affairs designated under
subsection (c) to Special Representative or Special Envoy with the rank
of Ambassador if--
(1) the President nominates the person so designated to
that rank and status; and
(2) the Senate confirms such person to such rank and
status.
(g) Arctic Region Security Policy.--The Bureau of European and
Eurasian Affairs shall be the lead bureau for developing and
implementing the United States' Arctic Region Security Policy, in
coordination with the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental
and Scientific Affairs, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs,
embassies, other regional bureaus, and relevant offices to advance
United States national security interests, including through conflict
prevention efforts, security assistance, humanitarian disaster response
and prevention, and economic and other relevant assistance programs.
The Arctic Region Security Policy shall assess, develop, budget for,
and implement plans, policies, and actions--
(1) to bolster the diplomatic presence of the United States
in Arctic nations, including through enhancements to diplomatic
missions and facilities, participation in regional and
bilateral dialogues related to Arctic security, and
coordination of United States initiatives and assistance
programs across agencies to protect the national security of
the United States and its allies and partners;
(2) to enhance the resilience capacities of Arctic nations
to the effects of environmental change and increased civilian
and military activity from Arctic nations and other nations
that may result from increased accessibility of the Arctic
Region;
(3) to assess specific added risks to the Arctic Region and
Arctic nations that--
(A) are vulnerable to the changing Arctic
environment; and
(B) are strategically significant to the United
States;
(4) to coordinate the integration of environmental change
and national security risk and vulnerability assessments into
the decision making process on foreign assistance awards to
Arctic nations;
(5) to advance principles of good governance by encouraging
and cooperating with Arctic nations on collaborative
approaches--
(A) to responsibly manage natural resources in the
Arctic Region;
(B) to share the burden of ensuring maritime safety
in the Arctic Region;
(C) to prevent the escalation of security tensions
by mitigating against the militarization of the Arctic
Region;
(D) to develop mutually agreed upon multilateral
policies among Arctic nations on the management of
maritime transit routes through the Arctic Region and
work cooperatively on the transit policies for access
to and transit in the Arctic Region by non-Arctic
nations; and
(E) to facilitate the development of Arctic Region
Security Action Plans to ensure stability and public
safety in disaster situations in a humane and
responsible fashion; and
(6) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, survivability,
and resiliency of United States interests and nondefense assets
in the Arctic Region.
PART VII--OCEANIA
SEC. 291. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES ENGAGEMENT IN OCEANIA.
It shall be the policy of the United States--
(1) to elevate the countries of Oceania as a strategic
national security and economic priority of the United States
Government;
(2) to promote civil society, the rule of law, and
democratic governance across Oceania as part of a free and open
Indo-Pacific region;
(3) to broaden and deepen relationships with the Freely
Associated States of the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the
Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia
through robust defense, diplomatic, economic, and development
exchanges that promote the goals of individual states and the
entire region;
(4) to work with the governments of Australia, New Zealand,
and Japan to advance shared alliance goals of the Oceania
region concerning health, environmental protection, disaster
resilience and preparedness, illegal, unreported and
unregulated fishing, maritime security, and economic
development;
(5) to participate, wherever possible and appropriate, in
existing regional organizations and international structures to
promote the national security and economic goals of the United
States and countries of the Oceania region;
(6) to invest in a whole-of-government United States
strategy that will enhance youth engagement and advance long-
term growth and development throughout the region, especially
as it relates to protecting marine resources that are critical
to livelihoods and strengthening the resilience of the
countries of the Oceania region against current and future
threats resulting from extreme weather and severe changes in
the environment;
(7) to deter and combat acts of malign foreign influence
and corruption aimed at undermining the political,
environmental, social, and economic stability of the people and
governments of the countries of Oceania;
(8) to improve the local capacity of the countries of
Oceania to address public health challenges and improve global
health security;
(9) to help the countries of Oceania access market-based
private sector investments that adhere to best practices
regarding transparency, debt sustainability, and environmental
and social safeguards as an alternative to state-directed
investments by authoritarian governments;
(10) to ensure the people and communities of Oceania remain
safe from the risks of old and degrading munitions hazards and
other debris that threaten health and livelihoods; and
(11) to work cooperatively with all governments in Oceania
to promote the dignified return of the remains of members of
the United States Armed Forces that are missing in action from
previous conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region.
SEC. 292. OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.
(a) Oceania Strategic Roadmap.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a strategic roadmap for
strengthening United States engagement with the countries of Oceania,
including an analysis of opportunities to cooperate with Australia, New
Zealand, and Japan, to address shared concerns and promote shared goals
in pursuit of security and resiliency in the countries of Oceania.
(b) Elements.--The strategic roadmap required by subsection (a)
shall include the following:
(1) A description of United States regional goals and
concerns with respect to Oceania and increasing engagement with
the countries of Oceania.
(2) An assessment, based on paragraph (1), of United States
regional goals and concerns that are shared by Australia, New
Zealand, and Japan, including a review of issues related to
anticorruption, maritime and other security issues,
environmental protection, fisheries management, economic growth
and development, and disaster resilience and preparedness.
(3) A review of ongoing programs and initiatives by the
governments of the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and
Japan in pursuit of those shared regional goals and concerns,
including with respect to the issues described in paragraph
(1).
(4) A review of ongoing programs and initiatives by
regional organizations and other related intergovernmental
structures aimed at addressing the issues described in
paragraph (1).
(5) A plan for aligning United States programs and
resources in pursuit of those shared regional goals and
concerns, as appropriate.
(6) Recommendations for additional United States
authorities, personnel, programs, or resources necessary to
execute the strategic roadmap.
(7) Any other elements the Secretary considers appropriate.
TITLE III--INVESTING IN OUR VALUES
SEC. 301. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN
HONG KONG.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 for the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the Department of State to
promote democracy in Hong Kong.
(b) Administration.--The Secretary of State shall designate an
office with the Department of State to administer and coordinate the
provision of such funds described in subsection (a) within the
Department of State and across the United States Government.
SEC. 302. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO FORCED LABOR IN THE
XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.
(a) In General.--Section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy
Act of 2020 (Public Law 116-145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subparagraphs (E) as subparagraph (F);
and
(2) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the following:
``(E) Serious human rights abuses in connection
with forced labor.''.
(b) Effective Date; Applicability.--The amendment made by
subsection (a)--
(1) takes effect on the date of the enactment of this Act;
and
(2) applies with respect to the first report required by
section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020
submitted after such date of enactment.
SEC. 303. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SYSTEMATIC RAPE,
COERCIVE ABORTION, FORCED STERILIZATION, OR INVOLUNTARY
CONTRACEPTIVE IMPLANTATION IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR
AUTONOMOUS REGION.
(a) In General.--Section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy
Act of 2020 (Public Law 116-145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note), as amended by
section 302, is further amended--
(1) by redesignating subparagraphs (F) as subparagraph (G);
and
(2) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the following:
``(F) Systematic rape, coercive abortion, forced
sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive
implantation policies and practices.''.
(b) Effective Date; Applicability.--The amendment made by
subsection (a)--
(1) takes effect on the date of the enactment of this Act;
and
(2) applies with respect to the first report required by
section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020
submitted after such date of enactment.
TITLE IV--INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT
SEC. 401. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE PRC'S INDUSTRIAL
POLICY.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The People's Republic of China, at the direction of the
Chinese Communist Party, is advancing an ecosystem of
anticompetitive economic and industrial policies that--
(A) distort global markets;
(B) limit innovation;
(C) unfairly advantage PRC firms at the expense of
the United States and other foreign firms; and
(D) unfairly and harmfully prejudice consumer
choice.
(2) Of the extensive and systemic economic and industrial
policies pursued by the PRC, the mass subsidization of Chinese
firms, intellectual property theft, and forced technology
transfer are among the most damaging to the global economy.
(3) Through regulatory interventions and direct financial
subsidies, the CCP, for the purposes of advancing national
political and economic objectives, directs, coerces, and
influences in anti-competitive ways the commercial activities
of firms that are directed, financed, influenced, or otherwise
controlled by the state, including state-owned enterprises, and
ostensibly independent and private Chinese companies, such as
technology firms in strategic sectors.
(4) The PRC Government, at the national and subnational
levels, grants special privileges or status to certain PRC
firms in key sectors designated as strategic, such as
telecommunications, oil, power, aviation, banking, and
semiconductors. Enterprises receive special state preferences
in the form of favorable loans, tax exemptions, and
preferential land access from the CCP.
(5) The subsidization of PRC companies, as described in
paragraphs (3) and (4)--
(A) enables these companies to sell goods below
market prices, allowing them to outbid and crowd out
market-based competitors and thereby pursue global
dominance of key sectors;
(B) distorts the global market economy by
undermining longstanding and generally accepted market-
based principles of fair competition, leading to
barriers to entry and forced exit from the market for
foreign or private firms, not only in the PRC, but in
markets around the world;
(C) creates government-sponsored or supported de
facto monopolies, cartels, and other anti-market
arrangements in key sectors, limiting or removing
opportunities for other firms; and
(D) leads to, as a result of the issues described
in paragraphs (A) through (C), declines in profits and
revenue needed by foreign and private firms for
research and development.
(6) The CCP incentivizes and empowers Chinese actors to
steal critical technologies and trade secrets from private and
foreign competitors operating in the PRC and around the world,
particularly in areas that the CCP has identified as critical
to advancing PRC objectives. The PRC, as directed by the CCP,
also continues to implement anti-competitive regulations,
policies, and practices that coerce the handover of technology
and other propriety or sensitive data from foreign enterprises
to domestic firms in exchange for access to the PRC market.
(7) Companies in the United States and in foreign countries
compete with state-subsidized PRC companies that enjoy the
protection and power of the state in third-country markets
around the world. The advantages granted to PRC firms, combined
with significant restrictions to accessing the PRC market
itself, severely hamper the ability of United States and
foreign firms to compete, innovate, and pursue the provision of
best value to customers. The result is an unbalanced playing
field. Such an unsustainable course, if not checked, will over
time lead to depressed competition around the world, reduced
opportunity, and harm to both producers and consumers.
(8) As stated in the United States Trade Representative's
investigation of the PRC's trade practices under section 301 of
the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2411), conducted in March
2018, ``When U.S. companies are deprived of fair returns on
their investment in IP, they are unable to achieve the growth
necessary to reinvest in innovation. In this sense, China's
technology transfer regime directly burdens the innovation
ecosystem that is an engine of economic growth in the United
States and similarly-situated economies.''.
(9) In addition to forced technology described in this
subsection, the United States Trade Representative's
investigation of the PRC under section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974 (19 U.S.C. 2411) also identified requirements that foreign
firms license products at less than market value, government-
directed and government-subsidized acquisition of sensitive
technology for strategic purposes, and cyber theft as other key
PRC technology and industrial policies that are unreasonable
and discriminatory. These policies place at risk United States
intellectual property rights, innovation and technological
development, and jobs in dozens of industries.
(10) Other elements of the PRC's ecosystem of industrial
policies that harm innovation and distort global markets
include--
(A) advancement of policies that encourage local
production over imports;
(B) continuation of policies that favor unique
technical standards in use by Chinese firms rather than
globally accepted standards, which often force foreign
firms to alter their products and manufacturing chains
to compete;
(C) requirements that foreign companies disclose
proprietary information to qualify for the adoption of
their standards for use in the PRC domestic market; and
(D) maintenance of closed procurement processes,
which limit participation by foreign firms, including
by setting terms that require such firms to use
domestic suppliers, transfer know-how to firms in the
PRC, and disclose proprietary information.
(11) The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and associated
industry-specific efforts under this initiative, such as the
Digital Silk Road, are key vectors to advance the PRC's
mercantilist policies and practices globally. The resulting
challenges do not only affect United States firms. As the
European Chamber of Commerce reported in a January 2020 report,
the combination of concessional lending to Chinese state-owned
enterprises, nontransparent procurement and bidding processes,
closed digital standards, and other factors severely limit
European and other participation in BRI and make ``competition
[with Chinese companies] in third-country markets extremely
challenging''. This underscores a key objective of BRI, which
is to ensure the reliance of infrastructure, digital
technologies, and other important goods on PRC supply chains
and technical standards.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the challenges presented by a nonmarket economy like
the PRC's economy, which has captured such a large share of
global economic exchange, are in many ways unprecedented and
require sufficiently elevated and sustained long-term focus and
engagement;
(2) in order to truly address the most detrimental aspects
of CCP-directed mercantilist economic strategy, the United
States must adopt policies that--
(A) expose the full scope and scale of intellectual
property theft and mass subsidization of Chinese firms,
and the resulting harm to the United States, foreign
markets, and the global economy;
(B) ensure that PRC companies face costs and
consequences for anticompetitive behavior;
(C) provide options for affected United States
persons to address and respond to unreasonable and
discriminatory CCP-directed industrial policies; and
(D) strengthen the protection of critical
technology and sensitive data, while still fostering an
environment that provides incentives for innovation and
competition;
(3) the United States must work with its allies and
partners through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization, and other
venues and fora--
(A) to reinforce long-standing generally accepted
principles of fair competition and market behavior and
address the PRC's anticompetitive economic and
industrial policies that undermine decades of global
growth and innovation;
(B) to ensure that the PRC is not granted the same
treatment as that of a free-market economy until it
ceases the implementation of laws, regulations,
policies, and practices that provide unfair advantage
on PRC firms in furtherance of national objectives and
impose unreasonable, discriminatory, and illegal
burdens on market-based international commerce; and
(C) to align policies with respect to curbing
state-directed subsidization of the private sector,
such as advocating for global rules related to
transparency and adherence to notification
requirements, including through the efforts currently
being advanced by the United States, Japan, and the
European Union; and
(4) the United States and its allies and partners must
collaborate to provide incentives to their respective companies
to cooperate in areas such as--
(A) advocating for protection of intellectual
property rights in markets around the world;
(B) fostering open technical standards; and
(C) increasing joint investments in overseas
markets.
SEC. 402. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VIOLATORS LIST.
(a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than annually
thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary
of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and the Director
of National Intelligence, shall create a list (referred to in this
section as the ``intellectual property violators list''), which
identifies all state-owned enterprises that have benefitted from--
(1) a significant act or series of acts of intellectual
property theft that subjected a United States economic sector
or particular company incorporated in the United States to
harm; or
(2) an act or government policy of involuntary or coerced
technology transfer of intellectual property ultimately owned
by a company incorporated in the United States.
(b) Rules for Identification.--To determine whether there is a
credible basis for determining that a company should be included on the
intellectual property violators list, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade
Representative, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall
consider--
(1) any finding by a United States court that the company
has violated relevant United States laws intended to protect
intellectual property rights; or
(2) substantial and credible information received from any
entity described in subsection (c) or other interested persons.
(c) Consultation.--In carrying out this section, the Secretary of
State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the United
States Trade Representative, and the Director of National Intelligence,
may consult, as necessary and appropriate, with--
(1) other Federal agencies, including independent agencies;
(2) the private sector; and
(3) civil society organizations with relevant expertise.
(d) Report.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall publish, in
the Federal Register, an annual report that--
(A) lists the companies engaged in the activities
described in subsection (a)(1); and
(B) describes the circumstances surrounding actions
described in subsection (a)(2), including any role of
the Government of the PRC; and
(C) assesses, to the extent practicable, the
economic advantage derived by the companies engaged in
the activities described in subsection (a)(1).
(2) Form.--The report published under paragraph (1) shall
be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.
(e) Declassification and Release.--The Director of National
Intelligence may authorize the declassification of information, as
appropriate, to inform the contents of the report published pursuant to
subsection (d).
(f) Requirement To Protect Business-Confidential Information.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State and the heads of
all other Federal agencies involved in the production of the
intellectual property violators list shall protect from
disclosure any proprietary information submitted by a private
sector participant and marked as business-confidential
information, unless the party submitting the confidential
business information--
(A) had notice, at the time of submission, that
such information would be released by the Secretary; or
(B) subsequently consents to the release of such
information.
(2) Nonconfidential version of report.--If confidential
business information is provided by a private sector
participant, a nonconfidential version of the report under
subsection (d) shall be published in the Federal Register that
summarizes or deletes, if necessary, the confidential business
information.
(3) Treatment as trade secrets.--Proprietary information
submitted by a private party under this section--
(A) shall be considered to be trade secrets and
commercial or financial information (as defined under
section 552(b)(4) of title 5, United States Code); and
(B) shall be exempt from disclosure without the
express approval of the private party.
SEC. 403. GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA SUBSIDIES LIST.
(a) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State,
in coordination with the United States Trade Representative and the
Secretary of Commerce, shall publish an unclassified report in the
Federal Register that identifies--
(1) subsidies provided by the Government of the PRC to
enterprises in the PRC; and
(2) discriminatory treatment favoring enterprises in the
PRC over foreign market participants.
(b) Subsidies and Discriminatory Treatment Described.--In compiling
the report under subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall
consider--
(1) regulatory and other policies enacted or promoted by
the Government of the PRC that--
(A) discriminate in favor of enterprises in the PRC
at the expense of foreign market participants;
(B) shield centrally administered, state-owned
enterprises from competition; or
(C) otherwise suppress market-based competition;
(2) financial subsidies, including favorable lending terms,
from or promoted by the Government of the PRC or centrally
administered, state-owned enterprises that materially benefit
PRC enterprises over foreign market participants in
contravention of generally accepted market principles; and
(3) any subsidy that meets the definition of subsidy under
article 1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures referred to in section 101(d)(12) of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(12)).''.
(c) Consultation.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Secretary of Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, may,
as necessary and appropriate, consult with--
(1) other Federal agencies, including independent agencies;
(2) the private sector; and
(3) civil society organizations with relevant expertise.
SEC. 404. COUNTERING FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Attorney General, shall offer to provide technical assistance to
establish legislative and regulatory frameworks to combat the bribery
of foreign public officials consistent with the principles of the OECD
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions to the governments of countries--
(1) that are partners of the United States;
(2) that have demonstrated a will to combat foreign corrupt
practices responsibly; and
(3) for which technical assistance will have the greatest
opportunity to achieve measureable results.
(b) Strategy Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a strategy
for carrying out the activities described in subsections (a) to the
appropriate congressional committees.
(c) Coordination.--In formulating the strategy described in
subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall coordinate with the
Attorney General.
(d) Semiannual Briefing Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter for
five years, the Secretary of State shall provide a briefing regarding
the activities described in subsection (a) and the strategy submitted
under subsection (b) to the appropriate congressional committees.
SEC. 405. DEBT RELIEF FOR COUNTRIES ELIGIBLE FOR ASSISTANCE FROM THE
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION.
(a) Policy Statement.--It is the policy of the United States to
coordinate with the international community to provide debt relief for
debt that is held by countries eligible for assistance from the
International Development Association that request forbearance to
respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.
(b) Debt Relief.--The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation
with the Secretary of State, shall engage with international financial
institutions and other bilateral official creditors to advance policy
discussions on restructuring, rescheduling, or canceling the sovereign
debt of countries eligible for assistance from the International
Development Association, as necessary, to respond to the COVID-19
pandemic.
(c) Reporting Requirement.--Not later than 45 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter until the
end of the COVID-19 pandemic, as determined by the World Health
Organization, or until two years after the date of the enactment of
this Act, whichever is earlier, the Secretary of the Treasury, in
coordination with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the
committees specified in subsection (d) a report that describes--
(1) actions that have been taken to advance debt relief for
countries eligible for assistance from the International
Development Association that request forbearance to respond to
the COVID-19 pandemic in coordination with international
financial institutions, the Group of 7 (G7), the Group of 20
(G20), Paris Club members, and the Institute of International
Finance;
(2) mechanisms that have been utilized and mechanisms that
are under consideration to provide the debt relief described in
paragraph (1);
(3) any United States policy concerns regarding debt relief
to specific countries;
(4) the balance and status of repayments on all loans from
the People's Republic of China to countries eligible for
assistance from the International Development Association,
including--
(A) loans provided as part of the Belt and Road
Initiative of the People's Republic of China;
(B) loans made by the Export-Import Bank of China;
(C) loans made by the China Development Bank; and
(D) loans made by the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank; and
(5) the transparency measures established or proposed to
ensure that funds saved through the debt relief described in
paragraph (1) will be used for activities--
(A) that respond to the health, economic, and
social consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic; and
(B) that are consistent with the interests and
values of the United States.
(d) Committees Specified.--The committees specified in this
subsection are--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Appropriations, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Appropriations, and the Committee on Financial Services of the
House of Representatives.
SEC. 406. REPORT ON MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA
EXPLOITS HONG KONG TO CIRCUMVENT UNITED STATES LAWS AND
PROTECTIONS.
Title III of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (22
U.S.C. 5731 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 303. REPORT ON MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF
CHINA EXPLOITS HONG KONG TO CIRCUMVENT UNITED STATES LAWS
AND PROTECTIONS.
``(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this section, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report on the manner and extent
to which the Government of China uses the status of Hong Kong to
circumvent the laws and protections of the United States.
``(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall
include the following:
``(1) In consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National
Intelligence--
``(A) an assessment of how the Government of China
uses Hong Kong to circumvent United States export
controls; and
``(B) a list of all significant incidents in which
the Government of China used Hong Kong to circumvent
such controls during the reporting period.
``(2) In consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury
and the Secretary of Commerce--
``(A) an assessment of how the Government of China
uses Hong Kong to circumvent duties on merchandise
exported to the United States from the People's
Republic of China; and
``(B) a list of all significant incidents in which
the Government of China used Hong Kong to circumvent
such duties during the reporting period.
``(3) In consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury,
the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of
National Intelligence--
``(A) an assessment of how the Government of China
uses Hong Kong to circumvent sanctions imposed by the
United States or pursuant to multilateral regimes; and
``(B) a list of all significant incidents in which
the Government of China used Hong Kong to circumvent
such sanctions during the reporting period.
``(4) In consultation with the Secretary of Homeland
Security and the Director of National Intelligence, an
assessment of how the Government of China uses formal or
informal means to extradite or coercively move individuals,
including United States persons, from Hong Kong to the People's
Republic of China.
``(5) In consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the
Director of National Intelligence, and the Director of Homeland
Security--
``(A) an assessment of how the intelligence,
security, and law enforcement agencies of the
Government of China, including the Ministry of State
Security, the Ministry of Public Security, and the
People's Armed Police, use the Hong Kong Security
Bureau and other security agencies in Hong Kong to
conduct espionage on foreign nationals, including
United States persons, conduct influence operations, or
violate civil liberties guaranteed under the laws of
Hong Kong; and
``(B) a list of all significant incidents of such
espionage, influence operations, or violations of civil
liberties during the reporting period.
``(c) Form of Report; Availability.--
``(1) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
index.
``(2) Availability.--The unclassified portion of the report
required by subsection (a) shall be posted on a publicly
available internet website of the Department of State.
``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
`appropriate congressional committees' means--
``(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the
Committee on Finance, and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate; and
``(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
Committee on Financial Services, the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Ways
and Means of the House of Representatives.
``(2) Foreign national.--The term `foreign national' means
a person that is neither--
``(A) an individual who is a citizen or national of
the People's Republic of China; or
``(B) an entity organized under the laws of the
People's Republic of China or of a jurisdiction within
the People's Republic of China.
``(3) Reporting period.--The term `reporting period' means
the 5-year period preceding submission of the report required
by subsection (a).
``(4) United states person.--The term `United States
person' means--
``(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence to the United States;
or
``(B) an entity organized under the laws of the
United States or of any jurisdiction within the United
States, including a foreign branch of such an
entity.''.
SEC. 407. ANNUAL REVIEW ON THE PRESENCE OF CHINESE COMPANIES IN UNITED
STATES CAPITAL MARKETS.
(a) Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In this section, the term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of
the Senate;
(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives;
(5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives; and
(6) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of
Representatives.
(b) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the
following 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with
the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of the
Treasury, shall submit an unclassified report to the
appropriate committees of Congress that describes the risks
posed to the United States by the presence in United States
capital markets of companies incorporated in the PRC.
(2) Matters to be included.--The report required under
paragraph (1) shall--
(A) identify companies incorporated in the PRC
that--
(i) are listed or traded on one or several
stock exchanges within the United States,
including over-the-counter market and ``A
Shares'' added to indexes and exchange-traded
funds out of mainland exchanges in the PRC; and
(ii) based on the factors for consideration
described in paragraph (3), have knowingly and
materially contributed to--
(I) activities that undermine
United States national security;
(II) serious abuses of
internationally recognized human
rights; or
(III) a substantially increased
financial risk exposure for United
States-based investors;
(B) describe the activities of the companies
identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), and their
implications for the United States; and
(C) develop policy recommendations for the United
States Government, State governments, United States
financial institutions, United States equity and debt
exchanges, and other relevant stakeholders to address
the risks posed by the presence in United States
capital markets of the companies identified pursuant to
subparagraph (A).
(3) Factors for consideration.--In completing the report
under paragraph (1), the President shall consider whether a
company identified pursuant to paragraph (2)(A)--
(A) has materially contributed to the development
or manufacture, or sold or facilitated procurement by
the PLA, of lethal military equipment or component
parts of such equipment;
(B) has contributed to the construction and
militarization of features in the South China Sea;
(C) has been sanctioned by the United States or has
been determined to have conducted business with
sanctioned entities;
(D) has engaged in an act or a series of acts of
intellectual property theft;
(E) has engaged in corporate or economic espionage;
(F) has contributed to the proliferation of nuclear
or missile technology in violation of United Nations
Security Council resolutions or United States
sanctions;
(G) has contributed to the repression of religious
and ethnic minorities within the PRC, including in
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or Tibet Autonomous
Region;
(H) has contributed to the development of
technologies that enable censorship directed or
directly supported by the Government of the PRC;
(I) has failed to comply fully with Federal
securities laws (including required audits by the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board) and
``material risk'' disclosure requirements of the
Securities and Exchange Commission; or
(J) has contributed to other activities or behavior
determined to be relevant by the President.
(c) Report Form.--The report required under subsection (b)(1) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(d) Publication.--The unclassified portion of the report under
subsection (b)(1) shall be made accessible to the public online through
relevant United States Government websites.
TITLE V--ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY
SEC. 501. FINDINGS ON STRATEGIC SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States and the PRC have a shared interest in
strategic security through enforceable arms control and non-
proliferation agreements.
(2) The United States has long pursued and continues to
seek effective, verifiable, and enforceable arms control and
non-proliferation agreements that support United States and
allied security by--
(A) controlling the spread of nuclear materials and
technology;
(B) placing limits on the production, stockpiling,
and deployment of nuclear weapons;
(C) decreasing misperception and miscalculation;
and
(D) avoiding destabilizing nuclear arms
competition.
(3) In May 2019, Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency Lieutenant General Robert Ashley stated, ``China is
likely to at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile in
the course of implementing the most rapid expansion and
diversification of its nuclear arsenal in China's history.''.
The PLA is building a full triad of modernized fixed and mobile
ground-based launchers and new capabilities for nuclear-armed
bombers and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
(4) In June 2020, the Department of State raised concerns
in its annual ``Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments''
report to Congress that the PRC is not complying with the
``zero-yield'' nuclear testing ban and accused the PRC of
``blocking the flow of data from the monitoring stations'' in
China.
(5) The Department of Defense 2020 Report on Military and
Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China
states that China ``intends to increase peacetime readiness of
its nuclear forces by moving to a launch on warning posture
with an expanded silo-based force''.
(6) The Department of Defense report also states that, over
the next decade, China's nuclear stockpile--currently estimated
in the low 200s--is projected to least double in size as China
expands and modernizes its nuclear force.
(7) The PRC is conducting research on its first potential
early warning radar, with technical cooperation from Russia.
This radar could indicate that the PRC is moving to a launch-on
warning posture.
(8) The PRC plans to use its increasingly capable space,
cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities against United
States early warning systems and critical infrastructure in a
crisis scenario. This poses great risk to strategic security,
as it could lead to inadvertent escalation.
(9) The PRC's nuclear expansion comes as a part of a
massive modernization of the PLA which, combined with the PLA's
aggressive actions, has increasingly destabilized the Indo-
Pacific region.
(10) The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), which was elevated in
2015 to become a separate branch within the PLA, has formed 11
new missile brigades since May 2017, some of which are capable
of both conventional and nuclear strikes. Unlike the United
States, which separates its conventional strike and nuclear
capabilities, the PLARF appears to not only co-locate
conventional and nuclear forces, including dual-use missiles
like the DF-26, but to task the same unit with both nuclear and
conventional missions. Such intermingling could lead to
inadvertent escalation in a crisis. The United States Defense
Intelligence Agency determined in March 2020 that the PLA
tested more ballistic missiles than the rest of the world
combined in 2019.
(11) A January 2021 report from the Institute for Defense
Analysis found that many United States and international
observers viewed China's no first-use policy with skepticism,
especially in the wake of the expansion and modernization of
its nuclear capabilities.
(12) The long-planned United States nuclear modernization
program will not increase the United States nuclear weapons
stockpile, predates China's conventional military and nuclear
expansion, and is not an arms race against China.
(13) The United States extended nuclear deterrence--
(A) provides critical strategic security around the
world;
(B) is an essential element of United States
military alliances; and
(C) serves a vital non-proliferation function.
(14) As a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July
1, 1968, the PRC is obligated under Article Six of the treaty
to pursue arms control negotiations in good faith.
(15) The United States has, on numerous occasions, called
on the PRC to participate in strategic arms control
negotiations, but the PRC has thus far declined.
(16) The Governments of Poland, Slovenia, Denmark, Norway,
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, the Netherlands, Romania, Austria,
and Albania, as well as the Deputy Secretary General of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, have all encouraged the PRC
to join arms control discussions.
SEC. 502. COOPERATION ON A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DIALOGUE.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to pursue, in coordination with United States allies,
arms control negotiations and sustained and regular engagement
with the PRC--
(A) to enhance understanding of each other's
respective nuclear policies, doctrine, and
capabilities;
(B) to improve transparency; and
(C) to help manage the risks of miscalculation and
misperception;
(2) to formulate a strategy to engage the Government of
China on relevant bilateral issues that lays the groundwork for
bringing the People's Republic of China into an arms control
framework, including--
(A) fostering bilateral dialogue on arms control
leading to the convening of bilateral strategic
security talks;
(B) negotiating norms for outer space;
(C) developing pre-launch notification regimes
aimed at reducing nuclear miscalculation; and
(D) expanding lines of communication between both
governments for the purposes of reducing the risks of
conventional war and increasing transparency;
(3) to pursue relevant capabilities in coordination with
our allies and partners to ensure the security of United States
and allied interests in the face of the PRC's military
modernization and expansion, including--
(A) ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles;
(B) integrated air and missile defense;
(C) hypersonic missiles;
(D) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
(E) space-based capabilities;
(F) cyber capabilities; and
(G) command, control, and communications;
(4) to maintain sufficient force structure, posture, and
capabilities to provide extended nuclear deterrence to United
States allies and partners;
(5) to maintain appropriate missile defense capabilities to
protect threats to the United States homeland and our forces
across the theater from rogue intercontinental ballistic
missiles from the Indo-Pacific region; and
(6) to ensure that the United States declaratory policy
reflects the requirements of extended deterrence, to both
assure allies and to preserve its non-proliferation benefits.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) in the midst of growing competition between the United
States and the PRC, it is in the interest of both nations to
cooperate in reducing risks of conventional and nuclear
escalation;
(2) a physical, cyber, electronic, or any other PLA attack
on United States early warning satellites, other portions of
the nuclear command and control enterprise, or critical
infrastructure poses a high risk to inadvertent but rapid
escalation;
(3) the United States and its allies should promote
international norms on military operations in space, the
employment of cyber capabilities, and the military use of
artificial intelligence, as an element of risk reduction
regarding nuclear command and control; and
(4) United States allies and partners should share the
burden of promoting and protecting such norms by voting against
the PRC's proposals regarding the weaponization of space,
highlighting unsafe behavior by the PRC that violates
international norms, such as in rendezvous and proximity
operations, and promoting responsible behavior in space and all
other domains.
SEC. 503. REPORT ON UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO ENGAGE THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON NUCLEAR ISSUES AND BALLISTIC MISSILE
ISSUES.
(a) Report on the Future of United States-China Arms Control.--Not
later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and
the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a report, and if necessary a separate classified annex, that
examines the approaches and strategic effects of engaging the
Government of China on arms control and risk reduction, including--
(1) areas of potential dialogue between the Governments of
the United States and the People's Republic of China, including
on ballistic, hypersonic glide, and cruise missiles,
conventional forces, nuclear, space, and cyberspace issues, as
well as other new strategic domains, which could reduce the
likelihood of war, limit escalation if a conflict were to
occur, and constrain a destabilizing arms race in the Indo-
Pacific;
(2) how the United States Government can incentivize the
Government of China to engage in a constructive arms control
dialogue;
(3) identifying strategic military capabilities of the
People's Republic of China that the United States Government is
most concerned about and how limiting these capabilities may
benefit United States and allied security interests;
(4) mechanisms to avoid, manage, or control nuclear,
conventional, and unconventional military escalation between
the United States and the People's Republic of China; and
(5) opportunities and methods to encourage transparency
from the People's Republic of China.
(b) Report on Arms Control Talks With the Russian Federation and
the People's Republic of China.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation
with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, shall submit
to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that describes--
(1) a concrete plan for arms control talks that includes
both the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation;
(2) if a trilateral arms control dialogue does not arise,
what alternative plans the Department of State envisages for
ensuring the security of the United States and its allies
security from Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons;
(3) effects on the credibility of United States extended
deterrence assurances to allies and partners if the United
States is faced with two nuclear-armed peer competitors and any
likely corresponding implications for regional security
architectures;
(4) efforts at engaging the People's Republic of China to
join arms control talks, whether on a bilateral or multilateral
basis; and
(5) the interest level of the Government of China in
joining arms control talks, whether on a bilateral or
multilateral basis.
(c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the
House of Representatives.
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